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Introduction
()lie of the most iml)ortaTll developments tat the nventieth century has been the move-
ment of humanity into space wilh machines and people. The underpinnings of |hal move-
men/--why il took file shape it did; whi(h individuals and organizations were involved;
what t_tctors drove a parlicular choice of scientific objectives and technoh)gies to he used;
and the political, econonlic, managerial, and international colltexts ill which tilt" events
of the space age tull()ltled--are all ilnportant ingredients of this epoch transit|tan tiom an
Earthbound Io a spacefaring people. This desire to understand the development of space-
tlighl ill the Untied Stales sparked lhis (tocunlentary hislory series.
The exlension of human aclivily into outer space has been accotnpanied by a high degree
of self-awareness of its hislorical significance. Few large-scale activilies have been as exlen-
sivt'ly chrtmicled st) closely 1o file lime they actually (>ecrured. Many of those who were
direcllv involved w('re tlUile conscitms that they were makhtg hislory, and they kepl full
r['cords of their ;tclivities. l$ecaus¢' tnost of the aclivity in ouler space was carried out under
lg<+vernlnent spons<)rship, il was acc<)mpanied by the doctunenlary record reqltired of
pt,blic illstitulions, and llmle has heen a spate ()t otTicial ;tnd privalely written hislories of
mt)sl tn;_j<)r aspecls t)l spac(' achieventent t<) dale. When mp h'aders considered wll,n
course of aclitm Io purstm in space, lheir deliherations and decisions (_tlen were (aretiHlv
pul (an Ihe rec()rtl. "[lleFe is, ;tct_),dingly, tat) lack of material ti)r Iht)se who ast)irc it) under-
sland lhe origins and ev()htli(m of U.S. space policies and 1)rograms.
This realily I()rms the rali()nalt' f()r Ihis series. Precisely I)ecause Ihere is s_t nntch hislori-
cal material availabh" on ,space matters, tile Nail,anal Aer, matnics and SI)ace
Athninislralion (NASA) decide(I in 1(.)88 that it would lae exlre,nely useful to have a selec-
liv(' ('r)lletli(m ()f many t)f the senlinal dt)ctnnents related It) Ihe ev()lulion of Ihe l, !.S. civil-
i;tn sl)ace program lhat was easily availat)le tt) scholars and the inlcresled puhlic. Whih"
rt'ct)t_nizing Ihal much sllac(' a('livily has taken place tm(lt'r lhe sptmst)rship of the
I)el)arlm('n! ()f l)eli'nse anti ()|her national security organizations, Ihe [!.S. private set'It)r,
and t)lher ('ounlries art)ulld Ill(: wt)rld, NASA teh that lhere would I)e lasting value in a col-
letIi()tl of (tt)('lmtt:nlarv lnalerial primarily ft)cused on the ew)lulion of tilt" U.S. govern-
lll('lll's civilian space pr()gram, most tat" which has been carried Oill under Ill(? agency's
auspices since 1958. As a rcstth, the NASA History Office c(mtracted with the Space Policy
lnstilule ()f (;corge Washington University's Elliott School tit hltcrnational Affairs to pre-
pare such a colleclitm. This is the third volume in the doctunentary history series, Ihree
ad(lili()nal ones delailing tarogvammatic developments with rest)eel It) space translaorla-
(ion, space sciente, and human spaceflight will follow.
The docunmnts collected during this research projecl were assembled front a diverse
number ()f both puhlic and private sources. A major reposiltlry ()| primary source materi-
als relativ(' lo Ihe hislory of the civil space program is the NASA tlistttrical Reference
(;olle(li(m o[ the NASA History Office, located at the agency's headquarters in
Washingltm, D.C. Pco.ject assistants combed this collect|tin [or the "cream" t)[ the weahh
of tnalerial housed there. Indeed, (me purpose of this strries from tile start was to cal)ture
sonte ()1 lht' highlights of the holdings at headquarters, tlistorical materials housed at the
olher NASA installali(ms, institnlit)ns of higher learning, and presidential libraries were
()lh('l St)lll't'es of (]OClllllelltS c(msidered for iflchlsion, as were papers in tile art-hives of
it_dividttals aud thins invt)lved in opening up space for ext)loralion.
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Copieso[morethan 2,500 docunlents ill their original Iorm collected during this project
(not just the dt)cuments selected |or inchtsion), as well as a database that provides a guide
to their contents, will be deposited in the NASA Historical Reference Collection. Atn)ther
complete set of project materials is locatcd at tile Space Policy Institutc at George
Washington University. These materials in their original t_arm are awtilablc |or use hy
researchers seeking additional inlbrmation ahout the evolution of the U.S. civilian space
program or wishing to consuh the documents reprinted herein in their original torm.
TIle docunlents selected for inclusion in this volume arc presented in three major chap-
ters, each covering a particular aspect of the utilization of space capahilities and the
uniqtte characteristics of the space environment. These chapters address: (1) commtmi-
eating via satellite; (2) observing the Earth fiom space tot practical purposes (Earth sci-
ence will be covered in a later volunle); and (3) the various ways in which space activities
have had econonlic inlpacts. Volume I in this series covered the amecedents It;, the U.S.
space program, as well as tile origins and evolution of U.S. space policy and _>I NASA as
an organizational institution. Vohtmc II addressed the relationship between the civilian
space program of the United Stales attd the space activities of other countries, the rela-
tionship between the U.S. civilian and national security space anti military efforts, attd
NASA's relationship with industry and academic institutions. As mentioned above, tuture
vt)lumes will cover space transportation, space science, and hunlan spacetlighl.
Each section in this vohune is introduced by an overview essay, prepared by individuals
particularly well-qttalitied to write on the topic. In the main, these essays arc intcnded to
introduce and complement the docmnents in the section and to place them in a clnono-
logical attd/or substantive context. Each essay contains references to tilt" docunlenls in
the section it introdttces, and many also contain references to docnmenLs in other sections
of tile collection. These introductory essays were the responsibility of their individual
authors, and the views and conclusions contained therein do not necessarily represent the
opinions of either George Washington University or NASA.
The docmnents included in each section were chosen by the project team in concert with
the essay writer from those assenlbled hy the research staf[ [br the overall project. The con-
tents of this vohune emphasize primary docuntents or long-out,if print essays or articles
and material fiom the private recollections ot +important actors in shaping space aft_tirs.
Key legislation attd policy statenlents are also included. The contents of this vohtme thus
do not comprise in themselves a comprehensive historical accotmt; they nmst be supple-
tnented by other sources, those both aheady available and to become awdlable in the
ftmue. Indeed, a few of the docttments inchtded in this collection are ilot colnplete; some
portions of them were still sttbject to security classificati<m as this volume went to print.
Each doctnnent is assigned its own number in terms of the chapter ill which it is placed.
As a result, the first docuntent in the third section of this vohtnle is designated "Documenl
llI-l." Each document is accompanied by a headnote setting out its contcxl att(l providing
a hackgrottud narrative. These headnotes also provide specific inforntation ah_mt people
and events discussed. We have avoided tile inclusiou of explanatory notes in the docu-
ments thentselves attd have confined such material to the headnotes.
xxii
Theeditorialmethodweadoptedfor publishingthesedocnmenlsseeksto preserve
spelling,grammar,paragraphing,anduseof languageasin theoriginal._ havesome-
limeschangedpunctuationwhereitenhancesreadability.Wehaveusedellipses("...") to
holewheresectionsofadoclllneDlhavenotbeenincluded in this publication, and we
have avoided including words and i)hrases that had been deleled in the original docu-
ment unless they conlrihute to an understanding of what was going on in the mind of lhe
writer in making the record. Marginal notations on the original documenls are inserted
into the lext of the <locuments in Brackets, each clearly marke<l as a |nargi||al comme||t.
When deletions to lhe original docnntenl have been made in the process of declassilica-
li<m, we have noled this with a parenthelical statement in brackels. Excepl insofar as ilh|s-
lralions and t]gllreS are necessary to understanding the text, lhose items have been
ore(fled fronl this I)rinled version. Page numbers in the original docunlenl are holed in
brackets inlernal lo l]tl" document lexl. Copies of all docnments in flleir original form,
however, are available tot research by anyone interested at the NASA I lislorv Of lice or lit('
Space Policy Inslilule ot George Washington Uniwwsity.
We recognize thai there arc ('ertain Io he qnite significant doctnnelllS h'ft otll of this con>
pilation. No lwo in<livi<hm]s would tolally agree on all documents to be inch|ded from the
more than 2,500 that we colh'cted, and surel}, we have not heen lotally s||ccessfi|l in local-
ing all |eleva|tl records./'ks a result, this documentary history (:an raise an (mined(ale qttes-
lion from its ||sers: Why were some documents included while others of seemingly e<lual
imporlance were on|tiled? There can never be a fully satislactory answer to lhis question.
Our own criteria tor choosing parlicttlar documents and omitting others resled on three
i||terrclaled taclors:
• Is the doct|xnenl lit(" hest available, most expressive, most represenlative |-etlection of
a particular event or developmenl important to the evolution of fir' space program?
Is the document not easily accessible cxcept in one or a few hwalions, or is it included
(for examl)le, in published compilations of presidential statements) in relkwence sources
that are widely available and thus not a candidate for inclusion in this collection?
• Is the doctnnent protected by copyright, security classification, or some other torm of
prol)rietary right anti thus unavailable tbr publication?
As general editor of this vohmw, I was uhimately responsible for the decisions about which
docmnenls to include and tor lhe accuracy of the headnoles accompanying them. It has
been an occasionally truslrating but consistently exciting experience to be involved with
lhis undertaking. My associates and I hope that those who consuh it in the future find our
eflorts worlhwhilc.
.J<:,hn M. l+ogstlon
Director
Space Policy Instilule
Elliou School of Inlermnional Allitirs
(;eorgc Washington University
+..
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Glossary
ABMA .............. Army Ballislic Missile Agency
ACI)A .............. Arms Conlrol and Disi_rmament Agency
AFB ................. ,Mr Force Base
AID ................. ,_gency tor International Development (Stale I)epartment)
ARPA ................ ,_,dvanced Research Projects Agency
ASTP ................ -\polh_-Soyuz Test Project
AS'CI" . .............. Application Syslem Verification and Test
ATS ................. ,_pplications Technology Satellite
AVIIRR ............. Advanced \i_ry I tigh Resohltion Radiometer
BSS ................ Broadcast Satellite Service
(;BD ................ Commerce Busine._s Daily
(;FR/C.F.R ........... Code of Federal Regulations
(_IA ................ Cenlral lnlelligence Agency
(',(IS(: .............. Committee on Satellite Communications
( :()SMI( : ............ Conq)tner Software Management lnlbrmation ( ;enter
(]SP ................ Cenu'r tot Space Policy
(:STI ............... Civil Space Technology Initiative
db/dB .............. l)ecibel
IIBS ................ l)irecl Broadcast Satellite
1)( ;I ................ l)ireclor of Central Intelligence
I)(:S ................ Data collection system
DI)R&E ............. llirector, I)eti'nse Research and Engineering
DI)T&E ............. Design, Development, Test and Engineering
I)MSP .............. I)eti.nse Meteorological Satellite Program
I)()( :/l)oC ........... l)epartmen! of Commerce
l)()i)/DoD .......... Deparlmenl of Defense
1)( )E/l)oF ........... l)eparlmem of Energy
1)( )l/Doi ............ l)eparlmenl of the Interior
El.\,' ................ Expendable Launch Vehicle
E()S ................ Earth Observing System or Electrophoresis Operations in Space
(program)
F()SAT . ............ Earth Observation Satellite Company
EPA ................ Environmental Protection Agency
FR()S .............. Earth Resources Observational Satellites (later Systems)
ERS ................ FaNh Resources Survey (program)
ERTS ............... Farlh Resources Technology Satellite (later known as l_andsat)
ESA ................ Em'opean Space Agency
ESSA ............... F,nvironmental Science Services Administration
ETM ............... Enhanced Thematic Mapper
EUMETSAT . ........ European Organisation for the Exploitalion of Memorological
Satellites
EVA ................ Extravehicular activity
FA() ................ Food and Agriculture Organization (U.N.)
F(:(: ................ Federal Communications Commission
FM ................. Frequency-modulation
FEI)I) .............. For Early Domestic Distribution
FSS ................ Fixed Satellite Service
H'E ................ Full-Time Equivalent
FY ................. Fiscal year
xxvii
GAO............... (.eneralAccountingOffice
GDP ................ (,ross Domestic Product
GE ................. General Electric
GHz ................ Gigahertz
GIS ................ Geographic Information System
GNP ............... Gross National Prnduct
GOES .............. Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
GPO ............... (,overnment Printing Office
GSP ................ Gross Space Product
(,WP ............... Gross Worldwide Product
HF ................. High frequency
HILLS ............... High-Resolution Infrared Sounder
HRMSI ............. High Resolution Multispectral Stereo hnager
I('US ............... Interim Communication Satellite Committee
IGI ................. Industrial Guest Investigator (agreement)
IPO ................ Integrated Program Office
IPOMS .............. International Polar Orbiting Meteorological Satellite (;roup
IR ................. Infiared
IRA(: ............... Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee
ITOS ............... hnproved TIROS Operational Satellite
ITU ................ International Telecommunications Union
JEA ............... .Joint Endeavor Agreement
JSC ............... .Johnson Space Center
KC ................. Kilocycle
KW/kW ............. Kilowatt
IA('IE .............. Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment
LCG ................ i,andsat Coordinating (,roup
LDC ................ Less Developed Country
LEO ................ Low Earth Orbit
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Chapter One
The History of Satellite
Communications
by Joseph N. Pelton
Although the idea of using artiticial Earth satellites to relay messages fi-(ml one point
on the Earth to an<)ther had been discussed in several places prior to 1945) most accounts
of the development of satellite comnnmications begin by discussing Arthur Clarke's land-
mark works on tile topic during that year. In two 1945 papers--one privately circulated
and one published in Wirele.ss World Clarke discussed the special characteristics of geo-
synchronous orbit that would enable three satellites in that orbit to provide global com-
tnunications. 2 It-I, !-2] Clarke noted that in an orbit of 22,300 miles above the Earth, the
vehwity of a satellite exactly matched the velocity of the Earth's surface as the planet rotat-
ed al)out its axis; thus tiom the Earth, a satellite would appear to remain in a fixed posi-
tion in the sky. In such an orbit, a satellite could "see" 40 percent of the equatorial platte.
(;larke noted the t)cnef]ts o[ sttch an orbital perspective, especially for telecomnltnlica-
tions, I)e(ause the ctnvaturt' o[ the Earth's surface and atmospheric interference placed
limits on ground-based lranstnissions. In addition, the use of satellites ill geosynchronotts
orbit would make the design ota ground antenna simpler in terms of tracking and point-
ing mechanisms.
For these insights, Arthur C. ('larke is frequently called the "Father of Satellite
Conmmnications," and there have been ongoing efforts to officially designate the geo-
synchronous orhit as the "Clarke Orbit." Ironically, however, while a visionary in many
respecls, Clarke did not tiwesee how quickly communications satellites would become a
reality. This is because he did not anticipate the invention of the transistor, which greatly
reduced the necessary weight of a communications satellite and dramatically increased its
reliability and lifetime. From the pre-transistor perspective of 1945, Clarke envisioned that
connntmicating via satellite would in effect require a space station--an orbital platform
weighing many tons with an on-board crew to replace burned-out vacuum tubes? And
while (;larkc may not have hcen totally prescient, he can be credited with identi ft_ng a line
ot technological development that bore fruit in less than twenty years.
l. l)elher! D. Smith, Communication via Staellite: A Vi._ion in Retrospect (Boston: A.W. S!jtholl, 1976),
pp. 15-19.
2. The more frequently cited of Clarke's semi-annual papers is Arthur C. Clarke, "Extra-Terrestrial
Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?," Wireless WorldS1 (October 1945): 305-(18. A May
25, 1945, lyp(!d paper abort! geosyn_ hronous satellites, "The Space Station: Its Radio Applications," was sent !o
IllelIIhels of Ihu British Interplanetm y _)ciely and other addressees some five IIIotlths hcf_lre the Inorc |_tlllOtlS
WiTeb,_s t¢bTId article. This earlit'r paper was finally published in Space[light 10 (March 3, 19G8): 85-_,6.
3. Personal intvrview by the authol with Arthur t;. Clarke, Sri Lanka, May 1984.
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The Early Years of Concept and Experimentation
(1945-1963)
In tile ttecade that fi)llowed Clarke's article, increasingly powerful rockets were devel-
oped, largely in tile context of the Cold War competition between the United Stales and
the Soviet Union. The lannch of Sputnik 1 tW the Soviets in October 1957 Itriggered a
nnnther of U.S. space initiatives. The creation of the National Aeronatttics and Space
Administration (NASA) from lhe National Advisory (]onlmillee for Aeroxtaulics (NACA)
and the surge of fiutding tor U.S. rocket programs, such as Vanguard, Thor, Atlas, and
Titan, were intntediate restdts. In the 1960 U.S. presidential election, the "Missile (;ap"
debates between John E Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon set the stage tor a strong U.S.
space program for the 1960s, perhaps regardless of the election's outcome.' One issue
under discussion at the tinte was whether space development would be ahnost exclusively
a result of government activities or whether private enterprise would play a significant role.
The creation of comntunications satellite research and development progrants within
NASA and the Department of Defense in the late 1950s and early 1960s prt)ved to be a
highly effective ineans of establishing U.S. capability in this field; however, these govern-
ntent eftorts were paralleled by private-sector communications satellite research attd
development activities. These commtnfications satellite initiatives caine at a key time in
terms of the overall developntent of international connnttnicatious. Anterican Telephone
attd Telegraph (AT&T) attd others kept private-enterprise interests alive with parallel
research and developntent efforts of their own.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a nuntber of new sttbntarine lelepltt)ne cables were
being laid across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. These new cables replaced outmoded
telegraph cables and stimulated the rapid growth of international telecommunications. The
leaders of NASA, aerospace manulZacturers, and telecommtmications organizations all rec-
ognized that high-capacity communications satellites cottld also sttpporl the rapid growth
of global communications. Only several years later did the idea enterge that contntunica-
tions satellites could also support regional or domestic telecontmnnications needs. '
Because of the U.S. lead in micro-electronics, the U.S. Signal Corps was able to launch
the world's first communications satellite on an Atlas rocket soon after Sputnik. The first
U.S. contn|unieations project was known as SCORE (Signal Communication by Orbital
Relay Equipment), a broadcast-only satellite latmched on December 18, 1958. SCORE
lasted only twelve days and cottld only send to Earth a pre-recorded message front
President Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Peace on earth, good will toward men. '_
The first artificial satellite that actually relayed a real-tinte voice ntessage from the
Earth to orbit and back was Echo 1, launched on August 12, 1960. The Echo progrant was
a successor to an International Geophysical Year effort to nteasnre the density of Hte
npper atmosphere by observing the orhit of a twelve-thor-diameter balloon-like satellite.
ht 1959John Pierce, an AT&T scientist anti one of the pioneers of the communications
4. See.John M. Logsdon, The Decision to (;o to theMoon: l_tqect Apollo and t/u',V_:tionallntere*t (( ;amhridge.
MA: MIT Press. 1970), and Walter A. McD_ugall .... 771etteaven._ and the Earth: A Political tfi_to O'oJ the Spate Age
(New York: Basic Books, 19X5), tot discttssinns of early U.S. space policy.
5. Joseph N. l'eltnn, Global Communications Satellite Policy,:Intel._at,Poltt:c_ and Fumtionah_m (Mr. Airy,
WA: Lomond Systems, 1974), pp. 44-102. The S_wiet Union with its vast size and northern latitudes had to tlst-
a highly elliptical orbit fi>r its communications satellites. This orbit reqttired less n-ockel power to rea<h trom
Soviet launch sites than did geosynchronnus orbit. The combination of internal need and ease of .rhilal access
led the Soviet Unioll tO initiate domestic c<,mmunications satellite service lllllfh SOOller than other c¢,tmtties.
6. Ibid., pp. 46--48.
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satt'llile field, suggested nsing thc larger l<)(l-lb<)t-diiuneter Echo satellite IO tesl transat-
lartlic radi<) comntunicati(ms. 11-31NASA aCCel)ted Pierce's stnggesli(>n, and lhe orl)ithlg
satellite was sltccessfttlly tlsed +is a passive reflector (that is, there were no eleclronic sys-
tents to amplify' the signal al)oard the satellite) of an Augnsl I_ inessagc liom New.Jersey
to France. (Similar experiments had been c<mdttcted earlier using the lqulh's Moon its a
passive reflector.)
Alth<_ttgh lhis and many other ('xl)eriments nsing the passive Echo l and l'_cho 2 salel-
rites (Echo 2 was launcht'd in +]anu,uy 1964) were successful, it+ the hue 1950s and carlv
1!)60s, industry and gov('rlltncnt alt('ntiort increasingly |()('tls(,([ <m active connntmicalions
sat('llilt's carrying <m-1)<mrd elcctr<)nics that receiw+d a signal ti<)tn the Earth, aml)lilied it,
and sent it I)ack to the Earth. Such satelliles had more predicr, d)h' _)rbits than passive satel-
lites; [i+wer were reqtfired t<+ create a commnnications nelw<wk; and signals r('layc'd
through actiw' satellites required less ¢'xpensive ground stations and had much high(+t +
Cal)acity. 7
"1"hi' lirst artiticial conmlunications satellite that foreshadowed lodav+s act+v(' satellite
tcchnol<_,_,, (tour+or IlL was desigtwd and ]annched l)y the U.S. military in October 1960.
]1 t_'altn¢'d solar and battery p<wcer, ;tit active antenmt for transtnisshm and recel)ti<)n, and
ele<+tr<+nic repealers Calml)le of frequency c,c>nversion from uf)link to <h)wMh+Jk signals.
l)esl)ile the te(:hnoh)gical gains Ihill (]Ollrier 1B represenled, if still had it (al)al)ility (:,f
only sixteen teh!lype ('hatlnc'ls. In shorl, it was little more than an C+Xl)(+rimental device.
Submarine cal)h's still ha<l 100 limes this capacity.
NASA, AT&T, and lit(" Dc_t)artment of Deti+nse, howevel, were by this time moving
ahead with Ireltlelld<)llS energy and quickly achieved imprt'ssivc results. ()n.July lO, 1962,
only a year and a half altcr (:<miler Ilk a (luantunl leap in Cal)ability was achi¢'ved with tilt"
latuwh o1" Telstar, ;u| AT&:l;designed and -buih exl+erimental satellite with sufficient
Cal)acity to relay a television sigual. Telstar was launched into a tneditun orbit with a
:")?()-mile i)erigee; at this orl)it, a nutnl)er of satellites (about twelve to I]fteen) would 1)e
required for an operational system. The success of the Telstar e×l;,eritnent immediately
changed the world's view of the potential of this new technoh)h_/, 1!-201 +Recognitiorl grew
lhal cotnmut+icatiotls satellites could have three to lout times the capacity of thell-(lnTelll
stll)ttlarill(' cables. Ahn<_sl overnight, their commercial viability was +l(lV+lll(ed froltl remote
to higldy likely. Quickly thereafter, on December 14, 1962, the NASA-fimded Relay I of
the Radio (]orporation of America (ReAl was launched into an orbit with a 660-mile
perigee, demonstrating many of the same features as Telstar but with a longer lil'etime in
<)rbit. The lechnical l_'asibility of active communications satellites ++'as thus clearly demon-
straled l)y tile sec<)nd half<ff 1962Y The development of these early communications salel-
tiles rel)resented the first steps t<:¢¢ard the practical use of space and began a del:,ate about
'_vhetlter such an enterprise should be public or private in nature.
Then, a satellite buih 1)y 1 hlghes Aircraft, developed with both company and NASA
t+nnding and lannched on l)ecember 14, 1963, demonstrated the final technical feature
required for commtmications satellites to become commercially viable--stable and con-
ti]m()us operation in geosynchronous orbit. Beginning in 1959, Hughes had I)een work-
7, .]_dm R. l'icrcc, 7he P,eginnin[4s o/ ._])ace Communications (San Francisco, CA: San Francim:o Press,
1':16_), p. I(.r.'h Arthur C. (3ark(', The Promiw of.b'pace (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. lO0-lOl: Smith,
(;ommun_catim_s vm Satellite, pp. 51-55.
8. It should be noted }tr+:xt, that t_,t!catlst! the detriment about Pr01c(t Tt!lstat wits produced in lht" st't-
mid hMtol 1962, it aplwav+ in t hronl)h+git al c+r<h'r aitCl +It)i:+ essay but is lt'l('i,vnc(+d i+tlt ()i (+l-fl('r within lht' <+ss;t't.+
AI,+() lit>It, thal the tt.li'rt'nct's to l)<)t umcntm 1-14, 1-22, and 1-26 are ttul el <)rtl<'r.
9. l,<',,nm+d.latti +, (JJmmuttication+ in ,_,pace (New "_brk: thtl_, Rt+inharl and Winston, 1966), p. 86; ()rrin
I"_ I)mtl_q,,JL, (:ommuni:alion+ iP_ ++,/)et++,(Nt'w _i,k: Itarper and Row, 1'960), it+ 151.
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ing on such a satellite, tirst with tile company's own timds and since 1961 nnder conlra(l
to NASA. [I-4, I-5] This satellite, Syncom 2 (Syncom 1 suffered a system tea|lure), was
f'ollowed hy a Syncom 3 mission that was even more successful in demonstrating the fea-
sibility of high-capacity telect)mmunicalions operations in geosynchronons orbit. "'
This lighlning-like development was paralleled by progress with military satellites, par-
ticularly the Lincoln Expevinlerttal Satellite (LES) series from IAncoln Laboratory, which
tested secure transponders li)r strategic communications froln the National (]()llllnan(l
Authority. Together, these accomplishments set the stage 12)r tile practical exploitation of
this exciting new technology.
The Creation of Comsat and INTELSAT (1962-1965)
The international civilian communications program sotm ew)lved loward a global net-
work of "stahilized" satellites in get)synchronotls orbits a tenth of the way to the Moon.
The civilian system began with an initial satellite over the Atlantic Ocean (19651, then the
Pacific Ocean obtained service (1967), and finally global coverage was ct)mpleted wilh
Indian Ocean service (19691, just as Arthur C. Clarke had envisioned it twenty-fi)ur years
earlier.
Although mr)st critical technical choices had been made by 1965, the issue t)f how to
inslitutitmalize the civilian communications satellite system was far tiom clear-cut or easi-
ly decided. Dul'ing 1961 all(| 1962, there was intense dehate in t|lt" United Slates al)ou.I
puhlic versus private ownership and operations. Political control and financing were also
items of disagreement. Not snrprisingly, these issues led It) a major political dehate in lhe
United Slates.
The Eisenhower administratitm supported the development of salellite coiTlnltlnic_l-
lions, bttt only if that development was based t)n private-sector initiatives." [I-6, I-7] "_']lell
Jt)hn E Kennedy took office in early 1961, however, he expressed a strong suppt)rt fi)r a
leading gt)vcrnmcnt role in conmlunicati<ms satcllitc developnlent. _'`'Achieving his objec-
live, however, meant sorting out within the Kennedy administration the appropriate role
of the government ill c<mHnunications satellite research and development, rcgttlation,
and ownership and <_peration. [I-8, I-9, 1-10, !-11, 1-12, 1-13, 1-15]
Once the administration had developed its position, it had to gain the assent of
Congress. This was not a straightforward task; many ill Cotlgress had views on the issue
that diffk'red frtml the [)rot_oscd White House policy. [1-14] The net resuh was that three
10. l)tmlat), (:ommt_Mcation_ in Space, pp. 152-55.
11. ()n Det embt't 30, 1960, in t>tw of his last speet ht's in o|fice, I'rt+sident Eisenhowev stated: "This
nation has tl+aditionally |k_th>wt'd a polity of <'ondtttting inlernational tcle|)h¢>ne, telegraph and t)thcr _ onmut-
nit'ation serviccs through [)tivatc t'ntel])rist" subjet't to govelnnlt_ntal {ontrol, ]ict-nsing, and regulation. V_k" haxe
achieved c<nnlnunications facilities second to i'ione amt)ng nations <+| the world. Accordingly+ the governlnent
should aggtt'ssivcly encourage private cntevp]ise it) Iht _ establishment an(| _peration (_f satellite relays t_[ icy-
('nile producing set vkt's." Pubbc Paper_ o/the I_e_sident_ o] the I "hired 51tater: l)wi,_._ht D. l'Swnhmt,el, 1960 (Washingt_,n,
l)ti: L!.S. (;ow'x nment Printing Office, 19791, p. 888.
12. "Flit" now-iamcms Ktmnedy st)Pet h of May 2.5, [961, that established tht' goal oi st'tiding humans m
tht' Moon and returning tht'ln to Earth also called for thc t'stal)lislmwnt of a global satellite systl'ln tolt _nlunu-
nicatkms lhat WOtlld bent-lit all countries, lJrOlllf)le w<_rl<l peace, and allow nondisc riminating a_cess fk_l all COUll-
tries of the worM. It called for a "constructive Yole li+r the U.N. in inlernati<)nal s|:,a(e _ornmuni(ati+ms." Puhli+
Paper_ +![ the Pre_ident_ o[ the t 'nited State_, lohn I': Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, D(:: U.S. (;overnmelll Printing O|tice,
1962), pp. 529-31. Kennedy's position on comnlunications satellites thus sex the stage for the United Nations t.
ac! on this subject as well. In September 1961, the United Natkms (;eneral _ssembly adopted Resoluliol_ 1721,
Section 1_,concerning Ihe e_tal)lishment of a global c ommuni{'alions satellite system. Section P stated that "com-
turin|rations bv lnt+ans o1 +satellite should l)t+ available to the millions ()It the world as soon as possible on a glob-
al and n_m-dist litninating basis."
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diflmt'nlversions of national Icgislalhm Io create a f,+amcwork for satellileconmm]lica-
6,>ns tmlergcd during 1961--and especially during 1962--within (:ongrcss. The bill of
Senator Roberl S. Kerr (D-OK) would have made space communicati<ms entirely private.
From the opposite perspective, the bill of Senator Esles Kefauver (I)-TN) would have
made such comtnunicalions entirely a governmental enlerprise. Finally, lilt" Kennedy
administration's bill sought a ctmq)romise between privatt' and public mvnership and
among various policy objectives. I1-16, I-I 7]
Afttq+ months of debate and a filibuster led by liberal Democrats, complete with a clo-
ltlie V()(e, the (:ommunications Satcllitt' Act of 1962 finally elllt`q'gt!d. [l-lg] This law callt'd
tot (he creation ofa nt`'w entity to be known as the Conununit'a(ions Salcllitt" (:orporation
((:omsat), wilh ownership divided fifty-fifty between the general public and (elecolnlnu-
nications corporalions, such as NI'&'I: Inlernalional Telephone and Telegraph (I'FI'),
R(:A, and V'/estern Union hUernalional.'+ (:omsat's Board of Directors consisled of six rep-
lt.,st`.n(a(ivt`'s froln tile public stockholders, six representatives of Ihe (t,lecotnnlunitali(ms
hldustry, and three presidential appointees. Comsat was designated ;is (he of tic(ill repre-
scntalive <)f lhe l_lniled States for global satellite coninnulication.s. Two vears later, (lit`" cor-
porati<)n be('aine lilt" inanagt`'l _)f (lit" elnerging global sVslenl kn()wn as lhe Inlernaliona]
T(,It,(<lniilnilii(;ilions, Salt'liil(' (;ons(n-litlin (INTF+I+SNF), which was forlned (ni Ail<_iisl 70,
I c.t64.'' 11-191
|letwcen lhe crea(i()n of(]OlilSa( as a ilew t`'()rporalion ()n/\ligliSl _l, 1<.l()7, and (he (Te-
ation of INTH£NI, (]oinsal conirat(ed with Ibe [|ug|les Airtratt (](nnpany (lilt." d('signt'r
()1 _Vill'l)In l, 9, ali(I !/) l<i build all upgraded version of the _yil('l)lit saicllhc. This satellite
wasinitially dt`'sigtiil(e(I l IS _40{'_; il later be('anie kilown officially as INI'H.SAT I. "Flit +
w<_i-ld, howevt`!l', ('alllt`' I() know it by its popular nallle, "Early IIird." Ttic slitelli(e, wllich was
(he first operational _e()synthl+(Inoils (-Olllilliinit'ations satellite+ weight'd eighty-live
l)oUlills alid was lit(Inched ill April 1965. h had a lifmime of eigh(t'en inon llis and ;i ta|)al-
hv o| +240 voice {'ii'('llilS o1", ahelnalivelv, a black-and-while teh'visi<m channel. This (i+ansa( -
];til(i{ sa(ellile, with three limes the (apacily of the largest sublnarine cable th<.'n available
and (tit' ability I() i/r<lvid¢ ' ieal-tiint`' television transinission, tal)ture(t the world's allen-
(ion. F+iuly Birtl ushered ill ii llt!W a_e ()t international lelevision colnnulnic;ili(tns. _" Also in
19(L,5, (lit, [!.S. |)('[)al-lint'nl (:,f I'lt_lT.'lis(' deployed a low-Eaitll-orl/it salt'llilt`' svsleln knllwn
as ihc lnilial l)c|+cnse Sait'llhc (]onununication Sysieln (IDSCS), while llie Soviet 1.3nion
th'l)loyed its firsl highl) elliptical salellite f4yslell+l known as Molniya ("l.ightning").
13. It is illtl'i'esting to holt' that John ,&. Johns<in, (;t'neral ('olin_;el (it NASA, was tcnlporarily dctaih+d
l(i _('ii_lt(il K('I i '+, lllti(c lit Wlite ilratt legislalilln tor lhe (]olnniilni(ations Salellil(" All. t|i+.'n lal('r r('qu('M(+<'t |)y
lhe Kl'lllll'd_ adliiilli+,lralilnl I(i i;lrati Ihl' "¢('r_,illn thai aCllially b('caln/" law (i)t'l _,lllla] inler'vi('w bv lilt' aillli(ir wilh
I,ttm A..l,dl;_s<in+ I+'<.lnuar_, 19S4, INII_]I+SAT Ar<hives)+ Scc alsl,J.O. PaslllrC. The .%l_._ ,1 C<,m.iii,i+.ti+.l_ (Nmx
_lk: Macl+'a<ld<'n-tlcHcll, 1964), lip. 67-92.
It. ()'+l'l Ih(' v('alS, Ihi' (;(lillliiiliiit;lli4)llS Salt'llile 7\(I o| 196 'j WaD; ;ilil('n(h'(I Io allot_ li+ll't (nninuliil a
li+_iis l>lt4ani/aliinls t<l _l,II +dl iht'h (](nilslil h+ddillgS, Io ri.%tlllt.lure thc (](llllSill llJoaill ¢11 l)ht!ciors, and l(i alhm
(]<)tiisal Ill lit' till' otli_ial ITS+ ]latlilipanl in Ih(' hltt:lnational M_u-ililn(" Satellitc ()rgluiizali<)n (INM:\RSAI),
anllllit'i (l>llS<nlitilli |OIIIll'd (iXl'l ;I dr'cad( + [liter, In illosl lt'spt:cU,, (++<inlsal's h+Rislali_t'l)dClillCd ((lit' has
l l,lllailll'd the _,alli<'. ( )'+el Ihiil', hi )w('%'t+l, ihrllugh actions ot the Federal (]()inlllilni(alil ills (](llllilliSsi(nl ( F( ](]),
Iht' I '.S. <+xt'( tlli_(" t)i aiit It+ and th(' (l)tlrls, (]OlilStii has _ivt'n lip its ownersilip ot l+_allh +,ialilnis. t-nlt'l('d lht' ['.S.
sail'llilt+ (<)liililiiliil nil<illS ill_ll kt'l Oil ;i (inlip('iili'+'t' basis with <)[|ler tuorpolati(nls, and lot(lid its iiiliiill|)ol% loll" in
IN I H.SAT and INMARSAI qu('sii<nlelrl. Thcsc ('|ialitt's '¢v't'le laigt'ly Ihe rt'suh ill a t haiiging ie_l+ilaloi_, t+nvi -
iolinit'llt within Ih(' I L,%, _<i'+rt'l'ilili('ill, l)urint4 lilt' Nix<m. Carlt'r, and Rt+;l_iii adlninistralions, th('r(' have Ill'i'll
iii( il-;isili_ t't[Oi D, 1o ilil)%'( _ lowald a derl'_tllatl)r) and competitk'e approa(]i IlL) IIl(l_,l l('ll'('OllillilUiilali<lns a_ ti_i-
ti_+s lhal }lall tladili<)nally |)et'n carri('d out I)v i31on(>polies. Despite lilt' I!l+Osion o| ill(! h'Rislalivc and rl'gulail)r_+
it aln('_COlk within ',_:lli( h (](llllS_lt (ipt'lalt'li whh i<+spcct Io [NTFJ.SA'I. which <it( UFi¢'ll I)<'ll_l'l+li 19t7_7 and 1990
(l'_p('l ially (hi' h_s ol ict hili< ill iliall;l_(qnt'nl it| ihc IN'I'EI+_AT t41ot)al systcin bt,i_t,t,n 197_/aiid 1979), (](llli_il
l<'inaiii', illll+ >ill the' I(q,_' in(lilltpl)]i('s h'ti in lhl' ITnitcd _tal('S,
15. It;N(; I)o_ iiin<'iil. 1(;%(;-7 IE (Aplil 1965). pp+ SJ.I.
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Twenty-Five Years of Communications Satellite
Developments (1965-1990)
,+ksthe engineering and design of Ihe world's first operational communications satel-
lites pr<weeded, the natur<.' o1 the institttliot|_d arrangemetlls tbr global sattqlite commu-
nicatiotis became a topic <_I intern+ttiotlal discussi<)n and disl)itlt,. +'+The l.tnited Slates
initially thoughl in terms ola series ollfilalttwal agrt+cmt+m.,+ between the t.rniled Stales +t]_cl
itl+tj_1 tlSe1.s <)1international lelecommt|nicatiot|.s, lloweww, those <m the other side of 111¢"
Atht|+iic, d¢'vch)ping a common positi<)n Ihrmtgh the (;o|n|niu¢'e on European Posts and
Telecommunications (the association of EinOl)ean commtmicati<ms el+lilies, most _+1
which were government-owned tnonot)<)lies), made it clear in Fct)rtmry 1964 that a tnul-
tihttend agt-cement was the only acctq)tat)h_ apl)roach. The Ettr<)peans also were l-(thlclallt
t_> h,uld all techmcal, o])m+atiollal, and p(_li(y ccmttol over It) the United Slates, while Ih("
Utfitcd States wished to l)reservc, as long as t)ossil)le, its ttwhnological advantages in this
n¢'w commercial st'clot. [I-21,1-23, I-2,t] Tht" United Stales also wantc'd to ensure that th<"
l)entqits of ct)tnmuni(ating via s_itt'llites we're available to all c<mntries, wire+t-tel their
stage of economic develol>me,ll. [1-22]
Tht' [!nited Sl_11<?s quickly dr_>ppt+d its it+nisle,we on bilateral arr_ulgcments and
w()rkt*d toward +111 a(Cel)labl¢ + multinatit>nal l)+anlew(>rk. Ncg<+lialions with Atlstrali:t+
(]an_tda, Japan, and EtHopc lasted two years; their outc<)nlc hinged on sew'rid key isstws+
France f)reti,rred three separ_llt + ,t+gi<mal salellile syslelt|_,+---ont + tbr Eur_+pt,, <me |i>r the
Americas, and one for Asia--but tinally agreed to a single global s)stem wilh a capilal
el+|ling tot a space segmenl investment of $.'500 million. This was a much higher initial
inxt'slm<mt than sew'ral other European coumrics were willing to accept..lap+m and
Australia played important roles in ])vomoling compr<)mise. Thcy als<_ promoted lhe use
<ffgeosytwhrollous satellites, bcc;utse meditml-altitude systems would have or+rated gaps in
coverage, with the largest gaps being in the l'acitic Ocean regi<m. '+ Perhaps the most
inlporta1|t compr<mfist + betwc'cn the United St_Itt-s and other countries was I!.S. accep-
tmlct" <)t" the posit|oil 1tl;:tl the initial _tgl+e¢.ln<.,nt _,+,'_ts otlly valid on a+_ itlle1"itll basis--after
five years of experience with a U.S.-dominated mganization, lilt • agreenlt'nt w<)uht b_"
rcopt'twd in 1969 Ibr review and poter_lial revisi<m. 11-25]
(),It + of the key issues debated and rt'viewed in Iht+ 1962-196.1 1_egotiati<ms was what
type <>t+st+rvi¢e.s INTEI+SAT shottld pr<wid¢'. W<)uld it turlfish all fro+ms ot i)ublic lelt'cmn-
ntttt_icalions smvices tbr both d<mwstic and intt'rn+_tional service? The lira'rim
Arran'gt+lnt'llt.s <)1 1964 and the l)¢'tinilive Arrat_gemtmts of 1971 I]lal tbll<>',_:ed b<_lh sj;,t'_-
|tied thai INTEI.SXI', with special al)l)roval, could iJrovide a wide range of "specialized
se,vi<t,s" that inch+deal btH were 11o1 limited to r_dio navigatiotl service.s, t)roadc:tsting
16, Smith. Communitali+m via S.tellile, i>p. 135-,tl.
17. h is a t_m+n+_ml', held bt'lit'l Ihat the sutc_'sstltl I:H,n_ h and _+]Jcralim+ <+1 l'iarlv Bird it+ gc_>svn_ h,_+-
ttm_s _+rhit t+lfi'ctixelx t'ntlcd 'lht' th'batc al>_t+t thc "right ,it lilt." ht la11, I+FI ' w;is st'Ic_ l+'tl l_> t_1+th'_ _akt' a dt'taih'd
stutlv <d tncdi+u1_-altitutle satt'llitcs +tltt'+ tht' |;lull+ h ill Early Bird. (_,xt.t tht' yt'ats, tht" is+,t,c <_f the "h+esl" _iI>il li>r
ci+ttllltlllli<';tti_llS satt'llites h:+s arist'n :tg;lil+ alld ;t.t,r:lit+. Bet att:.it, t_| if'+ tli)rtht'rn httitttdt,, not t'asil', t +,'¢e, t+11 b', s+ttt.l
litt"_ in gci+s',nchlon_ms _whit _,','t'r tht" equattw, lht' S_>'¢it't t "Hi,in us<'<l highly _'llipti_ al _wl>i_s l+_t its M_>Ini,,a satt.l-
lht+s P',I,+,+I it'+ t'Ittl_¢, |hi' itlt'a <_1 creating :t h>w-E;tt th-_t|+il g]i,:l <)I s;+lcllilt,s intc_,_ttn1_,v<tctl h,x i,+tt.ls;tlt+llit< i lit+k,,
h:+s ht.t,l+ i_<,l>,++,t.(l lw ;ll h+asl |me l)c+It'1+li;tl land n,_+hih, t lll11111tltlit +lli<+llS s:ttt'llitc ,,xsttqn (q)et;It<_l. Dt'slfitc tht'
+':IfIx n_+t|+_t,l+S'¢llt hliHltlll++ _,_,_,lt'I/IS, such ;IS |hi + S<)',it'l [ "Ini_11+'n M(>lni,,a +,'_Mt'lll ;llld llic l)t'l)arlmt'i+t <_f l)tq<'nsc',,
ID,%(+S,. :+i+<I dt.sl)ilt, lht' pr_+l>OSt'd new low- and mt'tlit+H_-altitt_dt, c_m_tl+mi_ _tli<m'++ m;ocIlilt' s'+stcm,;, H+,;_. _>I lilt'
gt'osxtwht<)m+t+s _II)il is ,,till l)tt.chmmlm11. Well _+xt'l !l;+_l)t'ict.lH i)l all ((m+in+mi+ali(ms saltqlilt.s I<,i th>mt'sti_
and imcu1+;iti<mal lixt'tl satt,IIitt, sm,+'iccs, as wt,ll ;is li>n d,mwstic, rt'Ricmal, :rod ilil<'l n:tli_m+ll lixt,d ,,atcllilt' +,t',-
+i, cs. plus tht_nc I<_I ndlitar'< n,<_hih., ;t_t+l dirt'tl l)ti:,:t+l_;ts! s_tlt.llil_+ _,clxict's, hm, t* l+t't'tt hint+< hcd it+t<_ g_'(_,_',_
< hl i_tlt,tlS i)rhit.
ExP|.{)RIN(;TI1([ !N KN ( )WN 7
sat('llit¢' s(,tvict's, s[)a((+ rcst'ar(]+ s('rvi(+(+s, mel(+()rol<)gica] s('rvic<:s, +tll(l F,arl]+ rt'sotu-(<:
scrv[ct's. Through()u! ils history, h()v¢(wt!r, INTI_I+SAT h,ts c<)idln('c[ its _t¢Ib.'[li(+s t<) tix('(I
+at(+llit( ` sc+rvi,t( • [)iLl)lie Itq(+c(mmltmicatiotts [_::,ns('V('l-+t] rt+;tmotls:
• Tht's(' pt,l)lic kqcc(mmlttuicatiotls stwvic:cs w¢'r(" the me)st w('ll-(+st,tl)lishcd, l)r(w_d('nt,
m+(i "d(+sival)h:' scrvi('cs tor its (+(mstittt('nl mend)('rs it] t('vms ()1 i('V('lltlPs.
• Th<' speci_d tiwaw(+ial (¢mdhi<ms and agv+t'(+m('nts u(,t,ch'd l<+ (.wdmvk (m "sl)('(i_tli/('d"
st,nvi(cs [)os('(| _t t)+trl-i('r t<) lll()Vill_ H|IO I|ICS(" ncv.; ;tlt':t'_.
• Th(.s(. <)th<'r "ut+w" st+t-'+'i(('s wcv(' largt'ly tmpr()v('n hi tt'ntus ()f m_tvk(q vial)ilil+v.
• ()lht!x- n_tti<)llal, rt+ffi(mal, on- gl<d)al vtmtur<:.,+ +iv)([ hlslhtlti(ma] cn)titit's l)r()viclinlg such
st, vvi(+t,n am m;trititllc (<mm]ttt]i(illi(ms, rt'giotta] (()l+mmlli(;lli(m'+, (|il+('(l-])+-<);t(l(_t_;tilig
t() holll(' +ll]l('tlt+i+tm, dl1(| r(_m<)t(' P+('Hshlg ,_rt"+v l_[) ov('r th<: ytqtlS. "rhtts it was i]()i +.._tsv
for INTEI+SAT t() ('Xl)and _ts these org_|lliZ+lti<)llS dt'vt'h,l)('(l t+tot(' Sl)t'(+i+dizt'(l tli_tt'kcqs.
hi lh(' (]uant('r ¢)F :t ('('i'tltnry th_l f()]low(+d the lh-sl (<)mtv+('r(ial _al¢']lit(" ()l)('vati()t+_s. _t,
v('t_+arkal)](" av-r;+tv of t('(htti(a] (lcv('lol)mcuts has Cl+Stt('(l. K+.'x' hm()xali()_s h_vc in+(hnd,t'(l:
vwtdti(h'stii_+tth)u s(wvi(t's att_)nff, +tt_(l l)cl'_,'(+('t] +rtii'_' +mall ,i[)('vltu(' 3ll)I('I|ll_IS; th(" tl_(' O|"
m()v<' li('(ltw_w+v l)at)dn; thrt+(+-axis sl_d)i]i/alion, r_th('r lhm) s_t(.llh(.s r<)lating about tht'ir
vt.rti(;t] a×is; m](i lay-g(', high-l)twl_+>rm_m(<+ ` at)tom)as ()]] l)(mrd tlt(' s_tl('llitt+s th('ms('Iv('_,.
Th(' l_tsl thrc(" dc(a(h's of s;+tt(']]il(" l<.'(hn(doh_' (l(!vt'l<_l)m('m (au) I)¢' l)t'st sl)<)wn ])+.,th;q)s
l)+vthe ¢,v(>lutionz (,I lht' s_tt,ullit('s ¢)I th(' INTH.SAT s,yslt,ttl, l)tu+iwg tlfi_; l)('tio(l, ttmuy tm!i,)r
l('('hw<dogi('al +i(]wtv+('t's (w(+tu't+(+d, hi(It_ding the scv(+u shown+ in T;tl)h' I-I. Th(' ('tm+td+ttiv('
v('sult <)I th('s,r t('rht+<dc)gi(+al gains has l)(!ct+_t() pr()(Itw(" lixt'd s+tl('11hc (h'siu,-Its llmt m-(' ()v('_:
_tll al)l)noxim+wt'ly IJ)00 titttt,s iiioi(" (ost-(+fl_(liv(+ thau the Emqy Bird sat('l][l('. It+ total, tlt("
Lt_+lthvct' (hw_t(l(',, hay(' l)t()(Itlc(+(l .,+m(qlitcs thal arc at l(+a.sl eighty lit+tlt's toolt+ (+l]¢+(liv(" in+
I('rltlS ()I + ])owtw, _+II-(" 100 tilll('S m()l-(" []cqttt+tlcy ('|'l]ck+n+l, arid }my(' m()v(" that+ t('n tim(,s
gv('altW lifi+tim(+s. It is pcrlml)s t)('('atts(+ til)cr optic cal)h's hart' +t(hi('v('(| l)malltq (hwch)l)-
lll('iH_, [11(_()_.I-(']]I('[_+'II(V ()II lh(+ ]'_arlh th+lt th(! r(Pmat_kal)]( • +rod ++tlst_ti_+(+([t(+(hu<)]()gical 1)]t'_k-
thr()tlghs h_ s_tt('llit(' l<+l('('()lllnllllli('_llion_ at'(! not lll<)l'( + wicl(+l_, r r(+(()grli/t'd ()r ((q(,l)ratt+d.
Most ;t(Iv;ttt(('s in (+()mttHmi(_ttioxt_+ sat(qlil<: t('(Im<d(+g,y h_tv(" ()n-i,_it);tl('(l withiw tht"
Unfit(,d Nt+ttt,n; I¢'a(litL_ (hw('lol)t'rs ilave be(,t_ lh(+ s('i('ntislm and ('llghl('t'l% ()t" milch _t('t'()-
Spa('(' matun[:,t(ttu't'v's a_+ Bail Aerospa(:c, Faircifild, Httghcs Ain-craft, l,ocklw('(I-Martiw
(n_<:,vi_(ltt(linL_ (;+,+u('ral E](+(:lt-i(:, or GE, mid RCA), TRW, and Fov(t A('tosl)a(<: (l_()w S1)+wt+
%ysl(,ms/[,<)ral). Thc'rt" hay<: |)¢+('n many other ('()r_tribtntors, ste(:h as NASA, th('
l)(.[)antnH('utl ()I l)(qi'n_,(', lh,t" N+itional Science Foundation, tmivt+]sitit's, m_d r(P._('arch l;tl)-
()vat<)v'i('s stt('h as IJu('(dnt I,ab()ratory, Johns ItopkirJs /\(Ivatw('(I Physics I.al:.orat()ries,
(:()lilS_tt I++d)oratot+it+s, at](I the let Pt+opulsi(m I.+d)oratory (IPI.) awd oth('t NASA (-t.mt, rsY'
ht th(' last (hrc+t(l(' in I)at+li('ulat +,the spread of satellite tcchnolog 3, has b(+come truly glob-
,d. M_i.r (aF.abiliti¢+s (+xis! iv+*Eur(>p(', Russia, Canada, an(lJapatL aud m()r<.' ar(" (.m('rging
i_+ lu(lia, (]hinm K<)n-t'a, Brazil, Isr_t('l, and Australia.
In. _.t.,. I,,hw tl. Mcl+]r<)y, ('(t., ._a: ,_cie.+eandA]_]dicatio._ (N('%V _)rk: II'II'_F_ Iht'ss, 19_6), pp. 1_-2_4.
Ahh¢._gh it is ditiicuh to nmgl,.' o111 pr<+'(i'.,t'lv awd wilhottt (.wissiotl all of the in't(lixi(h_als v,'h(> play,t'(I th(' t_l_)st
illi])<)l I#IIII l(dl's ill _<mm_mfit _li(ms sal,_+llit( ' (l,t'vc'h)pn]ct_t over lhis l)<+'ui()(l, sonn(' (d th(' m()st iml)<)rt:mt pl_)r_'.
;'_<'v¢': "¢Vt'_ ntht't "+(m l+_amL Ri(hard M;|r'+.tt'tL Robert I.(:,'(+ll, aud l.t.(.mrd .lafl(' oI NASA; llm-_d<l R<>s,t'vt an+d
Albr_l "lh+d" +,Vh('¢'hm _)I I lugh(", Ai_(vali: Adolph Thi('l .f TRW; .lark I laItix+gt(+_i (d L,im(dt_ l.:_,i+_)rat_)t x:
_igln i('d Rit'g(+L l+_t+i',l l)i('l_ i(h. Mavlh+ \_t+ix','. au+d lohvt Johnsot+ <d (;<)m,,_il +rod IN II'I ,_%'[ ; l,,,,'l,h (;;mq)_m(.ll:L
Wi11)lul lh if( h;ll d. _tl+t-I [+ill i(ii+ l+_(h.ls(m ,)I( _(+ttl,.._ll l.ai)(, at<,it.s: Kl+llll('lh R<)st. (_I l"(_n(l ,+_('l()S|)_t( (': J+l( k Kit'_l'.'t
(d (;E:R( :.:',; William ])i( krl iutg <)t ,Jl'l,: .],(). i);|sll)lt + ol lh(' t ;..%. %('t;+lt<': I+(l'.,,aud %%'('lsh <,1 Iht' N+lth>tl+tl N[m( t'
( _<)m_( il: an_d I<,}H_ I'i(,_( <' ()t Arl &" 1% B(']I [,_lb{)l_ll()l i( '_,,
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Table I-1
Technological Advances
A_ea r_]l)evehqmu'.lMeasu.'d Arh,a,ce K_y .\'e_v Terh,oloA,4es I)Fveloped
I. Satcllilc Power Power increased 81) limes • Sim-oricntc(t solar cell array
• High-_'flicivncy solar ('('lls
• ltigh-pcrti)rman(e N_H 2 hallt'li¢'s
2. Elfi.'ctivc Use ot Radio
Frequencies
Radio lie(luencies available at
100 times greater
• [rsc of hyt)rid ti'cquvncy bands
It ]21-C(|tlt?ll(_r rCl.iSt C by spatial _'pai'alioll
t _pO[-|)C_llll i:|llt('llllitS
• Fvequenwy reuse by I)olarizali(m
discriminati(m
3. Salcllilc l,iletimc Increase in ]itelime flora
1.5 to 15 years
• I Jmge]" lilb halt(!rics
• Higher pcri()rman('c dn'ust(*rs and
propellants
• Solid-stale clectroni('s
• Enhaw(ed salellile (()lm-()l
l('('hlliqu('s (including ()pli()n 10r
in(lined ()rl)il opt'lali()n)
4. Digital (:()mlllunicali()ii
Techniqu('s and Digital
(:ir('uit Multiplication
,m(l ( :()mpressi()n
Tcchni(itu's
[!I ) to l,()O(bpcrcent in(Teas('
through use of TI)MA and
(:I)MA I)lus digilal c()mprcssi()n
l('chni(itnes
• l)cvclopmcnt ot 155.5-mcgal)vl(,
I'I)MA
• Digital Sl)(,t.(h ink'rp()lali(m
• 32- and l(i-kih)l)yt(.-i>c)-s(.(-(m(l voice
bringing two- to t0urloId gain,
rcspccliv(!ly
5. ()n-Boartl Satcllile
Switching
Exact gain not easily measured;
('xpandcd use ()I spot-beam
aillellllaS--;,llll'l thus ('Xl)andcd
[i'e(ltt('n(y reusc--_)plimized l)v
,Oll-])()ard inllt'r(ollll('(lioll ()f
beams and cross st, ;q)piug
• Salcllite-swilched TI)MA
• I lybrM li('qu('nC¢ (()nn('( li()n
l)er_,(,'t:n ul)link and downlink
• ()n-l)()ard switching lauh d(q('( liovl
and diagnosti('s
6. Earth Station Anlt'illlaS [)('('lt';ist" in costs of Ea)lh stati()vis • Use ()f s()lid Malt' ('1('( Ir()tfics
fi)un- to tenl0ld while dt'c_cas(, i,, • Elimination of most cry()gt'ni(s
:_i/(' ()t ;tlltl.'llllilN I')V [;4('1()1" ()[ lull • EIIhiillC('d I()v¢.-(osl C()IlMI tl(liol|
lllalt'lials ;lll(I illlpl()"¢('(l
I,'()ID;I ILl( I iOII
7. l.:umch Vehiclc
Te( hno1()b,_'
l,aunch r('li,tl)ililv in( rt'ascd I()
ncarly 90 pt'r('enl and lift
cal)al)ilily by st'vcral lhous;.uld
[)('r('eni; ('()st-(qti('it'ncy of
laullchillg, howt'vcl', o1| ;A
pro-pound hasis, not changed
sigufificamly
• l':nhal](('(l r()ckc! ]nol()] design
wilh 'd:lt';tlUl" Ihltl,',;I
• ]:.nhan(('d guida.tw(' SySll,'lllS
I_XI'I,{tRINe ; "11II" 1 !N KNf)_'N _)
This uniqnc (leveh)pm('nl oF new spac(,, cmnmunicalions teclmoh)gics in Ill(," 1970s
and 1980s did nol simply spring up Sl)ontaneot).sly. Within NASA, a series ofexperimental
satellites raider the Applications Technolog 3' Satellile (A]S) program were developed and
tested during the 1967-197(i l)erio(,I. These satellites expan(,led the tecc'hnological reach of
satellite" comnnmications in Ic)ms of higher frequ(,'ncy bands, new antenna size and
pertbrmance, and slucllite pow(,'r and stabilization. The ATS program also helped
(lelnonslrale lhe n(,"¢,' lechnolog,_' rc'flllire(l to boos| ov(,'rall C()lllllnlnicalions satellite per-
fbrman((,x T|ws(," experimental slttellites not only (,t(,,monstrate(l new tcclmolog 3. but pro-
vided vahlablq (,!cchl(ationa] services to the Caribl)ean, the SOIlth Pacific, Brazil, and hi(lit,
as well as to rmal and remote parts of the United States. NASA joined with Canada in the
(;(mmmnications Technolog 3' Satellite(" (CTS) program; after its latmch in 1976, (;TS
(lemonstrated new te(:hniques of spa(,:e tclecommnnications that could operate with very
sm_dl terminals.
/ks th(," conlnlunicatiotls satellite indltstry matured into the only major succcessful (()m-
nl(,!rcial application of spa(,:e, ('otltl-()v(,!rsy arose dnring the 1970s over (-onlin/ting a gov-
(,rnnlent-ftm(,l(,r(,I res('arch an(,1 (,hevclopm(,mt program in support of thai in(,lustry. Sonw in
the Nix()n administrati(m argue(,l that such a program (,:onstituled a subsidy t() a particu-
lar segment of the private s(,'(,lor--a role the government shoul(,t not play. NASA, thccd
with this argmnent and Ihe nec(,I to a(!just to a rapidly declining budget in the post-Apollo
l)(.rio(t, (l(,:(,:i(l(:(I in 1(,172 t() terminate its support of commmficali()ns-relate(,l rcc'searcch and
development. [ 1-271
This decision remained controversial for a number of years; by the late l(,)70s, NASA
was l)eing urged to r('ent('r the area. [I-528] The program that NASA proposed, th(,"
Advan(ed Comnnmicadons Tecchn(llogy Satellite (ACTS), had a (,lifficuh time getting
White Hottse approval for most ()f the 1980s; congressional an(el some mixeccl industrial
pressm-e linally leccl to the pr()gram's going forward. [I-2(,)] Aft(', its lamwh in 19(.13,
h()wever, ACTS went ()n to d(,'monstrate a variety of new techni(,lU(,,s l()r ertbancing the per-
l_)rman(e ()f (ommmfi(ations satellites, (`,specially with regard to opt'rating in tile new l_l
b.m(,l (thirty l() 200 hertz) and ()n-boar(,l processing of signals so as to interconnect a v(.'ly
large number ()f spot l)eams (narrow, very-high-power beams), which boosted frequency
reus(' and incrt'as('(t satellit(' throttghotlt capacity, l-towever, it in hard to nieasu|'t" the sig-
l|it]cal|l inll)a(:t, i?)y tile elld of S(:ptember 1996, the Federal (]ollllrlunications (]onnnissioll
(F(',C) filing deadline, about fifteen new Ka-band satellite systems with a combined esti-
male(t valne ()f approximately $50 billion have been prop(,)sed to) l)rovide high-data-vat("
multimedia video sourc(,s to North America and/or the world. If completely displayed,
this w()tdd mean more than 1,200 new satellites in geosynchronons, medium, an(el low-
Earth orbits.'"
Furthermore, the d(,welopment of the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
(H)RSS) has I(,'d the way in such areas as intersatellite links and commnnications between
h)w and geostationary orbits, satellite-switched time division mnltiple access techniques
thai alh)w nndliple users t() eml)loy the same transpon(,ter, and combined fixe(,l and
m()l)ile slnellite comnnmi(,ations. Today, the Orion Satellite System is operating inter-
satellite links, and many of the proposed new mtdtimedia satellites will offer intersatellite
link capabilities.
The experimental programs tmlded by the Departnwnt of Defense have also been
c()ntributors to tcc,chnolo_' development. In addition t(,) lincoln I,ahoratory's I,E_! to
I,ES-(,) experimental satellites, there have been numerons missions designed by the
I% Space _o: Thi)t'r l+a) ()r,e)vietv ell Space Application_ arm I'.'x]>hmdion(Washingtot_. I)C: ._)ciety of
.%iil('lliI("])t()l(t's_,i()n_ds,19N91.
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Aerospace (k)rporalioll and various tactical communicalion and l)elense Satellite
Communications S)',stem (DSCS) spacecraft launched over rite years. Because man)" ot
these mill(art', slttellites were built 1))', (Oil(l-atCOl litins that also constructed commercial
satellites, there wits often ett_'ctive technolo_)', transfi'r wiflfin those firms.
Domestic Communications Satellite Systems
The first drones(i( satellite systems were deployed in tit(" Soviet Union (Molniya in
1965) and (:;mada (Anik in 1971). AJtme 1972 decision b)" the FC(; opened the way to
the use of satellites for domestic communications within the United States, thus opening
up a large new market for satellite teleconmutnicatit)ns. [1-26] The ability of such systents
It) provide service to rural and rem<)te areas an(l Io relay television and other broadcast
services tt) very small aperlm-e antennas was quickly proven. Over the last fifteen years,
these (rarly successes have r('sulle(t in seventeen countries tleveloping their own clpera-
tional or experimental domestic slttellite systettts ;t11(| placing satellites in the geosynchro-
nots <)rbit. _'' It( additi_m, approximately fifty countries are oblaining domestic
conmnufications satellite service through flwir participation (typicall)" through the h'ase
of transponders) in international anti regional satellite systems.
The beginning of the evolution toward regional systems can I)e attril)uted It) EUTEI.-
SAT, the Eurol)ean Teleconlnumicalions Satellite Organization. This organization started
in its provisi<mal t+<nnt on June 30, 1977. This was fi)llowed by ARABSAT, which bt'came
<_perati<mal in 1!)85, even though the i(lea was (tevelol)e(l eight years earlier. After AI,UXB-
SAT, the trend shifted :(wit),, [l()nt pul)lic consortia clt)sely modeled on a scaled-down ver-
sit)n of INTEI,SA.'E Newer systems used a privately ()wned--and more ct)mpetitive--
apprt)ach. ASTR_X was established in the 1980s tt) provide low-power direct-broadcast ser-
vice in Eurt)pe. PimAmSat began providing private transatlantic services in 1988. In Asia,
Palapa in 1980 and later ASIASAT it( 1990 began It) t)ffer certain f_)rms t)f both regional
and domestic service, wittl APSTAR tollowing suit ti)ur years later.
Conclusion
In the last quarter century, tremendous progress has been made in space connntmi-
cations. New and expanded frequency bands have beet( operationally proven, and various
uses of comnumications satellites have been successfully demonstrated. Consistent gains
have been made in frequency reuse, spacecraft power, reliability, and litetime.
Improvenlents in Earth station delay and l)ertbrntance, digital modulation, and digital
coding help complete a picture of total performance gains of more than 1,000 times in
the last three decades. The range of space conununicatit)ns services has evolved tiom
international and domestic fixed slttellite services to mobile satellite services, broaticast
satellite services, and evcn intersatcllite links.
It( the past, the distinction was quite clear between thc satellite servcrs known as Fixed
Satellite Service (FSS), Mobile Satellite Service (MSS), Broadcast Satellite Service (BSS),
and Ra(lio Deternfinali(nl Satellite Service (RI)SS). These designations, as developed b)"
rite International Telcconnnunications Union (ITU), were used to allocate frequencies.
Ironically, as the ITU has gone t(i, nl()re att(I more precise definitions of frequency alloca-
tions, such as aeronautical mobile, maritime mobile, and land mobile satellite services,
2(1. lhc se'+t'nieeu cl_Ulllrien tribal ]|;t'+'e ]alln(ht'd o11( _ ()1 illo1(' dOl'll('t,;|i( (¢nnnltllfit;ili<,ns s_tltqlilt" sys-
lems ;(re: Australia, Brazil, (_;ul;td;t, ('.hina, Fl'ail(e, (;elnl_uly, tndia, Indonesia, hal',, Japa,,. l,uxemt)ouiK.
Mexi_, Spain, Sweden, Iht" I.'nitcd Statcs, Ihc United Kingdom, and tht' Soviet t !titan.
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lilt' lechm)loKv has bccn moving m lilt" o]_posilt" dircclion. The salellilcs' ch;nacl_.'rislics
have bt'cn moving lo_('lll('l ill IUI'IIlS ()f" salcllilt' p_wcr, _IIII('IIIKI |)('_AIIIS, _tIId on-board pro-
(('ssing..M_my ()f lht" lalcs( K:t-l);tnd salt'llilcs, such ;_s (;cn_'ral Elc(lriCs (;E Slat. can atm-
ally o][kw tixctl, mobilc I)rt)a(ltasl, and navig_lli<_nal scrvict's.
Equally significan( is that lht.,,st, iicw skllellilt! ,_ys|(!l|lb;, ])¢!t';I.USC lllt_y Call W(_lk I_
microlcrmin;tls (fifty I_ sixly-fivc cciilillltql.'l-S in di;imclcr) and to handlwld Iransccivers,
can "]Lv]_ass" convcntion;d Itq'rcstri;tl nelworks. Thus, il can bc said Ihal sal_'llilc C()llllllll-
Ili(':lli()llS .'.,ys,l('lll"; ;lll.' II,IIV',:bcc_lning a trtfly largt', mass consmnt'r l_tlsint,ss Iha( arc st_ut-
illg Io Fi'¢;ll lUll(",;lli:lI II']I'C(HIIIIIIIIliCit.Iil,)II,N sysIuIIIS.
[inlt)'¢;lli_n has n<)l t:,t!(ql limilcd to the lcchnological 0.1¢'11_1.Beginning wilh a single
global tclccommtmications s;tlt'llil<' cntily, INTEI.SAT, lht'l(" h_ts I)t'cn ;i [)rolil_.'ralion of
organiz;tliona] fornls for bringing lh(" promise of commmficalions s;_It,llilcs inl_ r<'alil_,.
Thc I!)N4 decisiml in lilt" l !nilcd SlAtes lo modi[_, the traditional I_].S. position lh;l! INTEI ,-
SAT was Ihc only authori/<'d provider of glol>al commtmitalions salcllilc service,', was ;t kcy
It> lhis d_'vt'lopmt:nl. [I-301 Both pttblic and privalt r [brms of instiluli_)nalizing <ommtmi-
c;tlions salcllile s_'rvices hav_' cmcrgcd, as have scvcral crcalivt' hyl)rid pul)lic-l)riv;llc orga-
nizati<_ns. (:lc;trl_, today, new l)rivatc and (:<)mpt'tiliv(' tbrms of satellitc (mmntmitatit)ns
are becoming I)rcdomin,mt :ts both INTEI+SAT and INMARSAT arc spimfing olf nc+_'
commctcial cnlilies Io provide new forms of satellite se]-viccs.
Thc ability t. commmficatc words, images, and clal;t instan_t;mt'onsly ;uotuncl lhc gh)bc
h;ts fundamcnlally changed llw clmra(:l('r of inlernalit_n_al :lnd inllclclflttlr_tl rt'l;ttions.
['hr_ugh this al_plicalion_ ofsl)aCc technology, ;_ "glottal village" has truly come inl_) I)t,ing.
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Document title: Arthur C. Clarke, "The Space-Station: Its Radio Applications," May 25,
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The Russian theorist Konstantin T_iolkovsky was the first to note that a satellite orhiting 22, 300 miles
above the Earth's sa_faee would travel at a speed that wouM make it appear to be ._tationm_' Jrom
Earth because it_ orbital velocity wouM be the same as the _peed at which the l:arth was rotatit_g. In
1928, fh'rma_ Pot_cnik, at_ Austrian Imperial Arm), _?[[ieer, wHtin[4 under the pseudot_ym
,\#u_vlut_g, proposed a crewed .space station in sneh a "geosy_chrmum._" orbit, to be a_ed .fi_r meteo-
rolog)', tverm_mis._at_re, at_d Earth mapping, ltowever, it was Arthur C. ('lathe that fir_t calh, d wide-
_pread artery/ion to the utility r![ the geo.sy_tchrmtou_ orbit for communication,s. In May 1945, Clarke,
a physicist and at that time the secretary of the British Interplanetary" Society, ein'alated six copies _?]
hit paper "The Space-Station: Its Radio Applications" to his society' tvllea_,me_. (The paper was _tot
actually, published until 1968, when it appeared itt the ._ociety's Spaceflight magazine.)A .wcond
paper; written in.[une 1945, appeared in the October 1945 issue of Wirclt'ss World.
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The Space-Station: Its Radio Applications
Al-tllttr ( _. (]]iIl+ke
25 May 1945
[ 1] 1. The Space-station was originally conceived its a retheling depot f<)r ships leaving
Ihe Earth. As such it nlay till :Ill inll)ortanl th<)ugh transient role in tilt' con(|uesl (tf spat:e,
during the period wh('n chenlical fuels are cnlph)yed. O1]lcr uses, S<mlC of them father
t_lnlaslic, h:,lVe t)cen suggested for the Sl)aCe-stati<m, notably by tlcrnlann No()rdung.'
tt()wcvcr, there is at leasl ()lit" purpose fi)r which the stall(in is ideally suited and indeed
has no practical allelnative. This is lilt" provision <if world-wide uhra-high-frequcncy )adi()
services, inchlding television.
2. In the foll()wing discltssion the word "television" will 1)c used ex(lusively l+)ul it
lllliSl I)C Itn(It'rstt)<Id It) c<wer all svtvices using tilt' u.h.f, spectrum and higher. It is pr<)b-
able that loll'vision nlay be :thong tilt" least inlpot+tant of these ;ts technical d('vcl<)pnletlts
occur. Other cxanlph's are frequency modulation, t,tcsinlilc (capal)lc of transmitting
l<)(},(t00 pages an hourU), specialized scientifit and Ilusiness set+vices, and navigational aids.
3. Owing to Ilan(Iwidth consi(tcrations television is reslricted to tilt' frc(luency range
above 5()-Mc/sec llnegacyclcs per secondl, and there is no (Iout)t that vcry milch higher
frcquelwies will be used in tilt' inunediate future. The Anlct-ican rFclcphone and
Tclcgraph Company are [sic] :lllt!ady I)uilding an experitnental network using frequen-
cies up to 12,000 megacycles.:' Waves of such frequencies are transmitted along quasi-
<)ptical paths and accordingly rt'ceiver and translnitter nlusl lie not tal tioln tilt' line ot
sight. Ahhough t-<.+liaclion triereases I|lC range, it is t_lit to say that the strrvicc radius flit a
television station is un(Icr 50 miles. (The range of the I,ondon service was tathcr hiss than
this.) A+ long as radio continue+ to tw used./or communication, thi+ limitation will remain, as it i.g
a/i<,MamelPtal and not a technical reL+tP4ction.
4. Wide-band frequcncy-nlodulation, Oily ot +tim most inlpottant ot +radio develof)-
lIItqlts, conies in Ihc same category. FM can give nluch belier qmtlity and tieedotn tionl
interference than n<wnlal anil)litude-nlodttlati<m , and nlany htuldreds of statiollS are
being planned for tilt" post-war years in Anmrica ahmc. Tilt" lechnical requircnlcnts of +FM
tnakc il esscntial that only tile direct signal be ttscd, and ionospllerit retlcxions cannot be
entpl<+ycd. "Flit+ range of tilt' smvictr is tints limited by tilt" CUl-ValUrC of the Eatlh, precise-
ly as for television.
5. "I'l_ provide services <)vet a large area il is nt+<.t_ss:lly t,tl build nillllClOUS slaliOllS on
high gr<unld or with tadialors <Ill t<v,Vel'S several hundred t_.'el high. These stations have to
lie linked I)y landline or subsidiary t-adio citcuits. Such a syslcnl is ptacticablc ill a small
clmntry sttch as Blilain, but cvt'tl hctc thc expense will lie enot-mous. It is quilt prohibi-
tive in lilt" ('?,.st, of il large continent and it Iht't+t'tt>rt! seems likely that only ]lighly l)<q)u-
latcd connnunitics will be able to Ilavc tclevisi<m services.
(i. All ¢'Vt'll illOl+t+ serious |)roblt, tn at+ises v,,hen an attt'lllpl is illildt' to link telcvisi<m
s'+'stt, lliS ill different parts of the globe. Theotctical studies uindicate that using a tadio tclav
systvln, vt'pcater stations will I:,c ntwessary :it intervals of less than tifly nlih's. These will
lake tilt' lorm of towers several hundlt+tl |t,t,t high, carrying tt'ccivers, anlplilicls and tt+ans-
nlittcts. To link icgions several th<msand milts apart ++'ill lhtts <_>st tnanv millions of
p_mnds, :rod tilt" proI_Icnl of tl':,ltlS-Oct'ittlit" stq'vices t+t'lllaillS ins<_Ittl)Ic.
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7. In th(! II(.'_41" flllllfC, lhc l;).l'g(' airlin(ws which will fly great circle routes over oceans
and uninhabiwd regions of the world will require television and allied services and there
is no known [2] manner in which lhese can bc provided.
8. All lll(.:s(, ])rol)len+s can l)c s<)Ivcd l)_ r |h(" [ISC of _l chain of sl)ace-stalions with an
orbital period of 24 h()urs, whi(h would require them to l)e at a distan(c <)f 42,000 Km
[kilom('lers] |r()m the ((qHr(" of lhc ('aNh. (Fig I.) There are a number ()f possible arrange-
m(')Hs fiw such a chain t)tH that show)l is the simplest. The ,staff<ms would ]ic in ill(' earth's
('qtta,<)rial plane and would thus always remaitl fixed in the same spols in th(" sky, from th('
l)<)mt ()I vi('w ol Ic,Tcstrial ol)s(,rv(,rs. Unlike all <)thor heavenly l)()dics flwy w()uld never ,is(,
nor set. This w()Hld gr('ally siml)lil _' th(, use of directive receivers inslalh'd on lhc earth.
A
Beam Links
C B
t,'_._t,._I
9. The following longitu(les are l)rovisionally suggested fi)r the station.'+ t() provid("
the best s¢wvi((' t() the inhabil(.'d portions of the globe, lhough all parts of the planel will
J)(.' C()V(_'l'c([.
30 EiAfrica and Europ(..
150 E--(:hina and ()cean;L
(.)0 WITh(, Americas.
I0. Each sl;ati()l| w(Hi]d l)road(_isl pr<)gramm('s ov('r about a third ()f the planet.
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Assuming tile use of a tieqnency of 3,000 megacycles, a I?,] rct]ector i_nly a t?'w tcet across
would give a beam so directive that almost all lhe power would be concentrated on the
earth. Arrays a nletrc or so in diamelt'r cl_uld Ix" used to illmninate single countries if a
more restricted service was required.
I 1. The stations would be connected with each other by w'ry-narrow-beam, low-power
links, probably working in lilt" optical speclrunl or ne;.tl it, so lhitl beitlns less than a degree
wide could be produced.
12. The sysiem would provide the [bllowing services which cannot be realized in any
ot|lel- lllitn llel:
a) Simultaneous television broadcasls to the entire globe, including services ill
aircraR.
b) Relaying ot I)iOgl_inillleS belwt'en diSlalil paris of lht" [)]ailel.
13. In addition the stalion._ would ni_lke reduildant lilt! network o[" relay towei-s cov-
ering Ihe main _tle_is of civilisalion _lll(l rei)resellling iilveslnienls of hnndreds o| inillioiis
ot pollll(ls. (likl'olk oil lilt" |]rsl of these lletworks has iihc;tdy Marled.)
14. Figure II shows diagranlin_llicall)' some of lhe specialised services lhal COtlld lie
i)rovided i)y lhe ilse ill ditt_'riilg iadiattll sySlelliS.
t'7g_i_' II.
]>rol4rallillie tioln A tieiilg relayed to I)oint II _llid area (].
Pi-ligliilllllle tioin 1) being relayed Io whllle heinisl)hero.
141 15. The tllllllel'OllS lechnical t)rol)lenls involved in ibis conllllunifalion svslein cannot
I)e distussed ||ere |)ill it t_ill I)e slaled Ih_lt IlOlle o1 lhem pl-_?Sl'lll _tli_,' ditlicuhies t-Veil HI
the l)resen[ linie, thanks io tilt' develot)nlenl oF |lyi)erfrequenc )' engineerinl4. It is ]lllt)ed
Io dis_ilss ihein in _t I_ller paper wheli seciiiily COlldilions l)ernlil.
l'_Xl'l.( IRtN(; 111E [ !NKN( )WN 1 5
l+i. The rcccivin,g ¢,qtLil)incill at lilt + earth end wt)uld c()tlsisl ()I +small pai_lb()l_ts per-
h;tps a R)t)l ill (Ii_llllt+lei wilh dip()lc pitkup. These would I)e sul+ficienltly dhet+tivt • I<) l)ie -
vent il_terl_.'rent+e ill lilt" lhr('e dc)ubl+v-ilhtminated zones. They wotnhl l)e ;titnc'd It)wai+ds the
station with tilt" least zeilithal dist;tnce and once adjusted necd i_¢'vt'r bc tt)twhed _t_;till.
M(Ibih" e(luil)Itlent would require ;iul<)nl;atic l_lllowing which prescnls slight mechanical
compli(atit)ns (a It'w v_tlvt.s ;nld ,i st'i-v(> molt)v) l)tnt i+() It'('hnlical dillicuhies.
17. Tilt, eft+cien(+,, of lilt" s+Vslt'm woltld t)e nearly 100%, since _+lin()st .ill tilt" F,()wt'r
,+v()ifld t_tll ()n Ihc service itrt'it. A preliinhlai+y itlvestigatitln shows lh+tl lilt" wt)i+ld I)rt>atlcast
wotHd reqtfirt" abottt len kil<)w;+tts, while the beam relay servitt's w()ttld require only frac-
ti()l+s ()f a kilowatt. These p()wers are very small ct)mpared with prcsctll-d;ty br():tth;isthlg
sl;tlioils, st)tilt ()t which I;+tli:tlt! hlmdreds t)t kih)watts. All lh( • p()wcr rcgttirt'd tbi + ;t htvg, e
IllllllbCl" ( ) t 1 Silllllll_l+l('()+ls Sel'Vit'es could be t)l)l;tined trt)tl+ solar g('nel:ll()l-S with lllill+()lS
_tl)<)ttl lelt illelrcs ill r_tditts, _+sS+ittliilg _t_l efiiciency of abt)ul 4()'+/++.111:tthlitiotl, lilt' (<radi-
i)tins ()1+vacuutn makt' il e;tsy to use large and fully demotullal)lc v_tlves.
I_. N() commtulicath_il development which can be im:lgined will render lhe chain t>l
stali<>l+ls obs()letc and since it tills what will evenlually be ;in urgent need, its C('(H+OllliC
valtw will be t'n<>rtntms.
I!). F()I + C()Tnplelellt'ss, ()lllt'n + ill;ij<)l uscs t)f the stati()]l are listed beh)w:--
_t) Rt+search.--Astr()l)hysic;tl, F'hysical, Eh,clrotlic.
These at)plic;ui<)ns are <d>vit)us. The space-star)tin w()tfld 1)e justified ()n these
_,l+()[111ds itlollc, HS I]|CIC _,iFC llllill_+ CXpCI+ilIIelItS which C_-lll()nlv bc ('()lltIll('lcd ill)()vc lhc
H.[lll()sphcl+c.
b) Mele<+roh)gical.
The slat)tin would be al)sohtlely invahmble lot wt'ather Ibrecaslin_, as the
ll+<)VCllICl+l ()f fi'oYnls, elc. w<)+ihl be visible litmt space.
c) TraH+(.
This is It>()king ;_ good deal Fttrther ahead, but ultim;+Icly the chait_ will l)e
ust'd exlt+i_sively l_++ c(,nti()lling ++il<l checking, possibly by radii, lilt' m<)vetm'nt ()I ships
++pl+r(mching ()i +h+avit+g- tilt' e;lrth. It ++'ill alnt) play art extretnely itnl)(>rlaull +(lit+ as the lh-sl
link in+ tilt' s()l;u- ('t)mnnunicalion SySIClll.
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Extra-Terrestrial Relays:
Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?
By Arthur C. (:larke
[original set in lllree columns of newspaper style rex! l)cr page]
Ahhough it is possible, by a suitable choice of frequencies and routes, to l)rovide tele-
phony circuits between any two points or regions of the earth tor a large part of tlre time,
h)ng-distance communication is greatly hampered by tire peculiarities of flw ionosphere,
and there are even occasions when it may be impossible. A true broadcast service, giving
constant field slrenglh a[ all times over Ille whole globe would be inwfluable, not to say
indispensable, in a world society.
Unsatisfactory though tire telephony and lelegraph position is, that of television is fiar
worse, since ionospheric lransmission cannot he employed a! ;t11. The service area of a
tele,,risiorn station, even Oll a ver,v good sile, is only about a hlmdred nliles across. To cover
a small country such as Great Britain wotfld require a network of transmiUers, conlrected
by coaxial lines, wavegttides or VIlF relay links. A recent theoretical study _ has shown that
such a s.VSlenl would require repeaters at intervals of fifty miles or less. A system of tilts
kind could provide television coverage, a! a very considerahle cost, over lilt" whole ot a
small country, h would be out of the question Io provide a large ct)nlinent with such a ser-
vice, and only the main centres of population couhl he included in the network.
The protflem is equally serious when an attempt is made to link television services in
difl_.'rent parts of the globe. A relay chain several thousand miles long would cost millions,
and transoceanic services would still be impossible. Similar considcratitms apply to the
provision o1 wide-band flequency modulation and other services, such as high-sl)eed tkrc-
simih'[, ] which are I)y Iheir nature restricted to the ullra-high-frequencies.
Many may consider the solution proposed in this discussion lot) Ihr-tiqched to he
taken very seriously. Such an ahitude is unreasonal)le, as everything envisaged here ix a
logical extension of developments in the last ten years--in t)arlicular the l)erlk'clion of the
long-range rocket t)f whi(h V2 was Ihe prototype. Whih" this article ',',,as being written, it
was announced dial the (;ermans were c()nsidering a similar prt_iect, which they believed
possible within fifty to a hundre(l years.
Before ])rotceding furfller, it is necessary to discuss t)rietly certain fundamental laws
of rocket propulsion and "aslrolrarllics." A ro(kel which achieved a sufficiently great speed
in tlighl outside the earth's atmosl)lwre would never relrnn. This "orbital" velocity is 8 km
per sec. (.5 miles per see.), and a rocket which attained it would hecome an artititial satel-
lilt', cir(ling the world for ever with no expenditure of power--a se(ond moon, in lhct.
The (;erman transatl3.nlic rocke! AI0 would have reached more dlan half lhis velociw.
Ii will be possible in a tk'_,'_r illorc ,I/ears It) t)uild radio con/rolled rockets which can I)e
sleere(I into such t)rl)its I)eyond file limits of the altar)sphere and left It) broadcast scien-
tific inl_)rmalion I)ack It) lilt' earfll. A liltle later, mamwd rockels will he able It) Inake Siln-
liar flights widl sufficient excess power It) hreak the orbil and relr|rnl to earlh.
There are an intiniw numher of t)ossible stable orbits, circular and elliptical, in which
a rocket would remain if the initial conditions were correct. The veh)city of 8 km/'sec.
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applies only to lhe closest possible orb|l, onejus_ outside the atmosphere, and dw I)criod
of revolution would he ahout 90 minutes. As the radius of lhe orhit increases the vclocily
(lecreascs, since gravily is diminishing and h.ss (entrithgal torte is needed to halance il.
Fig. 1 shows this g,raphically. The moon, of course, is a l)articular case aud would lie <_
dw curves of Fig. I ifHwy were produced. The proposect German sl)a(e-stations [Figure
I I would have a l)eriod ()f al)ou! timr and a half h(mrs.
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I"lb,m;¢ I. L_t,'Jr,_//rm r_/r r.'_hll::/ l.'_'mM :z.d v¢hnil)" w/Ik rli_lam: fi-om Ik/' r'.,.,'ff,r._ _![ Ik¢ r'r,'_lh.
h will t)(" ot)s('rvcd lha! one ort)il, wilh a radius of 42,000 kin, has a period ot cxa(lly
24 hours. A body in such an orbit, iFils plane coincide with lhal oflhe [306] earth's equmol,
w(tul(I roy(dye with dw earth and would thus he stationary above the same spot on the plan-
('l. h w()tlld renlaii*l fixed in dw sky of a whole hemisphere and tmlike all olher heavenly I)od-
i('s would neither rise nor set. A hody in a smaller orbit wnultl revolve mort' (]uickly Hum the
earlh and so would rise in the wesl, as indeed happens with the inner moon of Mars.
[Tsing malerial ferriecl up by rockets, it would be possible to c(_nslrlwt _l "spacc-
station" in such an orbit. Th(" station could be provi(ied with living quarters, la|)oratories
and ('vervhing neede(I ti)r the (:omfi)rt ()fits crew, who would he relieved and provisioned
I)v a r('gular ro(ket servi(e. This project might be undertaken to( pm-('ly scientific reasons
as it would (()sir|hut(" ('n(}rmottsly to our knowledge of astronomy, pl)ysi(s and mt'tt'(}r(d-
ogS'. A g()od (lcal ()t' literature has already been written on the subjc(t. _
Allh(mg]_ such an undertaking may seem fantaslic, it requires for its fultilhnenl rock-
ets [)nlylwi('¢" _ls t_st _ts lhose already in the design stage. Since the gya'vitalional slress(.s
involved in Ihe slru('ture are negligible, only the very ]ighlesl malerials would he netcs-
S_I') r _]]_l l}](_ St_tlion could t)e _tS large as required.
[x'l us now Sul)pos¢' d_at such a slat|on were buih in this ()rt)iL Ii could he' l)rovid(,(l
wid_ receiving and lransmitting equipment (the problem of power will t)e (liscussed later)
and (()uhl act as a rel)ealer to relay Iransmissions between any Iwo points on tin" h(,mi-
sl)h('re henead), using any tiequen(y which will penelraw the ion(_sphcr('. If (tirecdvc
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re'rays ',v(,we used, the t)()w('r )equh-¢'m(eJlls would })e w'ry small, as dirt-el lira+ ofsighl Irmls-
missi(m wotd(,I t>t' us(,'d. Ther(,' is Ill(." [+tlrth('r important point lh_tt _tirays (in lhe t'at-l]l, oll(,c
set UF,, could r(,'m_lin fix(,'d indefinitel,
Mol-(.,()v(,,r, il tl_lllSmission l('-
c(fiv('d l)onl rely [)oiill oil lh(,' h(,,H)i-
sllh(.'r(," could It(., l)r()a(,l(ast Ill th(,"
wh()l(,' t)] lh<."visillh" I_I(,(,'t)f lit(," gh)l)(,',
alld thils tht! I'(.!(Itlh'(,'llit'ills o1" ;+Ill [)(Is-
sil)l¢' s(,,rvi(,(es w()ul(,l It(, nwl (Fig. 2).
Ii ilIiI'VIt(,";.II'gIIC(|thai we hay(+" _is
vt'In<)(lh,t'('t,vid(,n(('ifradio waves
l)a,ssing t)etwt'('n the surtace [Figur(,'
2] ()I Ill(,' ('ill'th ;+lil(l ()lil(,'i" ,_[);_i('('; all
w(.' CItll _,ll_+ with ('(.'l'l;+lilll'+' is Ihlll the
shorl(,'r w;zv(.'l(,qzgllls art- it(it r(.'lle(tt'd
l)a(k it) (.';+trill. l)il-C('l (,'vi(,l(,'nc(," ()I
livid str(,'nglh _d)<)vv th(, (,'arth's
;+itmOsl+h(.,r(,. could Ill,' ¢)l)laiil(,d l)v V2
rt)(,+kt't l(,'(hi_i(lu(,', ;+lil(l it ix i() Ill,"
lu)p(,'d tll_t! s()in(,.()n(," will d() sl)m(,,-
lhilt_ ah()ut this soon as th(,'rc mull
llc quilt' .l sttrl)hts stock s()m(,'wh('t'c!
/klt(,'rll;ativ(,'l_,'. givt'll sll[[i('it, nl tr;+tilS- l,iL#ur+, 2, "l_'pi+al +,xtm-te))i,+t+ml ),'la_ w,Pvi_+<s. 7mn+mis_i+m #++m A
tiiitting [)()+xt'r, wt" might ol)l;lill lit(.' )ela_ed t+, whole l+e.+i+phew,
nt,¢cssarv (.'vi(,h'n¢(" hy (,xl)h)ring fi)r
(,'(h()(.'s [i'(>ill h(."lilt)till,hl Ill(+ ill(';+lll-
Ihli¢'wt' liar(,"visual(,wid(,'n(,(,'that fr¢,qttenci(,'s;+itlh(el)pti(_tl('rid<itth('Sl)(+(truntpass
thr()ugh w[l]i Iilii¢' al)s<)rl)lion ('xc(,'pt at c(,,rl;+lin lrt'qu(.'ilci(,'s ,it whi(h rt.s()minc(,' ('fl_.'(ts
o(,wur..Mt'dium high ['r(,'(]itt'tl(,ies g<) thr()ugh th(,' l'_ ];ay(,'r twit(.' It) 1)¢" r(,>llt'(t(.'d [r()lll I/It' }:
IFi_ttr(,' 3] lav(,'r mill t'(,h()(,'s lmv(,' llc(,'u rt'(('iv(,'d lr(ltli lll(,+tt'()is ill ,>r al)()v(,' tht' I: ]ii'_/(,'i ", it
s(,'(,ills [_lii+I'¢ ((,'rt;,tiIl th;tt lrcqu('n(i('s fr()m, s+ly. 50 M(,/'s It) I0(),000 Mc/s could Ill,. u'_t'd
with(lut un(hi(,' alls()rllti()n in t]It" ;.itlll()silh(,'r(' l)r th(,' ioll(l.',;pIit'r(,'.
'_ _ D
l"i_u)e 7. Th),'e +atel/ite +t+tti+,+++++,+,tiM +'n +u te complete ++n,e) a_¢' +¢1the ,t_l+du,.
A singl(,' station could ()nly provid(," (()v('rage I<) half th(,' gh)|)(,', and 10r a world s(,'rvi(c
lhr(.'(" w()illd t)o z(,'qtzir('(,l, i|lollg|l lilt)r(" (,'ouhl I)(,' readily litiliz('(l, Fig. 3 shows th(," sinllJi('sl
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arrati_enlent. The slalh)ns would be arranged ;ippr<)ximalely equidislarilly aroutid the
earth, and lhe l_llowing lonl4itttdes appear to, be sttitalde:--
+-I0E--Africa and Etif,,l+e.
150 E--(:llina and Oceana.
90 W--The Americas.
Tile stations in iht" chain would be linked by radio or optical be+ass, arid tit(is any con-
ceivable beam or broadcast service could be provided.
The technical probh.it_s hlvolved it+ tilt, (lesign <+f such stations +it-(' extrentely inter-
estinl4,:' but only a few can be gone into here. Batteries of [:,ai+al)olic reflectors would 1:,e
provided+ of apertm-('s +lepelltlitig on lhe |'rt'qllO/l¢:+0s eml+hLvcd. Ass(sting lhe us(' of
!+,t)O0 M<'/s waves, mh-r()t+s ;+tli_>ut a metre across would beam ahnosl all the power on to
tilt; earth. I,arger reflectors could tie used to ilhtntinate single c<)unlries or regions |_+r tit("
mort' restricted services, with ['3071 c<msequent econonly of power. (in the higher ffe-
qtLencies it is not difficuh It_ pr<)duce beants less than a degnt'e ill widlh, and, ;is men-
tioned t)el_re, lhcre would be no physical limilalions on the _i/(' oJ the mirrors. (From lhe
space stall<,n, the disc t>f lit(' earth would lie a little over 17 degrees across). The same (nit +-
rors (<)uld be used l_n mau,, (lit+k+rent transmissions if ptec;tttti<ms v,,'('re I;tkel+ to avoid
(:l'OSs modtllaliOll.
It is clear l:rotn the tlaltlre t)f" the system that tilt+ power nee(l('d ,++'illbe much less than
lh;tl required fi')r any t)th('r alTatl_('inent, sill(:(, all the ene]_,O' radiated t';tll lie unil_)rmlv
(listrit)tiled over the service" area, and none is wasted. An appr<)ximale estimate of tilt"
power retluJred 17>r the I)rt)adt+ast service flom a single station can t)e made +is folh)ws:--
The field strength in the eqtmtorial plane eta Z/2 dipole in free space al :l (lislance
(it" ,:/ll|ell('s is
r_-l_.bl,_qP vt)hs/tii('lre, ,,vhere P is Ihv p<lwel +radiated ill 'w_ilts.
d
|akin_ d as :/7,0fit) kill (efl+.'('lively it wollld be less), we ll:t+l'e 1'-!_7.6 :" walls. (: now ill
tlV/lii('lr('.)
If wt' ;issuiiie +"1() lie 5t') llii(lOvolls/lnelFe, which is Ihe l;.(;.(L staild_ll+d tilt ti'equency
in(ithllitli<ln, I _ ,+,++illlie !)4 kW [kih)wattsl. Tllis is the power retltlired t()l a single dip<de,
anti liOl all alTaV which wotild (OllCelllFale all the pew(l on Ibe earth+ Stl(-h ;in ail-av would
h;ive ;i _-ain oveF _1 simple (lipole of :,lbOlli 80. The powel + i'oqtiil+('(I |_)r the bi()a(l(asl set-
vice ',_,'(Jtil(l lhils be at)()ill 12 kW,'
Ri(li(ul<lttsl)' sinall Ih<lli_h ii is, lliis |]_lire is probably illli(-ti I()o _('l+el'<itlS+ _illall
par:ll)<il:is al)<lul +it(l<)l iii dianieler would be +`(sell for Fe('eivillb_ al lhe earlh (lid aiid Wotlld
I_i,+'e;l very g()<l(l sign;iilnoist_ ratio. There would be very little ittter|Trence, l)arlly I)ecause
_lt lhv |reqtiency iised and fl+irlly tie(arise the mirrors would lie pointiitg Iowai+ds the ski'
which could ('oill_iili lie oilier SOtlice of signal. A tield slreli_lh of 10 liii(Tovol_/inelle
tlliglll well be ainple, aiid Iliis WOliid Feqilire a tF_ll_lsmiller Oillplil of only 50 walls.
'vl¢lien it is reineiilbered that Ihese |]gtlFe relate to the broadcast service, the efticien-
cy of the sysleUl ++ill he r(Palised. The point-to-point beam tr+msmissiotis itii<_lit tlee(I pow-
elS (it only It') walls (it sll. These t]_jilit's, of course, would need corre(:tion for ionospheric
;iitd _iiiliospheric al)sorplion, but lh_tl would be quite small oveF nlosl of lit+." I)and+ Tilt"
slight []llliiig off in tield strength due to this cause towards the etlf. W of the service alea
could I)e re;idily correeled by a llon-unifornt rat-tilter.
The eli](ien(y of lhe s)'stt'Ili is strikil<igly Ievea]ed whell we col+lsi<'ler lhal l]ie I+olld<)ll
Televisi<nl service reqttired abOlll !ll kll4+r average power for an _tFea less than fifty miles in
radius.'
,.\ se(olid fundaliielit_il |)iol)lelii is tile |/iovision of eleciFiCal enef_' to rtin lhe I_lil_,e
iiililil)eF of lr_iliSliiillers leqliired for Ill(, dittT.'rent services, in Sl)_ice 1)e)'<lild the almos-
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phere, a square metre no[nla] to the solar radiation intercepts 1.35 kW of energy." Solar
engines have already been devised for terrestrial use and are an economic proposition in
Iropical countries. They employ mirrors to concentrale sunlighl on tim boiler of a tow-
pressure smam engine. Ahhough this arrangemem is not very efficient il c<mld bc made
much more so ill space where tile operating components are in a vacuum, the radiation
is intense and continuous, and the ]ow=tempcralure cnd of the cycle could be nol far hom
absohne zero. Thermo-elcclric and phot<>-eleclric developments may makc it possible to
utilize tire solar cnergy more directly.
Though there is no limit m tire size of [hc mirrors lha! could be built, one fifty metres
in radius would intercept over It),000 kW and al least a quarter of this energ}' should be
available tot use.
The station would hc in continuous sunlight except for some weeks around the
cqumoxcs, when it would enter the earth's shadow for a few minu[cs every day. Fig. 4
shows the state of aft;airs during the eclipse period. For [?,08] this calculation, it is legiti-
mate to consider the earth as |ixe<t and the sun as moving round it. The station would gaze
the earth's shadow at A, on the last day in February. Every day, as it made its diurnal rev-
olution, it would cu[ more deeply into the shadow, mldergoing its period of maximum
[Figure 4] eclipse on March 21st. On lhal day it would only be in darkness for l hour
9 minutes. From then onwards [he period of eclipse would shorten, and after April l l th
(B) the slat|on would be in continuous sunlighl again until the same thing happened six
months later at the attlunm eqttinox, hetween Septcmher 12th and October 14th. The
Iotal period of darkness would he about two days per year, and as the longest period of
eclipse would be little more than an hottr there should I)e no ditticulty in storing enough
power ti>r an unh_lerrupled service)
I';K_., t..g,,lm _rulmli._; w.Md tw c_it ;![l /i. a xtu.t l>eri,,d ,..,h _lax m the ewim_x,,v
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Conclusion
Briefly summarized, the advantages ot +the space station are as ]olh)ws:--
(1) h is lilt' only way ill which lrtte world coverage can he achieved for all possihle
lyl>es of s('rvice.
(_) It permhs unrestcitled ttse ()t a band at least 100,000 Mc/s wide, and with the use
of beams an almost unlimited number of channels would be +wailabh'.
(3) The power requirements ;ire extremely small since the efticivncy of "illumitm-
tiotl '+will be almost 10<) percent. Moreover, the ct)sl of the power would he very low.
CI) i h)wt'ver ,_reat the initial expense, it wottM only be a fraction <)(that required t_)r
Ihe world tletworks rt,l)laced, and the rtmning costs would he incoml):.al)ly less.
Appendix--Rocket Design
The develol)vnent of rotkets stflticienlly l)owerful to reach "orl)ital" and evevt "escape'"
vt'locily is nol only a III;tlleF Of years. The thllowing figures ntay t:,e of illl('les! ill lhis con-
neclion.
The rockct has to ac(itfire a final velocity of 8 km/sec. Allowing 2 km/sec, for naviga-
tional corrections and ;tit resistance loss (this is legitimate as all sp;tce-rockets will I)e
launched from very high cotmtry) gives a total veh)cily needed of 10 knt/sec. The funda-
mental equalion of rocket ntolion is -_
v: v 1o_,_R
where V is the final veh)city t)f th(" rockel, v the exhausl velocity and R lilt" rail() ()f ini-
tial mass It) final mass (payh)ad phls structure). St) l_ar v has been aho.l 2-2.5 km/sec li)r
liquid fucl rockets ))ill llew designs and fuels will permi! of considecal)ly higher figures.
(()xy-hvdr()g(,n fitel has a theorelical exhaus! velocity t)f 5.2 km/sec and more p()werftfl
c()mhina|i())ts are known.) If we assume v to be %3 kin/see, R will he 20 to I. Ht)wever,
()win,_ t() ils lhfiw acceleratit)n, the rockel loses velocity as a resuh of _r;tvilational retar-
dali()tt. If its ;_ccelerati())t (asstm)ed (()nstan(0 is a ntetres/se('.-', then lht' necessary r;ttio
R g is intreas(.(t It)
Rg = R 0c
For an attmmalically conlr()lled rocket c( would be about 5gr attd so Ihe necessary R
w()uld he 37 t() 1. Such ralios cannot be realised with a single rockel but (';ill I:,e attained
hy "step-rt)ckcls," while very much higher ratios (up to 1,000 It) 1) can I)e a(hieved I)y the
l)rill(il:,lt • of "cellular conslruction."'
Epilogue--Atomic Power
The advent of atomic power has at one bound I)rottght sl)ace travel half a cenlttry
nearer. ]1 seems unlikely thai we will have to wait as much a.s twenty years betore at()mic-
l)()wered r()(.kets are deveh)ped, and sttch rockets could reach even the rein(tier planets
wilh a fhnlaslitally small fuel/mass ratio--only a t_:w percenl. The equations deveh)F, ed in
Ihe appendix still hold, hut v will be increased by a f_.ctor t)f ab()u! a tltt)ttsand.
ht view of lhese facts, it appears hardly worth while Io expend much effort on the
h,ilding of h_ng-distance relay chains. Even the h)cal networks which will soon t)c under
c()ttstru(ti()n may have a working, life of only '20-30 years.
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In the 1950s, John R. Pierce and his resemrh team at AT"&7"_ Bell Laboratories Iwgan exploring the
possibility, oJ communicating via satellites. This review article, his second mapJr one on the _utqeet,
examines the potential]br using satellites in either gea._vnehronous orbit or in lower orbits to receive ._it,_-
nals.fiom the F,arth and retransmit them to another location. Similar to his April 1955 article ]br,let
Propulsion, which diseuswd i_ more technical terms some _( the initial eomepts ]or different (_'pes O/
eommumcations satdlites and orbital radio relays, this article degcrihes some 0] the "state of the art "
expe*iments that he and his team proposed to carry, out using_ the Imge I",cho 1 satellite to tw orbited l_'
PC_4,S'Aas a passive r(,/lector q/sig, naL_ orig6natingJ}wn the l;arth. By 1960, Bell 1,ah._ had decided that
the technical obstacles to a medium-altitude active repeater communications .satellite could he _olved,
and A T"&T (vnsequently proposed the expev4mental Telstar pr%rram to the government.
1323] ,]. R. Pierce
Exotic Radio Communications
[original set in two columns of newspaper style text per ])age]
Pioneering work oflerl seems exotic in its inception. ()nly a very few years ago, the
idea of launching an artificial satellite seelned exotic, if not scatterbrained. But satellites
have hecome almost commonplace. Today's exoticism is space flight hy human beings,
alld we do llOl know what lonlt)rlow's might he.
In the early part of this century, it would have taken an incorrigible visionary to lore-
set' tile present Bell System direct distance dialing network, undersea telephone cabh's,
coaxial cablc systems, alld transcontinental microwave ,-adio-relay routes. These all grew
Otlt ofwork which in ils inception seemed far from any practical reality. It is an important
part of Bell l.aboratories activities to look t_u- ahead--to study possible future comnnlni-
cations services and thus build a tired of knowledge to draw upon if these services should
hecome economically attractive.
In this article l shall deal primarily with some of the pioneering work at Bell
l.al)oratories which may someday be important to the Bell System in providing broad-
band transoceanic radio communication. And to introduce this suhject, I shall first hriefly
review some of our past accomplishlnents. My purpose is not merely to presenl it list of
important radio icseal-ch l)mjects. Rather; ! hope to illustta.te the iml)oltancl' otgood sci-
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entitle and engineering work and l<} show Ihe value ot +tilt" Bell System pattern of careful
SltLdy, nleaSlllelllenl _n{l design.
Radio itself seemed ex{}lic in an earlier day. Before the t6unditlg of Bell
l+at}orat{wies in 1925, the A.T.&T. (:o. and Western Electric contributed heavily to tile
lechnolob,_, of radio broadcasting. Even earlier, in 1915, A/E&'E and Western made use of
newly developed power vacnllm tulles in demonstrating radio cOlnlnllnicittion between
Arlingttm, Virginia, and both 1tawaii and Paris. This showed a potenlialily for transocean-
it comnnmication which c<}uht IlO| t}e overlooked. One rcsuh was the tits| rise {)t+radio thr
commercial telephone service, from the mainland in Calitc, rnia to Carolina lslautl in 1920.
The work also led direclly to exl)erimen|s in transatlantic lelel)hony ;is early as 1923, and
It} lilt" inaugtn-ati{}n of commercial lransatlanlic telephone service in 1927.
, { ,[32.tl
"l he_elztal atmospheric nrfiw (in deKree._ K) ve_u_ /_equem 7 as an ideal antenna poiul_ at variou_ anI,Ve_ Io flu' horzzon. The
rolot I_'grlrni imluales the expelled ralll4t' o] co,mite tloise.
In lifts early long-wave work, accurate measuren_ents of tield strengths were made. A
tbrm of modulali{m was adopted--in this case Ihe tirst use on radio of the single-sideband
techMqtle--which was besl suited to the nature of the medium and the needs of the syslem.
The wduc of Ihis type of approach was again illustrated with short-wave radio, put inlo
commercial service in 1928. A tricky sort of communication, shorl-wave propagation
shows both long-term wuiations of signal strength and rapid fading. Careful measure-
IllelllS I)y Bell 1.al)oralories workers showed thai such fading has a muhipath nalurc--lhal
is, radio waves in I}{}uncing diflk'rent iliHnl}ers of times I)etween tile earth ,tnd the ionos-
i}her{+ ahernately add and sltl)|laCl in the radio receiver. These iIleaSllletnelllS ills{} slit}wed
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arapidvariationill tiledirectioutiOlnwhichsignalconlponcntsarriveat arccciving
antennandespeciallyin theverticalangleofarrival.
Suchextensiveandaccuratemcasurctnentsmadeit clearthat<_peratingt?equcncics
shouldbechangedfrolntimetotimetosuithecold;lionoftheionosphere.Asareplace-
mentfortheearlynarrow-bandanletmarrays,thesilnplerbombicantennainvente<lat
Bell,aboratoricspermilledeffectiveoperationovertherequiredwiderbandofticquen-
cies.Intollowingthemorerapidwlriationsinangleofarrival,theMUSA systenl--an array
of rhoml)ic anlennas interconnected with phase-cllanging nelworks--nla<te it possible ti_-
a receiver to track the observed changes in the vertical angle of arrival of the radio signal.
?is a part of the careful studies of stlort-wave phenl_melm at Bell Laboratories t?oln
1929 through 1931, K. (;.Jansky investigated noise in the short-wave bands at the Hohndel
I_aboratory. In the COlUSe of these sludies, tie detected radio noise of extra-terrestrial ori-
gin-work whicll laid the basis of radi(i asllOllOmy. In rccoglfition of Nit. Janskv's <liscov-
cry, the laboratory at the new Nalional Radio OI)servalory al (;recu Bank, Wcsi Virginia.
is to be named die Karl G. Jansky l,aboratory.
Besides this short-wave work, higher frequencies wcrc also explored, and much filn-
danlenlal knowledge was gained. This was applied in providing a numl)er of over-water cir-
cnils and in mobile radio, lh)wever, the IICXI large-scale Bell System apl)lica/ion of radio
was fi_und in the tield of lnicrowavcs, which have frequencies of thousands of megacvch.s.
(,. (;. Soutllwortll slarted his microwave work ;is early as 1932, long I)cfore any use tor'such
fiequencics could be assured. It. T. Friis and his associales took up this work in 1938.
litre again we sec how early scientific and cxploralory work led Io extensive nlea-
SUlCments and studies, and to the development of a sound teclmical art. The knowledge
so gained was invahlable t<> radar during World War It, and laler made possible lhe exper-
imental New _brk-Boston System in 1947 and the Transconlincntal TI)-2 Radio-Relay
System in 1951.
Reliable Microwave Service
As in previous cases, fllele was a lot to learn. Studies of microwave paths proved ille
vahle of using highly directive antelmas. Thesc stttdies set a pattcln in lhc Bell System of
using very good, llarrow-bealn antelmas that allow the use <)Flow power and thai minimize
illterli:rcncc. All of Ibis work showed lhal microwaves could provide very reliable service
illdee<l.
_¢_r IIOW apl)roa(tl lllOrc contemporary develol)menls , and il is lilllC tO renlind our-
selves again lllat it is largely an illusion to think of such pasl achievemenls as comnlon-
place. Ttlcy were, and cerlaila aspects of lhcm still arc, as challenging as anylhing we have
ill mind for die tlllllle.
(;urlent thinking in radio comnnlnications [325] still emphasizes the use of higher
and higher tiequencies, bill <tireclioll of l)ropagalion is another illlporlalll t?tclol'. ]_'[allV
intriguing f)robleuls and possibilities arise when we direct antennas toward [tie tropos-
phere an<l the iollosphcre, and towal+<t satellites. Some of these problenls were tiwesha<t-
owed at Bell l,at)orat<llies as early as 19.'14 when A. M. Skelh'tt and W. M. (;oodall, in their
studies of ltle ioll<_sphere, looked for retlections I?om ionized meteor trails. The fre-
quencies of 2 to 6 lnC [megacycles] used in these studies were too low to give a strong sig-
nal, but statistical analysis of the data seemed to yield evidence [or such rellections.
In other studies of ttle ionosphere, workers outside the I.aboratories proposed in
1951 to use lhc lurbulcllce of" lhe ionosphere t<>achieve beyond-the-horizon scatter prop-
agalion. At a frequency of 50 lnC, a 776-inile circuit was cslablished between (;edar Rapids,
Iowa, and Sterling, Virginia. Bell l,al)oralories monitored lhcse signals, and wiltl carefully
designed ;tnbi'llnas was able lo receive Icletypewriler messages during 1951 Io 1954. In lh¢"
course of this work, very high signal SlleIlgltls were dclecled fi>r very sllorl periods. These
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observations indi(aled slrong reflections [ionl nieteor trails, a verification ofSkellett's and
(;()o(lall's early ideas.
tiowevcr, ion()spheric scattering proved disalipointing for long-distance teleph()nc
circuits. For both ttubulence scatter and meteor-trail scalier, Ihe bandwidth is too narrow
and transmission is too erratic. The in(ire inlporlant region fin the scatter technique
pr(wcd to be the lower-altitude troposphere.
Kenneth Bullington did the pioneering work in Ibis tieh-I. During 1950-1951, tie col-
lected data on an<l tested what we now know to be lr<ipospheric scatter propagation, over
paths 200 tl) 300 miles long. l le pointed (lilt the possibilities of this nlode of transmission
in historic papers pulflishc<l in the l%ceedint, r_ of the LR.E. in 195() and 1953.
Beginning in 1955, further studies of scatter propagation were caN+ted ou! ovcr a path
between a 60-loot scanning antenna at the Hohndel l,aboratorv and a transnliner on a
[him in Pharsalia, New York, 171 miles away. The effi:cts of antelma size, signal strenglh,
depth and speed of lading, and angles of arrival were investigated. These dam were com-
pared with the predictions of a theory worked out by l I. T. Friis, A. B. Cr.|wf.rd and I). C.
lh;gg. Tilts theory supposes Ihal the scattering is caused by a large nuniber of randomly
positi<,ned lint nearly horiz<mtal <liscotitinuitics in dielectric consl;tlll in the fhst fi.+w titles
above the earth's surta<e. The measurernents fit the theoretical predi<ti<)ns very well in
many respects. The knowledge acquired in these smdics of tropospheric scaH¢;r is now
widely used in (lesigning scalier circttits.
Scatter Circuits in Operation
Scatter circttits (tesigne(t by Bell l,aboratories and inslalled by B_'stern Electric are
currently in operation over the I)EW [Defense Early Warning] lit;' in lhe tar north and
over the "White Alice" system in Alaska. In addition, a broa(I-band scattcr syslent for c()m-
ntercial teleph(inc an(I television service was estal)lished I)etwcen Florida City an(l ttavana
in 1957. This Flori(la-(;ut)a (ircttit han(tlcs 36 telephone channels and has the capability
of han<lling 120 or ulore.
If we lt()w ttlrll otlr altenlioll lo Ille
I)rolilcnt of fill|ire t)road-I)ancl radio trans-
nfissiovt t)etween North America an(t
Etui>l)e, scatter cir('itits are an obvi<_tts sitg-
geslion. It might 1)c possible, tiir example,
I<) set up a series of relay stations via [326]
(;rcenland, various North Atlantic islands,
an(I Scotland. ()ur studies indicate, howev-
er, that this type of coninnnfications wottld
be very expensive. Large antennas and
high-t)owcr transmitters would have to be
buih and ntaitmfine<l at reniotc arctic loca-
tions. Fttrther, the nnthipath nature of
scarier transmission woul(I prot)ably resuh
in a t)oor I)road-band circtfit by television
sian(I;u'ds, ahhough several dozen tele-
phi,vie channels nlight be provided.
!_V]i;tl, lhen, is anolher type of possible
inlerCOlilinenlal radio (Olliinlillicalions7
As early ;is 1954, we considered Ihe 1.ise (if
artificial earth satellites ;is relays, and I
pulflished a iechni(al paper Oil thc sub-
j('cl. AI Ih;tl tiine, ht)wcV(,l; plol)lclns of
I;lilnching Slich salcllil('s were tln(,xlil()re(l+
ANO
7De 14e.met#y o! a pas_ivr ,r]h+_tor _alelhte i. a p,da, orbit ¢tt
an altitude ¢![ 7.1700 miles, with tetmitial_ Imaled 1_1
,%7'wii,u ,'tdhi ud r_nd .'+¢rotla_ld.
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The first Sputnik in October 1957 changed the picture radically, and wc began to look al
these possibilities much more seriotlsly.
If satellite communicatitm ever becomes a reality, il will be n¢_ ex(epli¢ltl to past Bell
System experience. That is, it will necessarily be preceded by the established pattern of
meticulous study and experhnental work. At the moment, we do not have el+ouch knowl-
edge' <)t experience to describe it+ detail +l practicable system or to stale exactly bow it
+night be used. We can do little nlore that+ speculate on the various possibililies.
()he proposal is to place satellites 22,400 miles above the equator. At this height, a
satellite would rotate in step will] tilt+ earth and seem always to han_ in the same position
it+ lilt" sky. ,";etch satellites would be "active" relay stations---that is, they would be equipped
with IeceiVels _il+tl transmitters, and prt)bat+ly with accurately pointed dh'ective antennas.
This is an al)parmilly attractive proposal, ]+ill l_lr the present it raises _tl least two selious
questions: lilt' ptobhm+s of acctna.te tockt'try to launch and orient such satellites are
indet'd l't)<midable, and the pt+ol+Icnls of e<l<fipn+etlt lilo in mlch t+el;ly stations are, to put
it tnildly, severe.
A second proposal is to place active satellites in orbit only a It, w lltmlsand miles above
the earth. Tl)ese wotfld not be stationary in relation I<) lilt" earth, ]+)illwith a sIll]icient tillill-
lwr of thenl, signals could be relayed fiom each whetle',¢er it is in a usable section o| its
orbit. With this second proposal, rocket accuracy is sonlewhat eased, t)ul eqtfipnwnt lift' in
a Iow-allitttdc relay station is as seriotts a question as in lilt + case <)t tilt" 22,4<)0 mile satellite.
_+Vilh l<_w-altilttdc satellites, however, a IraHsnlilter and receiver on the satellite arc not
essenti;tl. Instead, one may put ill ot+l+it a gfolt F, of passive retlectms, l,arge, high-t+ower
tratlSmillers would Ihen transnfit to a satellite rt'flecl<m and signals would 1+olin,c+. I)<mi it
and thlts reach a distant receiver. The satellites would be ahltninized plastic spheres--
"tmlh)ol+S'" perhaps 100 tee+ in diameter--with a high retleclivity to microwaves.
As an exercise tit explore possibilities and probletns, we have sttldied in some detail a
theoretical system using passive satellites tier transatlantic broad-band tfansmissiotL +ks
she)we+ it+ Ill(" ilh]slr;ili<)n I<+t Ihe i)assive-ret]ectt)r satellite ], the lerminals werc c<)t)sitlered
to be ill Newfi)tmdlat+d and t)n an island in the [ let)rides <)ft+Scotland. The satellil(+s are
l<) I)e imagined :is traveling in I+ohtr t)rl+its.
Regions of Visibility
()n the polar projection shown l+elow, closed ct)nlotlf lines are drawn 1or vari<)us
heights of <_rbit. These deiine areas in which a single satellite would be sitnultanctmsb: vis-
ible to both tile Newfottndland and Scotland terminals. At a height of 2,00(bnfiles, fin
example, a satellite would be visible to both lertninals anywhere within the 2,000-tulle con-
lOtll\ even ah)t/g the outer edges of the area.
The first of the accotnp+lnyit+g tables (see behm,) shows c;llcul+ltions relating It) the oFt+lit
1327] heights. The shorlest and longest visil+ilily tittles it+ the second and thirtl httriztmtal
rows are of particular interest. For the 1,000-mile height, as at+ example, the zero Ior short-
est visibility time indicates that tbr some passes, a satellite would not t)e visible al all at both
of tile two terminals. A "+_,0<)0-mile satellite, ht>wever, woukl be visible al least 31.4 tnimltes,
and as long +is 55.4 mitmtes, for every revohtti<m arottnd the earth. ()n lilt' average it
would be visible 22 percent of the tithe. Thus, even with only one satellite, one might get
quite long stretches of broadband cmtmnlnication.
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(h,al shaped a_a_ define w t,qot_ m whidt /,olar-o_bit _atellites at va_4tm._ height_ wm_M t_, _imultam'ou_l_' vi_ibh" to both tel
mirmh at ,Vewfimndla_d amt S_otland. 77_e u_abb' area.g npoltld be _omeTt,hat .gmaller, lum,evr_; _ime tmn_mi_ion i_ d!fficult
when /the] _atellite i_ nettr the/torizqm.
Visibility Times at Various Heights of Orbit
thqght of Satellite Above Surface of Earth in Miles
5()0 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
Till)(' o|" one
revoluli()n
(minutes) 100.4 118.0 136.6 155.0 175.2 195.2
Shortesl
visibility
(minutes) 0 0 8.0 12.5 23.8 31.4
l_()ngcst
vis t)il Iv
(mintttt's) 14.7 20.0 29.6 36.6 46.2 55.4
Av(q'ag('
visil)ility
(pcwccnt) 3.5 6.9 12.9 17.7 19.6 22.0
Assumptions: Terminals ill N(.wtoun(tland and itebri(tcs; polar ()rbits; r(,fra(li_)n (.[tiwls
ignor(,d; and visibilfiy from horizon to horizon.
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This view is somewhat optimistic, however, since we have so t_n- ignored three sources
of noise that could restrict the range of this type of communications: (1) The noise added
hy the receiving amplitier, (_2) Cosmic noise, and (3) Atnlosl)heric noise. Fortunately, the
maser (RE(_ORI), tidy, 1%'38) provides us with a nficrowave receiver that adds p,actically
no noise to the received signal. Thus we can largely neglect the first of these three noise
sources.
Another illustration [the graph at the beginning of this docu.lnenl] gives some perti-
nent data on the other two sources. In this graph, noise is described in terms of ahsolule
temperature, ranging upward tiom 1° Kelvin on the ordinate, as related to ti-equcncy on
the abscissa. The color region describes the range of the cosmic noise discovered by
.]ansk_, and as we see from the graph, it becomes negligible at the higher ticquen<ies.
The third sourceialmosphcric noise--is a more serious limitation. Even cold air at
high ahitudes is hot compared to absolute zero, so it radiates electromagnetic noisc just
as hot ir, m radiates light and heat. The radiation is sinall hecause tilt" atmosl)here is
almost transparell[. To evahlate the noise, we lntls[ consider how |ransparenl the allllOS-
phere is at a given tieqt,ency and also how much atmosphere an alllellna "sees" as it fol-
lows a satellite.
In the graph, the t)()ll()tll curve labeled 90 degrees illustrates that an antenna point-
cd straight up sees a minimum of ammsphere and theretore receives a minimnm of
atmospheric noise. From about 2 to l0 kilomegacycles this noise is fairly constant and col-
responds to only about 2.5 ° K. :ks the antenna is rotated [art]lcr and tmther toward the
horizon, however, it Innst look l]Irt)ttg]l lllore and Inore atn_osphere an(l receive corrc-
spondingly more noise. The zero curve at the top is the case where the anlenna points
horizontally; here it sees a very long atmospheric path, an(l the noise actually al)l)roaches
the assnmed atnlospheric tenq)erature (290 ° K) at very short wavelengths for which air is
not very transparent to nlicrowaves.
[328] Note, however, that the curves tot the various angles are displaced downward
toward the lower noise vahtes as the angle ahove the horizon is increased. Even as ch_se as
10 degrees ahtwe the horizon, an antenna will see only about 13 ° K of atmosl)heric noise.
These curves make us tk'el that we can realize the adwmtages of the maser if we use signals
from a satellite retlector only when it is 7 degrees or more above the horizon. This limi-
tation in e[]ect contracts the contour areas in the polar-projection map, which were drawn
with tilt" assmnption that signals would he received right down to the horizon.
How serious is this limitation? Sul_pose we consider satellites 3,000 miles high and use
them only when they are at least 7 degrees ahove the horizon. Average visihility per rota-
lion will thus be less than the 22 percent listed in the first tahle, hut i[+we put more and
more satellites up, the resnll is an increase its the percentage of time that at least one satel-
lite is visihh.. For 24 satellites, at least one satellite would he availal)le to both
Newfoundland and Scotland tier 99 percent of the lime. The interruptions would occur at
predictable intervals, and would therefore he less serions than if they were random in
time. The second table (see below) lists some other possibilities for dilli'rent minimum
angles and percentages of service interruptions.
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Number of Randomly Spaced Satellites Needed for Various
Minimum Elevation Angles and Percentages of Interruption
Minimum Elevation Percentage of Interruption
Angle in Degrees 10% 5% 1%
0 9 12 19
3.25 I 1 14 21
7.25 12 15 24
12.60 17 22 33
Assumptions: Terminals in Newfoundland and Hebrides; Polar Orbits at 3000-nfile height
The nex! obvious question is whtqher transmitters and antennas are available fi)r such
conumtnication. Assuming an operaling frequency of 2 kilomegacycles, a 40 db [decibel]
signal-to-noise ratio, and 100-fi)ot spherical reflectors at 3,000 nfiles, we have calculated
that we would need anlemms 150 tk'et in diameter and transmitter power of 100 kilowatts.
Antennas of this size have been used, and the required power could be obtained by' par-
alleling ten commercially available tubes. At present, however, we cannot be sure that the
required type of satellile rcllecmr would withstand the conditions of space and maintain
ils shal)(' in ()rt)il.
Need for Knowledge
AI dtis stage the reader may fl'el lhal this is exoticism with a vengeance. We have per-
haps raised more queslions lhan lhose we have tried to answer. Aside flom the problem
_t costs, which can hardly be handled detinitiw'ly at this early dale, the .'c lmical problems
are extensive. But herein lies lhe poinl of this discussion--we need more flmdamenlal
knowledge of lhe possibililies 1)el_ne we can begin to think realistically of aclual syslems.
And the only way we know of m gel tiffs knowledge is to continue ore- traditions of care-
ful search, study of lhe 1)roblems, and ineasurenlellt.
()n March 19, T. Keith (;h-nnan, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Adminislration (NASA), announced plans to launch several satellite spheres nexl year.
These experimental spheres, fi_bricaled from an aluminized plastic, are m be 100 fl'el in
diamcler. The annomwement also mentioned the plan to establish communications
]wlWC(m an 85-fi)oi mwking antenna al (;oldslone, California, and colnlntlnicaliollS thcil-
itics on lhc Easl (:oasl, including [329] Bell l.abora, lories equipment al ltolmdel. The
(;oldstone anti'ram is operated by lheJet Propulsion Laboratory of Pasadena, Calitiwnia,
which is owned by NASA and operated under contract to the NASA by the (',aliflunia
]nslilUle of Technology.
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I'la_tt_ sphet_ _, IO0 /eet i_1 diameter: 14 /the/ type t_ he used in _atellite Imnsmh_i.l_ experime_t_, h_ tobit, thin plasti_ with alu
mmiz.ed su_/me will u'Jh'H microwave,s.
hi connection with this type of work, then, what are sonic of the spccilh pmbh.ms on
which we have worked, and wha! are some of the probh'nns conct, rning which we nccd
additional knt_wlcdgc?
Whih" wc have a vt'lv good mastw in tilt" (_,()()0 lnc liuig(., thcF(' is still sonic room liw
improvement, and we need masers tbr other th'qucncics. A related problem is theft some
typt'S of illllC'[llltlS lClld 10 pick up noise from all directions, so we an: adapting tilt" horn-
rcih'ctor typc antenna, which does not have this dt_fbct. With such eqtfipment, ",s'c'ha'to
already made mcasuJemcnts of sky temperatures which check tilt' theoretical curves
shown on page 324. We believe that theso itnlt'llnas may also have many uses i_l radio
_iSll'()llOllly.
Wc have made sorer' studies of the cHcct of ulmtvi_>h'! lig-ht on tilt' I>mpt'vtics ot alu-
lninizcd Mylar, and fi,-this material wc have im,esfigated al)sorption al v_lriollS witvc-
lengths to tell us tilt" tCml)Cntture a satellite might _ttt_dn in sp;tce.
()l]l,_'r _l)violls th'hls t()l additional work are those of 1)vopagation mt';,sllvcmcnls,
_ui(lilllt't', ;tll(t tht" IIliuly t'OlllpOllt'lllS I)csidcs I1111S('I-S and iUllt'llll;.Is lhill lllllsl ,_() illl() iulv
cxpcrimcllta] system. A vt'vy iillpol't_t.nt nt't'd is highl', vclial)]c components h)r cxpcri-
lilt'tits with acliv(' satcllit(' n'pcitters. We havc illatlgunttcd work on such (()lllptlll/qltS.
This need for further study should t,ml)hasize that today we hart. no proven iulswcvs
t<) thc i)vot)lcm of overseas l)mad-l)and radit_ ct)inlnllniti'ttions. Iiwt, ever 1/1111oil ()111' t(']('-
vision sets _md view a El,rope!an t'v¢'nt I)camed by r_tdio across the Atlantic, it m_', c<_m('to
US ()Vl'l" _l SVSIt'III 11(1 011(' hits uVuII thollgh! of yt'l. Bill ill Ill(' Ill('_lllli[ll(', It) _l.SSlll'(" 1]1(' p(ls-
sibililv wc mus! <ontinmc to plll'Stl(' :i vigorous and cih'ctivc rest,arch ilrogntm.
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Document Title: Memorandum from S.G. Lutz to A.V. Haeff, "Commercial Satellite
Communication Project; Preliminary Report of Study Task Force," October 22, 1959.
Source: Hughes Space and Communications Company, Los Angeles, California (used with
permission).
/IV 1959, _vo_k on et_mm_, _i_ation._ satdlite reseayrh and development wa._ going on it_ ._'veral b_du_-
tJ4al firm_ l,e._ide_ Ilell Laborrttor#s. The Department q[ De[eme had taken the lind in spollsori_g
research o_ active repeater satellites, while NA,S'A _vneentrated its initial _J]_Jrts ot_ pa_._ive r_Jll,etol:_.
In pratieulrtr; the Department o] lle[en_e _,a._ _upportint¢ resea_v:h on a complex _atellite project called
Advent, _t_hieh intetded to develop a satelliteJor _tse in geosvnchrotto_, orhit. A n ent,rinm'inls_ team at
lhtLrhe_ AirnttJ/ in mid-1959, led ta.' ltarold Rosen, devised a proposal ]br a m_eh ._impler geo,_)'n-
ehr_nott_ _atellite attd raked the eompat_y to s@port it_ development. 7"hi_ me,torandttm r_]_orts to
lhtk_he_ vice pre_idn_t .[or re._eanh, A. L: thu:[[, the conclusio_._ r( an inten/al task [i_ve set up to
a.g_e_ the propo._al t_] I¢o_en and his team, which also inel_uled Donald _{Tllirzms a_d 7'honta.s
Ihtd._peth. (The rtppendiee._ rein'red to in thi._ memo are not indttded.) (h,n the .]bllowing_ _t_o_ths,
lh_¢he_ ma_utgn:_ debated _vhethn to provide ._upportJ_rr the lrr_rposalJrom contpat_yJicnds or to seek l(_n_
n'nmen! s_t/rport /i_r the pr_ect, l(nouj_h rw]_m'ate./i_n,& were made availahh, to Ice_]t_the prol'eet ,¢oinl,_,
but it wa_ not u_til NA,S_'/ two!ratted with t htches to develop attd demomtrate what lu'came kno_tm a.g
,h'_'neomthat the project beea_w the Ji_undation.[or the many geos),ttch_wnou.s _atellite_ to [oll_,:
Ill
To: A. V. I lae[]
Hughes Aircraft Company
Interdepartmental Correspondence
cc: See I)istrihulion Date: 22 ()(l(:,her 1950
Subject: (:ommercial Satellite (:ommunica/ion Project;
l'relinlinavy Rep()rl of Stlldy Task Force
From: S. G. l,ulz
I. h is the ttnanimotts (_pinion of the Task Force working vneml)ers* that the satel-
lile (.mmttnic_tion system proposed hy Dr. H. A. Rosen is technically ti'asible, is possibh'
of realization within close to the estimated price and schedule, has great potential t'co-
nomic attractiveness and should not encounter too serious legal or political ohslacles.
2. The Task Force has, of necessity, concentrated on technical aspects of the pro-
gram ;m(I has not I>een ahle it) make an adequate market survey. The phrase<_lob,_', "gl'eal
I)()tt'utial ('ctmmnic attnactiven(!ss[, ]" is justified by the following:
;_. A rapidly iulcreasing demand for new long--distance cotllllltlulicati('.,ll fi_('ilities
is h('ing cve;tted by: ( 1) Population increase, (2) Shrinkage ()f travel time via
(ommercial.jet aircraft, (3) Increasing IV)reign industrialization and inlcrna-
tional c,_,mn'_erce, (4) Increasing military communication loads, and (5)
Forth(oming decrease in HF [high-frequency} commtmicalion capability
because (>1the declining sunsl)ot cycle. Rather than being able I() open morc
I IF radio circuits to carry the increasing traffic, new circuits (cahle, scalier or
s_tel[it(') wit[ he needed t() pi(:k up perhaps a third of the traffic now carried
hy IIF circuits.
* T, uk ]'(,t ((' _u)_kh_ Hwiul>('rs ;uc: E. 1). Fdkd, S. (;. [.utz, I). 1":.Mith't, It, ,\. I¢.st.n ;IndJ. It. St_if'lid.
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b. Tilt" Bell Syslem, which l_ornlerly depended on radio tbr intercontinental
phone circuits, has been invesdng heavil) and protitably in hmg submarine
cables; Ibm in the past few years. The tits! trans-Allantic phone cable provid-
ed thirty-six circuits (about 140 kc [kilocycle] bandwidth), cost abont
$30,000,000.00, and reportedly paid out ill its first two years. A second trans-
/\tlantic cable soon will be placed in serviee at a reported cost {}t
$'t0,000,000.00, presunlably t'{}r a similar ntlllll)er Of circuits. Tropospheric
seatt{'r radio chains are {olnparal}le ill cost and are geographically con-
strained.
c. Comparing the proposed satellite system ($5,00(i,00l).00 fin 4500 kc band-
width) with submarine cable, it could carry up to thirty times as much tral]k
at one-sixth the investment!
[2] 3. Converting "potential" into "actual" economic attractiveness will depend oil
acquiring (omntttnicalion trallic, most probably via cooperative agreentent with one or
Iltt)l'e commtlllicatioll colntllOn calliel's. (;eneral Telcphonc may bc !hc bcst prospect
({+eltainly a better one thali the COlllp]acent Bell Svstenl) because it is Irving, to gain
stature despite Bell's long-distance nionopoly. The proposed satellite system could bypass
Bell land-lines in linking C,eneral's east-coast and west-coast systems, in addition to giving
it non-Bell circuils to Europe and other con!inents. (;eneral Telephone also could nego-
tiate more elliciently with the connnunicati<m services of other c<mntries and even other
domestic {olnpanies (_Vestelll Uilion, etc.) !hall [thlghes Aircraft] could; not being a
connnon earrier. This and related market survey problenis seemed too sensitive to be
explored adequately by the engineers o[ this task ti}rce, even if time and suitable contracts
|lad I)een available. (;eneral Telephone tt¢'ed licit I)e tilt" only potellli_il parlller, of (OlliSt',
t_}l- even a snialler co|ninon {'ariit'r liiighl supply eliotigh Irall]c to gl'l Sial-led. ,,\s tt'w as
six circllils (30 kc Olit of the available 4500 kc) to l_2ill't}pe shouldjuslit_ a th'e-inillion-dol-
lar inveslnicni in proporlion to s(il)lnarine telephone eat)les.
4 .... (l._ ()cttibt'r[hlterdeparllnenta] (]tlrrespondence] fioln l.tll/ Io ]laet],
.]t'rrenis) lists three queslit)its which define lht" scope <)[ the ntarket Stli-vey believed to I)e
desiral}le. +ill this list should I)e added a sllidy of the relalive {osls aiid outage tittles for
splicing a broken cable vs rt'placing a dead satellhe repeater. :\s a prelhninary t'sliiilale,
keeping it iattllciiillg ill readiness Oil Jarvis Island should lie less expensive lhall keeping
a cable ship ill ieadilleSs alld ant, w satellite could be ptlt I1p in |lOi.ll-S, iltstead of lilt' weeks
rcquiied to locale and repaii a cable-t)reak.
._}. Technical aspe{ls of tilt" proposed progl+alll havt _ t)eeli evaluated in tllOle detail,
and with higher colifideliee ill tile eollchlsions, illan was possible with lhe preceeding
l si<i ecoliOlitic aspects. The crux of the lechilica] allraeiiveness of this pr_ll2,rani (alld all
inipt}rlalil ecolioinic COltsideradon as well) lies in quick-reaction capability at low cost. By
being able to keep the weight ota sin(pie broad-band repeater payload below 25 lbs, it ('all
be put in stationary orbit by ;all inexpensive (one-third million dollars) solid-fuel SCOtll
t)ooSlel. |(velvone t'lse (NASA, RCA, Spat'e Electronics, Signal Ct}rps) ]las viewed a sla-
lionarv orbit repealer aS a lnore sophisticated, hellct" heavier device, with attillidt' control
Io use high _ain alitenlia bea_tl,_ t)n the satellite. More payload weight i-eqtliles a lal-gcr
liquM-fueled rockel alid severe logistic problems in tlailspollilig ot making liquid oxygen
fiir Stll equatorial laullch. |'lit" ahernalive of latlllC]lillg |roln lilt" U.S. and "d,ig-legging"
it|to aii eq(laiorial orbil iitere,ises guidaitct" prot)lelns and requires Salurn lhrusls. Thus,
NASA and olhers ctmsider lhe sialioiiary orl)ii toniinunicalions repealer as a high-cosl
progranl t_li 19tL5-70. This Task Force has convinced itself of Ihe fcasibililv of piillin [ sic l
75 lbs, or possibly 2/t) lbs, into a tise|%ll qtiasi-slalionary orbit wit]t a S{otll booster, of achiev-
ing a 4500 kc I)andwidih repealer within this weighl alld of doing this within a v{'al- of the
dalt" lhal full fllndilig is provided.
ExPI .( :,RING "I"1II._[ INKN_)WN .%_
6. How can [lttght's expect It) do s<) much better than others? The answer does not
lie ill any starlling but qttestional+le innovali¢ms, inw+'ntions or break-throughs. Rather, the
answer lies chielly in application of the Hughes hrand of System F+ngineering, l)lus exploit-
ing Hughes competence in low-noise reception and traveling-wave-tube deveh>pment.
The starling point was to asstnne a quasi-stationary orbit (satellites held within about
5+ angular limits of desired point on the stationary orbit), to be pul there by a Scout boost-
er. The limited payload weight to 30 Ibm on the basis of Chance-Vought performance pre-
dictions, or to 25 lbs on derating the predicted velocity by 800 fps. This obviously lintits
the satellite transmitting power, energized t'rom solar cells, to a watt or so. [31
Transmission at or near 2 kmc (the accepted opt|ham ti-equency for space conmumica-
tion) faw>rs high antenna gain ;rod use of traveling-wave-tubes. The nearest to a break-
through was the assurance by Dr. J. T. Mandel of 1he feasibility of developing a 2.5 watt
periodic PM tocused 2 kmc high efficiency traveling-wave-tube of one pound, including
its INDOX V| focusing nlagnels. The low satellite power is handled at the earth terminals
by low noise (cooled maser or parametric) reception and very high anlenn [sic] gain
(58 db). In achieving the latter at reasonable costs, the quasi-stationary position of the
satellile awfids tile need tot tidl azimuth anti elevation control which has been made even
8[) ft steerable parabolas so expensive. At similar cost, the beam from a 150 ft truncated
parabola can be steered through a +5 ° range. Thus, the burden is put on the earth-
ternfinals, where it belongs. The satellite antenna design is a c<mlpronfise between using
an omni-directional anlenna fi_r maxinnml simplicity and using a 17 + beam for maximum
gain. While either of these extremes could be [_+nal, tile conlpromise of a spin-stabilized
doughnut pattern provides 6 to 9 db gain, with simplicity. Finall)`', with adequate design for
a 14 db S/N ratio, tile addition <ff frequency modulation raises tile S/N ration to a com-
mercial 32 dh.
7. Because of the importance (1t assessing tk'asibility of staying within the weight
capability of the Scout booster, Ed Felkel was nanted to the Task Force to analyze tile
weight of the pa)`,load package, ttis report (attached in Appendix B) shows confidence of
keeping it safely within weight.
8. Putting the satellite in orhit and keeping it in position entails a sequence of indi-
vidually-practicable operations within today's state of the art. Ctnnulatively, however, the
mnhiplicity of stages phts operations of velocity adjustment, de-spinning, re-spinning and
illcremental orbit adiusmaent present a currently-indeterminal>le hazard to the success of
an)`, <me tiring. It is believed thai a c<mlbination of (a) carefitl and conservative engineer-
ing with step-by-step pre-testing, (b) adequate training on analog simulators, (c) study of
any troubles in earlier NASA Scout firings, and (d) adequate determination of the cause
of an),, initial Hughes faih,re, will resnh in adequate probability of success within the pro-
grammed three tries. Admittedly, there can never be certainty of success in only three
attempts. However, a f<nnth or subsequent firings should not increase the program cost
proportionately.
9. A.s might be expected, the Task Force study has resuhed in significant system
improvements, by Dr. Rosen as well as by Task Force members and others. For example,
the payload configuration has been broadened to improve spin-stability and has been stiff-
ened by a central column. More important, perhaps, has been the swing away from design
prinmrily for television relaying, with additional narrower i-f channels fi)r other commu-
nication services, toward the simpler and more tlexible and potentially rewarding
approach of coordinated use of a broad-band single-channel repeater simuhaneously by
several earth-terminals. This mode ¢)f operation requires thal earth-terminals equalize
their transmitting powers by monitoring the spectrum timn the satellite, rather than
depending on A(;(] of separate i-f channels in the satellite Io prevent a too-strong earth-
signal tronl weakening other retransmissions. Also, this mode <_( operation provides tlexi-
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bility of bandwidth reapportiomneut between earth-terminals ill accordance with shifting
relative traffic loads. In short, this approach overcmnes tile "two at a time" limitation of
most prior proposals and [hns approached more closely tile eventual nlanv-user
"exchap, ge in orbit" concept. Furthermore, it accomplishes this withonl sacrificing lelevi-
sion capability, requiring only thai other traffic be limited during a television prograln an([
be kep! out of lhe television band.
[4] 10. Determination and resolution of possible legal and polilical problems and gov-
ernnl,,,qllal restrictions obviously is beyond tile scope of this Task Force. A few of tile pos-
sible problems will be mcntione<l. 'File usual dilt]cuhics wilh tile Federal Comnnmications
Commission can bc expected in obtaining a license tier a new type radio service lot trc-
quencies have no[ yet been allocaled. Similar, or worse, ditticulties can be expected with
the corresponding regulatory bodies of other nations where earth-terminals are Iocatc<l.
(;haracteristically, the FCC makes no precedent-setting decisions without holding indus-
try-wide hearings and these could be competitively detrimental. Ftulhcrnlore, the State
l)epartment might become involved because of the inlernational nature of this vellture.
Next, some governrnental agency prol>ahly has control of Jarvis Island and would insist on
approving its use. Finally, NASA probably would have 1o sanction tile commercial sale and
rise of Scoul hoosiers and could impose other controls on the program, such as requiring
provision tot removing dead repeaters from orbit, ,,r provision tor disabling their elec-
tronics in event thal tile project is abandoned with repealers still in orbit. As a fay of sun-
shine, NASA's mission is non-military space technology. They have expressed
encouragement toward commercial projects which would not require NASA funds. If
NASA becomes "sold" on tile proposed project, they might provide ineslimable assislance
in surmounting the other governmental obstacles. One recognizes that exploration by a
tlnghes representative of tilt" al)<)ve govermnenlal restricti<ms could readily "leak" to con>
t)etitors, or even to the press, and be highly detrimental. This danger can I)e avoided, it is
believed, by retaining a consuhant to make this preliminary investigation without disclos-
ing his client or the details of tile prqject.
11. The impact of tile proposed program on lhe military services could be both good
and bad. It would be conclusive proof of Hughes' competence to execute a ma:jor space
program and in Hughes' confidence and initiative in undertaking it without governmen-
tal flnlds. Thus, it should put us in better competitive position for managing future gov-
ernmental space projects. It could have a bad impact, however, in "showing up" the
inefficiency of military satellite programs.
12. It is known that Bell, RCA and probably other large companies recognize tile
potential attractions of satellite cominunication and prollably have program plans, h is
reasonable to assume thai Bell would plan to invest several times the cost of the trans-
Atlantic cable ill a big stationary orbit project, tinled to the availability of big boosters, five
or tell years hence. Pressure tot additional international circuits may lead them to
re-examine the feasibility of moving taster by using a smaller booster and lighter payload,
much as we propose. Certainly tile}, could be expected to do this if they learned that their
chief conlpetitor, General Telephone, planned such a program in cooperation with
}tughes. Most of the prestige value and a portion of the economic value w,mld be sacri-
riced if our communication satellite were not the first. This indicates tile need iota quick
decision and a fast program under tight security.
RECOMMENDATIONS
I. II another cOral)any g_'ts into orbit fir'q, much of lilt' pul:,licity and prcstiW." yah."
will be lost _llld w_' would have t_>COml)ek' for uallic, l:urlhermore, thi_, must lw a low-cost
pr_,_ram and d_'lays incr_'as_' co,_ts. (;.n_cqucmly, the program shouhl he l_lamwd Ic_ MiLl'!
devclopmenl now. Tlw c×pcn_,ivc comminncnts (l_)r rockels, _round inslallalions, etc.)
can Iw dcl_'rrcd fi_r a fi.'w months vdlhotlt delaying the htutwhitlg date.
[5] It. Fmld lht" travclinb_-w;tve-tul:,t' dt'vchqmtcnt scparalcly as a comm_'rcial pr<_duct. A
ont,-l:b_mt+d tul)c ol thi_, capal)ilily +hotdd find al:,F,lit'ation in Signal (:Orl)S l:_mlablc
microwave rt'hly r¢+lwalers, p_>ssibly i_ fichl television trap+st+tilters, +is well as it+ other pro-
grams. :\ qtmrlcn:nfilli<m fiw its (h'vt'h)pmcnt seems a n<wmally good l)ro(hwl dcvch>p-
mcnl risk. Tiff.',+ tuhe is lht" hearl of the proposed sitl.,t'llile ch'ctronic systt,nl ;tnd will bc its
hm_t'st I.t'a(I-limt' cotnt)mtenl.
11I. Ftmd th,0 rcmaindc'r _1 lh¢" payload develol)mt:tzt and earth-iermitml (antt'nna
and h>w-tlois<: rt,c¢,iv<:r), in an amottnl of al_out $850,000.00. Also, utke an option thr(,<. •
S('ollt l)o<:_Mt'l'S, plus I|('(('SN_II'V l+(.'it]-('stltlc, CIc. It"this is too lal'ge a ('Ollllllillll+?lll ill _l(l+',:_ill('t"
of ('+>ml)l,t'ti_m _,f the ('Oml)r('ht']+sivt" nlarket ._lnvcy _ll'L(I negoliali(>ns with l)Ott'ntial (us-
l<>nwrs, lhnd a stffficit'nt fraction to (arry the dcvch)pmct+t l>rogram this long. l)ehtying
IlIc' start o['dcvi'hll)nlctll w<_uhl dchty <'<mll)lelion of the |)ro_l_ilil corr¢+sp<>i+dil+gly,
IV. l'{xi)hlit' whh (iciit, ial Tclcl)honc (]oinl)any, al to I) llllillH_Olll01il lcxcl, Iht'h inler-
l'+l in li iioii-liJell loilg-diSlaliCC aiid ovt'is+.,_is capalfiliiy alid iht'ir williii_lii!ss I<) c<lol)t'ralt'
_t+ lht' C_>lliliiOll carrier ill lhl" pl+Ol)<l_,l'd i)r<)graln, Avoid disclOSillg d(,lails which lnighl
i)t,rliiil (il'lll'i_i]'++ t, ll,clroiii< :_iltl+idi+iiy, _v1v+illi_t, Io +itl+.+ln|)l 11) i-+.'])llict' ii+. Rt'_icli _t w<irk-
iil<ff, iigi-+.'+.'lll+.'lil which will [>_t'rtnit t)rolilt)l workhig-lcvcl dJsctissioils of (',('iit'iai's coolltqa-
Ii_>li ill lli<' [)rogralii. If iit,g<lliatiOliS whh (itqicia] fail, liy Ih(' ilc'×l 1)eM c<lilll)iiiiy.
V. A flick lTirce, or lir<!jcct l_.'iiili, consistili_ of ktly ])('l+solln/'l Ioalil'd ;t+ rt'quir+<'d Il<llii
++.'xt'i+al organilalions--(]oiliniiliiic_tli<)ns Division, Rt'st'_tich l+at)oraloi+it,s, _vslt, iiis
I)l,vt,l<il)lneill |,al)<lralori('+--shoilld |)t" sl'l ii t) to <.'arrv otil Iht" i)i+ogralii.
Document I-5
Document title: H.A. Rosen and D.D. Williams, Commercial Communications Satellite,
Report RDL/B-I, Engineering Division, Hughes Aircraft Company, January 1960.
Source: Hughes Space and Communications Company, Los Angeles, California (used with
permission ).
By the eP+d+j' 1959, ItaroM ,4. Rosen and his team had re_+mrked their initial mid-1959 desiLrn Iota
geo_ym:hro++ous communications satellite into a Jorm that was very close to what was actuall_'.tiP:st
laamhed as ._)ncom I in 1963. Thi,s report de.s(_4hes that de,silen; only relevant excePpts appetlr hePv.
The report anticipated a NASA pmg,_am,_r communications satellite research and developmeP*t that
miL_ht provide a _oune q/Junding to fIughes fi_r developing the satellite; howeveP; N,'L%4 fiP:gt chose to
._apport a lower orbit satellite propowd t_, RCA caUed Relay. During discu._sions with NASA i#_ 196(I,
the space a t,_em)' sul&_e._ted to l htKhes the use of a larger Thor Delta booster rather than the Smut boost-
er _pec!fied in thA report. 776s wouM allow the satellite to be launched J/om Cape Ca_mveral in
Florida rather than the.]arvis Ldand launch site discussed in the report.
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Commercial Communications Satellite
[l] 1. INTRODUCTION - PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
This docunient descrihes an inexpensive comnnuiication satellite system tot inter-
font+Dental transnlission of tehwision, telephonic, alld teletype Illessages on a conllllercia]
basis.
The system proposed uses an active repeater ill a satellite having a circular orbit ill the
plane of tbe earth's equator with a period of 94 horns. Such a satellite is generally recog-
nized as the tilt+mate colnmtulication satellite because it renlains stationary to the earth.
The NASA has a program which is expected to lead eventually to such a satellite. The
schedule for tile program is not firm, but NASA testimony to Congress* indicates that tile
goal is fimr to live years away. This conchision is reached tiom tile technical specitications
that NASA has until now believed are necessar); involving hea+y (800 to 3000 pounds),
complex payloads with two to three years' life as at+ objective. As a more immediate pro-
gram, NASA will pitt a nuniber of 100-foot diameter passive balloon reflectors into orbit
during this ),ear. These balloons will be tracked by several organizations, and will provide
vahtable scientific intormation, thiwever, such reflectors are not (if an)' real commercial
vahle because [ot] large amounts of power per unit bandwidth and immense tracking
atttennas required to give even tile intermittent coverage aftorded by low-ahitude orbits.
There are several nlililary conununication satellite programs now under way. None of
these contlict with the comniercial progranl proposed here; the military programs use
high power active repeaters in low-altitude orbits in order Io avoid any reqtliremenls t(ir
large antenllas at lhe terminals.
The presently proposed coniinercial systeni can be put into operation within (lilt" year.
This radical improvement in schedule is achieved primarily through the design of a very
light (25 pound) satellite repeater, a design based on realistic objectives tot satisfactory
commercial [2] application. The light payload required with the present concept permits
use of an inexpensive solid-propellant booster, the Scont. This results in a program cost of
5 million dollars.
The advantages of such a program would be severaltbld. Financially, it is believed that
the initial development, terminal installations, and launching costs could be recovered in
a fraction of the first year's operation, h is expected that the usefld liti: of a repeater will
be about one yell; and that the cost of replacing the repeater in orbit will be about
0.5 million dollars.
The stiggested connnunication systenl is capable (if large growth. The tirst repeater
will covet most of the continental United States, all of Europe, all of South Anierica, and
lnuch of .M'rica. An additional repeater would cover Hawaii, Australia, Japan, and other
paris (if the Orient. Iil addition to extension of geographic coverage, the existence of the
communication link will restih in all increase in tiireigll business which in turn will restlh
it+ greater use of tile facility. Extrapolation of recent trends in overseas messages shows
thai tile present cable capacit), between tile U.S. and Europe will be exceeded within the
next two years. Since tile proposed facility is nluch less expensive than a cable, it is logical
to expect this overflow to be handled by the proposed facility.
In addition to its conlmercial vahte, the proposed communication satellite should
contribute greatly to national prestige and tiiendly tiireign relations.
* "lh.arings tiefi)re tile NASA Aulhorizalion Sul)connnittce of the (;onlnliltcc on Aeronautical and Space
S(ien(cs, United States Senate," 1_3.S.(;overnnlcnt Printing OIlicc, l.tt59.
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The ,l)rol)<lsc(] c()(llllllllli(ilti(lll syMelll consists ofa satcl]ile lepe_lt<+q ill a syIICIiI'()II()[IP;,,
equatorial ort)it operating in c()liiun<+:tion with two <)r more ground terminals, each of
which is linked ,hy land lines ()r microwave relays to the aptnopriate doniesti( colnllllilli-
C:lti()ll sysl<+'lilS.
The relleatcr consists ()f a transistorized [I IF receive, and an IAlalld (2 KM(;) trans-
mitter having a power <)till)tit ()f 2.5 watts. Since the elect|+ical power is sttpplied by sol,u
cells, the useful lilt' ()t the repcate| is expected to be limited ()tdy I)'+' the life of the tr,uls-
xniltiNg tube to ahoul one year. Besides serving as the comtntmi<+alioll repeater, the rc<+civ-
er-llansniitt<+,(+ is also tts<+'<l as a gtfi(hmce signal repeatcl; and the receiver additionally acts
;is :l C()lilli]:|(id l<+.(ci'¢(!l.
'I'hc payload also (<)tllains a c<)ml)resse<l nitrogen attitude and vcrt/icr vehwity <(mtr<)]
s+vswm, which pr()vidcs for proper illumination of the sohu- cells, correct aiming <)f the
direclional anlentm, atld prc(isc adjusinaents of the ovl)il.
The ga(,tm<l wrminals consist of a large aperttuc antenna shaved I>y the 25-KW [kilo:
',raft I l!l IF Iratlsmitt(q and the l,(w,: tioise l.-band recciver. ,l'hc antenna r('flc(+tor ,,+,ill he
lixc<l, and the small d('p,utur('s (if the payload Iron) an exa,tt]) slati<)nary c, rbil will l>c fi>l-
h)wcd by moving the ant('nna Iced.
The satellite is hum<hed using the NASA Scout, and two a<l<tifi<)nal s()lid-p|()pelhmt
r<wkcts are used t() est,d)lish the <lcsircd orbit. The 1,uuwhing site will hc.larvis Island, an
('quato|'ial island appv<)ximatcly 1300 tlautical miles south ol,l,lawaii. The use of this stilt-
ably hwated cqtmt<)rial sit<+" rcsuths in a large d<+'cr<+'as<+"in required F, rOp(,lsi<m syst<+'tn per-
torm:tticc ai'ld gtti<la|l(c c<)|nt>lexity.
Ftulhcv wchnical detail is fin+nished hy the f<illowing sections <if this proposal ....
[251 6. PR()(;I,UkM COST
,'\tl eslitilale <)[ the dcvch)pnlcall (<)st of the c<)mnittnicati()t_ svst('tlt is given ill Tabh'
(-;-I, and an ('slimal<+' <)l the <+<:,st ()f tit(. ciltire pr<>graill is given ill ",l'al>le 6-2.
rl'hc 3_ti>l()>iil| t)l" ('()ll[]dell('¢' which can he place<l in these figtncs is +,vollll sol|><+' dis-
cussion. The costs of t.lle Sc<)llt r<wkct, attitude guidance, latmcher, an<l grotmd supporl
equipment were ohtaincd fr<)m the Vt)ug,llt Astronautics I_ro(htn-e, "S,l)ace Research
Vchi(lc Systems ,l)evehlllCd fr<)m NASA S('<)ul, '+ pul)lished in August, 1959. The UtlF TV
transtnitter is ;t I)r<ldtLclitln item and its cost is Ibm. The ((>st of the gr<ltmd antcmia was
estinmted by an experienced supplicr of such devices. Island constrttction costs were esti-
mated hy at) overseas c<)nstrt(ction company which has had considcrable cxperience with
IAtomic Energy' (;onunissi<m] projecls in the Marshall Islands.
The development cost estimatcs were obtained from the individuals W,llO would be
r('sp<msillh' [br the variotts items. Ahhough some variation in (<)st of [)articular ilems is to
t)c expccte<l, the <hances that the Iotal will remain trader the ,1.2 milli(m dollar figure
seems qt|ite g<)od, because of the strong appeal of the project to creative enginecrs and
the std)scqt|ent high degree of enthusiasm with which the job will be performed.
[261
l)avh lad
TWI' $0.15 M
Eleclwmi(s 0. 'i 5 M
StrtlCtllrC' ().05 M
:")I'll arid (illi Sl+ilgcs 0.2,'_ M
F]nvirollnlciltal Testing O. I0 M
Total $0,70 M
3_ Till" ][IST()R'V()F _ATF.LI.ITE (2)MM( NI(:A.i I()NS
Terminal
Amcnna l)csigtl
Tranmuitter Moditications
l,ow Noise Receiver Design
Total
(;uidancc - Perigee
Transmitter Design
R<.'ccivc'r Design
Alll('llllaS
(;ompt,ter
Total
( ;ui(lance - Al)<)9,t'e
Auxiliat+y Antennas
( '+onqmter
Total
Total l)(wclopnlct+l (:ost
t271
l)evt, h_pnmnl ( ',ost
rlk,rnlitl;tl (',()st
All I(.'llll;,I
Tl'allSlllittet"
R('ct'iv('r
BviMing and Land
Jarvis Island Installation
('+onslruclion of Buildings
( 2)nslruclion of Airslrips
l +aut+tcher
(',t+ottnd Support Equipn+cnt
Transportation
l,aunchings
SC<)ttl with Attitude (;uidanc¢'
Pavh )ad
Miscellaneous
Salaries ()t Field I)cvsonncl
Rt'sel'v('
T<)tal l)t+()Rram (:()st
O.O5 M
0.O5 M
0.10 M
0._0 M
0.05 M
0.09 M
0.02 M
0.04 M
0.2O M
0.05 M
0.05 M
().I0 M
Table 6-1
Development Cost
$0.30 M
<).12 M
<).03 M
(...).I 0 M
$O.55 M
$0.25 M
0.2. r) M
O.25 M
().70 M
().25 M
$1.70 M
$0.361 M
0.072 M
$0.4_3 M
$0A00 M
Table 6-2
Program Cost
x2
x2
x 3
$1.20 M
$1.10 M (2)
$3.4O M (2)
$1.BO M (3)
_0.40 M
$5.00 M
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h is concluded that it is technically li.,asibh,, within lhc pr_'scnl slate of the art oI vock-
t't and t'lectronic lechnt)iogy, t(_ t+slal)lis]t a ¢<nnmerci:,d 24-hour ('(>llllllt|nicati(H1satt'llhe
using the Scout rocket vvhicle+ h is recommendt+d thal NASA ellC<)lnage StlCh a ]m)gtam
_.lIl(i l'(tCO_l+li/e it +is all important new applicati<m of the Scout. This program can be
acc+>mplished 16+Ihe I lughes Aircrafl (:omF, any wilhin a year al a cost of 5 milli<m dollars.
Document I-6
Document title: "Memorandum for Conference on Communications Satellite
Development," December 7, 1960.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
h_ the clo_mLr monthg o/the t'/i_e*thower admini.stmtio,l, _M%S'A/ldmitfistmtor 7_ Keith (;le_lna_t at+d
hi._ a_._ociate_ paid much atte1_tion to the appropriate relationship between _muq_Hnent and the pri-
vate ._e¢tor i_ the development O/ communic/aitm._ salellite_. A T'&T'_ active intere._t it1 t_[vi_ to ¢'Lsta/;.-
fish a leading posiliott in thgs _u'w technolow ._timulated (;lennan a_lel hi_ ¢'oUeaL,'ue_loJocu.s o_ lhi_
is.sue. This memorandum, with no credited author; but almost certai_lly prepaTv'd tO" Robert Nunt_,
(;h,nttan _ special a_i_tattt for communications ._atellite_, summariz¢$ the situation a_ ¢![l)ecemlu,r
1960.
I11
Memorandum for Conference on
Communications Satellite Development
l)cceml)<,t 7, 1960
1. Basic Mutual Recognition
a. AT&T uniquely has the greatest and m<)sl obvious private business inlcrest in
satHlites lmcause of its overseas telephone business.
b. Other companies have expressed varying degrees of interest in and shown
wu+ying degrees ot +initiative with respect to participalion in lhe dcvelopmen_
o1 eh'ments of a connnunication satellite system, although none has Riven evi-
dence of desiring to spend company funds in substantial amounls as has
AT&T.
c. NASA alone has the slatutory resp<msibility to the nation Joy din,oh>ping
space lechnoloho' and t,tcilitating its civil applicali<m lo communications.
d. I I follows that all Ihcse respective interests tnust be harm<mized on ,t common
gvotmd.
[hat_dwrittetz notes in that-gin: "l) May-June 1961 - tirm up our COOl). utilizati_m ot +A's,"
"2) ()t>zain assurance of A-i)articipalion in c<_mm.," and "3) NASA mttsl presvtvc bid n
(and) compt'lili<m."]
2. (_omtnon (;round
a. Neither A'I'<_T tl<w NASA should pre-empt the other's central area of resp<m-
sibility and cmnpeletw,:.
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b. Bolh AT&T and NASA should avoid duplication and wasze, from the loml
nalitmal pcfint of view, including manpower, time, aud money.
c. Both AT&T and NASA t;avor private ownership and operation of communi-
cation salellites.
d. Both AT&I" and NASA must consider the national interest, which includes all
of the various competitive interests, in commtmicatitm satellite system opera-
lion.
e. Neither AT&T nor NASA can at]iwd to let the devehq)menl of the' ulilizatiotl
ol," iJl_ _co111111el'_'J_l satvlJJle s_'steln,s beCOllle _1"polilJe_tl" /.s,slw.
f. It tollows thitl ,t C{)llllnOll objective and it disciplined c<munon ilp])l-oach I(_ it
must be mutually understood.
AT&T's Position As Presently (Mderstood
,i. Xl'&T's approach may giw" others the impression that XI'&T is seeking to pre-
empt responsil)ility tot the naticm's non-military, satellite-based, c_)mmtmica-
lions pli)glitlll,
I>. This ('tin II()l t)e allowed to oCCUl eithel ill i'eitlitv ()1- ill stppt'dl-allCt' till the J'c>l-
lowing re_isollS:
I. It would seem to ¢'ollstilute all abandonll'tent bv NASA of its responsibil-
it',, under the law.
2. It would seem to constitute a "give away" by NASA, impliedly [sicl
sanctioning AT&T as lhe chosen owner and operator, which is beyond
NASA's legal authority.
3. It would contvil)ute fuel to the th-e <>t the _u-gtHlltqlts by those who fav<w
(;o','el'tllllelll ownership and operalicm of idl satellites.
_t. h would slimulatt • ctt'bitte insleiid el act|err and lhert%y evlgetlch,r delilv
and diversion fi+om Ihe main tcctmological lask ahead of us.
5. The nation can be asstued of continued (tevelol31tIc'tlt ollly I:,v
(;ovevnment activity mid control of R&D [rcseiu+ch and developnlent]
programs, since A'F&T does not and probably can not provide ,tssltl+;lll('e
<_f Cotllinuity Of efli)t-t should ulltOvesee]l obslaclt's ,uise.
NASA' s App r_mc It
it. SI'&T must lit its activities, even when using its own timds, into the COlllllltl-
nicalions progvitn+t of NASA as it ,Dart of it. Present here is the implicati<m Ih,tl
the itllerests and lecht6cal apprc)aches of AT&T mid NASA will be substan-
tially lhc same.
b. This dot_s zlol ittvolve NASA's pre-empt|zig AT&T because NASA is iz+ the tOvc-
fiont of lh0 pt+oponems of private ownership and operation.
c. This is otherwise essential for the tolh)wing felts<ms:
I. It assures the avoidatlce of wasteful duplication.
2. It supports NASA in its affivnmtiott of private ownership and its beliet in
lilt" ti'asibility of an induslrv-(;overnmcnl "partnership" for developmcn-
tal purposes.
3. h itsSttles the (;ongrcss of lilt' (;OVellllllelll con[I-O] of R&I) and thel-eliH+e
ilntJl-oves the possibility of geztillg on wilb the.job with the minimum of
legislative delay which might be cuused if Ihe (;ongress gels the impres-
si<:,ll lhal the Executive Branch is not giving adequate direction to lht"
total national effi)lt.
4. h takes itcCOtlll[ o| the tli(l that vehicles itlld ]attach facilities art" st,tl_.e
national assets and must be utilized under (;overnmetllal control.
5. "Fill" otllv way tilt" (;<)Vet|lille|l[ (',Ill t'ltlel- illlo a '+parttwt'shil)" is to reserve
unto itself the atlthol'itv to i(lenliI_+ and thc ittflhority to protect valid pul)-
lic intet+ests.
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<1. NASA's approach includcs competitive hardware acquisition tor al leasl two
Thor-based tlighls at (;,overnnlelll expense alld competitive launchings
(including satellite, vehicle and launch costs) at [4] private or (;owrfnmenl
expense using at least two Atlas-base(l vehicles.
1. The key to this approach is "compelition" hecause it is the only way in
which NASA can assm-e the Congress that ils approach is not prcli:rential.
2. Competition may also resuh in a better system.
Special Problems
a. Reimbursement (lepends upon a ruling by the Comptroller General. If tart)r-
able, then NASA can develop a relationship with in(htstry which is not depen-
(tent upon the hudg(rt-anthorization-appropriation cycle. If not t_tvorahle,
then NASA would have to seek legislation to authorize it Io credit such reim-
bursements to its own appropriations.
b. Patents depend upon the application of the present law, unless NASA is suc-
cessful in getting its statute amended. This means fllal AT&T's case for waiv-
er tm(lcr Ihe present law is one way the ownership of inventions might he
dewrmined an(t the application of the law to a "cooperative agreement" is a
less preli'rred way of deternfining ownership. NASA intends to seek a legisla-
live amenthnent of its stalute in the same terms as were proposed to the last
(;ongress.
c. Follow-on R&D and prototype launchings must be plamlcd since it is hardly
likely that a fiml_shot program will be adequate to develop an operational
prototype satellile aml an operational system. Back-up vehicles should be
available for repetitiw_ shots within three inonths of any taihue.
d. Participation hv A.T&T in all satellite communications experiments under
NASA programs in a manner similar to that employed in the Echo program
seems desirahle from the standpoint of all concerned.
c. Pttblicit Z by AT&T shottld avoid "predictions" inwflving launchings and avoid
the impression that AT&T can "go it alone" in the R&D phase. There should
he closer cooperation hetween [public information] oHices in AT&T and
NASA so that AT&T releases are available to NASA in a timely manner.
Document I-7
Document title: White House Press Secretary, "Statement by the President," December
30, 1960.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Short& be/bre he left office, Pre,,ident Dwight D. Eisenhower issued a ,,umber olpolio' statements in
an atiempt to set the future agenda on various issues, including communications .,atellite poli U. In
a statement released to the pre_s on l)eeember 30, 1960, Fisenhower reiterated his position that p_i-
vale indu_tr_, ghould e,tablish and operate communications satellite ._-_stems.
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Statement by the President
The cc, nuncrcial aF, plication of communication satellites, hoF, efull ?, within the next
several xears, will bring all tilt! nail<ms of the w<wld closer lo_elhel + ill peaceftd relation-
ships as at prodttct of this ll;tlion's progranl of Sl)aCe exph)ralion.
The world's requhemenls lot communicati<m lacilities will increase st+vera] IbM (hw-
ing the next decade ;lll(I COlnlllUlli{';ttion satellites i)lOllllSe the IllOSt eCOllOllliC_l] atlld
etti'ctive mean.,; of salist),ing these l+equhelllents.
Increased hlcilities for overseas telephone, international telegraph, and other l<)rlns
of long-distance persotHo-person communications, as well as new facilities tot llallsOtt'an-
ic television broadcast.s, through tile use of man-made satelliles, will constitttle a very real
benet]t to all tilt" t)eoples of lhe world.
This nation has traditionally lolhlwed a policy of+conducting international telephone,
teh,graph and other comnnmicalions scrvices through private enlefprise sul+iecl to
(;overnmenlal licensing and regulation. We have achieved c<)mnnlnications lacililies st't-
<rod to none among lilt +nations (if the W<)lld. Accordingl}, tilt' g<)vernlnent should agg, l+es-
sively encourage private enterprise ill tilt" establishment and operation of satellite relaxs
tot revenue-pfoducing purposes.
To achieve tile eaHy establishment of a C<llnllltUlication salellite Y,'yStelll which can
be used <m a commercial basis is a national objective which will requirt+ the concerted
capabilities and funds of both (h)verntnent and prixate enterprise and the cooperative
participatitm of communications organizations ill toreign countries.
Vari<ms agencies of (;overnment, including lilt+ l)epartmenl of Stale, tilt + i)epartnlenl
of l)efense atnd lilt" ()ftice o|'(:ivil and Defense Molfilizalion, have inqlorlanl interests and
rvsponsibilities ill the tield of communitations.
With regard to cotnnmnication satellites, I have directed lhe National Aeronautics
and Si)acc Administrati<m to take the lead within the Executive Brant:h both to :.ld'¢;.ulce
tilt" needed research and deveh_pment and to encourage private industrx to apl)lY its
resources Ioward the eaHiest practicable ulilization of space technology tof commercial
civil comnnmications requirements. Ill carryiug out this task NASA will cooperate ch>seh'
with the Federal (:onllnunicatiollS. Conmfission to make certain lhall the high s,t;tlld;ll-dS, of
this nathm lbr communications services will be nlaintained in the utili:_:ation oI cOlnlnu-
nication salcllites.
[handwriuen note--"l)rafted l)ec 23, 196<I `+]
[handwriuen note--"Released Dec 30, 1960"]
Document I-8
Document title: Federal Communications Commission, "FCC Relation to Space
Communication," Public Notice-G, 1627, March 14, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
7'he question o/ aulhori O' over determining .space communicalimts pofi O' was unclear al /irM. A(,I&'$
and the Department q/l)+J_'nse had both bee_+a._sig'ned re.spon._ibili O'./or tech_tolog 7 development, but
the k),deral Commu,_icationLS Commission (FCC) had a say in the allocation t_[]ieque**cie_ .lot satel-
lite commutticatiotts. In addition, several other commiltees attd otit(a,6zations , both international and
witbin the l _.S. ,q'overnme,_l, were resl_onsible /br di/]Prm+t aspect_ ,!f lhe _ubjecl.
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FCC Relation to Space Communication
(;ENERA1,
Tim Fedmal (;ore,nun!cations (:ommission aclivitics in c¢mm'cthm with space com-
muni(ali(m |lave increased greatly t)e(:ause of the many n('w and unique prol_h'ms posed
by rapid tt.chnological and sci('nlitic deveh)pnwnls in this tiehl.
Although the (_ommissitm in not responsibh" for any over-all Sl)aCc program or am
parliculm space v¢'hicle launching pr¢!ject, the Iltountiltg activity ill SI)aC(' ('()lllliltlilicilli()ll
has an imlnUl on its regulation of non-(,overnmenl radio users. This stems from its ol_lig,-
alli(:,llS tlllfh'l Ill(' (',otllliltllli('alioils Ac! which, among oth('l things, requires the F(I(_ to
"'study nm_r USeS lot radio, provide tot experimental uses o1 frcqucnci¢'s, and generally
('ll(()lll;lg(' Ih(' Imgcr and more c[[bcliw' tlSC of radio in the public itll('i-.('sl" !is well as to
"inak_.' avai]a]:,]_.', st) t_tl as l)ossible, to all the people of the tin!ted St!tit's it rapid, Hl'uient,
Nation-with', and w(_rhl-wi(h" wire and radio communi('ali(m s('rvi('('."
This involves Ill(' allocalion and ;issigmnen! o[ frequencies tot Sl)aCc communicalion
and Ill{' allthori/ali+m o1 privately (on(hlcled research and cxpcrimcnlathm h,+king
loW;ud the' usc' of natllYal or lilall-lllltd(? satellites to provide civil communication Solriot's
¢m a rvgular basis. Radi¢; signals "l_ounced" or relayed trom such satellites would pcrmil
the Iransmission of large illlIOlllllS ()1" telephone, !eleg, raph and other Iratlic, imludillg
lob'vision, over grcal distances. Such devc'lopittents 1)!'('St'lit at II('W Hild ('()lllt)]ex a_" I'_t_ r { _t
technical l)rol)h'nls. Not the least of these in finding suital+l{' and sttl[icienl fr¢,qu¢,nci¢'s
aild illSUi'iilg COlil]);Itil)iIity |)elweetl sf)_tcc C()lltllltiil[Cltt[Oll svsl('illS illld Slli['_t('e syst(?tllS st)
Ihal Ill(' lml)lic int('l('sl will best t)(" served. Many regulatory ]_lol)h'ms will th)w tiom
addin R SlmCV ctmununicati_m to radio's aheady manifold uses.
(:()()RI)INZYI'I()N AND C()()I'ERATIf)N
The' a¢'hicvcm¢'nt of Ihcse lint+poses involves both national and itllernalional consid-
¢,latiOilS. (;onsequently, the (:<mlmissi<m is working closely with lh¢' intt,resls involved.
This coordinalion and cooperation requires particuhuly close relalionsltip by the F(:C
with Ihe National Aeronautics and St)ace Administration (NASA), which directs the
Nation's non-ntili!ary space effort. ()it February 28, 1961, tit,." FCC and NASA announced
a.ioiut "memorandum of understanding" |or delineating and coordina!ing their respvc-
tire responsibilities in civil communication space activities.
12] ()thor interagency activities include F('X; participation in the fifth)wing:
Tim Telecommunication Coordinating Committee (TC(_____;)tall underlining is
handwrillen] of lhe Department of State, which has an ad hoc working group
undm the cllailntanship of FCC Commissioner T.A.M. Craven 1o drafl Ioreign
policy i'('('(_llllll{'tl(lati()ns Oll space colnlllllnical[on systelllS:
The Telecommunication Planning Committee (TPC) which advises Ihe
()tticc of Civil and Del_'nse Mobilization (OCDM), with FCC re,presentation on
Sl)aCt' Sttldy !)ant:Is;
The F( ;(: and the ()(:DM hawLjoint responsibility for national frequency allo-
cations, with stall work through joint meetings of FC(', representatives with the
inlt'td{'l)artlll_.:nt Radio Advisory (]omlnitlee (IbL_\(__.._._)alld its Sul){olnlllilt(',p (_ll
Frequency Alh_(;llions (SFA);
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The U.S. (]onmfittec fin Study (hottps I\__and VIII <ff the Inletnational Radio
(]onstthative (]onmtitl+,'e ((;(;IR) of tit+,+Int+,wnatimlal Teleconnmmication Union
(ITU), with whi+,h the FCC participates thr<+ugh suhgrottps;
The," Spa+,'e Science Board (SS__B), of which the F(;C's Chief Engin+,wr is a
menllz, cr _l' the ]nt+,wnational Relations (]omtnitte+,, cc, ncerm+d with internati<:,nal
basic space r+,'s+,'arch activiti+,,s, working itnernationally thrmlgh th+c (kmlnlitt+,,+,,
on Space,, R+,'s+,'ar+,:h (C()SE-XR);
The International Radio Scientifi+,: Union (URS__I), which has F( :(" lrarticipa-
lion and, ill turn, is a tn+,'mber of thee hlt+,'rnalional Council of Scientit]c [!nions
(ICSt__+) ; and
The National Bureau of Standards Central Radio Propagation I_+ahovatory,
with which Ih+,' F(](_ maintains liaison throtlgh memt,ership on the
Int+,'rd+,'partnl+,'nt (]otmcil on Radio Propagatiml and Standards.
INTFRNATI()NAL (_ONSIDEIL,XTIONS
'Fh+,' International Administrative Radio Conferen+,-+,_, held at (_,Cil+,'xa in 1959 under
lilt" auspices of the ITU, adopted an internaliomd table," of frequency allocations which, fin
the first time, pr_widcd bands of ficqu+,m+,fies fiw space,, and earth-space services. These
hands, however, m-e fi)r r+,+scarch purp<)ses only and arc useful principally for tracking,
control and l+,_h'metry ftulctions. Although n<) bands were allocated int+,'rnalionally |br
space satellitc relay communication, a special ITU Administrative Radio Con[_.'rcnce was
sch+,,duh, d tentatively fin late 1963 to deal specifically with spacc prot>hcms t)n the basis <ff
d+,'veh)pnlcnts as of that tim+`+.At the request of lilt" Dt'l)artn+ent <ffState, preparatory work
toward fiwmulating the Unitcd States position at thal ({lllf4:lenc(, has be+,'ll initiat+,,djoint-
ly by the F(](] and tit+,' IRA('.
[3] Domestically, steps have been taken by the FCC to imphem+,'nl the 1959 (;en+,'va Radio
Rcgulations nationally p+,'nding ratification of that treaty by the Pr+,'sidenl tll)<)tl the," advice
all+,t C<)llS+,'llt ()f the S+,'llat¢,.,.
FCC PROCH'_DIN(;S
?cs a r+,'suh of developlncnts in space cmmnunicati<m during 1960, the Commissi<m
reol)+,'ned its proc+,:eding in the general inquiry r+,-lative to the allocati<m _t frequencies
ahoy+,+ 890 Megacycles (Docket 11866) to determine, in the light of evidence then avail-
able, whether the freq+,lency requirelnents tbr +,:<)mmunicalion via space satellites would
reqttire moditicati<m of +the (_onnnissi<)n's decisi<ln to F,ermit some additional class+,.s of
us+,.rs t<l establish communications systenls t)ll freqtlenci+,.s 1)+,'tween 1,000 and I1+),000 Me.
After a carclill analysis of all th+,_ cvid+,mc+,, th+en on hand, tile (]onnnission c<>n+,Itided t]lat
its carli+,'r decision need not l)c modified at that tinl+,'.
|tow+,'ver, in view of rapid developments in space conlmunication, the (',omnlission
instituted an inquiry (Docket 13522) its to space frequency needs on a longer-range basis.
This information will assist the Comnlissi<nl in its preparatory work leading to a Unit+,'d
States position fin [a] [uttwe international conference on space needs and usage. The,"
inquiry was augmcntc+,l to consider conditions for sharing space bands with other radi<_
s+,'rvi+,+esan+,l wh+,'th+,'r prot+,'ct+,'d a]+,'as might I)e cstahlishcd and ]lcld ill r+,'s+,'rvc tbr filtur+, +
earth t+,'rnlinals tor civil +,omnnlnication SySI+,'IllS using space relays.
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EXPERIMENTATION
TheCommissionisencouragingeXl)twimentationin thisnewfieldin tile hope that
private industry can develop considerable additional technical infofnlation which will
serve to further the country's oww-all space program.
in thin regard, an experilnental attthorizati<m was granted in Janttary ()f this year to
the I'I'F l.aboratories, Nutley, N:I., u, bounce signals off the moon and passive (non-radio-
equipped) earth satellites tk_r basic research and study.
Also in .January ot this ,,'ear, an experimental authorization was glanted to the
American Telephone and Tek_graph (;o. to permit it to go [2_rward wit|l plans to develop
an experimental program wherein earth terminal facilities at I tohndel, N:]., would trans-
mit to and ve(cive |roFn active (ra(li(_'quipl)ed) earth salellites which also are un(h'rg(>
ing dt:velopment by AT&T.
MONIT()RIN(;
Anoflwr F( ;(', activity in the continued monitoring of channels being used for space
communication. This started with its hmg range direction finding work in tracing Sputnik
I, beliwe the (;overnment established special installations to track space objects.
(:ommission monitoring is to prew'nt unauthorized use by other stations o1 channels
elnphwed for space communication, and to identify and locale sotllct's o| interference on
those channels. At a nulnhel of FCC monitoring stations, special t,quiplnent includes scn-
siliw' receivers, high gain directional antennas and automatic frequency scanning devices.
[4 ] RADIO ASTRONOMY
Related to space communi<alion is the use of radio in astronomy. The (;enewt 1959
confi2rence, for the firs! lime in history, provided lot protecting specific frequencies uti-
lized in radio _tStl'tlnolny. The F(](] has completed the grotmdwork for putting these pro-
visions into effi.'ct domcstically when the (;eneva _lgleelnellt iS ratified by l|le United
Meanwhile, the Commission has adopted rules to minimize interRwence to frequen-
cies used f'of radio astronomy observations in this country, particularly at the National
Radio Astronomy ()bservatory at (;teen Bank and the Nawtl Radio Research Obserwm_ry
at Sugar (;rove, both in West Virginia.
Document I-9
Document title: F.R. Kappel, President, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, to
the Honorable James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, April 5, 1961 (with several attach-
ments).
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
Document 1-10
Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, to ER. Kappel, President, American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, April 8, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
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77w m,w l)emocr, tic mlmitfi.stmtio_ _J 15e.sidem .|olin E Kemwdy w,s le._s _ympatl,,tic Itm_ it_
RepublicaJi predeceswr ta AT&7"'s plall,_ to e_tablish the h'adi_g po_itio_ in the deveh_pment o/ eom-
mu_dcation_ satellites. This excha&ffe q[letter, rtfleets the po.dtion taken @ m-Tv NASA Administrator
.]ames E. Webl_---that it was desilvhle to re-examilw the _overmne_tt role ix communieation._ satellite
dez,elo/_meIH /#Jim" decidill_ that/he L_ovonme_t shouM take a seco_Mary position ix that development
to ATC3YT and po,_sibl¥ other I :. S. _wmmu_ications carrier,. The position oJ AT&T I're,_ident l"red 1¢.
Kappel to that stance, a_ re]leered in his h'tter to Web& is _upported tO, a _:rie_ o/'attachmems imli-
catinlz AT&T_s plato a_ the)' had d_,elopwl in the preceding months.
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Ill
April 5, lg(il
TItE I ION()iL.\BI.E JAMES E. WEBB, Administrator
National Aeronautics mid Space Administration
1520 H Street Northwest
Washington 25, 1).(;.
Dear Mr. Wcbb:
It has come to my attention that the !A'hll Street]ournal on March 29, lt)6l carried an
article slating lh_l.I invitations were issued last year to companies such as American
Telephone and "]k,legraph Company to come fi)rward with partnership prOl_osals with the
(;overnmcnl (on communications satellites), |)Ill Ill;it NASA has vet I_ rcceivc a lirm pro-
posal tiom any company.
In view of err'IllS which haw" taken place during Ihe past tk'w months, this statement,
which we understand grew out of a press colllkqCllCe which you held with respect m NASA's
budget, is of deep concern t_ me. The specitic evcnls to which [ veli'r are as tbllows.
()]1 Selltt'llll)ev 15, ]l.tli0, Mr. (;. L. Bey, l of this (]Omlmny, wrote to I)r. (,lennan
(Attachment No. l ) saying that we had trader way the development of an active ¢ommtt-
nicalions satellite and associated ground radio t:acililies and would hope that NASA would
be willing to lmmch trial satellites for tts at our expense if Ihis proved to be lhe most p]ac-
lical)le ,n-rallgtqncnt.
This hqtcv was tbllowed bv sew,ral intormal discussions afier which l)v. E. I. (,teen ol
the Bcll Tch'ph<me l.,d)oralorics WFOiC I)r. (J]ellllilll ()11 ()(lo])cr 211, ] _.)(iO (mll;t(]llllelll No.
2) and enclosed a statement <7t Ihe ol+jectives alld principal f_.'altn-t's of lh(' Cxl)erinlent
which the Bell System proposed to make.
121 Subsequently, Ihere were several discussions during which l)r. C,lennan anti his i)eo -
ph' oullined some of the i)rot+lems which NASA t;:h werc involved in accepting our <wigi-
mtl propt_sal. [)uring these conversations, various p_ssibilities _1 a.ioit_t NASA-Bell System.
project were discussed, and on l)ecember 14, 1960 1 wrote t_ l)r. (;Icnnan outlining in
some dcmil se,_cral specific proposals as 117 nov.: it join! tmdcrtaking migh! be accom-
plished (Altachmenl No. 3).
Shortly ;filer, NASA decided to ask lot bids covering Ihe consl]u,clion of an active
satellite of its _wn design and to seek the cooperation of private industry hcre and (_t the
telephone administrations of (;re;it Britain and France in trials using such a satellite. '0,'e
were offert,d an opporttmily to bid on such a pr(_jecl and did so, making sUbslai_tial
allowance in ore-bids tbr the vahte which wc Iht)ught the lclt'pllone industry might gel
tio]n such an experiment. A copy of lhe lransmitlal h'tter which accomp;mied these bids
is also enclosed (:\tl_l('lllllellt No. 4).
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l)urinl_ discussions which l:_rt'ccdt'd our bid, we l)oinlcd oil Ih_tl wh,.'ther such _t pro-
.iecl woultl take lh(" plact' of one" sic f) in th(' Bell Syslcm'P+ f;,rol)OSed pro_r_ml woukl
d('F,C't_d on lh(" I+V])(' _}t sal,:'llile which _,,_lsi)laccd it| ()rbil. AI that litn(' wc e×pres.,+ed Ill("
hoF,(' Ihal il<mr r('gnir('m('nis w(!t(' not tnel tl+vN,,\SA'_ I)t<_j,.'cl, NASA would Imtn{h a Bell
Nystem satellit(" later al our <.'Xl)t'mr'.
In ()m studies <if s;tlt'llile (:<)nmnmication.'+, while l:,;tying l)rimm-+v altenlioil 1() the
n,c,('(Is of itll(,rtl_tli()na] contmc>ll c;u-t-iers, wt" ha.v(' also consich'rcd cert;tir, _F,<.'citic l)el<.'nse
l)l'[;,;irlmt'tll n,t.(.ds--t_n c+,+:;mll)h', tn_ll:,ilil+v ;tncl lhc I)t_r,_ision t)_ lh(" I)ct<.'n_<.' l)t'l)arlnl<.'nl
of a f(.w r('lial)h" voic(' (h;mn{'ls t_} r<.'mol,t" h)c;tlions. The cal'ly ,u×t)t'rinwnls ;ltlcl l('sl_ ()["
sat<'llit(" r(.la),s cat) 1:,{"mad<' I<} s(,rv(, both civilian ;rod defense <)hi('ctiv('s ;_tl(I w{' Imvt' dis-
{'tlSS('(l Stl('h lllitll('I_':, (;'I (<HlIIll()ll intcrcsl with aff,t'ncit+s c)l+tht" l)el);trtni<'nl <d l)_'l_'ns<', l
t}t'li_+s<• I)r. Fisk ;rod Mr. l)ingnmn <}1this (;mnlmny (li.,+ctt,+s_'dthis bri¢,llv with you ;mtl l)r.
l)rvden ;I I('%'V WO(']';,_, ;I_C'.
Stnnlnin_ np lh<'s<' ¢'vcnls, l think it is clear thai we have tnad{' twct)' cfl<+rt to lind ;i
xv;t)+of <_<'tlin_ this vt'ry ','it_tl <'xl_eritncnla] work done pronIl>tly and that, c<)nlrat"+ Io <)nr
nol ]li<vin_ made' any Sl>t'cific l+r<il>O_,;tls, wc h+r+'c actuall), made three spc'rili< l+r<ll>on;lls to
NASA. Mr. Best ]i_Is ff,<inc <_x_'r this lll;illcr ])y t_,lephone with l)r. D]),dcu bttt l th_nL_hl lhlll
voiu mighl Ilk<' l<i hart' this nt;tl,t'in('nlt <)I"lit(" silnalion froni tilt'.
131 w<, <u-t, c'xtr<'int'Iv ;n+xions to avoid nnv l_+Irlhcr dela) +in _,t'nin_ trials under wa)' l_>t a
ntnnl){'r {)f lt'its, t)liP+, lilt' lii<);sl itnl)ortanl or which can I)<, Stlilllilal'i/<'d il_, lolhm,s:
I. Thcr_' is a nccd for ])oinl-t<}-l)oint sl)itc<" connnunicati<}ns s.Vsl<,tlls--to help tIlt't'l
lht' _rowinb_ , dent;lid J_)r o'+'i+l+S('a+s c(}Ittnltitticltli(}ns.
2. .Such svstt'tn.'+ w_>uld b{" +t tt;iltil+;II Itl<.+ilils oJ+lub_+,mmIlin1._ t,xislin_ connt+clin_ links
liclwt+ml IIR' c()iiliilf)il c;irrit'r netv_,oiks of this (+Olililt+) , and llt<ist' of forci,gn (ottti-
It+if,+ mid v¢otthl also pt_}vid<' +lltcrnaie routes for reliability.
_+. ()lit cstinmt¢'.s oI cosls :tnd tt-ld+lic vohnnes h'}td its Io ihc c{>nchtsion that +itsatt'l-
lit<" s),stcnt snch a_,wt' ]+rol>O_+c is econ<mfi(ally l_.+asibh '.
4. 'l'rial_+ ol trolly<" COllliilllilicalioilm satelliles art+ nct+dcd Io dt+tt'ttnint' the basir l_cts
ttp<}n which it comlncrci;t] c<)nnnunicalions natcllitt" s.Vslem in;iv l_J¢• d¢+si<gn¢'d.
5+ !lki'(' lit't+ l)rt'l)al't'd I<l iiiov¢" ahead rapidly if pt'rltlittt'd to (los<}.
6. It this c<}Ulili)' tl¢it,s llOl lnainl+tili the leadin_ l)<lsili<lil ill st)_tc¢" coiliintlliiCaliliiis
l_li l)t'_lct:tti] ]}ui-tlost's, which i+ now within its _i++isp, oiht!rs will lake ih<." It,ad.
7, Ttic s('vi'rilV alitl 17eguc'ncy with which +tin.%pol (lisliilbailtt','+ _ti+." otctirriil_ lhr¢'al-
t'li Io disrUl)l exislin+ tillhiS ot+ovl+i+cli+ radio cOiilililiiliclilion seriotlsl), durhl_ Ihe
iR!xl +t+Vt'l'+i] )'t!ai's. This is {ll14reat iilll)oilltncl" I<) inilitarv +isw<'ll its to civilian c<lili-
iliitlliC;lliolis.
Thl'rt" iR't'd tit +till t_P_il-lhal Ihis (',<lilll)illly is seeking a illono|)o|',: ill iillt'rnationa] COlil-
iiiuliicali<llis Itirotlt4h lht' list' of s;ttellites, Olir on] 7 iill('rtPst in satellites is their tlS{" a,_
aiiolhl'r lli<'aiis <it tOlilit'(till_ lilt" Bell _),stt'in's coitinlllilicaliOils nl.lWolk in thi._ coiinli-V
witll shnilar lit,lworks in t{ir¢'il_n coiilitrit's.
%_,'_,tiavt' slalt'd tlolil to ttit" (i<)vernml, nl _itl(l piit)licl)' lhal tin 7 slttelliic s)'stt'ni which
wl' slioils<}r will bc available io all l.!niled States intt, inational C<)lliilitinicali<iliS coiniiion
141carl'it 'rs-t+illit!r Ihi'otit-_h ]l+ast" <)1"owilt'i'ship arian_(+nlt'ill+--t(IF ailV _t_i'Vit'i'_i atllho-
rized by the Ft'der;il (]Olllliltinicltlions (]oiilini+_sion. llkt+etilts,,0 itlso stated thai iocktgs +iltd
laliniliin_ tttcilities will Ix" |)rovidcd b), piivate supl)liers iindt, r al)t)roi)rialt" arran+enii'nls
wilh Iht+ (iovci+illn<_'ilt. (_t't" Mr. l)in_nl_iri's letter of Maich 21, 1961 Io lhl" Ft,(tt,ial
(]oillllillllil+tliolIP+ ('+<)liiiilis_ion--Allachin(+llt N<-i. _.) Fui+ihc'rmolt ', llil" ClC_ilioil o| the
sltit'llilt' S)@;tt'lll WI" t)rol)OSt', io do ()tlr public service.job, will not preclude in any wa)' thc
<l<,vt.l<ll)ili{'lil ot olli_'r _l)aCe COlillllllni('alion_ s,vstl_il+isfor oltl('r i)nrliost's.
hi vit'w of lit{! iil_t!iic)' o[+ this whole illailCi +, ] slrl<)til(I likc very nitlch io drop ill aiid
[h;<ndwi+iil{,n undt,i-]inint_ I discliss _i<)llit" i)| +its aSl)t'cL_ with )'till in lli<lit" detail. I _llii _illt'
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there can lie no important dill+erences between tts as to uhintate ohjectives, and perhaps
we can by discussion at this time advance the attainment of those objectives. Will you
please call me at your convelliellce.
Sincerely yours,
|hand-signed: "ER. Kappel"]
President
Attachments
Ill
Attachment No. l
September 15, 196<)
l)r. T. Keith (;lennan, Adlninistralor
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
1520 II Streel, N.W.
Washington 95, I).C.
l)ear l)r. (;lennan:
1luring the discussitm which Messrs. Botkin, Pierce and I had with you and your peo-
ple several weeks ago, we expresse(t the view that the commercial satellite c(mmmnicalion
systems <if the futu,e shouhl be owned and operated ill this country by communications
carriers. In other words, we believe that existing national policy and practice in the com-
munications field should be extended it) embrace the new medium.
By so doing, it will be pt)ssible to achieve efficient integrathm of the planning, c<m-
struction, and operation (if overseas cable systems, satellite systems, and other radio tacil-
ilies, and ills() asslne the integration of domestic and overseas ()perations that is st)
necessary to the orderly planning and development of telephone service in parlicttlar.
(:ommunication with other countries 1)y any medium, of ct)urse, requires lhe c()<)perati<)n
of the organizations t)r administrati(ms resptmsit)le for furnishing external communica-
li()Xl services in those cottnlries.
It is assumed that there will be some form of (;overnment supervision of tile launch-
ing and orl)iting of satellites, its well as, of course, regulation of the communication ser-
vices rendered and the radio frequencies used. It also seems to us that any internatitmal
at'litH1 which Oily (;ovelllXllent IllaV tk'el desirat)le in t)rder to adequately comdmate wilh
other governments the use of satellites may be taken without (;overmnental ownership or
management of the facilities required to flwnish commercial comnumications.
lJuring our conversation there was ;list) ctmskh'rahh, discussion its to what t)art of the
wt)rk of deveh)ping a practical satellite communication systmn mighl lie undertaken 1)y
c()mmercial comnmnicatit)ns carriers, and what par/of the expense of such w()rk should
be t)()rne by them. At the ch)se o[ this discussion you asked that we se! dt)wn t)ur lhoughls
<m [2] these mailers, or, more specifically, slate what the Bell System companies' plans are
fin- the fttture and what part they were looking to the National Aeronautics and Space
Athninistralion to do. Our present views on this subject arc outlined beh)w.
The Bell System n<)w has under way the deveh)pment of an active salellite and associ-
ated grotmd radio tacilities and would like It) proceed with an experimental trial of Ihcse
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lhcilities in intercontinental conHnunications as soon am possible. The telephone adminis-
trations of Fngland, France, and (;ermany have all indicated a desire to l)articipate in such
a project. %2+ hope to be ready fi,r a transatlantic trial in eighteen to twenty months, or
less. The experin+ctnal satellite, or satellites, would be placed at an orl)ital ahitude of per-
haps 2,200 mill's and would carry a repeater designed to nlake initial list' (ira 5-nicgacy-
tie radio-l+ri!quency I)aiidwidth. tik(c are willing to asstillle l|le cost invok,ed in this
c×peiilnelil, e×cepl I|ial we We|lid expect the parlicJpalJl/g t(li+eign a(|itiJi/istralJoils Io pay
al h'asi the cosl i)| their own _l()liild siations.
()Ul preselil lhinking is I|l+il we would design aiid COllSirilCl lhc trial satelliles J()l +Oily
<)wiI iisc+ inakJng sllre Ihal l|lt" nlec|lanJeal d(,siln would t)e colnt)alit)h, wilh I|it" design
illl(l capalfilJly of wtllileVt!l lallllChill_ vehicle was used. _Xqiilc it is |)iol)ably loll eativ to
know just what [.tcilities ti)r lauilching could be nlade available, we would hope that lhe
Nalioilal At, i+oiiatlliCS and _l)act" A(|inii_istralion +Otll(t be willing Io laUlich tht'se irial
s;itelliles for its, al el|l expeilse, if this proved to b# lhe illost practicable _irrail_en+ienl.
Ahhoiigil o[Ir l)rhliary iniercsl is in proceeding with a lria[ of active satclliles+ we shall
t)c glad Io cooperale wiih y<iilr <)iganization in any furihel + iesis of passive salt'liiles thai
you lilay wish io condilCl+ usiiig not <lilly the grotilI(| egili|)nieili flOW available but +rise thc
vqtiil)inent Ihal w<luht t)c developed for active satellite trials,
I +Jill silre yell tin<ierslalld ilia| these thotights Ilia)' tic<+ sul)jcci |o Stlllle tiioflitlcatloli as
lhc ])r(i_l_<tlll devehips, bill | believe they will hold basically. _e would, <)[" COlirse, seek the
a(k'icc of yoiir oi_ailiZ+(llOli ili all phases of the Wol+k arid keep Veil ilit0rlllC(| 1)t Oill
t)r_)grcss.
%Ve wotild welcome all}' coiiiillents voti lllay ca.rc lo make' ai)Olll ail v part of this pro-
posed l)r<lgl-+tlll.
Sincl.qely yours,
G. L. BEST
Vice Presideiil
[ tie l)_tghl_ilioll I
Attachnlent No. 2
October 20, 1960
I)R. T. KEITtt (;I+ENNAN, Administrator
National Aeroliaulics and Space Administration
1520 tl Street, N.W.
+lki'astl higloil, l)(:
I)ear l)r (ileilllall;
1)r. Fisk agreed to provide you wii|l a brief statement of/be objectives and principal
tcalures of lhc experiment the Bell System proposes to conduct on long distance corn-
inimical|oil via an aclive sate]lite.
As indicated in the slatement, /he experiment is an important part of a continuing
Bell Systcln developmelll program directed toward large scale application of radio sawl-
lites for tiroad-liailll cllnilnuliicali<ms.
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Since Dr. Fisk is om of town, I am enclosing the slatenwnl, which has his agreement.
Sinccrclyyour_
E. I. (;REEN
Exe<tltivc Vice l'r('sidenl
PROPOSED BEI,I, Sh,'STEM EXPERIMENT ON
At+fIVE SATHJ XI'E (/)MMUNI(]AJ'I()N
OBIE(:TIVE
To c',trrv ()ut an cxpcrinwnt in trans<)ceanic (omnmnications with a satclliw carrying
an active r¢'|)catcr suitahlc fiw muhichatu+cl tctcphony and |or tclcvision. 'I'he c×p(:rinwnt
is an important part ol a conlinuin_ Bell SvslCln dcvclopnH,nt program directed toward
large s<alc _+l)])licalion of radio satellites [br l)road-b;tnd cotnnmnicalions. The pr()gram
imludc,'+ extcnsivc lld)oralorv rcscarch and dcvclol)nlt'nt work Ic_iding to long lif(' and reli-
able operation of ,'qt('h a s+Vsl¢.nl.
S_NI'EM Ct IAI-L,\( _TERISTI(;S
l)rol)()scd ()p('rating Fr+.'(itt<.'n(.'it's: (i775-6X75 m( [mt'gacydt +] ground I<) s:tt(.'llil,v.
6,t25-6525 m<: s,m.llitc It) gr()tm(l.
Basel)and Width: '2 nw.
M()dttlati<)n: FM with ± I0 m( SWillg.
Tl'a tlSlll i s,',;i( >ll I+)iH It: Etaopt t() U.S.A. and ft.'verst.
,";,ate|lilt: Micro,,v;_w. rcccivcr; 2-watt micr(),+v+lvc transmitter: circularly p(+larizcd rcccp-
lion and radial+till: st)Ira + ((.'liP+ fi)t+ ])rinlm.,, ll<)wcr: ni(k(,l-cadtniunl sl()ragc I)attcry.
St'par;tic bc;t(tm Iransmitlcr, I.')() mill+watts at about I?,6 mc [})r tracking. Satellite essvn-
tially sl)hcri(al, about ,I' diatnclcr, wcight 17,+')Ills. or I(,++s.The initial satellite will n()l l)c
cngint'crcd l)ritnaril.v Ior tilt' h)ng lili: needed Ibr c()nuncr(ial ()l)Crali(m. ()rl)it of satcllit("
should l)c as m-arly polar as po.ssiblc, at an _dtim(Ic of 2,00() t() 5,000 mih's. (Note: This
('xpcrimt'nt is directed palti(t)l_trh:' t(>xvmd ll()rlllal tclcl)h<)llC ('()l)Imulli('ation ill whidl
()no way transmi.ssion (+clay of 1/:4 scc<)nd, sl,(h its would 1)c cncounwrcd with a 24-h<)lu
satellite, would be intolerable.)
(;round Receiving Station al Hohnde]: Existing 20' x 20' horn r(.'l]¢'ctor antenna, limed
ill E(']lo 1. ]llIpl'()V('(I illlt('lllllt ('()+tirol sySt('lll. ((]OllSlrtl('li()ll of +l Ial-gcr 60' x 60' "hol+ll
rcl'lcct<)r antcmla is I() lie started immcdiawly, [2] hl,t this may not I)(. ill operali()n tmtil
a ['("+vm<)nl|Is a[tcr tilt' first activc salcllitc ('x|)erinlcnt.) ,Ma.,_(+'r[i.)l+ol)(:l+ation at 6475 tnc.
Wi(l(,l)and FM l_'cdl)a(k r('cciver.
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(h-ound lransnliuing Stalion at ttolmdel: Existing 60' dish, used ill Echo I, modifit.d
[i)r 6875 mc operation, or a new similar dish. Improved antcmm conlro] sysle|n. 1 kw
IIallslllillCl, tlsiHg CiI]IC, a commercially availabh" klysl]on or a uaveling wave lul)e under
development t:,y Bell i,aboralori(,s, choice to In' delcrmined I)y engineering considera-
[i()llS.
(h'otmd Station ()r Slalions in Em+ope: Same as al I Iolmdel, p<)ssil)ly with varialions in
detail ruqtdred to salis[): fi>reign partners.
,,\nlenna Pointing: [rse Minitrack data. tlave (;oddard SF,ac,v Flighl Cet+ller compule
oH)it ])aramelens Io I)e t|+ansmilted t() BTI,. Track com])ulation and antenna ('ontro]
_nch'rs t6' Bell l.aboralories.
Eslht|aled l'eHovman,:e: Witll satellite 7.5 ° above horizon, and as++iutning lotal noise
lemperalt,re of 34' K, 2 db [decilx'ls] satellite antentla gain and achit'vable accuracy in
atll('nna [:,oinlinG syswm would i)F+wide peak-lo-peak signal-to-rms noise ratio of 47 db.
Such l)ertormance will providt" a path tor about 450 one-way, ]figh-gra(le lelepl+,)ne chart-
nHs, or in the order of 100 lwo-w'ay channels. Alwrnalively, lhe exl)erimetilal systenl will
pr<wide <)lle-wa+v-al-a-liltlC uatv, missi<m of a black-and-white television l)iClt|re of a quality
only slightly inl¢'ri<n to Amvrican commercial standards, and not tlotic¢'al)le on the aver-
;t_e h()tltc l'cc(!i',,+el .,
Sch('dttle: The svstt,tn is expected to be operational in 12 n+onths, assmning no tmduc
dehtys are ('llCOtllllt'led hl: ( l ) assignment of the necessary exl)t+l-hnetllal l'adio lrt'qtwn-
<h+s, (9) availal)ililv of a stfilal)h' sawllite latm<::hitlg vehMe, and (3) a,_l+(.'emc.,t'Hs with the
loreign parlnerCs) and executiot] of their agreed-tt])()n te('htfica] tasks.
()(t<d)vt 21), 1!)60
[no l)aginati<m ]
Mr. (',. I+. Best, Vice l+'r,L'sident
American Telepllone and "l_4egraph Company
195 Broadway
New _iwk 7, New York
28 Seplen|l)t'r 1960
l)t'ar Mr. Best:
Thank you tot + your lcuer dated Scptember 15, 1960, which you handed me on that
date. It was a pleastnre to see you and l)r. Baker again.
The proposal of the Bell System to integrate satellite systems into its c<_mmercial oper-
ations is of c<msidetal)le interest to NASA.
From a i)road point of view, as you no doubt appreciate, your request that NASA
launch trial satellites fi)r the Bell System raises issues of national policy which we are cur-
renlly st|£dving. Accordingly, there is no simple or ready-made response that I can give you
at this time+
It is hell)rid to me to know l]+l,Pposition of your company and ils partictflar plans fi>r
the hmire. If y<)u are able to be mo|e specific aboul any |acet of yotu +program at an), time
in the futttre, F,h+ase be assured that I wotfld appreciate being inii)rmed.
Sincerely yours,
"E Kcith (;h'nnau
Adnlin ist rat¢)v
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Attachment No. 3
Dcccmbcr 14, 1960
DR. T. KEITti (;I,ENNAN, Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
1520 H Street, N.W.
Washington 25, D.C.
Dear Dr. (;lennan:
Our discussion of December 7 regarding satellites tor ctmmnmicalion purposcs raised
a ntunl_er of questions relative to the respective efforts of NASA and A.T.&T. Co. in this
area of scientific exploration. 1 believe there was lie disagremnent ell tilt" ileefl for advanc-
ing scientific knowledge as f_lst as possible to the point where commercial communica-
tions by satellites CHll I)e undertaken by the COlnllIOIl carrier comnmnications COlllpallies
aud tlleir illlerllatiolla] (;Oullter])arls, ead_l ill their respective areas of service.
III OUl" conversation, we indicated we are proceeding at our own expense with Ih("
development all(I construction of experinlt'nlal active satellites which will be ready fi)r
launching within a year, this to be an initial step toward tile establishnient in a Jew years
of a colnniercial salel]ite systenl. You in tl.trll advised lllai NASA is also planning expe|i-
mental)on in the field of active (-omnn|nicalions satelliles, with ttw view to developing fhr-
(her scientific information in lilts area.
h was agreed thai our objectives, sleninling us they tie fronl ()ill" respective areas ot
respousil)ility and conlpetcnee, have much ill COllUllOII. Nloreovcl, l t)elieve we were ill
arc(il-d thai Ihe ualiolla| illteresl could be best served if otu efti)rls were <:onlbined ill tllis
field st) as to avoid wasteful duplit-alion illl(I delay in the develol)lllenl eta final systelll.
[2] It is recognized thai NASA tlas broad responsibilities to advail(e "the role of Ilie
Untied Slates as a leader in aeronautical and space leCtlliolol.,_, and ill the application
tilt'l't'(if" to tilt" COll(hlcl o[" peacelul a('tivities within and outside tilt: alnlosphere." This
charges your organization with a broad obligation to assure that tile activities necessary to
achieve tills result are being eat'tied out. It does not, tloweve|, seem It) require tllat NASA
itself duplicate work now being (lone or planned t)y private il/dtlslry but ()lily that it
entotirage induslry in its ef}oris aild I)e prel)ared 1o move ill should induslry 1)e unable
or unwilling Io lake full advalllage of its opportunities.
Thc co)tin)ell carriers of the United Slates tlave tile responsil)iliiy to ltie Alilerican
public 1o furnish the best possible colnlnuiiications service nol only within Ihis (ouiilry
but also internationally. In lilt" course of disctlarging A.T.&T.'s responsillililies, we have
developed oveiseas radiotelel)hone servi(e alld overseas lelel)hollt! cables all(t tlave eslab-
lisht'd leleptione tOlliniunicalions with uearly every country in the workt. The iechiiit:a]
prolilelns which were solved in bringiug Ihese tacilities illtO service are coinl)arattle to
Itlose which are t{tced ill satellite comlnilnit'ation systems.
ti_i'e are also COllSialitly seeking to inlprove the colnlnlulicalions arl and lind belier and
lllore t'(oilOillica] illeallS of doing the jot) to which we ill'( > dediraled. Ill so doing we Illaill-
lain the |lies( extensive comniunicalions reseaich aud developmenl laboratories ill Ihe
world, Bell Tel(phone Laboratories, whose responsil)ility is 1o explore every possible way
{if ililt)rovillg f'Ollllllllnit'atioII. Tile exploratiou of lilt" list, of" salellites as a llleallS of radii)
I'ollUliUlli(:aliOli is a iialural t)al-I o| the Bell l,atloralories overall ])rograin aiid il has I)eeil
devoting sul)sianiial etlort to activities in Ibis alt'a [_)r a liUllli)el Of years. In this coil|lee-
tie)i, OlU- Bell Systein lechliolog_' has aheady I)een lilt" SOllr(e o| lhe esselliial COlUl)OnelllS
which enable a satellile to aft as a COliillilillicalioliS relay. These in(hide Irallsislors,
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diodes, solar cells, and reliahh' (raw'ling wave tnhes. Out of the work which tile Bell
I+ahoratories has done ill the Echo experiment, and from its long and extensive partici-
pation in radar haw" come a series of developments directly al)plicable to satellite com-
munications, such as high-quality antennas of the horn and Casegranian types, microwave
masers as low noise receivers, FM circuits with feedback, also t_)r low noise, and various
techniques for precision tracking.
[3] The achievement of a communicalions satellite system will depcml not only on eftcc-
tire satellite relays and expert c(m/munications systems engimwring. These must he joined
in a unique fashion with space technolog-y where NASA's primary responsibility lies.
Moreover, space relaying of signals, like other isolated communications techniques, can
provide usetitl communications service only when combined with existing land facilities.
It is this joining of Ill{: communications and space arts and tacilities which indicates tile
desirahility for the joint e||i)rts of our organizations.
It is our lhottghl thai such joint e|forts would have as their objectives both demon-
strafing transatl_nllic TV (which we understand to be one of NASA's primary ohjectives)
aml other experiments which will represent the first step in an orderly developmental pro-
gram fi)r an operating c<m_munications system.* Concurrently _r_"would haw _ extensive
efliwl on ground stations It)z transmitting and receiving, as well as tracking tacililies tiw
controlling tit{' alllennas. The problems of the entire communication system, including
ec_momic i)rohlems as well as such important nlaltCTS as {)plinmln handwidlh, operating
margins, systems halance atld reliahility of components would receive prime attention.
This experimellt in its l)uhlic {()mmunications aspe(+ts w(mld, we helieve, I)rovide
itdi)rtnalion and an o[)p()rlunily fi)r exl)erinlentation not ()lily It) llS htlt also It) other inter-
ested ('(>mmotl ('arrier commtmication c<)mpanies. This can be acc()mplished hy inviting
olher internati()nal (omtn(_n carriers to use the satellite circuits experimentally for lheir
()Wll [(>rlns ()_ ('Onlllllllli('itli_)ll.
With this as ha{kgroutld, we would like to offer the following Sl){'citic proposals:
a. Thai NASA aml we j()itl in the setting of ])erfi)rmance speciticati<)ns ti)r the tirst
experimental active satellite.
h. l'hat we deveh_f> and huild the tirst satellite taking advantage ()f rese,trch alre,t(ly
done atl(I {levehq)tnt'nts well under way. We are prelim(red to pay li)r this work in
its entirety, <)r ti>r st(el| l)_(rl ()1 the expense as would rellect our respective inter-
esls in the pr(_.je(t.
[4] (. Tilal NASA launch the first satellite and provide tracking data tiom its Minitrack
stations. In Ihis contlecli()|L we are willing to hear tile whole cost (tilaunching and
micking or to sh_(re these costs with NASA in any way yon feel will properly retle(:t
our respe('tive ime|ests in the project.
(I. That the existing grot|nd station at Hohndel be made available and moditied at
<)ttr expense ti)r the I)tlrl)osc (if making the tlecessary comtntt|+icati()tls tests. (This
slati(m is, (it+ course, c()mpatihle with the communications network of this
(:<)mpa||y.)
e. That, laki||g a(lvanlage <If o||| long established working relations with overseas
(ommu||i(ati(_ns ol)eraling agencies, arrangements he made with at least one of
[hell! t(Jl" ()ne ()r ll|ore ()verseas ground stations.
t. Thai other (:otmmm carriers he invited to use the satellite circuits experimental-
ly when such circuits are operational.
g. Thai ti|ll inR)rmati<)n on satellite performance he made available to NASA.
:t- A ploi41aln fi)r lht" l)cv_,hqHnctll <_lan Active S_tt'llit,t+(iomtmmi<':_ti(m Sv_;t('rnhas I),:.('++_[)rt'pat'('(lI:5
l+,cll"I'(.lepholw [+a|)<_t_11(_ri,rsand is availal)l,:' [<v+delaih'd discussi[)n+
5,t TIlE t |I.N l( )RY ( IF" SA'I El ,1,lie ( :l )MM( _NI( :,Hit )N _,
As is ('l)llllllOll practice, we w(lllld CXl/CCt Ihat Inu('h (if Ihc work on the ('()lllllllllli('a-
lions system would be conlraclcd io oltl_w privale colnpanies as was don(' in lilt' Ectio
experiment, lor exaniph', on lhe lranstnilling anlenna. NASA niay also wish to conlracl
wilh others tt)r lnany of the oilier ilenls involved, such as nit!chanislns for nuihiple launch-
ing, salellilc orienlalion alT;tngt'lll(qlls, i'll'.
It: as wc illX" conlldeiii, this t_xpt_rinlcnl is successful, it is our phul lo lnov(- ;is prolnpl-
ly as possible It)ward lht! t'slal)lishlnelll of a connntwcial salellilc coniinunitations svslt, ni
wliich will be integrated with existing tOllllllOll tariit'r tOllliiltlllicalitnls facililics, bolh
ht'i'e and ilbioad. If(hen this syslein is t)l)t'rlttional ciixuhs will bc made availal)lt, Io olht, l-
conlniunications ('oinlnon carriers ti)r list, in lheir I)usint,ss,.just as ciicuils ilit' now wail-
able in ovt_i-st!as lch'phone cables. Tht" i)ioposals l]lal we al(! making should 151Ill, ,if sub-
sianlial wihic to the nlilhary and oltwr goviwiilli(_lll deparlnlenls as well as Io lilt' oilier
ilst'rs of oilr scrviccs and lhost, of oilier (:Onllnllllitalions Ca)Tiers.
1 hopt! ltlal this oullhlt! will ot]7<!r a useful basis tot approaching ihc piot)lcnis which
we discussed last week.
Sincerely,
E R. I,LM'I'EI,
-,'g:g:g * :!::_ * :g :g :i:
Ill mIIalhnlcnl No. 4
Western Electric Company
IN(:()RP()RATEI)
l)efi'nsc AcIivities Division
120 Broadway, New York 5, N.Y
Alca ( :ode 212 571-5761
C. R. SMITil
VICE PRESIDENT
Mal'Cli 70, 19fil
The National aelonautics and Space Adnlinistralion
(',oddard Space Flight (]enlel
(;reenbeh, Maryland
Attention: Procurenlent and Sui)|)ly Division
.Ill( ::24 l:mj
(;t'nliemt'll:
The aIlacht'd proposal is subnliIlt:d in resl)onse it) your Requcsl li)r PropoSill No.
(;_18(il, I,ow Ahiludc Active (:olnnl/initalions Salt'llite, dated Janllary 4, 1961 lind lit("
Telegraphic mint'ndlnenl ihelelo daled Fel)rualy 24, 1961.
This ieSpOllS(, conlaillS l]ll(!c st'p{iFitl(, ;llld colnl)hqt: i)lOposals, lllOl)osal 1 is bascd Oll
tilt" list" of [leqtlen(it,s ill lilt 40(i-50(I and 2,71)0-7,_100 ii1( lialld_. Prol)osals 2 and !{ itll'
bastxl Oil Ihe list' of frt'qucncies in tile 5,925-ti,-t75 alid 3,<gltl)-l,2lR) lilt" t);illdS, ;IS rt'qllt'Sl-
cd in the Tclcgraphic aniendlncni of Pt'l)ruary 24, 1961. t>roposal 3 dilfiws ti'oni
Proposal 7 in Ihal it hlchldt's ;t conli;t(toi-furnisht, d ladialion eXpclhnt,nl liackagt ,.
ExI'I,( )rlSf; I lie 1 !3,KS( )',_,:N ._._
Bell TelcPll<_n<.' i,aboHIories has I)ecn aclivcly Pursuing a Program of rus+.,ar(h and
du'¢c'lo]nm.nH itl satellil(, commtmicatiolls. This work has b(',t.zl und,c'ztak0n bt'(atls<., of l]lt,
Btq] Synl_.'m's l)onilioll as _it ill.!jor [:.S. illl('rilali<_il_ll comnumicalions carrk'r and Ill(" ohlig-
alioH lhis i,np.ses Ul).n il 1<_dcvelo I) and in-_viclc any new mean.s of commtmicalions lh;ll
h_ld promise _d iml.-oving ils scrvic(.s to lhc general public and lh(" govcHmlcnl. The Bell
System's pr<_gram, Ibr developing a salcllile communicalions syslcm and I<)r placing such
11 ',;Vsl('lll ill ('<)illillCl('iHI SCI'Vi('(" ill collal)or;nion with Ihc Ic]c('()lllllllllliC'_tli()ll_; _tgt'il('i('S of
oth('r coualries, is cxp('clcd lo i)ar;dlc.l in ma.y r(,sl)ccls lhc System's a(hievcmenls in Ill("
dc'v_'lol/Inelll ;trial csl;d)lis]lmCnt of II'_lllS<)cc;-tlli(" Sll|)lll;_ll-illC I'cq(phollc cable svSlClllS. As
was don<" wilh lhe c;thh's, Ill<' Bell Syslem will raider- [2] take to work oul mul'uallv salis-
liwl<_ry arr;mg('m(,nls wilh th(' ()lhcr l!nitcd SlaWs int('rnali()nal (arri('rn wh('r('hy lh'_'v ('all
()blaill th<'ilili('s tc)r 1t1(" s<'rvi((,s thrlfish('(l I)y lhcm.
We h(.li<,v<. Ihal NASA and ill(' Bell Sysl(.m hay(. a ('omm(lll ivlt('rcsl in l)_finling cxp('r-
im('nlal work in Ih_' ti('ld ,_t sal('llilc ((nnnmnicalions t<twm-d lh(" r('alizalion of a com-
mercial sysv¢'m as quickl) as possihlc wilh a minimum of cosl and wilhou_ duplication of
cllbrl. F<_, lifts reason, wc slrongly thvor Proposal 2 or l'rotlos_d 3, since lhe 6 k,m and
,t klm fF<'ql_em ies are ah('ady hcing fiSCal ill COilllnOil ('arFitT ('(HllillliniC_llil)llS SVMCiIIS ill
h<_th _ll(' [ !nilcd SI;IICN _ll'ld |':llll)lic. The Bell Telephone 1.ahoratories' program, which is
hasc(l oll lh(' _lsc of lh('sc fr(,(lU(,nci(.s , is well under way and maximum pro_r('ss low,u-(l
our mtllual goal will, we hclicvc, hc achieved with Ill(" cxperimcnlal salcllil_ conleml)lal-
ed under thol)osal '2 or 3. No_ only will Otis permit the tcsling, ill lh(" ('xperimcnlal satcl-
lile, of components ot the kind lhal will be used in l'atcr protolyl)cS of commcr(ial
sawlliws, Im_ vahmhle intestinal(on will hc ohlained on the tnohlems of sharing lhe pro-
posed frequencies hy I<'rr_'slrial and salellile common carrk'r sVSlCillS.
In rcst)onse Io a Sl)ecilic NASA request, an ofti'r Io un(l('rta'ke lifts program on a cosl-
plus-tix(.d-tee basis is associalcd wilh each of lhe proposals. In view of Ill*." Bell Syswm
ivllc'rcsl CXl.esscd above, howcvel; each proposal also (olHains anl ot]i_:r to un(lerlake Ill('
program on a cost-sharing hasis. These oll_:rs involve hilling NASA an amount equal Io
ahotH ovlc-t_wlh of Ill(' experts(, associalcd wilh Proposal 1 _v a (onsiderahlv smaller pall
of Ihc ('xl)cHsc _tssocialcd wilh Proposals 2 or 3, since lhe work to bc unde]t_tken n._lldcr
Ilws(" ]all_.'r proposals will make a larger contrihulion to our own research and (Icw_lop-
m('nl program Ihanl lll_' work lnHd_.'r Pr_H)osal I. All of these cosl-sharing ofl_.,rs arc on a
cost rcimbuvscm(.nl basis. Each _t]i..r, however, includes a n_aximum dollar limil of cosl Io
hc billed Io NASA.
Th(' A. T. 8,: T. (:Oml)any has ofti'rcd Io provide grouml Sial(on cquil)mcnl and Ol)er-
alioil iN Ill(' [hilled Sl_ll(.s and t<) undcrlake to arrange tor relaled ground station equip
menl and Ol)<'rali_m overseas. NASA has bccll assured thai lhe United Slalcs glOlllld
station ,,viII hi' Ol)eralional in tilllC to nlcCl the planned launching schedule and that lhcsc
tin+(lilies will hc made availahle to NASA for this experiment.
131 Evcry _lll('lll|)[ h_ls bccn IlKI(|¢" t<) include in the three parts of our response, (;em'ral
E_alualion hdbrnmtion, Scienlilic and qi'chnical Proposal, and Cost Proposal, all of the
intbrmalion neqlleslc(1 ia conne(:lion with this procurement. The representation relating
Io small husim'ss is attached an a separate item.
This qllOl_tlioil, ill rcspOllSC Io NASA Requesl tot Proposal (,_1861, is tirm tbr a p('ri-
_d ot IHvH'ly days tiom lhe (late of this letter. Questions in cotmcction with this qu_l.tli_n
should bc dir_Tlcd to Mr. R. P. Wilson of lifts office on Exlension 5735.
Sincerely
"'(:. R. SItliih" [ hand-signc(l]
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Proposal
Exhibit '%"
[]1
Atlachmen[ No. 5
March 21, 1961
Mr. Ben E Waple, Acting Secretary
Federal Comnnmications Comnlission
Washington 25, D.C.
Re: Dockel No. 13522
l)ear Sir:
The comments filed by A. "I: & T. ('o. in l)ocke! No. 13522 were direcled to lhe spe-
cific questions posed in the Notice of Inquiry and Supplemenl. It is our tmderstanding
lha! file Commission was seeking technical information concerning flequency require-
ments for space communications without discussion at this time of legal or economic
question. Howevm. in view of the comments of this character in some of the other
responses and the puh/i(:ity the): have been given, we be/Jew=' a brie[ statemenl should t)e
made Io iorestall any misunderstanding of lhe Bell System posilion and bring the com-
ments into a better perspective.
Our interest in satellite communications is simply slated. There is a need for point-lo-
point space communicalions system--to help meet the growing demand for internation-
al communications of all kinds, and to provide allernale routes tiom a reliability
standpoint. Such space communications systems are a natural supplement m and exten-
sion of existing C()lll]lloII (arrieY networks.
The tradilional cotnmunications policy in Ihis country has been to have comm(m car-
riers serve both (Iomeslic and international needs for pttl)lic c<mnnunications. This poli-
cy was re('ently restated in FC(; Pul)lic Notice (;1271 dated Fel)ruary 28, 1961 that "...
overseas public communicalions are provi(ted bv private enterprise, sut)jc(l 1o
(;overnment regulation .... " This nolice also included the following:
"(I) The earliest practicahle realization ota commercially operable communication
satellite syslem is a national objective.
12] "(2) The attainment of this urgent national ol)jective in the lield of communi(alions
nmy be ac(:omplished lhrough concerted action by existing agencies ol
(;(>vernment and private enterprise.
"(3) In accordance with the traditional policy of conduc|ing international conmm-
nicalions service through private enterprise subject to (;owwnmen[ regulation,
priwm" enterprise should be encouraged to underlake <leveh)l)mCnl and utiliza-
tion of satellite systems toe [)ublic communi(a/i<m servi(es."
We do n()t seek a monopoly in satellite c(mununications. _Ak"d(> not wish l<) ex(ludc
oilier inlet+national (farriers either tiom estat)lishing such systems or ti-om sharing the use
(_t tl_¢_ S)rSI_'_ _+'_' propose. _i" seek only the opporlunily lo cmph)y private inilialive, man-
agement and capital in lhe public intercsl and under put>lie rcgulali(m in a manne, whol-
ly consistent wilh tradilional public policy with respecl to international ('ommunicali()ns.
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()ur estimates of+costs anti lraflic vohnnes lead us to Ihe conclusion that a satellilc sys-
lent such a.s we propose is twonomically feasible. Wc are prel)ared 1</move ahead as rapid-
ly as possibh +and il is imporlant that we be permitted to do so, not only to meet the service
requirements tor the near tiLttll+e bul also It> make sure that this country will lead lilt + wily
in international space c<mmmnications Ibr peacefid purposcs.
()wnership of tilt' t_wilities invohrcd cotfld be handled in lilt" traditional way. The tor-
eign terminals would be owned by lhe torcign telecommunication agencies. We have had
many years of mulually slttislhctory opcraling experience with these agencies all over the
world and art' c_mtph.tt'ly confident that we can come lo an equitable arrangement with
I]:,t'm to:,)c_+t+J_J:qg llm +:,v<,)c:,.sl_Jl) :.+L:_tlILse +>.("lilt! satel]Jles.
I!sc ot +the United States p<_rtion of ttte satellite systctn would be made available, of
('<mrsc, to all intcrtlalional comnntnications carriers serving tile United Slates tor any ser-
vices they now are, or may ill the thture be, attthorized to provide by the F(7(_ under the
C<mnnnni(ali<ms Act. ]lerc, too, lhc facilities would be made available <m an equitable
basis cithcr by own<wship participation through prt) rala payntcnl of capital inw'stntent
and operating expenses or by lease arrangenlents. These arrangentents would preserve
compelition in the internatitmal contmttnications tield to the extent thai il is delerntined
by the F(_C Io be in thc pld)lic iJllcrcsl.
Wt' believe tilt" h)w-orbil system proposed by AT&T is the pretmrcd systent at this time.
The technology is wt'll aftvanced tbr the low-orbit satellite. On the other hand, lhelc are
drawbacks {31 to the synchronous high-altitude satellite. "1"o begin with, there is a .6 sec-
ured round-trip delay which would be a very serious degradation of lelephone service.
Furfltcr, lherc are the vcry diflicuh problems of placing the high-altitudc satellite ill prop-
cr orbit, mainlaining it on lht' station, stabilizing and accurately poinling its directional
anti'area. The solution to these latter problems is at a ntininnnn several years away and it's
iml)erativt' Io gt_l ()n with the job now--not years hence.
The prt,dtuers oF electronic gear a,td other producls and services would benelit from
the intro(lttction of this new mode o[ communications which will 1)r_atl('n their markets.
A substantial part of the ground station equipment and ntany of the components of the
salellilcs tlmmselves will be obtained on a competilive basis t)otn inthtstrial suppliers.
Rockets and launching facilities will be provided by private suppliers under appropriate
arl-angt_tttents with lhe (_.(wernlnelll.
As slated al the (miser, we believe that the qttestions to which the Commission is seek-
ing the answers in lhis proceeding are essentially technical in character, and they must be
attswered prontptly if the United States is to maintain its leadership in rite communica-
lions tield. The put|lose of this letter is to provide infbrntalitm which may be helpfid to
lhc FCC as it considers policy decision vital to the vigorous advancement of the nation's
space connntmications prograttl.
Very truly yours,
'_I.E. Dingman" [hand-signed]
_ TI IE MIST( )RY{)F _A I'EIJ JTE ( ]()MMLNI( :ATI( )N_,
Document 1-10
Ill
April 8, 1961
Mr: E R. Kappel
President
American Teleph<mc and Telegraph (]Oral)any
19._ Broadway
New '_bvk 7, New st_>rk
Dear Mr. I'.2q)pel:
Thank vol, lot your letter of April 5th. l will Ix, happy to see you whenever VOlt plan
to be in _A,'ashin,gt<m. ] |till appearing bettire the House (]otnnlittet' on Science and
Astronautics on Muuday morning, April 10th, aud am engaged all ¢lay on Tuesday, tl,.t'
1 I th, with the President's Connnittec <m Equal Etnph_ynmnt ()ppormnity, which is havin R
its litst mccting. ()thcrwis(', l will be glad to reschedl,le my appoi,mnents s<t we can mcel
ill v<ltll- COlp, rg'lli('ll('e.
Ill order that you may im(hnstand, perhaps more fully than a r{'[)oll in the 1'13++11,_'tr+'el
Io.r..I, the qt,esti<ms and illlSW('l's ill lily pl'l.'Ss (+Ollt(qt'nt(" Oll tim budget, l am enclosing
the release. You will note, on page 3, my statemt.nt is as tblh>ws:
"In order to take [ttll advanlage of tile potentialities of Ih¢' commtmicalions salt-I-
lilt" tor both industry and gt+vernnmntal uses, h+dustry thumci,lg ot resea,-cll and
dcv,,'lol+-,m('nl costs is postl>Oned and full govt'rnmental financing is provided.
Ten million dollars is added for this putp<>se."
121 ()n page 8, you will note my slalt'nlent thai:
"The basic change is simply to F,OSll)(me, until wc know more lhan wt" know
It)|lay, tilt +I't'al dccisi<m its 1o how this llUW l't'Sllll (>f"space sti(-ll(t.s |tilt| I(whllolo-
gT can bc mosl usefully al)plied."
Again, _m page 9, you will note Dr. Dryden's statement that:
"... the program is the same,.}<thn (Fhmey), the program of Ibm- tlights that v<m
have heard oltllilled ill great detail. This is lllUl't'ly an estimiltc as to whether the
Tl-t'aStll'y would recover Ill()n('v. It sl..t,lllSt() 1)(' Sll(h till Illt('('l-lilill Iltillg ill this (illl('
thai we prctk'r to have Ih(" illont.v ill h;md. Io carry il ti_rwm'd to the test p,+ogranL"
Fmlher, in answer to the question as t_ whclhm lilt' additi_m of the ten million dol-
lars to tilt' I)tltlgcl reprt+senled any tnodit]cation of policy, I stated:
"It represents a policy decision to have a good hard look al this I)et_rc making
('Ollllllil Ill('ll IS."
Since you hay|" referred to tilt' discussion in m x ot]icc with l)r. Fisk and Mr. l)inginan
o|vour cotnpatty, [ suggest )tin ask then] it tht' ill>o',e does not rt,l>rt'st, nl 'wllastt [ Iold lhtqn
was going through my mind as tilt" only st+usiblc way it) approach a dccisi<m ol such ,nag-
nitude and signit]cancc far be'¢otld the connntmicalions industry, as well its long-range
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ilnpii(ati<_ns and imt)(_rla[w(" Io _i_I_ r _(_11_( _]_1_ ()[" I ]_(_ communication industry over and
above ils great significance to your own company.
I.ast night l took v(mr ]eller h()me and r(.'ad Ihe allacilll/('Nls. _)tH- [(_tter o| Deceml)er
141h t_ l)r. (;lenmm does slaw, ou page 3, that you would
"... like to <)tt_'r the ti)l]owing specilic proposals:
[31 "a. Thal NASA and we.j<)iJl in lh(" selling of perfo]mance specilhati()ns for the
first experimcmal active satellite.
"b. That we develop and buihl the thst satellite takit)g advantage of research
already done attd developlnents well under _,;t_r. _'¢" ;t_t' prepared to pay ti)t-
Ibis work iil ils entirely, or fi)r such part of lhe CXF,Cnse as w(:,ul(I retlecl our
]-eSl)e<-Iive inlel-('sls ill the [)r(!jecl.
"¢+ Th;ll NAS.'_ Llllll('h ils []rsl s_lt('llile a)ld provide tracking data ti-om its
MiJdlrack slaliol)s. In this conneclio)L we are willing to bear Ihe wh.lc c<,sl
<)1 I,um(hing auld tracking <)t- It> share lhese (:<)sis with NASA in ally way you
E'cl will l)rt)perly refh'<:l our respective interests in lit(' lWOjc(t.
"d. That Ih(' existing gro)uld station at ttolmdel he mad(' ;)vailal)h' :l]t(l m()ditie(I
at our expetlse t+<w lit(' t)ttrl)<)sc of making the iletessatx c()tntntmi<alit)_ts
leNIN. (This :'-,litlil)tl is, ()[" ('()tll'St', COml)atibh" with Ihe co]nmunficali<)ns uc't-
work ot this (:ompany.)
"'c. Thal, laking advanlagc ol our long estahlished working relati<)ns wilh ovcr-
s(';is ('Ollltlllllti(",lli<HIS ()p<.'l'_llillg agencies, arlangelllel)IS I)e 1)l_ldt" with al least
()It(' Ill" lhelll f()r l)l()re <)vl!rseas ground stations.
"I. That ()(her c<)mmon carriers l)e invited to ttse tilt + satellite circuits expcri-
metltal]y whe]l m,(h (ire(]its are operali<)t)al.
"g. That l+ull it+l()Fn+alion <)t) salt'flit/' perlbrmance bc math" availabh" to NASA.
141 I am u>hl that your teller of l)tTember 14th was delivered by a nlmd)t'r of your asst)-
ti;lles, (hal an extendt'd (<)nl_.'rtPl)cc ensued, and that it was ()lade clear that NASA would
not permit your company, <))"any other, to pre-empt the program of the United States it)
this art'a. [ handwriHen highlighting it) margin] [,ater, in a letter dated lanuary 17th, 196 I,
y(mr pr.l)<_sal (e) as amplified it( your telegram of January 121h, It) itYidertake negotia-
riot+is tbr ow,rseas land stations on hehalf of NASA was nt)l accepted, but instead negotia-
li<)lls 'were initialed and completed t)y NASA, with the technical advict" of your company.
()tl Jattuary 4, 1961, as inditated in your attachment No. 4, March 26, 1961, the letter
from your Mr. C. R. Smith to our Procurement and Supply Division, we requested pr(_
posals in ac(:ordatlce with our own perforntance specifications for an experintental low-
altiltld(', active communication satellite. With the lelter of Mr. Smith, you submitted a
i)rop_)sal I<_ ]lleel ()ill- p(,rt_)rmanct" specitications.
I believe you will agrcc that our request for proposals was not an accel)tance of your f)r(+--
posal of Decend)er 14ti), but was instead the first step toward a policy of permitting all con)-
prudes inttweslt'(I ill this project to tilrnish competitive proposals rather lhan limiling the
development of lilt" satellite t<) arrangements that would he made only with your company.
_bu will recognize Ihat all of the above either took place before or was tmderway at
Ihe lime I look tile (:,ath of office on February 14th. It is background for the position !
have taken puhlicly, and mentioned above, "to have a good hard look at this before mak-
ing ((_mn(ilmetils." ] assurne part or all of this fails into the category you have called
"events which have taken place durit)g the past few months," and needs I<) he considered
in ad(lilit)n to the "specific eve(Its" to which you refer in yotH letter.
With ftwther ref('rcnce to the record of my press c<)nfertmce, you will note <)n page
12 thai the (i)wstion which l)r. Dryden answered related It) it i)r('scntati(m by your cot)l-
60 TIlE tllST()RY ()F SAI'I_IJJ'I'E C()MM!TNI(:AI'I()NS
pany before the Federal Communicalions C<)mmission in connection with, as the ques-
tioner pu! it, your "heing intereswd in the $170 million program to put up Iheir (your)
own satellites." The direct question was whether I "had any indication !hat AT&T has
taken a new look at the desirability of this."
[5] Ahhough the conversation Dr. l)ryden and 1 had with Dr. Fisk and Mr. l)ingman was
of quite a general and explo,atory nature and was in no way a negotiation or even delin-
eation of official positions, I did get the impression !hal your company was making a very
thorough examination, doing some real soul-searching, and 1 so staled in my remarks at
the bottom of page 12. If this is not correct, I will appreciate your advice.
I agree completely that we should sit down and straighten out any misunderstandings
flint may have arisen. If you believe ore public statements do not lairly represent the posi-
tion of your company, I will be mo,e than happy to take any steps necessary to make the
real tacts clear.
Sincerely yours,
James E. _k'bb
Administrator
Enclosllre
A:Wehb:ns
N
co: Dr. Dryden
Mr. Nunn
Mr. Phillips
BAC
Document 1-11
Document title: John E Kennedy to Honorable Newton Minow, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission, May 15, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
DuTing his first State of the Union address on January, 30, 1961, President Kennecl_, had called lor
an international effort to develop communication_ satellites, kbur months lat_ he reiterated this posi-
tion while considering a sweeping acceleration of the U.S. space program.
l)ear Mr. Chairman:
May 15, 1961
I am most interested in having facilitated early development of communication satellites
and will appreciate prompt determination by the Federal Communications Commission,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other appropriate agencies of
the conditions and safeguards under which that can go iorward. Subject to establishing
the necessary precautions, I am hopeful tllal the public and private resources of our free
society can be brought to bear for significant and early research progress in this tield, and,
EXI'I.¢)RIN(;TIlEUNKN()WN ()l
as quickly as possible, ti)v actual operalion of satellite lelephones, television, and other
comvnunicalion syslems Ihat will bring tilt" world closer togelher.
I will appreciate your keeping me intormed of the steps being taken toward !hal goal and
of tangible progress that is made.
Sincerely,
l [onoral)le Newl()ll Minow
(:hairman
Federal (',ommtmications Commission
_vVasllil|gl<)ll, l).(:.
[signed] John F. Kennedy
Document 1-12
Document title: Ben E Waple, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,
"An Inquiry Into the Administrative and Regulatory Problems Relating to the
Authorization of Commercially Operable Space Communications Systems: First Report,"
FCC Report 61-676, 4774, Docket No. 14024, May 24, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
()_ May 24, 1961, the I"ederal Communications Commission (FCC), tasked with outlining the ini
tial polio' to de/ermine how the eommunication._ satellite system mould operate, issued it_ "l"i_:_t
Report. " 7"he I"CC limited participation in the system to international communications earriem--
AT&71 17'7; 11(24, and l,Ve_t:r'n lrnion. 77_i_ poll 0, excluded aerospace al_d communieaticm._ equip-
me_tt manufiteturers a,d eon._equently provoked numerous contphdnt._. I"oreed to respol_d to the
aerospace and rommunir atiott._ equipment mant(facturers' ol_ections, the FCC stated that such com-
pa¢HeC partieipation itt the establishment o] the system would be neither "nece._sar 7 nor benffieial. "
7"hi._ i._ue wouM later ploy a major role in the controversy over the Communication_ Satellite Act.
]475/I } l',efi)re the FC( : 61-676
FEDERAl, C()MMUNI(;ATIONS COMMISSION 4774
Washing!oil 25, D.C.
In the Malter of
,,\n Inquiry Into lhe Achninis|ralive and
Regtdatot+y Ih'ot)lcms RelalirJg to the
Attfllorizali<)w of (]ommercially Operable
Spat(" ( ',onmluni('ati<ms SyslelllS
I)ocke! No. 1402,t
FIRST REPORT
By tiw (2>mmission:
I. ()n March 29, 1961, the Commission adopled a Notice of Inquiry (reh'ased on
April 3, 1961 ) clcsigned to lacililale an early solution 1o the adminislralive and vegtflalory
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prot)len)s relating to the furore amhori/ation of connnercially operable space communi-
cation systems. It was slated in the Notice that it may not be feasible to have mole than
one or a limited lllllllb('l of ('Ollllll/'rci_tl salellile (f)llllllllni('_.llion sysl('llls (|u(" [o lilt" Stlb-
stantial capital investment required and limilalion of radio spectrum space; and that this
r;dses a plo|)](:lll ils 1o the lllilllllCl ill which StlC|) _.t. syslem or ]imiled n|lln])el- of sysl(,lllS
could be accommodalcd within Ihc (:ommissitm's policy of fi)slcring beneficial (ompeti-
tion in the international communication tield and within Ihe anli-trusl li_,ws. Accordingly,
the Notice solicited views from all interested parties as Io the best plan of It] nsuritlg l|l_t[
intt'lllaliotl_ll COnHntHli('_tliOllS ('OllllllOn carriers, all(| {)lhers, lmrticil)ale on an equilat)l('
and non-discriminatory basis in a single or limited nmnl)cr of salellile systems. \:lows were
also solicited as to the legality of the suggesled plan; the Commission's authority to pre-
scribc sttch plan; and the eXlellI io which particil)anls in the plat+ would be subject to the
(',<nntnission's jurisdiction. The Notice ditectcd that tesponscs thereto be filed on ot-
l)elin-e May 1961 and that tel)lies to such responses be filed o,l on l)elin-e May 15, 1961.
2. Responses have been liled by lwclve parties, viz., American Rockel ,%ocielV:
American Securities (:orporalion (for the l+uture Wcstm-n [cnion lntt'rnati<)md, Inc.):
Anleritan "l'clephotw and Telegraph (:Olnl)any; (;encral Eh'ctric Company; (;choral
Telephone & Flectronics Corl)oration; l lawaiian Telephone (:on)pany; h+ternational
Telephone & Telegraph Corporation (and American Cable & Radio (:orporation):
I.ockheed Aircral] Corporati<m: Press Wireless, Inc.: Radio (:orl)oration of America (and
R(:A (k)lllllltlllic+|ti()ns+ Inc.); The Western Union Telegraph Company; and th¢'
l)el)artmcnt of Justice (commenting only on anti-trust matters).
3. Replies to such rcsl;,onses were filcd by American Teleph<)n(+ att(t Telcgraph
(:ompany, ( ;eneral Elcc! ri( +(:<mlpany, and I .ockheed Aircraft 1476/2 ] ( :orporation.
4. In gen<.'fal, the I'('SI)()IIfIt'IIIS were in _tgl't'<:lll('Ilt [h,_l[ Iot ('t<lllOllli(" 3111(| Ol|l<.'l" I'('+I-
sons a single satctlile COmlnttnications system or a limited imml)er oI systems+ lh+anccd
and owned by private ent('fprise, would best s<:rve the public interest. I'o the extent that
the respondents addtesscd themselves to a specilic typc of plan, flwy gcncrally l_tvor a
joint ventut'e f<n- the ownership and operation of a systcm. The principal dill_:rt'nce
among respondents in this t-espect rclated to the composition of such a j<)int vetlttll-e.
Thus, American Telt'phonc and Teh_graph (:ompany and Internati<)nal Telephone and
Telegraph Corporation [,ivor own('rshi 1) in such a system being limited to intel-nati<nlal
c()mmunications common (arricrs, such entities [)artici])ating in ownership to a dcgrt'('
c()nsislent with their use ()[ Ih(' sysi('m; (;cneral Telel)honc' & El(,clr<)nics (:<)rl)()ratic)n
would limit Ih(" owtlerslfi]) t<) both ([<)tncsti<: _tlld ilHertl+lliolla] C<)llllntmi(',tli()Jls (()111111()11
carriers; while l,ockheed Air(Taft C(n'poralion, _ (;t'nt'ral Elcctri( (:ompany, and The
_A:eslet+n [Cnion Tch'gfaph Company flavor ownership by (<Jtntn<nl carrit+rs, the tmtnufitc-
turing c<,npanies, and possil)ly the public.
5. [!pon considt'rati<)n o[lhe t('sp()tlst's and tit(" ,'eplics til('(l her('in the (:(>mmissi<)n
has arrived at (crtain (+(>nchlsh>ns, the applicati()n of which ',,,'ill serve to fi)ster and a(c<:l-
('ral<: Ih(' ultimate ('stal:,lishm<:nt of a comm('rcially operal)lc sl)a((" satellite c<mmnufica-
lion system in the ])ul)li(" mlt,rest.
6. We have con(ludcd thal the l'('(()llll|I('lld+itliOllS tna(Ic herein with leSpt'(t t() tit('
fi)rmation or arrangcment ()I a joint venture (()r joint underlaking) composed only <)f
existing (<_mmon (+arri('rs trig-aged in it+t('rmnional tcleph()ne and telegraph commtmi-
cation is deserving of consideration and t,xph)ralion as an (,[]('(livt' llle_+lllS o1 l)]<_in<Dting
the ()rdt'rly (h'veh)l)m('nt and ¢'lli:cluati<)n ()I" su('h a sySlCln. W<' l)t'li('v(" that, tmdt'r
l. I.<_ckh<'<+d in its ]cplv (onimenls witl+dlexs its pr<_p<_sal that m_ncP_hi I) it+ a '+al('llil(" '+_..t('m in( h,h'
l)li'+_it,t + illlt'it'Ms olht'l t]l_lll lht' illtt'lll+i[il)lIAl (_ll l+i('l'++.
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(:oniniission rcgulatt_r),.jurisdiction and sul)ject to lilt" condilions and safeguards hcrc-
inaflcr sol tT_rth, sonic I_lrnl ofjoinl venltlrt" by Iht, inlernational colnnloll carriers is clear-
Iv indicated as hi'st serving lhc public interest t_)l" the f<dlowing reasons:
(a) It appears to tx ? generall)' accepted thai bccaust" of considt,rations of practi-
cal ccononiics and lechnical lilnilations, it will not be feasibh" tbr s<mle lime to come
to acconlmo¢lalc inorc than oil(" conlnlercial satellite s+s'stenl.
(b) (]onlnnlniCalion via satellite will be a suppletnenl to, rather than a substitute
tbr, existing, c<lnnnunicalion S)'SIt'IIIS operated b)' the internalion;tl cOlnlnon carriers,
lhcrcl)y becoming an integral parl of the total communi(alit)n s),steln (if each such car-
Fi(!l +.
477/31 (C)Thc resp<mscs tih'd b v the intcrnati(inal carriers cxplt+ss a willingness and
itldicate a capability t<l marshal their respective resources |br Ihc ptu-pose oF dew'lop-
itlg a salt'llilc ctmimltnication facility.
(d) B v reason of their cxpcricncc in and responsit)ility tbr furtiishing interna-
tional c<mtnnttlications service, the intcrnatitmal carritrrs Ihetnselvcs art" h)gically tl+lc
<nits hi'st qttalilicd to dctt'rnlint' the nature and extent of tht" facilities best stilted to
their ll('t'tls and tiros(" of lhcir tbteign correspondents, with whotn lht!), have Iongl-
Islanding, and iqR'clivl" commercial relationships and who necessarily will ha'to a sub-
slanlial interest in lilt' opt'r;tlions of any satellite system.
(c) [Ind('r lilt" (:ontnllutications Act, the itliernation;il c,uriers arc ol:digalt'd Io
tnrnish the public +++ill+ adequale, cfficient service at t+easonablc charges, and this
obligalion can best be disch;_rged by those carriers maitltainin,g, as t_ir as p<)ssil>lc, the
grcalcst degree <ltdirt'ct co|ttrol and responsibility over ttt(' t_tcilitics Cnll)h_vt+d in this
servictt."
+7. l'ht,sc considcrathms, hi onr <)pinion, demonstrate the (h'siral)ility <dexplorhlg at
this titnc Ill(' nlcans wht+reby the international common carriers may, c<llh.ctivcly, but sift>-
jcct It> al+propriali + regulation and s;tt_'guards, take such steps ;in arc nt'ccssarv to plan and
cfl<.,Cl the ttllilnale intcgralion of satellite communication It+chttiqtt('s into tlt<.' l_abric of
itllt+rnalit>nal i:olnlnon catYit'l s(tl+vitt ". At the name time these (<lilsi(h'talions would
apl)car to Inililatc agaitlsl lilt' sli+_g('slions which have been mad(" I)+x'ct+rlaiil of the rcspon-
d('ill_+ lh_it ;lit),.j_linl "ct'nlurt' with iX'Sl>t'cl Io fill) own{'rship of salt'ililt" cliilnniillic_tlion s.'vs-
It!ins should in(hidt" l:,arlicipatioti t:,)' tile pnbiic or by companies lit flit" al'l*Os|)act" alid
COliiliililiitalions t!(ttiipnit'nl lnaliii|{iciiiring industries.
bl. li41_l• atl- iitll llninindfill tit the substantial inlelests thai lhes(" induslrics Ilavt" niadt'
ill lh(" ticld oF spact' scit'iicc alid the illipolrlLalql contributions the)' liavl' IO inak(, to this
Iiehl. Nor atl" "we nlnnindtlll of Ihc potential market lhal satellite sysl('nis l+l'pl'c_+Cill foi" the
salt' of colninilni<:-alioiis and Ix'laled cquipmeril, tlowcver, it aN)cars lhal the adaptation
aiid ililt'_ralion ill salellii_" coinlnlniicalion techni(|lieS it) inil.,lllalional colnnlon carriel
Ol>t.ratiollS is wilhiil the i_!COlionlic nicans of the exisliilg carrit'rs, alliioul._h 147_+t41
it'qliiriil_ coo[)i'rlilivt! _lri-an_t'rilenls ainonl_ then(. _r+<, fail l<) st'c w|i)' owli¢'rship partici-
tlilliOll I)), lhl" al,i-oSp_l(t, alid C_llninuiticalions (,qiiipincnt in(hlsliics will tit" l>(,ii/,|icial llt-
iit't't'SS;ll'y I<1 lilt" csl;Iblishitl('ill ola saleilill_ conlnllillicalion sysll'ni I_l I>t' ils(,d I)), lhc ('Olii-
It(Oil t';lii+i('l" indllslrv. ()n Iht! <llh<_!l lland, snch pai+ticipation ilia)' well i-t'sllh in t'ntllnl-
t)l'rilit. _ lht' s)'sl('lil wilh COilipiicalcd anti costl)' corporale relalionshil>s, disrnplin_
lt])t,r_llioilal patlt'rns lhal ll_i'¢t' bcl!n established in l|1(" inlcrn_llioitai conltnon carricl-
iildlisir+v, and iliipt'dillg i,I]i'clivl" rt'_iilalion o| the ral+_'s and serx'ict's of ihc ill[histr,v.
7, It is it.( ll_lii/t,d lit;it lllis iit.w It.[ hit<lhll4 ], ill( llnlnlilttic;llioit ill;i)" plt'+,t'lil lltliiit,ll+tl_,, iiitilllll' ;(lilt <lit-
lit iih pi<d_h.ili ,, wlii_ h Ill;p, ili,+,lll'+<,_,l,tt,iiil ;il>lir_laclll'+, and _,_lliili<_n:_<it ;i l'+lil+ ;(lid ii;llliil, dilii'll'iii lil>ln lltli_,l"
I_lii< li tl;ix_' lit't+(( II++Cdht.il'l_ltOlt' ill Iht' Iichl _t ilill'rnaliilllal illlnlilililil ;llillll_,. Itiy+xrt'_l'l. wt' _lil +s_tlistit'd lli_il
lilY+ _,111h Ill+V+prlillh'lli'_ (+ill t)<++,llit. ii,_,llkt'd h) v+_+lkhi_ wilhiii (lit" cxislill_ ti-;lllli,Wlll k (1| o111illli'l ii;llillll_ll (i)ln-
lllllll I ;111 it'l ill[ill_,ll X.
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9. Insol:ar as ll)e proposal tor such participation may have been motivated hy con-
cern that withoul participation the manufacturers of communications equipmem will be
excluded from this markel hv the mamffacturing companies affiliated with dm participat-
ing common carriers, lhe (:ommission is well aware of this danger. Accordingly, it is the
(:ommission's intention to require that any joint venture that may ew)lve shall make ade-
(tuate and effective provision, such as competilive hidding, to tel nsure that there will lie
no favoritisni in the procurement of communications equipment required toe the c(m-
strnction, operation and maintenance of the satellite system. We want to stress that we
shall also take all necessary measiues and establish regularized pr<)ccdures to [e]nsure
that such a policy is t_fiththlly and conscientiously administered. In this connection, and
also to promote the maximum degree of standardization, lhc Commission will also
require that its approval he obtained with respect to the specifications tbr all eqitipment
used by die common carriers in lhe satellite system, including tile ground terminals. At
the same time, befiwe approving any specifications, we shall examine closely into the rel-
evant patent situation lo [e]nsure that an undesirable or (iominant pa(en[ position will
not hamper or fiuslrate die Commission's objectives in this regard.
10. h is neither possible nor feasible toe the Commission here to indicate all the spe-
citic teatures which it believes should he incorporated in any.joint venture of international
common carriers. These malters will, of course, require carelul, extended sitldv and tOf
mulation hy the interested carriers acting under the aegis of die (:ommission and in
accordance with dw procedures and policies hereafter to be provided tor. However,
regardless of organization or type of entity that may suhsequently evolve, it lllns[ COlllHili
clear alld definite pr()visions which will [e]nsure Ilia! existing and future international
common carriers, whether or I1Ot any Sllch carrier parti(ipates lhl-ongh ownership in the
joint venture, shall have equitable access to, and non_liscriminalory use ot, the satellile
syslem, under fair and reasonable terms, so as to ohtain communication tacilities in the
system to serve overseas points with the types of services [or which they are licensed or
avthorized by this Commission. The Commission, in issuing licenses or authorizations
that may be required Io cflectuate such joint venture, will take all appropriate measures
m imph'mem this policy and to elliwt such olher safeguards as may tie rcquired in the
public interest.
11. We are making no determination at this time as to the desirahility or need toe par-
Áicipation in any such joilH ventil.re hy domestic common carriers.
[479/5] 12. In view of the toregoing, the Conunission hereby announces tha! it will iilvile
:ill [lnited States international common carriers and ceNain l_hiited Slates govermnent
agencies to attend a conl_qence with the Conmlission a! an early dale to exph)re plans and
procedures whereimder consideration of the matters deah whh herein may go fi)rward. A
further order will be issued upon conclusion of such consideration.
FEI)ERAL COMMUNI(LXI'I()NS (]OMMISSI()N
Adopted: May 24, 1!)(;I
Ben E Waple
Acting Secrelary
Released: May 24, l (.}(il
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Document 1-13
Document rifle: National Aeronautics and Space Council, "Communication Satellites,"
July 14, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
This poll O, statement outline_ the Kennedy administration's approach to the development _[commu-
nications _atellites. It place._ a much gTeater emphasis than the Eisenhower administration on the l,rov-
ernment'.s role in en._u_ing that the public and national interests wouM be served as thi_ neTt,
technologqcal capability was brought into being. It also emphasizes the need to develop a truly global
system firr .satellite communiizztions.
Ill NATIONAI_ AERONAUTICS AND SPA('E C()UN(:II.
PoliQ Document Approved--July 14, 1961
Communication Satellites
National Purpose
Science and technology have progressed to such degree lha! comnumicatioll through
use of space salelliles has become possible.
The Presidenl has recognized Ibis polentiality and has requeswd tha! it he lranslated
inlo atl actuality. In his Message (m the State of tile Union, lhe Presi(lent invited all
nail(ms to join with us in a new communication satelliw program. ()n May 25, the
l'resi(lent asked the (:ongress tbr $50 million of addilional funds tt) ",iccelcrate "the use of
space satelliws for worl(t-wide communications." Again, on June 15, the President request-
ed the Spa(e Council "t<) make the necessary studies and government-wide policy recom-
mendations for bringing into optimum use a! the earliest practicable time, operational
communications satellites."
Hence, flw national purpose and intent have been made clear.
I¥ogram Status
Research and development in the communications satellite field have been conduct-
etl over the past few years. This activity has been [2] under government auspices and guid-
ance and has employed primarily the competence and facilities of privale industry,
through lhe use of public fimds. From these efforts have come prospects for several dif-
ferent lypes of communication systems, employing passive and active satellites, in cilher
high or low orhit. Much more scientific and technical work needs to be done before an
initial system can be selected for commercial operation.
Agencies of the government have been developing a U. S, position with respect to the
internatit)nal allocation t)f frequencies, in anticipation of an International
Telec()mmtmicalion Union space conference in 1963.
There is a widesprea(l private industry interest in communication satellites, with the
anlicil)ation that they can be utilized to meet increased deman(ts fi_r service and tot com-
mercial henelit. Also, toreign countries have indicated their interest in communicalion
salellites,
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The FC(: has instituted proceedings in which i)robh'nls concerning communication
satellile systclns are being examined.
The pl-(:s,t_llt status of the communication satellite programs, both military and civil, is
that of research and devch)pnlenl. Neither the a.rra.ngemcnlsbetween governmcnt and
industry tot research and (levelopment [3] m)r Hm government })articipatio,i as to prvj)a-
ration o[ a plan or plans for ownership and operation of a connnercial system have con-
lail){'('] ally ('()llllllillll('l'l|S _lS if) 1|1(! OD('l',_t[iOIl_t] S_'SI('II).
A (ommuni(ations system using satellites is made u l) ()t at nund)er of irlt('r((mn('cted
parts, of which the salellites are but one parl. "File lull system includes message origination
facilities, ground sending stations, ground receiving stations, and message delivery tacili-
tics--in addition to the salelliles llSCd for CI)lllilllll)lL_ receipt and relay of lllC.";S,ilg('._. _'{'
aheady have an clal)oralc communications syslem between the Ullilcd SLaWs ktlld SOIIIC
|)drls o[" Ill{" world. (_onmntnicalion salellilcs ItlllSl |)(' inlcg, ral(.:d into the existing svslem.
Adding communication salt,litres t_) flds syst('m would pc'rmi_ substantially inc)('asi)ig d,<"
coy(rage, in(rcasing the ca])at:ity for c()mmunicalion, and chat)ling felt'vision and high
spct'd ([aut, as well as voice and record, t() bc transmitted and received ()v('r _,l't'atl distances.
Problems
As a tllattcr ()f progrcssiv(" action, tile (clltraL qt]cslioll is how l() m()'¢c []'()m a rt'sear(]l
and development slams I() an opt'rational status ill which the newly ('m('rging t('ch,<)l<)g,,
may be utilized ill the public truer(st.
[4] There arc two principal problenl areas: one having to do with conlinuing to advance
the stale of the art on an accelcraled basis and tile technical selection of the sp(witications
()fan initial ()peratic)nal syst('nl: lit(" ()film" having to (to with ()rganizali()n and the nlod(' ()I
opt'ration best sl)il('(l )o accomn)odaw |hi"wid(" range of publi( int(.)('s)s invoh:c'd.
l"ofiry
Following arc maj()r obj(.clives and policy guidelines for tim prop('r handling ()| lhose
problems:
I, Time: ()perationa] sat('llit('s should become a part of lhe means of long distant(,
communication at the earliest pratt|cable lime a)ld this should Ix' achieved through tlt(,
leadership of the Unilcd States. This means acceleration of elfor! in r(,s('arch and devcl-
opmenl, in plans |or ()pcralion and manag('mcnl, and ill c()op('rali_c ncgoliali()ns with
olhcr (otlnllies.
2. Ownership: "Fit(we is a vet(l(! variely ()["types, m(,lhods, and ],)roccdures l()r lit(! own-
ership of tile U.S. portion of lhe system. The lypc of ownership should be |hal whi(h gives
Ill(" gr(!alest ;.ISstlrall('C Lira.(!tile pu|)lic illtClCSl will be best served. Any ()wn('rshi I) plan
which promises less would be conlrary _o policy [5] The type and nalure of ownership
should not be d('cided, however, until reconmlcndations sutmlittcd I)y private enl('rpris('
hart" |)ten ewduated by the appropriate agencies ofth(" governnl('nt It) (lvt('rnlint. whether
they ItlCC[ lhc policy rt'quirctncnts. 11 thes(' policy requirements are m('t, lit(" govet+nnlent
will encourage private enterprise to establish and operate a syst('m. This should b(" dot:id-
eal as soon as pra(ti('abh" in order Io maxinlize lhe level of nail(real ct]or!.
Ill addition to tile ()tiler policy st;.il(,lll(,lltS ill this do(ullient, lhc following (ritt'ria and
principles should I)(" emph)y('d ill evaluadng l'C('Olltlll(!ll(lati()ll_.i lilt privateowncrshi l) oF
the U.S. portion of lit(' sysR'm:
a. non-discriminatory use ()t and e(]uilabh_ access l() the Sys, ICIll by pr('scnt and
['l.[lll['e ('OlllIttlllti('attions ('alTiCl'S;
b. ct'feclive (omp('lili()n, such as (()repetitive' It|riding, in furnishing ('quipnlent
purchas('d, leased, ()r ()fl)erwis(' acquired fi-om ))on-l!.S. gov('rmn('n! s()u)((-s;
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c. lhIl compliance with antill,utst legislation and wilh the regulation of rates,
licenses, freql,tencies, ere.l,] by the approprialt' govt.++,st,net,lit agencies.
[6[ 3. (;overmnent Responsihilities: hn addition to its regudatory responsibilities, the
gl)vel,l,ml,el,I l shonld:
a. condl.lCl or l,nail,lttlil,i sl,l,pt.l,vision OV('F inl('rl,taliol,la[ _lgrt+etnents and negoti_t-
tions;
b. conduct and +'+co(+,l-age rescal,ch and developl,n, en! to the+It+ate accol,nplish-
+,sent of these policy ohjecliw's and to give l,naximnl,n assm+ance of rapid al,td
col,ltinm<)u,s and leclunological progl,ess;
c. control all lml,nchitlg of t!.S. spacecl,'aft;
d. make use of the cmnmwrcial syslel,n and avoid col,nl)elitiol,i with it;
e. cslahlish s('])al,';tl(' col,st,+tin+cation satellite systel,ns, wht'i+ required to inter
nnique g()V(+I']l'l,l]('|l't l+e('(ls which cal,lnt)l, [l,l tilt' l,lalional [lllCr('st, It+' ll,l,i'l hv
the col,nl,nt'l,ci_l,[ syst<.,l,n,;
f. assure tilt. efli'(tive use ()f the l,adio flequ, ency spe('lrtlnl;
g. ;tsslU'<: Ill,at +)roy+sit)n, fix+sis lo!r tilt+ discol,nil,ul,an(c (+f stir'flit<: tral,lsnfissions
wh,en iequil,-(+d in the interest of conumuunicaliol,l, eIlicielnCV and effi:ttivcl,wss;
h. i>l,-<wide techmical assistance Io newly developing col,intrics in order It) attain
an t'ffi:(tivc global system as soon as practicable.
[71 4. New Uses and Redl,u:ed Rates: It is all ohjective that satellites +,sake avaihtl)h, fin
gel,wtal use l,l,ew and expanded inwrnational cotnmuunications seirviccs. Transmissiol,t of
records, voice, and tch'vision over gl,eat distances sholthl thcililate the cxchal,tge of il,flbr-
nl,atit)n and ideas tlumughoi1t the workl. These new and expanded uses sh, otild, at the ear-
lit'st p(+ssihh, tin+e, he l,n,ade availabh' Ihnou, gh an ect)l,+tml,ical system, tilt" h)wer costs of
which will bt" relh.cted in overseas connntnfication rates. Anticipated greater us+, and
l()wcr ('(+sis p('l" ch_llHl(+l ill ;a ((+lll,l,nl,lll,icatiol,t satellite syst(+l,n In;ty l,llltkt" h;wer l,_lles ])l,;lcti-
cable.
5. (;h+hal (](wcrage: A systel,n of c<+ntmunications designctl lot, "gh+hal" coverage is
to b(" c<_nlrasted wilh, a system limited to connectil,lg hea+y traflic markets and suIpjcct to
expansion only it+ response to added demands of sufficient vt+hlnl,tt +Is to |)e pl,otitahh' pet,
se. Rather, a "gh)bal" system is one with the potential and the objective to provide eflh'iel,H
coral,+tin+cation sel,vice throughout the whole world as soon as technically feasible, it,+,elud-
ing service where individnal portions of the cm'erage are not profitable or even have no
expt'ctalitm of [iIlnu-(" pvolit. It is a national objective to have such a global system opera-
hie as soon as press+hie within the lint,its of technology.
18] 6. Foreign Participatiol,t: It is axiomatic that there be toreign participatiol,l in any
international commercial cornml,miealion system. In addition to participation through
use, there wol,l,hl he tore+g+ ownership or control of ground facilities ouuside the United
Stales; international agree+writs as to frequencies and operating practices; arrangements
ti>r c<mnections with other systems; and opportunities throngh foreign ownership of,- oth-
erwise i_l the s_l,tellites in tile syslel,n. The U.S. hopes that practical measnres tot inch t+or-
eign participation call be developed.
7. Relationship with United Nations: The U.S. shonld examine with ()tiler countries
the dewqopnlent of the +,hOSt constructive role for the United Nations, inchl,ding the
l lnternational Telecomml,l,nication l_nion}, in international space co++,+,nun+cations.
I)0cumenl 1-14
Document title: Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, et al., to the President, August 24, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
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The ]brm oJozLmership of an operational communications satellite system became a controversial Lssue
in 1961 and 1962, as it became clear that such a .sTstem would be established within a Ji,w yea_. The
Kennedy administration's poli 0, statement on communications sateUites (Document 1-13 in this vol-
ume) was released on.tidy 24, 1961 (approved on pdy 14), and provoked this response from thirty-
five members of ('ongress who feared AT&T's dominance of an operational system. 7"hO, urged
President Kennedy to wait until any s_,stem was full_, operational beJore he made a final derision on
the Jbrm o]ownership. Kennedy did not foUow this suggestion; several of the signers oJ this letter were
among those leading the push ]br public ownership of a communications satellite ._Tstem du_Jng the
1962 co_gressional delmte on the issue.
[11 CON(,RESS OF THE UNITED STATES
House of Represenlatives
Washington, D.C.
Emanuel Celler
1 I th District New _fi)rk
Chairman
(k)mmittee on the.ludiciary
August 24, 1961
The President
The White ltouse
Washington, D.{'.
My cleat Ml: President:
Early development of a space satellite communications system is of fundamental
national importance. Such a system gives promise of revohttionizing international com-
munications and communications within the United States. I! has potentiality tbr an
mlprecedented increase in worldwide telephone and telegraph communications and tbr
providing transocemfic television and radio transmission.
We undersigned members of Congress there!ore believe that it is crucial that the
United States be the first to develop the system. We fi_rther believe that the Federal
(;cwernment should by contract carry out extensive research, experimentation, and devel-
opment of a satellite communications system. Not a minute should be wasted. ,Mier such
a system has become tidly operational, but not until then, we believe, can decisions be
intelligently made as to whether such a system should be publicly or privately owned and
under what circumstances.
As you have poinled otll, "the present status of the commtmications satellite pro-
grams, both civil and military, is that of research and development. To date, no arrange-
ments between the government and private industry contain any commitments as Io an
ol)erational system." We believe this is as it should be. Present commitments of any kind
as to the control of this system may hinder its rapicl developmen! and prejudge vital ques-
lions of public interest and international relations.
The course of research and development fiw this new syslem have [sic] demonstrated
one overwhelming ['act: We do no! at present know which system can be put into use first,
nor which system w'ill be most efficient once in orbit. Given this technological uncertain-
ty, the complicated (lUt'stion of ownership and control of this system must necessarily be
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covert'd with an cvcn gwawr ha/e otuuccrtainly, lu order lo [cinsurc dial die rapid dcvel-
opnlt.nl ()f Ibis new sysl('m is not [21 impeded I)V _l p]'('lil_l[lll'(! tlc(:iSi(m as It) ownership, wc
arc of lilt" opinion tha! prudcncc requires a furlhcr iuvcsligali<m ()f lhc l)roadt'sl asp,.wls t)l
lilt" ()wncrshi I) qucsli<m. Specifically, wc bcli('v(' lhal lit(" dcbaw over ownership should bc
s('parawd from the d(welt)l)mtmlal qucsfi(m umil the (:ntir(' system l)c((mlcs fully Ol)Cr_l-
li(mal. During this period dcvclopmcm sh()uld proceed wilh all possil)1(' speed while care-
ful study is given it, dw dc(:isiou as It) lit(' c(mlrol of tlws,: um-il)cn('d Il'llils ,t)l sciul]('t'.
While wc t)elievc that lilt' final qucslitm of owncrship should not bt" decided :ll a time
when wc have insuttici<'m knowledge, wc wish It) mak(: it clear lh_li should i)vivalc con-
ccrnls t)c aull)orizcd It) ()INn and ol)Cl-alt! lllc systcill, lh(' ,_()v(.,lllllltq)[ ;tgt,ii(i(,s t'llll'tlSlt'(l
with u'csp<)]isil)ilily must, ct)nsistcnl wil]l the aniitrusl 1;lws, prcvcn! any (onccln hom
allai]liilg a mt)nopolisli(, (Itm]inaul, or pr(.fertmtial adv,mi;:igc. ()thcrwisc th,." mtlional
inlcr(!sl would t)e truslF_ttt'd I(_r gCll('ra.liop, s to colil<_ in a ]lisl()l'it achicvcmc]ll which,
actor<ling it) ;I rCSl)tmsil)Ic l>,cdicli<m, may well COllSlilillc _l mulli-l_illion (h)llar a vca,-
lmshwss hl Icu t() I]ftccu ycms.
()ll.]ldy 2,1 you issued :t policy slawmt'ni Ill;it (,sst,nlial conditions to privaW _)w]lc]shi t)
ol a space sawllilt' C()llilillllli(';tti()IIS svSiClli 3.i'c ;I "S[l'llC[ilI'(' o[" own,t'rslii l) arid ('()nil'()]
whi(h will :tssurc m:txhnum I)ossillh" compcfilic)n" and "ftdl <ompliancc widl ;mlilrusl lcg-
isl;llion." Wc arc in ((mipicl,t' :igl't'('lllt'lll wil}l lh(:se conditions :rod il is ft)F this rcas()n Ill;it
wc arc dCcl)ly couccrn('d al)oul orders issued by lilt" Fctlcral (:ommlmicalitms
(:;<mmlissi<m t)n May 2,t and July 25, 1961 which clearly t()nicFUl)l;tl(' limiling owncrshi I) u>
,I Sl)CCiticd gr(ml:, of so-called "inl(.'Nl:tlion;d carri('rs" which dt)cs uol cvcn include _dl
dlcsc t:;u-ri('rs. These ortl('vs arc contrary it) lilt" p()licy cslal)lishcd b_ r %r'()il: lh¢:'V arc coil-
tral+y to thc princil)lcs of thc itniilrust laws.
"[+hc F( :(: ordci+s _tl)pc;u for all practical pill-post's I<) d('lt'liiiillt' Ihal lhl" salt'lliic coiil-
lilliliit_tli_)liS sySlCln is 1_) 1)<! owii('d alld Ol)Clalcd t)%' Ihis grollp <it It'll "illlCill;ilioil_il (_ir-
ricrs." This would llit';ili l]l;il <)lily ti)tir +Olirt'rlls would piirlitiplilt" ill ihc s'¢slCili'S
OWlicrship silicc Ihc ()liter nix toilipaliics in tt_is glOtlp have pl<)lcsscd it<) inlcrcsl ;vli;tlso-
I,Vt,l in space iotililltlliit;iliOllS. MolC inipt)rlanl, il would lilC_lli lh_ii Ollt" <it Ihcsc It)ill
(()lii])lilii('s, AT&T, Wolild hlivc il doinitialil ;tild vcry pl+<lb;il)iy it ili<)ii<)polx p<lsiliOli ill t)wil-
ciship _ll lhl' sp;t(c (:OlllliililliClitiOliS sySlClil. In effect, AT&T would lit, Iht! <:liOSCll illSllli-
till'Ill ol lhc t_nilcd St;tit's ( ',oVt'Flllllt'lll ii) own and control civilian sp;icc COllillitllli(_lliOllS.
This would bc inl<dcral)lc lrt)lli Iht! standpoint ot + ihc public intcrcsl. ,L\S Ihc
[)t'plirlliiciil <d Justice tKIS sl;tlctl, "lhc COlllililling oppollllllily (tot A'I&T) io t_tVOl its OWll
t_icililics would +iiwavs I)c t)rcscnl and would int'vilablv result in discrilninalion or suspi-
ci_>n otdistTiniill;ilion lilt) lllilll('l how sli+i¢l niighl Ill" lilt" policy of (AT&T) io l)l'ovidc [:+I
cllu;il scrvi(:(' to its t:t)lnlJclitors." Fill'lhcrlllOI'(', "the oppol-llUliiy It) []ivt)r llIc ])lll(']l;tS<' ()t"
cquipnicnI produced b)' (AT&T's subsidiary, lla, reslern Electric Co.) would bc irresistil)lc.'"
']'lic hc_td ot the Justice l)cp;Jrtinent's AJililrusl Division has Icslified dial "lilt dcgrcc of
(<_li(t,lili;tliOli ill this Iicld lii;iy vt,ry wcll be one of lhe i('a.sons why Aliit'lit_i is liOl [litlilt'l
_il[VallCt'd in tht' field Iod;iy l|lall it is .... Our systeili has riol prodiict'd as ii should, :llld lilt
pul)lic iillcrcsi It;is suflt'rcd t-Jt'CliliS(" Iht'it" has IiC(!ll iindlic COllCt'lllraliOll in this field."
tt%'c bclicvc dial to satT,'14timd Ihc public intercsl il is esst, nlial Ihal ;lily plan pcrniiilin._
priv;lic ownership if, indeed, such is i)rcfcrrcd Io public, of ihc sp_i(t' salclliic svsl('lil liiilSl:
( I ) att_)rd till inlt'rcsit'd _Jililcd _talcs conllnunicaliOliS COllunoii CalTiCrs, dOilieS-
tic its wcll as inlcrilaliOlia], op])orlliilily lo pariicil)aic in ownt'rship of ihc svs-
ll'liE aild
(2) _l]'[7)i'd all illl¢!rt=slcd (:ollllntlni(alions and at'rosDaC(" iIl_lllllf,i(llll('ls o]lpOllU-
nily It) i)arlici])alc ill ownership of lh(, sysI('nl.
l,_i'l.• tilivt' st't'li [i-i)lii i);isl cx[)('l-iCll(C how lilt' Allit'li¢iill Tch'l)honc 8,-" Tch'gr:iph
(:_liiil)aliy ]l;is t)t'l'il able ill CXl)_lild ils iiiOliOl)o]y posiliOli _iiid slrciiglht'li ils hold oil ihc
Aliit'iit_iii (,toii<lliiV I))' (-Oliil)iiliiig-, liiidCl lhc aegis ot oiit' holding ioilit)aliy, iis cqUil)-
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merit lnanufacturing concern, the Western Eleclric (:ompany, and tile operating divisions
of the Bell Telephone System. Only by insisting upon the widest participant by all inter-
esied communications and aerospace manulactnrers and operators can there hy any hope
dn_t such a monopoly can be forestalled in this new and vital tield.
The antilrust laws prohibit monopolizalion of any part of the domestic or fiweign
commerce of the United States. They also prohihit the acqnisilion, ownership, control, or
operation by an interstate or foreign wire carrier of any station or any system for radio
communicalifms or signals between any place in any slate in the United States and any
place in any fi)reign cf)untry, if the purpose is, and/f)r lhe ef|e(l lhereof may be, It) sub-
stantially h'ssen competition f)r to restrain commerce hetween any place in any state ill the
United States and any place in any foreign country, or nnlawfully to create monopoly in
an}' line of commerce. In these circumstances, any plan which does not meet both the con-
ditions we have specified would, in our considered judgment, he ill direct violation of the
antilrus! laws and wonld require special legislation 1)y the Congress. No executive order
or decree of any agency can override the antitrust laws.
[4] Nor is there any logical or rational basis for excluding U.S. domestic communications
common carriers fi-om ownership in tit(' system while granting companies which have no
interest and virtually no investment in internalional conmmnicatioi_s service opportunity
to participate in the system's ownership, particularly since the space satellite could pro-
vide domestic as well as international conmmnicalions services.
Furlhermorc, it is ('lear that the space satellite conmnmications svs|em will be vastly
diflerent from the conventional colnln(ln c;wri('l + type of operation. Thus there is no jus-
titication tor excluding communications and aerf)space manutacturers, parlicularly when
the record clearly demonstrates that a number of lhese organizalions have a tar greater
contritlution it) make in expert technolo_' than am' of the tell "comnnmications carriers."
The question of monopoly is only one of many complicated questions involved in Ihe
decision as to what kind of an ownrrship system will best meet the public interest. The
ramitications of this remarkable system are likely to he truly revolutionary. And, as with all
revolutions, it is clear that our understanding of the implications of a new lechnoh)g T is
likely to lag hehind dm,elopments thenlselves. Because we believe time and sludy are
(,ssenlial It) wise drcisifm-making, and because we do not want to t)rqjndice the ultimate
question of control and ownership during It1(, period of study, we urge tllat:
I. No decisions concerning uhimale control be made unlil the enlire system
becomes fully operational.
2. No contracls, decisions+ or acts which may pr(_judice the ultimate decision as to
ownership be agreed to tmtil the entire system hecomes lully operalional.
3. During this period, the (;ongress br ctmsulted upon the question of ultimate con-
trol and ownership and allowed to exercise its {onstitutional respfmsibility to
supervise activities of Federal agencies rrgulating toreign and domestic com-
lller(e.
4. l)uring this period, all other interested parlies h(" consuhed fully Hpon Ihe qtlcs-
lion ()f ownership and control.
5. l)uring this [)eriod, all possihle (lueslions of international agreemenl, cflopera-
lion, control and ownership related to other nations and the [[rnilett Nalions] I)e
thoroughly exph)red.
The t!nite(I Stales can (|elllOnstrate l() Ill(! world what a democratic syslem can a(com-
l)lish in devch)ping a st)ace communications satellite system. But if decisions arc taken in
haste anti allowed Io crainp and pr(_ju(ti('e 151 lhe rational (teveh)l)nmnt of the new gift ot
science, it is likely that we nlay not only i)rcju(lice a (lueslion of vital natitmal (onfevn, bill
we may hin(lrr lhe rapid (hwelopment of Ihe system itself.
_l_HIl" slale111enl of July 24, 1961 makes it clrar tha! if private ownershi I) is to he
lavoreft, Ihc ownership and (-onlr()l systcm must rot'el eight slrin.genl (()n(lilions. _'e
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would like 1o emphasize fllat the conditions laid down are a very difficult set of tesls for
any systmn o[ ownership 1o meet. We bellow' thai if careful lhoughl is given m how or,
indeed, whether, these tests can be met, not only will the public inleresl be served, bu! th('
rapid development of lifts new gill of science will mo[v]e ahead unhindered by a prema-
lure struggle oww (Is fruits.
Sincerely yours,
Hubert I I. I hmll)hrey
Estcs Kctiuuver
V_lyn(' N'h>rst"
.I.scp|_ 1'. A(ldabt)()
Thomas 1,. AshTcy
Edwar(L P. Boland
Jam('s A. Burke
,lamt's A. l_yrne
Emanucl ( k'lh'r
Merwin ( :oad
,Jeft_'ry (:ohelan
lx'omud Farbstein
KvnnvdlJ. (;ray
(:hco I Iolitichl
Ehner J. Holhmd
l,ester Holt/man
Robcrl W. Kastenmeier
Eugene J. Keogh
Frank Kowalski
ThomasJ. lane
Richard E. l,ankford
Roland V. l,ibonali
(:lvm Miller
Document 1-15
Joseph M Montoya
John E. Moss
Almlham J. M.her
M. Blaine Pcters(m
Henry S. Reuss
Ralph J. Rivers
James Rooseveh
William Fitts Ryan
,John K Shclk'y
B. E Sisk
t h'rman Toll
AI tqlman
Document title: Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant to the President, Memorandum for the
President, November 13, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
In October 1961, the FC(" Ad I loe Carff_,r (or Indugtry) Committee Report proposed that a nonpn!/:
it colporation he establi._hed to develop and operate the eommunicalion._ _alellite ._'stem. Thi._ eo_po-
ration wouM lea._e cilvuits to authorized carriers, which wouM own the satdlites as well as their
g_ound stations. 7'he co_poration n,ouM be run by.' a board _?[ diwctors, includin_ representative._ o]
A'I'&7: 17"1: RCA, and ll_stern _htion and three pubfic direetor_" appointed 13, the president. "/'he
committee's report resulted in immediate rvntroversy, as noted in Frederick I)utton _ mernorandum to
PTesident Kennedy. I'1"1_ RCA, and Western Union all expressed concern that AT&T wouM domi-
nate such a corporation, while representatives of other aerospace and electronic manufacturer_ were
unhap]._, that th U would be exdudedirom participating in such a revolutionar_, fieM. Some membezg
O[ Congres_ expressed concern that such a co_]_oration involving all Of the international carrier_
would constitute a monopoly. The issue wa_ not settled until the passage o[ the (:ommunications
Satellite ,4el on ,4 uA,vz._l 31, 1962.
November 13, 1961
Memorandum for the President
As, a lilalteF of information, you should be aware that the i)ropc, kind of entity to own
;tilt] O[)l'i'_ll(" (()ii'liiilllli('itl}l)il sal(']liles is betoillillg all il)tl(!;,tSlllg SOilll'(: i:)J' t'olilFoi_tqsy, l
havc brought together a Task Force of rel)res(,ntalives tl'Olll Ihe interested Federal agen-
t+it's wilh lhe (:hah'inan, Ed Welsh, as E×ecutive Dh't'clor of the Space (:OUllcil, 1o prepare
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rtwommcndalions consistent wifl_ yore. Policy sl_llclnUlll ill this th.ld. The ExccntivC' agen-
tit's arc" dissatisfied with the rt!pOrl o| the F( :(:Ad l-toe Induslry (:ornmillt'l'; and Sl.lt)sl;ln-
tia[ (:ongressional and press concern continuc's ow:v XI'&T's potenlial stranglehold m,er
communicalion salellilc's. The Task Force will have recommendalions ready in I)eccmbcL
Scnalor Ken is prcp_.-ing his own h'gislalive Fecommt'n(lalions, so Ih(' entiri" lll_lll_.'r will
m_douhlcdlv com_' 1_)a hc_d dming dw coming (:_)ngrcssional st,_,sion.
Fn,dt,rick (;. l)tulton/
Document 1-16
Document title: Senator Robert S. Kerr, "Amendment to the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958, Space Communications," November 28, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
Document 1-17
Document title: E.C. Welsh, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council,
Executive Office of the President, Memorandum to the President, April ! 1, 1962.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
Document 1-18
Document title: "Communications Satellite Act of 1962," Public Law 87-624, 76 Stat. 419,
signed by the President on August 31, 1962.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
B_ the _pri.g oil 062. the Ken nedy _Mmi.islrali.. had decided its prf[erem'e r_:_(mdi.g what hiud ,1
commu,icalio,s .satellite ot_.ranizrtlio, shouM be developed. There were .some i, Co,g.Tes_. however
who wanted public tmmer_hip q anv .such m:_anizatio,, while olhm ar_(ued /or l.tallv private tv.,-
lrol. Whih" the tvmgressional debate was L.oi,g o,. 7bhlar was launr4u.d attd succe.sqU//y .peralM b_'
AT&Y: This [itrther strenL.lhe,ed the ease plr private-sector tqmraliou t(l iuler_lalio,al satellite com-
mu,icalio,s. I, addition to the admiuistralio, hill mentioned i, the memorandum Io Preside, I
Ke,,ert_' ./_vm l'.dwatd C. i'_._.lsh. Executive .ger'_rlal 7 [Or lhe ;\)tlimml Aemnaulirs a,d S/me.
f:ou,cil. /here were l!]iee_ other h:_.4_lalive propos:d_ cml_v.r,i,, k, the _:_me _uhjeel. "l'he_e advocated
aller,rtlive._ iucluded ._n.el ttnu'u! owm.rship, limited private .wttership _imihtt In the admi,i_lrrtlio,
hill. rt,d rq_elt ou.m.r_hi/J itol limited Io the ittlet,aliontll c:trrierg.
.].h.i.]oh,w.,. .\'A._A :_.¢e,eral c.u,v'l, wa_ Jh:st a_ked t. dmjt .ge,rlt.r Hobert Ker_ _ bill/or a cm,-
m,,icalitms satellite eot]_outlio, and lhelt asked Io dr:l]i the lx'eu,ed_' admittislralirm :s bill p, lhe
same proposal. Kerr'._ bill provided fi," a, e,lm.l_' pm.at4_, ru, cotpoiali.,, rt;¢ulaled b_' the gover,-
me, l. It u'pn'senled /he more tvmservative side t_/ the Hti_'ltllleltl oueY ownership a,d to/tirol. Kerr
cham.d the .gestate C.mmittee o_ Aero,aulicrd aml .Spate .gcie, ces .ml servM prim,rily as r_, ruh.o-
cate fi," the admi,istratio, :s bill rathtv' than his ow,. l:'sle_ Kf/+tuver repre_e,led the other side _¢ the
debate aml iutroduced a hill calli,L. /m total gover, me,t .w,er_'hip. lh' h'd the op[msitio, to the
admi,i_lralio, hill o, the Se,ale /loor first lhrouffh the addili., ,to ,umber o/ ameudmeuls and
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then b3,a filibuster The Senate finally moved]or clotuw fi. the fir+t time sinrv 1927 to end the debate.
In the end, the administration hiU was not _igvHficantly altev'ed and eventually became the basis fin
the Communications Satellite Act 011962.
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[ 1 ] (AUTOMATIC REI+EASE IN A. M.'S OF TUESI)A$] NOVEMBER 28, 1961 )
FROM TIIE OFFICE ()F SENATOR ROBERT S. KERR
I)RAFI'
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
That the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended (42 US(: 2451-
2476), is amended by adding lherelt} a Title IV, to read as follows:
TITLE IV--SPACE COMMUNICATIONS
DECI.MRATION OF POI+ICY
Sec. 401. The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States to provide
leaderstfip in the eslablishmenl oft world-wide communications system inwflving the use
of space satellites at the earliest practicable time, to provide ior ownership of the United
S|ates [)Ol[ion O[" the sySleln, and to invite all nations to participate in the syslem in the
interest _t" world peace and closer brotherhood among peoples throtlghotll tile world.
(;REATION OF SATEI+I+ITE ('OMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
Sec. ,Ill2. (a) The provisious of this Section shall take etl'ect as pr_wided in Sec. 406 of this
Act.
(b) There is hereby created a corporation, to be known as the Satellite
(:ommunicafions (:orporation (hereafter referred to as the "(:orporation"), whose object
and purposes shall be to develop, construct, operate, manage, and promote the use of a
communications satellite system in the public interest, and to fi_ster research and devel-
opment in the liekt of space telecommunications.
(c) Organization and Operation. The Corporation shall be organized and operated
as a communications common carriers' carrier, and shall own the United States portion
<_[ tile communications satellite system, consisting of the satellites, the earth terminals,
and associated ground control and tracking facilities. The Corporation. shall make the
fiwilities of the system available on a nondiscriminatory and equitable basis, at rates to be
established by the Federal Communications Commission (hereafter called the
"(_onnnission"), to all [!nited States carriers authorized by the Conmfission to provide
c<mtnuufications services via satellite.
(d) Foreign Participation. The Corporation shall also provide opportunities fin fiw-
eign participation in the communications satellite system, through ownership or other-
wise, (m an equitable hasis and on reasonable terms
(el ()wnership of Corporation. Ownership interests in the (;orporation shall he lint-
ited to United Slates comnnmicati<ms common carriel+s who are deternlined by the
(:omnfissitm to be eligible to participate in such ownershil).
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[2] (f) Officers of Corporation. There shall t)e a Board of 1)ireclors consisting oI two
Directors appointed by each carrier or aflilialed gt-oup of carriers having an ownership
inleresl in the (:orporalion and two adctilional Directors designated jointly I)y 1Jniwd
Stales carriers wit() ill'(' authorized t)y Ihe (]Olltlllissioll to provide ('olltlltlllti('alions sew(cos
via satellite but wh(_ do not acqttire an ownership inte|x.sl in the (:orporatiotL The Board
of l)ireclol-S shall choose, or elect I)y majority vote, Ill(' t)rincipal officers of the
(:orl)oralion. Each l)ireclor shall have one vl)le in all lllallefs determined hv the B(mtd of
l)ireclors.
(g) Financing _)f Corporation.
( 1) The Iolal authorized capital stock of the Corporation shall he 500/hill(on dol-
lars, consisting of live thor(sand shares of the vah|e oI $I0l),000.(10 each. Such
stock shall be <)lone class, shall he nonassessahle, and shall he issued only fi)r
cash fully paid. Stock held l)y owning carriers shall m)l l)e transf('rable, excepl
with the approval of the (',()tntnissiot+, and then only to other co(rim(in(ca-
tions (:t)ltlltlon (+arricrs determined l)y the (',Omlllissi()ll I(> he eligihle to par-
ticipate in the ownership of tile (_orpt)rati<m.
(9) The/ninimu/n amot£111 of stock which shall be held by an <)wning ca/-/+i¢+r shall
I)t" live sh;.tl'es.
P()WERS OF (;ORPOtC\TION
Set. 403. The ('.orporation shall ha'¢e perpetual succession, and shall have power li) (Io any
and all things necessary and proper to carry out the object and purposes of the
(;orporation, including, without limitation thereto, the li)llowing--
(a) to acquire, h<)ld, own, mortgage, lease, and dispose of real and personal propel-
ty, ot +every class attd description and without limitation as to place;
(b) to lease channels to authorized users of the communications satellite system;
(c) to c<)n(htct research and development;
(d) to enter into, make and perti.m contracts and agl'eelllellls ()t" evel'v kind and
description with any person, tirm, association, corporation, (nun(oil)all(y, cot(lily, stale+
body politic, or government or colony or dependency thereof.
(e) to sue and be sued;
(f) to accept unconditional gifts of services, money or properly, and legacies and
devises;
(g) to adopt and alter a corporate seal and, subject to prior approval of the
Colnnfissi<)n, 1)y-laws not inc(msisten! wilh tile laws of the U/filed Stales or of any Stale;
(h) to estahlish and inainlain offices and t+acilities tot the condu('t of tile aft+airs of the
(k+rporation in the Districl of Cohnnlfia and in the several slates and territories <)f+the
United States, and in foreign countries; and
(i) to purchase, hold, sell, and transfi'r the shares of its own capital stock.
[:31 RFIATIONSHIP BETWEEN TIlE CORPORATION AND
THE NATIONAL AERONAUTI(:S AND SPACE ADMINISTI,L, sffI()N
St,( +. +I(14. (a) The Administration shall bc responsible lot-
( 1) tin'nishing launch vehicles required for the communications satellite system
on a schedule which will facilitate the economical and efficient deveh)pmcnt
and operalion t)t +the system;
(2) launching the salellites, and furnishing launch-crew and assot:ialed servi(es:
(.3) consulting with the (;orporati()t| on (tie technical sp(*cilications fiw satellites
and earth terminal station, an(l on the ntnnher and local(t),( of such stations:
;tit(|
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(4) to dw greatest extent practicable, c(_ordinaling its research and development
program in lhe field of space lclecommtJMcations with lbat of Ihe
(_()l'p(H'a[i(H! s(} as to giv(_ iilaxiIil[|[ll as,".;llla||(+<.' o[ rapid and O,Hltilll.lOllS sci-
entilic and lechnological progress.
(b) The cosls of the launch vehicles and launching and related services furnished by
the Admitfistrati<m under sul)paragraphs (at (1) and (at (2) above shall he reimbtused
by the (;Orl)<wati(m as a credit to ('lllT('n[ apl)rOl)riati(ms <)t the Administration.
(c) The Adminislrati()n in als<) aulh¢)tized to furnish oih('r services, on a reimbursable
basis, u[)o_l the request of the (;orporadon arid its reqtfired tiw the successful dev,c'l<)p))letll
;uM operalicm of the c¢muntmicalicms satellite system.
(d) The (;¢_rl:,¢_vati¢m shall ¢_msuh with the Adminislraticm, and co_rt+lillale its
research program, as pr<wMed ivy subparagral_hs (at (3) ;rod (at (4) ab¢wc.
REIz_,TI()NStlIP BETWEEN TI IE (;ORPORATION ANI)
T! tE i"E I)EIL,\I, (;()MMUNI( ]ATIONS ( ;()MMISSI()N
See. t05. (at lu regulating the (:_rp¢_ratiot_ as a communications ¢:ommou carrier trader
the (;ommutfications Art _t 1!)34, as amended, the (]ommissi<m shall Jr'Insure-
(It lit;t! the c<mmumicatious satellite system established by lhe (:orporati<m is
lechtfically compalible with and operati<wta.lly itllerconnetted with existing
comtnttMcalitms thcilities;
(2) lhal Ihe fair" Sll'tWllll'e established tot the commtmicafiotls servicc's of ft.'red by
Ih,t' (;<wp<wation will provide a t_dr vetttrn on lilt" capital invested il_ the
(;orporation; and
(3) that there will be nondiscriminatory use olaud equital)h, access to the system
by present and ftltlll'e attlhorized commtmications carriers.
14 } (b) The (',tmmfission is also authorized to-
(It <letcrtnh+e which Uuited Stales comtltttnficaliotts cotnmt>nl carriers shall be
eligible to participate in the ownership <)f the (]()r])olation;
(2) approve the by-laws c)t the Corporation, or alterations lherelo;
(3) tcquirc the C<>vpCwati<+ll to emph+y competitive bidding iu the acquisition of
t.qtdl)met_t used in the system, to the maxinttun extent I+,,asible, st) as re> ptx.-
serve el'fiwlive c<m+q)etiti<m;
(4) rcqtdrc the (;Orl+orati<_tt to provide e<mltntzvlications services it! areas of tilt"
world where it may bc uneconomical, so as to ntake the sySlelll global in c<w-
erage as soon as technically feasible; and
(5) require the Corporation to provide opportunities for foreign participation,
through ownership or otherwise, in the system, on an equitable basis, and on
leaSollabletellllS,
(X}MPI+ETI(}N OF OR(;AN1ZATION OF ]'tie C(}RPOK_.TI(}N
Scc. 406. (at The President is attthorized to take all steps necessary to organize the
(;orpovati<m descril)ed in Sec. 4(12 hereof, inchtding but not limited to the fi>llowing:
(1) <_btaining a determinati_n by the Commission as to which communications
common carriers shall be eligible to participate in the ownership of tilt"
(2) obtaining commitments from such eligible common carriers as lo the
alv_t)unts tht'y will invest in the Corporation: ;rod
(3) receiving, nottfinatioltS to the Board of Directors of the (]orporation. as pro-
vi(h'd for it+ St+(:. 't02 (it hereof.
7(_ TIIE[tISl()RY()F SArI'I,;IJ JTE (]()MM l NIl ;ATI()N:S
(b) Tile Senate (k)mmittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and the ]lot,s('
(]Ollllllitte(' on St'it'll('(' alqd AstFoll;_iltli(:s shall hc notified when all steps ne(t'ssarv lo Ihc
<wganization of the (;orptnatitm have been completed, iuchtdiug approval of the pro-
posed (]orporation by-laws h) _t/t" Commission. Sec. 402 will lake effect fllirly (lays idler thv
date of such notification.
(c) If lilt" (irganizalion of the Corporation has not been completed within lhre(,
mtmths after lhe date ofenactmt'nt of this Act, the President shall make an interim report
it) the Senale (_olnrnittce oYl AmollaUtiCal and Space Sciences and lhe t [oust" Ctlnlmill('t"
on Science and Astronautics on the sldltls t)|" such organization.
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Executiv(' ,";t'crctary April 11, 1962
Memorandum to the President
It is understood that Chairman Otx'n l larris of the l|oust" ]tlterslatc iit)(l Ft)r('igl_
(]Orlllllt't'c(' (]Otlltllittc(" is schedul('d to see yOtl l()ttl()l'l't/W. If'SO, he may w'anl to discuss the
(_ommtmications Sittcllitc I('gislation, which is hi'tore his ('otlllllill('t'. I/t" has (omph'tt'd
his hearings and is hopiug to mark up thv hill very soon.
_mr bill was illll-otlltt(,d ill Ill(" St'trill/" its S. 2814. It WltS il)lt'otitlc('d I)y (_ongt cssman
tlarris in the lhn,s(' its II.R. ll)115, tlluris also ilHrodttc('d vottF |fill its rood|lied by l|lc
Seltate Spat(' (|on|in|lit,('. That hill is tI.R. 1 I0,t0, and is turFen/17`' tilt" ¢mc primalily b('ing
considered hv (:hairman Harris.
[tarris has t)een most ('oopcrativ(" in this mall('l, as ilhlstrate(l by his invilalion lo Nick
Kitlzi'nbilch and mc to help iron out various qUeslions with him and his staff 7`,('sttwday. Hc
indicated I]lltl hi" wanted Io ntake the minimum /mmhet of changes in Ihc bill and
thought it itnportatu to act quickly st) that elf(wts hy others to ohtain (;overnuwnt (fWll('l'-
ship of ll/e system v¢ould not have time to hlock action lifts session. This siltll(' sic'w is, |
b('liev(', held t)7` S('llal(31 Kcvr alld his ,%pact" (]Otllmillct% and Senator Paslott' it|it| Ihc
[nterstat(' and Foreign (_()lltlllt'l'('(' (:ommitt('(' ill tit(" Senate.
Our meeting with (_hairntan Hart'is was alst) attended hy Newt Mittow, wh(_ stated that
the majority of the FC(',, imhuling himself, bclicvcd they could "live with and make work"
the bill as it II()Wstands. Some clm-it}'ing language of varit)us minor points is t)('ing worked
out hv I['lt' staff of lilt (]Otlllllcrce (]ommittc(" and staff of tilt!Justice l)eparllnt'ut.
It is suggested thai (,nlphasis might wt'll he Ill|lilt" ()11 the following:
I. That I)road-based owm'vship is tlw impi)vtant principle, mid lhat the pyre'is|tin in
I I.R. 11040 (50% of stock ownership by the public, and 50% by ituthovizcd carvi-
cls) is salisfactorv.
9. That the new corporalion should hc iutthori:cd Io own gF<)tmd stations, wilhoul
]3rcv<'niing individual carviecs ti-om ills<) [2] owning such lerminals, aud |hal it
woul(| 1)(" best if lilt, legislation lt'|l the decision as to ground station m_'nershil/up
to it finding ()t public inlercsL ((mvcn icnct', and ne(t'ssity _m lhe pith o| 111("F( _(].
withottl any language in file hill which wot,ld l)rt[itltlict" (>r inl]tu'ncv th(" F(3(Ts
dccisi<m iu |my individual cast'.
3. That legislation should nol he (|t-l;tyt'(I any longer than absolulelv nei'essmv.
.t. That it milkt's lit) dilf('r('nce Wilt!tiler Ilt(" II('W ]('gislatiolt bt'c(mws a st'pa,atc
St|lit|It" (which you had ])v<_poscd) oF tak('s th(" fi)rm ()f itlll('ltdtllt'lt[ t() |hi'
(;mum|in|cat|tins Act in to the Space Act, and that this is it ll/ittt('l' [(1|" Ihc
(',otlgress to (|t'leYmin('.
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Attached tor possible retercnce is my recent ivslimony on the m_ljor changes made in
your bill and some of it/(' lmtjor a.s])ects ot t|le pr(>i)os('d legislation.
[hand-signed] E.C. Welstl
:_lllachilielll
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lgTlh (;ongress, It.R. 1104()
allgl.lSl 31, 1962
An Act
76 STAT. 419
'l'o prm, idv t_)r Ih(' (.slablishlnelil, own(,rship, oi)eralion, and roglllalioli (it a
C()llllll(!lCiil| c()lllllllllliCaliOilS satellile syslelll, illld J_ll ()lhel t)urposcs.
Be it e.acted &, tit; Se.at; a.d /louse _f Repre.sentative_ _] the l :.ited State_ <?JAmerica in
Conl.n'es_ a,sgembh,d,
TITI.E l--Sl I()RT TITI.E, liE( :I..\RATION OF P()I.ICY AND DEFINITI()NS
SI tORT TITI,E
SE( ;. 10l. This acl may lm <filed ,is I tie, "(]omllluni(ali_tns Sal('llile (]()ilinliinicalions Act ()1
I_.lti7 '' {(ilalion in illalgili: "(]OlilllililliCali()li Salellice ACl of 1_._62"1.
DE( :I,AIL-\TI()N OF POI,ICY AND PURPOSE
SE(;. 102. (a) The (|(ingress herel)y declares that it is the policy of the United S, ial('s Io
('slal)lish, in coll, illn(ti()il ,lid in cooperation wil]l otiler COtllltries, as expeditiously i)racli-
cat)l(" a coinln_'rcial colnlilUilicalions salellile syS[Olll, |is parl of |ill iinproved global (Olll-
lilllni(ali()ns lielw(irk, which will Ix" responsive io public lieods and n,iliOlia[ ob.ieclives,
which will ser'¢e lhe ((tillmilnicati()n needs of |he United _laleS and olhel ('oiiillries, ,lid
W|li(|i will COllilit)lll(' to world lmaCc alia ulldt'rstalldillg.
(b) Th(' iiew and eYl)and('d lelecommullicali(in services are io I)e in,de available as
l)r<mll)lly as possible ;tlld ill'i! [o I)e e×lellded 1o provide global (-overage al Ihc earliest
l)iaciicable fl;ii_'. Ill ct|_'clualilig ibis progralll, cal(" and alienli_tn will be dil'i'ci_'f] loward
]lr(>viding such SOlVices 1o econolliically less developed c()unliies and areas its well as tli(ist'
liilti-e hilghly developed, ioward efficient and eron(iiliila| use of the ele(lr(illia<t_ll(!li( |re-
([lll'll()' Sl.leclrillll, ,lid toward i|lc relieciion of lhe benel}ls ,l| ibis new technology' ill bOlil
quality <)f services an(l charges lot + su(]l services.
(c) In <)r(|cr Io fa(ililale Ihis developnieili and Io provi(|e for lhe widesi possible par-
lJcJpalioll })I' [:ll'JVall" elilerprist, s Uniled Stales parlicipation in liie global syslelli shall be
in 111l' [()rin (if a plivale Colp(iralioli, sub|eel io ai)proprial(' goverlilli('iila] regil]alion, h is
lhi. illlelll ()|(]()ii,gress lhal all alllhori;4ed ilscrs stlall have ll()lldis(Tilllillal()rv ac(css Io lhe
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system; that tnaximtun competition be mainlained in the provision ¢)1eqttil_ment and st'r-
rice's utilized by the system; that the COrl)oralion created under this Act be so organized
anO +)pt'raled as to maintain and strellgthell ¢+Oml_ctition in the provision of commtmica-
lions s_'rvict's to the public; and thai the activities of lh_, corporation ¢Teatt'd nn(ler this
Act and or the persons or c<)mpanies participaling in lhe ownership of the" Cm-l)Oralion
shall be consistent with the Federal antitrnsl laws.
(el) II is not the iiHent ot +(]ongress b+v this Acl to precltldc tht. _ts¢_of the c<)mmtmi-
(ati<ms satellite system tbr domestic commtmicalion services wht're c<)nsisl_qll wilh the
i)rovisi<)ns of tiffs Act nor to pr¢'chtde the creati<)n of addiliomd c_>mmtmi_ati<)ns satellite
syslt'ms, it required to meel tmi(Ine governm¢'nlal needs or if otherwise rt'qttire(t in the
mtlional int,'rest.
I)EFINITIONS
SE(;. 103. As used in this Act, and unless the context <_therwise requires-
(I) the lerltl "conmnmicati<)ns salellite system" rel_,rs to a system _I c<_mmtmica-
lions sal¢,lliles in space w]+¢)se purpose is to relay lcqecommnnication inlbr-
itlalion t)cl+A, een satellite terminal stations, [21 together with stl_'hassociated
equipment and facililies tot tracking, gttidance, control, and cmnmand tithe-
lions as are not part of the gent+ralized latmching, tracking, control, and corn-
mand t,wilities fro all space pmt>oses;
(2) lhe lerm "satellil¢' lt,rminal station" ret_Prs to a cmnplcx of commtmicali<Jn
eqtli|+m_'nl located on ther t'arth's stnl_tc¢', <>perationally _onnt.(ttrd with _mc
o1 illOl-tt It-l+l+(,Silia[ t't)lllnllll'_icatioll svslt'lllS, anfl (al)al)le o| + Iransmitling
Ic]ecommHtli¢'ations to <)1"Fecciving [elecollllllltllifatiol|s li'otll a C<+Hnllltllli('a-
lions satellite system.
(3) the tt'rm "commm+i_ations satellite" mr'ass an earlll .satellite which is il+lt'n-
tionally tlse(t to relay teh'conmmnicati<)n intbrmatMn;
(4) tht+ lerm "associatt'd eqnil)ment and facilities" ret;_'rs to facilities otht'r than
satellite tern+inal stations and cmnmuni_ations satellites, tt> l>c¢onstt-uctcd
and <_[)erated fi)r the primary pm-l)ose of a c<)mmtmicalim_s salellile s+vst<+!m,
whether Ibr administrati<m and n)anagcment, Ibr resear(h and d(,vch +pmcnt,
t+r tk>v divt'ct sttppt)rl t)t +space t)l)eralions;
(5) the term "rt'search and develol)ment" reti:rs to lhe conception, design, and
lil'St <.realion of exl}erimt'nlal or l)rololype opt_ralional d{wi(cs lot th¢, opera-
lion of a connnttnications satellite system, itwhtding the assembly _+tseparate
components into a working whole, as distingtfished tiom tht + term "prodtw-
tion," which relates to the' constrnction of such d<:viccs to fixed speciticalions
comfmtihle with repetitive etuplication tbr _+perational applicati_nxs;
(6) the tel+Ill "telccollllntlni(ali_ll" illealls ally transmission cmissiot_ or re¢+epti<m
of signs, signals, writings, images, and s<)tmds or intclligt'n_c <_t anx llaltlr+: [)X:
wife, vadi_, optical, or t_ther electrontagnetic systems;
(7) the term "commtmications c<m+tnon carrier" has the same mttaning its the
term "common carrier" has when nsed in the (]ommtu+itati<)ns Act of 1934,
its anwn<t_'d, and in addition itxchtdes, but only {t_r |_utposes of sections 3_)3
and 304 [citation in margin: "48 Slat. 1064; 47 US(] 609"], an+v individttal,
t)aitncrshil), associalion, joint-stock company, trt,st, corl)<>rali<)n, or other
entit.v which owns _+t controls, directly or indirectly, or is under direct _r indi-
rt+¢t common t'<)lllrol with, any stwh carrier; and the term "authorizt, d carri-
e_, +'excepl otherwise provided fi)r pro-poses of s_'ction 304 by section 3+14 (b)
( 1), tn_'alts a cotntnttnicati<>ns common cart+ier which has bectt authorized tw
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the Fe+Ictal (;oltnnutlicalions Commission tnld,ur the (]omnltmicati<)its Act of
I(..)?)4, as altl('t)(led, Io provide services l>y means of corns)re)cations satellites;
(&) the I(.'rlll "corl),twali(Hl" lll(.+alis the coFporatioll atlthotized by title Ill of this
At:t.
((.It the term "Admit)istv_tti()t+" nleatls the National :_el+<)ltatlIies altd Sp+lt'e
AdnliltiSlratiol); all(]
( I 0) the (eFm "(+;ommissi<m" l_le;ttis the Federal (:ommtt1+icalioHs Commission.
{!_1 TITI,E II--FEDERAI, (;()()RI)INATION, PI_SLNNIN(;, AN1) RE(;UI,ATI()N
IMPI.EMF.NTATION OF POI,/(;V
SEt;. St01. It) ordt'r it) achieve the ol)jcclives and to carry out the purp<)ses <)l Ibis Ait--
(at Ihe President shall--
(It aid i)t the plat))ling ;t)+d <'I(-velopment and foslet the exectltiot_ <)f a )tat)offal
l)r()gram for the estal)lishnlenl and <)peYation, as expt'ditiotlsly as l)()ssil>le, of
a (Olllln¢'l(ial (Olllltnllli(ali<)flS satellite syste/ll;
(2) provide l_)r (())_litltlotls review el+all phases of the (Icveh)pmet_t aml opeYali<)t)
oF s_t(h a syslcm, i))('ltl<li))g Ihe activities <)1+a e<)t))t))ttt)icati<)t)s salellile e<))p<)-
ration atH.h()rized tlt)tlt'r title IlI <)f this Act;
(3) coo)dinatt+ the a('Iivitics <)tg<)vt:r)lme))lal a_¢'z)cies wilh reSl)O))sibilitics it) the
field <)t telet<)mmttni('atit)t), st) as to [e]nsure that lhel"e is full at)d eflk'(tivt'
c+))))plian)ce ;it all limes wilh the policies set to)lh h) this At'I;
(4) exercise such supervision over relationships oF the c<)tporatiot) whh loreig)l
gt)v(:)t)n)('t)ls or (!)iIilies or with i)iternaliona] bellies as ))_ay l)e +_pprop)-iaI(' It)
aSStll'(e Ihal Stlch ielaliC)llS]lil)S shall be consistelll wilh the llatiotlal itltel+eSl
a)M to)cig)) p()licy of the U)lilcd States;
(F)) It. It)st)re lhal thnely arra))gymet'Jts are made ttll(l<.'r which there can I)(, tbt +-
ei_,)) t+)a)licil;,aliol) ill Ih(" establishment and use <)ta (<)t)_tn)n_icatit)ns salt'llilt,
systelll
((5) lake all )H_('es.sary sleps to [e]nstire tl)e availal)ilily a))d apl))op)ialt" t)Iilizalio))
<)f the (()mmt)nications satellite system fi)r ger_eral governinental p))rp<)ses
except where a separate eo)n)))nnications sale]lite systen) is reqt)i)'ed It) )heel
tmitlt_(' g<)verntnent_tl needs, or is <)therwise required in the national interesl;
and
(?) so exercise his attth()rity as Io help attain coordinated and efficient t)se ()f the
ele('tronm,g))(,ti(: speclrt)n) and the technical compatibility of the system with
existing (:otnmttnications facilities both in the United States and abroad.
(1)) the Nali()nal Aero))aHlics and Space Administration shall--
( 1) advise the (3<)remission on technical characteristics of the c()mmt)nicati<)))s
salellile sysl cln;
(_2) c<)operatc with the corporation in research aml development It) Ihe ('xlent
deemed appropriate t)y the Administration in the pt)blic interest;
(?,) assist the corpora)its in the conduct of its research and developtncnt pro-
gram I)y ftu+nishing to the corporation, when requested, <)n a reimbursable
t:,asis, st)oh satellite latmching and associated services as the Administration
deems necessary tor the most expeditions and economical developn)ent of
the corns)mica)ions salellite system;
(4) (,ot_sltlt with ihe (:<)rporation with respect t() the Ieclmical characterislics ()f
the (:ot)+ttnmi(atiot)s satellite system;
(_) fnr))ish t() Ihe corporation, <))1 reqttest and ()_) a rehnt)ttrsable basis, satellite
launching and associated services tell)fired for lhe eslablishme))l <)perali()n,
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and maintenance of the comn+ttnicali<ms satellile system approvcd by the
Conmfission; and
[ 41 (6) to tilt+ extent feasible, [innish other services, on a reiml)m+sal)Ic basis, to the cot-
p<wation it] (ontle(tiot] with the establishmetn and operation of the svslem.
(c) the Federal Conmnmications Conlmissi<ln, in its administration of the provisions
of lit<_' (;omnntnicatiot+s Act of 1934, as atnen(|ed, and as supplemented by this Act, shall
|citation in ltlal+_itx" "4_ Sial. |(_fi4; 47 USC 609"]--
(I) [e]nsure eft_'ctive competition, including the use of competitive bidding
where appropriate, in the proctncment by the corp<)ration and torero|mica-
lions common carriers <it apparatus, cqttipmenl, and services required thr
lhe eslal)lis}imctll and operation of the conmnmications satellite svslent and
satellitc terminal slalioltS; and lilt" (]otnmissioll shall constth with the Small
Business Administration and solicit its l'eC<)lnlllclldalioll'; <)It tllea_;,tll+C_',,all(l
pr(wedures which will [elnsure that snmll brim|hess concerns are given .tn
cquitab|e op|)ortunity to share in the pr<wurement program of the ctn'|>tna-
tion [br prol)evty and services, inchtding but not limited to research, devcl-
o[)lllelll, ('OllStlllt'tiOll, iltainteliall(*(,, arid Fe})air;
(2) Ic]nsme thai all l)resenl and t'tlltll'e attlhorize<l carriers shall have n<mdis-
ct+itninatory ttse of, and equitable access to, the communications satellite s+s-
tern and satellite terminal stations under jUsl and reasonable charges,
classifications, practices, regular|tins, and other letms and conditions and
regulate the Inatlner in whi<h available IS.oil|ties of the svslem and stations are
allocated atutnxg such users thereof;
(3) in any case where Ihe Se(retarv of State, after ol)taining lhe advice <>f the
Administration as to technical fi+asibility, has advised that commercial corn-
re|re|cation to a parlictdar fi+reign point by means of the con]nnmicati<ms
satellite systent and satellite terminal stations should be established in the
natiotml interest, institttle fi)rthwith appropriate pr<>ceedings under set+lion
214 (d) of the ('+<)mtntmitations Act of 1934, as amended [citation in margit_:
"57 Slat. 12; 47 US(: 214"I, ttl veqttire the estal)lishment of such cotntntnli(a-
tion l)y the cor|)oratioti and the appropriate c(nnnton (arriet + tit carriers;
('it [e]nsure that facilitit's of the communicalitlns satellite system and satellite
terminal stations art' lechtfically compatible and interconnected operational-
ly witil each other and with exisling communicatior_s tat|lilies;
(5) prescribe sttt+h accounting regttlati<ms and syslems and engage in such
ralemaking procedures as will [eJns(tre that any economies made possil)lc by
a conmnmications satellite system are apl_r<_priately rellected in rates for pub-
lic commtnficatiotl services;
(6) appr<>ve technical chara<+leristics o1 the operali<)na] conlmtmications satellite
system to be cmphlycd by the corporati<m and <+t the salellile terminal sta-
lions;
(7) grant appropriate authorizations for the ctn_struction arid |)petal|tin _i each
sittcllile lerlninal slat|oil, eilhet" It) the COl+|)oralio]l Ol t_ <tile oi I]]<H-e atlth<_-
rized tat+l+iers or t(t tile COl|)orali<)t;t and one c,r InOl-e ,+,;,rich ('arricl_;,.jt)illllv, as
will best serve Ihe ptd)lic interest, convenience, and necessity. In dtqerntining,
the put>lie interest, c<mvcnienrc, and necessity the (;ommission shall amh<>-
tize file (OllStl+nt'tion alia o|)crali<)t] of milch staliollS t)v (otnmntli(alions COIII-
lll()ll (ar]ieYs or tit(' ('<)tilt)ration, wilht)ttl [)Felelellce Io eilher;
(8) auth<)rize the (Ol[)<)rati<_n to |smile any shares of cal)ilal stock, ex(+e[)t tlt+.* ini-
tial isstK" _+|capital st_><_-kl'<_'t_='I'Fe(|ttl ill set;tiotl _()4 (at+ of tt> |_+tl(>',_,' all)' tll_>lX-
eys, or to ass|rote any 151 <}ill|gallon in respect t)| the securities of any olher
l)erson, ttDon a finding |hal such issttance, b<)rrowing, or asstnnl)tion is <+ore-
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pafible with lhe public inlerest, convenience, and ne(essity and is n('c('ssary
or appropriaw tot ov (ousistent with carrying out the lmrpos('s and obic(tivcs
of this Act 1)y the (:orporation;
(9) [el nsure that no substantial additions are made by tile ('()rporati<m or carriers
with respeel t(t [_tcililies of the system ()r satellite lerminal stations mdess such
additions are required by the public interest, convenientc, and necessity;
(10) require, in ac(<wdance with tim procedural reqtfirmnents <ff section 214 of
the (_otmntmicali(ms A(I of 1934, as am(reded [(ilation in margin: "57 Sial.
11; ,17 [!S(] 21t"1, that additi(ms be made by the (Orl)()ralion ()r cart+ierswith
r,pspe(l It) t_cililies of the system or satellite lerminal slati,.ms where such
additi(ms would serve the public inleresl, ('<mvenien(e, and n(,(essily: aud
(1 I) make rules and regt,lati<ms to carry out the provisions <_f this Act.
TITIJ'_ III--CRF.,YI'ION ()F A (:()MMUNICATIONS SATEI,I+ITE (:()RP()RATI()N
CREATION ()F CORPORATI()N
SI'++(].31+)I. There is hetehy authorized to be (vealed a commt,ni(alions satellite (otp<wa-
tion l<)r pt<_fit which will not 't)tr an ageta(y or establishnwut of the United Slalt+s
(;<:,'+,'<.rllllll(+lll. The corp<wation shall he sail)jeer Io lhe provisions <)1 this Act aml, to lhc
cxlent ('ot+sislet+t wilh this At'I, t(t the l)islricl <)[ Columbia Business (:()rporali(m Act+ The
right 1(_ repeal, alter, <>t amend this Act at any time is expressly reserved Icilalion in mar-
gin: "68 Sial. 177; I).(:. (:()fie 29-901 "1.
PR( )( ;FSS OF OR(;ANIZATI()N
SEt: 302. "l'hc President <)f lh(' United States shall appoint incorporators, by and with the
advice and ((resent of the ,':";elaate, who shall serve as the initial board of directors until the
lit+st annual meeting <d st()(khol(h'rs <>r tmtil their su(:cess(trs al+e elc(ted anti (itlaliti(+(t.
Such iucorpo,at<ws shall arrangv tbr an inilial sl<)ck ot/_.t+ing and lake whatever <_ther
actions ave necessary Io eslablish the corporation, inchtding the tiling of attich's of im'_+r-
l)otati<m, as approved I)y the President.
DIRF(:TORS AND OFFICERS
SEt:. 303. (at The corlmrali(m shall have a board of directors consisting of individuals
v,'h_ ave t itiz+.,ns ot the Unite(l States, of whom ot_e shall be elected annually l+tyIhc I)oat-d
Io serve as <hairman. qhree members of the board shall be appointed by the President of
the I!nitcd States+ by and with the advi(:c and consent of the Senate, et/e(live Ihe date on
which the other illellal)els _l.l-t.elected, and [or terms of three years or tmtil their stwccs-
sots have t)ecn apt)oittted and qualified, except that Ihe first three members of the board
s<) apl+oinled shall continue in oftice for terms of one, two, and three years, respectively,
au(l any tnemher so al)pointed to till a vacancy shall be appointed only tor tit<" ttttexpited
term of the director whom he stlcceeds. Six members of the board shall be elected alanu-
ally by those stockholders who are communications common carriers attd six shall be
elc(tcd atmually by the other stockholders of the corporation. No stockholder '+vim is a
communications common carrier and no trttstee tot such a stockholder shall vote, eilher
dir(.<llv _>t indirectly, through the votes of subsidiaries or afliliated companies, nominees,
ot +zttLv peasons sttl_ject to [6] his direction or control, for m¢+te than three candidates tt+t-
membership on lhe t)oavd. Nt,bjecl to such limitation, the articles <_t inc<wpotati<m 1o l)(.
lil('(l by lh(' in(<wp<nators dt,signale(l uta(ler st'clion 302 shall pt+ovide fi)r cumulative rot-
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ing under section _7 (d) of the District of (]olmnlfia Business Curporation Act (D,C,
Code, scc. 29-911 (d)) Icitalion in margin: "68 Slat. 191"1.
(b) The corporation shall have a president, and such other otticcrs as may I)e named
and appointed by the board, at rates of compensation fixed by the board, and serving at
the pleasure of the board. No individual other than a citizen of lhe United Slates may b("
an otticer of the corporation. No otBcer of the c()rporaliotl shall receive any salary from
_t[l_r S()tl_'('_" other lhan the corporation during the period or'his employmenl by lhc (or-
[)oration.
FINANCING OF Tt IE (X)RI"ORATION
SE('. 304. (a) The corporal|on is aulhorized m issue and have outstanding, in such
_t_li/()lllllS ;i.s it shall (If'term|he, shares of capital stock, whh_mt pal value, which shall cmrx
voting rights and bc eligible for dividends. The shares of such stuck initially o||ered shall
bc sold at a price not in excess of Sift0 tot each share and in a manner to encourage the
widest (tislril)uti<m It) the American public. Sub..}e(:t l<) the provisions of subscctions (t))
and (d) of Ibis se(lion, shares of stock o|tc'rt'd under this sul)st'(ti()n may I)(, issued 1o and
held I)y any perstm.
(I)) (I) For the purposes of lhis section tile tm+m "audulrized carrier" [nolo in mar-
gill: "At_lhorized carrier"] shall mean a communicafil)ns (onm_on carrier
which is spccitically authorized or x,vhich is a member of a class (it carriers
authorized by the (immnission t() (D,VlI shares of Slock ill the corporation
upon a finding Hla! su(-h ownt'vshi t) will be consistent wi_h _hc public inler-
('sl. ('olIV('lli('ll('('. illld II('C('ssilV.
(2) Only lh()s(" (()nmmnications (-onunon carriers which arc authorized (a,-ri('rs
shall own shares ()l y,l()('k ill lilt' (orl)()l-ati()n al a|l/y |ill1(', ;tl](| ItO o[hel" ('oln-
municati(ms ('mnmon carrier shall own shares cith(u directly or indirectlx
through subsidiaries or affiliated companies, nominees, or any l)ers(ms sub-
.jett t() its di,cction ov conlrol. Fifty per ccnmm of the shares of stock atllh(_-
rized ti)r issuance at any time by lhc corporati(m shall I)t, reserved ti)r
purchase by authorized carriers aud such carriers shall ill tile aggregate lit.
tqlli(l('([ I() Illak(" ptu(hats('s of the res('tved shares ill a lotal munl)t,r n()[
('x(('cding lilt' total ntunt)cr o| the n_)nr('servcd shares 1)t any issue purchased
t)y otht'r pcrs(ms. At no lime atier Ill(' initial issue is completed shall the
aggr('g-a¢(" of th(" shares of _'odtlg sm(k o/ th(+ (oq)orati¢m o;,,'ttcd by autho-
rized carriers directly (ir indirecdy lhrtmgh sul)sidiaries or affiliated compa-
nies, nomin¢'t's, or any persons subic(l Io their direction or ((mtrol (,x(ce(I 50
per c('nll,m of su('h shares issued and outstanding.
(3) At no time shall any st()ckh()ld('r who is not an authorized carri('l, or any syn-
dica[(" or al'tilialcd group ()|' such stl)(:kholders, own more than I0 per (entmn
(l| lhe shares ()t voting stock (if lilt' corp(trati(m issu('d and outslanding.
(c) Th(' (orporatilm is authorized to issue, in ad(litiort to tile stock attlhorize(t 11},sub-
se(ti(m (a) of dqis s('cli<lm n(mv()ting sccurili('s, bonds, d('b(mmrt's, and oth('r (('rtiti('at('s
of in(lel)tedness as it may (lmerminc. Such n()nv()ting se(urilies, 1)<rods, debtmmrcs, or
olher (crtiiicales of in(tt,btedness of the corporation as a (:ommunicatitms ((mm_on car-
tier may own shall be eligible tot inclusion in the rate base of t|le (arricr to the cxtem
allowt'd by lilt- (;ommi.ssio_. T|m voting [7_ smtk of 0)e coq)ora_ion shal| +m_ be eligib_<'
[or inclusi(m in the rate |)asc of tl_e carrier.
(d) Not mor(: Ihan an aggregate of 20 per centare (if the shares of sl()(k t)f the (or-
poration authorized I)y sttbsection (a) of this seclion which are held by holders (iti'Jer than
aulhorized carriers may be held by persons of t}_(" classes described in paragraphs ( 1), (2),
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(3), (4), and (5) of section 310 (a) of the Conuuunications Act of 1934, as anwnded (47
U.S.(;. 310) [citation in margin: "4_ Star. 108"1.
(el The requiremcllt of section 45 (b) of the District of Cohmd)ia Business
(;orporation Act (I).C. Code, sec. 29-920 (b)) as to the percentage of stock which a stock-
h()lder must hold in ()rder to have lhe rights of inspection and copying set till'lh in thai
sul)section shall not hc apl)licahle in tile case of holders of lilt" stock of the corl)orali()n,
alld they Illay exercise such rights without regard to the percentage o[ stock they hold.
(11 [!liOn application to Ihe (;ommission hy any authorized carrier and aller notice
and hearing, lhe (:ommission may compel any other authorized carrier which owns shares
of stock in the c<,rp(,ratitm t<, traust_'r ¢o ¢l_e applicant, tor a fhir and reas(,nal)lc consider-
ation, a imml)cr ofsu<h shares as lhe (;ommission determines will advance the public inwr-
est and the purl)oSes of this Act. In its <letermination with respect to owmwship of shares
of Slock ill the corpora.liol_t, tilt" (;ommission, whenever consisleill with the public illteresl,
shall pvomole Hw widest possible distribution of stock among the aud_wized carriers.
PI. !RI'()SES AN l) P()WERS OF ]'HE (;ORPORATi()N
SE( L 305. (a) 1_1order lo achieve Ihc objectives and to carry out the [mrpt_ses of Ibis Act,
the c,)rporation is aulhorizrd 1o--
(1) plan, inilialc, constrttct, own, manage, and operate itself or in conjunction
with foreign governments or husiness entities a commercial conmnmications
satellite systelli;
(2) ftu'nish, tot hire, channels of commtmication to United States commttnica-
tions conlmt)rl carriers and to other attthorizett entities, toreign and domes-
tic; anti
(3) own and operate satellite wrminal stations when licensed by the Commissiol_
under section 201 (c) (7).
(hi hwhltled in the activities authorized to the corporation tot accomplishment of
lhc purposes indicated in suhsection (at) of this section, are, among others not specitical-
IV llallletl--
(11
(2)
to conduct or contract lot research and dcvelopmcnl related to its mission;
Io a<<luire the physical t:acilities, equipment anti devices necessary t() its oper-
ations, inclu<tit_g comnttmications satellites and asso('iated equipn_ent at_<l
t_cilities, whefl_er t)y conslru(lion, purchase, or gift;
(3) to purclmsc satellite launching and related services from tile United Slates
( ;(}x, crlllllel ] t;
(4) I<) cot_tra(t with authorized users, including the United States (,overnmetlt,
fin the services of tile conmnmications satellite system; and
(5) to develol) plans for the technical specifications of all elements o1" the com-
munications satellite system.
(c) To carry out the fi)regoing purposes, the corporation shall ha_x' the usual powers
contiwred upon a stock corporation by the District of Cohtmbia Business Corporation Act
Icitation in margin: "6_ Slat. 17; D.(;. (',ode 29-901"].
ISl TITI.E 1V--M1SCELI_NEOUS
APPIJ(JABII JTY OF COMMUNICATIONS A('T OF 1934
SEC. 401. The corporation shall be deemed to be a common carrier within the meaning
of sc(:ti(in 3 (hi <if the (;ommtmications Act of 1934, as amended, and as such shall he tidly
subject t_l the provisions of title 11 and title 111 of that Act [citation in margin: "48 Star.
1t)66; 47 US(; 153; 4H Star. 1070; Ante, p. 64; 47 USC 201-222, 301-397"]. The provisitln of
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satellite terminal station facilities by one communication connnon carrier to one or more
o|hcl" COlllllllltlicaliollS COll|ll|On carFielS sl'la][ De deemed to be a COlIIIIIOll ('alTieF activi-
ty fully subject to the Communications Acl. hqqenever the application of the provisions of
tl_is Act shall be inconsistent with the application of the provisions of lhc (]ommunicatious
Acl, the provisions of this Act shall govern.
N(YflCE OF FOREI(;N BUSINESS NE(;()TIATI()NS
SEC. 40_. Whenever the corporation shall enter into business negotialions with respect to
facilities, operations, or services authorized by this Act with any international or fbreign
entity, i! shall notit_' the Depanmcnt of State of the negotiations, and the I)eparlment of
State shall advise tilt" corporation of relevant foreign policy considerations. Throughout
such negotiations the corpovad<m shall keep the Dcpavmwnt of State iuti)rmed wi!h
r<:sl)eCl It} such considerations. The corporation may request tilt' l)eparlHR, nt of Slate to
assist in lilt, negotiations, and thai I)epar/mcnl shall render st,oh assistance as may be
;tppropviale.
SAN(TFIONS
SEC. 41)3. (a) If lilt, corporation created pursuant to this Act shall engage in or adhere Io
any action, practiccs, or policies inconsistent wifll the policy and purposes declared in sec-
tioll 10_ of this Ac!, or if tilt" corpovati<m ov any other pcvs_m shall violate any provision
of this Act, or shall obstruct or intertbre with any activities authorized by this At'l, or shall
refllse, |ail, or neglec! to discharge his duties and responsibilities under this Act, or shall
lhl-t'illcn itlly such violation, obstruction, interference, refllsal, Ihiltue, or ilegh'cl, Ihe dis-
lricl COllFl O1' the l_!nil¢'d States for any district in which such corporation or other ])t'rson
resides, or may 1)e tkmnd shall have jurisdiction, except as otherwise prohibited hy la_.
upon petition of tile Allorney (;eneral of lhe United Slales, io grant such equitable relief
as may be necessary or appropriate to prevent or terminate such conduct or Ihreat.
(b) Nolhing contained in this section shall I)c construed as relieving any person of
any punishnlenl, liability, or sanction which may I)e imposed olherwise thm'l mltler this
Act.
Co) It shall be the duty of the corporation and all conununications COllllllt)ll carriers
to comply+ insothr as applicallle, with all provisions of this Acl and all rules and icgt,lations
promulgated theretmder.
REP()RTS T() TI IE C()N(;RESS
SE(;. 404. (,t) The thesident shall transmit to tile (;ongrcss in.January ofeach year at rcporl
which shall include a COml)rt'hcnsive <|escripli<m of file aclivities and acCOml)lishnlenls
during tilt' preceding calendar },eat +under the national progtam retk'rred 1o ill section 20 I
(a) ( 1 ), l<_gether with an evalualion of such activities and acconq)lishments in terms of the
attainllletll of file <>bjt,ctivcs of this Act alld any recommendations for additional legisla-
tive' or other action which the Presidenl may c<msidm- m'cessar'¢ or desirable for the altahl-
Illelll t)t" s,ll('tl objt'clivt's.
[91 (b) The <orpor;tlion shall mtusmit to the l'l+.psidenl and tilt' (_ongrcss, annualb,' and
at such other limes as it deems desirable, a comprehensive and detailed rcporl of its opt'r-
ations, aclivities, and acc<>mplishmcnts under this Act.
(c) The (',onnnission shall transmit to the Congress, annually and at such olheF times
as it dt'euls desirable, (i) a report of its aclivities and actions <m aulicompetitive practices
as they apply to file communications salellilt' programs: (ii) an cvaluatiorJ of such aclivi-
lies and actions taken b v i! within lhe scope of ils aulhorily with a _iew It> rt'commending
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such addilicmal legislali_m which lhc (:ommission may consider Imcessav-y in Ihc public
inlel-('sl; al|d (iii) an m'aluation of the capi(a] slru(l|.-e (d the corpovalion so as m assme
tl')c (:ongress that such sll'llcltZl-e is c(msistcn! wilh the most efficicnl and (.cowomican
o]>e,-ation of tlm corl)orali<m.
Al)pmvc(I Augus_ 3 I, 1962, 9:51 a.m.
Document 1-19
Document title: Edward A. Bolster, Department of State, to Mr. Johnson, Memorandum,
"Space Communication," May 3, 1962, with attached: "Role of the Department of State in
Space Communication Development."
Source: Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Archives II,
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
As the debate over the mL,anizatio, attd owne_hip Of the [_.S. commu_icatio,s _satellite D,.stem heat-
ed up i_/ mid- 1962, the question o/the wlation._hip of that ,s:vstem to the re_l _f the world '_ cam m u ,i-
calio,_ e, titie._ was a/so bet,6,,i,g to be addressed. Thi,_ inter,al Stale l)epartme_/t memora,dum
a m ma Hze_, [;Jr a n ¢_[fitia I O/the 1)epart me, t :_Eeonomic Bu tea l/(atria, i'.a!io, al code '7" "), the _la le
,/ a//_/ir_ i, May 1962.
Memorandum
T(): E - Mv..Johns()n
FR()M: TR(:- Edward A. Bolster
I)ATE: May 3, 1962
SI_B.]E(:T: Space Communicali(m
'I'h<' alla('he(l mal('lia] sumvnal'iz('s the Department's irlleres! and vesl)onsibilities in
Ill(' spa((. ((mm.micati(ms ticld. As you know, Phil Farley's office (Special Assistant fill
Atomic Enelb, _, and ()UtCl- Spa('(') is, to be ab()lished soon; vesponsibilily within Ill('
l){'parlr]lcnt tot commtmicalion satellite matters will probably be transti'rl+ed to E. I sug-
,_,t'sl thai yo. o])tail/ Ml'. Falley's comments on this subject wilhin tile n('xl t/'w days,, since
h(' will be leaving in Ill(' near future for his assignment in Paris.
I)r. hsin Stew;ul, Director of Telecommunications Management, wishes to meel with
",'(Ill _ls :",()Oil ilS possible to discuss yOlll" IllUlllal interest ill certain aspecls of COIllZllllllif'a:t-
lions policy, l suggest lhal you arrange such a meeting soon and thai we brief you orally
ill _t(lv_ll) C(!.
_k)u will recall fllal Sena|or Past(we told Under Secretary McGhce that he would like
lo mc('l wilh y()u at your convenience Io discuss the Deparlmcnt's handling of c<mmmni-
<ali()ns p()liM_, lllall(qs.
*_g@g#**gg
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[attachment, page I ]
Role of the Department of State in Space
Communication Development
One of tile earliesl instances of ill{" Department's participation in space communica-
tion problems was in the preparation tor and parlicipation in lhe 1{.}58 I,os Angeles
Assembly of tt}e International Radio Consultative {]{Hlllllillee (CCIR) at which significant
technical recommendations were formulated, particularly wit|} regard to problems of
radio frequency selectitm and use by such systems. During this time and immediately tol-
lowing that meeting, those concerned with regulatory problems also assisted tile
Department in tbNnulating U.S. proposals tot the 1.{}5{.)(;eneva lnlernational Radio
Ctmference. These proposals were substantially iron-controversial, although they did elic-
it lively discussions at the Conference and required some special meetings in Washington
during the Conference in order to resolve certain differences involvil}g radio astronomy.
These were of such concern that the Science Advisor to the President became involved at
one point. The issue related to the recognition of space research as compared with radio
astronomy in the international table of frequency allocati<ms. A reasonably satisl_actory
solution was developed in which tile Department played a major role in bringing the
opposing views together.
Following the Geneva (_onterence the 1)el)arlment was immediately involved in poli-
cy dewqopmenl plans with various agencies, h worked with NASA in clearing frequencies
wilt} fi}reign el}unities in connection with tracking saletliles, will} the F(;(; and
Intevdepartmenl Radio Advisory Ct)mmittee (IRA(;) in space tiequency use planning,
and with tile Senate {;omndttee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences in the issuance on
March 19, 1960 ofa sl}ldy Of "Radio Frequency (]onl}o] ill Space Welecommunicalitms" by
l)r. Edward _kmk,.Jr. 'File private companies, especially AT&T, were becoming interested
in lhe potelllialilies of relay by salellite. Ihandwritten underlining] In [_lCl, the pace
became st) rapid lhal it was necessary on Sel)lember 30, 1960 tot the q>lecolnlnunication
(_oordinating (;ommittee (TCC), advisory to tile Department, to request those companies
known to be active not to "make any commitments to tbreign entities pending thrthe,
advice as to the promulgation of relevanl policies which will guide and govern such activ-
ities." It [handwritten underlining] then set up a committee to develop such policies
under the chairmatlship of FCC Commissioner T.A.M. Craven. Membership on this con>
mittee included those involved in other groul)S also developing various aspects of space
communication policy nor necessarily directly related to international aft:airs. For exam-
pie, tile IRAC/FC(] began developing coordinated views on the radio frequencies needed
fi)r operational (as distinct from research) use of space. On l)ecember 4, 1960, the
[page 2, handwritten underlining] Senale Space Committee issued a second report on
"Policy Planning fin Space Telecomnnmications" largely based on replies t?om Executiw
Branch Agencies to inquiries from the Conmlittee based on questions posed in the March
re_L_)ort.
Meanwhile, lilt' AT&T had replied {m ()ctober 21, l{.}(_0 to lhe FC(; lot attlh{}]ity to
operate at comnnmicali{ms satellite system.
On Decemt}er 31, l{.}{iO,President Eisenhower issued a communication satellite p{}li-
CV statelllelll tlrgillg tl}al the (;overnment aggressively encourage private enterprise in the
estat}lishment and operation {}t a revenue prt}ducing syslem and directing the National
Aer{maulics and Space Administration It} cooperate closely with lhe F{2{2 in facilitating
this ob.jective. InJanuary 1{.}61 the FC(', license{I lqT and ATScT for commtmicalion satel-
lit{" experiments.
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The Natitmal Aeronautics anti Space (:ouncil was reacliwtled as a resuh of an amend-
ment <m April 25, 1961 to the 1958 Space Act which, among other things, made the Vice
President Chairman of lhe (:mmcil. On July 24, 1961, President Kennedy issued a new
communicati<m satellite policy pret)ared by the Council. It is the currenl basic policy in
the field and will be foutld (m pages 45 and 46 o1... "('.ommunicalion Salellites:
Technical, Economic and International Developments."* It c<mfirmed the policy of own-
ership and operations to he in private hands and (;overnment responsihility to encourage
research developments, provide launching tacilities and exercise regulatory fltnctions
including the obligalion 1o "examine wilh olher COllnlries llle lnOSl conslrtlclive role till
lhe United Nalions, including file ITU (Internalional Telecommunications Union) in
inlerzlalional space colnmltnicalions. Foreign participation in Ihe syslt'ln would be pro-
vided "d_rough ownership or otherwise." The Space Council has Ihe responsilfility for pol-
icy coordinalitm and tbr making recommendatitms to the Presidenl concerning atlitres
needed "m achieve tull and prtmlpt compliance with the policy."
Tim T(;C Space (_ommunicafion Subcommittee had, in April, t(wmulawd an initial
drafl s[alelnen[ ot" policy and on June l, 1961, this was circulated on an ()[licial Use Only
hasis to the TC(', Memhers noting that, hecause related studies were heing c<mducled in
other areas of Ihe Executive Branch, the l)epartment did nol propose tmther considera-
lion of the ntatter at the time. It in, however, desirahle to summarize its conclusions:
Ipage 31 1. The development of communication satellites should he a national objective
and immediale action was required.
2. It slmuld be accoml)lished by joint efforts of (;overmnem and p,-ivate enterl)rise.
3. The new syslem sh<mltl supplement, not replace, existing systents.
4. It should he privalely owned and (;overnment regulaled.
5. Existing and flllllre colnlnoll carriers should have non-discriminalory access lo
lhe systent.
6. ()ther nations should participate in the civil system.
7. The civil system should meet all (;overnntent needs normally provided hy pri-
vately {)wne(I {(Hnl'llllllicatitHl systelns.
8. They should nol be subjecl lo special space law.
9. The lnternalional Telectmmnmication Union should serve as the l)rincipal inler-
nalional organizalion in this field.
Ill. Interim installalion of key message centers is desirable pending establishment of
diret:t circuils.
11. The F,ossibilig of global "IV and radio relay via communication satellites should
be emphasized.
Also on.lune 5, 1961 the F(JC met with the commercial communications carriers in
ti,rlht'rance of its Docket 141)24 regarding the form of ownership which might be appro-
priaw to an inlernational communication satellite syslem. An Ad Hoc Committee was
tormed which ret)orted in October... in favor of a joint venture non-profit corporatitm
with ownership limilett m llte carriers, access by all carriers needing the service, and par-
titil)afion by Ioreign carriers "by ownership or otherwise" as provided in the President's
policy of July 24.
()n.lanua,y I I, 1962 Senator Robert Kerr, Chairman of the Senate Space Committee,
introduced a bill, S.2650 . . . in the Senate providing for private ownership and leaving Io
the F(;(: (whi(:h had staled its preference for ownershi t) limited to the carriers) lhe
approval of tile owners.
* II may la' ol itllclesl to note thai this document was prepared under the dircctiml (d Mr.
MacQuivery ot TD wh() was dvlaih'd floln th(' l)eparlment to lilt! Senate Space (]Oll1111i1I{'¢' [ I'('S[ Of lilt' _,('lll('nc('
is illvRiblv I.
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[page 4] (;onsiderable opposition had been expressed by the Deparmmn! of Justice and
some non-carriers to the restriction in ownership on the basis that lhis would [ofm an
undesirable monopoly and lhis view prevailed in the Executive Branch during the tall ot
1(.)61. The Space (_otmcil coordinated a ¢haft bill which was fi)rwarded by the President m
lilt" Congress and introduced as S.2814 on February 7, 1962 .... h would have provided
t(ir two (`lasses of stock, one t)f which could be purchased by the general public and lilt"
otht'r by lhe carrims. A third point of view was expressed by a rather small group of
Ctmgressmcn in t_avor of Government ownership of tile system. Congressman William
Fius Ryan represented Ibis group and intl-oduced H.R. 9907 ill supp<)rt of this view.
Ahhougtl specific legislation was not introduced until January 1962, hearings had
been held t)etore varitms Ctmgressional committees beginning with thai betore the House
Committee on Science and Astrtmautics in May 1961. Tim Department tcstitietl belore
this (',ommiltee and since then has testified before the Senate (',(mnncrce Subconmlitle( +
till (_C)lllllll.lllit'atiOlIS, the Senate Small l))usiness Stlbcollllllittee Oll Mtmop()ly, Ihc Senale
(;ommittee ()n Aeronautical and Space Sciences, tile Senate.Judiciary Subc(mmfittec on
Anti-trust and Monop<)ly, the Senate Com)nerce (:()mmittee and tile Subconmlittee on
(_otnmunications of the House Committee on Interstate an<l Foreign (_<)mnmrce. The
principal witnesses for tile Department were Under Secretary (;forge Mc(;hee and Philip
Farley, Special Assistant l(i Ih.e Secretary for At(mile EnevgO, and Outer Space (S/AE).
l)rimary responsibility in the 1)epartment for space communications had been delegated
t(i S/AE although tepresentatives <)f E usually acc()mpanied tile witnesses fr()m Ill(:"
l)epartnlent when they testified, and S/AE consulted TRC when ITU matlcrs wme
involved. It is understood, however, /hat with lhe planned dissolution of S/AE, primary
r(.'sponsibilily will be transferred to E.
The foregoing discussion has related primarily to domestic devclo]mmnts. They aFe
basic It), and intluence greatly, international develol)ments , h(iw('ver. In addition It) prcpa-
vati(m ()f positions f()f the (:(:IR l+os Angeles and ITU (;entwa (;onferences, tilt"
l)epaflnlenl is actively concerned n(lw with preparation f()r the pr()jeclt,d IT[.!
Exlra<)r(titlary Administrative Radio (;onfevence on Space Radiocomnmnicalions cxpec/-
ed to be held ill (;entwa in the fall of 19(i__. Frequency proposals have lenlativ('lv been
agreed ill the FCC/itL_(: and circulated b,v the 1)epmtment to missions ill ;tll ]'!'I!
Member countries as "Prelimitlavv Views of tilt" U.S. on the Allocation (it Radi()
Frequencies tot Spa(:e Ra(`li()communicati()n."... Response to this etle'ct is just beginning
I() be signiti(ant.
[page 5] The U.S. was hosl to an in/ernalional meeting ()t Study (;r<)up IV (tin Space) of
tile (:(ilR in _Aashinglon in Mar(h 1(,)62. in review and ampliti(alion of tilt" I,os Angch's
acti(ms, thrlht'r scientific and technical recomnmndati(ms were a(`tt)lm, d on various space
comnnmication problems.
On March 7, 1982, tim President Sell a leHer to Mr. Khrushchev It)which l]le lauer
replied (m March 20 concerning cooperalion in <)tilt'l" :,;pace. Related lalks were initialed
in New York (m March 27 betwt,(,n Deputy l)irecmr ttugh Dryden of NASA an(t Mr.
Blagonravov (`)f the USSR. Communicati(m satellite co()perati(m was specitically consid-
ered and it is exl)ecled I]lal lifts will lead I() further contact I)ctwe(,n lilt' two administra-
ti<ms in this particular area.
Perhaps tile most significanl and current international pv<)bh'm in this area is lilt" rt'la-
don of space communicalions t() other sf)ace questions t)cfore the United Nations, par-
lic(,latly iw¢()lving Ill(." U.N. (;<)Fnmillee ()n the I)eaceful Uses of ()tttt!r Spate. A.tier nearly
tv,,o ,,'cars ()I+d()rn:umcy, at h'asl [)artially (lue t<) the relhsal <)I the [!.S.S.R. t<) patti(ipat(',
the (_()mlnitlee was l+eactivatcd and given a new lease on liti: in Novend)ev 1961. ()n
l)ecemt)er 20, 1(`)61 the (;enefal Assembly adopted tmanim(msh' ILN. Res. 1721 (XVI)
dealing with space .... Section 1) of that resohtlion inv(llves communication sat('llites and
dt,signatcs the ITI.T as lilt" resl)<msible agt'nty in Ihis area. After n()ling plans for the I.()(i3
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extraordinaryconxl_'ren(cit recomm(t, nds "that the ITU consider at this c()nl_.wcnce those
aspects of space communication ix+which intcvwational cooperation will be required .... "
I+l'lhis implied invitation to expand the agenda <ff the EARC beyond consideration of
radio Ireqttency allocalions atncl is ctnrrcntly a controversial isstw in+ tit( + [ LS. The l))+l+-('+l+l
of International Organization Aflhirs (l()) has had the primary resp<)nsibility Ibr prt,l)a-
rati<)n and c()ordinatiotl <)f p()siti()ns fi)r lhe U,N. discttssions and is (ttrr(+ntly very inter-
cstcd in) imPhm,('ntmi<)n ()f t!.N. Rcs. 1721 as regards Ilw ITt!. i)ePtny Assistant Secretary
(;avdner ot +l() Plans to) pattie:it)ate in ctl+r(Wll +uccti+lgs o|" the Administralive (;otm('il of
th(' lTI7 al (',elt(,va all which Mr. Francis (',<)h de Wolf of TR(: rt'l)r('s('nvs th(" U.S.
[ll s+immaty, the prhwipal ismles hlvolving the Depaltnlenl as re_ards sF,+t((" (Oll+mtu -
lli(a|li()llS ill [)l('s('llt all'(" (l) devt'l<)[)n+enl <)f lit(,+ tt.S. posilion its l-cgards the aF)l+roprial('
r()h + <)I th(' ITt; iu this al('a +It relation to our oltligath)us tmd('r th(" [LN. R('s()Itlth)n; (2)
(l('veh+l)nmnt ()f the U.S. p()siti(ms to be taken at the ITU I_xtra(+rdinary Administrative
Radio (_<)nl(wcn'w(" l)Imm('d fi)r 19(+3, in (;eneva; [page 61 (3) det('rminati()n of th(' man-
nor in which t() al)pr<)ach (>thor inleresled administrati(+tv+ iv+ the (Icveh)l)mCnt of the
international (ommtmi(:alion satellite system (as distinct fr()m the U.S. position its('ll) and
(4) how I.IS/USSRjoint elfi)rls in the deveh)pmeut of commuuication satellites (<)uld l)e
m()w'd forwmd in accordanc(' wifll the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchang(' ()f h.u(,rs,
In aclditi()n to the (omxntmicatiotl satellite r(:port, allached also is at slatcmev)t of lhe
l)epartmcnt's position l)res('tned l)y Under Secretary Mc(;hcc bcl()rc the Sttl)commin('e
<)n Anti-trus) and Mon()l)<)ly of the Senate (_otnmittee ou theJtMiciary <)n March 30, I(.)62.
Document 1-20
Document title: Project Telstar, "Preliminary Report, Telstar I, July-September 1962,"
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., 1962.
Source: AT&T Archives, Warren, New Jersey (used with permission).
Telstar I was built a.d paid ]or Ig, Anwriean Telephone and Telet._raph Company, which wanted to
i,ve_tiL_ale the viability of a communication._ ._ystem that used a eonsteUation _![medium-altitude _atel-
lite._. When Telstar I was laanched on July 10, 1962, it became the first real-time active communiea-
tions satellite and broadcast live television between the United States and England and France. This
was a consideralde advance over previous expeF_ments, which had invoh,ed only voice and data com-
munications usinlz stow and [orward satellites such as Signal Communication I,'y Orbiting Relay
l"quipment (SCOHF) and Cour/er It demonstrated the attractiveness (?fsatellites compared to under+sea
cable_ /or tra,satlantic communications. But it also demonstrated the limitations of a tm,dium-altitude
_tttellite, which o,l_ _taywl in view _f a gmmnd station fi_r a brief amount o[time. Telstar I had a fimr-
mo,th lift, _pan. The]ollowinl,_ are exceffJt_ Of two of the sections of Telstar l_s pwliminarv report.
PRO IECT TEl.STAR
Preliminary Report
Telstar !
.It:l?,'- SEPTEMBER I(.)62
I)REI)ARH) BY
BEI,I+ TEI.EI)II()NE I+AB()RAT()RIF+S, INC.
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131 SECTION I--OBJECTIVES AND EQUIPMENT DESIGN
INTRODU('TION
The ti:asibility of communicating by satellites yeas dcmonstraled bv NASA's Prc_iect
Echo ill 1960 and also by Projects Courier and Score. In March 1959, Messrs..]. R. Pierce
and R. K<mq)ihev of Bell Telephone Laboratories, hlcorporated wrote a paper showing
the ti'asibilitv of an active broadband satellite cotnnntnicati<)ns repeater. This started
Project Telstar.
Ob/ectiv_
in general terms, the Telstar (]ommunications Experiment is intended to advance the
entire area of communications by satellite. Speciticall_, the experiment is intended to do
tiw' things.
!. The first objective is to test an actual broadband communications sittellite. The
Telstar satellite was originally intended for experiments in telephony, data trans-
mission, and single-channel television. While not primarily dcsigne<l lot Iwo-wav
telephony, the system could provide 60 simtfltaneous conversations.
2. A second objective is to test the reliability of electronics equipment in the satel-
lite under tile stress of launch and the environment of space.
3. A third obiective is It) provide measurements o|radialio/l levels ill space; this tunc-
lion is completely separate ti-om the communications experiments.
4. A tburth objective is to provide additional knowledge abOtll tilt" t)csl lechniqtte
tot tracking accurately a moving satellite.
."3. A tiRh objective is to provide a real-litk" test for the ground-station eqMpment ....
[ll7l SECTION 5--CONCLUSIONS
FUTURE TEI,STAR PR()(;IL,_,M
The results which have t)een discussed represent the current picture of what we have
learned in the field of satellite communications. A considerable amount of data has been
gathered on transmission phenomena and propagation. In this alea it has been most grat-
ifying to find thai transmission at 4 and 6 kmc is exactly according to theory, and there
ihas been no l,ading or mldtipalh effects that have been observed. The transmission of a
wit|ely of signals has indicated that the perfc)rmance of tile link can be completely speci-
fied by the standard transmission parameters.
The area where filrthcr inl,brmation would be helptul is thal ofenvir<>nment, tlere, it
is imp<wtant that we be ahle to characterize the levels and types of tad|all<m, the incidence
and (listril>utitm of micr<>mete<)roids and the bchavi<w of the earth's magnetic tield. The
reliability of components in a space environment will have an important bearing em the
economics of satellite COlllllll.llli('ations.
()n tilt" ground station, continued eftort is being expended to simplity' and minimize
the equipment required. This is especially true in the area of satellite tracking. Tilt' track-
ing at Andover has been excellent--with no loss of signal level being attril)tttable to track-
ing el-lOl, l,loweven in ftltllle systems, it would appear thal greater advantage call be
(let|veal from autotrack and that programmed tracking can be considerably simplitied.
To summarize: The future Telstar Program will consist of:
1. Flu/her transmission tests to confirm and refine the data aheady gathered.
2. (_onlinued observation of radiation ell('cts, temperature and spin axis orientation.
3. Evahtation of satellite performance to obtain a measure of component relial)ilitv.
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Document 1-21
Document title: Memorandum from J. D. O'Connell, Special Assistant to the President for
Telecommunications and Director of the Office of Telecommunications Management, to
the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Commerce, Administrator,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Chairman, Federal Communications
Commission, "Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in the Development of Foreign
Communications Satellite Capabilities," September 17, 1965, with attached: National
Security Action Memorandum 338.
Source: Record Group 273, Records of the National Security Council, Archives I],
National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland.
All interim hlternatimml Telecommutdcatio)_.s Satellite Organizatirm (IN'17"1+,%471 wa,s created i)_
1904 with the u_tde_:_tandin_ that after five yem:_ the_e wouM be negotiations to create a more per-
mam,)H m_ra_tizational structure /br internati¢mal telecommunications via satellite. (_mnsat wa.s the
matta,_tq o/the interim INTl';I_,OAT system, and it.s structuw institutionalized l _.S. domi_mnce oJthe
organization i_operation.s and hardwaw procurement. The United States hoped to mailttai)_ that dom-
inant position /br as Im/g as possible. 7"he White IIouse appointM a Special As_i.stant to the President,
(;enemlJame.s O'('onnell, to.[urth_q" that oOective. Th, is national se_'uh(3' directive re[le_4s O'Cmn_ell'._
efforts to restrict U.S. assi._tance to other counhies that desired to deuelop their own eommunication._
wttellite capabilih'.
[no l)agination ]
Sepleml)erl 7, 1965
MEM()IL,\NDUM T(): Secretary of Stale
Secretary of Deft'rise
Secretary of (]OllllIlerce
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Federal Communications ('ommission
S[ !BIE( 71": I'olicy Concerning U.S. Assistance in the Development of
Foreign Comnlunications Satellite Capabilities
The auached policv statemenl concerning U.S. assistance in the development of lor-
eign c()nnnunications satellite capabilities is promulgated in accordance with the approval
()l the President, as noted in [handwritten underlining] National Security Action
Menl(nandunl 338, dated September 15, 1965. This statement was transmitted to the
l'resi(lent l)y my memorandum dated August 25, 1965.
As noted in NSAM 3"_8, my oftice will keep lhe subjcct policy under constanl review.
The (()()peralion and suggestions of the departments and agencies concerned arc invited.
[handIsigncd ",]. D. O'Connell"]
Special Assistant to the President
fin Telecommunications and
l)ire(l()r ()l Telec()mmunications Management
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hdiwmation copies:
Directol, Bureau of tile Budget
Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council
Special Assistant to tile President for Science and Technolog T
President, Communications Satellite Corporation
[attachment, no page number]
POIJCYCON(,ERNIN(; U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS
SATEI,LITE CAPABILITIES
August 25, 1965
GENERAl.:
It is the policy of the United States to support tile development of a [handwritten
underlining] single global commercial communications satellite system to provide com-
mon carrier and public service communications. The intent of the United States to
exploit space technology fi*r the service of all mankind, and to promote its use in support
of peace, understanding and world order has been stated clearly in legislation and in
Administration speeches and official releases. The U.S. Government is committed to use
glohal commercial communications t:acilities [or general governmental communications
purposes wherever commercial circuits of the type and quality needed to meet govern-
ment requirements can be made available on a timely basis and in accordance with applic-
able tariff o_; in the absence of Federal Communications (;ommission jurisdiction, at
reasonable cost. Separate satellitc communications t:acilities including surface terminals
may be established and maintained by tile U.S. Government to meet those unique and
vital national security needs which cannot be met by commercial tacililies. The capacity of
these separate tacilities shall at all times be limited to that essential to meet such unique
needs. These policies underlie the spirit and the letter of the Communications Salcllite
Act of 1962, its legislative history and the position of the United States in the negotiations
leading lo the signing of agreemcnts establishing interim arrallgelnelllS ti)l a global com-
mercial communications satellitesystem.
Provisions for the establishment of the global commercial communications satellite
systelll and a W.S. national defense communications satellite system consistent with these
policies have now advanced to the point where it is desirable to amplit}' and interpret
these policies [page 2] in order to guide United Slates relations with other countries in
the development of communications satellite capabilities, particularly with respecl to pro-
viding technology and assistance therefor.
DIS(;USSION:
No Foreign Dissemination
Most major countries of the world other than the United States provide internation-
al puhlic communications services through governmental agencies or chartered chosen
illslltllnelll corporations partially or wholly owned by the governnlenl. A_ssistance to any
of these fi)reign governments in the development of communications satellite systems can
potentially develop competitors seeking to divert tratfic from the single gh)ha] system
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b('ing developed hy the inwrnational consorlimn ('stal)lished as a resuh of U.S. actions ini-
tiated by th(" (]ommunications Satellite Act o| 1962 and now joined by forty-six nations.
The (+ommunicalions satellit(' activilies <_l U.%. (;overmnenl agt+ncies, including th+`"
Department of l)et_ns(' and Ihe Nalional Aeronautics and S1)acc ,,\dministralion, have an
important hearing <)n Itw U.S. supt)ort of the <_bjectives<,F th+.' (;ommunications Satellite
Act _t 1962. These activities may contribute to the dissemination of scientitic and techni-
cal knowledge' of the subj(,ct Io fi)r('ign countries which might h(' used to the detriment
of [r.S. [)olicy in lifts field.
A policy to gtd(It" gov('rnmcnl ag<.'n(ies in the disseminalion of salellit+`, te(hnol()g)
and in the provisi<)n (>I assistance which ix c<)nsistent with tlt++` overall I)olicies entmciat<+d
above is nec('ssary. Such policy should be sut'ticiently c(iml)rehensive Io give due regard t<)
tlw sp('citic requirements <)1 nati()na] security.
l;<)l" lh(' l)tH'l)ost!s <d"Ibis l>olic)slalclncnt it ix intended that restrictions hi)on ll+allsl('l
ol + t('chnol<>_.,_/ and provision of assistance [handwrinen underlining] rt+I<.'r to d(,taile(I
en_inc('ring drawings, l)r<)(lu(ti()n le(hniqu<++s and equipnlent, and matlnl_,icturing or lab-
ri( ali()n l)roccss pertaining Io complete ('()llllltunicatiotls satellites <w ;l signilicant I)orti()ll
thcr<'ol +, and to pr()visi<)n ()I laun(hing services or tat|rich vehicles lot comnnmicati<_ns
satellites. It is not itlt('n(le(l lhat this policy state(hen( apply t(> slul]l(<" terminals ()r limil
(liss<'minali<m <)f intormati(m <<)n('(!rning [ page 31 systems c(mcCl)tS, description of sl),lte-
craft and normal scientific and t(+chnical publications of a l)r_di'ssional character.
Ftuth('rmor(', it is n()l inlcn(tc(I that this statemenl shall limit th<' (liss(.minati()n of infiw-
mation required Io he (tisclos('d trader the provisi<ms <)l Ihe S1)('(ial ,'\gl't'Clllelll ()1"AUgUst
20, 196.1, l)+`'rlaining to lit(' (.slahlishment <)l a glohal (<)mm+`+r<i,d (<_mmunicati<)ns sat<'l-
lit<' svstt'm.
Si)(,citic principles to gtfifh' [ !nit('d Stat(+s aH-angemcnls Ibr assistalwe 1<_ othcr (oun-
tries in th<+ d('v(+lol)nl('nt _t c<mnntmicati<ms satellite capabilities arc:
I. The I!nil(_d Slatt's should (<)nt+<)rnl fnl[y with the 1964 ,&gremncnls l']stah[ishing
Interim ArrangenletHs fiw a (,lohal Commercial (;otnnnmications Salt'llite System.
"2. ]'he [_nited %t;tt(,s should re]_ain ['r<ml t)r(>viding assistan((' to other ('(:,nnlri('s
whi<h w<)uhl signiti(antly ])rmn(>l( ', stitnnlate <)r en(<+urag<' l)r<)lil_.'r,ttion ot +c(>mmunica-
tMns sal+`'llitu systems.
3. 'I'll+`' [!niled ._[,llcs .should not consider requests ti)r lalm(h s+`,rvi(es i)r olher assis-
tanc(" ill lhe (l('vel<)|)lne]tt <)[ (Olltmunications satellites ti)r c<mnner(ial purp<)ses ex(+`'[)t
fi)r [handwrilten tinderlining] use in connection with the single glol)al system established
tm(lcr the 1964 Agr('em('nls+
4. Thc [!lllit+`'d Sltatcs sh()llld re(+<+gnize the vital national sectnity needs <)f<)ther allied
nati+)ns which ('an be met by sal+`'llit+`' c<+mmunicati<ms and which cannol he met hy the com-
mt'r<ial system, fMr +`'xampl¢ _, the tInited Kingdom has indicated its nccd lot highly reliable
satcllil,t' (+mmmmi(:alions fiom England to Australia and to other Far Fast lerntinals.
5. The [!nited States aim is I<_ encourage selected allied nations t() use fiw t!.,"+.
national deti.nse c<mmmnicati()ns satellite system rather than to develop in(l+`'pendent sys-
t_.lnS and Io a(c()mtn<_dal¢' allied needs within the U.S. system (with additi<)nal costs nor-
mallv t<+ he I)()vne 1)y the participants). Recognized needs sl_()ul(l he restricted t<) thos(',
similar to ours, which are vital t<) the national security of the selected allied nations and
which (ann<)! be met t)y ((mnn(wcial facilities. To accommodate tit(, needs within the 1.7.,%
national (lefi.+nse system it may pro,at+ necessary to include <)he or more satellites, svn-
chr<)n<_us <w otherwise, [page 41 whether of the same <w dill_'rent (lesign. In this case,
such sat<.11ite(s) should he (|+`'signed to he electronically interop(-rabh' with the satelliws
oi the haste U.S. nati<)n,d d('l+ens_ • ColtlllllllliCalions satellite sVstcIII ill ()l'dCl" Io permit
lllll[tla] ttsar,t!.
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6. Agreements tor direct assistance to allies which may signiticantly promote their
c<)mnnmications satellite capability should require satisfactory assurance that the assis-
tance furnished will be used only within the tiamework of agreements and arrangements
to which the United States is a participant and will not be transmitted or transterred to a
third nation without prior U.S. authorization. No agreement [handwritten highlighting in
the margin through the end of this paragraph] should be concluded with any nation until
information has bccn made known to other allied nations concerning the U.S. willingness
to cooperate in Ineeting other nations' national security needs which are similar t,) ours.
7. II.S. firms are required to comply with Munitions Control licensing procedure
prior to communication satellite or related technology, transferring equipment or com-
ponents as end)raced by the United States Munitions 1,ist, [handwritten underlining]
including booster lechnoh)+.,, 3, and launch services, to foreign nations or firms.
8. U.S. tirms are also required to comply with the l)cpartment ¢)t (:onnnerce's
export licensing requirements prior to communicating or transferring to t+oreign nations
or firms certain other relewtnt technology, equipment or components, not covered by the
U.S. Munitions List.
9. All transactions approved under paragraphs 7 and 8 involving technoh)k, _, and
assistance pertaining to complete communications satellites or a signiticant portion there-
of, and to provision <ff latn|ching services or launch vehicles tor communications satellites
should be conditioned upon express (written) assurances to this government I)y the for-
t'ign nation (s). The assurances should he that technolo_,_, and assistance obtained will be
used only within the tiamework of the existing international consortimn agreements tor
a single global svstem or the tiamework of sttch special agreements as are referred to in
l)aragraph 6 above and will not be transmitted or tr;+.tlsl_'rr_'d to a third nation without
prior U.S. authorization.
[page 51 10.The principles and policy set forth in this (locument should hr' reviewed and
updated as connnnnicati<ms satellite system dewqopments progress and (lelinitive require-
ments are determined and after the global connnercial connntmications satellite system
has heen established and is in snhstantial rise.
P()lJ(?f:
Theretore, in keeping with the ahove, it is the l.rniled States policy to:
1. Promote the prompt establishment and successtifl operation of a single global
common carrier and public service conmmnications satellite system in COOl)eration with
<)[her nations as part of an improved global commtn+lications network which will provide
expanded teleconmnmications services and which will contribute to world peace and
understanding.
2. Aw_id measures which would adversely afti.'cl either the continued expansion ot
participation in the existing intcrnati<)nal agreement for a single global connncrcial com-
lnunications satellite system or acceptability of the hasic premises of the present agree-
ntenls on a ])ernlanent basis.
3. Make use of commercial conmmnicalions tacilities tbr gcneral governmcntal pur-
poses wherever commercial circuits of the type and quality nee<led to meet government
requirements can t)e ma(te availahle <)n a timely hasis and in accordance with apl)licahle
tariff or, in the absence of Federal Connnunications (;<nmnissi<m jnris<ticti<m, at reason-
able cost. Establish and maintain separate satellite communicaticms tacilitics including
ground terminals with capacity litnited to that necessary to meet those nnique and vital
national secmitx needs which camlot be met hy commercial t_tcilities. The capacity ot
these sel)ar:tl+.' tacilities shall at all tilnes t)e limited to that essential to meet such unique
nectts.
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[page 61 4. Encourage selected allied nations to LiSt: the U.S. national deli:nse communi-
cations satellite system rather than to dewqo t) independent systems and accommodale
their LLeeds within the U.S. system (with additional costs normally lo be bornc hy tile par-
ticipaLLlS). Recognized needs should be Lestricted Io those, similar m ours, which are vital
Io lhe national securily of selecled allied nalions and which canno! be nlel hy commercial
lhcililies.
5. Wilhhold provision of assislanceIO any li_reig,n nation in the fieldof eomnLuni-
calions salellileswhich could significanllypromole, slimulale or encotuage prolili'ration
of colnnlllllieati,()ns satellite syslems.
6. Provide teclLnolog, T and assistance in lhe field of conlnllnlici.iliC, llS salellites to for-
eign nations: (a) only it such nalions are Io participale in lhe U.S. nalional defi'nse com-
municalions salellile system and lhen only to the exlenl required for Ihat parlicipanl 1o
be ettective: or (b) only for itlse ill COllne(:lion wilh Ihe single global commercial cotnlnu-
nicafions satellite syslem in accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreemenl and
Special AgreemeLLl of AtlgllSl 2(), 1964; and only if there exis! appropriate assurances !hill
such Icc|Lnolog3;" or assislance will not be mmsmil!ed or transti'rred (o a third nalion wilh-
om prior [LS. authorixati<m.
The policies expressed above will be kep! under review by (he Special Assislan! 1o !he
President fi)rTelecommL,nicaliolls/Direclor of Teleeonmnmica/ions Mimagemenl and
lhe agencies and deparlmenis ('(HICel'n(:(l.
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()_e °/ I're_Ment Kennedy _ ol_fl,ctive._ firm the start of his invohu'menl with commu_li_ation_ ._atel
lite_ wa_ to make _ure that any _ystem developed was truly global, served pomer counl_qes, and linked
centers o/ecm_omic activity'. Lyndon.Johnson's administration continued thi_ poli¢_ and i._sued thi._
directive to emphasize it_ inqmrtance.
I I I March 4, 1966
NATI( )NAI, SE( :[rRlqN A(TFI()N M EM()RANI)UM NO. 342
T(): The Secrelary o[ Slate
The Secrclary of l)efi, nse
Tim Nt'ci-elitry <)l (]()llll-ner(e
The Secre!ary of tleahh, Education and Wellare
The Adminislrator, Nalional AeronatLlics and Space Adminislralion
The (',tv, tirman, Federal Communications Commission
The Adminislralm; Agency for International Development
The l)ireclor, Uniled Slales Information Agency
The Special .A.ssislan( to the Presiden! for TelecomnLmfications and l)ircLlor
ot Teh,cmn nmn icalions Managemen!
f,)(i TIlE ] ilNI()RY {)1: SAIH.I.ITE (]()MMI:NI(_,\II¢)NS
SUB iF,(71': I:!.S. Assistance in the Early Eslabtishnlent of (;onnnunic;tlions Salcllilc
Service for lx'ss-l)cvclol)ed Nations
In (arrying onl his rcsl)onsiliililic's under tlic (;onuliunicalions Satellite, Aft of 1962,
lilt' Prcsidcnl has direcled lhal ihc Unilcd Slal¢,s (',o'l't'rnnicnl lake aclivc steps to ('liCOllr-
agt" lh(" collsirucliOll of t'_irlh-slalion Iillks 1o ill(' worldwide, coniilllinicillioiis satellite svs-
it'ili in sl'lecl_'d h-ss-devclopcd counHit, s. l_]ilil)ilasis in ibis e||i)it is Io t)t, on t'iiloliragillg
tile sclectcd (Otlllllics t<l COllSllllt't lhes_ +St;llions Otll <l[ ttlt'ir OWll l¢'s<)ul(c_,, sti-/,ssing Illl'
llliln'_ t)_,n¢,t]ls of dirt'ci ii((t's_ lid iht' global COlilliitlllit+_ili(lll_; s;ilcllilos.
"i'tlc Spt!ci;t] Assislanl to the Presidt-nt for Tt'lt'conlnlunit;tiionstl)ir¢,lior o[
Tt_lt'conlillullil-;llioiis M;tii;igtqileiil ii;ts hi-ell dt'sigilalt'd I)y Ihc |>lt,+idelil as lilt _ agt'iil t01
coordhlaling ibis project.
Tiw Sial\' l)ol)aiinlt, ni and AID are to delerillint, (a) lhl! countiics Io I_i. iiilllld_'d in
tills ]Jro/g,i;llll ;iild (I)) I.]._. (_,oVt'liiili(,lil ;ictions, if ally, [_)i ¢lnc<)iir;tgiilg the +i(_.:ch.'r;<tll!d
coii_llUCliOli of t'ailii ,_ialiOliS +tild relalcd tacililics in Itiest' (OUlill-i/+_;. In cast+s involving
f)ossil)lc U,S, It'ctlnical or [inancial assisl+iiict!, the Prt!sidcnl ii;i_; dirtwit'd thai iio Slit,cial
[tlilC[+ sh<lliid ]R" i't'qtlt'sli'd. All ['undilig <if" such projects is lo I)c h;iildlt!d o111 ill illll+t.lll
All) FY 1966 al)t)rot)rialions o1 Otll oJ ihc iegliiiii I_]" 1967 funds.
l<2i The l)_'l;lailint'lll <if State is io rei)orl its tindings Io tht' Prl'sidl'lil, lill+Oii<gh Iht' Si)t'ti;i]
:\ssi+l;tiil to Ihe Prt'sidtqil I_)r Yt'i¢'c<_iilllluiiic;iliOlistl)irt, cl</i + of Tclt't<)lilintiiliC;lliOn_
Mililli<i_t'ilit'lil, I/y.lul ) l, 1966.
Tilt" Prt'sidt'lll has dilettt,d Ihlil lilt" i_]xt'ttilivt ' +,\gl'lll ;lnd M_lli;lgt'r ot Itil' N_tliOll;il
(]</liillitllliC_tlioils Sysl_.'lii iN(iS i alid [_.S, (;oVt'liilllt'iil _tg(,li(-it,s ¢l[)0i+iilill_ Licilili¢'s oiil-
side the NCS utilize lh¢" global coniniunicaiions satellile sVsl¢+ni in ]l;tndling ll+;tf]ic • wht'n-
cvcr l)ossiblc _llid wticr(" il_ilional securily i('qtiircintqils will iiol I)t + COliil)rOlili,_t,d,
(<lllSiSlt, lll with SOillld <o,_l-clt]cicncy ;ilid ol]ltq- lli;in;t<_t+illClll c<)lisidt'i;ilioils.
A %,%'<)l-king ('_lOtllJ is Io I)o t,sl;ll)listil,d, ill iic(-<ll(l_lll(t, wilil Iht' ]+it'si<tt.til'+ inslrUCli<)il,
Io Sllidy Ihc t)ossibilitics of ilSillg llw tolniliuni(_llions salelliie sx'+lt-lil Io ;idv+ulct, ilif0rilia-
don cxch;tligc _illd educational ilui-i)ost!s, in lint" with his dt'sii+c that lilt' Unilt'd Slaics phi)
;t glt'_tlt'l +role in iiiltqn;tlioti;ll t'diic;ilioii ct]0iIs, l);lrlictil;tl+ly ill Icss-d_'vcl<q)cd c<>uillrit's.
l tland-sigiit,d: "Broniltw Sinil h"l
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lquropean govermnctd._ aml imla_tr_> knew that the _ mired State_ was pdb_wittg a re._trictive poll 0'
rcffardinL_ the tran._fi, r _[ techmdo._q,, thi._ hecame a _oune o/ir_Ttatiott a_ the (,'idled State_ attempted
to imrea._e the itttettsi O, .S it_- _/,a<e coopt'mtio_ with t'_urope aml a.s the 1969 ttegotiation_ [m <D'/i_t
itive INTEI.,%.IT arra_tfement._ approached. 7his diplomatic cabh, /?om the I _.,'_ emha._v i_* lxmd<m
n;'[h'ct_ a/hreiff#l polio, perspective--that the _,._trictive poll 0, outlim,d i_ ,\'._,;,tM 33,(¢ (lJocume_d
1-21) was m_t i#_ the best tJverall it\fete,st o[the _mtiott. O/her_ i_ llhshinfflon a_td over_eas, cotlct'rm,d
with iater_tati_mal ._pace p<di_y, _h<Hv<l this perspective mul u_]¢ed that the 1%5 poli_y directive' b_'
revi_e<t. 7"heir a_gmments wen'partially _ucce._.S/U/. a_M a _h'<_htl_' h'_ restrictive version, O/,\;.g..IM 778
wa._ i_ued it\ mid-1967.
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Transfer of U.S. Communications Satellite Technology
REF: STATE 76929, I,ONDON'S A-1084 OF NOV. 4, 1966
NSA
1. US policy on the dissemination of information on communications satellite tech-
n()h)gy has an impact not only on US objectives regarding a permanent single global com-
nmnications satellite system but also on technology as it relates to European well being. It
is tim Embassy's premise that an economically strong, techm)logically advanced and polit-
ically ((,hesive Europe is in the US national interest. Economic strength and technologi-
cal c()mpetence go hand in hand. This is not to say that technological parity in every field
is necessary tor strong e(ononfies but reasonable competence in most advanced sectors
appears to he a sine qua non fi)r hmg term competitiveness even though comparative
adwmtage may lie with one country or another from time to time. This is particularly true
in an environment of reduced trade harriers which exposes the industrial sector to keen
international competition.
2. In this context it is clear that communications satellite technology encompasses a
very narrow slice of technology. The acquisition of greater competence in this field is like-
ly to have only a marginal impact, in practical terms, on narrowing the over-all techno-
logical gap. By the same token US initiatives in other single sectors of technolo_', treated
individually, will have nfinimal efl_'ct on the over-all position. However, concentrated
c()()t)erative elfOlqS by the US across the board in all possible areas might lead to a signit=
icant improvement in Europe's position vis-a-vis the US (and the USSR). But, given the
extent of us investment in R&I) in the advanced sectors, it is unlikely that Europe under
any civ(:umstances could [2] eliminate the gap in the tbreseeahle timwe. Any substantial
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narrowing of the gap will require a major increase in European invcslnlenl ill R&D which
under current circumstances is improbable.
3. Therefore, on a cosl benefit analysis the COSls to the US of sharing wchnolog_,,
widl Europe in lerms of _k_'steln leadership, markets, etc., are not likely Io be great. (In
the olher hand, lhe benefits could be considerable. The principal gain would be psycho-
logical. US initiatives would be regarded as an act of good will--a cooperative gesture
from a friend and ally--which would turdler slrenglhen Atlantic bonds, h would encour-
age US/Europe scientific and industrial cooperalion and neulralize all',' lendency to turn
It) the USSR in frustrati()n. It would tend Io still those voices which charge lhal [!S p()li-
ties are directed tt) establishing and maintaining abst)hlte tit)ruination in all advancc(t
areas of lechnolog3,'.
,t. To a lesser degree US technological cooperation, It) the extenl Ihal it would :lssist
Europe to mainlain a reasonably compelitive position, will increase specialization and
trade for the benegit [sic] of bodl sides.
5. Turning now to the specific case ofconnnunication satellite technologo', much of
the above reasoning applies. The advantages to the US of relaxing ils ot)jeclives is tor a
substantial US share in a single global communications satellite system. Such psychologi-
cal t_lclors could well be important. The ambilions of European industry in ohlaining a
larger share of the INTEI,SAT contracts are well known. Both industry and government
regard communications salelliles as tilt: one sector of space investn_enl which promises an
early conunercial return. Inf_wmed Europeans are aware that current US policies prevcn!
European industry from obtaining the know-how which they tk'el would permil them to
compete for and obtain such contracts. Much of the recent publicity ill Europe released
by industry sttpporling tilt' concept of regional communications satellite syslems, alleged-
ly complementary with the global system, is believed primarily designed to provide
Europe a greater share of tile markel t()] satellites and other elements of tilt" commercial
system. The European Conference on Satellite (kmHnunications (CETS) is meeting in
"File ttague later lhis month with lilt' specific objective of improving European capat_ili-
ties in satellite technology. Certainly regiomd systems will be examined as one means of
achieving this objective. While France may t_cvor regional syslems as all end in themsel',es,
it is believed most countries are basically concerned with industrial aspecls and are 13]
quite content with [a] single system concept so long as tile), obtain [a] t:air slice of lilt"
equipment cake. Thus, if Europeans feel that the US policies and predonlinancc ill a sill-
gle glohal system will continue to frustrate what they feel to be their quite legitinlate aspi-
rations on production, they may well seek to negotiate an agreement al tile 1969
Conference which would permit the establishment of regional systems.
6. It is recognized tha! there is fear lhat the relaxation ofreslrictiollS on transft,r of
satellite technology will give Europeans dw tools to establish separate systems. Ill our view
this fear is exaggerated. First of all, as mentioned above, the general European objective
is to achieve adequate competence to bid tot INTELSAT and possibly IDCSP [Initial
Defi'nse Communications Satellite Program] contracts, and not to establish independent
systems per se. This is particularly true of the Brilish. Second, the possibility appears
remote that tile Europeans could launch an independent system by 1969. Aside flom the
question of satellite development, Europe will not have launch capability until well into
the 1970's.
7. To conclu(le on this point, an ottt'r to share communications lechnolo_' with
Europe would gain a measure of good will and serve to alleviate European suspicions of
US intentions. This should improve tile US negotialing posture in 1969. On tile other
hand tile danger to US objectives in such a move would, in practical terms, be negligible
since tile Europeans would be unal)le to use such [echllologv eve| tile shell tel'Ill It)
launch an independent system.
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8. Answers to lhe Sl>ecific queslions i)os¢,d ill tilt" final paragr,q)h of reference
teh'gram art, as fidh>ws:
(A) Policy dil+eclive has In)l hindered desirah, le scientific and lechnoh_gical c<_ol)-
eralion in any FWaCtical "way except in the area of communicalhms satellite
lt'chlloh)gy. I/owever, Ille existence of this policy has un(hml)tedly (oh)red
Em-opean ,,'i_'ws an to the disinterested nature of US ot]_.ws of cooperation.
(B) Scientific or industry dissatisfaclion has not been reflected as irritant on F,olit-
ical lines since 1964 negotiations. Political interest may real)l)ear l)ri_w to
1969 negotiations.
((;) The divergencies of view among British interests on commtmications satellite
technology' were analyzed in Embassy's A-1084 of Nov. 4. To summarize
hrietly, the (;1'O is fundamentally concerned with elticienl economic com-
munications and less involved in political and industrial considerations. The
(;P() slrongly supports the concept of a single gh)l)al system. The li)reign
ot]ice is anxi()us t() ablain [sic] political cc)hesion in Europe and will s('ek
l;All',_lpeitn ('otlNellSllS (?Vell 141 at some colnl)FOlnise i_f domestic _tllll)ilions,
Indttslry prinlary interes! is to secttre larger share of INTE1.SAT pv,0ctucmen/
and will Sll|)|)otl vigorously any proposal, either t'ova sitlgle svsteln or all inch'-
pendent system, which will improve its competitive position, vis-a-vis US
industry. The Minislry of Defense (MOD) is not taking a the+re active role in
the communications satellite question due to participati<m in II)(:SP and pos-
sibly AI)(_SP. Any MOD support fi>r independent European initiative will
depend largely on its experience with joint US/UK military l)r_jects.
(l)) If British are assm-ed of ItS commitment to genuine cooperative ef]i)rt in
communications satellite technoh>g'y, we believe they would be prepared to
give the requitcd assurances. Clarification on lilt+ role of regional and nation-
al systems (e.g. ABC proposal for US national '1_' relay system) would he
required. Also Europeans may wish to launch experimental slttellites using
ItS latulcht'rs. Embassy judgement here is not based on specific colnnlettts
fi-om industry or govel-llnlent hilt fi'onl the intel|)l-eliHiOll ()1 exl)vessions of
opinion hy lhe Foreign Oftice, (;PO and industry contacts over the pasl year
or so. Bruce
BT
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(;eneral.plme.s D. O'Connell, the individual responsible fizr promoting the U.S. poll 0' ol?lective o[ cw-
ating a _ingle Klobal ._?;stem o] satellite communications based on INTI_LSA?_ saw many hazards
ahead. This memorandum sketches his perceptions of the challenge.* to achieving this poll O, objective.
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Ill MEM()RANI)UM
The White House
Washington
MEMORANDUM FOR TIlE PRESIDENT
Fel)ruary 8, 1967
! submit a proposed draft of tile President's 1966 report to lhe Congress as required
by tile (:ommunications Satellite Act of 1962. This report emphasizes positive accom-
plishments, h does not describe the hazards whith INTEI.SAT and ComSa! lace. Some of
tl_ese hazards are:
a. Actions of certain international record carriers indicate tllat they consider it to be
in their corporate interest to emasculate INTELSAT, the single glt_bal system, and
( ]omSat.
b. Certain major aerospace manufacturers t)ot}l hc're and abroad deprecate Ihe
value of INTEI,SAT and tile single Kit)hal sysleln. They thvor many proliferating domestic
and regional syslelllS. Obviously these would provide a larger market for flmi, products.
c. Ibolded passages were highlighled with a marker in the original] France has been
promoting within Europe a regional communications satellite system which will compete
with INTELSAT, and will probably join the Soviet Molnya [sic: Molniya] system.
d. (]omSat's studies c<mclude that there is more business and earnings in the domes-
tit" communications field than can be derived from international traftic. This contlict of
interest has heen demonstrated in recent FCC tilings where (;omSat has failed to take a
clear-cut position as the servant of the international INTEI.SATjoint venture.
e. (;ertain members of INTELSAT who derive a tavorahle balance of payments
under presenl arrangements are not supporting the U.S. policy of actively encouraging
tile establishment of satellite comnnmications facilities tor the developing nalions. This
has resulted in inadequate progress toward the design of low cost earth terminals and
satellite systemsIconcepts which are needed to promote early effiective anti economical
use in the developing nations.
f. [bolded passages were highlighted with a marker in the _riginal] Major conti-
nental European nations are critical of the "excessively dominant" position of the United
States in the decisions of the International Consortium. Actions to reduce U.S. dominance
and to obtain a manager other than ComSat are expected during the 1969 negotiations to
extend the existing Interim Agreement or consummate a more permanent one.
[2] g. Action by the llnited States to embark upon separale domestic or regional enter-
prises prior to 1969 will have a serious negative impact on Ihe single global system, the
Internati_ real (;ons_ wtium, the 1969 renegotiat ions, and ( ',<)mSat's fhture as M _tnager tor
INTEI,SAT.
h. The recent F(:(] action to adopt a 50-50 shared ground station ownership t0rmu-
la between (_omSat and the communications common carriers has not reduced contlict as
had been hoped. (]onlSat's investment capital potential has been CUl ill half but the
record carriers still want more. A merger of (:omSat with the six other U.S. international
carriers is becoming increasingly vital.
i. The general disorder of U.S. inlernational telecolnmunications has been and is a
serious obstacle to progress in commercial COlnnumication satellites and is a threat to
their futttre. It is also creating increasing pressure to reverse tilt' trend toward grealer
(;OVelnlllell[ list, of the international COllllllOll carriers an(J causing serious consideration
I_XI'I,(IRIN(, IIIE 1.TNKN(i%%'N I()1
()t' ])rf)l.lralllS I() sll' l) lip In{' Cal)acily oF lh(" (;()V(,llllil(,lll'_, (iwii C()lllilllllli(ali(lll saicllilc sys-
I('ilis. l)i'c(,lsi(m o[ (;ovl,rillil(.lil Iralti( tl(llii ih{' (arric'rs will [urih('rj('_lliar(lizc the I'ulur_,
vialiiliiy ot(:olii_at aiid Ih(" global svsl('lii.
j. Ibolded f)assa,_t's wi'rt' highlighie(I whh a inarkcr ill i|ic originall Communication
satellites are in such an early stage of ihcii l(!{'tul()iogi(al alld sysli!iiis d('vcl(iplii{,lil lhal
l)res('iil _;yslt'lliS sll_til(I slit)it tie lnade obsolete t)y the iicw d{'v('i(ipln('nls. Bul research and
development efforts by ComSat and NASA are inadequate to ptk_h progress fast enough.
] alll iil(Tl!asin_ tile eftorts of lit)' ot]i(c to push tot t_(stel- progress.
The national p(llic7 cslal)lish(,d by ihc President and (:(ingress is 1o give [irsl liriorily
Io Ihe suc(('ssflil a(hi(.v(,nicnl of _i single inlerlialional glot)al svsl(mi at ih{" carli('si lint('.
li is ii SOllll([ policy wllich iilak('s i)aiainOillll lh(, olwcliv(,s of world pt-a{;(" and liild('r-
sian(ling. The hnl)oriancc of ih(' single glol)al sVsll.'lll 1() a('hi{'vc lh(!s(' oiWclivcs ('al/ll()l
tm o_,('rclnlihasized, i']×('{'llliV(" [ll-ali{'h (lcparlillcnts arc workiiig (liligenily lo re(hl('(' lit("
hazards all(I ol)lain lh(' .Iwcliv<,s st)ugh{ by lh(' (:(lliilntini(aliolls _alc]lil(" Acl, tiiil Sll((i'ss
is t]ir lloili c(!ilaiii y{'l. The lr('ild al)[iears Io l/l_ loward lilOgl('ssivt'ly more serious obshi-
cl(,s. Filrlh('l (lis(ilSSiOil (l[ lh('s{, (ibsla(l{,s is c()illaillt, d in Ih{! alla(ilin('lll.
hi a st{list'{lilt'Ill rt_l)Orl ! will sel l()rlh th(" steps I)eiiig laki'n 1iv, niv. oificc and oilier
_()viqlllll('lll ag('n(ic's I() cop{' wilh lh('s(, hazar(ls. _()lllt' oF illl pr_qiosals fi)r (i()v{Tnlll('lll
ttlli()ll_ _ll(' inchldc(I ill the _ttltt(h_.'d Stllliillar,v.
j. l). ()'(:onn('ll
Ill
A Global System of Satellite Commtlnications
-- The Hazards Ahead
St !M MARY
The hazards to the flllur(! Stl(Cl'ss of the International (:onsorlilinl lINTEl,SAT) and
(:Olli_al app('ar lo 1)(- it{creasing and b{'coniing there serioils. Knowl('dgcal)lc slud¢!nls of
the siiualion lll(" I)rivall:ly expicssillg Ihc thoughl lhal [bolded passages W(_l(_ highlighled
wilh <i liiiilki'r in lh(' orit.Iinal i it is entirely possible thai INTELSAT may fall apart in favor
of a series of regional systems.
If lhis were to o((llr it would Ill('{lll:
tt A Inassiv(' s{'lba('k in fllllll{" growth and easy access in inielnaiiolla] leli'{i)lnlllll-
iiicali(ins.
The loss oF lht" so{ill(lest, silnplesl, lowest el)st systeili of inlcrnalional liqecolii-
lllllllicalioll _<hich _'_111 lllake lhc largest contrihlltioll to world peace allll lintli'r-
standing.
,, A r{'v('rsion 1o reaclionary concepts of rich nation domination of zones of corn-
taunt{alien inlhmnce, increasc(I length and lower qualily of Iransmission palhs,
_llld higher (()ltSlllllcr {:(isis,
t A v('ry serious preslige loss Io the United Slates.
* Financial loss to lhe shareholders of ComSal.
i'he most s(,rious threats Io INTEI,SAT and ComSal which are des(Tibed in the lift-
lowing pages have/iol .vei reached (Tilical or unmanageable slage. Bill m'('r optinlisln, lack
o1 vigorous a(lion, or aclions which aggravate lh(,se tr(,lldS C{tll (gillS(, lh('s(' plOl)l(,lllS Io
ral)i(lly gcl 1){'von(l conlro].
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ACFIONS UNDER WAY
I aln bending ewwy effort to clarit}' this situation and achieve unified government
action to overcome the growing obstacles. Among my proposals are tile fi>llowing:
a. Give first priority to development of INTEI,SAT and the international system. This
is in conformance with U.S. policy and statute.
b. Emphasize the great adwmtages of the single global system. [bolded passages
were highlighted with a marker in the original] (There is no regional need which
the single global system cannot meet with better service at lower cost, with better
spectrum conservation.)
till c. Provide greater U.S. aid to developing nations in getting earth stations.
d. Develop as rapidly as possible tire practical use of the higher (and less used) ti-e-
quency bands tor exclusive use of large domestic satellite systems. Service to be
available in 4-5 years.
e. Use the INTEI,SAT system for early U.S. domestic service growth and ETV [edu-
cational television] experiments.
f. Avoid FCC or Congressional action to constittlle a separate U.S. domestic satellite
system lot the immediate future.
g. Accelerate the development of low cost earth stations.
h. Accelerate the development of more efficient muhiplc access syslems to re<lute
the cost of communication to both rich and poor nations.
[11 A (;I,OBAI, SYSTEM (IF SATEIJXFE COMMttNI(;ATI()NS
-- THE HAZARI)S AHEAD --
Tt IE U.S. COMMITMENT TO A SIN(;LE (;I,OBAL S_STEM
BACK(;ROUNI)
The [oundalion of our comnnmications salellile policy has been embodied in tile
concept of a single global system to which all naliolls could have equal access, and
through which international commlmications could flow free of arliticial conslrainls held
over li-om tile cohmial traditions of past centuries. The concept sterns both fionl tire pol-
icy objectives established by tile Congress and tiom our international agreements.
Ti IE COMMUNICATI()NS SATElJ_ITE ACT ()F 1962
Declaration of Policy and Purpose
Sec. 1(12. (a) The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of lilt" United States to
establish, in conjunction and in cooperation with other countries, as expeditiously as prac-
ticable a commercial commttnicalions satellite system, as part of an ilnproved gh)bal com-
munications nelwork, which will be responsive to public needs and national objectives,
which will serve the communication needs oF Ihe United Stales and other cotmlries, and
which will conlrilmle to worht peace and understanding.
(b) The new and t'xpandcd leh'conmmnications services are to be made availabh' its
promptly as possible and are to be extended to provide global c(werage at lilt" earliest
l)raclical)le dale. Ill ettkwlnaling this program, care ;lllfl allelllion will be direcled toward
providing such services to economically h'ss (h,velol)ed countries and areas as well as those
more highly developed, toward elficienl and economical use of the electromagnetic hc-
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quency sl)eClfUm , and toward lhe reflection ol+ the l)encfils of this new technolo_+ in both
quality ot SCTViCt'S and charges for such services.
THE INTERNATIONAl. A(;REEMENT OF AU(;UST 20, 1964--55 NATIONS
Desiring to establish a single global commercial comnmnication satellite system as
part of an improved global communications network which will provide expanded
telecommunications services to all areas of the world and which will contribute to world
peace and tulderstanding;
121 Determined, If) this end, to provide, through the most advanced lechnolog_+ availahle,
tor the benefit of all nations o| the world, the most etficient and economical service pos-
sible consistent with tile best and most equitable use of the radio spectrtml.
BASIS
The single gh)bal system is truly a rew)lutionary concept. It is also intrinsically sound
fr<)rn the viewpoint of supporting tile policy objectives established by the (]ongrt'ss and
cf)n|irllled ill O(Ir international agreements.
USE ()F ( ;()MMUNI( ;ATI()NS SATELI.ITE TECtl NOLOGYTO CONTRIBUTE TO W()RI J)
PI+'A(;E AND UNDEIL+';TANDIN(;, IMPROVED WORLD TRADE, AND (_OMMERCE
The inlegrity of tile global system is vital to our primary goal of using satellile tech-
n<_l<)+.O, to prf)mote world peace and understanding, and to our c_rollary goals of
improved world trade, comnwvce, and better ttnderstandillg I)etweell llalions. _t_,re IllllSl
ntlrltwe this global system concept, [bolded passages were highlighled with a marker ill
the original ] for if we allow it to deteriorate into a series of isolated regional networks we
may forever lose the golden opportunity which satellite technology provides for creating
a world community in which communications flow freely between nations.
SPE(;IAI+ ATTENTI()N TO TIlE ('OMMUNICATIONS NEEDS OF LESS I)EVEI,()PED
C()L!NIRII",S
The single commercial commlmications satellite system provides the hroadly hased
SlrllC|llfe If) meeling the demands of the smaller nations. Further, it provides a tiamework
in which the [!nitt'd Stal¢'s (an work efl_,cliw_ly to promote commtmicalions satellite tech-
noh>gy designed I<+aid the dcvch_ping nations.
EFFE( :IIVE t JSE ()F TI IE FREQUEN(:Y SPECTRUM
Ihe demands lilt c<mmntnications satellite service already pr<)mise lo overtax the
(apal)ility <)f the tietluency spectrum. Only throttgh tile e(:onomies of scab' and engi-
net'ring efticicn(y f)l a lt'ltly gh)llal syslenl will all of the nations of the wf)rht be allh" to
gain eqtlal henetits Iffml commtmications satellite technolog3'.
[31 TI IE t L,\ZARI)S AI IEAI)
These are ftmdamental i)rf,blems ill tile field of satellite cotnmtmi,ati<ms which have
national importance and which can prof<mndly affk'ct the economic, social, and p<_litical
f>l)jvctives of this Natif_n. Thcsc l>roldcms arisc from many sotHtes but may I)t" gent'rally
categorized as toIh>ws:
| {)'t T111 _ | | I_,l( )lOl' ( )1; _ \1 I, I .1,1'1'1, ( ]( )MMI 'N I( :.\ FI( )N_
1. lnlerents that collt]icl with Iht" glolml system;
'2, The impact <d U,S, <h)mestic communicali<ms issues;
3. The "limited ob.jectives" syn(Ir_)mc;
4. Fear _)t"U,S, domination;
b. 'l'hc general disorder _)t I.!,S, imcrnational c<mmmnic;ui_ms.
INTERESTS TI IXI' (;()NFI.I(7I" WITH TIlE (;I_()f',AI_ S_%TEM
A. [boldt,d passages wevc highlighted with a marker in the original] International
Carriers
These organizations, inchtding both I]1<."t!nited States ;tnd toreign carriers, view the
INTELSAT system as a direct competitor to the established cable and high frequency
radio routes, l+ong cslal)lished spht'rcs <Jt inllucnce and mt'th_>ds _t ,q)entti,m arc also
threat_'ncd. With a singh, g,lob,d communic.ltion satellite svSlulll, _>p])orlt,nit+v tbr nation-
al ct_ntr_] _1 int_'rnati<lnal cotlmHmicaliotls routing, al>ilily tt> charge transit t_.'cs _lnd
apply olh¢,r testriclive practices will be losl. Many <+t the Ibreign carriers ti+el that lh_'ir
earnings would be greater and their control maint;tined if u;ttlic is tYansmitted ovt+r cabh +
and high frequency radio sxstems where their <lwtlership may be as high as :30 perct'nl in
('<)ltll'ilsl 1<1 their 1 t<_ 5 percent owlwrship which is typical in INTEI,SAT. S_mlc
Adminislralions in Europe frankly admit using lhe protits of their internalional telt'com-
mtmicalions Irattic to subsidize their domestic cosls for both lelccommttnications and
post;tl services. Some Administrations also ti'el thai where cable _tnd high ticqttcncy radio
are no longer viable, their interests would be better served through Iht" creatioH <_tYegiotl-
ally oriented satellite sVMeIllS WhCle Ihcir ownership share could be increased.
Another ;+tlr;allgelllelll preterrcd by U.S. record carriers and some torcign
Administralions over the prest'nl (:()MSA'FINTEI,SSI" arrangement would be a com-
ph't_'ly non-protit space segltlent .structure which would be 141 supported by the various
natiolls (_ll lhe basis of use. Adtninistrations would deriw' income horn earlh st,ilion
charges which could be handled much like cable charges wilhout the added ¢omplicalion
of providing income and protils to the space segment owners. Ihe only m_tjor impedi-
tnent in ihc way of this arrangement is (;OMSAT. Other nations are ,lot faced with this
dilemma. All s_q_hislicated Adminismttions can be asstnn¢'d to bc thoroughly aware I]lal
the tt.S. p,,scs Ihc only impediment to this kind of structtning.
Sotn_! of the inlernaliotlal l+ecord ('alTi_'l':s al+e ittlso c<:,lIcel'lled that the INTEI,SAT
organization will spawn greater sophislicatioH ill the h'ss devehq)cd nations and enc<_ur-
_tg<_' tllelll Io _l.,;,Stlllle it IilOle ])l'lllllillUlll role ill their ilHel'H;.I] COllllllllllit'a|iolls syslelllS its
well as the sate'lille carlh terminals used as ,_aleways tor inlernali<mal traffic.
In the past, intevt_ational carriers have <_tien <hmfin;tled c_mq)lelely commtmications
within ;t developing nation Ihrough c<_Mr<d _t inlt'rnatiot_al commtmicalio_:t facilities.
B. Domestic (]omm<m (]arriers
While our dollleslic colnlllon carriers recognize Ihe uet'd tbr single ownership and
n_at_agetnent of international c_lmmttnicalions systt,ms and tbr compatilfilily between
intcrnatiot_al and d_mestic systems, they arc in conflict with certain of COMSAT's pro-
posals Ibv eatIv domcstic communicati<ms satellite service. A k<:v qt,esti<m alfe<:ling
domcslic servi+_e stems flOltl the l)rcs,.'tll intt'rt+ational ;tgrccmet+tts which provide tbr
shill'ed ti+equencies I)t'twet'll tt'llt',sltli;t] Illi('l<lWitve Sx,'Y,I('III_, HII(I sI);I('¢" '+('l-Vict+s.
In the liequency bands assigncd to satellite conmttHtications, we also o]>er;+tte a pro-
fttsion c,f <-Iotn¢'stic terrestrial microwave relay s,,'stetns which involve a capital inveslmet+t
over $2 billion. This is over twi¢e tht + total (ai)it_d itwested in inlcrnati<mal telecommtmi-
(ations by ,dl lilt" nations (d the world. "l'hesc It't'rcslFi:d tnit'F<)w;tve s_.'stems are continuing
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toexpand rapidly.Itisch'arthatthe installationof numbers of domestic satellitecarlh sea-
lions is certain to impede flw growth of lhese lerrestrial microwave services. It is also clear
thal lh(" unrestricted instal|alien o[ ('arth stations [or domestic purposes will preempt
space reqttired to e',:l)and the int('rnati<)nal system. Despite technological advances there
is an n]limale ]imilalic)n l() lhe am<)nnl of (+()nmumication which can lw carried in lhis fre-
quency band.
151 The solution to this pr()hh'nt lies in the development of new exch|sive frequency
hands Ii)r satellite cotnmunications. The course of action is [i2asible but will require addi-
tional research and deveh_pment and a l+ew years of timeihtll it will make it possible to
exploit sal(qlite cotntnunicaliotls to ils fullest potential.
(:. [!.S. SPace SYstcn|s ManuLtcturers
At present tjie aerospace indnslries of lh(" U.S. enjoy a signi[icant technoh_gical h'ad
over all Ibreign con]lwlit<)rs ill tile field oI'conin'Jnrli(:ations satellilcs. The concept of a sin-
gh' gloha] syslem prevenls rapid, albeit wastefnl, pro]ileration of tile space segment hard-
ware and restricts lhe markel to supplying the INTFLSAT organization. [bolded passages
were highlighted with a marker in the original] A greater market potential could be cre-
ated more rapidly through the development of independent national systems or prolifer-
ation of regional systems. The aerospace industry thus seeks a proliferation of systems.
While this approach may produce a short run profit [br the aerospace industry, it will
produce a long run harvest of inlernalional telecommunications chaos and ill will. We
cannot al]i)rd Io l)e cast in the role _l sponsoring these misguided alt('inpls l<) itnplement
inefficient and unnecessary connntntications satellite systems that (Io not have the lral+fic
base Io make their operati<)ns viable or to achieve the economies el +scale possible in a sin-
g]e global syslem. In this case, the sh<)rl tern] commercial interests o[ onr aerospace man-
nlacttwers art" in conflict with the national and international objectives of creating an
t'l'li.'ctive ghd)al s+vswm to introduce it new era in world teleconnntuticalions and better
serve all mankind.
l). National Ambitions of Foreign (,overnmcnts
Several f(_reign natiotls, [bohlcd passages were highlighted with ,t marker in the orig-
inal] notably France, |_-'el that they must develop their own communications satellite capa-
hility as rapidly as possible to rcintorce national prestige.
An imp<)rtant motive for individttal nationalistic control of communications satellites
sletns tiom a desire [h<)lded passages were highlighted with a marker in the original, note
in margin: "#1 "] to continue to exercise cultural and political leadership in traditional
areas of influence without intervention by an international body such as INTELSAT. [ note
in ntargin: "#2"] Equally important is their desire to create a viable option which can he
used as a negotiating point in the 1969 discussions. [ now in margin: "SymphoniC']
I(il TI IE IMPACT OF U.S. I)OMESTIC (X)MMUNICATIONS ISSUES
A. The Ownership of International Earth Stations
The recent F(',C decision to share ground station ownership 50-50 between COMSAT
and lhe communications common carriers has not yet reduced conflict or speede(t
progress as had I)cen hoped. COMSAT's investment capital potential has been cut in half
1)nt the re(ord carriers still want more.
As more and more international traffic shifts communications t<) satellites, the rat("
base p()sili()n of the illternational carriers will become pr()gressively worse. Furlhe_. divid-
ing ()wnershi f) among (:()MSAT an(I the live international carriers seriotlsly jeol)ardizcs
tit(" pr()fit position of (:()MSAT as well. So hmg as we have the present irrational arrallge-
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nleil[ ()f illtelllali(Hlal COIllrllOll falTiel'S, the si[llalion is cerlai]| to Co[Itinlle 1¢) get worse.
A merger of the fiveU.S. internationalcarriersishecoming increasinglyvital.Ifitdoes
not take place soon some of the wiser heads in the illdustry see no way of preventing
(;overnmelH ownership as a way of bringing order out of chaos.
B. Patent Problems
The INTEI.SAT organization's patent provisions are aheady a prohlem that promises
to hecome increasingly acute. Some U.S. aerospace firms are halking at a requicemen!
that INTELSAT he given patellt rights to all patents used on INTEI_SAT contracts.
(]. q%' and Educational "I_ r Interests
The proposals o1 the Ford Foundation, American Broadcasting (]ompany, and others
to create a domestic TV distribution system via communications satellites have confront-
ed the FCC with problems that are fraught with economic, policy, legal, and technical
issues which overlap and impact upon our international agreements.
These domestic issues are raising serious apprehensions among our foreign partners
that the U.S. intends to place domestic interests and pressures ahead of hetler world com-
munications. And, of course, the Soviet Union has repeatedly criticized 1NTEI.SAT as a
rich man's cluh heing rtm tot the primary benefit of the United States.
[7] THE "LIMITEI) ()BJE(]TIVES" SYNDROME
A. Inadeqttate Research and Development
Communications satellites are still in a very early st_:,ge of development tiom tile view-
point of both technolog 7 and utilizati<m. In order to a<hievc the goals established hy the
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, a substantial acceleration of research and devel-
opment program is needed.
A primary lask is to prodttce advanced muhiple access capabilities lo serve low traftic
density terminals of tile developing nations. _ also need more slable space platforms,
better poiuting accuracy in our antennas, and improved primary power soulces for the
space vehicles.
[holded passages were highlighted with a marker in the original] Although COMSAT
is seeking to construct a major research and development facility, they are encountering
strong opposition from our European partners. Such a research center would tend to he
competitive to foreign manutacturing interests. Certain U.S. aerospace litres have
opposed the COMSAT research and development center for the same reason. (;()MSAT
is certain to run into seriotts trouble unless they adopt a carefully planned philost_phy
acceptable to their toreign partners and (!.S. industry.
B. Conflict as to the Proper Pace of System Implementation
COMSAT has pltshed ahead taster than desired by some of the European partners in
order to create an operating system with worldwide coverage prior to 1969. A stlccessful
system will I)e the hest possihle insurance of our contitming tile presen! tavorable pattern
of international agreements. Within INTEI,SAT, however, there is an element which feels
that the glohal system should proceed more slowly so that tilt' gap ill aerospace technolo-
gy hetween the U.S. and other cotmtries can be closed prior to major deployment of the
system. There is also a reluctance among those nations who arc large owners of telephone
cable systems to divert traHic to satellites so long as channels are available in the cahles.
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FEAR OF l!.S. I)()MINATI()N
A. Technolo_)_' (;ap
Many tmeign nations t_,'el that ihcy were Ibr(ed It) ac(('pt lhe 1964 ((mmmnicalions
salellite agre('inenls on [L,%, I('rlllS :is _! resull of (leficien¢ics in ll|(.,il OWl} s[)_tc( _ research
and devl'lol)nl(qlt (apahililies.
I_1 These iiiililiils tire w()rkiii_ +ts hltrd _is [holdcd I)_lssliges w('i(' hif4hlighl(!d with ii inlirk-
('r in ltl(" orit_itull] possible to improve thelr technical posltion to give them optlom to
strengthen their position and insure more equitable participation in the INTELSAT orga-
nization after 1969. [note in margin, arrow pointing to, and emphasizing, the tblh)wing
s(m,.,(.<_l The maimer in which Ihe U.S. shares its technoh)g_' inll)a(ls directly on lhis
i_SIl('. _4t,'(! ill-i! (!it_('i" IO SII_tI'(." I('chli()l()_,_' with those nations |irnllv (()llllllill(!(l I() INTEI,-
SA'I: We do not, however, find it in the U.S. interest to provide the tools with which a for-
eign nation can circumvent the INTELSAT agreements by contributing to the
establishment of competing regional systems.
I/. l,ea(lt'rshi t) in INTF, I,SAT Adnlinistralion and Man_|t{enit'ni
AI l)rt'si!nl lit(, U.,%., lhr()li_|l Ih(' (]onlninnic_tlions Satlqlil(' (]orl)or;lliOll, s('rv(,s ;is
(]h_lhliiali of Ihe hil('rhn (]()nilnlilli¢_lliOliS Salellh(" (]oinniitl('(!, 1)r()vides ih(, Manag('r t()i
all I('clini(al ()[)('ralions ()1 INTEI.SXI\ and hat [bolded |)_tSS_t_,(_S WI'I'(' hil_hlighh,(t wilh il
nl_lrk(,r iii ilic ()rit4hial ] a controlling voting interest of 54 percent hi nlosl (h,cisions of itle
(',()nsorlililii. Many [(ireigil ilali()ils I{'t'l tliai this is _ln unac(-Cl)lal)h" (hilllillali()ll ()f INTH,-
•%AT t)y lh(' [;.<%. Vi'(, _ll-(' already eXl)Crienchlg pressllr(" wilhin iht" (]()lisiirliilnl 1o i('(|u(_e
lh(' illl]ll(!n((" ()f lilt" U._. alid I() nlri l) (:()MSAT ofils _t(hl/inislr_iliV(" _tll(l 1('¢hlli¢_tl C(llllro].
This will Ilnd()llt)li'(tly I)(, _ili iiii])(irl_lnl i)()ini in tllt_ 1(16(,)r(!n(!_oliali()iis.
A (;ENEIL,%[, DIS()RI)ER ()F U.,',;. INTERNATIONAl, (:()MMUNI(:ATI()NS
A. hla(le(lnale R('sponsiv(ql('ss io (',onlnnlniealions Needs of lhc U.S. (;()vl'rnnlenl
The scrioilS (()ntli(ls (if inlel'i'st thai have e×isted hi re('elil y('Tlrs _ilil()lit4 U._. inii'rna-
li()il_ll (()llililiilii(;lli()ll_; (-()iiiliiOll c_lrri('rs h_ive |)elan gi't!:llly ill(l'l-_ls(.,(I I))' Ili(" _t(Ivl'lil of
(oiiliniuli(ali(iiis sal('llh('s. Tllis Silil;tli(lii has resnhed in increased C()lllr(w(,rsy _tnd (l('Lty
in meelinl4 nigv (;overniili'nl r('quirein(mlS. A recent l)eparlmenl (if i)et_'nsc rcquirelll(ml
t()r (Olllnllllli(itli()ll s('rvice Io lapan, Thailand, and ihe Philip|)ines Io i)riividc Stil)l)(irl for
()l)('rali()ns in Vi('lnain has rcsuhi'd hi many con|]iciinl_ t]lhlgs wilh lhe Federal
(',()nnnuni(allons (]onllnission. 'Fhis conflict and others like ii t_ave raised seri()ils donbis
within (;()v('rlllil('nl 71geli¢i(.'s con¢(_rrllng the ability of lhe U.S. hiternali(inal conlln()ll c_lr-
rii'rs, i)laced as they are in a eoiistanl eoil_ict of interesi, io provid(- aSsilr(_d and rapid
r('spolis{' 1o ll('W or ('inertialiCy (:onlnlllnications rl.'(]uiremenls of ihe (_,ov{wnlllenL
_u(h lill¢(qlainties (Te_il/' _l. gr()wing incemk,e for lhe (;oveFnnlent lo reverse previons
lr()lil+l_; low_ird iil(re_tsefl list! ()f international common carriers _lnd Io lllFn inslead I{)
git'al('r d(!l)ciid('i_( )' np(m aild nse o| I91 (;()verllrlienl owned ¢onlnlunic_llions sah'llile
svsi('iliS. _ili((' l|ic Ir.S. (;(w(wiim('ilt is b}," l_lr the largest singl(' llser of inl(>rnali()llal ('oin-
ili('r(ial (()lninnni(_aliOliS cll_innl, ls, loss of ally portion of tllis t)il._hless hy lhe carril'rs
(-()ti](l hav(" a setit)us 7i(Iv(.,rs(l eff{'¢l (ill all the international carriers, bnl i)arlicnlarly (in llw
viat)iiiiy (fl" hlternati()nal satellite ¢Olnlnnnications.
II. I)('lays in [I.S. Earth Station (]onstrttction
Th(_ (Olltillll;4i COlllrov('rs}' 1t11(t divi(Icd syslem resl),)nsibiliiy ill U.S. inl('rl/;llion_tl
c()ninitnli(_lli(ins tiaiv(" also a(Iv('rsi'ly affected and delayed ¢()nslrii(lion of all ad('qual('
[!.S. (,arlh lerlllili_l] COllll)lcx to kccp pace with the growing ¢onllllinli(_ili(illS capacity of
the spa((, _('_lill'ill. ()11 lh(' 1_7t_I (]o_isl (if the U.S. ihc sy,MClll ilccds Iwo full s(al(, ()l)(,rai-
]()_ TIlE I IIS'F()RY ()F _,\I'H.I,II'E (]()MM/TNI(;AI'I()NS
ing mrlnhlals. One ternfinal is ill op,.'ralion but the authorization to COIISIrtLCI the second
ICl'lnin_l] has II()w b('t'll dclilvcd fhr over it yclu ill _ill ii[[('ltlpl 1() c(ml])l+<illli_t." [lit" C(>llllict-
lug interests bctwccn the imcrnafional mlcgraph carriers, the (;ovnmunicafions Siucllitc
(]orporalion, lint] o111 thmlesli( C()llllll()ll (;tl'li('l+S, By I 9(iF, ;I s('cond (Olllllllllli(itliolls s;tll'l-
litc terminal will bc ncc(ted in ttawaii and another OllC (m lilt" West (;oasl. Both oF these
slati(lllS shl)uld Iw under construction now. They, arc IIOt. A inlljor lactor in tile delay has
been lhe general disorder in the L!.S. i[llernlittional colnnnulicaliollS sllu(llll(" _111([ Ih('
c_mdnuing pattern of c_mllict hclwccn lhc carriers.
C. Conhlsion and Conllict Resuhing tiom the Foreign Iin<'rests of U.S. lntcrnatiolml
(]ore mort ( ]arriers
Thc need tbr conlmlLniciltions satellite ('alth slitliozl_, in tor,L, ign COulHri_.s w]l_'rc [;,S.
illlel-nationa| ColnrllOll Citllit'l,_ I/_lvu UILSiIICSS il]lt'rcsls |ills ClCalt'd (tisS¢'llSiOll _llllOll_
these carriers and had a _'¢l__r serious impact o]i the U.S. image ()verst'as. In the
l'hilipt)im,s, COlnl-ovcrsv bctwccn [LS. (ommcm carricrs COlwcrnin K responsil)iliiy tor
;issisling in the organ+zillion of c<)mnmnicilliol+S satellite a(livitics itlM lilt conslrn(li_>n ()I
an c;n-tlt tcrminal rcs+lltcd it+ a long period o[slalematc + and confusion. The ultilnalc th'ci-
sicit+ <m lhc parl of thc l>hilipl)inc (;ovcrnlncnt ++,its to sharF, ly rcdncc lhc activity of l].S.
Calrit'rs within the l'hilippines.
A sitnihu situation has dev,tq<)pcd in (;ctttral aud Sleuth Atncrita vdxct¢' +ertaiu ot <>tit
intcrlmtiomll CatTict's are lighting it r<:ar girard acli<m against loss _)f lhcir operating fran-
chises. Thcsc contlicis and ('olllr(wtw,',;i¢'s ill'l' delaying the const]+uction <d satcllilt, earth tcr-
I+lhiilis in direct opposition to the ;tlillOtltlCed United Slill¢!s policy I0 pl'olnoll" ;i rapid growth
ot'Sill¢'llitc coinniiniicalion,_ capill)ilily so _lS I0 Ml'Cli_lht'li tloi+ds wilhin lhis ht'niisphcre.
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The 1%4 l.ter'im Al,++.ement that created INTEI,.%4T ._per![ied that a[ter /ive year_ a ro,[en'.rr'
wouhl be called to d:velop a df/hlitive agrreeme,t /m" the +.{_a,i=ation. A+cmdin<k4y, a Ph, ni/mte.tiary
(+'ot!fi'renc_, .n l)q/7.itive Arra.fement,s ./or the l.ter.ational 7;.le_ommu.ication_ Satellite
Co.w_rlium conveaed ia li'h_hi.ffto., I).C., rm February 24, 1%9. The re/:mt o/the [ '.S. dele,tratio.
o. the fir_t w'_,do, o/that co_!/i.tvme r&taih'd the mat(y areas ,/ di_aLrwement that would hal,e to lu,
rr_oh,ed b@_v a de/i.itive a<s,'reeme.t was po_ible, l//.ok w_,eral y+,ar_ o/di//icult .,it.otiatirms /uJor+,
thnt obj+'ttive wa,s attli+'_*+,tl. The d+Jmitive a q'ree.t+,./s ]i : IN'IT+;I.:+AT we.t i.to e[lect rm Ala+"21,
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Report of the United States Delegation
to the Plenipotentiary Conference
on Definitive Arrangements fi)r the
International Telecomnmnications Satellite Consortium
(|:irsl Session )
Washhlgton, I).( ].
]"l'l)Iti_iiV 74-March 71, 1969
Silbillilted Io the SeCTei_ilv of SI;iil':
ix'on_ud I 1. Marks, Ainl/ass_idor
(]hairin_ui, l_Jliiled Slalcs [)ch'galion
April 10, 1969
,lllllllllllal-%
The puil)OSc _lt lhc (;oiifeleil(c is to cslabli,sh dcl]nilivl' alT_lilgt'l|iellls l_li- lht'
hill'lliAlioli_ll "l'l']cl'Olllliillliil'_llil>llS S_lll'lliic (]llllSOl'lhllli (INTH,SAT). l)tiiiilg lhc period
Pl'lnlllUV 7,1 I_> Miill']i 71, 1!)6!t, 91i hill'l'Cslcd liiCilll)cr _ilid noii-llit'lilller ('Oilllll'iCs
('xl ]i;lii<_l'{1%-ril{'li%rS ()i) g('ll('i'ilI _ISI)i'('Is illld SpeCifiC del:iils _>t" prollosed definitive illlilll<_C-
lill,llls. No tin_ll decisions WCle l_ikcli I),v Itie (]onf_,'rcn(c, which sl_llids il,ccssl.(l until
Novi,iiltil.r Ib{, 1969, ill which lillie ii is cxiiecled Ihal dliifi definilivc _liT_iligClllellls will lIc
clnlsidt'i'cd by Ihc i'l'coiivl'iied (]onlku'l'iice. hi I|le inicrhil, an illlerscssioilal Prei)_u;iloi-y
(]_liliiiiillec is being f_nliiCd Io develop lhe draft dt'finilivc alT_lngclllciils.
'I'lic (:Olitk'lCIl(c t)illvidcd |tie tirsi occasion since the iillcrhii _llT_iligCillClilS werc
si,_zied in 1!)6,t fl_r <_OVClllllli'llls in their s()VClCi_il capacity to ('X_llllhlc the org_tlli/,_tliOll
_-olleclivclv. l Icmc il is iiol Silipiising lhat political t_iclors ililhlt'nct'd lilt" I)osilions lakcn
I)v Ill{lilY delegali<nis. ||owcvt!r, t|lC avoidance o1 I|lc cxlrlillCOllS polili(a] iSStlCS oficn
r_iised ill inlernalion_il conli_rences is notable. There have |)(,I'll no chalh'nges 1o Clcdcll-
[ial_ _illd ilO polclilics _lll iSSllCS outside the business of lhe (kllltTJl'CilCt'.
The (klnft.ll,iic_. worked in ils filSl session through [_nlr working _onui/illccs and in
]lit'lieu) session. The V_il iOllS ( :ollllilillce lei)orls i)rOdllied ]l_iVc been reti'rrcd to lhi" init'r-
st.ssi_llilll l_iepalalor)( ]olnniillcl. and will provide _l basis for lilal (]oilililillee's w_trk.
I. I{_l( kground
Following _l serie,s of successful _onnnuniclttion salellllt' cxperhllciiIs I)v (iOlCliiiiiClil
_lllll indliSlly in the [Jniled ,_t_iles ill ihe period 1958-1963, the Uniled <_lales iiliderlook,
t)lllSii_uil Io lhc ICrlliS _tlld lli_ill(|_tll,s of lhe (]olnillllniC_iliOllS Salcllile Act o| 1967, io
cslat)lish, hi /onjuncli_nl and hi cooi)Cl-_tliOll wii|l Ol|lCr COlllllliCs, it single gIohal (lllll-
ilici_ilil _OliiliilliiililliOll saicllile svslelli. After scvcr_l] lliOllths of illtCril_itiolia] I)ilaicr_il
aiid liiilllilalCl_ll lie<_oli_ilioil 171in 1963-64, the (;overlillll'iil o1 lhe l_!niled Similes COli-
vciicd _1 lilCliii)ol('llliill ') (]oill_.lCiicc _i[ li{'_lsilillglOll, I).(]. ill July 196,t, ill which lcxls ot
Iwo _lgll'CillClllS WCl'C iniliaIcd I))' 19 parlicipating (_oVCFllmClll,%. The firsl is Ihe illlCl-_Ov-
erlillIClilli] ,,%b_l'eCliil'lil Establishing ]nlClilll AiTaligcinClllS for a (Hobal (]OllililCi/i_ll
(]Olllillllili(_iliOllS Salcllilt' SySlelli, in which l]le |)_trlics agi-i'cd Io i'slablish _i glob_il coin-
illlilli{-aliOll saiellhl" sysll.lil ill iooiJcr_ilioil with Olie _iliolhci; ,._i icl_ill'd Spc_ilil
i%gil'l'lll('lll, sib_ned 1)v (_livci lliliClilS IH Icleconnnuni_alions enlilics d_'signalcd ]ly lllCl/i-
I)ci (',OVClillliClllS, imii_tills dclails ielaling Io operation, fhian(-ial _tst)ecls, t)lO(lllCillCiiI,
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control and maintenance of tile global satellite system. The U.S. (;overnment is a party to
the first Agreement and the Communications Satellite Corporation (ComSat), the
telecommunications entity designated by the U.S. Government, is a signatory of the sec-
ond (Special) Agreement. Pursuant to these two Agreements, opened for signature on
August 20, 1964, tile cooperating member countries brought into existence the
International Telecommunications Satellite (kmsortium (INTELSAT), which now has
68 member countries.
Ptrrsuant lo Article IX of the hltcrim Agreement, the governing body of INTEI:SAT--
the hllerim Communications Satellite Committee (ICUS)--produeed a report containing
the Committee's recomntcndations, and other shades of opinion, on detinitivc arrange-
ments tot the organization. This report was issued to all INTEI_SAT mentber
(;overnments on Decentber 31, 1968.
Under other terms of Article IX the United States was obligated to convene a plenipo-
tentiary conference to consider the ICUS Report within 91) days of tile date it was issued.
In compliance with this obligation, the United States corlvened the Plenipotentiary
Conl>rence on Definitive Arrangements for the hlternalional Telecommunications
Satellite (]onsortium in Washington on February 24, 1969. After four weeks of work, the
Conterence recessed its first session on March 21, 1969. This report covers that session.
II. Agenda of tile (;ontt'rence
,acs adopted, the agenda provided for:
1.
2.
I31 3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Election of the Chairman
Adoption of the Agenda
Adoption of Conference Rules of Procedure
Election of other Officers
Organization of the Conterence
A. Credentials Committee
B. Editorial (_onlmittee
C. Working (]onrlllillees
Rep<wt of the (;redentials Committee
Consideration of the report and recommendations of the Interim
(]ommlmications Satellite Committee and of detinitive arralrgenlenls ti)r the
International Telecotnmunications Satellite Consortitml
Signing of definitive arrangements
The Confi:rence fi,llowed this agenda, completing items 1-6, inchtding adoption
unanintously of tire rules of procedttre, established its work program, and proceeded in
working committees to consider the wide wu-iety of proposals contained in the I(2IS
report, as well as other proposals introduced during the Conference. It did not complete
consideration of item 7, tile substantive Imsiness of the Conference, and, of course, did
not reach item 8, signing of agreements.
I11. Participation
Sixty-seven of lhe sixty-eight members of INTEI,SAT registered at tire Contk'rcnce.
They were Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, (;anada, Ceylon, (_hile,
China, Colonlbia, l)ennlark, Ethiopia, France, Federal Republic of (;ermany, Greece,
(;uatemala, india, Indonesia, han, heland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,
Korea, Kuwait, lx'banon, l,ibya, IAechtenstein, larxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco,
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Republic of Sortth Aftlea, Spain,
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania,
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Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Rcpul)lic, Unilcd Kingdom, United
Statcs, Valican City State, Venezuela, Republic of Viet Nam, Yemen Arab Republic. Only
Iraq was not represented.
OI)scrvcrs were sent fi+om die folh)wing twenty-nine non-member countries:
Afghanistan, Barbados, Bolivia, Bulgaria, (:amb()dia, (;amer<)on, Congo (K), Costa Rica,
[4] Czechosh)wtkia, Ecuadoh Finland, (;hana, Hungary, Iv(iry Coast, [Aberia, Maldive
Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Paraguay, P<)land, Romania, Senegal, Somalia
Republic, S<)uthern Yemen, Union ()t" S(iviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Yug<)slavia,
Zambia. In addition, observers attended from the Uniled Nations and the lnternatitmal
Teleconmmnicalion [s] Union. Thus a total of ninety[-]eight delegations attended lhe t]rst
session of the (:onference.
A complete list of parlicipants is altachcd as Annex A, including a list of the United
States I)c[egation.
Among the non-member observer countries, a substantial numl)er spoke during vari-
ous meetings of the Cont(rence. Particularly the USSR, Poland, Romania and some of the
Ali-itan observer <lclegali(ms prcscnted substantive comments and views on questions
being considered by the Working Committees of the ConlL.rence.
IV. Organizati<m of the (:onfi:rencc
The United States, as hosl (;overtu'nent, provided the secretariat and physical facili-
ties for the C<mfi+retwe. The (()ntk, rence facilities in the Stale Departnmnt Building were
used. In additi<m, the main auditorium of the Pan American Ileahh Organization
Building was used tot several commiuee meetings. Administrative and secretariat support
fl()nl |he ()ffice of lnt('rnational Conferences was outstanding through<rot the
(:onli+ren(:e an(t won deserve(I praise tiom many delegations at the tinal plenary session.
In a(Iditi(m, the Fe(teral C()mmunicati(ms (:ommission, the ()ftice of the Director of
Tehw()mmunicalions Managemetlt, and lhe Conmmnications Satellite (;orp(Iration made
available secretarial and administralive support staff and equipment which c(mtril)uted
further It) flw efliciency of lhe overall operation.
The (:ont('reuce was formally opened by the Acting Secretary of State, Flliot l,.
Richardson. The names <)1 the elected Conference of liters and (;<muniltee (]hairmen and
Vice (;hairmen are sel torlh in Annex B. All Conference ofticers and Committee
(:hairmen and Vice Chairmen were unanimously elected and there were no objections to
the 15] compositi(m of any ot the Conference (;ommittees. The established W<lrking
(:(tmmillees of the (]<mtiwence and their subject matter were the folh)wing:
Commiuee I Structure and Functions of INTELSAT (]onsortium, with
particular regard to questions of membership, scope of ser-
vices, organizational structure including slructure (1| maj<)r
organs, their fimctions and voting.
(:ommiltee II l+egal and Procedural Questions, including definitions, legal
status, cntry into force, duration, amendment, withdrawal,
settlement of disputes.
C(muniuee III Financial Arrangements.
(iommittee IV Other Operational Arrangements, including procuremenl
policy, inventions attd data, technical and of)erationa] matters.
All i_:)ur ()f Ihese (:ommillees were constituted as committees <)t the whole, i.e. open
It) parti¢ilmtion t)y all menll)er c(mntry delegations, and all committee sessions, Ihongh
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not tilt" s<,'ssions of working glO+ll)S, w<,'l'¢" open tt) ol)servt'rs. Most of the+ work of thc
(:onl_'r<.+n<,+<.• was dcm+: ill It+t" (:oIltlnilt<,'<:s, with l)lemu-y m<.'<,'tings hem only at thc l)cgin-
ning and near the end of th<,' s<,'ssion.
V. Work of the ('+onlliiill<,,t,_
(:t>mmilt<,'<." l--Structtn<,_ and Functions
(:ommilt<,'c I's work pr<+gram, intlnding hint,' Sl)<:<,+ifi<,:topics, is set tovth in Amwx (:.
1o lacilitat¢' its work. tht' (;onm+itt<.'c t_)rm<.,d three working grot,ps, each of which prt'-
pared a r<,'port, which x_r;Isrcviewcd and aCCel)ted l)y lilt + (]t)lllllliltt+c and Ibrw_trd<.,d t_+ a
l+l<,'nar_,, m<,'t'ting ti)r <,onsithcratit+n,
Working (;toup A--Th<,' report _+I \Vorkin_ +(;r_)up A ((;ore. 1/8+I, R<,'v. l) deals with
the pnrp<)s<.'s and ol_i<.,ctiv<,,s <ff INTH+SAT and lh<e sc<q)t, oi INTEI+SAT's acliVili<.,s. 'I'll<.'
V_)rkin+.r, (;roup d<,+v<,'lop<,'d a draft Preamble l_+r th<,+tl<,'l_nitivearrangements, a draft [61
art+el<," on '+()l_j<,.<,+tiv<,._;:tnd Purpos<,'+" and :t draft arlichc on "Stop<,+ <ft Activities." 'l'ht'+c
dr;lit ;nlichcs w<,.rt, adOF, t<,+d unanm+ottsly I_'+r the l<,+tl-t'Otllltl'X + Working Group, subject t+)
ittHcs arid rt'st'rvatioll.,; sct t<)rth in Ih<.' r,t'l)orl.
"I'll<.' Prcambl<,' is stlbslanti;tllv similar t_ lht' Pr<,'alnl+le of Ih<," It.tt;+_ int<,'rgox<,'rnm<,'tlial
Agrt'emt+lH and rcpres<,'nts, ill slh)slanc<,', th<,' points whi<,h th<," [7.S. [)eh'gati<_n st+u_ht t_>
hay<," m<,-luded. Franc<.'+ SUl>ptJrtt'd I)v Svria. Swit/<,Prl;md, I+J<..lgium, :tnd Swed<,,n, rt.servt+d
on the qu<,,sti<>n of the use o1 tit<,"word +'singlt ,+, in th<,' phr;ise "sin,_le gh)l:,;tl ,",;_:Stt'lll,'" al+_tl -
ing that th<," t<,'rm is ambiguotts, i<_nores lhc i)t<,'st'n<,+t' <fft_lht'r ct)nnnnnic;ttion sal<,'llitt- s'+'s-
terns in tlt<_'world, ;tnd, lht'rcI_)r<,', should b<,"c'lin+inal<,'d.
Th<,' objectives an<,l l)Ulpos<,'+ of tilt+ organization as l)l+<_l)OS<.'d it+ lh<," draft ;trlich +
h+clud<," the ('le_tlit)ll ol';t ,_h)l>_tl org_tni/;tli<_n to <.'stablish a +ingle ,_h)bal <,<)mmcrci;++l c<_tn-
nntnication salt']lil<," svst<.'m (Franc<.' rt,s<.,rving again on "sing-h.") +'intt'nded prim;uily t_
F,rt::idt' int<,'rnatitmal F,ut+lic k'lt'c<mnntnli<,atitm ser'cic<.'s t)n ;t ccmmlet-cial t:,asis <)f hi+,4h
quality and r<,'lial)ilit',, and sltfficicnt tt) F,tovide snch servi<,t,s to all at<,'as of tilt" world."
This slatt'ment t+f ol).iecliv<.,s and purposes is ct>nsistent with U.,S. vicws.
The W_)rking (;rottp sul)ntitl<,.d ;t l:U-Op<)st+d ;trticl<,' m+ the' t>r,_:mization's ;lutht_ri/t.d
s<,op<,, of activilies. Th<," draft art+tit' +.;I;tt('s that INI'EI+SXI': shall provide the space s<,+_m<.'nt
tbr intt'rnational publi<, tel<,'<,onnnnni<,atimls s<,'rvic<,'s; shall make its _4h>bal satcllite t_tcili-
tit,',, availal)lc |br (|Oltl<.'sli(' public t<.+]<..t+,!:,itllntlni(;tliotlS _,<'W'+,ri('eSOil ;I tlOll-discI-illlinat_H'X
basis if lhis would not alfe<.t ;tdvcrs<,'lv th<,' l)rox'ision of t:tcilities tm- int<,'rt+ati<mal pttblic
st'rvi<:<,,s; may provide thcilitics in lilt, gl<_bal spact, s<.gm<.,nl liar spcti;tlizcd s<,'rvic<.', prc-
snmal)l',, dt)m<.,sti<, + or intt'rnation;tl in scol)t,, it +this wtntld I)t, I)+)tlt te<,-tmic;tllv and t'ct>-
nomic;tlly a<,c<.'ptal)h," and dot's not ;tlli'¢t adv<,'rs<,qy Ih<," provision ot internatitm;tl pnl)lic
st,rvict,s; may ptovid<,, s<,.l)ar;tlt, sat<.qlit¢'s tbr domestic put)lic I<.'h,'c_mtnunicati<)ns st'rvi<, cs"
and may l)rovid<, ' s<,'I);trat<," satt'llitcs tor spt.cialized tt'lecomnnn_ic;iti_)ns scrvict.s, l)rcsnm-
ably t)t>th dom<,'sti<, and int<,'rmtti<mal ill scull)C+ it+his would 17] l+c I)_+_1_tt'chni<,all,, and
<,'conomitally ac<,<CF,tal)l<,' and tic)<.'++not aftk'<,t adv<,:rs<,'l'+:lh<," l)mvisi<m of int<,'rnation;li pttl)-
lit s<.'rvic<,'s.
:\hhotlgh lht' W<)rking (;rt>up a_r<,'<,'d on Ihis tcxt+ thor<,' ;irc slill scvcr;tl ;u<,';+s <fl less
lhan c_mtl)l<,'t<,, _t'_r<.'<.'nl<.'llt. I'll<,' status ;tnd relative ptiorit_ _)I d<Hllt'slic Iraffic is ;t matt+'+
of l):uticttl:u ctmccrn to l)cnntmk, Pakistan+ IMrtugal, the [;nit<,'d Kingdom and tilt'
t'nilc(l Stat<,,s, all of which h;iv<,, gc_)gral)hi(ally s<,.paral<,,(l art'as l)(,lWt,t,n which connnuni-
('at+or+ satt,llitt+ traffic is or may l)e(<mt('n+plat<,+d. (The [].S.conc<,'rn, how<,+v<,'r, rt'latcs t<>
all domestic traffic.) Ill ('Oil++<,'<,'tit,In with "spe('iali/cd" (clccomnnmic;tti<m +t'lXict's,
Ft;In¢'(', illlltlll_ olh<,'rs, <,'xl)rt'sst'd COll('t'lll lh;ttl INTH,SAT lllilV l)<,' t'lltt'l+ill_ illl<_ art';ts _)r
typ<cs of scrvi<,<,, I)ellcr +<,'It tt) <)+her ot_anizati<)ns or I<7 naliom+l ,_oxrt'rt+mt'llls it) pr()vi(Ic.
As draI+t<,+d, the arti<,:Ic w_is acc<.'pl,lblc I<>l]t<,' [!nil<,+(l _tal<,'s.
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Working (.rout0 B--lhc r('l:lori of W<wking (;rot| l) ]l ((]onl. I/l 11) (tc'als with Ihc'
slrii(_lilrtl tl|" the ()rg_iniz_ilion. Tit+`' \_i'orkili_> { ;iX)ll I) disciiss<'d and rt'i)oi-icd Oil I|l+`" li_ililr+`',
+`(ll+l++f)<)_iliOll _lil(| ['llllCli+`lll_, (l| lilt! lllllit)r (ll'_,_lllS (ll" I+111' tll-g_tlli/_tiittll ill('llldilig till _ts,st'nltlk'
ot ln+.,ilil)t, rs, iI gov+`_l'liiiig ll(idy and a llllilili_Cl. No dlilft _lrli+`h!s w(,it' t)rt!liar+.,d ahh()llg|'l
_i iiiiii1|)('1 o[ l)r<)l)oscd +`trafis w+`w(' ,_llt)lnill+.!d Ill lh(' glOU l) illlC[ _tl't' l(!t]('cl('d in |lit" l+`'l)()ll.
"l'h_' +.'ighll_t'll-+`()lllilly gl-Oii t) _lll+`,liil)ll't| I() identify _in+`| i_'toi'd _ill(,riiiiliV+._ vi+`,ws l/ll ,%llil(-
It|r+`' (it lht' oi-g_iliz_llioii |)ill did iitll alWmpl l<l ilc'goli_ltt" ()i l't'c<lilcilc il_Ctlll,siSWlll <it"
in+`l)llllliilit)]c [)rol)Oslils.
l'tl<'i+`" was illilinilliOil._ Slii)iJol't for Cl=C?tlillg _ill assl_lilhiy, t)til Ill+`" (lti+`'slion ill-(is( • _1_; Ic)
ils loilil)osilioil, _filIl(' l|lltllghl Ill+-" as+SCllll)ly _+,hOllld }it" +`'xcltisivl!l)' ii g(iVt'llllll+`'lli{tl bodv
(i.+`'. |l_(lli+`il)_lllls w(luld tic! lltldcr dir+.,ct gtivt'rillll¢.!iil ((lllll(il), ttlid (llht'lS stlgg+._slt'(| il I)('
_lil ass<'lilt)lv of l_'lt'coiillnuliitalioll o|)+`_ralilig ag('iTcios or t'iiliti('s which ;11( • lht' sigil_ilo-
ri<!s tel tht" ot)c'rating or ,si)+`'cial _lglt_t!lilt_lil. The {in|it'd _lltlc',+,, [lldi_l _illd ill(" l!ilil+`,cl
Kingttolli, iilllOllg <)l|i('is, |)iOl)OS+`,d Ilial itw designation t)t d+`'lcg_iliOliS I<) ill(" _tss+`'iill)iv lit"
it'._ervt'd _t+s_l l(l_(ll+.'l of di.scr+`'lion of ttl(' itidividual lltt'lll|)C'i counlri+`'s. All allt'llialixt' s(Ihl-
lioll t)i'()|)os+`'d was 1o divide lhl! assclnt)ly inlo I_1 iwo iisst'iil|)li(!,_;, (I) till ,ISSt'llll)iV OI'<_(W-
_'i lilii('lil_;, ill('+`'lillg I+`'SS r<_gli]arly _lild +`¢lllCl'inillg itself OlllV with i-('vil'w o| ])logi_ilii,_ itild
t)i(Jgit.ss illid |)ossil)ll" ililil_lidlil+`,ill ()[ ill+`' iill<'lgOvt,rlllii('illlil iigit't'lll('lil, _liic| (7) lilt
_t_,St'liih[_, ' o[ I+._ic('<lliiliiilili('tllion ot)t!r_tlill g +.!iililit's, lli('('liilg i(/<)l-+`" r+`'_ulttriy, |lt'rli_lll_;,
_lllllll_lll)'+ 1() o%'+`,1-_+.-+`,_illd coilsidcr lht" Illilll_tgClllt'lll 7(lid l)l-<)lrl-t_s_ ()l I]1+`" Syslt'lll.
Th('i'(" +,','|is +`'Ollsidt'rat)l(' (lisctlssion Oll tilt" I)owers o1 Ill+.' iis,s(,llll)l+v, alld ])lOllOslil,_
i_llllgt ,, ill Slli)!+,l_ll/l't', t'l'()lll ll('_llillg Ill#." _1_,%('II1_|%" _1_ 1|1t" I+q(li+¢ill('nl ol _1 slolkhollit'ls' lllt't'i-
ill!_ l(I t.r,iving lh(, ilsS<'liltilv dir<'(i i+`!sliolisil)ilily _ili(I dc<:isioxl-in_ikilitr , l)()l+,'+`'l'S rl'l_ililig Io
o])(_l'_lli()ll of lilt' ,_,%'sll!lll. 'l'li+`_ i)ioa(lest S(ll)pOl'l I)rot)al)ly is lill Ill+`' rl'lltlk't'lv ]('ss Ol)Cra-
liollall) r<'sliOlisilJh" _tss+`'llll)ly, 7ti1¢1 |)lO[)()nClllS ()| ill(Tt'_l,%Cd ilSSt,llit)l+v t)ow(,rs ill(' [7.'W('l _ts
lht" i)ow('ls assign0d ill(lt'Ti_it'. 1"ill'r(" itl+`" IWll s('hol)|,% o| lh(l/l/2,tll l)ll volilig il_ l|Tl" ass+`'n_l)l', <.
_t'_iilv till o|lh()st' sl)t'akill g ()11 ill+`' 1)oiill J.IVOlt'd ()lll' ll_lli()ll-(lll<! v()l+`!, ill Ill{lily CH_I'S, h(>w-
Iwtq, siibi_'ct io lilt" _lSSilllll)li()ll Ill,it lho _iss+`,ilil)l)' will |lilVl" r('l_tiivt'iv Iiiliit+`,d pow('r,s. Tilt"
I rilit<.d _llil(,s po,_ilion w_is 1o (olil|)ill( • ont' il_ilioii-Oli0 volt" witt_ a wcighlcd v_tt" rt'flccl-
big rt'l_lli\'t" I_,v('ls ot ili\'<'_lllit'lil (it' lilt" illolilt)l-rs.
'lti+`'l+`' was Illlilllilll()ilS Ol)illiOii iii lll+`_ (]olnlnili+`'c thv(_i'illg ('st,ll)iisliilil'lil of _i _(Wt'l'll-
illg t)ody ('qlliVli]+`'lll I() itw pl(_,%cnl lnl_'riiii (]()llilnllni+`'ali()n_, Satelliit" (]t)llllilillo+`" (It ;US)
ot IN'I'EI,SAT II was unltniili(_llSly iigr¢.'_d ilial i+c|)r+`',sciil_iliVl',s It) this I)ody silollid ])+`' troll|
lilt' l+`'[t'('olllllltllli('_ltiq)ll <)|)+`'r_tliilg eiililies involved. Tht-rt" was a f.'(illSt-IiSil.% lh_ll l|le sizt, tit
Ill<, body shotild tic Iilllil(!(I in llle interest of eftlciellcy iiiid efti_(livcliess, alltioilt4h all
_i+_il'('([ lh;ll t,quilal)h" _iriaii<_('in('nt,s should lie iil_id¢" tilt I+`'l)l-+`',sciil_lli<in fit)ili .slnall+`'r
illt'llll)('l (ouiill-i(,s _illd _dl geographical 71r(!{l_. Tilc'rl" wa<s i1() ('(lllll>ll_ll_, oll how It) achit,vc
lti+`'sc g<t_ils. Tht'rc als<_ w_ls liO specific _tgr_t+lll<_lit ()IT t+tii_clitms o| lhe govt, rilillg |)ody, I)ul
il il])l)('_il<'(I Io lit' ililt'ild<'d 1)y iilOSl delegations lhal |is fuli(lion+s Wolild 1)c silniLll ill
ii;lllll(' lllld sl()li(" Ill ih()s(" ii<)w |)l'r|(il'lllt'd by the I(][.TS. Volitlg ill tile govl'lniltg t)odv w+ls
<lis(liss('(I wilholll 191 t'l)ii(]ll,'+i()ii._+ "l'|l+`'i'e' is g_'ii+`+l+_ll _igl't'Clil(!iil llilll Volillg s|lOlil_l lit"
w_'igllit'd t<l rcllt'ct rclativt' iiivt_+lilicnl in oi tls__' i)| the _,ysl+.'ili, t)ut there apl)car+s io hc _,tit/-
sllilili_i] Slllil)()ll till lilt" vi+.+w lh+il liO sill_l+_" (+oilntry (ll+ Siilal] gl(lll i) o| (_otiilllies (7 (it _+i)
_+li<liilcl tit, ith](! Io ilnl)ost+ <)1 ])lock (vt, lo) a decision of lht, goveiniiig |)ot+ly. (Tilt + I_!.S. (lli'-
it'llllV ]i_lS +ill ettt'ciivc +,'t'l() powt'r iilTdt_r lhe interim _irl_iligt'ill/'lll_+)
"i'tlt' l,,4,'_/i-killg (_l+tlttp it!p<lric'd thr+<'+c' principal views <lit thl" ili_tli{t_,c_iilC'ltl it.llitli_.!-
lilt'illS tot Iht! Iiillir+`! Olg_iniz_ition and the propon_nlS _llid su|)t)orlcrs of l'_icli view I)r<) -
(laiiil<'(l lhtqr desiic to +`!iT_(ilt" efficieilt, (;t)nipetent in_4ii_t_+.'lil_2lil.
The pi-_)lJoii+`.ills (if ltw |]r_+l view ili_liill_lin_d lh_il the dt'l]nilive _irrllii_eillt_llis _}l_lli]_|
t'stttllli_li _t lirill gclal tit |till illtt,ritali(lilalizatioti tl[tht" lll_(it_l_t'iiit'lit, tilid+.!l _t ([ii('cl<lr _+`_lt-
t'ral, wit|till ii spt,citic tJt'i'i<)(l _tt iiili('. This view was ,_il|)|)<)ilt'd I)y tlt'lgitllil, Pr_ill(e, iii(ti_i,
.i_wil;t<'rl,ili<l, lh(' I riiii<,<l I_iil_d<)iii+ (]_ili_id_i itlltl tic|in|all) ', _tivl()iig olh+.,i>_+.
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The proponenls of tile second view, while not excluding the possilfilily of partial t)r
conq)lete internationalizati()n ()f the Manager under a director general, ti_lt thai fixing a
rigid time period in which Otis goal must I)e realized mighl interim're with the necessity of
[c]nsuring efficien_ and efli_ctive managemenl. Australia, (;hile, Nigeria and Venezuela
thvored this apprt>aeh. Sorer" members of the Working (;roup who slq)porlt!¢l lhis view
wanted it made clear |hal staff should I)e recruited on the basis of compclenee rather than
m_ die basis of investment or geographical representation of counlries.
A 0fird view, expressed by the United States, spetifically rejected the view thai inter-
mtlimlalization of the Manager should, in itsel[, be a primary goal or common aim.
Efticiem management should be thc only goal of the organization regarding tile strttcture
of its management body. Internalionalizaliot_ of the organization should be addressed in
lhe assembly and the governing body. SId)sequently, the U.S. Delegation indicaled that we
could consider dividing the nlallagelllellt hmction and creating an international admin-
istrative [10] management body to handle administrative, tinancial, and legal functions,
with lhe operational manager toni|raring to handle other lilnclions. The United Sl;i.les
matt(- il (lear, however, that the c(mcept of a diccctor general imerposilioned bclwcet_ the
manager and the governing body was mlacccptal)h'.
Working (;roup (',--'lhe rel)orl of Win'king Group (3 (Com. 1/94) deals widl eligibili-
ty tbr INTEI.SAT membership and the question of relationships with non-member c()tm-
tries. The Working (;r(mp produced lwo drafl artieles, one on membership, which
slip|dates lha! OIIIV International Telecommtmicalionls} Union members are eligibk" lbr
INTELSAT membership; and one selling forth principles of access to the system, which
would make direct access to lhe space Seglllen[ (l|" the gh)bal svslelll available I() all signa-
lories anti other slates, countries or areas not members of lhe ()rganizalion. The (;r()up
unanimously sltpported the draR arlicles, with Ttmisia, however, recording the view thal
the p()ssibility of admitting non-lT[r members lo membership in INTELSAT should not
be excluded. A I_'w other members imd several observers also spoke in tavor of this view
in meetings o1 the parent (_ommittee, though a consideratfiy larger number of members
sp<)ke in favor tff ITU tnemt)ership as a condition.
(;ommittce I discussed the lopics considered by its Working (;roups betbrc and atlet
tilt" (;r(lups reel. [n addition, the topics (if llle rights and ol)ligati()ns of members and
INTELSAT relationship with Ihc IT() were (tiscuss(-(I in the (;ommiltee, but 01ese dis(us-
sions did not go beyond a few expressions of views and Ibese topi(-s were not assigned to
a W()rking Group. The Secrelariat ])repared and (tistrit)lncd a smnmarv ()t"the main poinls
louched upon in these disctlssi(ms ((',ore. 1/107, Rev. 1).
Comnlinee II--Legal and Procedtual (,)lteslions
(_()nllnillee 11 established three Working Groups. hs age_lda is set ]()rth in Annex 1).
[ l I 1 W(irking (,roup on Legal Status--Legal sialus was e×anlilled at some length in t)()lh
lhe Working (;roup and the tull Committee. All of the oflwr members of the Working
Group (Brazil, Chile, (;ermany, file Philippines, Sweden, Swilzerland, and the U.K.)
()t)post'd the [I.S. pt;siti(m that INTEI.SAT should continue as a joim venture without legal
persomditv. Instead they favored estat)lishing INTELSAT as a legal entity distincl fr(tm the
participants. The joint venture was described by the U.S. as a viable means ()f carrying out
the activities and ptuposes of INI'EI.SAT. The nu_jority view urges that INTEI.SAT will t)c
better able to contract, own property, site or be site(l, oblain privileges and immunities,
and incttr and dispose (1t liabilities appropriately if it is a separate legal personality. The
United States position is/hat ;ill lhcse ]im(lions bare been peril,treed and can continne
to |w pcrti)rmed through a joint venture.
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Thereportof theWorkingGroupcontainseparatestatementsofthemajorityand
U.S.positionsand, with t ll(_ sunmlary recor<,l of lhe (;ommittee's discussion of the report,
was trattstnilled to (:Otltlnilt<,!e I [k>t"consideration. 1[(_r_xv{'r, Ill<,' In+{tie1" W_tS t/or discnssed
in (;ommittee 1.
Com. II/9 (and 1 I ) contains the tel+oft of this Working Group.
Working Group on Accession, Supersession and BIl.y-Ottl--
Entry Into Forc<,'--lhe U.S. position was thai the detinilive arrangcmenls should
enler into torte up,.m tinal adlwrenc<, +by two-thirds of the present memlmrs who hold+ or
whose signatories to the Sp<,'cial Agr<,'ement hold, a sul)stantiat proportion (80% was sug-
g<,'sted) ot +th<,' investmenl quota under the Special Agreement. This position was adopted
as the majority posilion hy the (;ommittee, but the exact percentag<,' was 1<,'1+tto be de<,:id-
cd by tlt<,' l+letlary. Tit<,: n+aj<w poinl olcont<,mtion conc<,+rnt'<,l the financial criterion. Some
d<,'hegates (('.hihe and Switzerland) strongly objected to a r<+,quir<,mmnt which would enal)l,p
the largesl "sharchold<,w" Io bh,ck tile entry into force of the new ;tg.reent<,'nts. ()Ill},, a
small minority otdelegalions (Sweden, [121 Fran<,:e and Mexico) asserted that tiler<." nntst,
as at matter of international law, be unanimous adherence by all prior members. The
remainder appeared to ac<,+<,'|)tadh<,'rence I)y a sttbstantial matjority as legally sufiicienl.
l'ranstbv <d Rights and Obligations--The Working (;roup produ<,'<,'d two a]lernaliv<,'
dlall atrfiches. The tirsl ot ltmse wouhl transfer lilt+ rights and obligations of signatories to
lhe interim Sp<,'<,ial Agreenmnt to tile signatories of tile c<mtparal+he part of lh<," definitive
;.urang<,+nl<,mts, including Iransfcv of ownership in undivided shares. The second approach
Iiansf_'rs all rights and ohligations of interinl signatories to IN'IT]I,SAT trader the defini-
live arran_('nlenls. The l+,,'<)approaches are contrast('<.| as appropriate, resp<,'ctiv<,qy, lot at
con{in{ted joint v<,+ntur(" or the establishmenl of an organization with a I<,'gal personality.
Bt_()ut--(;<_mmittec 1I in its report formulated the following general legal princi-
phes [or the htly+4)llt of ItOtl-conlitltlitlg members, leaving tit(" me<,hanics |o (]olnnliuee Ill:
(I) lair cotnpensalion with reasonal)le expedition; (2) t+or palenls an(I (lata, either t]tit +
C<)lttpellsaliolt i)i c(mtinued enjoynmnt; and (3) the am(toni (>t' compensation to t)e set-
th'd t)y neg<)tiati(m t)elw<.'<,'n lhe non-continuing meml)er an(I INTEI,SAT. Failing an
aRrt.enmnt, |he n(m-continuinlg memi)er co<,tld challenge any (leternlination by tile gov-
erning body betore at neutral arhitral tribunal. Ahhough there ;q)peared to be no <)pposi-
ti<m Io the l)rincipl<, ' <+dequital)le compensation for non-c<,mtinuing memhers, Chile and
Swed<,'n argued that a non-coFttintting member's share cannot be I)oughl out without its
(+1)lts<,'nt.
Cont. II/I0 contains this (,roul)'S report.
Working (;voup on ()ther Matters--Com. II/15 an<,i 16 are tit<."reports of this Group.
Privileges and hnmunities--This item was considered at some lertgth in the full
(;ommiuee as well as in the Working Group. The report of Committee II on this subject
noted that a majorily of the delegates favored including in the intergovermnental agree-
ment two general provisions: tile first would commit the host [13] stale Io conclude a
headquart<,'rs agreenmnt providing R)r appropriate privileges and immunities within the
jurisdiction whet<," the headquarters were located; the second wonld authorize the board
of governors t<) negotiate with memher states on an ad hoc basis those privileges and
immtmilies appropriate tor Ihe proper functioning of 1NTELSNE It was generally recog-
nized that INTEI,SAT would obtain tax immunities where necessary, ahhough provision
tbr such immunities should not be specifically made in the intergovermnental agreement.
Some delegates expressed the view tha! INTEI.SAT would have to haw legal personality
in order to be granted privileges and immunities under their domestic laws.
Settlement of Disl)utes--There were three major points of controv<,'rsy: the proper
parties to arbitration; the selection of the panel from which the third member (the pres-
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i(h'nt) of an arbimd trilmnal is chosen: and, flw scope of arbitrable dispuu_s. The (!.S.
position was thai the signalorics to the opt'rating agreemt, nt, the board of governors, and
the assembly should be the only comptqt'n! i)artics to an arbitration l)roceeding. Thv
majority of Ill(' d('h'gations wanted to include in lilt' intt'rgovcrnnl(,lltal a.gr('('lnt'nt some
mechanism lor st'tiling disputes mnong the gov('rnmt'ntsl'l pal-lies It) thai am-e('m('nt.
With rt'spt'('t It) the sc'lc'clicm ()f I|lc' pam'l nlcml)vrs, tl_t" Working (;roup's rc'pOFt, which
was a(h)pled I)y (;ommittee II, slated thai a nla:iorily favored sel('ction of Ill(' pancl I),, Ih('
Assembly without weighted voting. This was inconsistent with Ill(" U.S, position that the
selection should t)e mad(" by the board of governors. As tOr file s(<)p(, ()t art)ilrable (ti_-
pul('s, tit(" [!.S. position thai the stop(, sh<nihl be (ontine(I t<) lt'ga] (lisputcs rcceiv(,d
m+!jority supl)ort, althottgh some (lclegali()ns t+av<)rcd a broader scope. Th(' tnajority
tm,ort,d limiling thc scope to legal disput('s I)ut using a. different fiwmulation tr(ml lhat
proposed by the U.S.
Amendment l'rocesses--Th( • U.S. position that a proposed alnendm(+nl t<) the oper-
ating agrt'('mt'nl be a|)l)roved by the board of g()veln_)rs was o[:,|)ost.d by several delegates.
Although there was genera] a,gr('(-tnt'nt thai no atlllt'n(lln(,llt to tlm operating agre(ml('nt
should l)c made [14] with<rot the consent of the l)arties to the irHerg<)ve1tmmnta] agree-
llICllt, difl<.'ring views were t+xpress('d as to the lllallllICl + ill which that consent should bt'
manili,ste(t.
Lial)ilit_ oi tilt" Signlat()ries--This tnatlt'F was (liscILSSt'd <rely in tilt" full (_<)millilt(,(,. A
signiticant issu(" was whether, if INTEI,SAT is girt'It separate lcgal status, th(' signatories
would or shoul(I ciijoy limited liability l()r INTEI.SAT obligations. There was signiti(ant
opinion that limited liability autonlaticall,, fidlow,pd tr<ml establishing INTEI.SAT with
legal i)ersonalily. The U.S., along with Australia and Swcil(+n, leh that it would nol.
]lowcvcr, Sw(,(h.n and a ntmit)cr of otht'r (l('Icgations ('xpress(.d the vi('w that linlit('(1 lia-
bilitv is an a(Ivanta<t,ry which should I)e ;tt+lorded tile signatories. A s('(on(t issu(" x,,ats
wh(,ther <.+xt.mF,tion <)t the sigrnll<)rics t() Ill(" OF,Crating agreement from inter s(' liability
sh_mld vxtend I)eyond c<mse(luential damages arising tiom a br,,'akch_wn in s(,rvic(,. Th('r('
was general agr('('lll('nl that tile (hqinitive arl-all<'d,t'lll('nts sh<mld not itnpair m('ml)vr slatt+s '
rcsponsil)ilitics under the Treaty on ()ill(q Nl)a('('.
Withdrawal, Res('rvali(ms, l)eliniti<ms and Number of Agre('mtqlts--Withdrawal was
(lis(ttss(,d only bri('llv ill (]()nunitte(+ II. No gt'nt'ral agre('ntent wa+s (lis(('rnibl(,.
The malt('tm ()f t+eservations and (lefitfition,, were d('lbricd until lilt' 1lint] t('xl <d tilt +
agrc('nlcnt has l)('cn gcnerally established. Ther(' appeared to l+c no opl)ositi<m at this
time to the IT+,+';.position l)rohibiting r('scrvations.
An ovt'rwh('Imin, 4 inaj<+rily SVl)p<.-t(,d th(' [I.S. position 10r two aRi+t'(,m(,nts, wilh s<mlc
(h'l('g,m's l('FA'l",'hl<_ ttntil me)r(' is kll()Wll ()] Ill(" fin,tl tt'xt.
(;ommittt'(' Ill--Financial Arrangements
(]onlmittcc Ill's work program is shown ill Ann('x E. Its report is 1)oc. 16.
[ 15] There was general agr('cmcnt in thc (]<)lnlllittt'(P lhal illVt'Sllll('lll ill th(! sVstt'lll should
bc related to us(', as tilt" [r.s. had l)r<)l)osed, though some countries, ])rimil)ally tim Arab
gI+<)ttl:_, i+av(>rt+d applying tilt" in'+t'slmt'nt/its(" svslt'nl ()lit'++afler ,dlocaling a I)as(' share ol
ilIv('slm('llt t<) ('atIt tllt:lilbcI. Tiler(" was lit'all" _l_l('('llIUl]| Oil +I lllillillltlln sh;.tl+(: l()t" ('ach
mmnl)('r, rt'gardlc'ss of its usc of tilt" syst('lll+ I l l( ),+',;l delegations favoring 0.05</e. lh>wev('r,
many (lelegali()ns thmtght ni(,nll)(,rs with h)wcr use should n<)t b_" rt,(luirt,d I() a((+t'])t lhis
minhntun.
Tim (](mnnitl('c dividt'd thrc(" ways on the t]UCSlion of what types of us(, ol the svstt,m
should bc (at)tint('(1 in dct(wnfining +investni¢,nl share,+, al)out <me-third of th<_se (<+untrics
lll;tl Cxl)rcsst'd vim_'s tint+hi(ling the U.S.) l,tvorinb_ all use of INl'H,S]Yl:linanccd laciliti_,s,
onc-thir(l lav<+ring int('rnalitmal traffic only, and another gr_mp pr<>posing t<) count invm +-
national Irafli( and that dont('slic Irafli( that (tosses inl('rnati<mal boundaries (or would
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tl() so ifl)r(_jt'cl('doil IIw smI_t(' of tllt"earth). Tlw itlcas.f severald(,Ic,galionson lilts
tluesli(mcleaMy w('r(,r('I_10dio lilt,qu(-slionofvolin_ slrcnglh illlit("org_uliz_llion,h w_)s
a_reed that shares should he a(!jusl('dlwriotIicaIIy,hul It'llopt'n wlwther adjUSlllWms
Wol,ld he based on pasl ((!.S.Ior prqjcclcd us_,or strut(,coniI)hlalionof lhc two. Tht-rt,
was also a division of vicws on lilt' tlut'slion of circumsl;tl+ct's und('r which :t signatory
Colll{I dvclin0 Io ;.'cq)l ;ill hicrt';ts('{I or {Itwrv;tst'd share.
II _,s'_ls:tgl-('('(I hv all ])111:l I(.w llICll)l)tq'S IhiII Iht*r(' sh(inl(l lw a ulilizali(m ('h:lrg(', I),lrl -
I'_ :IS il lilt'tins Ill ('()ll)[ItqlS_llillg ()'_Vll('l's whilst" Sll_l)(' is ]m_('r lh:ln lhtqr use prior Ill adjust-
lll('ll{ O_" shHr(_. _()lJ_.illg (;)()up l, which hHlldl('(I Ino_;t (if [hi • (]Ollllllill(_("s %viiik,
r(,conlnl(.n(h'd lilt' (()sl ill )ll()n('y pills :lbol|l 9% :Is lilt" ll:l_]S ()J" ('()lllll('ns_tIi()ll f(ir list' ()t"
(at)lull ill dt'lt.rlni)lin_g ulili/ali()n (h:lrgt's.
(]()lnlilill('( • III's S(W(m(I W()rking (;roup c()nsithwt'd I]nan(i_d i)r(ivisiolls r('l:lli)lg Ii)
lr_tllsili()ll h'()lll lh(' l)l(",;C)ll iI_r(_t*lll('lllS _tn(l p(issil)lc wilh(haw,lls h()lll I16] ill(* (ll'gillli/;t-
lion. Whil(' llw \_*()rki)l_ (;13)lip did n()l, and (lid not _11(1:111pl 1o, )t'_t(]l Iiual _lglt'cnwnL
Iht'r( • w:ts gtql(*r:d :tgr('t'lllt!)ll Oil lilt' I)rincil)lcs lh;tl should lit' alll)licahlc, h slllllll([ not i)(.
Ill() (lifi](u]! Ill rt'ath a_,lt'em('nt ill Ihis art'_L
_,_)rking (;r()llp _ :lg)t!('({, wilh rt'sl)('cl lo _i]l_lll('i:|J ,i('('t_s_ Ill lh(' _vM('lll I)V }l(In-IllI'lll-
t)('rs, lh:ll lilt" ol-g:tniz_lliOll, ill t,_lahlist/hlg s])act, st'glli(qll ulilizali(in (h:lr_('_ {()r nl)ii-
In('lnl)(q_l, I sh(iliH l:lk(' :l('((}llllI (it lht" tact lhltl ll()ll-)ll(_ll}t)t'lS h:lvo 111)1 hill-Ill • illl'_ oJ lh('
risks _t)l(I ohlig,lli())l'_ ()1" nl(qlll)(,rship. This would rot'an Ih;ll ;i Ii)I(! charred I(i n(in-nl('lU-
h(qs silo)lid l_tk{' :t(C()lllll (}t t)t)lh Ih( • (osl (l| Ill(' nl(qnll('lS _ (_ll)ilal _tn(t lht _ risk lhcv hart.
l:ik('n ill invt'sli)l_ ill lh(' svslt'm.
( :()nlmill('c IV--()lh('r()l)_'r,tti()n:l] Arranl.lt'n}enls
(](}llllllill('(" IV, whi(h ]l;l(l p,v() _)lkhlg (;rolll)s, (()ilsitltT(,d (1111}' IIlO('ll)'t'llltqll p(_]i('_
(_,¥{))kill_ (;r()l)p/\) _ln(l i)ktl('nl :11)(1 (l:tla ii()li(y (W(}rkin_ (;l'OU I) I))).
(ill l)r(l('llr('lll(!lll p()licit's Ih0rc dtwclop('(I lhr('c :lllt'rllklliVt" aill)r(mcht's: (1) _l r('la-
liV('ly _ilnl)l(! pr()visi{)n (:dling I_11"inl('rllkllion;tl 1('n(t('r_ and (()nlr;l(lof s(.,l(,(liOll (in {h('
I)_tsis ()l Ih(' 1)osl t'()l/lt)ilhlli()ll ill" pli('t% quality _lll(I li]ll('l_/ dtqivt']y: (_) r(.l('nlion of tl_t'
t.xis[ili_ illl('lilll ill]k)ll_('lil('11{ pl()vi_i()]lS, which h:l'¢(! all()w("(l i)ll('ln_tli()n_tl _pl(':ldin_ tit
('()11II-6,('1:-;: ;_ln(.I (:_) Iht' aml)lili('alion (if (I) lib(iv(" h_' ad(iilion of _l)t'('itic I:I]lgllklg(' (,n("()llr-
agill_ i)ll('rn:tli()ilaJ sl)rt!_t(tin@ , of (Olllra(ts with dislri|lulit)n rollghly iil()l)(llli()ll_tlt" It) rtq-
_tliv_" il_v_-.stmt'n_' pt'r<t,nl_t,_¢..s of memb{'rs. There" i.,_,in tiwt, ht/lt" _{tt_tJ _lit*t_vt'nct • i_ tb_ •
t)robablc praclic:d ctt('cl _)t all(wnatives (2) and (3). The United Stall's, and appm('nllv a
m:ljolily of Ihosc countries ('xpressing themselves on this issuo, t_tv()rc(t allernaliv( • (1).
The ( rllil(_d Kingdom and Japan supported ahernativ0 (_) and Franc(" supported ah('rna-
livt' (?,). Thc propos_'d spcciti(: wording is set forlh in the (_olnnlillct*'s rt'p()rl ([)oc. I_).
I 17t \Vilh rc,E,ard to paten l and data policy, two alternatives emerged. The t !nited SI_II('S,
tilt" I3nilt'(I Kingdom and ()lht'rs favored a provision whi(:h would leave Ill Ill(, tlis('rt'tion
of Ih(' (;OV('lllillg Body Ih( _ parlictllar patent policies Ill bc applied ill t':lCJl conll-_l('l I/('g()-
li;llioll, (;:lll_-IcI;t, (;t'l'll]:tll}'_ hitli;t, Flanco and othtws prt)pos(.d ;i l)alt'nl i)rt)visio]l which
w()_ll(I ('nlal)lish in the (Iclinilivt" arrangements a tixed non-('xclusivt" lict')ls(" p(llicy put-
suanl I() which any INTH_SAT c(nltracl(ir would get till(' to inventi(ins m_d flala (l('w'h)p('(l
un(l('r 1NTE[.SAT (()tllra(:ls, anti tile organization would lakt. a n()n-('x(lusivt" li(vnst. Io
)is(' lilt" inli)rmali(m ()nlv ill c(mne(:lion witll space segnl('nls and would thus tort,g(i c()n-
lr()l ov('r lht" ['()lllr_l['lor's list" of tilt" infi)rmation. There was virtually unaninll)tls agr('t'-
mr'hi lh_tl It) lilt" (t×l_.tnl INTEI.SAT obtains rights ill inventions and (l_tla, lht'y sh()ul(t be
ninth' :lv_filal)lt" on a rt)yahy-tY(,tr basis for use in lht, INTEI.SAT space s('glll('lll ;tnd (in ,i
r('_ls(ln:tbh" rov_)llv hasis 10_ i)lht'r list'S. Th(" :tllt'rn_llb,*(* p_]tl'nl ;m(1 (l:tl:l polici('s :)rt"s('l
J()rlh ill (]llln, IV/10 and 11.
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The Credentials (;¢mnnittee
The Credentials Connnittee was nominated by the Conference Chairman and
approved during tile initial plenary meeting. Its members were Ireland, Norway, Panama,
Philippines and Turkey. The Committee elected the representative of Turkey Chairman.
The Committee found all credentials to be in order and its report was accepted withoul
<tiscussion by the Conference.
The Editorial Committee
The Editorial Committee was nominated by the Contcrence (;hairman and approved
by the plenary. Its members are Belgium, Canada, Colombia, France, Jamaica, Mexico,
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. There being no work to be done on
final texts, the Editorial Committee did not meet or function at the first session of the
Conference.
[ 18] The Steering Committee
(;omposilion of the Steering Committee was provided fi)r in the Conference Rules of
Procedure as ibllows: Chairman--(]onIcrence Chairman (USA); members--the Ibm-
regional Vice Chairmen (Netherlands, Venezuela, India anti Algeria; but the
Representative of The Netherlands left and was replaced by the Swiss Representative in
the fourth week) and the Chairmen of the tour Working Committees (AJgentina, Japan,
Australia and Italy). The Steering (;ommittee met regularly throughout the first session,
coordinating the program of the Conference. This C<)mmittee prepared the proposal
adopted by the Conl_q-ence to establish an intersessional Preparatory (:ommiuee (Annex
G) which is discussed in detail in Section VII below.
\q. Plenary Session of tire Conference
The Conference met in five plenary sessions. At the initial plenary the agenda was
adopted, committees were formed, and <ont;erencc officers were elected. There were fimr
plenary sessions during the final week to receive and consider lhe Working (;<)mini|tee
reports.
The opening session proceeded thorough the agenda as planned without any dilfi-
culties. Prior to adoption of the Conference Rules of Procedure, representatives from
Italy, Nigeria and India sought assurances, which were given by the Conference Chairman,
that tire rules with regard to statements of observers would be interpreted lil)erally to
ensure the ftfllest possible exchange of views. The United Kingdom suggested an<l was
assured that maximum opportunity would be ma<le available to achieve consensus on all
matters,
Sweden introduced a comprehensive and novel set of draft definitive arrangements
(Doe. 8). This d,aft was not given much direct attention by the Contierencc. The only
other comprehensive draft agreements submitted wcrc tabled by the United Su_lcs at the
end of the first week of the Conference (Doe. 10). These drafts were not discussed as such,
but various articles were considered by the Conference Committees.
[ 19] At the [bur plenary sessions held during the final week, reports were received tiom
the Working Committees and were discussed. Because of the number of unresolved issues
an<t the general complexity of definitive arrangements, it became ohvious that substan-
tially more lime would be required to develop final texts. It was decided, on the recom-
mendation of the Steering Committee, to recess the Conference March 21, 1969 an<l tO,
refer tire Committee reports and all other relevant Conference documents to an interses-
sional Preparatory Committee ft>r study and work. A proposal to provide fi)r interim work
was discussed at some length during the fourth plenary session and the Steering
Committee was requcstcd to revise the proposal 1o reflect tire views expressed. A revised
paper was submitted to the fifth anti final plenary and was a<toptcd unanimously wilhout
discussion (Annex (;).
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VII. Future Meelings
'File (:onti:rence provided tot lwo types of fum,e meelings. First, nmmlier and observ-
er countries are lo notify the (;onference Secrelarial if they inlend Io participale in or
ohserve meelings of lhe intersessional Preparatory Comniitlee, which is lo convene in
Washington as soon as possible afler May 20, on a dale to lie notified by the Conference
Secretarial. The Colnnlittee is then to meet again thereafter at such limes ;is it may decide
as necessary Io complete its work.
A second plenipolentiary session of the (:ont_wence is scheduled it) convene in
Washinglon on Novemher 18, 1969.
The Prel)aralory (]ommitttw is inlended to be broadly represenlalive of all areas and
allilndes. It is encotlraged lo resolve in an ohjective manner differences of views present-
ed during lhe (;onference, although it is not empowered to negoliate definilive arrange-
nlenls. No counlry will be bound by the" views and positions of the Committee's reporl,
whelher <)r not il is represenled on the (]omlnitlee.
The (;omnliliee is inslrucled io elect its own (]hairman and tO esiahlish its own prtl-
cedlires and melhods i)fwork, lls report is to tie circulated through the Serrelary (general
(if the (]l)ll[iq'enle al leasl sixly days prior io the reconvening of the (Ton|erence. The
reporl will he in 12l)1ill<" |i)rin of drafi agreements, with such ahernale drafts el specitic
arlicies ;is may be necessary to ret]eci difti'rences ofsigniticant views, t|owevei; degrees of
supporl are not to be reth,cled in the reporl.
[t lhe (]olnmiilee shonld lie unable to complete its work in Iinie, ii may poslpone lhe
reconveiling of lhe (]onference and request the host Governlllellt (U.S.) to reconvene the
(]onf('rence al ihe earliest convenierii (late.
VIII. (](mclusi(Ins
Fronl the <)ills(!l ii was known thai tilt' lask of eslalilishing detiniiiw" arrail_eineills for
a glohal colnmercial comnilulicalion satellite system would lie delnall(ling, coniplex and
lhne consuinhlg, l)urhig lhe ftiur weeks of this session, the (]onference collecled, consid-
ered and (:on(lensed a great many views. This was an essential arid desirable firsl slep.
Machinery has now I)el._n esiahlished for fllriher significanl sleps, i.e. preparation of
drafts and, hopcl%llly, resolving {if ditlerences of views. This work is Io lie done in the inter-
sessional Preparatory Committee. The Committee's work product will lie draft agree-
menls, inchiding alternalive provisions where appropriate, which all inlerested countries
can consider prior to and at a reconvened session of the Conference, now scheduled for
Novelnher 1969.
()ne overriding value of the first session was the educational benefit it offered to all
participating counlries. Many countries, particularly those not represented on the ICUS,
expressed their views a! !his session for the first time. Many of the earlier published post-
lions (it oilier countries were explained, elaborated and docuniented, hi the increased
inlerllaliona] nndlq'standing it produced, and in tile high level of international coop/'ra-
lion ii evidenced, Ibis tirsl session was undoubtedly silccessfu]. The in(li,<'idna] and .joinl
elfilr!s {,t ;ill the participating representatives and observers, particularly those of lhe
(:ontiwence ofticers and Conlmittee and Working Group Chairnlen, have advanced tile
prospecls oF successful conchision <if these considerations immeasurably.
The first session appropriately concluded on a note of constructive optimism and
cooperation. The provisions for further work and deliberations shonld make possible [21 ]
a conlinued vahlalile exchange of views and timely conclusion of definitive arrangemenls
tor Ihe presently operathlg global commercial communications satellite sysiem estah-
lished hy INTEI,SAT.
The Chairlnan of lhe l)elegalion wishes to thank !he other nlernbers of the
l)elegalion tot ltleir very able assistance an(l solnl(_i advice.
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l,{'onard tt. Marks, Ambassador
Clmirman, United St.;.tt.c's Delegation
Document 1-26
Document title: "Second Report and Order in the Matter of Establishment of Domestic
Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities," Docket No. 16495,
June 16, 1972.
Source: Federal Communications Commission Reports: Decisions and Reports" of the Federal
Communications Commission of the United States, June 9, 1972 to August 4, 1972, Volume 35,
Second Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 844--851,
860-867.
I{,Tte_/ the or@hal institutional arrutt_emettl.s ]m communieali_tg via _alellile were discussed duH_tg
the 1962-1964 period, the l_'Tfite House and ('o_gTes_ ]m'ttsed on _etling up a ,_),slem /or inlerna-
tional communieotion,_ as quiekl_' as possible. Little atte_ttion a,a,_ ,&riven to issues 1vialed to u,sin,ff com-
municaliotLs satellites/or domestic servi<v',_ within the l:_ltiled Stale_. Be&_ttt_tiR_ ( itt 1966, howtq,et;
vud<mx co.qmtfieu be ffut¢ to upply to the I:ederul Cmnmut_ications Comtni.sdm_ Ira authoH:ution to
develop am/operate _uch domestic satellite ,B'_tem_. T/tit order and accompa_tyittLr report rt].'ewg_l the
I:ederul ('ommu_ieation_ Commi_siem :_ eh'¢'i_imt op_ /he matter opettint( the _,'.S. d,me_ti¢ market I,
it_len,_led multi/d+, prcndder_ O] _,aricms c,nmmH_ic¢ltiott_ service_ via satellite.
[844l
l'),derul Communiecttions Commission Report
E(:.(:. 72-531
BEF()RE THE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
WASI tlN(;T()N, D.( :. 207G4
Ill lh{" _lilllCl" (}t"
ESTABI,IS1 tMENT OF D{}MESTI{: C{}MMI, 3NICATI(}NS- I
SXI'EI,I,H'E FA(:II,ITIES BY N(}N-{;{)VERNMENTAI, } l){}{'k{'l No. 16495
ENTH'IES }
SE(:()ND REP( )RT ANI) ()RI)ER
(Adoplcd,JIm{' 16, 1972: R{'h'ast-d .]mlc 16, 1972 )
BY TltE {:{)MMISSi(}N: (:ttAIRMAN I',/:R{:ll I}ISSENTIN(; AND ISS[!IN(; A SIWI'E
MENT IN WttI{:It {:()MMISSI{)NERS REID ANI} WII,EY J{}IN; (:{}MMISSI()NER
.]{)ttNSON (:{)N{:URRIN{; AND ISSI:IN{; A ST£1"EMENT.
I. I'R{){:EH}IN{;S BEF{)RE TIlE (:()MMISSI()N
I. This pr{w{'i'{ling was inslitlH{'{l t}y Ih{" (:ommissi{}n {}n Mitr{h 2, 1966 (N{}li{{" {}[
Inquiry, BI FR. 2}}5l}7; Sui}ph,m{,nml N{}[i{{' {}f lnquir b (){_{}tt{,r 20, I{,}ti(i, 31 IQR. 13763)
I_]X PI ( )RIN( ; I l II( I _N KN( IWN 121
It> cxph)rc various lcgal, technical and policy questions associated with tilt' l)ossiblc inlth<i-
rization <,f d<+nlcslic c_litlnltnlicatio]is salc]lilc file(lilies to notlgovcrntllclita] clilitics. ()n
March 2<1+, 1970, lilt+ (;<)nlnlission issttcd it ti)st fie mr/a,d Ord++( 1970 Rcl_t)rt ) inviting tilt +
sul)mission of applicllti<)ns 1<) assist out dclcrminations (22 F( ;(; 2(t 86, 35 F.R. 5356), and
consolidated a coiicllrl'clllk: issllcd N()tice ()f Propt)sa] Ridc Mitking (22 F(;(; 2(1 810). In
rcspt)nsc i<l Ill(" 1970 Rcp(wl, Wstcm appiicatiolls ,,yore filcd by the t_)ll<+willg:
+Hie _,.Xk+stcrn l.!nion Telegraph (]ompany (%_StCl'll l._rlliol])
l lughcs Aircraft (;ompany and vi+.lions tclcpilonc oi)tqaling c<llnl)anics of (;'['I';
Service Corp<wation (I h,ghcs/(;TE)
Western "lclc-(;onllmini<alioils, hlc. (_,_I'(]l)
R(',A (;loba] (;olnmuIHCalions lille. +hid R(;A Alaska (;omn|nllicatiotls, lilt. (R(;A
( ',hflw<ml/R( ;A Alasc<>m or "lilt R( ;A applicants")
(;onmlunit:+lli_lns Satcllilc (;orporati_m and American "Ik'lcl>h,>nc and Tclcgral>]l
Conlllatly (C<mlsat/AT&T)
( ]onlmat
M(;I l,+,ckhccd Sittcllilc (:orporalion (M(;I l,<wkilccd)
Fairchild hldustrics, Inc. (Fairchild)
In ildtlilion, appli<'alions fi_r earth millions oillx were filc<l by:
Iiawaiiml "l+clcph<)tlc (;<_mimily
Twin ( ;_>unty Tran._-\'idc_>, hie.
"I'clcProull+Tcr ( '+t+rporati¢lil
I+V() (;at)It, Inc., and l.!tlitcd Vi<Ico, inc.
t)hociliX Salcllitc (;<>i[)or_itiotl
1+45i 2. (]OlliillClll.% ilild rcf)ly COil(lilt!IllS on (tic al)plir_tii(ins iiild iillC lii+tkill_, iSSlit,,_ wcit'
received tt+oln ihc +il)l)licaitlS alid </thor inlt'i+cSlcd parli¢'_. By a i'_ilciliOl-liilthiiil ()pinion
((lid ()rdt!i- i_i,'+ilCti Oil Miil+(tl i 7, 1972 (34 FCC 2d ] ), lilt' (;OltliliiS,Si<)li aff<)rdcd Ihc l)iirlics
ill] (>])[J()i-ltlilit)' l() file wrillcil COllllllClll_ itli4"t to I)(' hl'3ti'd orally Oil it tJi+ot)oscd _t'COll(1
Rt'i)tirl illid ()](tci (_'_4 F(;(] 2d 9) I+t'l'ollliilt'lldt,d t)y tilt" (;hict of lilt" (]_)llllll()ll (;ill'i'it'l"
Bltic_ttl (sial'l rc('llilliliCll(i_tli(lll). +lk(rillcil COlllIlI('III% WI'IC rcccivcd ;tlid oi-al itrgtililt'ill
I)cfiWc lilt' (]Olllilli+_iioil eli I)iili<" W+is held Oil May 1-2, 1{i72, _
{t. Upon col_sidcratioil _t Ihc ciilii+c record, wc +llt" _+>+ttiic xicw iil_il the slatT it,(Oiil-
liiCiid_ilioil _idCqilalt!ly dc,_cribcs iiic l)ackgroillld o[ this proeccding, ihc goiter+i] ii+illlrl' of
tilt" i)cnding aplilicalions, itlld the l)rcvi<lnsly tiled cOlnliiClii_ ((lid reply ('()tlllllClilP+ <)1" thc
I)arlit's (ill t|ic ai)])licalions +(lid rule lil+ikill_ is._lies. Accordingly, wc will itd<)pl ihc dcscrip-
tivc porliolis tit llic sl_li] YCi'oiilmt+i_ldalit)ll wiilioill rcilcraihl I snell illalt'ri+tl here.
I iowt+'_+rt, l ", its st+lied ill tile Mcllillrltlitiui_i Ol)iliiott and Ordcr of March 17, i972, lilly aCtioVi
lit d('+it._>llaliiig lilt sill'[' ri,c<liliiiicild_ilioil ii>r wrilicil _itid oral COil((lit'ill _+'+t+ t:<tkcli "l)ctT)rt'
rc_ichiill_ +ill)' dclcriliili+ilions iii It(is lliallcr" _ilid "tlicrc]orc (lots iiol rcticcl +lily t)rcdis -
t)<l+_iiitlil I)y lhc (]<)lllilli>_SiOli wilh l+csi)ct:l Io Ill(' rcsohlliOn ot +Iht' is,_tlt'_+ hlvolvcd" (34 F(;(;
7(1 _tl 2). The (;oinliiis,_ioii'n dl'lcriililililiorl,_, wiiich _iic sol torltl below, iliCOi'])<lrltlc lilt"
slafl"s i'Cil+Oilili_ iiild COll('hi_i<tll+ Oil lilt" isstics only as cxprcssl 7 hidicalcd iicrcin or i<l t)ic
cxl('iil It(at ihcy iir(' clearly c<lliSislcnt witi_ oiir st+tit+lilt+hiS of policy +tild c<)ilthi,_iitii.'+.
I. Till' I_+,+ cl+lilic_ +_ht+ had nt+! pit'vi_itl+,l) i)artit iil_llcd in this ]>riil t*cdilig wclc t4i+tliit'd Ic+i_t' it) bc
hc+lld <_i+lll'+: thc l)cli_llllllcllt _>! ]h'lcll',c ali<l illc NCI',+,Oi k l>l'+!+i'ct I'PC(; 72-++II+I).'I'hc nl<>iioll'.> <+I +,+ali_Jlis l]_lil+(i+
I+> (<_i ii'_ I lhc trilllSi" i ilJt _+I <_lal al gtllilCilt +li,_' liclcli) _l_tlltCi'l..%i>lllC ap])li< _ilil'+ hli'v<' st£1)llliltc+l '.,l_tlt'ttii'iil_,, v, itli-
<illl ]tit'<i' lIiilll the ( '+<inlniis+,i<,ll, llilrln wli'dl!, in hnthcr iCSli+)n,,c Io qucsli+)lls h<,n illdividlml It ;<mllni+,ni_+llcl + _li
tilt" _>t_il ;ll¼Uttlclit. Whih' such sl_tl+.'lilt'lll++ have bclt'tl l)la_c c<[ in thc t+cclird, ,,'+c di+ tii>l rclx oil if'lOll(+
I_2 TIlE HIST(}RY()F SATH,I,H'E (;()MMt'NI{;XI'I()NS
I1. INFRODU(TFORY I'OI,I('Y STATEMENT
4. As the Commission recognized in the 1970 Report (22 FCC 2(t at 88, 95-96), and
its ('onlil'lued hy the applications and responses filed pursuant to that Report, the satellite
technolog 3, has the potential of making signiticant contribulions to the nation's domestic
communications structure by providing a better means of serving certain of the existing
markets and developing new markets not now being served. There are concrete proposals
before us fi>r the use of commmfications satellites to augment the long-haul terrestrial
tacililies of existing carriers for point-to-point switched transmissions services, and lo con-
nect ,,ll:shoz'edistant domestic poinls (i.e., Alaska, l tawaii, Puerto Rico) to the corlliglzt)us
states. There are also proposals ti)l the use of satellites as a means of providing point-to-
muhip<fint services, su<:h as l)rogram transmission, although plans tbr such use are now
most tentative an<l uncertain. Other proposals retle<t the view that the most itnportall[
value of (lon_esdc satellites at lll_" present time lies in their potential for developing new
markets and for cxpan<ting existing markets t_)r specialized communicalions services.
5. Notwilhslan(liug the specific proposals that have been suhmiue<l, the true exlei'lI
and nature of the pul)lic henelit dmt satellites [8461 may prodttce in the domestic tiel<l
remains [sic] lobc ttcmonstrated. Tile United States has a well-developed and rapidly
expanding complex of terrestrial t_tcilities, anti advances in terrestrial lcchnolo_,n:, and
operalions can hc expected to colllilll.le thc presell! lrelld loward reduced lranslllissioll
costs and more efficient services. Although pointing to some increased operati<mal flexi-
bility in the rouling o[" its traffic, the prcdominam terrestrial carrier, gI'&T, disclaims that
the satellite technology' presently ott_-rs any cost sltvings or other marked aflvanlages over
terrestrial [acilities in the provision of the switched services that constitute the hulk of its
traffic, message toll telephone (MTI') and wide area telephone service (WATS). At the
same time, there is an tmcerlainty, that call only I>e res_dved t)y actual operaling experi-
ence, its to whether the time delay inherent in voice communications via synchronotls
satellites will provide an acceptable quality of service to the general put>lie when domes-
tic telephone traftic is r_)uted indiscriminately and on a large scale basis via satel]ile and
terrestrial facilities.
6. Although tilt" satellite technolog 3' at>pears to have greal promise _i immediate
pttblic benelh in the specialized communications market, hcre too there are uncertainties
as to how efli'ctivcly and readily satellite services can <levelop or penetrate that market.
Thus, in the area of point-to-multipoint transmission, the commercial broadcast netw_)rks
iu'e its yet undcci<ted as the whether to use this technologg, in whole or ill part. We do have
a concrete proposal flw a CATV network from Hughes, expressions of interest by public
broadcasting and other educational entities, and the possibility of interest by independent
supplies of program nmterial to CATV an<l broadcast outlets. Moreover, several system
applicants, in addition to seeking to attract program transmission husiness, have premised
their proposals on the sale of other specialized services--in part its a complemelH to exist-
ing or proposed terrestrial offerings, but in the main with tile expectation of expanding
cxisling special service markets and developing new markets. To be sure, the applications
generally do not i<lentit_' specific services that are new or ilm<>vative. HoweveL in <_.r i.dg-
meul, the uncertaill lies as to lhe nature and scope of the special markels and innovative
services that might be stimulated will only I)e resolved hy lilt"experience wilh operati<mal
facilities.
7. Under the circumstances, we will hc guided hy the fifllowing .bjeclives in fi)r/ntt-
lating the policies to govern our licensing and regtflation of the cons/ruction and use of
satellite systems fbr domestic communications purposes, namely:
(a) to maximize the opportunities for the early acquisition of technical, opera-
tional, and marketing data and experience in the use of this technolo_* as a
new communications resource fi)r all types of services;
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(b) to affi_rd a reasonahle opt)t)riuniiy for nluhiple entities t() demonstrate how
any operational and economic characteristics l)eculiar to the satellite tech-
nolog 7 can he used 1¢_provide existing and new specialized services more eco-
nomically and efficiently than can he done by terrestrial t_tcilities;
]847[ (c) to facililaie the efficient development of this new resomce by removing or
neutralizing existing institutional restraints or inhil)itions; and
(d) to retain leeway and tlexibilily in our policy making with respect to the use of
satellite technolog 7 for domestic communications st) as to make such adjust-
merits lherei|| as future experience and circumstances may (tit:tale.
8. We are further of ihe view thal muhiple entry is most likely to produce a trtfifful
denl(mslrali(>n of Ihc eXlel]l to which the salellite technt)lo,t 0' may t)c ||sed i(> provi(h"
existing and new specialized services more economically and efficiently than cau he tltme
by terrestrial lacililies. Thougl| specialized services constitule a relatively small percentage
of AT&T's total iraft]t, it is presently the predominant terrestrial supplier of specialized
services. There is some existing and potential competition fion| Western Uniorl and any
new specialized carriers authorized pursuant to the Comntission's decision in SpecializM
Common Crtrrier 5;ervices (29 FCC 2d 870). But the capacity of ihcir terrestrial f:acililies is
small compared to those of AT&T or the high capacity facilities proposed by the satelliw
syslein applicants.-' The preseiwe of competitive sources of supply of specialized services,
bolh among satellite syslem licensees and between satellite and terrestrial systems, should
encourage service and lechnical in||t)valion and provide an impetus for etfi)rts It) milii-
mize cosls and charges to the public.
9. ()f course, the inceulive fi)r competitive entry by financially respousil)le salellite
syslem enlrepreneurs to develop specialized markets must be meaningful and not just
token. This requires that we take appropriale measures toward the end that a reasonable
opl)orliuiily for effective entry is itot delkeated or weakened by AT&'I, either directly or
througb its existing or fiilure relationships with Comsat. In this regard, we cannot ignore
the eflk'cis upon achievement of our objectives that might result from AT&T's existing
economic strength and domiiiaiwe siemming from its permealing presence and influence
in all domestic communicalions markets. Nor can we ignore the ability of AT&T--an abil-
ily not possessed by other applicanls--to load a high capacity satellite system with MTT
and WATS traffic attd thereby control the cost of specialized services thrnished via thai sys-
tem. Other applicants, lacking a similar initial traffic nucleus, would be operating--at
leasI initially--with lightly loaded, costly facilities until such lime as they might succeed in
reducing their unit costs by a substantial specialized traffic till.
10. In addition, where AT&T combines its monopoly and competitive services on the
same t_acilities, it is difficult to identify AT&T relevant costs associated with specialized ser-
vices to insure that revelities from the monopoly services are not being used to subsidize
any part of its competitive services. Thus, if AT&T were permitted unrestricted use of
salelliles fi)r both monopoly and specialized services, this might obscure any meaningft|l
couiparison of operating costs between satellite and terrestrial facilities for the provision
of specialized services as [848] well as curtail any realistic opportunity fi_r entry by others
to serve the specialized markets s4a satellite.
1 I. We recognize that the problem of cross-subsidy now exists with respect to the
establishment of rates and identification of relevant costs for specialized services
ftirnished by AT&T terrestrially, ttowever, this longstanding problem would be exacer-
bated hy l)ermittiug the trt)ttblesome monopoly anti competitive service comhinati<ms to
7. '[tie (]omnlission has also aiilhorized terrestrial |_-I¢ilities Ill various nlisccllani.ous carriers pr¢_vidmg
prli_r;llll lrallSllliSSil)ll sclvi(c Io (],,'ItTV sy_;li-lll_; ;and broildc_l.fi, lt'rs,
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be carried over into this new arena. Moreover, the cross-suhsidy aspect is only part of tilt'
deterrent to a reasonable opp<)rtttnity for competitive satellite entry ill the specialized
field and, even if resolved+ wouht not overcome AT&T+s unique advantage of heing ahle
to c<)ntrol satellite circuit costs by the extent to which it chooses to h)ad the high capacity
satellite tacilities with telephone traffic while the specialized tield is being developed. +'
12. All of the foregoing tactors and concerils with resl)ect t<)AT&T, in onrjudgnwnt.
might well resuh in discourag'ing or deterring others t'ronl attempting to penelratc the
tnarkets for specialized services. /'_s a tinthee consequence, AT8+:T's dtmiinan<e in the
connnltnications field would be extended rather than lessene<t in the domesti( area. This
would dert)gale trtmt our policy <)f st'eking to prolnote an envir<,tmlent in which ttew sup-
pliers of ctlnmutnicalions services would have a bona fide opporttmity for competitive
entry. This pt)licy was the hasis toe our decision in the Specialized Common Carrier Service.s
proceeding (29 FCC 2(1 870). While this policy explicitly accomnlodates an opporttntity
for AT&T and other exisling carriers to c(,mpete 'Tully and lately" with new entrants, it
does not preclude the Commission ti<)m taking reasonable measttres to assure that com-
petitive entry would be a meaningtitl reality in the high capacity satellite field. Paragraph
104 of the ,S])ecialized Carrier decisi(m states: "We fttrther stress that our policy determina-
lion as to new specialized carrier entry terrestrially, (h,cs not at]oral any measure of pro-
tection against domestic colntntmications satellite entry or otherwise prejttdge our
deterniination in l)ocket No. 16495 ;is to what conrse would hest serve the puhlic interest
in the domestic satellite field" (_9 F(:C 2(I at 920).
13. The same c(,nsidcratit,ns h:ad us t(, (:(,nchtde that tilt, achievement (,f our (,I)jec-
lives wonld he prejudiced hy attthorizing the (:omsat/ATScT prol)osal based (,n their con-
tractttal arrangement. First, since AT&T is a principal sonrce of the donlestic service
reventte that Comsat would seek to ot)tain, it is not realistic to expect (]onlsa! to (:onq)ete
vigorously in the provision of specialize(I services on an end-t(_+nd or "retail" basis and
thereby challenge AT&T's terrestrial domination in this field. Secondly, if (:omsat should
proceed in the dual capacities pr(,pose(t in its two t)ending systetn applications, Ill(. rev-
enues that would be guaranteed to Comsat fi-om tilt + ATSeT contractual arrangement
wottld give it an extraordinary advantage and head start over all other potential domestic
satellite entrants seeking to deveh,p specialized services in competition with (]omsat as
well as with AT&T's I849] terrestrial services. If Conlsat were given tile option of serving
A'F&T soley [sic] and accepted it, sttch a course wottl(I tntnecessarily deprive <,thers of the
I)enefit nfComsat's expertise in the commttnications satellite field. If Comsat were to elecl
to serve t>nly entities other than AT&T, its expertise and facilities would he available to the
public and carriers other than AT&+E Bitt if Comsat is to he authorized to provide satel-
lite services to AT&T, it sholtld operate exclusively as a carrier's carrier--not engaged in
retailing communicati<,ns services to the ptfl)lic--and provide snch service under a tariff
ot/k+ring which would afford an opporttmity for other carriers to haw" non-discrinfinatory
access to tile same system.
14. Finally, our consideration (,f the conditions under which AT&T and (:(,msal
shoitld he permitted to enter the d<)mestic satellite field is necessarily affected by AT&T's
ownership (,f 29 percent of (:ntnsat's stock and its ability to elect three of the 15 Cotnsat
directors. Such ownership was contemplated and encouraged by the Ctmgress in enacting
the Cotntntmicalions Satellite Act <,f 1969 (see Section 394(b)(2)). Thus, this is n(,! a mat-
let- <,ver which (:omsat has any control, l-h,wever, that Act, which was fornntlated to meet
2a. We rcto'gnizc tha! XI'ScT, in its oftrrings o| ,+pecializcd sol vices, ma_, .i.t, toe raw pttrp,_ses, di+,tin+
gtfish I+t're,+t't'n specialized sefvit <+s providcd via satellite on thc one hand, and Irflcstrial tacilities on thr oilier
hand, and Ilium solnewhal alh+viate the compclitivc problem. However, we I)rlirve that il will from a i<'gulah>r_,
stmxt|pt>iut t t)mplicatc a del'illilivt" coltlpari'+ola between the relative c_)s+ m+Jd olhcr ;I(]Yi_tllta_t'_i O| Sattqlitt" alld
tcrft'slrial tacilitics in serving tile comt>ctiti'+c market [bf spc( ializrd scfvit cs.
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the naticm's poli(ic's and ot)iv(livcs with r('specl to Ill(' ('arli('sl possihle cslahlishm('nl of a
glohal communications salcllilc systc.|n, (hu's sol l)rcchulv amhorized carriers from rob
untarily disposing of Iheir shares of (:omsal slo(k. _All ot lh(" m_jor carriers who original-
lv owned (:omsal stuck, cx('('l)l XF&T, have since divcsu'd their iiHerests. Whilc lhc
particil)alion of ('xpcric||c('d (arHc]s had a useful thncli,m when (:omsal was n('wly orga-
niz('d and gaining con|n||unicalions VXlmriencc, Ihis rclalionshi I) WalTallls I(.as_('SSlll('lll ill
light of (urr('nl condilkms.
15. Aside from lhc lore'going hasic consi(leralions of Ihirness and ('quily we teatIbm
lh(" slaftr(Tommmldali()n in thww (dmu]lip](" enlry. In Ihis (onnc(lion il is iml)(Trla|ll als.
Io lake (_gnizancc" oF lh(" lacl Ihal Ihe inilial impl(mlenlali(m of don|('slic salellilcs (hws
II()l ('()ll[l'()lll IIS wilh a n()llnal cq- roulin(" situation. SOlll(. d(.1)alllll('s from (o|p,'(,ntio|lal
slan(lards may h(' |cqui|cd if Ihc puhlic is to realize lhc l)Ol('nlial hcnetils of tt/is high
cal)avivy u'chnolok,?, and we arc to pursue our oh.icctivc of c_Tml)t.tiliv(. ('HII'V. This is uuc
sol only in Ill(' cas(' of AT&'I: hul also tot olher al)plicanls ht.ca||sc of dittmt.|lv taclots. For
eXaml)h', as Ihc slaff ])oinls _ml, lh(" capacity proposed hy lll()s[ sys[('lll applicanls suhslan-
niallv t'xce_'ds lh(' lrafli( un(l('r their control ()r fi|m (:uslomer commilmcnls. Tht'x arc rely-
in g primarily on Sl)V(ulafw husint'ss which they hol)e will malerialize atIra Ihv tacililics
h('com(' operational. We illllSl, of ((Ttll'Se, lltake lhe refluisil(" slallllOl-V tin(lings as 1_7an
alTl)li(-arH's t]nan(i;-i] (]llalil](alion and ahilily I() hnpl('nmnl its proposal, and w(" can
I('qllir(' a Fl,as()llabh" showing lhal lhele will he 1117a(IV(.lSC' iltll)a(l on ia|t's o1 s(,rvi((.s I(7
(vslomcrs oF ca|Tier alll)licanls now engaged in providing ('ssenfal communications ser-
vi((,,,; I() Ih(' Imblic. Bul if we adhe|e mo slriclly Io co|wcnliona] slandar(ls in Otis UlWOn-
vt'nti_mal silualion, su(h as requiring a persuasive showing h:, new entlalllS thai
( ompclition is rvas<mahlv t<tsihh" and that the anticipated market can economically sup-
l)o|t its prop<Tsed [8501 facilili,ps, most such flew apl)licanls may in cft('cl h(! denied any
opporttmity to detnonslrat(' the merits ,_7t"their proposals at lhcir own risk and wilhout
p<_lenlial dangers to cxislin,g services----thereby depriving the puhlic of the potcnlial hen-
cths to hc d('rived tionl diverse apl)v<)aches by multiple entrants. It is ot||-judgment that
Ill( +pol(.nlial t)en('lils to _t_("puhlic warrant tit(" application {71yules and policies which will
atlbrd a veasonahl_' opt)ormnity tot domestic satellite Iitcililics to h(" cslahlished iniliallv.
on a connpetilive basis, h is also necessary to retain t]exihilily to ahcr our initial (lelernfi-
nalion in Ill(' li,u,hl of evolving (:ircumstances.
II!. I)ETERMINATI()N ON THE ISSUES
,4. Number q/,9,stems to be authorized initially'
16. iu lighl of th(" tor('going policy ohjectives, we have (oncluded lhal liw puhlic
inlcVc'sl would be b,t.st served at this initial stage by affording a reasonahle (:,pp(Trtunily fi)r
('ntry by (lualiticd apl)licanls both pending and new, suhjecl 1o Ihe showings and con(li-
ti_ms (h's(rihcd h,.'low which we helieve to be necessary to implemenl our objecliv('s and
I() I)|(71('('t the puhlic. W(" have reached this decision after consideration of lit(' vari()us
all('rnaliv('s discussed in the slaff recommendation (paragraphs 45-78) and Ih(' views
cxpr('ssed hy lh(' parlies.
3. hHh'cd, in 1969 (:_mg_(._s an_e)l(le(l tim 1(,)62 A_t to pro_id(' fi _v I('wvr common _an Her ('1('( I_'d (ti_'( -
II)lS ill l)_Ol_ovti(m to llH'ii (h'( H'ase in st(_( k own('rshil> in (',omsal {-17 I'.N.(:. 73:';). This schedule ((mlCml)lal('s
Ihal Ih(' I)('H ('lHaRv _d (,mml_m ( al nit'l slo(k owuct ship ma', tall b('low ('ighl pcl( ('hi, in _hi_ h mvna th('i (" _umhl
I)c' II1)(]il'('('l(ll "_, ('le(ll'(l t)'_ ((HIIIIIIIll (;11 I i('lN,
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17. lake the sta[t'and most parties, we think it unwise to attempt to select or prescribe
one system (either a consortitmi of all the applicants or selection of one applicant) or to
choose one or more systems through comparative hearings. In addition to the reasons
given by the staff (staff recommendation, paragraphs 50_1), which we adopt, such a
course wonld not promote our policy ohjectives discussed above, ttowever, we arc not
accepting the alternative recommended by the staff (paragraphs 71-78) or requiring of
encouraging consolidations of applicants along guidelines prescribed by the Commission.
While we recognize that there may well be advantages to and need tot vohmtary consoli-
dations or sharing arrangements (st, oh as "launch risk pools") undertaken at the appli-
cants' initiative as a matter of prudent business judgment, we do not deein it advisable to
structure the architecture of arty joint space segment operations. Rather, we will permit
and encourage such arrangements so long as they arc consistent with the policy condi-
tions set forth herein. Accordingly, we will accord the system applicants a 30-day period
within which to apprise the Commission as to whether they intend to pursue their pend-
ing applications, as modified to achieve compliance with this Second Report and Ord_, or
whether they desire fltrther time to reframe their proposals.
18. Our decision in favor of muhiple entry does not mean that we have opted for a
policy of "unlinfited or unrestricted open entry." Our aim, as outlined above, is to afford
qualilied applicants a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate the public advantages in use
of the satellite technology as a means of communications. But such entry ca,mot be
"open" in the sense ttmt it is without any restrictions or limitations. Pursnant to statute we
nntst require showings of financial, technical and other qualification and make the req-
uisite finding that a grant of the particular proposal will serve the public interest, con-
[851] venience and necessity. Ahhough, as discussed in paragraph 15 above, it is our
intention to make such determinations with due regard for the uni¢lue circutnslanccs
involved here, each applicant lnttst lnake a sufficient showing of potential public bene|]t
tojustit}' tile assignment of orhita] locations and frequencies. Moreover, we believe it nec-
essary to impose certain conditions to protect the public front possible detriment and to
further the implementation of our policy objectives. In addition to the conditions dis-
cussed helow, we will require a reasonable showing by any contmon carrier applicant now
engaged in providing essential commtmications services that revenue reqttirements relat-
ed to the proposed domestic salellite venture will not be a burden or detriment to cus-
tolners fiZll-Sllch essenlial services ....
IV. ORDER
[860] 44a. Authority tor the policies and conditions adopted herein is contained in
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(i) and (j), 2t)1, 202, 212, 213, 214, 218, 219, 220, 301, 303, 307-309,
310(h), 319, 396, 41)3 and 605 of the (:tmmnmications Act of 1934 and Sectiolt 102 and
21) 1(c) (8) of the Connnunications Satellite. Act of 1962.
,t5. Accordingly, IT IS ORI)EREI), That:
a. The policies and conditions set lorth herein, and such portions of the slaft
recommendation (34 FC(_ 2¢1 9) its are expressly approved or clearly consis-
lent with the policies and conditions herein, ARE AI)()PTEI), eltk'ctive .]ttly
25, 1972.
1). Each of the applicants [br (tomeslic communications satellite systems named
in paragraph I above, SItAI.I. APPRISE TIlE C()MMISSI()N on or t)etiH-c
,July 25, 1972, as to whether it inlends to ])tlrSl.te its pending systetn applica-
tions, in whole or in part, with such modifications as are required to achieve
compliance with the policies and condilions specified in this Second Report
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and Order; or whether it desires additional time for tile purpose of refram-
ing its proposal consistently with such policies and conditions)'
The Commission retains fill jurisdiction over all aspects of this proceeding.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Ben E Waple, Secretary
DISSENTIN(; STATF.MENT BY CHAIRMAN BURCI I
In lhis proceeding, lhe Ctmnnission is dealing with matters of extraordinary com-
plexity and even subtlety. We are called on to establish ground rules for an industrial tech-
nolog T that does not yet exist, to serve some present markets and st)me that are at best
speculative--and most di[ficult of all, the interrelationships between flw two. The policy
decisions thus arriw'd at are not in the usual sense definitive: rather, they represent "sig-
nals" 1o Ihe applicants that will cause them to reformulate their proposals, and these in
turn will ahnost surely not be the same as those with which the Coinnfissitm is here t)slen-
sibly dealing. Our objective is Io engraft a new and untested technology' onto an existing
domestic communications complex, whose characteristic problems are essentially inde-
penden! of satellite technology per se.
In approaching such a maze of unpredictables and potential pit[hlls, the Commission
would haw" heen well advised to adopt a posture of "least is best" (thus making only those
dccisitms necessary to elicit lhe applicants' genuine intentions), to build fi+om the base ot +
irreducible marketplace realities (namely, AT&T traffic), to discipline itself [861] against
the mmptatiort to piggyt)ack on this already complex policy finding its favorite regulatory
schemes and hangups (tbr example, the desire to "get a handh" on AT&T'), and to offer
all applicants a maximum of options (which might well lead to the evolution of a com-
petitive marketplace in which t}lc consumer will benefit). As a general proposition, I
believe the Connnission has violated every one of these counsels of caution.
And 1o whose real benefil? Thal is most difficuh to say. For, although lhe thread runs
lhrough lhe majority document thai its key findings have been made in lhe interest of
"competition," somewhere along the line the overriding purpose of the competitive mar-
ketplace seems to have gotten lost: namely, benefit to the consumer in the fiwm of better
and/or cheaper goods and services than would otherwise he available. Instead, the
(:ommission has gone off in pursuil of a peculiar and novel form of compelitionImea-
sured, so tar as one can tell, by how many satellite systems go aloft in how many "space seg-
ments" (a benchmark thai [ strongly suspect would strike the typical consumer as
irrelevan! even if he conld grasp its meaning). "Space segment" competition may, of
('f_,lll'Se, Iranslate into consumer benefit one day. Then again it may nol. It all depends--
and it is here that the nt_iority document leaves pragmatic reality behind and takes off
into the bhte sky of academic abstraction. For example:
(a) There is repeated retk+reoce (see in particular par. 10 and fn. 2a) to "meaningful '+
and "definitive comparison" between the relative costs "and other advantages" of satellite
technologw as against terrestrial facilities in providing comnumications services to Ihe
public--most of which services are nol unique to satellite technolog T anyway. This is ttsed
as at pritu+ipal rationale for imposing inhibitions on AT&T, tot example. 1 agree thai such
"basing point" ctmlparisons are desirable. But this proceeding is not tnere academic exer-
cise. Tens ot millions of investment dollars are involved, and so are services to the con-
suming put)lic--present and near-term as well as fimtre. In my,judgment, there is an
I I. trptm considcrati(ms o[ suth rcspons,:s, lhe Commission will issue a pul)lit hi,lice ctmt t'rning, tilt'
pr_)t _'duH's wc will fi)llow in processing applicati_ms.
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excessive trade-oil of present and ncav-tcrnl bcnctits t<_r mostly sp<'cnlativc I<mg[-lvangc
Ih'veh)[)nlcnts that, in any case, tnav bca wash from the consumers' perspective.
(b) Other inhibitions and l¢'striclions ave rationalized (scc in particular pars. !t and
11 ) ¢)n tilt' gtottnd that AT&T's "lmiqut" advantage" ()f bcing ahlc to lill salcllilc (al)acitv
with existing and l)tediclahlc li.mn-c traffic will incvital)ly t.)rodu¢c "unlait" c_>ml)ctition
and som,.,h<:,v dissct+vt • the public. I find this ,Ul ironic twist inth.,.+d--lhat "sttcct.ss" is to I)('
p<:,mlizcd tathcr than rewarded and that (+c()ll<)lllit"+ <)l' stall" must I)¢' l_)vt'sw<_r+1 as ilICf)ll-
sistcnt with it thc<)r('li('al triode] of pure Conlpctition (fi)1 traffic thai is m()stly a glcanl in
P.;Ol11("spccul;ttovs' _:ycs). "l'hc (_o111111is,iOll would hilv(' l)t't'll l)t'lltw advised, in inv vi+:w, t()
take existing traflic as a "given" and then allcml)l to builtl l]-otn there--with salc'gllalds,
;is spcciticd in the +:arlit_r St_cc:ializ_+d (_()nltnon (_allicl decision, against tmdtl(+ donli-
nance of 0wsc Sl>ccialized nmrkcts l)y <:xisting cat-vi_:vs. This might have r<:dotmdctl to th('
imme(tiatc bcnclit <+f the consuming public, availahh, alik<: to AT&T's cttstotn,t'rs and t<)
its ('Olnpt+tit()t's', in II1¢ fi_,rm of htwest unit costs.
(+) The (;omnlissi<m m+tjovity, by contrast, stands the usual notms of 18(+21 conq>cti-
tiOll <)tl th,_'i1 h,.'ad. 111 its attempt to "structttre" the mal-ketplacc rathtw than pc1mit full
and t+air co]nl)Clition b¢lwct:n new and t'xisting carric'rs, thc (_(mltnissi()n in ct]_'ct ignorcs
its sound c<mlmitment in tilt' Specialized (_otntno,l Carrier d,ucision not t<+ cvcalc any
"l)VOlt'ctiv<: tln11)v,t'lla" fiw nt'v,' entrants oi "any ,utificial hi)Isletlag of opt'rations that calf
It(It succeed <)n their own inerits." Thus, AT&T is pre(htd<:d fiotn providing l)oint-to-p<fint
l)1ivate-li,le s,_'rviccs via satcllitc--+:ven though, as the majority a<:kil()wlcdgcs, +'<)th<_+rappli-
cants, lacking al n] inilial Ira|tic mwhqls, v,,'<ndd l)t+ operating with lightly loaded, costly
t_wilitics." All of which pvcsulnably means that Ihc" consiHner will have to pay artiticiall('
intlated talcs till + specialized services dltring an initial three-year dew'lopmenlal pc,+i<)d
(unless I)v Icvrcstrial t_wililics alone, wholly in line with tht" "frill and t_dt"" competitive
entry lilrmuhl <if the carlicr decision, AT&T is al)h' to undcrscll its C<llnl)elitors anyway).
And fuvthcr, hccausc the nmiority docunwnt is Ol:,en-,t.ndcd (see par. 21), this initial peri-
od could 1)c cxtenth.d ad h_finilum at the (_onlnlission's sole discretion. Again, tl+¢qc is tilt'
question "who I)cnctits"--cxcept possibly the st<lckholdcvs <lt+a fi.,w specialized cart-lets
operating in a protcctt.d markctplac,:, and all ill the nn,ch abused name of "COml)etiti<m"'.
My ovcrt+iding concern is not so much that this dccision will lead to irrational rcsttlls
as that il may lead to ,io rcsulls at all that will bc of substantial pul+lic I)¢ncfil. It is doubly
ironic, in view of tilt' maj<)tiLv's determination to inhil)it AT&T and that company's own
(lownbcat pr<_jeclions as It) tile cost/bcnclits of satellite lcclltn_hlh% that AT&T may in tlw
elld simply apply tbr a satellite system of its own. Alld l:,<.'laus+: its ,nonop<>ly S¢'l:vices--
MTT, X_%+I'S, AUTOV()N--constitute thc vast pv<:l)ondcranc<: of l)rt'st'nl tt-affic, an AT&T
systt, ln is thc only OtlC that could conccival)ly achicvc an immediate fill and thus Ct)llt'lu-
sivelv dcm<_nstratc its ccononlic viability.
The big loscv set'ms to I)e tile one applicant with gcnuin<: cxpclicnce in sl)acc-scgment
nlanagclnCnt--llatnely, Comsat. By rqiccting tilt +AT&T/(;<)lnsilt contractual atrangenlcnt
out of hand, rather than attaching +vndition.+ that might ePtcout7t[.rethe evolutio++ O[leal competitiott,
the Comnlissi<m nlajority has reduced Comsat's et+t_'¢tivc choice t<) one: that is;, clotting to
l)ccome an end-to-end rclail carriel; But cvcn here, tilt+ opti<)n is nlotc apparent than real.
Bttfatlst_P of a seemingly inIl()(:tic,11s sc11[(+11(+(• at the cnd of l)al ".2[i ("In the (-vt'nt thal ( ',omsat
elects to l)i+<)(:(+(.clothc1 than ;is a carri('r's carrier, it will l)e prohibited l]onl owning <)v <>per-
ating domestic satellite l_wilitics at any overst'as p<fint served by INTFLSAT l_acilities (stal]
vcconmlendalion, paragraph 114)."), Comsat would l:,t" barred li+om serving any nonc()n-
tiguous staR' oi territory, would lose its present Iraflic to tht'sc points (alinost all ,_I which
is Ira|tic to the nlainland), and wolthl ])c left will1 virtually u11uliliz('d "whitc clcl)hant" t'arl]1
stati<)ns in Alaska, I lawaii, and Puttt<) Rico. S<mlc o])ti<)n.
The other option--l)<:conling a carrier's CalTicr and IcasiHg tl+ansl)<>ndIrs <)t_ tariH to
:111tOtllt,1-_;, including Nl'&T--is in thc cad AT&'I+'s thoicc and not (;omsat's al all. And my
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own strong conviction, ill view of tIlt' decision as here finmnlated, is thai AT&T will not so
cho_se. Why should it, in ctt_.!ct, subsidize its own colnpetition--and conlpetition operat-
ing trader a protective umbrella at that--by [863] filling idle satellite capacity with the
only substantial traffic now availabh'?
There is, in all can<lot, no ideal solution to this prohlcnt. Our job is to c<>me up with
the best ahernativc available=--and I make no apologies lor thus relying on marketplace
realities in an elTort t_ bring to the consuming public some triune<litre benefits of a new
lechnoh)gy. In my view, the answer is to be found in an approach that afthms in essence
the AT&T/Comsat contractnal arrangement but then attaches to it one critical con<titi<)n:
namely, thai (;omsal, with its unique technical and managerial expertise, also provide
satellite service to those entities who, lacking the initial nucleus of assured traltic, might
be unwilling <)r tmahle to risk the huge invesllneHt iIc(essary to launch salellite facilities
of their own. As an ahernative, (;omsat should be tice to elect the route of an end-to-end
retailer.
The majority attempts to "structure" behavior largely t>y recourse to penalties and
blue-sky "models" o[ pure competition. But the proposal before use, in my judgment, suf
t_:'rs t_"o_n two t_tla] t]aws: it nmy retard the evolution of satellite lechnol<_b, _, not get it
going, anti it nlay thus withhold realistic benetits to the public. The (:ommission can and
IllllSl (lo better than that.
((;ommissioncrs Rci<l and Wilcy join with Chairman Bnrch in this Dissenting
Start'merit.)
(X)N(:URRIN(; OPINION OF COMMISSIONER NICttOIe_.SJOttNSON
The Commission now arrives at the <tenouncement of this seven ye:tr old proceeding.
An examination of the plot of this story, and its several acts, giw+s a revealing insight to the
policymaking process at the F(;C.
Domestic satellites became a p_dicy question at the FCC, not l>ccause of Commission
action, but with lhc tiling ola proposal for domestic salelJite television network intercon-
nection by ABC in September 1965. To examine the important policy questions belin-e
taking definitive action, the (]ommission returned the ABC application and instituted an
inquiry. 31 F.R. 35t17 (March 2, 1966).
In response to the inquiry, the Ford Fonndation filed a proposal in August 1966 link-
ing the financing of public broadcasting to the institution of domestic satellite service.
Under the Ford plan, the savings in interconnection costs would he used to finance pub-
lit broadcasting as a "people dividend" from the $40 billion of puhlic expenditures to
dew'lop the space technolog T that made the satellite system possible. This was a proposed
alternative use of the savings--rather than flowing them through to networks' profits, or
lower costs to users and their customers. J. Dirlan and A. Kahn, "The Merits of Reserving
the (;,)st-Savings fiom Domestic Communications Satellites for Support of Educational
Television," 77 Yale L:I. 494 (1968).
The FCC responded with a filrther notice of inquiry. 31 ER. 13763 (()ctober 20,
19661. In February 1967 President Lyndon Johnson proposed the legislation that later
becalne the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. And in April 1967 (]Olnsat proposed a pilot
domestic satellite system to demonstrate the potential and benefits of satellites, including
their use ti,r public broadcasting.
[8641 On Augus! 14, 1967, President Johnson announced the lormation of a Task Force
to review a variety of telecommunications policy qnestions, including domestic satellites.
This began what was to become a three year review by the Executivc Branch o[ intportam
policy questi,,ns before the F(;C in this arca. By late 1968 the Johnson Task Force had
c<nnpletc<l its work witll a reeornrnendatkm that a Comsat-directed pilot program he
attfllorizcd. In early 196!1 the F(:(; was prepared to authorize such a pilot program. A
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rep<)rtandorderhadbeendrafted,andtentativexpressionsof thepositionof eachConmlissionerhadbeenmade.
Befineissuingit, however,then-ChairmanHydetookthedocumentto theWhite[lousetoinlormthe White I louse stall of the action tilt: (;ommission was to take. In the
interml there had been a change in Administration, and the inR_rmation-providing trip
resuhed in a reqt,est that the Commission hold any action while the White House once
again examined the policy questions.
The White House recommendations, lot an "open_'ntry" policy, came in a January
1970 memorandum trom Peter Flanigan toChairman l)ean Burch. In March 1970 an F(:(';
Report and Ordel, 22 EC.C. 2d 86, concluded that ill) decision could be made on the
appropriate policy tor domestic satellite entry and specific prol)osals ti-om potential
entrants were requested. Tile next Comnfission order, and tile staffs recommended deci-
sion came in March 1972.
Today's action seems to signal the end. Open entry is adopted with certain moditica-
tions. The benefits to be realized by public broadcasting are, at this point, speculative.
There are several interesting conclnsions to be drawn about the (]onnnission's rote in
policymaking at least for domestic satellites.
(1) The (]ommission has relied heavily on tile parties appearing before it for the
analyses and proposals it has considered. Ahhough there is ill) read|h, available way to
make an exact calculation, I suspect that most of the important parties'appearing before
the Comnfission have invested significantly more resources, each, on Ihese policy ques-
tions than has the Connnission in total. This seems particularly true till+ tile Executive
Branch. The Connnission has been a "captive," responding to and arbitrating between the
variety of forces which have attempted to move it.
(2) The relative congruence between Comnlission action and White House recom-
mendation, occurring over periods of significant shifts in policy, is striking. The ability of
the Commission to move in variance with White ttouse positions on important policy
questions (regardless of who is President) is very questionable.
(3) The effects, benetits and costs, of both regulation and delay would be worthy ofa
detailed analysis. Suppose ally entrant, including ABC, had been able to launch a satellite
system in 1965 by merely "purchasing" the needed resources, inchlding spectrum.
Suppose die Conmfission had gone ahead with a pilot program authorization in early
1969. _rhat would have been the results of these---_)r other alternatives---on services, tecl_-
nology deveh)pment, and so forth? Are we better off, or worse today? Shonld tilt' dome.++ -
tic satellite question have been handled diffe,'ently, and if so, what can we learn about
[865] handling other policy questions before this and other governnlental agencies that
engage in an economic planning function?
(4) Over and over again the Commission meets the question of melding COml)etitive
and monopoly portions of tile teleconnnunications common carrier industry. The issues
were joined in the Telpak and other hulk ofliwing and privam line proceed|Jigs, and are
still tmt-esolved. They are met again in tile relati<mships between monopoly landline tele-
phone companies and miscellaneous carriers who offer a variety of land mohile services
in c<)mpetition and monopoly in communications equipment and interconnect|on. They
are met in the pricing questions surrounding the entry of specialized competitiw, carri-
ers. And they are met here in tile treatment, particularly of AT&T and Comsat, <)f certain
entrants for dolnestic satellite services. The issues remain unresolved.
Given these limitations, 1 believe the staff work and ultimate Conmlission position put
torward today is much better than anyone had a right to expect. Acc<)rdingly, as a realist,
I concur.
Because of the significance of the policy, however, perhaps a few m<)re words regard-
ing my own preferred approach to decision would be appropriate.
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_" are entering into a new are;t of communications. The nexl few years will be y¢'ms
of experilllellt_l|i()ll ;ti1(1 g;itherillg o[ ex[)eriellc('. It's iioi Ill,It we don't kFtow how to
launch and opt'rate ;I satellite. (',<mlsat, NASA, the military, mid numcr_tus Avntqican corn-
parties haw" a great deal of" expertise in this ticld.
But we h_lve no experience with lhc non-iet:hnical aspects of this <_peration. Will the
public toh,r_tw the short delay, or ¢'cho elt_:ct, in voice (+OIIlllllllli('itliOll_ by' satclliw? Whal
nt".v inslit.ti<m;d (and l>ossibly pcrsonM) uses of c¢lnirt+ttili(_iti<ms will cvolw" Io list' dw
FW<uli;ir q.+dilies <ff s:)wlliw dislribulion systems (cheaper ]ong-l);+u] <<_sts+ F,ossibilily ot +
)t)ttltildc distrib)ition points, and so tilrth)? What problems will arise inj<>int ol+<:);itio)ls ill
sale]litcs, or of e_Htll stall(ms? _v_:hat new ratemaking or regHlalt/ry cfmce])ts kind i)root `-
d).es will be net,ded?
(1) Accordingly, l still Ilelicve there is some nterit to the idea of a i)ilot prl!ject at this
stag(,. Ralht'r tit,)t) |)ave il f_l+Ci,)tt'd by _1.chosen compat)y ((;<mtsat, ,,YI'&'I'. stnnc tither prc-
scnt c<ml[)any, (it a new eltlitv), hov.]cver, I would h;l,¢e it operated Ily NASA nr sonic olhtw
('|)lily of gov('rlllli(!lll. This is not slwh ki radic;d idea. It is the '+,,'ay every f)lher n;tliOl) in the
world has dealt with the llr<d+hqn. And most have resolved |lit' iss)te long l)(,filrc us. It is
Ill<." w;Q', ill i_)tl, lh_il wt, rtlll ()tit Sll_)cc + prt)grant. It is tile way wc ¢'volvc )ww techntdogy in
tl)_lllV ;l)eils ,t)i" the et'(lllO))ly. All(l, eVell ;Is It) sp;Ice coll)ll)ttt)i<.;itiflllS s:ttclliws, lh(' inililary
and NASA halve ;ihc;tdy <Jper;tled Silt-l) systems+
All I would prfq+ost" is that Ik)r lhe first genera|loll of,t'Xl)crienc<: (3 It) 7 +v('ars) a Iml) -
lit cntit'+' tmdertake the eli, oration of Anwrica's first domestic conlnnunicatitlilS satellite svs-
l(+li) i]')r lht' benefit el all l+Otelllial tisers and operators. Every eff<irt would bc made to test.
at test, any rc;tst)n_tl>le p,<il)osal fi-tlm any Aster|call company, institution, t)r individual.
The results fit ;ill tests would l)e nl;ide frilly open I¢) any interested i)m-t) ', "|'raining opp<ii-
l tiliili('s wi)iilt[ tit' till|de a'+';iil- l_661 ;lille Ill as iiian 7 il)lt, resiod persoiis i++s l)<lssible. This
wottld s;ive a llelitt'i)(ioti_; ;|tilt)+lilt ()[ Illo)ley liil" Alnt'iicait I)llsiness, ;is well as lilt + pul)lic,
;i)id Opel) tip thc p<lssibility ol a g)+l'lit deal litOrl, ilSC (;tltd cot)lpetition--if Ill;it's wh;tl
w+_"l'<" P+e+'d[y i)lte)'cst<.'d i)i) Wilt'it Ih(" svstl'lil t)t" syste/iis itle fi)l_l]])' esl_ii)lished Oil ;t (O)ll-
)1) ('|(ill] basis.
I ])live ill,tall! ibis pli+lJOS;i] Ihrollgi)Ollt my six year lerlli ;it the (]oinn)issioi). ]i h;is
)lt.vt,)- rt+ceivcd ltlt+ _;ii|)l)Orl ()t' liic +v4¢iiile HoliSe or it m;ljority <it the (]oiniiiissioners. Thert'
is little doubt in niv lni)id lhal we would be mticii tilrther down the road today if it had
bee)l adopted in 1966.
(2) If lhere is itol to t)e _ili experimental sy+lein, there is ntiich io be said for;t choseii
iliSli'ilnle)ll. A single sy+t<.'il3 oper;itor c_ln instire economies ot so+liP, tTth- ;ind Ol)t+n _i(ct's+
ill all COlliers, tile hiwesl p<lssil)le rales, ;ttld the |)lOSt geographically disbursed syslelll
(incltldilig, t<)r cxa))iplt,, tilt' llest service It)Alaska, H;twaii and so fiirlh).
My t)rl'l('rcllce woiiid t)e to creale a new eniity--a DoillSai--t(lr doinesiic s_ltellile ser-
vi¢¢'s Ol)lV, lit;At wotild I)+tv(" ever)' illcelilive Ill c<ltllpete fillly with ATDT. No ('_irrier w<ltild
1)¢. tit.r)i)illt.d Io hold siock in the company or sit oil the board (;ilt|lOil_h, <)f Coilrse, indi-
vi<i)l;li sha)chold(+rs Co|lid |)old Mock in AT&T ;|lid l)o])ls;tl)+
Anol|wr alternative WOtl]d be to give AT&T a nlonop,r)ly over d<)lliestic satellite ser-
vice. AT&T is nf_w having sonic growing pains even keeping tip with expanding service on
earth. But AT&T exchisive olleralion in space would have lhc adwil_lagc that ;ill users--
inchlding Iht! homet)wner--wcmld get some benefil from the new technolo_', which will
i)flw t]flw _tltnost exchlsively to large corpf)rate users of satellites. If this were done, AT&T
shotild l)rllllably W:ilil Io ])e required io provide such service thr<lttgh a separate coi-por_lte
t.ntily t0r ptlr])os('s ()| I)ookkeeping (as its currenl Colpor;lle practices wotlld hid|talc il
would pr¢+ballly w;tnl It) do iin)_,+,'iiy).
(;<)llis;il CO|lid ;lls<l i+c ihc ch<_sen illsi)liilit'ill.. It does I)_iv_' lhe exiwriise. Bttl it tv_)llld
n<)l it;tvc ill(" ;idv_lill;ig('jitsl described I|l;tl A']'<_JcT would tl_tVe--,¢irltl_i]ly nloltOpoly [olllr()]
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oF all U.S. conmnmications on tile ground ior purposes of rate averaging. Moreovei,
Comsat has additional problems as an internalional operative. At one time l urged that
intelsat be encoreaged to become a truly international commtmications carrier, supply-
ing domestic <ommtmicafions services ti>r tile world as well as internationally, h seemed
Itl ill( all apl)rofmate, and symbolic, i)eaceful Vell|ltFe |OF IlaliOllS ill need of till('. Bill that
idea never caught till either. St) lit)w, it seems, we art, doomed to a world in which every
nation must have not only its own airline, merchant marine, and steel mill, bul its owl'1
domestic slttellite system us well. Given such a world, however, it seems to me inappropri-
;tle tot (]omsat--aheady carrying the burdens of Big Brotherism into its international
meetings--to have to conliont its world partners with Ihe potential conllicts of interest
(and division of managerial energies) involved in operating the world's most lucrative
domestic slttellile system.
(3) If we are nol to have an experimental system or a chosen instrument, Ix'cause of
a deistic reverence ti, competition, then we ought to really have competition. I'm remind-
ed of the children's riddle: 1867] "Where does an 8002pound gorilla sic(F,?" And the
answer: "Any lilac( he chooses." True competilion is one of Ihe most highly regulated
states of economic operalion possible. Thal's what the antitrust laws are all about--when
they're enforced. }ira either keep the 8<)0-pound gorilla (in Ihis cast" the $18 billion Bell)
oU[ of !lie canary cage entircly, or you tell him where t, sleep.
If we're really serious about experimenting with the radical notion of ti+ee private
enterprise, I'm ;111tier it. Bul then there have to be some very meaningful restraints on
AT&T and Comsat--at the very least in the initial stages. ()tile(wise, we're just kidding
omselves--thottgh very likely nobody else.
If we wall( it competitive arena i would keep otll AT&T and Comsat entirely. (AT&T
has never been consistently entht]siastic about using space anyway.) I.et anyone else in
who wants m. l+et them experiment with equipnmnt and the search tbr servi¢es and mar-
kets. Try to maintain some conditions of fair competition. IF after a tk'w years the
(]ommission wanls to ((assess this decision, and ]el AT&T inlo the business in _,vavscon-
sistent wilh mainlaining/his newly burgeoning indtlstry, lille. BIll not ullti] then.
(,t) Finally, I cannot but bemoan our tailure to Provide express]y lOt--at least--free
inlerconneclion tot the public Broadcasting CorPoration and other edu.cationa] users. ]
itlways fi'h that the Ford Foundation had made a tairly persuasive case that lllOlC was called
lot. The American people, having invested more lhall $40 billion in the soaring growlh
stock called civilian space, are entith'd, someday, to at little bit of a dividend. ()he has vet
to be declared. Ford proposed that a proportion of the savings lo Ihe commercial !{el-
works from tile use of space be passed on to the public in lerms of it funding source lot
pt,t)lic broadcasting, it seemed It) hie it t_air idea.
But all Ibis is history. WCre now in cotmM<_wn, ll's no time Io dissent. I'm on btmrd.
Document 1-27
Document title: George M. Low, Deputy Administrator, NASA, "Personal Notes,"
December 23, 1972.
Source: George M. Low Papers, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York (used
with permission).
(;emge Low wus NASA's deputy administrator fiom the fidl o  1970 until 1976. Du_ing that pe74od,
he dictated "pe_:sonal ,ores" on a reffular basi_ to recoPd his actions attd thoughts. These notes pro-
vide a /ascinating n'cord Of the e_mnts of the time. As the Apollo 17 astronauts explored the Moon dul.
in K the last Apollo mi_sio, in Decemher 1972. Low. NASA Administrator James Fletcher; and othe+
top NASA _![]icial.s had to divide their time hetuu.e, monitoring the lunar su@,'e activi(3' ]_om
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flmoto, _md meeti,g o, NA,_.t k fi_cal year 1 ?77 a,d fi._cal yem 1974 Imd ed_ with O[]iciaE_ ,/the
O/rice o/"_lanageme,t aml B.d,¢,et ¢OMB) i, W, shing,hm. To ,we/the .#rill_renl hlltl_r/.l ¢'_1_ [_ropo_t'd
t_ th+' .Vixon admillistrati.. _ 031B, it was l+ow'.s idea to take ,\_J,,%4 md o/commanicalio._ _alrb
I)le tewwn D and ¢leT,e'lopmel#l (1¢¢5fl)). A'A£'A had had an Apldi¢aliem_ "li,¢h.oloqy 5ah'llite (.17[S')
pn_,_,'mm _in¢'e 196 7 Io /¢_/Iow ap Jl_ _a/._porl q/tile initial Ieehty a.d &,ntom /nWlT, ct_. and/hat/n.
_,,'ram had hdped drvel.p many new teehnolo¢ies and eapabilitie_ in the commu.iceai.n_ _at¢'llite
area. 7'De NA&I decision to wi/h¢lmw [tom evmmn.li¢ations satellite lI&l) mra.I thai lDe.lina] ,t7_, '
mis_io.. IDe AT]_,-(;, wet_ ¢¢t.¢el_,¢l.
[ I p l)e¢'¢'nilmr 2B, 1972
I'F.RS( )NAL N( YI'ES N(). 8: +,
12] Fiscal _i'+t, + 1973 and 1!)7.t l+,ttdgct
M<:itnw|lilt" }|lit'I< <nl +.'illt|l, things weren't g<fiug ,,:itfile its well. ()n M<mda'.., l)¢'cc/nl:,cr
I I. aF, F,U <_xhnalcly ,it tht" lime <JItht' hmm lauding, wc r..t'cciv,pd it call from Bill Morrill ask-
in g l:h.tc h,rr, l.illy, and Ira' to nlt'Ct will+ him t_ discuss the FY 1973 and I!+7+I Imdg,pls. Wt'
Irit'd Io get him to give us our mark |>y lelt'ph<ine, biLl lit' "+++'itsunitl:,]c t_> <hl so. :'ks il restflt,
Flctchcr, M,c(Mrdy, _hilpl,+'y, l.illv, and I trawlt'd Im,.k to \Vi;shiu,gi<,+ .u '¢,,'cduc,+d;ty,
ll¢'ccml>cr 13, iottghly l>¢'tw¢'cn EV\s 9 and 3. (_,_: wt!rc in llousion lot lht' lull peri_>d ill
l_th ol these I+WAs.)
_'t" mt'l in Bill Morrill's t+llit t, with Morrill, _tiltlng, illld Tafl. (\Ye had It,It I [ouslon il1
5:15 in tht' Inotnin g <m a.]cl Sial li'n Andrews lair Fori'e Basei and ;uli,,cd in Mo/rill's
oltilc lit prccist'ly 9:?.0, tit<.' thnt" of lilt apl>oinlmt'nt.) Morrill inli_imcd its Ihat lh¢'
Picsi<h!nt was dt'lcrnlincd to briug the FY 1{t73 budget down to :i $2511 billion ceiling in
olillays, alid I_> h;p,l' ii iiol 1oo milch higher ntliiil)t!l l(ll t;Y 197,1. As il H'Sll]l, all dCl)art-
lilt'illS alid iigi'liCit's lilid Io lake lni!jor ('illS, boiil ill FY 1973 ||lid ill VY 197,t. The 1973 +<ills
wcic I)<u licuiiirly difl]cuh to SilSlain, ._iiicc only one-hlilf yclu-was Icti tot UiOlicy savings, hi
cfti'cl Ihl'l/, lilly (ill Illadt' in 1973 _'otlld have d_nible lht' llOllllitl t'lli'ti, lu NASA's cast',
()MII had itlceillcd lh/' "'Slilmiargiiial subniis.sioii" and inadt' drlisliC cuts tmlow Ilial h+vcl.
Within |lit+ _ul)niiiiginli] litld,!_<'l. , we had alrcltdv, {:ill oul the alleltill cil,_int' r('tiol]l work,
ilioM _t Ihc new MittIs, ilhlloM all ot lhi- ll/Ideill Wolk, iuld had ('Ill bllck in lllal/Y i)lht'l'
iilX'iis. The ()MB iilalk, iii addilion, (illlt'i'led Viking, Cilll(+l'led Q IrEST()i,, dcla{'ed the
,%tUillle, delayed ERTSII I l']iil-lh Rl':_Olll(:t.s "[t't'liliohigry Satellite ill" l+andsai ] (did 11<)I iillow
I-]RTS-(; iu illc hilcrior budgl'l), iuid lliadt" fuFl|it'i" across-thc-i)olird culs. (I should 13)
have illCllliOlied lhlil (),%()-1 was also cancelled ill Oilf Sill)ililll'g, illil] SliillliisSiOli.) Tht' llCl
i-i'sull xviis ii I>lidgel ill aill)i+oxinlillely Ihe ,$3 billion level lit otilia)'s I<li-bolh PY 1{t7!$ ||lid
FY 1!#7t. Wc were also tom lh;il lhe n tunber of fills Wi!I'C policy decisions approved I1_, lhl'
I>icsidcnl illid lllll otiis Io (hllll_('. Thcsc wcrc llarliiuliuly Ihc lu;{ior Ollt'S such its Vikiug,
()St) I()i'bilin<_ ,%oLII ()bst'l'ValOly i, lili(]ear Wolk, QUEST()I. elC. Ill lhe iil't';_l (It" lilillOr
(His, wi. would lie allowed Ill lllitkt" iidjliSllllelltS. Tilt' Presidt,nl I]l('ll also asked, wt" wcrt'
lohl pt'l-slniilll), lhTtl il tairlv :,,li|)._,l;lllliiil lllllllbel of dollars bt" inrhldi'd ill the NASA I)/Id-
,_<+1 <ill lhe _tl[)<'l+Olli(' II'iill:_lJol'l, wilh lhe words lhlil lie ti'll that ibis was il illlilidlil<li%
dexchqnncnl t01 Ihl' COUliliv alid lhal NA,%A should lake on ihc fight +vilh lhc (]<mgl+ess.
()lit iii/,l'lhi_ llislcd for ,i})Olll all holil; alld tillhlwing It|lit lileelin_, I+illv c<mlinucd t<l
lilt'el with %l{)llli_ illld Ittli tTn ct|)pl<iXilllalt!ly Ollt, illOfe hOlll\ %_,lt" l]lell I_ol bitck <)il <)tll ilil-
pllili<' iuid ilqlll'ni'd Io IlOllSlOli. _41"e held additional lllet.liil_S Oll the pialit' oil lilt' wliv
back I<_ [ lotiM<lli, in ] |OliSlOn lhe li<'xl illOrliili._, iuld lileli i'l'llii'iled lo \41"asiihi_loil in|tin'-
dilllclv _t[It'i the hiillil it,ll(|t,/\lltls ;ltld d_>ckiug (ill lllt't'liilgs <)ll lilt' (illl<l_viug Flidllv,
_iillli'dli'_, _ililday, iiiid Molidil'¢. |1,.¢ _illidliv iiOOll we ]lad t]iliiCd II t) Olii I)OSition iiiid
[%'l_lilllll)' WilS sl>l'iil Ill wiilJiig Ihc l)o_ilion tin a icClaliia siibniission to (EMIl.
1!'_4 "['lll_i tlly;'l'()lCf ( )l, S,',.I'H,I,[ I'],_ (_l)MM/'NIC,,\I I( )NS
Wifllin NASA wc were [_dlly unanilnous in deciding thai a Viking cu[ would Ix' unac-
ceptablt'. Firs! ill all, Viking is the ()lily highly visible sign of space exploration in file mid-
(lit" 7/)'s. Sc(ondlv, nlOl-e (ban haltof lilt" $_00 lc_ $91)0 million <ill Viking has already been
speut, Third, il would bc ahiiost impossibh" Io sustain file support of lhc scicntit]c coin-
munily for the rest o] Ihc NASA program if\:ikinb_ were cancelled. For ;ill of these lCaSOnS
and many more, wc decided lo do ore bcsl co fry co g_'c Viking back into lhe budgel. My
first inclinati¢lll was lo fry Io cancel llle AS'H ) [Apollo-Soyuz Tesl Pr¢!jecti mission, since
I]oln NASA's poinl of view il conlriliutcd Icitsl Io our overall lirogranl, tlowever, after
SlllilC discussion _ili(1 ;lflcr St)lilt' (;-Tilig liy Picictici; il I)CCitllll' VCIV t'icai lil;il tile I_residt'ni
coliSillCi-s ASTI > Ill(' higllcsi l)riorily NASA nlission, ;Uill t]lill ;lily' Silggl'._liltll ()ll OI11" p;irl io
c;Int't'l this t]ighi would bt" iol;l]ly Ull;tt'cc])l;it)il'. The Prcsidcnl also c_nlsidcrs lhe Shtiliic
lhc f_l'lolld priorily N,,\SA Ini_;sioll, ;ill(l, wt' were told, would not consider cancelling 141
l[i;il pl_!jecl. From NASA'n poiiil of view, of I'Olil_l', i! WaS ('](';il" lii_ll ill ii _'t billion level wc
would liOi hilll, slill-lt'd t'illler tile Shuttle ill ASTIr Thus, we wt,rc in a ini!ior bind.
I ihcn sliggcsied Ill,it il ill(gill t)e Iiint" Io 1)ilase oul ()[' liie coniiiiunic;tlioils blisiness.
The lt';iSOllillg ]lClC g()CS _,;Oilll'lhillg like this: NASA lille; I)ecII _i c;ll;ilysl tk>l" space coiniiill-
iiicaiioils develoi)iliCnl in lhe cariy I)h_lse of lilt' spacc l)lligl-;tlll and unlil ilow.] towever,
lhclt' IlOW ll;ls developed ;l Sigllil]l';illl CCIlllllitlllit'illil)llS sllleliil(.' Cal);ll)ilily ill i)riv;ll(' ill(Ills-
try. For CX{llll])[c, (]{)MSATt'INTH,SAT is sfil, lldin<_ $14 Illiliilnl ;I ltrt!;tl" OII ilfk';lll('C(I R_I).
ii iS cll'al', llil'rl']_)rl', ihai I'Olllililllli('_ilioils work will 14o oil W]ll'lh_'r ()1 ilol NASA p_triici-
|)all'._. ()t c()urst', Ih('le are sonic _irt'_ls, such ;is direcl iiio;tliliislhl<_, wlii(h will takt' nuicii
longer wililoul It'dt'l-ltl glIVCl'lllllt'lll I);U'lil'il);lliOli. In ()lhcl ;il'l';ls of at)i)lic;itions, such as
carlh ie_oizrcc,_, t'liViiollniczil_i] wolk, el(,, llieil_ exisis iio coliiiilerci;i]/ilidU.Sliia] c_tlJlltli]-
ity ili;ll will C;illV i)ll if (he tt-deral ,_OVCllllllt'lll gr<'ls oul ot ii. l, lheret¢nt', reasoned lii,il il
would I)(, b(.'si Io do (till' apl)licalions ;ll'C;t well inslead _lf doing lwo maior liFt';is not IIC;ll-
Iv s_l well. PlclCiier ;it tirsi was q(lilC ichi(l;ilil Io iic/clJl lifts l'e_lsonhlg, I)ul ;lli('r _i d;iv _n
st) lit l]lillkhlg ;al)lllll it, Cllihtlsi;lslic;ll]y Sllf)lllll'lC(I ii. ,'\s ;l rCsllh, Wl' decided 1o propose
tant'cll_lliOll of Ai'S-G, to /';tl'iV Oill ATS-F t)ctiillSC lilOsl ill file lill)lley ()n ii was ;llie;illv
silt'ill, bill al thc Saliit' linie Io |)l/;ise down all in-house conuliuliiC;ilions R_[) so Ih;il I)v
lilt" liint' ,-\T_I: Ilil's we will cOnll)ll'lely 1)ti;ise o111 of l]li._ business, hlcidcnl;ii]), I]lis hi,iv I)i'
ci ln;{ior tll,_l f_n ii ,_()VellllllClll ;igCll(y Io gl'l lllll (tf (ill R_|) I)iiSillCSS t)f ils OWIl voiilion.
Ill ltie ()ffice ill Sp;ice Scit'llCt" l_t/I decided lo kt'cp \:ikiug, bul susl)Clld (lEA() [] Ugh
|']ll('lg)' AMI'OlIIpllI)' ()l)sei'val_ryl. S(ISl)elidilig ;I |)ro<l_r;llll i_ SOlilcIhillg l'ls(" Ih;ll lilts iicV('l
lialil)t'ned ill NASA t)et{li'e. Basically, we would ke('p ;i skclclon It';till logclher, Ill,ill in
NASA itlld in ilidtlSli-v, [{)r a ve;Ir Ill" nlorl, while w(' reviewed I IEA() to (telermille wht, lliel
wc (_lil lilt'el ils ,ibic,livcs itl, lili" t'X_iliiplt', half lllc co_ls. _illltgle w;l_i ill l{ivor ot _utrigili
c;inccliillion, if illis were the c_tse, but ill.',' view W;is ltl;ll lhrough suspt'nsion we xniglli Ill'
al)ic Io pick file pl(!ic(l tip ag;iin wilhotll ;tg_lill sl,ckin<_ it "'liCW _litll." hi space scienct' ;tlso,
()St) is ill) IOlll2-cr iii 151the t)roty, r;llil ;i.% wc sUl)liiillcd it (I _ill coilIc back Io lh;ll [aler).
_lllfl Illl'rc wcr(' Ill{liP,' ;ici-oss-lhc-I)o_irfl ClllS.
hi (lAST It)like of At'l-llll;itllils ;in(| Sp;ilC '['eCllllol_>gyl, ill IItll' ])itsiC ;uid t]l'Sl sub-
lilissillll, Q{!ESI()I, _lll(I ihc I'll_illl! rc[]tilllhlg wt'rt, Olll, ;lllliOSl ;tll lill/lCitl" woi'k w_ts Cltli-
c'eled, alld ltlCl'l" W('FC addilion;ll t:uls in SR'I'/AR'IL ]ii fill' ovez;ii] SRT/:ART |)rogi;ini, l
t,sl;ll)iislicd glLillclines lii_ll (.ill'J; o[" Ibis work slioiiid llave ;I pro(hiS(' o[ being releV;llil willi-
ill ;i f)eliod of scVt'll yt'_llS; and Illal only 10% o[ ()ill" SRT!ART work should t)e ill file
[itllll'C I)cvonlt Ihc scvcii-VC;ll i)('riocl.
In M;uuied Space Fli<tlhl, Skviab ;ind ASTI' Wt'll' it'ti ;is lhey Wl,lC, and llie Slnillie wiis
(ui I);ltk SOlllt'wllltl ill ('()_ls illl(I Ihcl'Cl)y dciilv('(l by ;t Iollil ()t" ()11(' yC;ll, ('(lll:_i(h'rhl<ff, lilt"
_chl'([ule ('h;ulg_'s iih'ca(ly ili;t(lt! l)y previous 1ii73 ('Xl)l'il(tiililt' cuis on lop o[ lh(" i)rescnl
('illS.
().MB also _u_gcsle(I nl_tior (ills in personnel iol;lling 1_4(I wiih th(" bulk (if Iht'sc (lllli-
ing ;ll Miushall ;lli(l ill l,t'wis/ll|unit)r(l(ik. {4,'t. h;ivt,, ill t'ftT<,(i, it(_t,f)lt!(l lht' l,(-wis/
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I']unnl)r_._k cul t>ccausc lifts is whmv all lhc nuclear work was going on. t lowcvcr, wc haw
in<lical('d thai until v.:c.(a`nt get lhings SOlIt'd ,out, v,,,c',vouM nol a.ccCl)l a cut al Marshall ,[:,r
elsewh('nc al Ihis lini(.. W(: slated, in_,l.ead, thai a munb('r roughly al)pro×inmling Ihc ]gNO
wouM t:,(. coming out of NAN,,Vs huclgvt, bill _'xacllv wh(q(" th('st" cuts wouM 1),:' ,haole wc
will d,ru.rminc lal,..m In lhe meanlimc, I Wahl to vnak(" a ma.ic, r ('ttOrl to s(.c wh('lh('r w,.."can
%c11" the cx(('ss NASA capahilities 1o agencies such as EPA [E`nY,Arc,nm,pnllal Pr,[)leclion
Agency I (tot l.ewis) anti lh(" I)()T {l)('l:,artmcnl otT,anSl)ortation I (ti.- Marshall). This is
clift_.r,pm trom whal vvc a.llcmpled lasl year when indicated l]`nal we would mak(- NASA
capal:,ilily availal)lc as a service 1o Itmsv other agen¢i,{'s. Aftra lryitlg t(_,l"a v,par 1o niak(" thai
w,c:,rk, il .iusl is clc:,u Ilia! il w,:,l`n'l, lm, tvad, our intvnlion now is 1o "spin off" some of the
cal)al:,ilili,e'-; dirv,:tly Io ,cHh('n ag/.'n(i('s '_o I]`na.I lllt'y can develop an in-hou,,v capahilily.
A_, I m,:'nli,_:,m'd l:,,:.lorc, I ,;pc`nit .M,_:,nday, I)c¢('lnl)cr IN. v,TilinR our ,-,..cl;tma. lcltm to
W(qnl_vrgvr, and, in addilion, writing a h..uer Io Kissingvr soliciting hi'_ SUl)pOrl on Viking.
(:opiv_, .f Ih,p clratis ot Ih('s,(" I(.lt('rs aY(" alia(hod. In Ih..{' [6] mcantim('. Hcl(h('r had hv('n
workinK wilh Whilchl'a(I, Al`nd(.rs, and.Jon Rose Io ,gel lh,Pir (;-_ c:,n wh'al was r('ally going
,c:,nill lhc' Whil(' llousc, and, at llle same lime, lie also rccciv('d Ihcir fr,pt' a(Ivic('. Ion. wl._
is tlt',a.'d 1() d('aling within the While ttousc, t(:h Ihal lh(" [cql('rs Ihal 1 had wl'ill.'_'ll might
mak(' lh('ir mark vvilh ()MB I`nul he really t_.ql thai they wmx" m'cdvd wilh EHichman and
Fl.migan and were not suilabl,r tot Illal l:,mF, OS,r. A,_¢or,:tin_ly. hc v,:'wr<_tc hoth ]cm'rsiusl
heft _lc I:h'lch_'r had a mevling wilh '_%_qnl)crger and Morrill on l)vccmhcr 19 (I was hack
in Ihmsl,!:,n at Illal timv). A copy ol their rcwrilc is also alia( h('d. Thmc w,.'r(' no (hangcs
ill Sll]):-,l_lll('(" v,'ilh (:,n(' ('xc,Pption: Ill(" engirLe r('lan pv,%Rxan`nwas t)a(k in Ill,..' v,;,ords Iml n,_)!
hack in Ill(" In,dR(.1. Thi,_ is a program where a gleal (h'al _1"f)r_'.'.,surv has hccn al)l:,li('d to
II`n(' Vi,.(' I_rcsi(h'nl's otti( (' and Bill Andvrs would, lh(.rt'tbre, liD.' to svv il back ill lh,..' In,d-
R('I. W(' inclicatvd to ()MB llml w(: would ¢('rlainly und('rtakv lh(" in_!ivct if additional
monvv ,,vcrc a,d&'d over and ahovv lhc mark Ior lhis puvpose. AI Ih(' lime ,::,ftiffs, writing,
il is qum, l)r_hahlv Hlat this monC,: will h(' acldcd. I Ibrgot Io in,.'nti,_m thai Bill Ancl('rs m('l
wi_ll us on dr(' l gth, and Ill:.tl w_.'m`ngaged in a very sibgtiticanl llhih,sol)hi,:al argum,:'nt ,.villi
him. II is Bill's opinion (sh:m:'d allt:,arvnlly I)y all Whil(' I hmse slat]i'rs) Ihal NASA's nmin
ol_jccfi,.'v, sl.mld bc t,_ _.xpIor,r and 1o provide I;u,n(l`n scrvicvs. Suhjc¢ls such as applica-
lions ;Ln(I s(it'n(_:' w(' should only ,rio as a servic(" for otll('rs, a`nid, Ih(.rclorc, should ,('_'k
Ih('ir lunding, _'.R., us_w agmlci,rs or NSF [Nalimtal Science F<mudalionl, tot this imrllOSc.
l_oHi Fh't(hcr and 1 engag('d in a tairly v<.hemenl argum,rnt wilh Andvrs on this point.
Although I don't think w,.' l:U',-suad('d Anders, at leitsl h(' knows where wi" sland.
()ur t)ttdR<.'l submission as rm, iscd, was <rely aF, pr(_ximat('l_ .$31t million ovt'r the ()MI +,
mark tor I)olh FY 1!)7'3 avL,:l FY 1974. Weinbenger was apl:_arcntly quitv l)lvast'd with our
l)rOl)osals, al`ncl il is quilt.., i)robat:,le Ihal they will l:>e a<.(,el)l('d, i [ow(,xCl; at Ill<." lin'm (_+l
( :hi iSllll;l:', v,vckvnd wc Imvc nol ycl heard posilively lhal OllF proposals have t)CCll ;IC'('CI)I-
,pd ,c:q that lh{' NASA hucllgcl is locked tip. As a tinal atlerll'_oughl, Fh'lchcr wcnl back I_,
Wvinh,ergm and asked him whether it wouldn'l be p,._ssibl,r to vcinslale ()St). Th,:" rea-
soning is thal Ihis miRhl be a minor concession l() make to the s,_ientilic ¢,<,mmunily. 1'71
This r,pinsla_l('nl(ml, of cOUlS(', wc couM only make with addilicmal tun(ling. This, too. is
ali`n<,lmn item :it the time of this writing.
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B_, 1975, trifles we_" betg'imdn_" to raU imo question NAX4 i_ decision to withdraw it_ _upport /tom
t/)e researrh am/ developmet_t (R_':'I)) O/(ommumratiot_,_ satellites. Sudt critic_ a_]_rtted tltat the
!ration needed a grov_q'tmwttt ptv,,_rram to invesli,t.qth, _vlated h,chnolot_ie.s in Iheir earth' _talre,_ o/devel-
opment, a_ well a,_ to exph.v terhmdoL_ie_ arm app/ication,s that were trot clearly, linked to private-st,r-
tot objective,_. In re,_ponse, NASA !writ!acted with the iudepe_Met_t Nati(ma-I t¢:_eanh Cm_mil to
(onducl a _tud_, on whether their was a/u_tifiableJederal _vle in rommuai_atiom _atellite I¢&D. The
._ludv rm_duded that their was df/initel_ a need /hr _'mh a p-!oK!am O'xr_'_pts ./ the _tud 3" report atv
im'lud.d hetvl. This rm_c/u_io_ [brined ore" q[ lhe hrtses fi-lr _X;:LS'A :.min_ ahead with the contmversial
Add,an red (:ore m a n icatimt_ Tech n .Io,w SatelHle (A (;7",S') pro,,.am; A ( :7 '._" wa _ fin al(_' la u n ched it!
S_lemher 1997.
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In .]anuar 7, 1973, tilt" National :\t!ronaulics and Space Administration (NASAl, laced
with tilt' llt'ct'ssitv o| rvducing cxpcndilurt's, cx;ullincd its prog, ranls to dclt'rnline what
could be eliminaled. _,%:tliJc NAN..\ madc ;1 l|UtllbCl _)f reductions, ore" ,,[ intt'leSt tl, this
stutl'_ x_r_s the decision to csscnti;lllv clinliuatt" its satellite c_,tntnunitations actixrilies
I_t'C;lUSt ` this \Vats feh to bC ;.t relatively lll:tltlt-t' field and N:\SA bt'licvcd Ihal R&I) in Sttl>-
port of tilturc activities could Im pl,,vid¢.d h\ tilt' comnlunicathms it_dustrx. ,%in( (, ];unlat+v
1973, scvcral orRanizalions have asscssc<l Ihc <onst'qucnct.s _>t thai dt'_isi_>n and h;tv_'
urgc(I llhlt tilt'decision ht" rt'-t'x;lmint.d.'
hi late 1975, NASA asked and Iht' Nalional Rcscarch (',ouncil agreed 1o sllld'¢ tuvthcr
tilt' question "Shot,ld fi.'dcral rcst'm_ h and dm'ch)pn|enl ,m satellite communications t)c
rt'sumt'd and, it so, ',vh;tt is thc proper ti'&'ral role in this ticht?" To ut|dt'rlakc Ihc stud',,
at (;ommittt,e on Salcllihp (]omnulnicalions ((It)S(;) was tOrmcd undt'r the auspict,s ,_t thc
SI);tct' Apl)li<';tti,>ns I',_);lrd (S,\B). This rcpo_l picSt'lltS tilt" (]Olllllliltc("s tindings; signil]-
I. '"lhv I:,.'dt'_;d Roh' in (]Olmnuni_atiolls Sal,.'llilt' R&I)." :\ll_crkan Iiv.,tiltll¢. ot :"-,ct_mat_ti(s and
.\..ll _l_atllit s. N,:,v, '_I k (lit',. 1975: "lhc N,\5; \ R&I) lqo_ am on Nalt']lil_.' (]_mlnlmli_ athms,'" A I'.siti_m Papc_ ,_1
the Nalcllitv h'lc_tmmmni_alion_, S.c, litre, (iolnlmmi(;tlions and hulusl_ial I']h'_n.ni_,, Ilkision, Eh'_ IH.ni(
]lldtlSlli_.'s \ssl>_ iatioll ;llld The (;,_'_'l Illlll'lll ['l{)fill( IS [)b.i',i,_ll. Eh'< t_t,ni{ s ]lldllSll i{'s _ssl*( iafion, Waqm_Xton.
D.( ;.. 197 t; untith'd pap<'_. ,\vtospa_ c and Eh'_ n ,mi_ Sksivms { houp. The hl.,litlil_. _1 Eh'_ ni_ al ;uul Eh.cti_mil
I']n,aint.cl s. In_ ,, W._shinRl.n. D( ].. 1976.
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cam background inii)rmalion and working i)ap,ms a.-,semhled t)y itle ('.oznmillce during ils
d('liberations will be published sel)aralely.'
{ 1 { INTR()DUCTI()N
111 I]IC o11(" ]lllll(h'e([ _r(m_ll'S Si_('(I lh(" illvt:ntion o| the lclel)tl()lle, t(']('(Olllnilinicati()zis
has t)('('onle a l)ervasiv(' parl of the developed world. The lelcphouc is in nearly ever)
h(iliie ail(I ill ('Vl'l+V olti(c ill lhe Uniled Stales, aild lhere is al)()iil OllC lelei)lion(" for every
leii |)ersolis eli (,arlh. Radio I)roa(Icasting and olher radio links have I)e(()ille ('ill||Ill(ill-
place t(l(ils t(ir lircividiil_, hoih t!lltel'tailllB('lll aBcI services. Telcvisiim pr_ividcs t'lii('rlail/-
ilielil, news, and edlL(ali(ilia] s('rvic:es Ill most hollies in l|ie lechn(ih)gi(ally (l(.vehll)ed
(()lliilries ()f |hi' world. Tilt,re reniain, however, sl)iil(! troul)iing Iiinitalions I() furlher
iin|ir(iv('lil(!ills ill coillilluilicali(llls services. For exaiill)le, lilt' (osl o| providiug l('lt'pl/olle
()i" 'l_/ s('rvic(" t)V (OliVlqltiolial llieans is high iii r('inol(" ail(t sparsely populaled regiOllS.
"|]iliS, Ihe Ruial He(trili(alion Adiliinislrali()ll Ilas inade an(1 gilaralilt-e(t a|)Olil ,$(k'_0 lllil-
li(m in le(leral l(lalls aillittaily I(i slhuulale an (_xtensiv(, riiral R.It, l)tl(m(" service ii()_v _el%'-
ing 3. I lnilli(in suhs(Tii)('rs in 47 slales.
1 li,gh tri,qlienry ra(li<) is widely ilse(I i() span greal (lisiances I)iil SilliblS tiom Olilag(.s
(;.lllS(.d t)y solar (lisltlrhall(t's o[ lilt" iOllOSptl(_re. **\s a it'sull, sllifis ;&lid aiF('l'af{ ill'(! |i'e-
([li('ntly olil ()t (:()illlllUllil'alioll with lheir bases for long peri(ids ()r (hiring critical l)]lases
el lileir .joliril(',vs. l tigll tre(ilil!ll(y radio is also severely spe('ti-uni-linliled alid ils list is
hu'gcly ((llilhl('(t I() the |)r(ivisioll (It" voice alld hiw-speed data services. First steps iu
ililprovilig ship (Ollilliilni(ali[)ns |legal| ill 1976 witil lhe [allil(h of (:()MSAT (ienl'rai's
MARISAT salellites which llOlv prcivi(le lii'geill]y needed, rc,lial)h' Sl,lvi(es I(} (I.S. Na_,l_ and
(()llllll('l-(ia] ships in ih(' Allanti(' an(l Pacific ()eean I)asiils.
Nin('lecn veais agl) wh('ll Ill(' tilsl satellites were laull('he(t, il was (lear Ihal they (oul(l
serve as higil-aililu(le relay slalJ()ns alld thus OVeF(Ollle SOill(. (}I Ill{.' lilllitalions (it telTi's-
Irial ('(llliiliilnJ('ali(ills sVM('liis. Firs| eltorls involved ])olln(iilg radio signals |ioni ()rbiting
t)all(i()ns and ('V(!ll t]()in ('arlh's ilalura] sali'llite, lilt' lilt)eli. Aliolher al)proa(h inv()ived
liw ilS(' of a i('((,ivei-Irali_;lllilllT, (ailed a llailspoil(|(,r, in a salellile io r('iay signals tlOlll
i')ll(. (lislanl point on (!axlh 1o ;lll()th(:F Early ¢|t(}llS ilsin_, ]()lv-a]lJlllde satellites showed the
t{.asil)ilily (if tile lrausp<)n(ler i('ehnique, but such satellites had short orbital periods, did
11<)1 F{'lllaill wililin sig|it o[ lhe earth stathms at all tinles, and required lhal earth sial|oils
(onlinuouslv track |host, salellitcs in view.
The promis(" of (olnlnuni(:ations via satellile was realized wilh lhe us(. o|' salelliles ili
g(.oslali()liary ori)ils al all aliilu(Ic of B(),()0() kin [kilonlelers]. At thai heighl, tile orbit
period, syllchroniz(,d wiih lhe earth's relation, |)laces ihe salellite in an essi'uliallv sla-
li(}nary posilion above a selecl{'d p(}ilil on the eqliator ail(t wittliii Ihle-ol;sighi o| abOlll
one-lhird of |he i:arih's sinl]tce. This possibility [2] for provi(lhig eorllinuiiy ()f service and
s()k'ing ihe Iracking l)r(>l)iein was pointed ()tit by Arthur (]larke _ ill 194._ and |]rst aciii('ved
I)y NASA's S_tN(',()M in 196,"k
In 1963, lhe I,].S. (;ongress eslablished lhe Communicalions Salellile (;orporalion
((:()MSAT) Io bring aboul a commercial international satellite communications system as
quickly as possibk, and to represent the U.S. in the lnlernational Telecommunicali(ms
Sall'llile ()rgani/alion. hllernalional salellile commurli(-alions servi(e began in 190. r) wilh
E. l:ede_al lte_e._*h .t.I lh'_,el.pment fi,t ,_tt#'llite ('.tnmuniratiot*_: 14bd¢i_lff I'apetv (;(lilliilill('_ • on .Sat<'llitv
( ;()illllllllli( ;ili()llS Of Ih(" F,pa((' Alipli( ali[ms BIiHI(t. X'aliOlla] Ri'si'al(']l ( ]Oillll il, NalJona] A(llfl('lll',' (i| S(iell( ('s,
Vladlingi_)u_ I).C.. 1(.i77.
3. {;latk, A.{]. "l+]XllTil('ltl'Sllial Rcla)s," l't'_#v>l.<_s_World. ()cliilR'l, 1945, pp, 9;05-'A0_L
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INTEI,SAT 1 which could carry 240 lelephone channels or one "I%: channel. INTEI.SAT
I1, 11I, IV, and I\,_',, satellites were added in subsequen¢ years. As of.January 1977, the sys-
tem provides telephone and TV links between tile %| countries Ihal share i1_own_'rship o_
Ihe system. There are also 17, non-_lwner countries thai use lhe INTEI£AT svsmm.
Use of salcllilcs tbr domestic conl,nunica_ions wilhin die U.S. was delayed by pMitical
and regulalory processes until 1974 when policy decisions were hi;de about who would
provide such services. Meanwhile, Canada's ANIK satellite system had Ix'come operational
in early 1_J73, supplying some U.S. domestic services.Since then, a number of companies
have entered lhe tield and loday samllites arc being used to provide domestic telephone or
'D/ services. Additional domestic salellhes are planned tor Ihe U.S. and tor other coumries.
Since 1963, lhe United Stal('S has led the world in salel]ile conlnnnlhations. Initial
cxperinlents were conducted by tile National Aeronautics and Space Adlnhfisnatiotl and
the Department of Deli'nse. Transilion from experimental IO practical use of salellites ,,,,'as
rapid for transoceanic lelcphonc and TV services because thme existed an infrastructure
ready it) exploit lhis new ineditun and because lhe lmmbcr of new undersea cahles was
unat)le to keep pace widl tile demand. (!.S, aerospace and electronic industries were able
m capitalize on /heir own work ;is well ;is on tilt' research and developmcnl funded in
these industries by file tk'deral government to develop a competitive advantage in thc
world market.
The private sector has conlintted to make advances in the technology for providing
convenlional teleph<me and +13¢services. The induslry has taken some risks; tot examph',
one company paid I_l launch vehicle inlprovenlenls and incorporaled nnlch advallced
technolog, T, not previously proven in flight, in ils satellite to improve periSH-re;nee.
ttowever, it t)t,C;tllle clear dial the risk die private seclor was willing (or (Oll](l permil itsell)
lo lake was limited and d_at most private initiatives were being channelled m exisdng mar-
kets and to where technical risks were not t)erceivcd as unacceptably high. II is cl('ar thai
cVell in the largesl companies, prudent illall_lgelllell| requires lllal large illVeSllnenls in
R&I) llol be made illllcss Ihere is reasonable aSStllallce Ilia! relalively short term payoHi,
will result. Furthermore, tile risk of violadng tederal alHi-lrusl and trade regulation
statutes has led companies to refrain fronl entering illlO joint cftorts that nlight pernlit
tilt'Ill It:, shal'e risk. As a resuh, following tilt" withdrawal of |he tk'detal govertllnent fioln
satellite c<mmnufi(-ali(m R&D, there have been no conlmer('ial experinlental satellites to
lest llew lec|llliqlles HiId COllCepls or [0 pul'llli| IlSel's It) expt'l'}lllelll wil]l lleW selvic(!s.
There are a unlnfl_er of potential connntmications services, such as tor heahh care
delivery, edllCalional services, search and rescue, elecmmic mail, lelecontmencing, and
enviromnc,ltal data collection, which apparently cannot readily [31 or economically be
provided using the lechnoh)gry available to tilt- connn<m carriers for producing conven-
titmal telephone and television services. If Ihe option to initiate strum of these services is
to renlain open in the future, then advances nnlst be made in needed technolob, _` by
undertaking research and dc'`'elopment progranls now.
There are examples otw<,'k which IllllSt be undt+rlaken it new services are to be con-
templated. These include technology tor utilizing new portions of the i-a¢lit:' ti'equcncy
spectruul, enlploying larger atilt| Inore sophisticated sF.acecratl antennas, utilizing a satel-
lite as a switchboard in space, and advancing technology to driw' down the cost of com-
llltlllicatiollS.
:ks time passed, nlany concerned with tilt+ development and the tullu'e of satellite
colnnumicatitms canle to realize that NASA's 1973 decision to reduce R&D in the tield
might indeed close options if advancemenls in technolog 3' such :is those just cited did ira!
become available. Mindful of this, NASA, in lhe 1,111of 1975, asked the NR(_ to conduct a
study of the lederal role in satellite conmnufications research and developmenl. The NRC
agreed on ()ctober 7, 1975, it:' underlake lhe study and decided thai tile work should bt"
done by a new Committee on Satellilc Counnunications (C()SC) under the NR(','s .Space
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Applicalions B¢)afd. !I was also aRree(I that lhe (k)tnnlillet" should t)e constilutt'd of I('ch-
IIologisls, communications syslt:m OpCl'atol's, salellile t-olnnltlni(alions ilst,ls, a ('()llllllll-
nicalions policy specialist, and a regulatory t,c(m(m:usl. The metal)ors wefc selected with
due regard tof a balance in view|)oinls ....
In its work, tilt+ (_Olnlnillct" c(msidcred whcllwr it is likely that sal('llilt's ill ge(:,station-
all'}' orbits could make voice, video, and data colllmtlnitattions attratlive t()l a \artery of
l)ul)li(: uses not presently provided. Such satellite systems shottld |)e ahle to provide new
services to remote and distant places and to sparsely distributed users. Fc>r examph', using
lhc XI'S--6 satellite, Brazil has ('Xl)erimetlted with dclivming television hroadcasls to s()me
of ils isolated populace. The U.S. has experimented with providing heahh care informa-
lion and educati<mal services Io inlhalfilants of remote villages in Alaska, Apl)alachia, and
l|lc Rocky Mountain X_'est. +vVtl('ll lilt. ATe6 was withdrawn tr<ml such experiments to keep
an intt.tnlalhmal commilnmnl to c<)nducl similar ,demonstrations in India, a number of
user groups lestilied to their need l+of lhe replacement satellite which NASA had planned
to lamuh. + floweret, ftmds to complete and taunt'l+| lhe replacement satellite wcre llol
al)pt+<_prialed and no individual ttstW of c()mbinatitm of tlSefs was ahh" m ad'lot+d tilt" esti-
mated $45 million to $50 milli<m to launch and operate it, While tilt" cost-efl_xtivent'ss oF
any singlc application of lhis tyl)e I)y it satellite may be queslional)h', +'tilt: use of nndti-lmt-
t)osc satelliles may open an increasing numher of opporlunities tot l)uhlic service, gov-
el'lltllt'ltl, and ('()mn_t+r(-ia] uses.
141 Am<rag the non-technical questions conttonting tht! (_olnmilt<:(+, fllct+ct+ow ',wcre
these: Are there at large number <)t disaggregated, mainly pul)lic service users in ,+em()te
places likely to need and wallt the capabilities of salellite +onlmtlllitali()ns. :+ Is an expe++i -
met|tal iHogranl, building on lhe experience of the (+ltrlailed ATe6 ex[)cl'inlcIItS, war-
ialllt'd 1o |)Cllllit IISCI+S lo evaltnttc the worth t)|' slIc|l services and It) (Ic.in()llS|l-ale Ill('
lnan'k(g and It/(' costs? Itso, what sh<mhl such a progranl comprise and whal should 1)t. Ihc
rcspet:liv(' toles of tilt+ g<)verntnent, the conmumications industry and tilt" potential |)tub-
lit" S('I'ViCC SCCI()I" tlSelsY
(k)llcctively in (',ommittee tneelings and hldivi(htally outside of those meetings, the
mvmhers of(at)S(;: (I) reviewed the history and present status of sat('llile c()nulllulit'a-
lions, (_2) c(msidefe(l in nullll)('I-of important conlnlllnicatiolls scrvict" ilet'cls exl)resst'd t)y
t)_m,nlial users, (3) identitied advances in technology required t()F tnecting those needs,
(L']) judged which of those a(Ivatwes prohably would, and which prol)al)ly would not, bc
111('| by Ill( + private st!ttOl, (5) strut:lured and evaluated sevel+al p<)ssit)h' NASA roles in tilt"
advanccm('lt! of lechnolol.,%,, and (6) decided upon recommendations.
[5 PER( :EIVED NEEDS AND REQUIRED TE(;HNOI,()(;Y
PER(:EIVED NEEDS
The g<)vernment investnwnt in research and development on multi-channel point-lo-
point satellite c.mmunicati<ms, which hegan with tile space age and culminated in tilt"
tormali(m of Ihe (_omnnmic+aiions Satellite Corporation, clearly has bt)rnc rich dividends
f()v tilt' (()untrv. The FeVt'IIIL('S|I'O11/ this new industry cttrrently exceed $_00 million t)cr
yt'ar attl(I at(" expanding rapidly. It was only after the Department of Defense (DOD) and
4. t;.S. Scnalc (;ommitlc( + on Acr(mauli(al and Space S('ictHt's. II(.arinRs ml S.35,t2, A Bill 1(_
Aulhotizc Applopliali<ms to thc National A<qqmatLti(s and Sp:ac(' A<hninistfali<m lof Rt'st'ar( h and l)(,vt.h_pm_'llt
Rt.lalin R to the ,'+qt'v,t+I11h Appti_ afim_s T¢'( htmlo,t,'3' Satcllite,.luly 23, I!)74+
5. St't" Edu(ati<mal I:+olit ,v ( '+('lltCI, ]n+ltut lhmal Television: A ('ore|re+alive ?;/ud+' o[ .Sah'llite a,d ()Ibm lh'livePj
_l+'ms. Nt,'l_|(ll_,,-' R<.seal(h (;<_t lJol;tlhm, S}laCtlsl+, Ncv, Yolk, 1976.
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NASA had developed the technology and demonstraled its practical use, however, lhal
conunercial firms were able to risk operational systems. Today the price of multi-channel
poinl-lo-poinl w_ice service has dropped to several d,msand dollars per channel-year.
B()lh Iranso(eanic and do{nestle systems are in op{wation or planned in a large numb'('r of
counlries.
The situalion for oilier classes of Iong-i-ang{: satellite comnntnications--ti_r exanlple,
service to nlolfil{, plaitornls (ships and aircraft) or to widely distribuled or rcnlote ground
locations--is much less t{tw_rable. Mosl users of such communi{:ation ll'l'lliiil;,ll installa-
lions fi:cl lh{,y can atlord only modest sized and h)w-cost antennas. The services so p,o-
vided might in<hl<te pul)lic activities such as education, mail, environmental monitoring,
geophysi<:al exploration, hazard warning, heahll care delivery, navigation aids, time and
tieqt,ency diss{qninalion, public safely, search and rescue, or wildliti' monil()ring.
The [ !.S. l)epartnient of Heahh, Education and Welfare and NASA have recenlly con-
dueled experimelltS in Appalachia, the Rocky Mountain Stales, Alaska, and WashinglOll
Stale.' l]l('se experinmIHs were designed to assess tile value of service to relnole locations
and to assess the communicati<ms satellile as a lneans li)r prt:dding it. For example, using
lelevision, voice, and a variety of data signals relayed by ATS-6 (Applications Technolo_,, T
Satellite 6), the experinmnls delivered heahh car{: and education services to thousands of
Alaskans living in [6] areas t(:,(:, l'('lllt)le to t+e_tcll readily ill person or thr<)ugh ground-
based (-omtnuni('alions. r*
These experiments suc(-esstidlv demonstrated the capability to provide diagnostic
consuhative services between medical l)roi_.'ssionals and paraprofi'ssionals, lrans,nit and
pl'()vi(le {()nsllltali(lliS ()ll X-la+vs, i+.ll(l ll-_tllSliiil Sill(| up-date medical records, all in real-lime
via slttelliles. As a resuh, the Alaska Native ltealth Board now assigns highest priorily Io
deveh)lmmnt of tilt' community heahh aide program and to impr<)ving the communica-
ti<)ns that provide 1he aides witli pr<_t;essional I)ack-up.:
The Public Service Satellite (;onsortiunff' has compiled the needs o1 litllllel-Ol.iS ('ill-
rent and potcntial users similar to those portrayed in the Alaska example, but the []tcl is
lhlll fill)St potential liSeFS C_llillO[ attmd ('lllTenl ci)llillitlni(ali(_,n Sel+vi((, i)lices, llltl(h its
Ihe lranso(cani(+ point-to-point users (ould n()t afli)rd early satellite ('<)lnliitilli('aliolls s'¢>
toms t)efore technology advances brought lower prices. If prices (ould be reduced, an
increased markel I}.)r st{oh services might well develop.
REQUIREI) TI_]CI-INOI X)(;Y
The tcchnical challenge in reducing costs for satellite servi(-e lo small tvrlninals is dit:
l]culi, ])tit it is n() g,valer than that l,tce(| in originating salellite conmnmi(alions in l!)5bL
The basic approach aheadv can be e]wisioned." "l'<_enable small alll+.'llnas to be used al
6. Malion II..]ohnsol+, "ATYb6 hnpa{t; i\ View h_ml the (2mlrld Rc+otn," Nalitmal l.+&+t U ./ ),l+'di, m;
,\'ew+. V_l. XXX, N<_. I()-I I, ()< t<_hc_-Novembcr+ 1975. pp. 3-7.
7. (_hmlt's B_ad?,, "lcl¢'mcdic inc Moxt's N_ Ih t<_ i\la'.,ka." ,Vati+mal l,ilm_v _g .Xl,,di_im, ,V,-+_+. Vol. XXX,
No. I(bl 1. ()cmlwi-Novvmbvt. 1975. pp. 7-10.
8. .Maltha R. Wilson atnd (',harl<'s l+.la<l_+, "lh'alth (2ut' in Alaska Via Satellite." .\I3.A (;tmlc+cn,:t..m
(:l)lllltlttllit atti_m Salcllites fi_l I lcahll/l+_dutali<m ,\ppli< ations, .\IAA I'aper 7.')-898. Nt+++ \+_lk. 197_-_.
{I. Ntll)t(+llllilittt'v <m .\l>l>ri>lHiations [i>r 111(" l)t'paltlll(.lll i)[ lht" hllt'li(>r ilti(] Rt'lalcd :\'d,t'It( if'n. I',N,
I lous,t, o[ Rt'plt'St'ittali'+t's. '['vslitl.m,, on hi'half _I tlw .\htska Nali',.c l lcallh B(ml d I:.+ l+illw 11. M¢(ku ,,,,',,. Ma',
13, 197").
I0. l'hc lhnhli_ 5;ct vi_ c _alt'llilt' (:+inls<_i liutn is ;t ptixatc ()tb{_|lliZ_llioti dcdit att'd to il,_l('_;llill_ the pu1_
lk scrx k es salt'lille lllalk('l, lls suh',.t fibers m]mb+.'r ]no+t' lhali 6,'5 st;tie, Io_ al and r+.'Ricmal ot Ranizali(ms (iul vt+th
conducting iY.,'t'r 20 public servicc ,,alt+llilt' (imHiHini( attions eXl)erimcnts ;';ill> lhc NASA .,\T_scii<,s salcllil_.s and
Iht' N:\,_:\,'( ',aiiadian ( :<millllllli(ations Tc_ hn,>h,g_ Satcllitt'.
I I. _A'ali('l +1_].M_lrlol_, "(]urr<'nl alld Fulurt' (;lllninuni(alilln++ Sat_'llitc ll,( ]lnoh)_rv," Pil'_(qllalil)n I+) Iht'
lnit'lnalillnal ,\silonaulicltl Iq'd('ialilln 2ihh (]oli_im+,,, l.isbon, _t.t)l(.nil)t,i 11175,
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¢'arlll I('Nninals, high-gain salellile antennas nlus( t)(" cmphly¢'d. 'I_l 1)c economical, lil¢'sc
IllllSl |)c Sllai-cd |)v ]al_C lllliil|)ClS c,t ilS(,lS :,11 IllalllV ](l(ali(ms. _,'[allV allICIllla bCalllS JlOlll ;I
singh" sal¢,llil¢, will 17i t)e r_'quired, along Wilh mclluods Ib, a(cmal¢'l', aiming the anlCm-
na and a lncans Jot swil(hing signals tr()lll ()11C I)Calll I(I al/OlhCl" bV IIIC_lllS ()f _1 svdl('|ling
sysl¢,m aboard the salellitc.
I iigh Gain Spacccrati Antennas
Thv possibility ot high ,_ain (large) spacccratl anletmas scorns anlilhc'tical Io lhc
tlolion of spacccrafl w_,igihin R, al mosl, a t_._w thousand kilograms. (lhc' standard _._-mclez
RrOlllld alllC'llllas w(,igh hundz('(ls of I}l(_,usands o[' kiloRrams.) Th('t(' is one large (iit]br-
('n(c, ]l(iwc,v(,r, i)('lW('('ll Ill(" sulta((! (itlll(" ('arlh _lll(t sp[ICC; namel), in Ill(" al)s(,n(_., otgrav-
ilv alld Willd t_)l'C(:s, ]argc st)act' _tnlciinas C_lll t)C I)uih Ilsill,g v(q'y light Sll'll('llll'CS.
"l'ilc" NASA et'l'_(i spacccraii incorporalcs a l()-Inctcr parabolic aillCiiila l]lal wciRhs
less iliaii ] 00 k_, I kilogranlsl alld is opt'ral)le io 10 (;I t/ I,Ri_gahci-l/I. This alilCiilla {(lllSisls
{)[ ii scrics of shl'cl ahllllilllllll ribs (in which is sllclched a incialli/cd llCl. l)uring launch,
Ihc _1111('ii11:1 is packed illl_> a silia]l COlilainci by wrappill_ lilt. ribs and illt's]l arotlnd a t'Cil-
Iral ]lull, |7tloii icacllill_ <)ll)il, ltic ribs arc it'lcased whclCllp(in Ihl'v linwilld iiil(i llieii
dt.pnoyt.d position. _-'()liter designs lleed invt.'sliRalion wiill llle olwciivcs i)f |illlilt,l iCdllC-
ili_ wci_lil, iiicreasillg l)t,rti)rmanct_, and incleasiii_ si/_.,.
Mulliph" tlt'atns
()lit" dill]tully wilh high ,_ain space(Tali aillelillaS is ilial lhey lii-oducc veiv nail_lw
ilcalliS aild Iiicrel_)rl" iiavt" Iinliied coverage on the carlll'S silrtitlc, For iliSlaii(c, lhc
ATS-6 ]0-111cIi,i atilt'|ilia lias a beaniwidih of ai)oul i" al onc of lhc opl.,laliilg flequciitit's,
_.(7 (',J i/. If such all alllt'llll_l is I() t)c uscftlliy eniployed ovci-lilt carltl'S Sili-tiicc visible Io
Ihc salclliic, ii will I)v lit'ct'ssar,v Io gent'ratc a iota] o| at)olil sevtqily-livc hCalllS and Io
shalC liic SllaCcciati alilClllla apcilllr(' alllOilg l|lCSC inally I)cains.
As all t'xalnph', ltic Massachusclls InsiilUlC o|Technoloks"s [,incohi l.al)oi-alory devcl-
_lllCd a 10 (;I I,_ Ions alllCiliia a])lllll (),7._ |licit.i- in dialilet{'r', illunlinalcd I)v 19 tt'cd holliS
aiid producing 1_.)]lCaliis--wlii(]i ill llie i;asl! of this an[oliila will just {ow'r l]lal pai-I of lilt'
('al'l|l visibh" |i(lln _coslaliOllaFy orbil. File salt'l]ilc IFallSlllilIcI" Call 1)t' ('olln{'cIcd |iv (Olll-
llland Io any (Olll|)iilaliOll o| Ihe feed horns. The entire alllelilia syslCili wt, ib_hs less Iha]l
70 k_. Silliiiar aiTan_ciiit!iils |night be madc |(it |argue parabolic retlccloi- alilelliias, lit lhal
taisc, _1 citlSlCi" (If aillcllna feeds would be locaied ai ihe tTiCllS (if file parabola. Ftlrllicl
(|cvcloplncnl o| l|lCSl" (Oil(Cpl.s is nl'e(led bloih io achieve the plo|)Cl |)cl|(irlnallCC ovl.'l
t|ic r_.'(liiilcd |)andwidlii and I_l niinilliizc efit'cls of file space cnviroilincnl sii(h as
cxl rclli ('s ( it It'llii)Clal lift',
[81 l'll'rision AillCiiil;l :t.ilninl4
Willl loda):s lechnolog'y, alining an antenna in space 1o a precision of {). 1 is relalive-
i) casy. |lowcvcr, the high _ain alllCnnas of anticipated flltilrl" spac{'crafl will |iavc
I)eainwidlhs of 0.1" io 0,$ ° and will iequire a pointing precision of 0.()1 ° or |)citer. h is
adValilaitgCOliS Io ailach lhc alllcnna rigidly io the spaceciafl and aim the slrtiCtilre as a
_%;_11.ml (;oililacl_, NAN Fi-2,1111I and NAS 5-740l 7. (7oiUl)Ulcr _ h',lle'. (7ol't._rali_m, Silvvr Splhig, Ma, vlalld.
1'{_7__.};,p. 1'3-F_tli_ 13-_1.
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whole. To pohtl the bealn accurately, tilt" satcilite's location in space must bt, kn<)wn, tlm
dilectional v<`'ctor to the calth dctt'rntincd, and then pitch, roll and _'_t+_t l+t+tl+t'tlX't'l"_ ])('l--
Ibrntcd. The spacccrafl location can be dcttumincd fly nmans <If a s+`.rics of ,_rl)tllldil);-ilStPd
ohst'rvations of salellitt" rangc alld l';-lll_(' l-;-tlu (It+bV fliP,IllS <`)f;.ill <m-board S<`UIS(IFsvSteln.
()Ill' <m-bl>ard s'cstt'+n ill a l,in+`o]n Expcrhncllla] ,_+|It'll+It', llsed :-l l)rt'+`'isiol} c}Ir<)l'lOl}i¢'tt'r
,tu+`l visual altd/ol" il+frarcd siRhtings <if lit<.' Still atlld lilt" t,arth's edgc. Thc satellitc ]lw_ll+()ll
was dclci-inim'd by noling tilt+ lime al whic}l lilt' tll)st'rvcd auglc bt'twecn lilt' Still allld
+'attit rcachct[ a givcn valuc.
:\ spacecraft with a large anlt.tlll:l cat+ l)t' turncd it+ space by lll(+3tllS ol ;_lll <mb<mt-d
nlolnt'nttult wh+`'t'] tlr ++'['+.+.'+.+is.Bv speeding ttp i)r shlwing down the wheel, pitch in:ancuvt'rs
can bt" made. Pivoling of tile vtheel axis c;,tlt product" i-_)ll and ya,+vln<_lions. Tilt, spact'cratt
IlItlS! :.llS,OI)(" kept ill proper orbital posili<m. This is often acc<mlplished by hvdrazm<:-
fuch'tI tinus+ors, i\llllllt)lli_l thrttmlcr svslelnS can alst) bc used and eh'ctronically powered
thrusters havc l)eeu considcrcd. (:tuTenl aiming techniques need to bc ilnpt+<_vcd at+t[
addili_mal rcscarch and dcvt,loptncnt htilialcd to provide sinlph" and aCCllratt" svstt'lllS.
()n-Board Message Swilchin g
Th<" usc of nlultiple bcaln high-gain satellite antvtmas will pill-rail tile use ol small t<`+i-
tninals. ()n the' othcl- hand, tilt' l)rt>l)lem rcntains of how to hltm-connect users on diffcl--
+.'Ill l)t'mns. ()no solulilln would bc to collct't tile signals fiom tilt' Val+itlus i)catns and
translnil Iht'nl Oll a Vt,lV wide-Iron<| downlink to a lalgc ground tcrnlinal. The hllcrCOll-
nt'clion could Iht'n lie nladc I)y c_)nvctllion;ll switching cquipnlcnt and tilt" signals
rcturnt'd 1o the si)act'crati ol+ ;t wide-band link with each sig.lla] addrcss<'d to lilt + pr<)pel
dtiwnlink Imam. This solution, while llcrnlitling rite complex switching eqt,ilmwnt IO tw
located on lilt' ground, would requiIe additional vei+y wide-bat+.d channels in tilt' ah+eadv
crowded radio frt'qut'ncy specl,tnn. Much mort+ powcr would I)c requir+.,d ill tilt' satt'llitc
alld lilt, existing ().25 st'cond lilllt ? delay would be doublcd.
Another s_dulion would be to F,crl<wnl the switch+rig in lhc satcllilc. ()hi-It)+lard
switching can t)t, done ill several ways. While switching al radio frequency woultl avoid lilt'
c<nnplt,xily of delnodulatitln, limc sharing in llte list' of the dlm*nlink tl';lllSlllill<`'l" would
I)t' very ditticult.
++\I+.alternative is dcnlodtHation of lilt, up-toni+rig signals to idenlify on which I)eatn
tilt' d<v,vn-going signals musl l)e placed it) reach I|I+`+inlend,t:d recipients. R<`:tctll adval+ct's
in high-speed digital signal professors oifi.u encouragement thai <m-board switching in
possillh,. Much re'st'arch and dcveh+pnlcnl is necded t<) arrive at practical soltllions and
eXl)crinwnlal verificatioli ill Hight +++illbc nct+t.SSal'y l)t'lot-e tht" ct)nununicati<ms hldttstry
Call risk <Jpciati<mal list'.
191 Higher Satt,llilc I'owcl
,,\ way to increase sat.cllile capacity or achiew a given capacity with low cost gl+_>tllld sla-
lions is to increast" l]w salellit<`? transmittt-r powtq. The trallsmiller |.:,owcr Olllplll iS lh<`'
product of the availat)lc prime power and tile e|ticicncy of the lransmillers.
TlletW in relalively litllt" possibilily of increasing the 60% efficitmcy oFCUFFent salt'llitc
solid-stale transtnillel-S operating at frcquencics up Io 2.0 (;tlz. AI frt'qut'ncies ahovc
9.0 (;llz, tr:.ts,rt'Iling wave tulles with efliciencit's of up to 40% aft" CO111111ollly llSt'd and
hlJ])r<+vt, tntmts in cflicicncy should be possible.
Signiticanl advances in the F_t'rtornlance of prime power systmns should 1)c i)<)ssibh'.
Most t'lll'l't'lll salclliles t'mploy silicon so]ar ccl] p_wtw syslcnls having efticicncics as low as
10%. The lightest weight arrangenlent involves solal+_rit'nted planar arrays having al)oul
I_XI'I.()RIN(; |111'i ( !NKN()WN ]'i_
20 walls of t_r_" I_l" kilogram. New designs having more clt]cicnt cells on lighlwcighl
th'xibh' NIIbMI'kHI's should t)(" at)h" to Produce 50 w_tlls 1)('1 kilogram.
11may als()})v ]u_ssiJ)h'Io dvvt,lop ('_'('lJhighvr pow('r pt'r llT)il,,veighlby mcalJn of laFg-
('_ solar array .slructurcs ov dvl)loy_'d parabolic solar conccliIrators which could b(" us('d
with (_il.h(,rsolar (xqls or l)crhaps Bravura ch)sed-cych" lurboallcrFkalors. l'lwsc me'arts Ibr
achieving larg('r sal('llitc ('al)a(itics :rod lhtus h)w('r ca]th ,_Htli()ll ((),Ms require new lech-
n,d()gy in [)rime poV,r('r(h'vic('s,in slrll(Itlr;ll(qiit:i('u('y,and in Hw high l)()',,_t('l'Irallslnilltq
(l(."_ri('('n thcms(qvvs.
Mod_dalio)) Sysicms
N,I()_I (())H('m[)orarv '_)'st('ms Cml)h)y anal()_ fr('qu('ncy m()(lHlati()l) v()i('(' and I"V |falls-
rob, Sill)l. F()r I:M v()ic(, syswms, a :')0 dB [d('cil)('l] p()wcr sigmd-lo-nob, c ralio in a ()nc-(v(h"
band is r('(Itfir('d, l)igiml Sl)C('ch Iransmissi()n sysl('ms op('raling al '.)400 l)ils p('r s('(()nd
wii}i v(')y ('flich'))l)))odlilaii())i svsl(')))s |)av(_ b('c)) d(')))onslral('d i() o[)('ral(' al ])OWl') sig-
ll;_t[-l()-ll()is(! i-_ili()s ()[ _0)()ll! <|0 (lB. Whih" (urrc)Hly lhcsc (ligilal systems at(" far I()o cosily
t() I)(' use(! it_ in('x|)('])siv(" m()l)ih' ((,rmh_als, rc(('n( advat_(cs hl the )(,(lL(((i())i ()| |h(' ('()NT
()I (lizilal c(]uil)mc)H i))di('ai(' lhc l)ossil)ility of ]()w-cosl voice synl(,ms ()l)(,rati)ig al _igififi-
(allll)' ]()w('r sigi/a]-l()-il()i:_(' r;iii()s.
()TI IF, R TE(:I tN()I,()(;Y ANI) PHENOMENOI,()(;Y
()lh('r iinl)r()vi'n_('nin alc n('('(lc(I ill satellite sllpl)()rl sysi('lns. Typi(al ()f Ill('s(' n('(,ds
ill(" lh()_<,(" li)r Ii<_lil('r, [()llg('r lift' (iii(k(.l-hy(lrogi,n) 1)all(!ri('_ ||lid _;lali()ll-k('('i)iil _ ('ligili('s
(i()ll ('ll_ill('_). tl('il('r tlii(l('l-Sl_ili(|iilg is _tls() iic('d('(I of c('riain sl)_l((" ])h('n()ill('ll_i nli(]_ as
slali( (|isihar_('s al _l'()M_tli()ll_(l'y ()rl)il ;til(l Ih(" ('fli'cls of rain ()11 lilt<' l)()]ari);ali()il ()1 radi()
si_ii;il_. 11 siiOll](t b(' il()t(!d lhal A]'_'l"s (]()M_TAR sail:lib(' (;tiii('_ r_ldi() l)r()l)_igali()ll
('xi)('liill('lil_,, ;il ll'_ (;!1/ ;ili(I ?)0 (;ilz. Ttlcs(" cxl)('i'iliilHil_, ;i]liiOil_h Sillglll_ll, sir(' lyt)hal
ot ill(" iilaii,v ('Xl)('i-iill('iils il('vd('d I() I)('li(,r iiii(l('rsiali(l p()i('iilially Iililiihig li;illii;i]
])il('n()lll('ila ....
17(.)1 (:()NCI,USI()NS AND RE(;OMMENI)ATIONS
TIll' (;()i))liliilV(', i)) ils diqit)er_)lioi)._, r('vi(,w('d a ntiliil)i'r o| |uiur(" (()miliuiiicalil)l)._
n('('(l_ whi(]l |)()l('lililil].v could t)e satisfi('d by satellite syslciiis. These in(:lude(t llCi'{ls ill
ti('l(l_ nlii'h _ts ('{ltic;lli()li, h(';illh ('_lr(" delivery, hazard warliillg, ll_tviga[ioli aids, s('_ilch aiid
1('_((1(', (,l(WllOlii(- mail d('liv('ry, Ii111(' itll(l |Tc(]ucncy dissi:nliilation, and gC()l)hysical ('×l)lo-
r_llh)il. Maily ()[ Iht'_t- ill(" t)ul)lic si!rvi(:(" nee(Is which mighi I)_ salisti('d t))' salcllii(" COlii-
llllllli(-_ili()il_i _)'M(!iilS il_ill_ tligli |)ow('r and a high-_ahi _tnt(-illla in lilt" spat(" s(,_lll(_lil,
|)('riiiillint_ ]ow-g_till, ]()w-(()_l ('arlh slalions. To lil_tkc _ut'h sysl(!llls l)Ossiblc, l('Cilnoiogi(_tl
_i(b,'_ili(('_ ii) llliillil)(';ill) ,_|)a(('ci-afl _llil('illia.% h)w-cosi _'allh sl;ilioiis, lalg(" saiclliiu |)ow('r
s,Vsl('iliS, tiigh-sl)('('d _|)a(('cra[l (olnililinications switches, and Sl)aC('crati _til)t)oriillg I('('|l-
liolok_' lii_ty t)(" l(,qilii('d. If(:osi.s can bc rt'(|iic_d b)' th(" apI_ili('alion ofn0w I(_(:hilology, lii_lii)'
l)()l(,nlial i)ut)li( service ii_ClS 11171ybcnetil Ironl ni:w salcllhc conlilluni(:;itions s('rviccs,
The (]()llliilill(!(! (onchldt's thai lhc l(:chi_o]ot_ .' Io inccl such ll(X_(ls is o[l('n il()l ])ro-
vid('d I)y ih(' |)liVlil(' _('(l()i b('(_lil_(' ()fih(- tcchni(:a| an(t coM i-iskn ii_volv('(t. The
(]()illlllill(!(" tllt'r(rl()r( • (()nihl(h!s l]lai Ilit'i(" is all approprialc tT(leral role and lll;).l NASA
shoilid 1('£4iilll(' ill(" r('s('arc|i alid d(,v(!lol)liloill aclivili(-s lic(,d(-d to pr()vid(" ill(" ll('W lech-
ii()l()_s_, '. . . .
As (Ii.s(uss('d carli('r in this report, il bccamc (lear as t|_(" (]omnliltcc |)rogr('ssc(l
Ihrough |Is (h'li|)t'ralions l|l;tl it would t)(," n,trilhcr |)ossil)h', nor al)l)rOl)vialc, f()r a 1)arl -
finn(', sllort-diirali()il (:oililllitlc(_ to lill(Icrlak(_ an c×haustive sit(ely ()f the |tlltirc n('('d._ ()f
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l|l(_ COlIIlll'y ill salellile Cf)lllllIUlliC_lliOIIS iIll(I[]ICIl [0 IIl_Ikc delai]ed l'C('t)llllliCll(I_llioilSOll
lhe basisof such a comprch¢'nsivc sltuly. ]llSle;4d, the (;Olnlllill('('focused upon classesoi
possible NASA programs (calh:d "options" in this report) and, accordingly, lhc
Commiltec's conclusions and recommendalions are ti)cuscd on Ihc options considered.
The (_ommiltee conclndcs lh;tl l|w Clll'l"Clll NASA salellilc communicalions program
(()|)lion 1) is inadequalc, I)olh in l¢'rms of meeting NASA's statutory advisory ol)ligalions
and in ternls of mt'eting the country's nt't.ds ill satellite communicalions research and
d,,'w:l_)pnwnl. S_mw mcmtwrs, tml no[ all, ti_'lt that if this opli,:m were the <rely <me lhat
tilt' nation was willing Io support, NASA should ch<q) out cnlirclv ot Illc slllc]]ilc (()lllJllll-
Ili('il[i_)llY; l('s('ill'('h :Ill(| (h'vclolmWnt tmshwss, :lad [|liH lcgisl;lti<m should l)e sought which
w_mld tcrmimm' NASA's slaltnorily mandatcd advisory responsibilities in sawllilc com-
illtllli('illions.
The (_Ollllllillt't • bt'licves Ihal the cxira tunding required I<_ slip|loft an cxp;:llldCd
NASA saudlilc communicalions lechnology progrmn (Option 2) is no! likely [30] lo l)r_ -
dl,ce enough returns of value t_) the ¢olmlry to make it worfllwhile pursuing, and !here-
lore retommends againsl it.
Option 3, a salellite communications lt,chnology Ilighl-lcst suppcwl program, has ccm-
sidcrablc appeal in t}/;al il is dircclcd a! removing a m@w roadblock in the way ot
im'rcascd plivalc sect_w illVt'SllllCI)l ill Sltlt'l]itt" ('OIllnltllliCa.lioIlS research and develop-
meal. Such a progrmn would til¢¢" many difficuhics in dcciding tidrly who shcmld Iw pro-
vidcd such t)pporlunilics and in resolving (|tt<!sliol_s tit" access 1o results, pal<'nl. [)v<_tccli_m,
g<)vcrnnwnt rights, and i)rolwicta,+y righ!s, It) ll:llllt.' it tt",,v. Th,.' (]Ol)llllilt¢'(. ill('lCfOlt' is
skeptical of the likely cfticacy of such a program and recolnmcnds ag:tinst pursuing it--
even if undertaken in c_miunction with ()ption l.
77_e Committee recommend_ that NA,% s, imDlement a_ ex]>erimental satellite communica-
lions ter'h_toh_L_, ./lit,4!/proq, ram (Option 4) using the sq/_;_?mrds p_vvided tO the.fir_t two
phases oJthe decision process discussed in the preeeding_ _ection.
"['h,II procedmc is inlendcd Io ensure Ihal Ihe (Omlntmicalions I('chno]ogO, program
iS l('Sl)OllSiV(" tO Ill(" i)crccivcd nccds _)t lilt' ('lllil(- salcllilc C'()llJlllllllit'illiOIlS C<HllllltlllilX, r,
inch!cling, in particular, polcnlial users of lilt' services. In addilion, il is Iwlicvcd Ihal ti)]-
lowing lhis proccdurt, will help fi)slcr Ilcllcr Iransilion of the CXl)Crimt'nlal rcsulls into
subsequent operational syslems.
1I secms clear to lilt' (;ommillee lhaI Iher¢. ill'(! _1 ntunbcr of [)olcnli_d pul)lic service
salcllilc communications syslems which should be invesligal_'d in derail tot possil)h- implc-
mt'nlation. However, as discussed in lhe preceding chaplet, [hc (_ommitle(" also 1)clieves
firmly Ihal NASA should pursue such a program only if one or illO1(, i)olential user groups
are involved from lhc slill[ oJ I)lC plogl';tlll through its tinish, and only it I11(, cSlilllillcd
costs and bencl]Is are thoroughly investigated and lhe balance indicau'sthe i:.ursui! ot the
l)rogram is worlhwhile.
The Committee reeommends that NA_S;4 implement an experimental public service ._atellite
communications .s),gtem progwtm (Option 5), provided that the [noA_am is carried out udn_,r
the entire [m_)_phase deddon process dis_msed in the preceding _eHion.
The (;ommillet" conch)des lh;tl lhe arguments againsl an op_'ralional public service
satellile communications svslClll program (Option 6) are compelling, d_at such an option
is imq)t)rol)ri,,te tbr NASA, mid rcc<)mmcnds againsl il.
In sunmlary, the (;ommiltce <m Sittelli_e (_<mmmnicalitms concludes that thcrc might
wcll bc a number ot public s¢'rvic¢" communications needs which sale, lille communicalions
,%}rsl,{'||l:_ {)t" |h(_ t'tHure could help satisI}'. Some o1 lhese services mind syslt'ms may ]-cquirc
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lhc d¢'vcl¢_l_mcnl of Ic'chll_dogy such as muhi-b¢'am s|_accclafl alllcllilas, low-co,st ¢'arth sta-
ihlils alid oil-1)oard sigiial swii¢'hizig--I¢'chlloh)gics which do liOl readily deliv¢' ti(lill CUl-
re'ill ¢)1- aillicii)aicd t'llllirt' aciivhii's o] the l)rivatc (Oliililillii(_iliOllS cOillinOll c_tri'it'r,_, hi
addilion, bcc_iil$¢.! of lhe di,saggrt, galc'd illilllll' oil those' wiio ll_.'c'd Ih¢,,s¢, _¢,rvicl.,s, Ihc_ [)ri-
will' si'clfir ()t[(,ll CIIIIII()I filid a i'(!iid)' m,lrk_<g which .juslifics lhc risk of ¢'xi)_illSiOli llllO lhc
i)lOViSioil ¢1| llil'sl" ll_.,w sl,rvicl,n, Thl,lO is, lhl!ll, Jill ill)l)i-o[)ri_lt¢' ll;'dctil] roll, in 1311 iissisl-
ilia llw th'v¢'h)l)nlc'ill ot il¢'¢'¢h'd ll'/qiliOlogy aild ili dc.'liiOliSli_lliii_ liC.'w t)ul)lk" scrvic¢'s fi>r
_i nlililciciil [l¢!liOd ih_tl Ihl'ir lisc,rn lil_iy t)¢" pCl¢ _ivcd as a vial)k' iiialkcq I)y lh(" I)ib,_il¢' s¢'c-
1()1; The' IIl()Sl ii[)])l()]Jl i;ilc sul)lJli¢!r elf Itle needed l('chnolo_.v is NASA.
7'he Committee recommend_ that a._ ._oon as possible, ,_]4SA, with the paeticipatitm ¢_]appro-
priate uwr A,toup_, begin c¢meeptual definition o.[hoth the needed technoh_Lq .' (Option 4) and
Ihe public servi¢e experime.t_ lhemseh,¢_ (Option 5).
'l'li¢'s¢' iiliti_liivc's _ill' ih(" Ih'sl si¢'l)S hi the hliplc'nlclltaiioll tit" the ( _'()illillilll.'("_, ()l)liolis
<t illld ,") which IllIV¢' I)(!1'11 d¢'scritlc_d i'iil'lit'l" in this l'l'l)orl. The r('l)orl _tlso d_'sclib_'s a
tJi¢)_.¢.'ss of ch¢'cks iliid I)il]iiill't's which lilt" (]()lillililll_" bt'iicvcs iii'¢." ¢<!sSl'llliliI Io i]l_inii_.'] th¢'
t'Xl/;llld¢'d NASA iolt" in lli¢! ll¢'i'dcd dil+t!ction.
Oocumenl1-29
Document title: John J. Madison, Legislative Affairs Specialist, NASA, Memorandum for
the Record, "Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) program meeting,
October 13, 1983."
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
BeA,'inning in 1980, NAXI t_'e.tered the communication,_ _atellite re_e.reh and deveh_pme.t area,
[i_:_t with a teehnol%9, drvelopment e/]Drt and then with a proposal fin a _ategite mission that would
demo.strate variou_ n_o tech.olo,q_.'_ and their abili(_' to worh tog.ether a_ a ,_ystem. 7'hi._ mi._,_ion,
k.own a_ the Advanced Communication._ Technolog)' Satellite (ACTS), was controve_ial within the
goverttmenl. 7"he lteagan admini,_tration helieved that it was the phvate ,sector'_ re,spo.sibili(_' to
inve_t in leehnoloAg, a.d demonstrate its capabilities in areas where the primary' pt?'_?[]_ wo.ht be com-
mercial, l'Tn several year_ during the mid-1980s, l_resident Iteagan feint.seal to app_vve./undi.g im
NAX4 to drt,elop ACTS. llughe._, the worhl's leading buiMer qf communications ._atellites, al._o
opposed the program on the A,_m_nd_ that it rq_resented inappro/.4ate government competition with
the private _eetm; Congres,_, with a Democratic m_',_p_fi(y, believed in a partnet_ship between the public
and private _eetm:_ wouht a,s.sure the natio. _ continued leadership in the communi_ations ,satellite
_e_tm: t",ach yem; for v'_,eml ),em:_, ConA_es_ restored fundingfor the mission to ,\(4 SA's budget. It was
not until early 1987 that the Heaga. administration reTmrsed its opposition to the proL, tam , allowing
it to mm,e Jorwa_d. A ('7_, ' wa_ finally launched in 1993. This memmandum captures the early _N;4._iA
iustification fin the prog_'am, a_ pre,_ented in a meeting of two staff memhe_:_ t?f the ,space ._uhtv, mmit-
tee o/the/louse ol lh.p,esentative_ (Rad I_yerly atul 77m C/ark), head t_/the ACTS" progwtm at NASA
fleadq.arte_:_ (Robert lxn,ell), and NA,S;-I '.s leAd.dative afJhi_:s _peeialigt (John Madison). 7"he pro-
Arram "_ rationale atul de_iA,'n underwent continual change until a proh.am tvncept acceptable to both
the exetutive b_vtncb attd ConL_'e_ wa.s developed.
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Memorandum for the Record
SUBJECT: Advanced (kmmnmication Tcchnoh)gy Satellite (A(71"S) program meeting,
()c(ober 13, 1983
PRESENT: Conmfittee star|:
NASA:
R. Byerly, T. (;lark;
R. l,ovell and.]. Madison
The p,rpos(" of lhe int't'ting was )o review lhe status of tlm NASA A( ;r]'s |)l'()g|'}t)|}.
l)r. Byerly started the meeting by asking a nunfl)er of (]ll(2SiiOllS it|)()lll lh(.' t;_tiiOll_tl [()l
NASA's l't'{()lllllti{llICn| lO d(.'vt'l()p _t stJC()lld g(.ncrati()ll sa(('lli((.' (()lltlllllnit'ali()llS tcclm()l-
og,3' base lot industry. The following points w('re established by tile ensuing discussions:
• Th(" Clll'l'Clll global shift I})rm [si(] a.n industrial t() an informati(nl-l)ased ec()n()-
my is creating a rapidly incr(,asing demand for capacily that (ailllOt I)C lllCt bv Ill(.'
satellite communication te(hnol()gy base devch)p('d by NASA and industry dur-
ing tlm p('riod oi 196'2 t() 1973.
• The satellite (onmnmi(ations industry is not monolith|(; individual s('('tors like
|hi' hit.l'([W_tl'C Illdntlf_l('llll(.'l'S,, Ih(' ('()llllllt)ll (.'a.l'li('l'S, lht' ;llll(2111tH Ill_lllll[_iti'ltllClS,
ill(' cIlll't'pl(.'lll'ltl'S who I)l'y llallSl:,ond(._rs Oll(.'-;:tl-_l-lilll(' alld re'sell |h('llt Aft(|
()III{'I'[S_ ]_t_tC tl_t(l little hlICI'USl ill maintaining an adva,wcd tc(hn(ll()g_' base.
• The U.S. competitive edge in the world market has been substantially er()ded t)y
tilt. Iransfer of techn()hlg, T to |()reign ntatlllfk_.ctur(.'rs; ill the U.S., only lw() ()tlt ()l
|iv(,/orm('r Ica&'rs in lhc world mark(-( remain (<)mpelilivv.
• "l'o pt'()Vi([(! l|I{" (.';llJllt('il",' t() lll('{'l lilt" [()I't'('_Islt!d d(qlt_ttld, NASA and industry over
the past five years focused rt's('ar('h on the precursor t('chnologi('s t(l an experi-
mental systcnl like A(;TS: tilt" tcclm()logk's inctudc frequency reuse th)(lugh spot
l)eam:% on-board switclfing and regeneration, data c()nll;,Fessh)It, modlflali(nt and
d(,m()dulafio)) and b('an) hopping; lltt'F(" is )tow a g()od ).)nd(:rslal)ding of Ill(- I(.(h-
nical risks r('latcd t() mos! of the tt'(hnologies.
• Thc ACTS program provides l()r tlm testing (){ many ()f these I(.(hnoh)gics in an
eXl)Crimcnlal network lhal (()itl(l l)(.. applied t() the next gcnerati(m ()1 ge()sta-
ti()nary comnumicali(ms sal('llites. It's [sic] objt,(tiv(, is to restore the preenfi-
n('n(,<" ()f th(.' U.S. industry in satellite communications.
l)r. Bycrly and Mr. l.ov('ll dis(:usse(I tile NASA et]oll that stlppOltS l]lt-A(:TS pF()gram.
It (onsis_s (,I lwo activities. One im_olv('s lmlda)n('nlal research aimed at dm'elol,)ing |he
([cvi('('S |Ill(| ])I'O('CSS(2S that suppot't till a(l',anccd (Oral)orients deveh)pm(ml activity and
SOllt(! highly sophisticatcd c()nIF, OllelllS whi('h are l)(_?r()ti(i llt(_ technical level ofA(:TS. The
s(,(:ond is directed low_tl(l developing coilt])otlelltS that will rt'duce some ()f |he te(]uli(a]
risk r('latcd to the A(H'S experinmntal flight systems.
I)r. l>)yerly inquired into tim status of the ACTS program, Mr. I,()vell indicated that
NASA was still involved itl tilt" s()ur(c sel(.(ti()n process. One pr()posal was submilted in
)('sp()ns(' t<) the RFP [request for pr<)posalsl which was issued in March I(,)83. Th(' pro-
posed industry temn is (onlpost-d oi RCA, TRW, COMSAT, Ihtghes and Motorola. R(:A
would act its ill(" prime contractor responsibh, for flw sa.tellile [)t).s and the integration ()f
thc A(:TS payload. The total estimated cos! <)f the A(71"S pr()gram is $334.0 milli(m.
Industry will (<)ntril)ute l() the ('()st ol th(, pr()glatn.
So/n(" dis(ussi(m aboul Ill(" i))ct'))livi's for industry l() pal-li(ipal(' i)l 1})("A(/I'S p)-ogram
fl)llo-,vi.d. Thc principal motivators are: a $I 0-$I 5 |)ill|on per year commercial (omnnmi-
cations market ill tlt(" 1990's, an opp(irmnily to It(.' lhc b('nefi(iarv ()f a good t('(hnology
trans[br ntechanisn) and goo(l proleclion ()[ l)r()|)rielary data amid _(II a(ti_ily inclu(ling a
II(lllll)t'l" ()[" ('Olll|)(?til()FS.
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No additional ilcms wen'e fcviewecl, l)n Byerly requested a two page progranmmtic
description <d the A(:TS program,
John J. Madison
Legislative Altairs Specialist
Document 1-30
Document tide: William Schneider, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance,
Science, and Technology, and David J. Markey, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Communications and Information, "A White Paper on New International Satellite
Systems," Senior lnteragency Group on International Communication and Information
Policy, February 1985.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This rrport _ets ]orth the reasoni,g behind the November 28, 1984, det+'rmination tO' Preside_t
leo.aM ReaKa. thai "separate iuternational cammunication,_ satellite systems are wquired in the
_alional i.lete_t. " (A eo/o' _] the delrrmination is included in the exelqpls _om lhi._ report.) 7"hi_ deci-
sion martwd the end o/an era during which it was U.S. pofio_ to protect the po, ition o['INTI+'I.SAT
as the only provider o] global point-to-point communications via satellite.
A White Paper on New International Satellite Systems
Senior lmeragency (;rout+
on [x)ternali<mal Communicati<m
and Information Policy
William Sctmeider, Jr'.
U,_dcr Scct-etary lbt Security
A++.sJ.stamc, Scie_)ce, aml 'Ft'chn+d+_g O,
[ !,S. l)epartment o1+Sial(!
David J. Markcy
Assistant Secretary for
Commm)ication,s and Information
U.S. Department of Commerce
February 1985
[ 1] hmoduction
Since 11183, scveral U.S. lirms have filed applications with the Federal
(;<mm)mficali<ms Commission (FCC) to establish international communications satellile
systems in additi(m to lhe glot)al system owned by the [International] Telec<mmmni-
cations Satelliw ()vganization (INTEI.SAT). Orion Satellite Corporation, Inlernalional
Salcllile, Inc. (ISI), and Cygnus Corporation propose new transatlantic e<mmmnications
sysWms, and R(;A American Communications, Inc. (RCA) has applied m use capacity on
a I!.S. domestic satellite to provide international service. Pan American Satellite
(:orporafion (PanAinSat) proposes to establish a system which would serve l+atin America.
In addilion to existing and planned regional satellite systems independent of INTELSAT,
<)ther Iranso((_ani( salellile syslems are under consideration at)road. Approved and pro-
posed I]ansallantic submarine cable communications facililies, many of which arc actual-
ly or potemially comt)elitive wilh INTEI,SAT, are pending as well.
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Focus of Report
r|']lC filing of L!.S.--lmst'd satclliw sysl¢'m al_l_lications with the F(:C l)ronq)t¢'d actiotl by
Ihc Executive branch, which has special rcspcmsilfilitics iu this I]chl unch'r the
Commuuications Satellite Act of 1962, as am¢'udcd (47 U.S.(L 701 ct st,q.) including the
responsibility to dctcrmint, whether addilicmal U.S. illl<'rmttional salcllik" syslcms arc
"required in the' national intt'r_'sl." The Senior Intcrag¢,nc) (;rou l) cm lnt¢'rnati¢nml
(]ommunicati¢m and Intbrmalion Policy (SIt;) rcvk'wcd U.S. intcruafional sawllitc policy
to determine whcthcn and uudcr what conditions, authorizing satellite, systems and ser-
vices in additiou to INTEI+SAT would be: (a) consistent with prewfiling U.S. la_s; i)raclicc,
and intt'rnational treaty obligations; (b) compatible with sotmd torcign policy and
telecommunications policy goals; and, (c) in the U.S. national imerest.'
[2] Tlw Ex¢'culivc_ agencies represented ¢nl Ihe SIt; tmd¢'rtook a study and re,ached a
ummimcms position in favor of new entry, sut_jocl 1o certain limitations. A rccomtmrnd,t-
tion subscqtxcntly was made to the I'residcrnt by the Secretaries of Stair" and Commerce.
The Prcsidcnl determined ¢nl November 29, 1984, that inlcrnational satellite systems sc|)-
aratc tiom INTEI.SAT were required in lilt' [!.S. national inlt!Ft'M, subject to certain ccnl-
ditions. Spccilic criteria relating to Ihe Prcsi<tcnl's detcrmination were Ihcn tinwarded to
the F(]C by the Secretaries of Colllll]ClC._? and State jointly. S¢'e Appen<tixcs A and B.
This teporl provides background intormation regarding lh¢" President's detcrmina-
lion, and it also pr<widcs information on important regulatory and other parallel mea-
sures which arc dcsiFable to ('llSIIFC thai the Executive I)ranch's timdamenlal policy
go_tl--_lll t'flicicnl and Fc'sl)Ollsi',;c illl(qllHli()ll_ll ('IHIIIlIIItlicHIioIIS ('llVil'Olllllt'lll--is
achit'vcd. The" discussion hcrc focu,s¢'s ¢)n the tmtjor ¢ommunicalions and inlOrmation P<d-
icy issues raised 1),,,,the applications belorc the FCC. It addresses commercial, lradl,., allcl
]('g;.I] Ill;lll('l"s, and also ¢'xalnin¢'s major U.S. f<lr¢'igt] Policy inlt'rests alld conccrn.s.
This report d<lcs not seek lo resolve all of lhc questions |]IHI Ilave ])c(q) raist'd l'Cgdl'd-
ing new int¢'Nmtioual satellite systems tlor to direct action t7y the I:C(] on Sl)ccific pt'u¢liuff
applic,ltiovls. II ctocs, however, consolidalc much of the exlculsive analysis that has bt'cn
utld_'rlakcvl by tlw Excwutiv_ • Inam+la aud s¢'ts fbrlh Ihc rcquirctm'nts applicat_h" to any SVS-
l£'lll lilt' F(](', Ill_l}' cvcutually authorize.
The Ex_'cutivc branch has concluded, in brief, Ihat il is technically ti'asiblc, econom-
ically desirable, and in the national inter_,s! to allow nt+w entry by [!.S. iirms illlo the it_tcr-
lultioua] salellitt, field. Customers should Ix+ aftbrdcd both lhe llC%Vn_+lViC(' options mid
the Ix'ncfits <d"COml)t,tition among ctistomizcd scrvicc providers that ucw ¢+ntry promises.
This can I)_, acconq_lishcd, tiiort_ovt+r, +++hilt+ maitHail]it]g 11]_['tcwhni<al intcgrit', of the
INTEI,SAT ghd>al mystcm and avoiding +ignificailt coot]omit hmm Io that systt'm, t '.S. for-
eign policy, and itltcrtialional cotnmtmicatiou+,, and inl¢)t-itlalion policy, r¢+qttir¢, a contilt-
u¢+d strong vl,tti<_t+al contmitmcnt to INTFI+SAT a_+ "a singh, global ¢ommt+rcial
lt+lt'i<lnlitiUliit+itioi],_ satcllil¢+ [3] S_,'st('ili +is [)_trl <if _tii iili[)rovcd global tclt'coiiiliitliiica-
tioilP+ ilt, twork. '+_t>ltil olir II_ilioHa] coilliliitllit'ill lo IN'I'H+SAT and oihi,r iliil)orl_tiil g<)_il_+
c_iii |)t" atcoililiiOd_ilt,d, [)rovidc, d Ih+tl lit'w hll_'rii_iliilli_ll Salcllilt, ,;yslt'ili,,+_ilid sci-vi<cs _ll+t+
auth<irizt'd aild rcglilalt,d ahllig Ihl_ Iint!s disctis,_cd iii ttiis i+t,i)orl.
I. The SIt; is ct)liit)lint.d ot it'l}lt._t.ntali,.t.s ot lilt" l)t+l.+arlllil.tllS ol Start +, JtiMict'. l)t+li+llst -, alld
(]Olilliit'it t'; I|it' ()tth cs +_t M_ili_lgt'lilt'lil and llll(lgl'l. _lit'li(t ' aiid "|t'¢|iiiliillg,, P<dit+, l'olic_ [)t.vcloiJiiit.ni. and
lilt" I'..'q. Tr+ldt' Rt'iSlt++.t.litalivt.: lhl' Nlili_ilial _t.t+iiiilx (]ountil: tilt" (]t'nlr_ll Iiiti;llib_t.il_t. A'd.t'iic'.: Iht' t!._;.
ltitilrnialioii A_t'IICV (USIA): lh<' fl*oaid h>r hilt'lliationa] Bro_id(a_.lillt4; th< + A_I+II('V t<)i hitl+iil_ttioilal
l)t'vcloi)ilil'ni; _iiid lilt' N+ltiotlal At'roiiautic'.; alid ."_ll_ict. AdiiiiiiiMralioii. ([<liiillit.l_ t> ail(I _.tlilt' I <t-t hail ttit' _1(;
_iil(l [_L-_t P+t'lVt'_+ tl_+riot' t'hdil\
7. ]ltl'tilnbh'+ :%._lt't'lllt'llt Rt'l_llill_ 1o tiic ]lllt'lli_itillll_ll Tt.lt+COltllllilnil;iliilli _, Satcllitt. ()l_ltlli/;llioll
"IN'I'H,SAT." I'IA:'.; 77i32. 23 LST 3._13, !_._14 ( 1973i,
F',xI'I _ iRI Ni ; ll I1( [ !NKN_ WeN I '_¢-)
Spoci[ically, Ibis i-el)ml c_mcludcs thai-
(a) Additional international mm'llile facilities should 1)t' pt,rmiit('d 1)v the FC(], pro-
vidcd the'), salisl)' collv('nlional rt!ff, ulaic>ry rcquiremt'nls, t)ul th(' nc'w (,lltlalliS lnl.ISl [)("
restricted to l)rt)viding ('nslomizcd st'trices, its defined in this rcp<)rt. When <)no or more
auth<)rities abroad authorizes tim{+ of such new syslt'nis, the [!nited Stair's with tllosc
auth<)rities will t'ntt'r into consuhati<+n procedures with INTH,SAT undt+r Arlicle XIV(d)
oI the INTH,SAT Agl't,'t'lllCDl. (',<)nslrttclion permits may I)( + [ssn('d at lhe ('onclusioll of
r(',+.+tflatory pr<)('t'edings to th<ise applicatlts ni(+('ting the publi(' htlcrcst requii'cments <if
lh(' (:omnnlnicalit)ns Act. Final licenses and attthorizati()ns sh(ml(l not be issticd, h<iwt'v-
.t'r, )mill attcr INTEI,SAT c<lnsifll_tlion is completed.
(b) The FC(; sh<)uld t.xamint" alh)wing U.S. carriers and ust+rs in at-ldiiit)n to th<:
(;onnnunicati<)ns Salt'llil¢" (',orp<)i+alion ((]omsal) to have cosl-t);:tst'd a(-t-t, ss to Ihc
INTEI,SAT spat+t! st!glntqit for cuslomized services. This malit'r can l)l+ pursued on a liar -
alh'1 track+ +is lh(! F.cnding ;tl)])licalions are bt+ing processt'd, h_ixs,cvt,r, and dot's Dol COll-
siillll<: ;i <rind)lion to F( ]('+ a(liOll Oll thest' applicatit)ns.
(<) The t!nit('d ,<';tams sliotfld, and will, maintain )Is full commitment Io INTEI,SXF,
whih" [)('rmiltitlg l(,(htl<)logy_hivt'n competition in this impt>rtatlt st'cl<)r 1<) ¢"+,¢>lx't'....
I 5til Conclusion
The al)l)licati<)ns it) establish additional international sate'lille svslctns now I)t'ndhlg
t)¢'t0r+." l|it" I;( ;(; prc'sclilt'd t_)tlr ol)li<lns+ Tile F'+×eculivt" I I)ranch] conld havc it'Cllllilllt'll(i-
t'<l (1) al)proval, (2) iI('nial <if ih0 applicaii<)ns outright, (_+) al)l)r<lval of the al)l)licalit)ns
sul)jcci i_> siiccitlc (lilaliticali<lns, fir (4) fui+iher sttidy, with ])oslp<lli('liit'iil ol aliv dt,cisi<)n
t0r all indt'l]nilc period. The illiallilli<)llS vicw alilOllt2 , iht' lilt,lll])t'l a_('llCil's rcl)rt+s('nlt'd
Oil Ih(' SIt; is thai il would I)c ill ihc U.S. Ilaliolia] illl('i-t'sl l(i allow iit'w [irovidcrs <)tililt'r-
li;tliOlial salcllilc t]l(ililit's, I)l_lvid+,!d INTEI+SAT wcrt, 11ol c×p<lst'd to Sigllit]Clilli (,coii<liliic
h;irlil. Tht" Prt,sidt'iil's (IcIt'i inillaliOli rt'tlt'cts this vit'w.
Tht'rc is Silt]]l.iclil risk of signiticanl advcrst" econoitii( illipacl <)11 INTEI,<_+,\T to liiak+<'
]llaiik('l al._l)r<lv;i] of iiliresil+iClt'd compt_lilioil illiWiS¢', h wolild also> lit' l)r('ilialurt" Io lakt'
Silch _i sit" I) lilllil iht' rt'siihs of cosi-I)ast'd acccss, lit'w Ill)iT optic cal)lt's, ;)lid llt'w
INTEI+SAT St!l'Vi(+t+s are t+ully ('vahial('d. Unrestricted ciilr.v could ii]liinalt, ly ilil(t+.'rlililit'
tilt" t,(:t)ilOiliic init_grii) +of this inlportant international cnterpi+ise, which would be incon-
sistent with iht" U.S. national inlerest.
l Sll The case has llOl b0cn made for flail), disapproving the existing applicali<+ns. The
ii<.+x', t'lilranls have lli;idt" a thr_.sh<)ld slit)wing thai services the)' prol)OS(+ al'(" )lot Now avail-
alih" till conlparal)l(' It'llllS. [,inliicd entry along lhc Iiil('s t-l,COlllliii-lidt+d wotild ttlrlht!r
l_r.S, inlClilalional lradt" inlercsis, promote technological progress, and lie consiSlclll wilh
national dc|i'iisc and st, ciii-it), init'rests as ++'ell. (liven these linlitalions, and the rt, SlliCliOns
likcly I<) I)c plact'd till all), llCW salellite s+Vslenl t)y telecollalillillicalioiis authorilit's atiroad,
ihc risk of aliv signit]cani adverse impact on INTEI,SAT is exceedingl)' small.
I:ln-ttiiT study and resnlling delay [are] liniikel)' Io |liriher th(" nalional hllcrt'sl. ()v('r
a vt';ll +<if cxicnsivc sit)d), arid review by the P'×ecutive branch has already taken place. This
i(;Vii'w has liOt icsulit, d in ih(" sulllliisSiOll of credible illt'<)liiialit)ll siipplit'd I)v allyOli(',
inchidill/_ INTEI,SAT alld (]omsal, which detnonstrat('s phlusibh" ad'+'el+s( • (+tti'cls. Th('rt" is
ii<l basis It) aSStllll(' Slich int_lrlilalion will be |+<)rthconihlg.
,_alt'lliic svsl('iils t,lllail signi[]canl lead iilil( +, TilliC is rcquircd Io st'(lil-t" Ih¢' r('qnisiit'
s]);,i(('cratt, I<l it'_ich ]alillC]i agrt_('ilit'lllS, and Io s<:cilrt! <)pt'ialilll. _ aiTall_t'llIclilS. U._. il'12 ,-
illal<)rv pr(l(l'diirt's art" _,cill'ia]lv mort" lime coilSlilllillg Ihail I]lost" a])r<)ad, whiTe dcci-
si<liis caii SOliit'liint's tit" reacht'd aiid iitipl<:mt_iilt'd wilhl)iil I]ic r+.,<_illalor+x I)i-oc/'('dili,_s
and I)i-_llraclt'd ct)url al)pcals characlt'rislic tit 1!._. rt,_tllali()li. (]_lllsti]ialioil wilh
INTEI,S/\T is alstl r(,qnircd, l{vt'n xvt!i+t" lli(" pl_ndiilg al)p[icaiions al)pr<lvt'd I)v Iht" I+'(]( ',
ilnilicdiait+])', st,rvic/' woiild iiol I)(, availai)]t" tilr SOl)l(' lit)it'.
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(;overnment should nol stifle p,ivatc entrepreneurial |nil|at|yes absent sound and
c<mq)elling public policy reasmls. Such initiatives should not be discouraged when the ser-
vices proposed could prove ot value to customers, improve their I)]oductivitv and elli-
ciency, and thus enable American t]rms to compete more effectively both at ilome and
abroad. The public policy case lot continuing the st|It\IS qllO alld tla'tly prohil)iting addi-
liomtl international satellite systems is weak. Simply the pendency of U.S. applications has
caused INTEI_SAT to accelerate plans fin special Ires|tess-oriented services and has pre-
cipitated a beneticial review of c()nq)etilivc conditions in the internati(mal satellite field
generally. Further study and inevitable delay are unlikely lo yield public dividends (om-
ii|ellStll+D.Ic with the economic costs imposed.
1521 h in the view ()f the Executive branch that tilt" national interest will be tml]lered I/'¢
approving additional int,.wnational communications satellite systems subject to limitations
designed to minimize adverse ¢'t[_wts on INTEI+SAT. Spe(:ifi(all}, additional systems
should be restricted to providing services through the sale or hmg-tt'rm lease of transpon-
ders or space segment capacity for communications not inter((mnecled with pulllic-
switched message networks (exct'pl lot emergency neslorati(m service). (:onsuhati<m must
l)e undertaken wilh INTEI,SAT pro-st,ant to Artide XIV(d) of the l)el]nilive Agx+eelnelll.
[531 Appendix A
[54] THE WtlITE I it)USE
WASHIN(;T()N
November 28, 1984
Presidential l)ctermination
No. 85-2
MEMORANI)UM FOR TI tE SECREIARY ()F STXI'E
THE SECRETARY OF C()MMER(:E
By virttte of the authority vested in me by the (kmstitution and stalutes ot +the United
States, including Secti,ms 102(d) and 201 (at of lilt" (kmmnmicati<ms Satellite Act of 1962,
as amended (47 U.S.C. 701 (d), 721 (at), l hereby determine that SCl)a+rate international
contnnmications satellite systems are required in the national intercsl. The Untied Slates+
in order to meet its obligations under tile Agreement Establishing the International
Teleconmttufic:ltions Satellite Organization (INTEI,SAT) (TIAS 7532), shall constth with
INI'EI+SAT regarding such separate systems as are authorized I)y the Federal
(:<mnnttnications (:onmfission. You are directed jointly to inh_rm the Federal
Conunlmications Conunission of criteria necessary to ensure the United Staten tlleets its
international ol)ligatiotls and to further its telecommunications and t}.neign policy interests.
This determitlation shall be tmblished in the Federal Register.
[hand-signed: "Ronald Rcagan"]
I{XI)I_(_RIN(;ItlE 17NKN()WN 1,_1
1551 THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washinglon, D.(:. 20230
Novcmlx'r 30, 1984
Ihmorahl(" (;e(>rg('P.Shuhz
S('(r('laly()l_lal(!
WashinRmn, 1).(:. '20520
l)cm (k'orgc,
Tht'rc art' I_A'I) Ill_|[[tt'lN rt'gartling lh(" F'resi(h'nl's d(.tcrminalion on nt'w inlernalional
satcllile syslcms that nc('[I to I)(" clariti('(I. Firsl, lhc While lhmsc has dirt'ctt'd our d('parl-
merits t<_cxamin(' lh(' s(op(" ot INTEI>;AT's F,ricing tl('xil:,ilily. Second, our position on Ihc
rclalcd issm' o1 direct access to INTEI.SAT should he mad,." clear.
"l'hc ('x('t'ulivc agrc('nlcnl cslahlishing INTEI+SAT generall) rt,quircs mfiform pricing
Ihr cach scrvicc. Prices on heavily tratfickcd rtmles may now exceed costs whih' thosv <)I|
Ihin roul('s may h(" I)('low ('(>sis. It is nol (lear whether INTF, I+S/\T could vary ils i)ri(cs
tm(h'r the agrt't'm(!nl. I1 INTEI+SAT's prices on busy rou+les are ardli(iall_ int13.1('(I, incfli-
ci('nl ('Hlry 1)) nt'w sysl('ms may t)c inth,ce(I. INTEI,SAT shoult[ have pricing [h,xihilir,.
v,'h(!n (:_mfronlcd wilh aclu:l] or pol/'nlia] ('(mlpelilion :is hmg as the prices il /halgCS
('()x,'UI"its ('()SLS.
A rc]al('d issu(' is dircc|, cost-based access Io the INTELSAT space scgm(ml. Alh)wing
users :rod carri('rs in atldilion I() (:omsat lhc oplion Io deal widl INTH.S/\T directly f()r
coml)clitiv(' services would l_)sl(,r ((mll)elili(m based (m sup(,rior c[Ikiencv and [oresighl
and l('nd I() (l('t('r ('ntry I)y int'fli(it'nl systt'ms.
Wc sh(mhl e-.:l,-<'ss clear F,ositi(ms on thcs(' two important t:,(fints in thc tiling we ,,+'ill
soon hc sulmfilting.ioitHly to Ihc Federal Communications (:ommissi<m. I have asked
l)avc .MalkC_ Io work wilh Bill Schneider Io ensm+e this is throe.
Sincerely,
[hand-signed: "Mac"]
Secretary of (:omnwr(:('
((: (:hairman Mark Fowler
1561 T I t E SE(:RETARY OF STATE
WAStIIN(;TON
1)ec¢md)cr 20, 1(.)84
Dear Mac:
Thank y<)u f<)r your h'ller of November 30 relating to the President's delcrmination
on inlcrnali(mal satellite systems separate from INTELSAT. Your understanding conforms
with ours lhal the _,Vllile thmse is interested in having us examine the issues of pricing
tl(,xil)ility in INTEI,SAT and dir('ct ac(:ess to INTELSAT by users <)tht'r than C()MSAT.
We have received, and a,-e reviewing, the draft paper i)repared by NTIA INalional
T(q('(+ommtmi(:alions and Inlormation Administration] whi(:h might he s¢'nl .j(finlly t()
I1_(" F(:(:.
] .r')_ TI II. } | INI( )RY ( _,t,"_ \I'EI .I .ffE (]()MMI rN I( L\'I I( )N_
The ()FIiccoI the (:oordinator l_)rInternational Conmnnlication and Inlbrmalion
P_dicy, together with others c_nccrncd with the issue, arc working with v<n r statt_ I these
and additiomd issues emanating From the Presidential detmminaliml.
Sh.crtqy yours,
Ihand-signed: "(;corgc"l
(;eorgc P, Shttltz
The ] h>noral)h"
Malcolm Baldridgc,
_{!C]'('I_I.I'V Of ( _<Hllll|t?rc(_.
cc: (:hairman Mark Fowler
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Tt IE I)EPARTMENT OF (_()M MER( _1'_
Washington, 1).(_. 20230
Novcml)cr 2X, 19_4
ltonoral)le Mark S. Fowh'r
Chairman
Federal ( ;ommmd(+ations (:ommission
Washington, 1).(',. _()55,1
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Prcsich'nt has (Icterminc(t thai scl)aralc intern,ttional communications satcllit{'
s+vslen+s art+ reqttircd in tlt(' national illl,t'ft+S,l. I[(" has also dircctcd lll;J.t w(' inl_)tm the
Fcth'ral (:ommtmications (',<nnmission of crileria necessary to (+tlS,tLl+(' the [+nited St,tlt.s
mccts its intcrnatiot+ud obligations and to ltn+thcr its tcl¢'commtmicali<ms and fi)rcign p<d-
i(v int('rt'sts. Prior to final auth<)rizati<)n })v the (;<)mmission of _t]_yr systt'ms, to assm-c Ihal
tt_e Unilcd States met'Is its obligations as a Party It) the AgI'CC'IIIt'III Establishing l]lu
internati<mal +Ik'h'c<mmmnicafions Satellile ()rganizalion (INTEI,S,'\T) (TIAS 7532):
( 1) t*ach S)',";,IClll is I() I)C rcsll+iCtt'd Io providing St'I'ViCt'S through flit' s:tl(" <If" ]l)tlg-lt't'lII
l,:.'_Is(' <)f ll'itllSl)<)ll(|ClS <)1 + s|)3t('c st+glll('lll capacity tor (+O]llllltllli('ittiollS ll<)t Jilter-
connected with l)ttblic-switched message networks ((,xtt,l)t for t'lnt'lg¢'llC+x i('_,tor:t-
ti<m scrvicc); and,
(_) 1)IIO O1" lllOl'(' [+,)l't'i_ll authorilies art" to atnthorizt • tt:.;t" of.t'ach _;ys|(']ll alld ('III('I lilt()
consultation proccdtncs with the t hdtcd States Party trader Article XIV(d) of I]_¢'
INTEI,SAT Agrct-mcnl Io cnsttrc technical c<mll)atibility and to ax'_fid significatn
('('()] l()llli(" hill'lll.
The ]h+csidcnl's dclernfination, its conditi<)ns, and lht'se ctilcria art' prenfiscd <m .fur
review of the issttt's l)rOmF, tcd by the applicalions now belorc the Connnissi<m. If propos-
als std)slantially diflerent arc li)t+thcominff,, ftttlher Executive Branch review may I)¢'
rcquircd.
The (;onmdssion shotnld allbrd ittlcrt'slcd parties an opportunity to sul+)nfil timely (<nn-
mt'nts on lhe l)¢'nding af)plicatiotls in view of lhest. Ext*(lnlivt' lhanth rt,commt,ntlalions.
[_:XI'I ,_)RIN_ ; "11 IE 1 TNKN( )WN l ._{
A memorandum of la_' co]_cevning ,&]licit" XIV ut lhc INTEI,SAI" A_vccmcnl is
cHcl,,scd.
Si_lcercly,
lh;md-signcd: "(;c<,rg(' P. Shlfltz"l
_('('l'(!l;ll'V ()] NliiI('
[h;md-sigJwd: "'Malc,,Im l_,;ddridg,."l
_('(TI'I;IIV ()t ( :()lnlll('l-C('
EHclosurc . . .

Observing
Chapter Two
the Earth From Space
i)y Panmht F. Mack and Ray A. Williamson'
l'r(igralns lhal apply the cap<lhililies of sl/acc lt_chnoh)gy 1o nl,c(Is Sil(ii as lelecoin-
illnllicalil)ns 7t11(1 Eilrlh ohsc, lVali()n have hrollghl sociely InallV Cttll(l-tq(, heliCl]ls.
l lowt'v('r, dcvel()ping lir(!jl'cls Io realize lhose henetlls has nol hc('ll easy, parlicularly tor
Earl h ohsi'lVal ions. Applicalions prll/._lalns have neither lilt" glan/llr and high-l)rot]le polil-
ica[ illipacl ill hlllnaii sl)acellighl llOf IIR" well-_wganizl.'d advo('acy COlilinllllity of the s,i)ac('
scicnlisis. NASA, which is l)rinlarily a research and develol)nlcnl lt_ency, has had all
mnhivalclil r('lalionslii l) wilh lhc al)piicalion of space Icchnolog_/' to ]':mlh-hound iiccds.
Whilv Ihe space a_('lWV wel(olnes; opporlunilies Io prove hs %qthle in (oncrele ways, ii l('c-
()14iiizcs Ihal all al)plicalions t)rograln lhal has colnpleled devel(ll)nlenl and Clll0red Ih('
opcralional phase inllSl nsually he iranst_'rred t]oni NASA Io anolher a_elily (il I() 1t pri-
Vale s('ClOl ilSl'l: I1()I surl)risingly, HAS:\ sial] have often pret_'ricd Io work lill lhose pro-
_,ralilS lhal (1o llOl tiavc Io hc "given away."
.,\]ihough s(i('illiti( and lechnolog, ical ti'asibilhy and acconll)listnncnl arl' essenlial 1o
sl)ac(, applicalions, Ihey are ollly I)arl Of lhe story Tensions helw(,ell NASA, as developer
of space capahililies, and lhe organizalions or e×perts who aclually dislrihnle or ilSU lhc
services or data provided hy apt)licalions satellites also play an inlf)orlani l)ari in lhe SllC-
I'('ss or []lihlr(" el' aiipiiCilliOllS, l)rogralllS. To givt- a few exallll)l¢'s, s,[)lll(' scil'nlisls WCle excit-
cd ahoul lhe dala lhal meteorological satelliles could provide, hnl lheir enlhusiasnl
played a snulllcr role in the origin of ihe Television [nfi-,ired ()peralional Salellile
(TIR()S), lh{" []rsl lilvleorological salellile project, ihan did nlililary needs. The Kennedy
adlninisllalion crealed lhe (:olnniunications Satellite (]orporalion ((:onisal) :is an innov-
aiivc way el hringin_ a ilew tTirln of inlernalional leleconlnlunicalions inlo being, hul lra-
dilional (onlnlllnicalions c<)rporalions steadily increased their role ill satellite
conilnllnicaiioils.-' NASA predicled large benel_ls []onl crop siirveys using dala I]oni [_]arlh
r('SOlllTe salt,ililcs, hul agi-iCllilllial scientists look a diftt'renl al)proach io using the dala
Ihan lhe <ill(, NASA had developed.
This hroad theme--lhal diftTerenl players have different goals and expeciations--also
has hccn l)layed oul in specific controversies in different applications projects. Usnally al
abolll lhe lilne of the lallnch of all initial satellite, progranls have often experienced dis-
pules over whelher to conduct further research or to develop an operalional program
inlnledialely. Knowing Ihal lhe research satellite would set much of ihe pattern for lheir
operaiional program, lisc'ls have often sought more control over the initial developmenl
of/in apt)licalioils salellile than NASA wanted them to have. Finally, progranis have su[k
Ik'rcd from nmior conlroversies over the proper role (if tilt" governnlenl in lheir develop-
inenl and operalions. (:ommunications satellite systems became tile province of priwlle
industry, hut ,,nly aller a I)illi,i debate concerning whether or not to lllrn tile fiuils otgov-
el-lllilenl l'es('{ll'('h over Ill private profit. Congress in the early 1980s rejecled ill nil
I. Hie alilh_lrs Ihallk DOll IIIcrs(h, Russ Koltler, Rob Masters. alld Brt-ill Sniilh |iii- providing iil|Oi-
niali_)ll alid Fllillk F.d('il t_)1 his review el a dlatl o| ibis essay.
7. (]Olllllllllli(aliOllS satcllilcs fir(' {lis( ussed in (]hapll'r ()llrc'; ltll-'_ all" illl'illilllll'd ill lhis chapll'F i)nl'¢ ill
ll'llllS ot Ihcii i_.laihllinliip Ill I;.allh (d)scrxalion salellile |)r()_ralli_,.
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uncertain terries proposals Ihat meteorological satellites be commercialized. The debate
al)oul tLIrnhtg Earth vesom-ce satellites over to private industry ]+as been lonR and contro-
versial, and by the lime privatization occurred, the U.S. system had t,dlen behind the Male
()f the art in important aspects. This debate als(+ contribute(I to lhe slow development of
conunercial remote-sensing satellite syslems. (The "vahu'-adde(l" business fiw (lata liom
mele(+rol<_gical and lan(l remote-sensing slttellites has been more comtnercialh/su((essful.)
Meteorological Satellites
Today's widesl)read lamiliarity with satellite images used t)y television weather t0re-
casters encourages the assumption that meteoroh+gical satellites were an eagerly awaited
breakthrough in the trchn(dogy un(lerpinning weather lorecasls. It+ fact, at the start of the
space age, meteorologists were not certain satellite data would prove useful. One ot the
pioneers of meteorological satellites, Harry Wexler, wrote ill 1954:
To predict ttu,.[uture +,]+the atmo.sphere, the meteorologist must k,ow its present state--as
&,fined t_' the three-dimensional distribution o[pwssure, tempe,nture, wind, humidity....
Knowing the present state _?] the atmosphere a,d past motions o/ the storms enables a pre-
diction to be made tF extrapolation and other techniques. _
\_,k'xler pointed ()tit that a satellite could provide (rely a "bird's eve" view, t+()l the
thrre-(limensi<mal (lata meleor(+h)gists +we(led. Theretore, a satellite w(+ul(l "st'_-%rt• pritwi-
pally its a 'stornt patrol.'"' ill-l] A warning of a severe storm obviously wottl(t bc (ff great
practical value, but most of the practice of ineteotology addresse(l lt+OlC routine silua-
tiolls. A meleoro]ogist's desire [_.)t Ihree-ditnensi()l+al nleaslll-enlellls of lllallV varial)les wits
<)tee of Ihe arguments for developing there sophisticated weather slttellites in the 1960s
and 1970s.
Because the value of gathering weather data fiom salcllites was not immediately ()]+vi-
ous to civilian meteorologists, early meteorological satellite proposals emphasize(l military
uses. Gtound stations att(l hurricane patrol airl)lanes provided acceptable st(arm warnings
f<+r the continental [hilled Stales att(l nearby waters, but the Navy nee(le(l storm walllill._,s
it+ whatever remote areas ships might be operating, and tile All For(e had similar needs
for worldwide torecasts.
l'lanning f<)r a (1.S. sl)ace program l)cgan will+ a 1946 Project RANI) rel)()rt titled
"Preliminary Design el an Experimental World-(;ircling Spaceship."' This rep(>rl empha-
sized various military al)plicati(ms of a satellite; it noted that "perhal)s Ihe two most imp(,r-
tant classes of observation which cat+ bc made tiom such a satellite are the spelling of the
points of impacts of 1)ombs launched by us, and the observation of wealher (-on(titions
(+vet enemy terfitov+x: '''_In the section of the report discussing the scientific uses of a satel-
lite, the authors commented that (d)servations of cloud patterns "shotd(l l)e o| ext]eme
value in connccli(m with short-range weather torecasting, an(i tal)ulation (+f such (lata over
a period of time ntight t)rovc exttemely valual)le to long-range weather lore(aslhlg. ''r
3. Dr. Haft y 'Wrxh,'+, "()l)srrvi,, g the Wratl;rl liom at Satellite \+chi<h+,".],uP,alo] thelhitish l,+t:tplaneta_+
Smb'l+_ 7 (NCl)tcml)<'f 19:+_4) 21_!1-71+: scc l)o(mncnl II-I.
,I, Ibid.
5. For the hisl<,1 v ol Ran(l's tl)tt+ ill t'allTs space plat.tin,R, s,r¢. Mt'IIOII 1+_.l)axirs and William R. I lattis.
t{A,VD',, t{oh' i. the Ifvoluli+m o/ Bulhum ..d Satellite Observation ,_',_O'ms a.d I¢,,lat+,d I'.S, ,S/,,+ue 7;','h.r,b_t.", (%atlta
M<mi('a, ( '.'k: The RAND ( ;or poHtion. 1988).
6. l)<mglas ,:kiltFatl (',Oml)at+_,, Inc., "l'tclimitl;uy l)rsign of _tll F,Xl)mim(.imd Wo_l(l-(_il¢ling
SF, atrship," Rrport No. S,M-11827, May 2, 1946, p+ 1 l, Spa¢<+ lJoliQ, h+stitulr 1)o{ unmntmy ltistfw} (;<dh'¢fi¢m,
Washington, 1)( :.
7. Ibid., p. 13.
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l,atm RAND sludit's sought to tackle the proHcm ofwhelh,:r cloud images alone
Wl)tlld bc of much bct+clh to mvleor<>logists. An April I<.)51 RANI) rcp<wt tith'd "lnql,iry
into tim Feasit:,ilitv of W¢'ath('r Rec(mnaissalw,p from a Sau.llit<, Vt,hicle" c<msid,ur,rd
wh<.'thcr the data m¢'tcorologists wanted c<)ttld bc derived liom cloud il+mtges. [11-21 The
r,rport staled lht + (_>ll,o'..+,ring:
II i.s Mn,iou_ thai in oh_ervi.g 1he weather Ihrou£dt the "O'e" O/ a hi£4>altitude robot almost
all o//he re£,'.lar qua.lilalive ,teo_.n'ment', awutll_ a_,_ot'iated wilk melemoh,gy must hill &
the u,m_sith'. 11 is im/mssibh, to mahr .unv 1hart a. i.lelliL_enl ,_um._ at 1he vah._s o/trm[w_
atllY#, /ll'¢:Sglt_:, h..ti:lily, att:l 1he t_.maini.g qaanlitalive meleomloL6cal palllmrlet:s ....
Chaut+, b+'in<g Ihr MqrH+ most rasily digcernabh' [+ic] /},m. exlrem+'(y hi,_h allitudr+, he+'o. :
Ihr imp.rla.I item and must lu, ulili:.ed Io the/tlmo_t ill ./m'_l/il_ a _)_m/Hi_ pictun'. 1I is
appare.I thai/iota HmMs ahmr it will be impos,_ihle to tell m,m3,thi.q aboul thr c.rrr.t _r.-
_/_li_ sihtalimt. Combined+ howe_,e_; with both theorelical k.ou,h.d,_.e timid that ,¢_ai.ed
lhmu/zh ex/..rie.ce, mc._vllr cloud anal)',_i._ _w. produce _u_pri_ing(_' ,_ood rr_ulls. _
Stanlin,_ in 19.t7 v:ilh im.tR<.,ry taken [n-,Lm+l \:-2 ro,ckt'l.., fired at Whilt. Sands, N,vv;
Mvxico. '+<iculists s<mght Io classit}: clouds aud I<) deduct, weather l)aramett.rs tn-_m+ his-
torical d;+la al+,d ,ch_++d [).tll(,rl+s. Tht'y.jtuqg<.'d tht'ir rest+lls t() I)e ,quihp sl+c,c,..ssh+l. 1)ul the,,
alrg+l('d 11++11II('W 3tl)l)1+fl:1('[+{'S +',v<>llld 1)<' ll(,(.d(.d to 111_+.ke lh(, })(.sl list, ()l l}l(, ([+llal. For (,x+l+111-
pie, dwy want.¢'d a new mcth<)d of classil},ing clouds, iatht'l +than liar" tr:udili(mal classili<a-
li<m m¢'th<_<l hasccl soh'Iv, on ,l])l)(,aran(+e. ''
An analysis <d similar images by the Naval Restartoh l+aborat<w'+, at [t'w vt,_tlS latt'r l)r_) -
tided I+i()I(' (,vid(.l+f(. <)1 lilt' xrahl< . ()l" w('alhCl+-l<.:l._itt.d ol:,sm-vali_ms hom :.,pact'. For cxam-
ph', ()II<) I_<'I-R discovcrcd that illl++g{'s lak,{+n |),,,' i-l+Navy Acr<dx',p rock¢'l in ()ctol:,,pr 195.1
had sh<wm at m:!j_w hun-ricanc in the (hdf of Mexic<)--a storm that then hil lhc trni_cd
Nlalcs with no ;tdvan+c,u warning, from weather stall<ms. I h' arRucd lhal satt'llil¢'s would bc
immv<liatclv +nmulul l;+>r l)rovidinR st_>rm warnings, l+,t'rg sugRcstcd that "in lhc 111oi<+' dis-
tam lulurc, lhcsc tc_ htfiqucs <_l ro<kel recolmaissanc,p will l)c applied I<_ inv<'stigation o[
olh¢,r tn<:l,:,<_rol<)<_ical ph,pnon+cna. '+'''
l'lw tits| wcather Salcllitc l:w{!j,_'ct. TIR()S, rest+lied hal.just h-am the pvrceivcd usc-
ftnln<.ss _)t st,:,rm wmt+hlgs I)lul ;also fiom Ihe existent|, c,f inarve dift_'u+,mll gt+<ml)S in th,<.'
I)el_aV_mcnu <d l)vt+.'nst" (I)()D) that wanted a hand in space. The Air Force Sl>Ons<wcd a
mnml)cn c,t studi,us Io cxphwu lechnol<_g_' I_)I reconnaissancc satellilt's, h'ading cvcnlt,all,,
to ;i dev('l<)l)nmnt ('(>llltr,1<'l with I+ockheed for what ev(.ntually b(.c+am( , th<.' Sall('llit('
Mililarv ()l)s('rxati(m S.vstcm (SAMOS) 1+e(:,c)nl+laissance satellite. The R(:A (:()rF,()]ati(m,
<m<' +>I the tmst+(c('sslul bidders, then approached the Army Ballislic Missih' Agency
(AI+,MA) with a llr(_l:,()sal t(_ d,rveh)p a satellite with a teh'visi<m ('+tlllt'l'_l l_:,l+ cithcr lilt'l('(} +-
Iol<_Ry <_t surv,_'illan((+. '' Th(" ABMA inilialed l)roject.lanus to, test Ihe t('lc'visi<m (+,_mc,c't+l
[_)I lht' [)lll-[)<)s,(' <)l I,t'C<)lltl_tissilll('c, 13ul ill arid-April 1958, D()I) assigned tht' satellite
l t'< ¢)lltl;tinsatll_ t' missi_m cx_ It,six¢'Iv to tilt" Air Force. Tim ,,\It, M,.\ thell changed the tnissi<m
_+l what had l>t,COllit, thc ]amus II l+voj,rct lr<m+ I+('('()I11131[_,S+III('( ' IO mctcorology.'-'
8. S.M. (;,t.cnlivld and W.W. KvlloR, "Inquiry in+m)thc D..asihilily ol Wt'athen Rt't_)nltiati,,s;lll¢ t' li_m, ;t
.'++;;m'llilv\vhh It'." 'l'hv RAND (:,,_ p<,_athm, R-363, :\ugusl, 1 9(i0, p. I; :+,t't'l)<+<'Umt't+l II-2. lhi', is tl_,.+unu he, silh'd
,+_'n..i+m+.| R.\NI) P.cl_o_ R-21_, :\p_il l!+7>I+
9+ IBM., p. 22.
I+I. ()tin ]+i.B,_'l'g. '+J|igh.X.h}IzI,'l,p l'<_+Izah <d Storm (',h)uds," O/[i+e "I ,\m,td lea,gareth t{t+trHq+'_.t'])It'llIl+t'l
1935, 5,1)a¢ c I'oIi_ ", Institult' 11<.+umvntat ', I listo_ x (;olh'c tic,tL Washinglcm. I)[ :.
II Rhhmd I+vl+.o: (:hapman, "'+x(:;t+,c Ntud'+<d Ihe1.1+%.V,.k.athv_ Nat<,llitv Ih_am: Ihc ltmqa_li,m _d
_ U'n+c and I'+_hli_ ++."PhD Ili+,-+.,"+',_;t_u+,t. [ 'ni',cr+,h,., 1967, I_+1_.20-24.
12. /hM, F.p. 3(. 3:..
]_)N ()I_NERVING I'IIE FAR'Ill FROM S]'A(:I_:
Ill May 1958, Jamts II was u;msl_'rrcd within 1)()1) ironl the ABMA to tilt +Advan<('d
Research I'r¢_jccts Agency (ARPA), a new organization eslablished a t_.w months earlier
and intended to centralize military (and, Icmpormily, civiliat0 sl)acc rcscarth utl<Icr
lighlCl control by lit<" st'ct-claI+V of dc|(.'nsc. Allcr an(>thcl t+ccotll]gurati<)n to take advau-
lagc <)I ;l Imgcr l)o<)stc,, ARPA ch;Ingcd the ]);tm(" <)I tilt + l)r<+jccl ft-ont Janus II Io TIR()S
(fi>r Television lnfra]cd ()l)st+rvati<)tl Salcllilc) m)d conlnlittcd lml(ls to final <h'sign and
COl|Sttucti,)n fi)v a plmlncd launch in the summcv of 19597' The U.S. Signal Rcscar(h and
[)cvchq)mcnl l,al)orat<Hy at Fovl ]Xh)ntlnlltlh, Ncw,lcrscy, malla_cd a contract with R(:A
t<w coustructi<m of the satcllitc.
The Civilian Program
NASA look ov(.+] tilt' TIR()S ])l'<)jc¢'l, Ul)On its ¢rcati()l) later ii) Iq58, with the un(IcF-
slan(liFIg that the Sl)aCc _Ig(.'tlcy would coopctatc with tllc +vVcatl)cr Bur('au. l lowcvcr, l)()l)
intclcst i11wc_)lhcr satcllilc data c(mtinlwd, (-onll)licating the process ()I pla+ming an <)l>('r-
ation,d l_t()grmn. [,+tic) in tilt' 196()s, lilt' Ail Forco b(.'g,_Itl dcvcl<+l>in g a scpmatc l)('lcnsc
Mctc_)r()logica] Satellite l)r()gram (I)MSP) to meet spccilic military needs lot data to sup-
port its Ol)Craliot)s. '+Early s_tlcllilcn it) lllc I)MSP (lil]iwcd litth" from 'I'IR()S, l)u! later satt'l-
lit(',,+ in tilt' l)r<)gram l>V()vidcd qu',tntilafivc radi()mctvi( data dcsi_twd spc(ific+dly t(,
suppov, l)()l) requirements. (:ivilian uwlct)v()logi(al satellites coutilnlcd to 1)c usc(l l)v
both civilian and military nwtcor()h+gist.,+; tilt" (:vcntttal (onvctgcn(c ()[ tilt' lwo [>l()grams
is discussed in lilt' ]_cxl scctiotl.
In July 1G)58, al'tcv l)rcsidcnl Dwight l). Eisc+lhowcv had decided thal all Sl)a((" l)to -
gl-+ItnS that wcrc n()t clcarly ]nililaly should bc trallSl_'rrcd to the new (b.'iliat) space a<_Cll(+x,
the White l louse assigned TIR()S t<) N+\SA. Arranging the actual transl<.'t p<,mcd (lifli(u]-
tics l)c(ausc the pvogt+mn was so lhr al<)llg in its dcvclol)Ulcnt, but a nlm)l)('t" of s('i(q+lists
told engineers agreed to tn<:_,c lt<)m l)()l) I<) NASA ah)t)g with the pr<!jc(t, and NASA
arranged for the Weather Btlt'C;ttl t() [)rt)vidc lcscarch sul)port in l]|ctcov<d()g_'.t:' A lt++It)s -
t+:v a_rctqnct)t was signed ill April 1959. [1I-:+1
l)csl)itc the dil'i]ctdtics of tilt" transl+cr, NASA lautwhcd tilt+ CXl>Ct+imcnlal TIR()S I <)u
April l, l(,)(i()--+l sl)itl-stal)ilizcd satellite ('ttlrvitlg Ix+,+<) tclcvision (';dlll('l+Is. "fhc results g('tl-
ct'_tt(.'d .%() llltICh t'X('ilctllt'llt iltll()Itg tllCt('<)l+OIogists lhal NASA soot) s('l Ill) +t S',,Mt'll] I()
[l;Jllsl('l + lilt t-t,stllti]lg cloud cover illl()l'lllilli<)tl ()Ill<) standard weather + llll)l)s ;llld to solid
thcnl to weather stations m+d to tilt' nlilitmy scrvi(cs. ''+ Allh()ug]l nlctcor()logists loimd
satellite data <lifli(uh t<_ illtC_l;llc illl<) the l'()lC('+Islillg, [)r()(+css, l)(.'<._itls<.' their models
Icquircd data ou Icnlpcraltuc, lJrCSSUrC, mt(l wind Sl)CCd atl<l <lirc<tio11, they l<)tmd that
satellite images showed larg, c-scalc weather ]);lltctns s<) (h+arlv that lhcv x_t('l(+ iultncdi;llclv
ttscl'ul.': Satellites also dcmonsllalcd their value fi)v sl<)lm walning. ]t) SOl)tend)or t961, a
TIR()S sal('llilc hcll)c<l track an extremely (l_u)g('tous hlnri(;ulc, (:arla, l)caviug <h)wt) on
tilt" (',ulf (:()ast. _,X:+ll'tlitl<_, led to the CV;l(u;tliOll O1" lll()l'C lh+tn 3,')0,()()0 [)('<)[)If. t" AIs<) ill
13. /hid,, pp. 3+i-5 l. 61-G2,
11. Ill additioN, the highlx t lassilicd (:()R()NA lfl+otovc<olnmis.+atwc plo_am was i()intl,. It_;umt_c<l I>_
the :\iz l"()Icc ;uld the ('.cu_ttal lntclli_.cncc :\gt'tw%.
15. (:hal)tnat_, "+\ (;asc %tnd'+,'" pp. 60-Ii-I.
II+. l;mi<c llill, lA_,,the_/++,, Ah,v,,: .t,,,m<t', M+'h':.+d+,_#+.l 5,alellit+'+ (\Xashh)_tot_. D(:: :Stllilhnot+ikttt
lt+slitttti_>n lhcss. 1991 ), i)1). 9-Iii.
1"7. l"¢_n it (list ussii_n+ (+I th(' icsint;m('c ()f mctc(_ioh)_isls I¢_ lhc t£sc .)I s+ilcllilc data, +.('(' Mai_;t_t't Eilcctl
(:i+tnaiuL '"h'_Im.h,g,. Rt'(_)n(iliath)u; i_) the Rcxn(_tc-.Scilsit)_ l+:t_ <d lhc t'nitcd Nt;,t('_+ (:i'+ili+m x.%c_,thc_
]:._c(a,,tmg, 1957-19:+,_. '' PILL). Dis,.+. R;_l_cn'_ ['ntixtqsilx. 1991+
IS, I'atvi< k IIt+glt,,,s, 'gA'cathct Satcllitc_, (:(Hiic ()[ ,\_C,'" n,+_3'+tth+'_++,]',++: 7 (April 19SlI: (iS-7:-_.
|_:Xl'l <IRIN< ; I I II.: [ INKS< )WN l .'_(.)
Scpl(+nllwi 1961. a IliI]}+rdevch)l:,cd hurrican(., Fnthci; was located thr<mgh satellite itnaR(.s.
This was tlm litst hurrican(' to lw idi'i+tified h,) a satclIilt' l:,,>Ibre l)(.ing <)lis(+rvi.d hy then-
OCitlVl'lltioila] lllt?allS.
Evi'n h('loi+c tllcs(+ successes, lh(' usefulness <if the TIR()S sali'llites led to pt+t+ssure to
Iransl_+ii+nn thv (+xperhncllta] [)Ix!jecl inlo an Ol)('rationa] sy:.,;t('ill. ]'o addlx'.,+s this issue,
NASA callvd together an hliel-agency Pa,lel on Operational Meteoroh)gical Sat('llilvs hl
()ctoh, er I C.i{10. Disagr('t'nlt'nts <)vcr the futule of the prograln quickly al)pt'ared. The
IvX_'alh('r Bureau s(ni_hl nlort" ((mti+ol than NASA wantvd to g,ivc UlX it asked for cOnllll('tc
aulhorhy over the Ol)t+rati(mal sySlcln, h+cludhlg huln(llhig, data reil-ieval, and finill d('ci -
siO,lS (ill thc design <,f n('w opci+ati<mal satellites. In-41
The panel issued a C(mIF, rOllliS(' phlu in April 1961 calling for a national Olicrational
ni<'tcor<)l<Jgical sal('Ilite svst(.in (1)ast'd on a se(:<ind-gt'neration satellite ah,pady tu_dci
d('v<'l<)linl(ml by NASA) It) lit' nlanagcd by tlt(" %%_'ather llureau. '++This plan did not go as
lar +is lh(' Weather Burcau had o,-igi,ntlly prop()sed, NASA wot,ld lnahilahl control oi
lalmch scrviccs and gl-otlnd Slllip(_rt and WOtLId develop and pr<)(urc spa(ecraft under
(ontract I<) the I)(q)arlntent ol +(:onililClt't. ((:,f wIlivh lhc Wcalhcr |lui+cau was a l)arl).
I'rcsi(h.nt Kennedy's May L)._, I!R;I, spcvch to (:ongr('ss tith'd "th+gent National N('(+(Is," lit
wl,ich hv urged tuutling at i:,r(:'glanl to land an American o,t tilt' ]Vl<:'on belolt" tilt' ('ncl <+f
tilt' dvca(tc, also r(,<lut.sl<.d tunds Io put Ill{ +weather satt'llitc phul into <:'])erati<m. (:Ollgrcss
al)l+l+<:"+t'd th(' funding K(+nncdy ha<I l('qtl(+St(P<I, despite conlinuing controvt'rsy ovt'r wh:ll
w<.lht h,c tilt' best divisi,m ol +r('sp<msibility I'.,,(?t+.'+,r<.+(+tlNAS,,_ +lltd tilt' W('atll,er I{ur('au for
,':,])t,ratill_ tilt' svst,{'llt. +'++
Meanwhile. NASA was ',+'<:',king on tlt+.' s+_'_:on,d-gt_nt+rati<m invteorologi(al sat,pllit(.,
Nitnl)us. as +l l)rol<:'tyl:DC Ib, tilt" (:'lJCl+ati()nal sysl(qn. Nhnbus was a tnorc s<q:,hislicatcd
Sl)aCcctaft than TIR()S--stal)ilizvd so that it always pointed tOWal(l lilt+ Earth rather than
c_mlinu<mslv l<:'tatill_,. It ,,++:IS,It:, 1)(+ ]+tllll(']I(+<I iltlo a S[tn-syn(ht'(lll(HlS pO]_ll of+flit st) that it
could colh'cl data li<ml tilt' wh<:'h' Earth at thc saint local time each day. The sat('llitc
woul(l tarry n,)t only in()rc sophisticatvd tt!It!vision cam('ras, but also a high-r(+sohlli(m
inliart'd radit)nlCtel- that used thernlal inliared sensors to trial:, tctnpvrattu('. (A silnplt'r
CXl:,t+rimt'ntal sensor oI tilt: SanlC typ(' had be,pn (arrie(I on later TIROS flights.) I:'lans lot
Ninll:,un also includcd :l varictv of In<.(' sophisticaled scnsors--tnost significantly, sound-
ill<_ instl+uln(.nts providing data that (+ould b(" llSCd to delcrmin(' t('nlp('ratures al various
Icv(.ls in lhe atnlOsl)llme.-" These new inslrulnt.nts rt'lle(:terl the efforts ol +NASA s(icntists
t<) Itlt?t't lilt' ('olttilltlhlg demand ll-Ottl research nmteOlol,_)gists Ibr hasic tttlltlt'l'i<.'_tl dat+t ill
addition I<)<loud imag, vs. +'?
Whilc researchers "+','ant('d tilt" more sophisticate(| tiara Ninlh, us w<mhl plOVidC, the
_('ath<'r I+_lll'<.'all I>(:c;,Itnc ('<m('('l'lled abOllt ils increasing Cost and delays in launch. NASA
and Ihv \Vcathcr l+,uleau :tim<:' had (lifl_.'l-ing pe,spv('tives on what dtrcisioltS should hc Inad('
10. t'.5;. Nati<,nal (:oov(linalitlb_ (:,mlmitl('(' l<)r Avialiot++ Met('<.oh)gy. Panel of ()l)rrali<mal
M('lc,.,_h.gi(al :';alvllill'.., /'laP+ [+)+ a ,\'ali+mal Ope++ti+**/al MvlcoP+*lo_Rr+d ._alellile ._++t+'m (Vx'ashit+glon, D(:: t'.S.
( ;o:rl i.n('lll I'I hilin g ( )Itil v. lg(:,l ).
'2+). l'hvsv is'.u(+s m(' (lis(u'.sed h, +l+h< + Natiot)al M<'It'ov()l()gi(al Ptogtant." pt<'lhnit+ar_, shill t<'l:,otl ol
th(' (:()llltlli|l('t' l)Ii _( it'll({' ;tlld Astr()llallli< s, S7th (',_mR., I sl s('s,,.,July I:{. 19(il. ]+'<. a (li_,, llSSiOll ()I th(' pl<_(t,s+_
()t _t})})l()X. ill_ II1(" i,hm. st.(. S,,i(.,.(. I'(,li( 3, Rt',,('ar(h [)i'-.isioul, (:ot+gr,t.,.si(:.tla] Rcs<'mxh S;v, vi(<., (+++it,',! .%'t*+l+<s
(.'I+'ilHH! ,S/*,***v PP*_'P(HtI',: _<+_/HII_.+' II, .tlq,I/+,aW+++ ,v_tt+,llite++ l',pp()l I l).'pa, v(t I<,, th(. Sul)(,)mmiuvt. (m Spa(t' S( icn<c
+t,i(l .\l)l)li< ,.it,..,, I .5;. lh)us(..I Rc'l)t c_,('ntalixc.,, !Igt|l ('.ong., Ist s('ss., Max 19_'3. pp. l_l_-!l_l: (:haplnan. "A (:asc
SIll(I;," I+}). 1117--';'7.
21. (:hal:,i_);.L ":%. { :at,( ' 5;Iu,+I'L" p. 161.
22. hldct.<1, lh( + Niml)u'. ",clw', ( ()lllilllt(.d thH.igh Nhnhus 7 and p,.xidv(i lh(' l:+a'r,i_ ilill)i'ItlatiOtl t++.'cd-
rd I() <h'x('h> I) lal<'i I('M';II( h satt'l[itc s'+si('l|)'% iT)( h+(ling th<" t +ppt't .+_t]|t{J+.})ll('l( + R('s('at( h Natt'llilt. ;ui(I Iht' l':al th
()h..r, _int_ '+';_+.t('nl. It.F. l+:<h..,, I+LI '. H('v<,, ;._(I I,N, I'(,rkms+ "Nil|)l)t]s .%;l{(.]lit(._+: _{qtill_ till, _l;l_t, h)r Mi.._.h,n i,_
l'lall_'t l':;lllh," 1_i( )5., I_ez_/wt_I/l_/L ,_*zH_lt(lll (.t'o/_]l_ita] _!_/l_,n 7t 1,1u.(' '"_l, t993): _NI, _.',.
I (_() ()I',_,i.;RVIN(; I11t'; E\RI I1 FP,( )M <_I'A( :E
ali_)ul lht" (ipci-aliolial svsl('nl _uld on which _ll4i'n(y should lliakc Ih('lll. -'_ This I)('l:anic a
serious ])rot)ielii _is NASA's plltns for Nhlll)lis hlrr('ashl._iy divcrt4('d t]olil We,tth('r Blire:lu
priorilics. N,-\<NA had _i_i('(*(I 1o t'Xltul([ Ihc TIR()N ])lll_lalil trolii lilt' orit4inal two salclliic_
I() I('11 st) _ls Io i)iovide (()nlinil()tlS (]_il_i t_)r i]iosc lis(,i,_ will) _lllt'_tli) dr'|)elided oil Ih(" (]_il_l,
I)lil dcl_t7,_ ill illc .'X!illi])ll,_ ])lll_l'_tili still ('l't'_ilt'(| lilt likelihood ot/4al),_ ill ({iVl'l-a_('. Tit(' ])o_-
,_ibilily of t'x])cri('ii(iil<l _ _i period ot" lliOilllls will| lio liit'lCoi'olo_ical ,_ili('llilt" (lltl_i _t','_lil_il)lc
])arlicuiiill): Wolri('(l 1)()I). _ (;rili(s _il,_l Y_ii,_t_d ([il(',_li()liS _l])_lill lilt- lt']ill])i]il'_, i)t Nililiiil_
I)('(_itl,_(! il ((llisliltllt'(t Sil(h _i l_ii_t! It'll I) in sopilisiicali_)li _)ll!l TIR()S." hi _lddilioii, ihc
i)ix.dicit'd anlili_il ((),_I ot_ln o[)('l_iliOlial _)'sl('lli ])_ls('(l Oil _iill])lis h_ld li('_irlv d_)ul)lcd shlcc
lilt' ori_iila] I)]iin had Ill'i'll su])iilillcd i_) (]()11_1(!_;_. ->'' Tht" titt_t'_tlht'i Btllt'_ltl would ])t'
ix.,_i)l)nsit)]c t_ll t]iiidiii<_ l]ic o])cr_llional syslt'lll, t)ul il wa,_ _i sit|all _i_('ll()' wil]i it [iiililcd
I)u(l_cl _lil(t with lililc ch_lliC(" _lt _ciliil_ Ih_il t)li(]<_('l ('xl)_lll(it'(| slil)slaillia]l)'. _r
l/v iiic l;li(' StLinliil!r ()1 [{)tl_l, dit]i;,rcil(cs ])(.Iw(,t,li _/\_A _ili(l ih_" lt_l't'iil]i('l |/iil(!_iil |lad
Ilill(h'nt'(| illl() _tll illll){l_,st'. 7_ ()11 _('i)i('lll|)('Y 77, 1_.)t_{4, lilt" ll4'('_llll('l |_llll-('_lll llOlitlcd NA,_A
liial ii wlts tJlillili_ _)lil o[" c×isihll4 illlt'l_l_tuic)' ;lt4i'eCilit'ills ali(I l)lll'Sliill_ _lil ilil('rilli (l])('l-
itliOll;il satt']lilc _y._it'lll ])_l._t'(l ()11 TIR()<_ l('('hlll)ll)_)'. The tt_'_<'iiill('l" lillll'('Tlil w_ts ;ll)](' Io lll_lk('
Stlch ;i slail(I olliy ])('CailS(" ii hltd tillllid a i);il'lii('l'; 1)()1) il_ld ;[14i'('cd lo l)iovidt ' lallii(tl st'Y-
/'il.'t's t(ll" lilt' (l|)t'l-_l(i()ll;_ll 'I'IR()S s%:sll'nl Ih(' Vi*('_iillt'l _Ul('_ltl W_illlt'(l.:"
A,_ ii l('Silll, NASA li)llll(l ii,_']l" ill ;i wt'iik ])osition. i'll\" spacc it<_('ll(')' ('_tiill[ 11()I .iu_lit_
dcv(.Iopiilt4 _i([_,'_ili('t'(l s_ilt'ililt's f()i _i liscr ll/:ll did iiol Wallt lilt'lit, aiitl h col|ill i1ol alior(I
to lilix't" 1)()1) as ;i COllll)('litor in lJlO','i(lili_ l_llln('h ,_(.l-viccs I(ll civililill slti_'llil('s. N,,\<%,\
(()llli)ll)llli_t'(| |lilt| _l<_l%'t'(I Io ,_i_'c lilt' !t4'('itih('l l/lll'('_lll ii ]itl_('l viii('(' ill _]i{ti)ill _ Ill(* ll('Xl-
_t.nt'i_lli()li ili(,i('ol-()Io_-i(iil ,_ait']liic s,.'_l('ili. 'Flit' (_lliiI)rolnis(! i(,sii]l('(] ill dccisioil,_ to build
il "I'IR()_ ()])t'i_lli()illtl _v,_it'lii wil]l []liiliili._ plovid('d i))' lit(" _'t_t't'_iiilt'i llili('_ui, io c_>nliiiil('
Iht' _iilil)iis t)ro<_-I_llll ()11 _t I)ili-(*]_c ('xt)('lilii('lil;l] I)a_is, _iil(] Io si<_li _i llt'w li_illl_l] _l._l('t'lli('lil
I_ll (()()t)t'lillil)ll l)('l,.vt'Cli 111(" Iwo ;t<_cll(i('s. l l[-,_>]
"l'li(* ii,_l(*t'lll('lil (_l]lcd for _A<NA Ill dcv('hl l) _ill(I ]iillll(Ii liic it|ilia] v_.l_i_lii ()1 ;lllV. |it'll;
ili_;liulii('iil or _i)a(c(illfl ill|i[ f_>i Ill(' !i_i'('ill]i('i |))iirc_lli 1() ])i_)_'i(l(' [/lil(lili_ till _>l)Ci'_lli_ii;ll
v('l_illii_. "l'tli_ _t_iCt'liiCiil rclliaiiit'(l ill [_li-cl" ililliI 11.)_7, wlit'il NA._A (Iccid('d I_> wilti(lrliw
[rOll| i)lX)Vidillt4 ()[)(ualiOll_l] iill])l-()V(,liit'lll,, ;I,_ il COlllilillilll_ oli]i_ilioii. Ai lt/_ll lit|i(', lilt'
_;llioiia] ()(t'iiliil and Alilili_l)ht'ril A(iiliiiii_lrllliOli (_().,\A), lilt' ,_licc('_or a_/_ii()' Io ltl('
_i%l'iitli('i ]llil (';ili, a_lllil0(I rc_l)_ln_il)ilily lily (l('Vl'](l[)iil('lll, ;i_ wcll ii_ _l[)t'r_iliOli. ot till <k il-
iali ilit'lcoi'olo<_-i(al _alcllilt',_;. Tilt' it_CllC)' ]ilckc(I ilic cll])a])i]il) ail([ filli(lili<K ilt'ci'_ilrv lot
_il('li ([('vt']O])lii('iil, ali(] t",'t'iillia[l',, il i'('llil |it'll Ill iillilrin_l] _lli([ lll('li tOilil_tl ( o_)])('iiiti_lii
with NA,_A.
'l'h(' +itlt'llitc+ ill" Iht' *I'IR(),_ ()i)t'iitliOlili] _,+lt'lil (i('liiillit'(| ]_]_._\ 1 Iliroil_]i {i'" ittllu
]iitiilch) wt'it" ]t'+,_ ('al)+ll)h" Ih_ln Niiiil)ii+, ])ul Ihl'y did iliX,oi,.t" +i_liifi(_lill iliil)rovt'iiituit+
()%t'l lit(' ()ri_,ill_il I'IR()<_ ,_alt'llilt',_. _()111(' ill liit'+c +])act'(+r;t]l tl+t*lt ;i ]li_]l('i-rt.+(ihlli<tli (+tlll-
t'l;i Ilr+l I('_lt'd _)ll Nillll)ti+. ()tile|+ I)iovidcd it';tl-lhilt' d;ll;i i_) il_('l_ _il<lllli([ lht' tv<lrl<t
Ihr()li<_h lilt + Aiilliiii;llic Pitllli(' [i;ili+iili+_ion _v_lt'iii dt'vt*]_)l)('(l h)i Nillil)tl+, ])ul tll+l l('_i-
i'll 1)11 IIR()_-VIII ill I(.tlil.
7:_,, I;uilt'_ E. _%i'l)h I.I. Ill'the'it I hflh>iii.li,.Julie 9,_, IU()Y. _illl .ill<it ll_'d ilit.llil_: ,\l>l,ih,iili Ilk;ill h_ lhl'
,\(hllilli_ll;il_H, "_t%'l'illll('l ])lilt (';Ill }>l_lll.".itliic 7.-I, ]liGT, NIl;i( I' thfli_ \ IIISlittll(" l)_i( tlllll'll[;ll _. ] [i_li)l x (]l >lhJ[ titlli.
%%'{1",}1iI1_1(}11, Ill L
71. ( ][ialilil;lii. ":\ (2;1_{' Nlu{l_,'" ]}l }, I.'G-71.
Y__. ID/d.. 1)1_. 71(i-1 I.
7i_ Ih/+/.. p 1!17.
77. /hi<L. pp. 717-7!1.
2,',I. /hiU,, pp. <.>'_.t-19.
2tt IhT</., pp. <,.t-t.l-5_t.
I_XI'I.<)RIN(; I lIE [JNKN<)WN l {)l
()nee they hail made (h'cisions ahout lhe scope <)l' tilt' initial operating system, NASA
and the Weather l))llre+ul were more free to lhink ahout experimental satellitt's to test Otlt
flew instrtt111('nls that mighl he incorporated into future generations of operational satel-
liles. Nil)bus 1, launched April 2_, 1(`t64, experienced a nuntber of prohlerns and operat-
ed tor only a nlonth; Nimblts 2, latmchcd May 15, 1(.t66, was much Inore successllll, testing
out improved ('atllel-aS. NASA also i('sIcd meteorological satellite teclttlolog_' ;is part of the
Al)plicalions "lk'chnol()g3' Satellite tATS) prt)ject to orhit experimental geosvnchrtmous
satellites (used t_)r colnnmnicali(ms experiments as well its meteort+h)g, ic;_l ones). In
l)eceml)er I(.1(5(_iand N<v+,ember 1967, ATS-I and -3 explored the possibility of el)serving
wealher with line scan il+lagers, a p<)ssibility conceiv('d hy Vernon Soumi, a pro[k+sst)r at file
t !niversily ()[ Wiser))sin; tit(' resulting c<)ntinuous coverage (inmges (if the full Earth disc
every thirty minutes) prt)ved extremely valuable tot tracking sierras and even showed
sh()rt-lived (It)ud paltelllS ct)rrelated to tornadoes. +' {]ontilIIIOItS C()Vetage flOlIl get)s_'n-
(hr()nous orhit made it l)ossihle to obsel've the moth)n of ch)uds and (h'(lu(;e wind speed
al ill(: level tlt the ch)tHls--a signiticant step toward the three-dime)sit)hal quantitative
data meteor()h)gists wanted. Three (llher satellites in the series, AT_2, -4, and _r), alst) car-
ried tneteort)h)gical exp(winwnts, ltul all suHered launch i)rol)lems. '`' ATS-(i, lattnche(I in
May 1(.)7,1, carried a new (h)ud-im;tging radiometer ah)ng with a mr)re powevfill (rats)lit-
ter that made it p<,ssil)h, l<)r an.vote with an eas_-to-l)uild ground station It) receivc the
ililages. :+
While the ATS progrant tested ideas for weather satellites in geosynchronous t)rbit,
Ill(" Nilnht_s program c<)nlinued to lest advanced instruments in h)w-Earth orbit, with live
launches between lit(it.) and 1978. Nimhtls 3, launched April 1(.)(+(.),carried tire new sen-
stirs. Th('se in(ludt'd the tirst sounding instruments using remote sensing It1 furnish mea-
stwetnents of IeltlpeFallll+e itll(l ethel" variables at different levels of the atmosphere li)r
prt)viding nunwrh'al data l_ir (limate m<)dels. The sounding instrumenls on Nintbus _)
measllrc(l leml)erattlre, water vapo+, atld el.one content o| various alrnospheric h'vels;
later Nimbus salellites carried sotulding instruments to Ine;isure other varial)les. The sen-
stirs w()rked well, l)ut lhe data l)roved much less useful for weather predictit)n than scien-
tists hail expe(te(l. Metvt)r()h)g, ists hail hoped that data on tetnperature, wind speed, and
()l]'ter tat:lots couhl l)e plugged inlo a model of how the atmospher(, worked to l)rovide
w('ather predictions. Sat('llite sounding instruments provided much of the data necdcd
with reas()nahh, accuracy, but existing, climate models were not designed to assimilate
these dala easily. Meteoroh)gists discovered that they needed to pertorm much more
research hct_lre the): ct)tthl use data acquired by satellite to hnprove the a((uracy of weath-
er predictions."
In August 1(`)(:)(i,tlt( + Weather Bureau stated the following as its objectives for an (11)er-
alional sate]lit(" syslem: +'(]) It ]he establishment and inaintenance of a satel]he s+,stem to
<)hlain gh)hal (ibservations on a regular basis, (2) mete<)roh)gical ohservations f_+om syn-
(hrt)nous altitllde, and (3) global observations of atmospheric struclure needed fi)r
ntmteri(al weather fi)recasting." [!!-6] The first ob.jeclive was met l>,vcontinuing impr<)ve-
llleIlls i11 th(' TIR()S series (if h)w-ahitude satellites, which wt're flown l++()m ]c.)(i(+ to I!)(+9.
31. The N['S ( ameras provided pi('Itlres every thir D' mintlles, compared 1+) once or l,,vi( e a rla,_ fit)t)) lh("
"FIR( )Fi( )pv)ati()nal Sip'sl(.l_l. For ;i dis< ussi<)n of lhe t)seluh+_ess el ('onlintl<)tts ('()ver;tge, P+,e('1,4,'.I+. Smith H al., el'he
M('teo)()logi(al Satellite: ()verview oi2. r) X+Fars <)| Opera(it)n,'+ S,'+/ence 231 (January 31, 1986): 4F)5_2.
_+,2. llill, Werahe)/r.m ,'_/.+)+,e,pp. 23-2(_, 2(.)-32.
_. I/.6d,, tip. 33-),5.
::;4. .];,n_('s (:. Fh't(he) t() .";It(art I'_izenslat, '+])<)ssit)le htiliali'.,'('s,'" Fel)ruar,, ](i. 1t.)77, sugge,,,s that NASA
hill)i'd that s<)untli))_ ins(trent'ms w()u]d h'ad I() a major new reseat( h initialive. ])amc]a E. Mat k, "(_h)u('l,+
Seeing: l)ev(']()ping New St'ns_)ts li)r Weath(.i Satelliles," paper presented at the S<)cict,, fit+ the llisl()r++ • ()i
]<'( hnoh)h+"s annual n+eetinu, I+()ndo)), F)+glantl, A+tlgtlst I[)_)(+.
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NASA launched an hnproved TIROS Operational Satellite (1T()S) in January 1970. <'
Starting in 1972 with lhe third salellilc in the IT()S series, NASA replaced ihe television
cameras that had been carried on all earlier tlighls wiih a two-chanuel scanning radiome-
ter providing visible and infrared imagery. :_" This infrared imagery was used It) monilor
llighlliilie cloud cover and to produce sea-surface temperalure maps. This same salellile
(designaled N()AA-2) carried the first operational sounding iitsllttiilt!itls, which provided
vertical lemperatuie protiles Ihrough the atmosphere. These inslrumenls provided |tit"
data needed to ineel the third ()[ lit(." objectives eslablished in 196{i, Additional improve-
ments to the h)w-ahilude satelliles made in ihe lale 1970s resuhed in the TIRO_N design,
carrying a finer resolution radiometer and sounder as well as a data collection l)latlbrm
and it solar energelic particle monitor. _v
AT_I and -3 provided data to meel the second of the 1966 objectives, but budgetary
constraints delayed the operation of it geosynchronous mete()rological satellite system
until the mid-lllTl)s, lit lh{' interim, NASA funded two prototype Synchronous
Meteorological Satellites, launched in May 1(.174 and February 1q75. The space agency
then launched lhe first (;eostationary ()perational Environinental Satellite (GOES) on
October 16, 1!175. Soundin R instrmnetHs were also in('luded in imp)oved GOES salellites,
starting with (;()E_4 in Sepmmber 1980.
While NASA developed new capabilities |_)r meleoroh)gical sluel]ites and the National
Weather Service integrated the ,esulting data ini() tlt(' Ol)eralional weather lore(asting sys-
lem, I)tldgelary pressures (:onliiltiefl I(i _row. Tile Reag;lil administralion wanled to liails-
t_.r operational space systems to privaie induslry lo cut l}le lederal budRel, lit early 1981,
Comsat proposed taking over both the Landsat (set" below) and tire meteorological satel-
lite syslems; ofii(ials in the Reagan adminislration responded with enthtlsiasnl. (]lmgress,
however, disagreed strongly with the idea of pvivatizing meleor(llogi('al salellilcs; members
argued thai the governntent properly provided weather forecasts as a public good and
therefbre should rctain control of the production oF meteorological satellite data." Late
in 1983, Congress passed and President Reagan signed ;tit al)pri)l)riati(ms bill fllat includ-
ed a specitic prohibifi(m against the sale ()| tire mele()rological satellite system to privale
industry. :''' ttowever, tire isstie of charging users tor wealher satellite data arose again in the
19(.)0s its a restfli of cooperative programs with olher counlries thai look such an approach.
Clearly, the I)ahmce among technological p()ssiMlities, riser needs, and |inancial tin|i-
rations shaped not only lhe origins but also the (onlinuing development of the meteoro-
logical salellile syslen). D,'eal|ter fo)e('asts illlproved, ahhi)ugh nit! as llliich as
meteoroh)gisis had predicted when lhey looked torward to tilt, new capabilities various
sittellitc technologies would p,ovide. Part ()f the probh'nl was thai the path frmn a go()d
idea to its incorporation into the operati(mal svslmn was inevitably slow and ro('ky.
Probably, however, Ihe ntore important tactor was thai predicting wealher was, and (()n-
tinues to be, a pr()blenl of much greater cotnplexiiy than scientisls had anlicipaled.
?;5. Tim first 'FIR()S sat(*llilc was ;m opcraliomd prototype; sul)st'qu('nl salt'lliles in lit(" serics w(,i(, to l)e
rcnamcd ESSA 10, I1, and so on. ;tiler launch. Ih)',_,t'vcr, Ihc new National Oceanic and AIm()sl)hcri(
A(hnhfistralion rcplact'd ENSA, and lh(' salt'lliit's were named N( )AA. h is at Ihis l)Oini Ihal Illc Wcaflmr Bureau
")vAs I ('llallll('(t ih(" NaliOllal _'t';ti]l('l Scl'vi('(),
?,ft. Ilill, V)D,athr)/,.r_ A/;',',,t,,,',pp. '37-38.
37. Ibid., pp, 49-51.
31'4. ])l't'ss Release. ,_,tqlale (;onllllt'l(t', Scit'ncc and Tlansp()ilali(in (;I)llllllilie(', Sel)lcnil)ci 20, 1t.)83;
'"t%'ealher S;liellitcs," (_lill&rli_$,%ilJtl¢ll /{p¢old, _. 14367, ()(i()ber 70, 19;q3; "Tlans|er ot (:kil M('leor()logi_al
Sat(qlili'n," C+m1.,r_:s+io,al[¢+'+<)Pd,l I.R.t.iN12-!i_q22, Ni)vt'ttll)('l" 14, 191q3.See also I Ii11. Weathr) fio,+ +.t/_Ji,e,p. 60.
39. ()ltic (' ()t Tl'chnoh)l_y Asst'ssiiit'lll. t I.,t_. (]q)ll_lt'ss, +'rt, lliOlt, ._(+iising tiil(I ih(. I)tivaic S(.(-l(ii : ISSll(.S t0r
I)iscussion." 7l'dl ),>loj..ual Me)m,a,d,)rl ( Mal ch 191"1.t): 22.
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Converged Polar-Orbiting Meteorological Satellite Systems
Ahh<>ugh the civilian and milila,y pola,--orbiting meteorological satellile pr<+grams
have Iblh>wed separalc paths, there havt, been several altt'mpts to bring them logether
over the ,,earn. ()It+rials wilhin several administrations kepl hop+rig that a nlel_ed sysleln
c_+uld meet the reqtfi_ements _>I l)_>th NOAA anti I)()D (l'Jecau:-;e c,tch had a ncetl It>
acqt,ire imam, cry of cl<)tlds) whih, providing an overall savings I<) lhe t_,l)verlinlent.
l lowever, NOAA and I)()I) weathm systems acquire varying kinds of data at different
times <ff the" da,, r to stq)F, Ort distinct I vpt's <)1"Uses. For example, l)()1) is interested in cloud
image tiara ac(itfired in the early m()rning It) stq:,l)OUl tatileal and slrategi( Ol:,enati<ms:
Nf)AA is mort, interested in atmospheric sots+dings in lilt' early afternoon, which tilt"
Nali<lnal Weather Service tk+<.ds inn) its pretlit'tive weather m<_dt'ls.' Flwthermore, until the
1980s, I)MSF' data were IIOl shared with civilian users.
In 197_+,, a national space policy study led I)y the ()ffice of Management and Budget
and the Nalional St't'milv (:otmcil ++'cxamined Ihe liscal and policy +mill+cations of con-
+hwting separate D()D and N()AA operational weather satellite systems. This sttldv based
its assessment of Ihe lechnical Ik'asillilily and costs ota converged sx:Slelll o111 NOAA,'NASA,
and I)()l) analyses, c<m,vhl<ling that no option cottld maintain l)erli)rmance levels and also
reduce costs sig, nific;mtly. In add+tills, policy (<Hl(erns rt'garding the open dislril:,uti<)n o|
weather data useltfl to potcnlial adversaries argued fi>r separatt, pr<)grams. 't The 1977,
review did, however, rt'suh in the Nixon atlministrali,tln directing N()AA t<_use the DMSi'
Bh>ck Sl) spacecrafl bus, then trader develol:,ment by the Air Force, as the basis for the
nexl-gcneration series ill p{llal:_lrl)iting satellites. It+ addition, N()+.L,\ and I)()D were
inslllltted to (Ooldinate inole closcly tilt' lnallagetnent of the separa|e pl-O_lanls.
()n st'yen olhcr occasions since 1972, the Department of (;<_mnlerce alnd DOll stud-
led Ihe p_tcnlial tilt it|legra|ing their programs. These studies ilid not lead to merged pro-
grams, I)nl they did restth in a st+miler <)1 modest economies, +schilling Ihe tzse of similar
sl+acecraft with nmner<lus comm<>n sut+svslems and COml)<lt+ents. In add+lion, both pro-
grams have used a common latmch vehicle and have shared resF, onsil+ility for creating
prodtlcts derived fimn the da|a. Tht' two progranls have also worked together closely on
research and deveh_t>n|enl effi_rls and pr<>vided complemenlary envir<mmcntal informa-
tion. Most (>t the scnsors, htlwever, remaine(l us(let the design anti c(_ntr<)l t)f each agency
(see Tattle 11-1 ).
l)espi|e these elt_)rts, unlil the early 1990s, foreign policy and national security con-
cerns precltlded full program inleg+ation. By that time, the drive t<) reduce the federal
Ill_<lgel and increase government efficiency led a number of observers Io suggest again
cons<)lidating the two systems. In addition, in October 1992, NASA and NOAA had begun
to exph_re the potential fbr c<)ns<)lidaling aspects of NOANs Polar-orbiting Operational
Envirozmletnal Satellite (POES) system and NASA's Earth Observing System satellite,
E()_I:'M. The laller is an atlelllf)on equator-crossing satellite thai will gather data similar
It) the F'C)ES afternoon satellite, but of much Ifigher quality and comF, lexity.
I0. '+J'h< + Mt.tt.ot++h_gi<al _iat<+flhv An;fl,,q+_ Stud,,' (MSAS): ()trice <Jt Management and 13udgt+t, IDT?,.
This study was bt+gun in 1972.
4 I. Tht+ t rnitcd St;it<.++ h+ld ph.d,gt.d Io mahnain ;Ill <lpt+n civilian wt+ather satellilt+ ++,'+'sit+in. Also, NOAA's
vtlvh'onmt+nlal salcllilt.s dt'ml+lLnlratcd Ihc t F.S. '+<_pcll skies" policy and s:tliP.;|i<'<l h_nb_,-,.,I;tndin_, t_.S. <fl+ligati++nn
tl> t'x< |l:tlt,'¢l' l_al lh d;ll;i will+ lilt' mvtc.l<)h>_i_ al a_cm i<.n and stit+st+tit or_;ufizali_t+s i>[ i)lh<.r itations.
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Table II-1
Key Sensors and Priorities for NOAA's and DOD's Polar Meteorological Programs
A,_eno_ a.d l)ata Acquired Se.sor Attribute._
N()AA
Muhi_,l)eClral imagery
((loud, vcgclali<in)
Tcml}Ctalmc aml htunidil:_
(initiali/t' nlmtcrical wt'athcr
lirt,dil ti<m model)
Ad',anced V¢' U, ttigh
Resohltion RadiomeWr (AVttRR)
TIROS ()peraliomd Verli_ al
Soumh'l t I'()VS)
( ;alit)i;llt'd, mullispc(tval ill|;lgt'r'.
I ligh spalial IcsI)lulion, ( ross-
tra.tk Si;lllllillt. _ (PM i'llll_tll)l
cl_lssing)
I)()D
Visibh. and hl|rar_'d cloud
iinagt'l y (i I(nid-diqt'( thin
|(ll'l'(';l_l, tat lic_ll inlagcr;
dis:,t.niin;tlilnl I
Operational l,ill(!s(_iil _iMcill
(()I_S)
( :OUlg_illt livid ol vww; hl_-Iight
(t-ally .&M cr_lssiil_)
Mi(Iowavc iinagcr)(o(t'illi
winds, t)it'( ii)ilalion )
I_,nll)cralurt" and hunlidil_
(t,ll,( I ro-_lplicltl |)lOl)agalil nl,
inilializc litiliWi ical w/'_ilht'l
t)redi( liorn niodel_,)
St)el ial Sl'llSOr _| (OW Ivc 'lill_tt_('l
(<";$M " I )
Special Sensor _,|iITOW_tW'/
T('inl)crillilii' _liilndl'i (SSM/'I:I);
_pccial Sensor Mi_ _<Jwavc/'
V%rill¢,1%,_t[)or _oun(lt'r (SSM/'IL2)
( :lllli('itl NC;tll
I,oW _l);lli;ll It'sl)hlli(lll, ( I'O_,_,-li';l( k
_( _llillill_
Source: ()ftice of "l'echnolog)' Assessment, U.S. (;ol|g, rcss, Civilian Satellite tCemote Sensing: A
Strateg4c Approach, OTA-IS_(';07 (Washington, I)C: (r.S. (;ovcrmnen| Priming Office,
Sct)tcmbcq 1994), p. 79.
In February 1993, Rcprcscnlalivc (;corgc Brown, then chair of Ihe t|<nlsc Colnmilie("
oi1 S(icnce, Space, _ind Tt, c|lnology, sent a letter to NOD\ Adnlinistralor I)..James B;lktq,
lt'qilc<'sling _t review ot ihc N()_ and DOD polar-orb|ling l)rotl, ralns to explore possible
cosl savings. 111-71As a resu]t of this initiative and silni|ar inierest wilhin the (]]inlon
adlninislration, the lW'o ag('lll:i('s l)('gan to eXitlnine the two programs oiic(l again. A It'W
lllOlllhs later, Sell_tlor Jalllt's Fxon, ct]air (if ti_t" Sellale Subcolnmhtee on Nucl/'ar
l)0lt'rlt-nct', Ailns (]ontrol and l)t, tTJiise hllt>ilig_.'llCe, SOlll a .%iinilar requesl to (]Olnlncrct-
_('('rcl_irv Roll Brow|i. 111-8] A rcporl of |he U.S. (]Oli_lCSs ()ffice of Technology
Ass(,SNlll{'lll ;11,%o offered consolidali(m of tlic two |)l-o_r;tlllS its 1411 o|)lion for reduchlg ti'd-
Clal spending. '_
By luly 199:_;, lhc two ina.ior iOilvcrgellCl" Sludics Wt, lt" consoli(latcd into a sin<glc iri-
_igellC'y sludy involving DOD, NASA, and N()AA. _illl inpul froin this siudy, by SOl)it, nil)or
1993, Vice Prt, sidenl AI Gore's Nalional P(,rl()rlnance Rcvi_._w made a Ill-in I)rOl)osal io
•17. Ra', A. _,¥illialnson, "NASA'N Mission to Plantq Eailh," Slalt'nit'nl I)t'tore ilw SiJac(' Sub( oininillt'c ot
lhc House (:onuniul.¢. on Ncicme, Spaic, and Te¢ hnolol.,p,, May 6, 1993; U.S. (:ollgrcs_, ()ltkt" ot ]¢'chnolol.,G,
As_'sslllelll, I'he I"utu#_' oi Remote Sen._ing: ¢.:tvilia, Satellite ._,_tem._ a_ld Applicatiun_, OTA-IS(:-541"t (Wa,,hillgton. 1)( ;:
I:.N. (lover nment Ihiming ()ttic,.',.luly 1997,), p. IlL
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hlleglal<: the two systems. 111-91 This pr(>p<_mal esthmttt'd that lhe _r('_'+_l would save
St+,()()million through lhe year 2000 add _1 l)illiol+ ()vet a decade by Cl<,'alill,_ a (llnvtwged
envir_mmental salellite system. The Naticmal l'erfi)rntance Review aiso rec()tnmended that
NASA
a_si_t in ongoiTtg e[]mt_ to converffe l :.S. operational weather satellites, g'/ve++the benefits o/
streamlininL_ the collection O/ weathm+ data a,':r0ss the /4over+_me+lt... By eon.sideriPqZ
[Mis+ion to Planet Earth/ research activities in context with operatio_al weather satellite
p_wg.am,_, cost savi_Lrg ape possible through _vnve#_en+e of the current operational satellite
fleets. Convergence O/the Natimlal Oceanic and Atmospheric Admi_i.stration (N(3AA)
I'olar iXletsat attd NA,S'AIs E(),gI>M (lqarth ODserving ,Si_',stetlt x/tfieylloo#l (]+l+(j,$,gill_r
[l)escettding] Mission) will e/ira|Prate redundan O, 0[ measun'nle_Tt_, etlhat_ce the capability
o/ NOAA '._data +et a Pld poteP+tiallv result in +vst saviP+ff_. _
Afler fltvther study, Vice l'residi',il Gore's initial prOl)osilion r_'sttlted ill a plan
detailed itl a May 1994 Pt+¢,sidetltial Decision Directive (also known as NST(;-2) on the
"('x)llvergence of U.S.-l'ohu-orllilillg Operational Environlnental Salellite NVsl,<.'lllS."
[lI-l<)] This decision direclive called lilt-an hitegrated l'rogratn Of lie<' lIP()) thaiwill "l)e
rt'sp<)i/sitilt! lilt" the' niatiagl!ineilt, planllitlg, deve]oi)illt!nt , t_lbrication, and oper_itions <if
lhe t;OliVeiged sysleill," |'fie IP() was set tip in Oclo|)er 1994. N():L_t gailied llle lead
iX'Sl)_)ilsil)ilily t_)i opel_ilioli.s, wilh i)()D leading svsleins acquisitioil alid NASA leadillg
iiew dl,veh)])llient aiid Ihe itlsertioii of ilew leclino]ogies.
()lit., <)[ Ih/" iilil)orlaill considerations in exphlring lilt" exa(+l lellll_ of (OlIvergellCe wa_,
])riot interesl al N()AA ill /<lopel-alitlg Iliore ('](is('ly with l+]tllOi)e ill N()AA',_ ]/olal-
(li'])iliilg pl-Ogialii. I'_lLiOl)t' had |)el'it c<lnlrii)ilting instrliilienls 1<) N()AA's P()E_ spacecl;ltl
sili<t' 1978. l)ilring tile e_iriy 1980s, I lie Reagan adniinistrali<)li allellil)ted to red|ice the
IWo-saleliile conslellali<)ii (Olle lli()rilillg-crossillg, ode atiern<)<iii-(rossiilg) Ill a siilgle aller-
IIoon-crossilig space(l-alt. N()AA o[licials ])t.¢+allle exlr+ineiy (l)ll(erllt,d thai illailltailtillg
oiily a siilgl¢, <)rl)iler Wolilll gix'_illy redii(e llle reliability of dala deliw'ry, t telice, lhe agt'lilv
])l'g_lll disttlssions will| ()llil'l- (Olililries, ti)rnliilg lilt! IliliWllaliolial Polar ()rl)ilin<_
Mele+ii-ologila] ,t_all,]lil¢, (il+<tll]) (II'()MS) io |)l'<)llllll(' a InOl'(" Cqliila])l_' sli_tring of lilt' bill--
den ot +ilia|||lain|Jig [)olar-_lri)iting rneleorologica] satellites. Meillbersiiil) ill II'()MS incilid-
eli lil()+l o| lli(" nlaior relllole-_ellsiilg satellite op(Halois. Within IP()MS, the Eilrol)t,ali
_plt(e Agellcy (l_]Ss_lt) togt!l]ler with tile newly created FAlropean Organisation |kit t|ll'
l']xpl<iit;ition of Melelll+olligi<:al Satellites (FUMETSAT) exprl'ssed illteresi ill providiiig it
European polar orbiter that could replace one of NOAA's spacecrafl. ++
trnder the strategy developed during the 1980s, NO_L_\ planlied to provide several
iil,Slrilillents |or a Etlropean orlfiler, which would replace the nlorniilg-crossing N()AA
sattqlitl'. ()rigimtlly, this s;Itellite was io be a large ESA spacecrait carrying bolh glol>al
¢'hall,ge rt's_'arch inslruillelit.s aild operalional ltieteorologit'al instrulneilts.'" By 1¢,)92, this
ill;ill ]llllt evolved till<) Olie in which Filrope wolild i)lt)il lwo s])acecTafl: an I_]_A glolia]
13. ()lit< <" _+1Vitc I'rcsidenl. National Ae+onauti+:+ and Spa+e Admim_lmtion+ ,\_ISA05: (.'lapfUl, the OlJi+,+tivc+
o/the Mis+i+m I_ I'h+P+et Farth #5+ogw+m+ in A<+ompanying Rq)ort of the National I%Ji+rmance Review (Washington. l)( ::
()lti_l' i_f th_ + Vicv Ih'l+sident, Septcllll)er 19q3)+
'II. Minilt<'s ot tht' Fourth IP()MS IH<'nal-,, and Firsl Adnlillistrativc W_+rking (;r_iti 1) 'l'<lk_,_+, .lalm.,
N<_x<'llllwl 12-13, 19_7, IP()MN Rt'p<>lts, Nati_>llal I']llviroiltn<,nial Data +llld llltilrnlalioll Svslcnl, N:llional
()_t++liii_ and Alill_l',pht,ii_ ,'\<hllinisii_lii<lil, 1987, Spa_e P<+licv histillltt' [)l)lunli'llt;ilx Ilisi_i_ (]_)llctlil+n.
_';tshiliglllll, I)( :.
13, Tlii_ _]llil'l't lliti W_l_, +wil4inally I Olil I'ivl'd Io Ill' lliil' i)t _iii iill/'i n;ilillii_i] f]t'l'l <l| ];ii_<' il'_,<'_ii(h iilid
ol)l't_iliotl_il ]lol_ii' oi]lil<'r_. I_iilii<'hl'd :|lid _l'i "¢il_'d I)'. I|il' ,_it)a_'(' _hilill¢'. _,Vilh lhl' ]f_. ill (,']l,'l[I,,,itt,_,l ill Jaiiii_il v
]9_4G _lii+l till+ _ll|)_,l'(llll.iil i ]lllii_¢. o[ t _._. llolic_ Iowa|id lhl" li_l" o| l|lt' ,_.l)al l' <Nhiiltll,, llll+_l, l)l_iii_ wl'rl' _i]l;indl>llt.d.
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change rcsearch satellite, Envisat, and a EUMETSAT meteorological operational satellite.
MET()I'. N().+L,\ and I_:UMF.TSAT began to develop Cxl)licit plans to operate the MET()P
slitellitc scl+ie.,+ as tllOl'llittg-(TossiIlg spactwralt (+;illyitlg three U.S. illslltllllt'lltS: tilt'
Advanced Very lligh R(.solution Radiomctcr (AVIIRR), flw I ligh-Rt's<flution Inl+arcd
Sotm(Icr (IlIRS), and tilt+ Advanced Microwave S¢mn(ling Unit. ()n May 6, 199.1. N()AA
formalb,' invited F+tCMETSAT Io partit:ipatt" in thc (()nvt'rgt'd [!.S. system. [II-I I, ll-121
Under the C(lIIVt'l'gPll('(" plan, by abottt 2005 ,)r 2007, the United Slates will keep two
matt'lilies in orbit at all tinles: il polar orbiter that ,,+'ill cross the Ctlttat<)r early in tilt+ lilt)HI-
ing Io obtain early cloud data of particttlar interest It) D()D and an Mternoon--('rossing
orbiter ,hal will provide the atm<>sphcric soundings that file National W(.athcr Servict'
nccds Io support data inlmtS to its predictive models. MF+T()P-I will cr<_ss the equator in
tilt" |at(' inornitlg Io collect data of particular |nit.rest Io EUMI(I'SAT's F.tlrol)t'an data
t ty,(+l+_.
()Ill' i,nportmlt issue that had to bc decided was the data policy for MICI'()P. In kcel)-
ing with its long-standing U.S. data policies attic,flared in ()flicc o1 +Manag,_+ln('tll and
Budget (]ircttlar A-] 30, the l]nitcd Stales has insisted that data lrotn it+'+,sensors n_t |:,(' con-
trolled even if they lly on tlt(+ spacecrall of other nations. +'+In kccping with its data p<>licy.
I_t_MI,7I'SAT wishes to control the data ti-om tile satellite to assure that tilt + COtllltlit+s l)cne-
fitting from the system conlribtHe to its tmlding. On the other hand, the United Slates wants
the power to deny data dclivcr+v to an adversary in limes of crisis or war.
The three [!.S. agt'tl('ies will n('e(I the long period t)t, lwcen tht" convergentt +decision
ill,([ OF,,'rational status <)f thc system to rt.solvc stwt'ral tc'chnical, I)l()gl+il+llll)lillic, and insli-
tuti(mal issues:
l)eT,el@ing tteT+,settsot:s and LSJmcecrap. Beclmst + 1)()1) mid N()AA have ditli'rcnt data
reqtfirt'mcnls, it will tw challenging It) meet all the primary (tata rctluircments and
still reduce pt+ogram costs. The IP(), tot exatnl)le, may lind it diftictdt to sat|st},' D()l)'s
need tbr images of t<)nstant resohltion at+ross the ticld and maintaii1 lhc ra(li<)mctri(
quality that N()AA (lt'sires. N()AA also has a rt'qtfit+ctnellt f(n- sounding data of high-
¢'r (lualily than l)()l)'s.
lm.orDora/ij+g neTo caDabililies in o/)eratiolPal +e+l+0r+. NASA's inv_+lvemt'nt in the integrat-
ed froNtam could lead t<_interesting Ol)pOvttmitit's to incorporalc improvcd scnsots
or new data types in D()D's and N()AA's Ol_Craliomtl pt-_gvmns, derived ti-om cxtwri-
enct" with NASA's Mission Io l)]ant't Earlh rt.s('m-cil t.ff(n-ts. ]l(>w(+ver+ the sensors
(Icsign,'d to tackl," rest.arch i)robh'ms m+t+ gt'ncrally nltt(h in()rc CXl)cnsivc and Cal)a-
l+h+ than lh()_+c (h.signcd for r(mtinc data t+(>ll('cti(m, lhrncc, making the it;ins|lion t<_
operational status also presents Sl)ecial challenges to ,h.'signcrs in making ch(.apcr
instrttmcnts Cal).d+l(' <)f mccting t)l)crati_mal requircnl('nls. Data oscrs will also)have t_>
adjust thcir op('rati<)ns to make cilicient use ol mort' COml)lcx, l)llt lllOl't • usclul ,lain.
3+ Mai_+taini_g i_lsli/+_limml colhlbotvt/i¢m am+rag [ :.S. ag'em'i_. Thc thtcc i_gcnt'i('s in the
II'() hi|v(+ Wol'k(+([ till|gently I<_t'still)lish it ('()llld)OlaliV(' working vt'lltlionshil). | |<_'+vcvc_,
('il+('h ilgt'll('y'S bti(lgct is sul)jt'('t IC, tadically ditti'rcnl I)l'i(>tliti('s |tilt[ is ()V('IS(+t']I within
the ()tt]cc of Mimagcment and Bttdgct by ditti't+cnl cxatnincrr+. In add|titre, cltch
rcccivcs oversight and its al)l)topriatiim from difti'rent congrc_,sional committccs and
-t(i. ]tzt,,'znltlilmal ,%l);uc l. qli,,czsit), Ibwatd _t_ Ittl+'fft+tlcd ht/¢'tt_ali+mal lh+la I%/t¢'l t+)amt'woHc /o_ l(atl/_
()bwt_,al_,Pt_. A |_.i,'_tw/_ I¢_?m_t, IS, '/RH', !t7 ' I (lllkirt h. I+'_illll ('[ IlltCl nllli()llM Nil|it t" I "nixcl.dl'+. laHu:u "+ 1997)
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mll)c(mlnliUC('S, lh'n('(', c<mlinuc'd progress ill nlainlaining II1(' IP()"+,,,ill (lep<:n(t (m
lilt' delt'l+lllinali()ll <It":+';('Vt'lal ('If'lilt'IllS ()I' lilt" athnhlistration ;in(l (]()ngress to follow
through on their program (+oniHlitments.
4, MaiP+tainin/g :lo.+e interPmtioP+al ro@eratiom (;ooperaling with EI.rMETNAT and in time
p<issibly other nations in el)crating a tleet of operational +.'nvironrnenlal satellites
p<)ses additi<mal challenges tilt Ihc three agencies. I_UMETSAT poli(:it_s and thnding
mechanisms will continu(, to h,c driven hy the needs, iihih)sophics, and fhnding mech-
all|SillS <if its iii('lllt)(w wcallll,r organizations, whit:h arc likclv to be dilIerenl than
those of tilt' IPO. Maintaining the syslem and high-quality data dvlivmx over timt. will
require contii+ltu:d fh'xibility on the parl of the IPO in licgotiating s},£tcm upgrades.
Adding additional organizations to tile system will thrlhcr complicate such hegel|a-
lions, alth<)ugll this (o1,M increase system ('aF,ability and |ilrtht'r re(lute U.S. costs.
l)cspitc tilts(. (]iMhmgcs, lhc aueml)l to (ons<lli(lal,t. N()AA's told l)()l)'s m(+t,.+<)ro-
logical pr<_grams is nl<irc ]ikt'ly to succeed than past t,ff<,ts bccat,se of lilt" (onlhwnc(, <Tf
st'vcral tTicl<)rs. First, c<>nlintting pressures to maintain re(hut,d agency bu<lgets will
<'n(-Olmtge agency otti<ials t<l (<retinue to seek pr<)gram etIicienci(,s. (:osl savings are ats()
;Ill imp<lrtant tiactor in resolving |)ossit)le frictions among congrt'msi(>nal oversight and
appr<lpriati<lnS (ommitte(,s over programmatic aspt'cts of the (onv('rged syst('m. S('(<m(l,
('alli('l" phuls 1)y N()2_'X and I)()1) t() upgrade bolh tile DMSP and P()ES instrlml(,tHs and
Sl:m(ecraft sh()t+tly after thv turn ()f th(" century ',,,,ill sttpp(irt tc(hnical (<mverg,pnce. Third,
the (hang<,d internati()nal s(.(+urily ('t+vironment will cause I)()l) mlalvsts and managers to
((>nlinll(+ It) lll(ld,prale their historical <)bjecti()n to sharcd mililm,,-(iviiian systems. Ill ad(li-
it<in, tilt" (ippot+tunity |o involvc EtJMH'SAT and perllal)S other nati(+ns or <)l+gani/alions
it+ providing ellVir()nll+et+Ha] data could lilrther re(hlc(+ <)veral] l)t+ogram costs. Finally,
in(luding NASA explicitly in lh<' pmInershi I) pr<)vides the <q)p<_rt<inily to l)Lm ongoing
inn<ivati()n and lilt' mulsiti<m of research instruments buih in SUpl)<+rl of NASA's l+]arlh
,S<i(+n<(" activities Io ()])crati(ma] slatus |i)r tile o0nvengcd system.
Earth Resource Satellites
Em-lh resource satcllilcs sulIi'r('d man), <)|+tlt(+ same kinds _ll controversies it+ theit-
lrailSili_m troll| ieSCal'ch I_+ ()pel'illi<)ll$ {is nieteoroh+gical satellites, with worse results. Part
_)t lh(" tt'nsioli (iv(,i- this lransilioil rest|lied from worries al)otll wllelhcr _1progralii I<) col-
Ic(I ililagcs of lhe F+al+lh f_i civilian i)ilrposes We|lid Ihl+t.alell lilt' st'crt,(y stlrrOlllidilig
l)()D's ri'COlliiaissan('t' satt'llitc i)i+o_ralliS. AliOlller mort" ini|)orlalll Soilrct. <it difficuhv
was ii tla_llit'iil('d data ilst'r COilillitlllily; lilt' ilila_es taken I}<)lli Earlh it'SOllrte saleliilt's
wt'rt' ust'fiil tbr geol(igisis, hydrohlgiSls, agril:tihtii+a] scientists, city and regioiial l)laillit,rs,
gt'<)glaph('rs, aiid pt!<lph" lioin other dist:iplint's, x+{,t, a syslelii servhig all Iht'se (lisciplint, s
was ill|at)h, to It|eel lhc ii(!l'ds el +any <)lip exlreltieiy wt'll. Even within the li'tleral govern-
lll('ill, two agt'ncies with diff_.'rtml interests, lhe Deparlnlenl Ill" ilic Interior aild the
l)epailln<'nl of A_,ricillllirl., so||gill Io shape the progralii. Anolht,r pr<)blcin was thai
|+]arlh ieSotlrcc satcllitc pr(!jt,cts slarled laler than lneleoi-ological salclliles. With a I]lSl
lmln(h in 1977, lh(" l<]arlh rt,soui+c( • saiellhe progranl t)egan <)lily iiti('r eilthiisiasili t_ll-
Af)oll<l had Wailed; at this i)oiiil, NA_z+x's |)tld_t,l was subiecl 1o milch int)l(, ililt,n+;e sciilli-
nv tioni lit(' ()filet of _'|alta_t'llit'lll alld l_tldget and (]Oll_ress.
] ()_ ( )I),SER\ r]N(; l'l IE E\Rr[ l| FR( )M SPA( :I,"
Research Program
Th(' idca lilt+ a civilian Earth r('s<)mc(" satellite had two ,sources. D()I) had an a(liv('
rc(onnaissimcc satellite program growing oul of expcricn(c wilh rcc()nnaissancc air-craft
dating l)ack to World War I. Scientists wh(1 investigated new techn()h)g)' li)r the classilit'd
reconnaissimce pr(igram often had training in get)fogy or gc<)graphy, and lhey saw much
potential for civilian use of the class(tied data they studied. In addition, NASA hired sig-
nificant immbers of geologists It)prcl);Ue file scientific ])togtam I_.)r Apt)lit|, and some ()l
them became interested in lot|king at the Earth as well as the M(1on froln spa('e, c hl 1!)()._,
NASA slarled 1(i investigate the potential oF studying Farlh resources from space using
illSll'UlllCllt,"i flown ill its OWll aircraft. [lI-13l The space agency wa)ltcd to involve the U,S.
(;eoh)gical S(trvcy (a l)ranch of the l)cpartmt'nt of thc Interior) and tltc Army (:()l-ps (if
Engineers in remote-sensing rcscar(h.
NASA pr()cc('ded slowly, testing a variety ()I sensors fr()m ain-crafi bcli)re planning an
(,xp(:rimetlta] satellite. In a pattern sitni]ar to the debate over Nimbtls, the space agency's
initial plans for Earth rcsotlv(.(." satellites callcd f()r a large, sophisticated experin|ental
satcllitc. [ll-141 Meanwhile, scientists at the l)cl)artment of the Int(.'rior had lwcom(" con-
vinced <if the value of satellil(" data li)r applications and wantt'd an early opt,rational satel-
lite inst('ad of elaborate experiments. [11-15] Impatient with NASA's lack of acti(m, a
gvottp ()f st-(enlists at the U.S. (;(,ological Survey persuaded Sccretary (if the [ntcrior
Stewart I. Udall to announce in Septeml)<_'r 1966 that the Department of the Int(:riol-
wottld slart its own operational satellite program. TM 111-161 When the W('athet Bmcau
l)ullcd out of its mcte()rological satellite agreement with NASA, it made an ahernativc
alliance with DOD. The Department t)f thc Interior, on the other hand, was unable t(1 lind
it pal'lltCl" with sj)act, experlistq |hi.IS it,+,;allllOllll('Clll('ltt was lllOl'C a |)IIFeallcl-atic lllallCIIVCl"
than a veal(slit plan, Nevertheless, flw resultant publicity ti)rccd NASA to commit to fastel-
act(tin on an experimental pr(_jcct t(t Imild tile kind of small satellite tilt" Department (if
the Interior wanted."' [11-17] NASA initially called t|lc pr()j('ct lllc Earth Re.sources
Technology S:.tlcllit(" (ERTS), but it (:ha.rng(.'d the naln(' tt) l+andsat in ]!)75. (;('n('ral
Elcctri(" Wt)ll thc I+)rin+Je (()lltra<.t li)r 1)<)th the Nilnl)tl.',; and l,illl(l,sat ])r()granls, ;.|lid 1hc
Nimt)us i)latform that had I)ccn devcl()pcd and flown by NASA was ills() used tilr l.andsa(.
Many problems rcmaincd after Ihc agre<.'lnent on what kind ()l satellite NASA w()uM
build. Thc intcrcstcd agencies c()ntinttcd t() disagree over a variety (if management and
technical issues and over the pvopcv balance lwtwt+t!n alt CX]ICl+iIlICllta] alld all operational
program.'" The Departm('nt of tilt' Interior and the l)(,partmcnl ofAgricultur(" wanlcd dill
ft.r(.nl kinds of sensors; Interior prt,fi.,lrcd ;t rctmn-lx'am xidicon (a type of television cam-
-17. I)amela E. Mack. Vte_+,i.g the FaHIt: 7"/.' L_llria[Con_tr)lctiml o/ the l.a.rlsat ,gatellzte .'_s'stem ((:amt)vidgv.
MA: MIT l)rcss. 19(.1(1'),pl ). 2:)I--12, "I)) st'<.' how an l_;lllh observation lit(|gram grt'w out ol rt's('alt h on lilt' <)lht'l
planctn, s('c l)elc) (:. gadglcy. '_]'h<`'Applicalion'+ o| Rt'm.u' S.t,nsors in Pl;in('larv l'_xph)r:tti()n," ])apcl pt<`,scnlc(l
at lilt' thiud Anntml Rcmt)tc Sensing (_onlcrc))(c, Ann Arl)on. Mi(higan. ()tlobt'r I t, 19(i4.
IN, |he IIcpattnlcnl (if lilt" lntcri()t tallcd its ptog, ranl lqatlh Rc'..()mtc',, ()l)sclvation Satcllit('s (lalct
_0,'slt'tllSj, (it ER()S.
|!l. '_'.rI'. l)('t'ora, l)it('('tt)r. (',colo_h:ll Nut v<`%ttl Ilt+th'r ,St,t tela) }, lit'liar Imcnt ()I lilt +Intt'vh)x, "SIilItI++(>I
I'.R( )S l)t()gratn, ,' <hMt,Junc 15, 1967, Spate l)olit v htstitutc l)ot unwnta)x I list(it', ('.()llcction, Washin_t<)n, I)( '+.
F()a m()tc details, scc Ma(k, Viewi.g tl++"l .aPth, lip, 5(i-(:,F),
,50, I)clcr (',. l))adglt,y, l)togt;un (:hi('l, l_i:tnt|l RcsotLr(t's Ntln_.tg, I() l)ist]it)utit)n, "M(.'cling ()t I'_;luth
Rcs()t£_t cs I 'ncz ,\gcnt ', Rcl)rCscnlati_cs with SI)a(c ,\Ill)lit all(ins StM1 'Mt+tnl)('l s and Advan(('d M;tnnc('l Mission,,
Stall Mt.ml)cvs. Al)til '.)0, It)(;7, '' Ma', 4, 19(;7; .la(()I) E. Sm:ut, Assisl;mt Mhnmist)at()t li)) l'.li('., NASA, t() lh:
Scatnann, "M('('ling wilh R(,])icscnlati_cs ()I Dcpmlmcnl ol Agti(ultmc and Inter(()) Emth R(,,,()m(('s.'
Scpt('ml)c) II, 19(;7, wifll a (onlidcnti;ll sc(()nd memo (if samc sul!ic(t and datc:Ja(()b E. S)navt, Assistant
.\(hnilfiStHl()) lilt lit)lit v. NASA. to |in. Muclh'n_ _'t al., "E;l) th Rcs()ur('cs StH xcv lh()gn am." ( )( l()l)(,n 3, 1967; Edgan
5,I. Cot|tight lilt C;c()tgc E. Mtwlh'r, Ash(it(arc Administxat<)t lily Mmlncd F;l)a¢c Flighl, Mcm()ran(Itm) t()
Assistant A<hninisttat()I l_>n l)oli(F, "l_;tt th Rt's()uI(l's Sltt(ly lh()'+.[nillll," N()tcml)cl 17, 19(;7; flint', ]. (;<)('tl I<)
D;micl (;. Mazun, l)c(cntbct 3. 1967, All ()I th<'sc dotumcnts (all bc f()un(l ill thc Sl)a(c l)+)lit_ Instil|fit"
I)o( imtcnlat "+1 []sll)n x ( ',()llt't tit)n, Wa+,hin_t()n, 1)( ;.
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I'ra), while Ag1+i(zi]tu1+e dt,sh+cd a intullisp('(tr;ll sc;izzncr. I_oth sensors hivolved rclalive]y
imlcsled It.(lilloh)+.,_C '_
Data pr(_t:t,ssing ;iucl disliil)utitln i)1+(_vide(l cvcn lnovc set+it)us challenges: a s;itcllilc
t;ikitig pictures of lllt" t+iilil'c E;t1+th, e'+.'t'ii ;tl ;l spitti;ll 1+esoltttio_i o|';abtitit I00 Itielt+1+s, would
tluickl)i produce ;,ll OViwwl+elillilig :tin<mill or +l+ll_. El]ectivl + |,st,, F,:a1+lictfl;t1+lv c<)vt.r;lge of
1;tl'_t" _ll'('iis ;ind i('i)c;ilt,d (;()VCliigt_ ill lhc S_illlt" SCCll(" to (ll)sc1+vt" (h;ing<.'s, would it'(]lli1+o
_ill;i]%'sis I)y ('<lmplitlil" r;iltll!r lh;in I)y ii hlllll;tll plloloinl('1+p1+i'lt'1+, i ll)wcx,t,1+, l<.,(hnlill)/.,7, flit+
sii(h I;ir_l'-sc;il(__ illllt_t" pr<)(csSill_ It;ill I1<)l )'ct t)ccn devchll)t.d ill lht" civilian world. '_
llii¢lgcl;ii'+l' ctiilSlr;iilllS lii()vctrl ('Veil lilOi'C sl-ri(liis i|iali lcchiii('al pro|ilcilis. P_t¢irl_
(l(!(+lillillg sul)po1+l t'o1+ lilt! si)ii(t: t)t<)g1+;tlil <)n(-t" NASA 1+t,;ililt'd its Apollo g<);il, tilt" siliitt"
+lgt'llCy'S ]0;id(!1+s ;illt'nlplt'd t(i (at)il;ili/.(" ()11 the tls(2ftllnt'ss of Sli:ilt! to I)l'()lil()ll" applica-
Ii(>ilS pl-ogr;inis."+ lit-18, 11-19, i!-201 The sli;ilt+h+, did not w<)1+k; lhc I_tirt,iiu of lilt" lludgt'l
1+t'lil!;ilt'diy deh+lcd the ERTS pit>iecl |l'<)ili the |)tidal, Is of NASA ;ind lilt! Dcp;irlnit'lH <)[
l|i(' IllI('1+iOl; 111-71I lit tTit'l, 111(" siralt'k,_ +, of p1+i)lliolilig llSt't'lllllt'ss lil;I,X' II_iVl+ t);ickti1+t'd: lilt"
liilt't';lil (if tile Bil¢lgcl (()ftit+(' (if M_tila_cliloiH and Bil¢lgt+t ;iflt,r 1{)70) 1+e|)t';llt'dlx' asked
NASA Io p1+<iv(" lh;il lilt'Ill'lit'Ills ()t" [+;inds;tt Wi)llld cxc(,ed tilt ('<isis. NASA sl)<ins<iit,d the
rcttuii¢'d Slildit's arid also apl)call,d (-ills in the prt_iect's btidgel di1+cclly to Ihe p1+csidcnl+ _''
Tit(, l)(,i)ii1+tlilt,lil of die liii('1+io1+ tl|ll_iilicd t+lindirig Io t)iiild a d;illi plot+t!SSilig lind disiril>-
Ill|lilt It'iili'l oli]+x' Wiltl lhc help of Rl'pliblican St'n;tll)1+ K;i1+] Mlmdl of Si)iilh i);ikoi;t.
,l'_t'llill()l Millldl hiid 1)('((1111(' ii Ill{lj<)l" Stlpptl1+lt'l" ()i" th(" pr<+ieci Wilt'it lh(" l)('p;irlllit'lil (if 1|1(2
llil('ri<lr tlecidcd It) Iot';ilc hs dlit;i tli'oct+ssii/g ccnlcr in Sioiix F;ills, Solith l)iikol_i.":' 111-721
[)espitc all lilt" discord, lilt! [iisl s;ih'llitc provt.d a technicltl suttcss. NASA [_iiin(ht'd
[+;iilds;il ] <ill.Jill+x, 7+l, 1{_72, 1ti1<1 sci¢'tiiists quickly t<lilnd lll;tily list'S lt¢)l" t|l¢ + (+|a{;t. P1+i<)1+to
ttlt" s;itt,llitt"s [;iilll<.ll, NASA il_ld received lilt)ill, tit;in lilt0 pl'optisitls tl<)lil scientists ;tnd <)tti-
1,1+sit!tlli(!slitig ttlnding it) ilptt,slig;ilt, list, s of data |1+oni tilt, satellites. Moist" Itian 71)() f)i'<) -
p<is;ils tiotn IT.S. iii/,t!slil_;it(11+s _illd I 01) ti-om overseas were fiinded; Iht'sc scicntisls stood
rc;ld), Ill tis(_ l.ands;il d;tl;i ;is st)on ;-is It/(')' bet;tin(" available.
'Flit" list, o1 l+_llittsal tt:ii;l 1+;iised +t illlllll)t,r o1 is.silt'.s, l)cvclopillff COlilll1+ic.s Ii;id iiliti:ill)'
w_r1+it'd atl<iUl lilt" illiSilSC ot +d;ila l._:tttieicd without thei1+ t:onscnt, bill when sat¢_llile d_lta
t)t'g_ill I() ;llrivt', lilt')' tblUld il (it" considerable %'alllc ill p1+<ividiilg illfti1+lii_llit)n (in at'ells thai
wt'lt, ili;idt.qU;ilci), tli;ippt,d. 1II-7_41 Despite ih<_'se b(.'nt'i]ts, di't);tlt! conlintlt'd ()x,('l" iiilt'l-
ii;itiOrllil politiciil ;tlld legal iSSlleS associated wil|l I'/'lilOi¢_ SCIlSirI_. [11-241 l,arlds;il d:tla
p1+<)vi,d list'tii] 1o scii'nlisls (if 1111111)'Sl)1+i+s,|711+everytiliiig from si_l+t+'hin_ t+O1+oil io rli;ippii) I
i(t'. ''_x+_+lun]ikt" incteor<)logical salelliles, wtlose data p1+o'¢ed lllOFe us_'l]ll II) wl, allit,1+ t+()l't "-
('iislt'1+s I|i_ili Io i't'st'_ii't']i scit'ntisls tlililding lnodcls, l+;iilds;il d;ita wl,1+t., quickly list,d t)y
it'st';i1+(ti('r_, _illd iiiii(ti iiil)it" slowl 7 siicI1 data lcotind widt_spF<.,itd op¢'r_iliol/_ll list,. NASA
51, M;i(k, I+lP_l_#_l_ I/t+"I;arlh, pp. 66-7% NASA w_ls I)()1 _llhlwed t<l list' bCltl'r lesled tcl'hn<llt_)' thai h;ill
lll'<'il dc_clopt'd |i)r i'c(lHlii_ii_s_lnct' salcllitl,S.
/'_7. P)iidk0t'y to l)istributioil, "Meetirl_ lip Earth Rl_Slltir(-t'_; User A_erlcy Rt'prcseillatives, Apt ii 2(), l{tfiT,"
.%1;i_<I, I_)liT; Ma_k. l._/_Tr_14++tl_'l+;rll+l/l,pp. 107-11"I.
_l_/. l.<.llii_till J_lll_' Ill Ihe l_elor[l, "(71)llilniHIl_lr) r Delivered I)y Mr. l,t!llll_ll-d .laflt" _11lhc Airlil! Itottsc
Pl;iiiiiint4 S(.iliiil_li, liiilc l_.)6ti," lulv _+ 1t.tti6, S|)_ll t' P_licy lnstihlll' l)ocllint-lii_li y Hislory ('_dlt'<'lion, '_%';t_,hilll_itin,
1)( :.
F,I. P_l;ltk, l'/_+_/r_4tD+>/','_vt,l_,lip. _0-!)_. This issiit' c<lnliilli+-d cvcll _ltitT I;lllllcll. S<'¢ P_IUl A. "¢;Irldt'r M_dc
Ill (it.oral' M. l._lw, Fl'tlril;try 7."1, l{)7.rl, Sll;Icc Policy Institule DOttliliCillllry ttistoi'y (]<llh'cti_lil, li¥_t_;|iin_l(>li+ 1)(].
_'l_l. Pi<!s._ lelc_ise |r(llll thc _itice of Si'i)alor Karl E. Mtindl, M;trch, _lO, 11171),SI)_tcc P_licv lnstiilllC
l)ll(lllllt'lll_ll"+ }lJstori' (;(_]]('<'lJol), Vl_;lshirl_lol), I)(]; I);ivid Is, _t('ll+;t'th, "EI_()S_T|It, I.ocal Stl>r_; +' 11,)171.I'+S_PID
77a#_I (ltmc i974): 4-F_; Mack, 1'Tel_,7_l/,_#lie l'_rtrt#l, pp. 1_7-4rl.
Fit;. Alil|iony .1. (;alil) lt_ I)il+_+cl_lr, .l()lins(>n Sp;l(t' (it!nil'i-, "l'];li'lll Rl'+;llliiTl+S Ilrh'tinl4 tin ]lt'll(llt'llili
In<hi_;Ir) Reprcsl'ni;liivcs+" N<lv<'iiillt'l [2, I_.i7'./; ('.|l;irh'f |). (]ciii('rs It) Pi|;tlht'_+rs,1;<'t)l'ii;tr',' IFi, 197.+t.ltoth It<tt'u-
ilil'iil_, ;ill' Ill(;lll+fi ill thc Sll_il C I'_)li_ hl_+iiluh ' 1)<ltiillit'ill;tr%: Ilisl<li'y (]_lh'ciillii, li_'_is|iiil_lllli, I)(L
170 ()I_sErvIN¢, ['] n_: EAr rli Fr_)M SPA( :1,:
leaders discovered tirol if tile space agency did not lind ways Io convince potential user,,,
to apply Ihc data, tilth lhc pr_jcct would not bring file bcnc]]ls promised.": [11-25]
NASA thc|-cforc became involved not only in promoting the usc of l,an<lsal dam, bul
also in supporling rcsca|ch lo dcvclop al/p|-oachcs IO lhcir use. ()no m_ljor prqjccl
inw>lvcd agricuhl||al smvcys, because better prc<liciion of harvcsls was one use of l,antlsai
data that thc space agency had llrc<li<'Ic<t wo||hl bring significanl benefits. .'_ Thc l,argc
Area Crop hwcntory Experiment (I=A,(3E) involved NASA, lhc National BZ:athc| - Service,
a|xd lhc Dcparlmeut <if Agriculture ill an ;tltcmpl lo develop and lcsl a crop t_rc<asting
system using 1,amlsat data. The data, it was claimed, could p|ovidc Iwo [hings: infi)rma-
lion on how much land had bccn planted in a givcn crop (assuming one could difi_:|cn-
iialc among crops in dw dam) and informalion on crop t|cahh (because badly slrcsscd
vegetation relict:ted less infraicd light). Thc plojcc! at:hicvcd reasonable siK:t'css, but Ihc
l)rol)leln of idcnlit_,h_g _tnd difiTercilli_tthlg crops tToni salcilitc iil]_iglq',y ltlllwd ()lit lo hi'
iiillCti liiOlc ditticuh lh_ill expccic<l. "_' I11-76] Pili'l]lci*iiioic, lhc 1)c])iirliiieiil of A_ritllhtirl'
(']losc I1ol Io a(h)pt tile systl:lll dcvclopcd by the L,\CIE pr_)iCCl t_)l- o|)('l_liiOll_i[ use. '_"
Scvcra| <)tiler cxpcritnctits wcrc IliOl'C succcsstul, but IIS(" t,)[" l+andsat data t_)t <)pci-atiotlal
;ipi)licalions (OillillllCd Io <lcvch)i) It(Illt" slowly lh;_tn its pl'<)lllOlCl-+ had hopt'(t.. "+ A NASA-
si)Oli,Soi+cd lCt|ino]ok7, tr+iiis[__,r _tlld tilili/ation i)lOgl+_iili invoiviiig ilnivcrsilics, stall" _tild
local _OVCl'll]lli'lll$, and industry could llOt lCVClSC ltiis reality.
Operational Landsat Program
Tlic dcvcloplncnt of an operational program bct;_tlllC ilic sulTjcct ot'a series of politi-
cal <tel)lilts. Different groups proposed al lcasi three (li||{:rcnl aitcrnativcs. First, the fi'd-
t'l'_ll _ov('l'liml']ll ('ouid develop _lil opcratiollal Earih I'CSOILI'C('S progl'alll oil the Inodcl ot'
lilt" ol)t'r_ltiOll_-tl wc_llhel salcllitc |)rogr_tnl, providing salcl|iic dala |or lilt" public good.
Sccoiill, _i l)riv_ltc coilit)_iliy nlighi take over lhc cxisting Landsat syslciii _iiid rim ii as _i
t)tisinc_;s, all o|)liOll ilSil_illy calh'd priv_iliz_itiOli. Third, a privy(It" COlii|)_lny illigll[ dcvclop
tiild ltttulch it Ilcw _ill<l separ;ttc Earth ot)scrv_itions satellite, all option liStl_L|,v callcd t-olll-
ilit'r¢ildiz_tliOli.
Despite the SOlllCwll{ll disappoinling growth of Lalids_ll d_ii_i list, the |)c|)_irlmt, ii[ of
llic hltcrior wanlc(I _ili cariv tr_uisilioll lo ;l _ov(_llllllCllt-spolls;orcd <)l)craliona] salcl]ilc
piOgl_iln, but die _lg,Cll(y |{iced _i ilillilbci- of ol)siaclcs. [II-77] First, the ()tticc of.
M_lnll_cilit_ill _tn(| ll_tid_cl qtit,,stioilc(l wtlcihcr l,andsai had yielded eliOUl_ll I)enctits loins-
57. .lalncs (;. Plcwhci to Pr;Ink E. M_lss. Pclli u;ir,. 70, 1.q73; tl_ins Mark t_l (;]itti_id E. (;h;ulcs_'l>rth..lill_
3 I, lt.)73: 1,Villi_lni 1";. _ll)il('V to l)isiril)iilion, "_llllllll_ll } "l'houghls i)li l_;_lllh Rt.sl)llll('s Tillns|t'r Mcctinl4." lure'
77. 1975, All of(hi'so dolllnlt'ill._; ;.ire iii lhc <_t)_l_.'t" Poli_ hislillile l)ll¢tillit'lil_iry t lib(or)' (;oilc(li_)li. l{'_tshiilgloil.
I)C,
._l_. (;arroll (;. (;rulitl/_'_'t-i, U._. l)cl)_il'lllil.'lll ot A_liCtlilurt'. 1o l.cllntu-d .laitc, i)cptll], Asso_i_ltc
AdniiiiiMllltol. _A,%A. AIIgIIM 7 U, 197;/. itisl ilSSl's ;I lll'_.l it'M'llr( h ;llid dcv¢'lolJm('lll _ill(I)" io develop a ( OlllplllCl-
|Ktst'd s'__4tCtll li)i slliiill "_vllt';it yichl c_tilllttliOll.
59. .lluncs 1,. Miichcll, Otti<c ol Milli?lgcnicill ;ind Budget, 1o Rnhard E. Bell _lld Don I_;tltril)cig,
Dt.Qitltlllt'lll ol Agli(ltltuic, '*l;llgc .,tl-i'it (]lllti [il','cllllll'_ l.]xlit.iiiilciit,*' ()< t<lhcr S. 1976, Sfilt(<, l'_dic_ lllsliltilt'
i)o(tllllCil[_irl llislolv Collcclion. "vti'lts|liiigloli, l)(].
6(I. Ma_k, l'i_'_l,/tlg t/it I"arth, pp. 1,I(7-5R.
Iil. Pill iI _;l(ll-V with a _;llCCl'_;Stll] Olll(tlllli' scc.John It Erl;illd_,oll, AllllV (;l)lps (11 [*]ll_illCel_,. lo R. Pi,
_,l;lll)_ll_itl<l, .]<dmsoli S|ltlcc (]t'lll¢'l'. M:tlx'h lli. |l.17('l. %little l'<dky h_slilutc |)ll<'lilll_.'illiliw tlistlliy (klllt'itioll,
Vi';i_.liill_ltlll, I)(L Mack, 17_.l_U_l/.r/he #:'/lttD, t ). 131i. l_]_i • llic ic;l,.;oils ot slow ;idoiJlioii. ncc loller tiom Sally Bil',
(;oiil_,;'t'll, N;lli_lllll[ (]lllll{'lt'lll<t" llt'_lillt" [,_:_islllltll'cs. Ill Allt'll l I. ti_,':llkiil_,, [_]!()_ l)itl;t (;t'lllt'l', Dt'tl'llllwIr ',_, 1977,
;llid Iclici tiom Ath'n It, tlki';llkillS to Sitll_ liJ;iy (]_)l iIwcll, l)ct¢'in|)el 77, lt377, SI)tilt" Polio,, hislillllC i)ol iiinclii;tr _,
1 li_,llll ) ( ;llilt'l'lil>ll, !i4"ttSl/ill_/llii, 1)( ;.
|+_XI'I x )RINI; TI IE UNKNOWN ] +71
til T'a c_mtinucd governnwnt-ftulded l_rogtam. _++l ll-2_l This issue posed 11tlik'mma: l)Otcn -
lial nscrs did n<_t WktIIt to ilIV('_l ill t|It" ill[+Ol+lll_tli()l! P.;+V_,t('lll_ ll('('('SS_tl+y t<) l)l'o('('sS +ll'Id ;tll_tl_,'/t"
Earth rc+'+,<itll't+t+ssatellite data tmtil thcy knc'w thal lilt+ d_ita would c<)nlitnl(+ Io bt, available
in lhc liltut( ', wl61c the ()flicc of M:allagelll¢'nt _++11<IBudgel +lit! |lot want Io !'und an opera-
tional l)r+_gr_Itn !mill it was clear lhill ('llC, ll_h llS(+i'S would participate to justify' if.'" As dclavs
IMIJ, IlIII¢'<I, [,_lllCiS+ll Icchnology bc<anlC increasingly out of (late; in 1986 France l;nmchcd
an Earth rcsoHlCes satellite n,un('d SPOT (Satellite Pour I'Obgervation de la 7),rPv) thai in
S()Ltll(" W_lyS _'_15 lllt)l+e s<)pl)isli('_IWd.
Instc_id of cho<)smg which l+.+dcral agtu+icy would house _m c>]+eralionai ])t-ogram, an
altt'rmttivt' ,q)l)t+oach gaivt_.d inCTC;Ising attention: that priv+tte industry should lak(" _iv('t
Earth rcs<)tnc_+ salellilcs becausc it had c<)mmunications s;itcllitcs (instead of r(qaining tht +
pl-l)_l++tlll _tS ;+t gOV_TIIIII('III function as had !)cell done with me|tort+logical satellites). The
inll)clns lor the idea cant(" primarily l]<in+ those intt, r¢'sicd in r,+'chlcing tlt(+ feder;d bltd<_ct;
unlike commtmic:ation satellites, tilt" potential prolitabilily of Earth res<nlrof satellites was
st+ llll(+('l+l+tilt that ])rival(' industry had only limited illtelcmt ill taking over ill(" whole sys-
Icm."+ [11-29, 11-301 In ()clober 1.¢+78, PresidenlJinn+ny (];Itl('r issued l'residt'tHial I)ccision
<12, which a.sked NASA and the D(+parlment tff (+<)l't|ltl(Yl+cc to find ways to cnc<liH-agt> !)ri-
Val(' ivldnml1y ])articil)ali<_n in civilian remote s(_viSillg (including [+anclsat, wcath('r sat|q-
lilt':',, ;!lid o('('+lil ()I)s('IV;IIJ()II salt'!Vires). +++'
Sotnt' lypt +<i[ decision ab<nlt an o|)oratic>nal l+andm_t program had to l+e mad(', bin l>ri -
valizalion rais('d nlany dilficult questions. Prt'sidcnlial l)ccisi<in ++,2l('d to the creation _ffan
intt'ragcncy task liwc(' to study tin + l)r<_bh+n+s of and pmential It>t l)rivalc-sect_w imrticilm-
ti_m in r,('nlott' sensing, with a l)articnlar loclts on l.;tndsal+ ']'h(' t;tsk fi+rcc rcl)Orl addrt,sst'd
iSStl(+S r;mgillg liotn cosl to l_otcntia] ivlternationiil scnsilivily al)otlt l)riv,tte-scctor control
o!(l_tl_L It c<nwlt_(h'd lh;tt [)rivalization of tile whol(+ system <)l + o[ the spa(+( • S('glll¢'lll X_,'_IS l)l'('-
IVl+lltlrt', l)nl |hal pl'+V_tl(' industry should l)c <++ticotnagcd to riVal+k(+ l)rOl)OSals ii_l+!!Vet'stint'lit
in am: part _>Ithe" system. '+ This restlh(.d in Presidential Decision 5,I ill Novq.'inl+tq 1979, giv-
hlg N(+)AA l,_'tlll)<>r_tl+Xrcsp<_nsibilily !br itv_til++gillg +ill <_[)eratiomll l+andsat svstcttl+ :Irl+l ask-
ing N()AA to sttid+x ways It> t'nclltlr:agt+ private l)articil)ation. ]'rcmidt'nlia[ Dccisi<m 54's
h)ng-lcrm g+)al was e,,'enimd <)l)er+vli+)n by lhe l)rivale se<l<)r.": l ll-3l, ]1-32)
+;'..'+. lames (;. l"hq_hci _ _ _ L _ _ _ _ _ _ < ' _ +I _ [._lln, (_l|l]t I+ <i_[Miln_tgt.nlt.tll ;ili+l l+,ud_t't, :gcpt<'mDcr 13, 197<i, _,pa_ <+
l'_>li+ v ln,,tiittlt' I)<+( lint'hi;try llisnw_, (;ollccli<m, Washingt<n+, I)C.
{+'.+L l+,Itlnl+ Augt'nstciH, Willis II. _haph'y, EUgCln' B. Sk_Inikoll, "l:atlh [nlcnlnatil>ll h_+m Sl>att ' Iv'+
Rem<)tc ,_(.llhill_," It'l),:il I l)rt+l>ai_+d 10i DL F_;nlk Prt'ss, Direclor, ()lilt c _I _ il..llt t' !villi +l'cchnoh_+,r', l'<,li,',, ]u,n'
2, 1978: st(' l)<+_tHncnl II 30. Thb, <lot llllltql| _llst+ ad(h+esscs an_+lht'l obmla<:le: c<mlrl)vt'rs'+ _ixt'r +_hich ;l_('ll('+
w<nlht (_nlltol lht. o,t)+..l ati*+na] _,%Mt+tll..%t=t= Mack, Utewing the FIn/D, p t). 204-05.
64. l'ti'+;iti/ati_n In(+_llll !hi' dt*vclo|mlcnt t>f SOlllt'thill_ similar Iv> (]OlllS+ll--a privatc t_+rll<_t_ni_+n thal
v,<_uht lJuxt has,t' satcllit<.s, pay fill launlt h s('rvicc++;, lltitnlilgt, lilt' workh+g spaccclalt, and |)rot'l+ss ;tlltl sell <l:mt, all
at its <,wll lisk. This is dih'<'t,_+ilt |ionl the small industty that had d_'v<+lol+t*d t_+ sell anahsis and sp<'cial l.<Wt'ss-
mg <_I [ +;Ixlds;I[ dala. "]h_|t iiidtlslr"+ did llol "N_IlII lht + +_<)Vt'l'tllll('nl l)rtlviding It+t) l]ll+llly St'lVi(('s, ])ill it <tic| 'Willl[ !hi'
gl+Xl't 11111(+111t() p, ovide tilt' lmsit data. SccJ. Roberl l'.r,cr, Jr., |_residt'nl, ]'_arih Satcllitc Corl>t+ration+ '<Slalt+mtqtt
l+tqOtt + the l [ousc Sub| Ollllllilltrt' <WI Spat|" .%(i('t+_l'e and Applicatitms, +' .Jttnt" 23+ 1977, Sl+atc P(+li<v Institute
l)l)cumcnlav'+ l list<)r_ C<>lh+clioii, Washillglt)n, I)C.
GFL \lsiJ iit ()it<it)or, St'll+ll<)l tlariison S(hnlitt introduced a bill calling tot lht' tlciltil)ll ill ;111 Ealih
]_.l._,lllll( t's Iiitill'illltli()li Salt'llitc (]<lri)oration lllottt.lt, d ()ll (]<lllISitl, HI) _lCtil)ll *.,.'ii_+ t_lk('n llii Ihl' hill. _( it'lllt"
P_)li_v R<+_('_llth L)ivisi<ln, (;_lngrt's_+ion_il R('_,t'at'ch Scr'¢ict', Utlited .gt_tel Cil,ilTa#l ,"/pine I'n_fflam_. Udum_' /I.
,tpph<a/mt_ ._Tztelh#_. plClmlCd Ibl lhc _ll|)Cttllllllill<'(' Oi'l _|J;ll.'(' _('i('tl('l' illld A[t[.+li<;ili+_tl_ O| t|ll" (;¢lllllllill<+<" <ill
.i_( il'llt t" _tll(| '['C( |lill>lo_,_,', 1+3.S. I|OUSt" <It R('l)rt!g(!lll_tti'+,('s. P_l;I)' I(.)H_ _,, pit. 249-50.
tTG. "l'livalt' _'_('(t(ll hivolvcnlcnl in Civil Spllt't • Rcnlolc St'nsiiig." dratl..lunt" .I, 1979, ._l);l_t" P, Aic_
hiMilutc l)ot iinlcniary I lislttr)' (]ollt+ciioll, f4/a_hiill41oil, l)(].
67. l'nited ._lale_ Cit,ilirt#l ,%_J(trv' I'tvq.,_'am_, li'olltme I, pl t. 2314--t2. F<lr isstlt+s it'littit>,g to the tr;utsition l<l an
ll|lt.l;llioli31 s)slt'ill, st't, lilt' ]t'lllq trl)ln Richltid 1). Lalitln Itl (;corse" _. llt'lltoli, N():\:%+, A|tlil 30+ 1!1_11. "with
itlt_it hi'd: "Rl'(Oliiilit'lid_lli_)tis <it Ihl' _;llillillil (;OVcln(ir's Assot i_ilillli, _;ili(llltil (+,<liili'it,iict' ll]_llilt' l+cgislatnlcs.
Ini<+ilz<>_Cilinit'nl_tl <N_it.iitt'. l';nt4hlcclin_ &. Tcthn(llog) Athis.ry Pttncl. N;ilion_ll Rt's<liiitt's 8." I']nxii_ntnlcill
"lTisk I+'+_lll ", litl Ill<* |;iil_il Tr_lll_ilitlll |'l+ln li_t Ill<' _lli<_ll_il Civil ()[)_'l;itinl4 RClli¢)lt' _¢'ll_ill_ I)rol_l_llll (/ilst _llatl
AIHil ](I. 19_4(ii. >" At. il )+III, 19,_1i.
A lcnglhy <Iclmtr i(+ll<),,vcd c<mccrnhlg whether and how F,rivati?:mkm mig, ht takr
place. ';+During lh;l.t time, two additional Landsat satcllitrs wrrr htutlchccl to F,rovidr con-
tintiity of data (Irlivr,y, but the dcvelo|:,n+cnt of a more advanced operational svst¢'nt +,,+its
l)ttt on hold. Thcsr salcllitcs di+l carry onr m'w in+strtmwnt, tit<.+Thematic Mapprr (TM),
which was a significant improvcnlctH over lhc Muhispcclral Soarmor thal had bccn carri('d
t)n the inilial satcllilcs. Thc most [:,r<)vocalivc proposal t<) C()IIIC l'rolli l_rivat¢ , industry was
ht)lll (]OlllS2tt in.July 19F, I it:, take t)ll lttll rcsptmsibilily ik)r l)oilt l:arth Yt,.s()t+tl-l:t._tli([ llltqC-
orological satcllil<.'s." [11-3!_;] Many <)l:,scrvrrs had doul)Icd that c<mmtrrtialization could
l:,rotc(t the pttblic interest ill mctt'<:,roh>gical satrllitr data: similar (on(+t'rns wrrc volttel
with lCSl)cCt to Earth l-CS()tllCC satellites. +'+111-341
Presi([cnl Rragan provc(l an rvcn strongrr SttF,l)Orl<..r of the ll_lllSft'l" Of" g()V(+l'lllll(+lll
proiccts to private industry than President (:artrr had l)ccn, in March 19_3, Rragan
annt)tmcc(l a dccisi<m to transfer l+andsat, the mctcorological sairllites, and future orcan
obscrvalion salrllitrs to private industry. 7' As ah'('a(Iv mentioned, (:()II_I'PSN rqiccl('d lh( +
idra of trmtsi('rritxg the mctcorolo_ical salrllitr program to t)ri,+'atc industry. [1L-:451
th)wcvc_, the l)clmrlmcnl of Commcrcc i)rocccdrd with a request I_)r proposals from pri-
wttc itldttslry for Ol)rralional control ot+thc l.ml(Isal systemY-' (:ongrcss i)asscd a bill Selling
the terms ti>] tvmisti'r in lt.lB4, and the Earth OI)scrvali<)ti Satrllitc (:<mq)any (I:.OSAT), a
joint vrnttnr oflhlghc,+ and R(:A., won lhc COml_Ctiti<)n. III-361
This 1984 Irgishttion stq)f)(,'tc(l the c<)n('ct)l o1 t)rovi(ling sutii(irnl suhsi(lv to (+()mm-
uc I+an(tsal <)t)cration+ while EO.";AT t)ttih a m',ukrt fi)r (lata. l)rf)arlmcnt of (:ommrrcr
ofticial+ (,nvisionr(l that with ,_ovcrmncnl hrll), t,:()SAT w<Jul(t huild l,ali(lsals ti and 7.
Evcrttttally, a(huimstration an(l ((+rtv, r,.'ssional sttpportcrs l:,rli,.'v¢'(l, tlt+.+,d+tta market -w(ittl(t
grow Iargc ('11()tl_h to Sttl)porl entirely l)rivatc ownership and <+l)Cratiotl of lutm+,u I .andsat
svstrms. N().-L, Vs 1985 (:ommcrcializatiorl l'l_m (allcd fl>r ('(mtintv:(l govrrnnicnt furl(ling
of $250 million to build Lan(tsats 6 and 7. +_I() assist m this pr(wrss, EOSAT I)cgan 't)ttil(1-
mg ils own Ol)Crali(ms c()nlr()l and receiving slati()n ill N()rnmn, ()ktahoma.
In lhr lall ot 19<'45,E()SAT comt)li(at('d ncgoliali<ms over the mnotmt of subsidy by
i)rop(_sing to tlv lhc I3,1 on a spa(-ccraft (lcsignrd t() I)r latmchr(l I)v the S[)a(:c Shulllc. _'
l)csl)itr thr loss of the orhitrr Chall+,p+_,,'erm January 19V16, N():_,\ agrcr(t to Ihr l)r<)l)osal
(7_. William ti. (;tc_4(,+:,, "'F_cc Emt'_p_i_,c aml l,ands_tl," ,l+,iatir,;t II_'ek amt ._;lm++' 71'thin,to,q) 1 1:+I _l.l+ II,
ll.)SlD: 13; Eli llatpri io (::ai+4 Full<'r and M_illin .\uidt'tstiil. "Rt'+ioliiliiin ol ]++slit's Rrlatrd i,, I'H_atc St'tl,Ji
]'tansfi.'r of Civil l+and ()l)++cr',iil_ +at<'llitc Actixhic_+" .ltil', 13. 19_1: Nalional ()cctnik and Atm+_xl)hr_h
,%(hnini+tr;iti<_n. "llall++t/T of Ihc Civil ()ti('lltiil)iiiil Eai'lh ()ll_,t'l"+3li<)ii _alt'llht'_+ 1<) the I)li',_ilc _+( h_i," di_ili.
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77. 1"._. D('l);llliii('lli (l[ (]l)lliliil'r(t', "Rt'(lut'st li_i ]liol)ll++_lI++ t(li Ti,iii++li'i ill lhl' /'nii(+d _l_lll-_ I.;ili(I
Rl,iiilllt, _l.ll<+ili_ l>i i)gl iilil Ii) Ihc I>lix;Itc _c_ h)i;" ]alniai)3, 19_ I.
7:1. [,;tll(l_;il i)11>1)Ol1('111"4 Algtit'd Ih_ll Ilt'_llk (l(itll)lc this ;llll(lllnl '+%ilN II(-(t'_;ll\ Io ('ll_,tll'lL" itdcqllalr sup
poll t(ll lhc i Olliint.r(-iilli/atil)ll i)loct,.,s, t)lil I)itvid _lo('klliaii. dirt'(toi tit thv ()t]](c o| Malla_t'iilt,lil ;iiid lhidt41+t
ttlt(lt.l Plcsidcnt Rt'it_lll, x,,xlllld 2t_lc+< ' tllxly Ill Iht' _5{I lmllkltl.
71. .%.t Ihc liinc, N:\S+:\ Cli_,i_+ioncll t)<'iii!4 _ihh > io lalim h ihc Shutllc iiit(> polar (>lt)il h(inl \ttil(t_-iill_'il 4
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in Mm'ch 1986; in Augusl of the same ,vcaI, tht" Reagml administration issued a dccisioll
lira|ling Shullle payloads to those requiring lht" uniquc character|slits of the Shullle. _'
This caused N()AA lo direct E()SNI' Io prepare toy launch on an expendable launch w'hi-
(h'. ()lh¢l (lisagvccments I)t'twc'('n lhc administralion _md (:ongrt'ss delayed a decision to
fund lhc [,alidsal s},M('lll ttnlil the spring oF 1988. +'; By lh;tl lilll(', it h_td become tully aF, par-
t,nt thai the subsidy ($219 milli<m) would cover only Ihe dcvelopnlent and totlstruclif>n of
()lie Sl)_tcecrafl. The Reagan _tdminislrali(m and (:()tigress nearly lerminatcd E()SAT's opcr-
at|oil of l,andsats 4 ;tvl(I 5 scver:|l lilln.s 11_1 lack ofa ti'w million dollars of operating thnds?"
])DII f)f lhc difticuhy arose becaust', in lh(_ 1980s, proponents of land remote sensing
tacc'd tilt' same problem they had experienced in |h(' 19(i0s. No single agcncy was willing
tO t'Ollllllil fired|rig ($15-30 million per year beyond E()SAT's IUVt,ll[t(. t]<)111 ¢t_11_1salt,s) Io
tolllilllt(" syslenl opt'rations. Unlike lit(" wc;ither salt,lilies, which N()AA operatt'd lo pro-
vidc dalai fi)r |Is own National _Vcalllt'l- Service', the l)cpaviment of (_ommerct" had no
inlvrn;tl constituency for collt'cting remotely sensed land data. The Cmter adminislr:ttif)n
had sclccled N()AA bccatlsc of lht' agency's experience in oper:tting 1he weather s_ac'llitc
syslems. (;ongrcss cxpvcsscd only lukewarm interesl in supporting N()AA's long-ll'rm
operation of I,andsat. This lack of c(mlmitn|enl to a cotllinttously o[)t'r_iled ren,,)ic-sens-
ing syslt'm tmdermincd what little conlidence ¢l;lla (tislolllers had in lilt' l.an(Isal system.
Relatively ti+w customers _rt'|'l_l willing I<> develop Ihe necessary i)rocessing infigtstvucttu+c
mid training pvogFams or m:_kc other inw'stmcnts that depended on thc routine delivt'rv
.f l.;m(ls;a (lal:L
N()AA :tlltl I_()S.,\T t'xp('t'lt'(l 1o ]HIIIlch I,antls_.ll (i ill 1_.)_.)2, Wil]l I]11" ft'(h"r_tl gf)x,:t'lll-
mt'nt l)rOviding most of the timding tbr I)uilding and launching Ih(! satellite. 1 towcvt,i,
t,vt'n i[ l,antls;tt 6 su(cessfidly rc;wht'd orbit and opt'vatt'd ;is ([csigned l_sv five years, this
i)l;_n still Icft the l!nitcd St:tit's with Ihe prospect of enter|rig th(" lair" 199()s with n(5 Calm-
I)ilitv to colltwt l.;tnrls_lt (I;H;t. It sotwt became clear that even if th(" (l:tla wlarkel ¢hnd)lcd
or IF|pied, E()SAT wonld not earn sufficicn! revenue l(> Infild l,:m(ts:tl 7. '1'o resolvc grow-
illg ('fHl('('l'llS (5VCl" tlIc I'llllllU t)f" lhc I,;ulfly, at pl'Ogl'Hlll, President Bush "dirt'clcd the
N;a if real Slmcl" ( :ouncil ,rod lhc ()Hicc ot Management mid l_,tldgt'l Io rt'vit'w f)plions wilh
1he intcnlifm of continuing I,:mdsat-lype data collections aftc'r l,andsal 6." [1I-,"17]
The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992
l_v the cavly 1990s, st'veral circttmstances led to the decision to return I,ands:tt syslem
oper:ttion If_ the g<wetntnent. First, the U.S. military made exlensivt" nse tfl l,atlrlsal ,ltltl
SP()T (l;tla If) trt'alt" Inal)S used in planning and t'xecuting [!.S. tnancttvers (tuving tilt'
1991 (,ulf Win-. TM Second, I_andsat proponents worried thai failing to dcvt'lop I.andsal 7
would give SP()T fhll control of the international market tor mtfltispectral satellite data.
Third, global change researchers began to appreciate that the twenty-year 1.andsal data
;II't'hivt: would allow them t(5 tbllow environmental change on parts of Earth's surface.
Fr)IIIIIL 1hi, _tltclnpl Io commt+rcialize the I+an¢lsal syslenl had taher.vd badly, and I)olic)
77_. The White |louse, "si;iicmc_il on the S]);wc Shuttle." Augnst 15. 19s6. Sl_;l_t. I'olit_ hlstiiHic
I)111lilllt'llLii _. ] lisiot v (;_dh'_ ti.n, V,/ashillgton, 1)( L
71;. ('.S. (',ongH,ss, (',ovlgvcssi.nal Rcscarth St'trice, "Future ifl l.and Rcwtoit' S,t'tlsitL_ ,%'_slum
(I.;mdsat)," 91-685-S1'R, pp. 6-7, Spat _" Policy Institute l)ocUlnCniary I lislorv (;olh'(tion, Washington. Ill',.
77. M. Mirt-ht.ll Vqahrhol:,. "l,;mdsa! Commercialization Stttmlflcs Again." Sc/,'nce 2,11; (]_mlun'_ !l,
1987i:1_'_5-56; t:.li.t M;nsh:dl, "l.;indsal: ( ;lilVh;ulging, Ag;fin," _.iem, (()clol)t'r 211. 19N!I): :,_ I-2_.
7_. Ill, ( ;Oldt)ll, _I:iICIIIUIll ll('ttli(' the I "Y;. ] hlllnt' ill Rt'prt'sf'ililtlivl's,Joiili I I_':liilig _lt Ih(' (]_liilitlilicl' oil
_lil,ii(l.. _,l)a_., _llid l(._tii_ohl_)alld 1111.]lllii_,t. Pl'Fiilalll'nl ,'g_'k'ci (;lllliillilll'l" ilii hll_.'llit4cnct', _( il'illilil.
Miliim ;, ;ilid (]olililil'il i;il AF.plil _lli.ns _>1lhl' [.alid_ill I;'i'ogrluli, lh'itiiil_ R,_,porl 11)9-1il, lliilt' 7G, 1991.
makers l,)egan l<> t_:ct thai no privale conlpany was soon likely Io be able Io provide +`'qlliv-
_.tl('nl (l,ala on If,It`" scale needed 1)y ti'deral a<_vncic, s. v" Finally, ill+`" a(l,vcnl of ll,le geographic
intormalion system ((;IS) and lit+`" dcvch)l)menl of <)liter intormalion leclmoh)gies+ such
its higl,>l,)(iwcred com])uleis, inexl,)cnsive storage deviccs, anti II,le l,nl+`qn+.,l, promised lo
I'('dll+`'+`' tl't+` + +`+os|s and complexities of proc+`,ssing I,antl,sal dala. +'
:ks a rcsuh of lhcst' aild oilier l)rc_+sures to +`onliltUt- +`'ollccling l,andsat data, ill lt.)!A2
tilt" administration, with the strong SUl)l)Orl of (:,{)llt_l+C'SS, lltovcd to |>lace Ol)mational con-
trol ol +l,andsat 7 and l,mv<md to I)()D ancl. NASA. 111,-381Under the l,andsal lllitlt_.tgt'lll¢+lll
plan nt'goliatt'd l,)ctwccn DC)D and NASA, I)()I) aglt+ed l<l l'und tihc devcloptnent of lilt"
spaccct+aft and ils instruments, wlhih+ NASA agnced to fund the c<mstnuction oi, +thc ground
data pro+`cssing and <)|)craft(ms syslcnis, to o])erat+`+ the satellite, ;tnd to provide lot
[+ariel,sat data dislril'mlicm, l i,I-:+_,)1Tim l+aud Remott + Sensing Policy• Act oi, 1,992, signed
inlo law in ()clol)er, codified lhe nlatiag¢'ntent plan and. authorized a|)l,)r<)xinlalclv equal
tunding tmm catch agency ton the Ol)+`'talional life of l+anlcl,sat '7. [I1-t0]
I_ancl,sat 6 was t<l carry an Enhanced Themalic Mapper (ETM) having l')eltcr radio-
metric calil)ration than previous TM s+`'nsors, ahmg witth an additional '+sl,latl)¢.nin,t_"
patlcl,lvomatic band of t]ttccn-t|l+`qer rcs<)lution, allowing il to delivcr ciata with rcs<>luti<m
nearly C<luivalcnl to SP()T dala. NASA had studied Ibis capability in the n|icl,-1!t7<)s l,ml
dnopp+`'cl any plans to build higher r+,+sohlliOn instrtmienls as a resuh of national sl'curil'+
rcstricti<ms tm lh+. + sharlmcss of data tiom c+ivil,ian satellites. By lilt + lD{i()s, oll,l+`,r counlrit's
haltl, slall+.+d svlling linc-r¢'sc>lulion data, st,) ll.losc national s+`,t tllilv (OllCCl+its had l')(+('<)Int •
tnoo0 (st++ +` t)clow).
Initial NASA and DOD plans called for Landsat 7 to incltltle an ETM Plus, an
ilnln-oved vershm of tl,lc ETM under dc'+'ch_pment tot l+andsal {_. l+a.ter, 1)()1) bcRan lo
consider adding a new ltitil,tispeclral sensor to If,re salellilc, the High Res<)lution
Muhisl,)t'ctral Stt'leo hnager (I,I,RblSI), capable of collecting tilt-meier resc_lution+ dala
I);trticularly ttsclul l,br tnapl)ing. NASA and D()D analysis cslimaled lhal dcvclol)ing+
lat,nching, and <_lpel+aling l+andsat 7 tot live years would equal $;880 milli<m ( 1¢.)92 dollars).
NASA considered lit+`" ;td(l,itional inlstrument optional; in the c:oursc of discussions, I)()D
d+`'cich'cl ll'lat it shcluld I)c an opt'raticmal, requilenl+`qll. Howevel; II'l+`_ t I,RMS! sensor and
additional ground ol,)cralicms equipment would have <osl an additional $400 million. lhc
high data rates expected li. lit+`' I, IRMSI neat'Iv doul,)h+d the <>verall rt+quircd system data
tatt" and would halt" added signiticanl cosls to NASA's yvarly operalions l'mdget t0r
l+an{lsat 7.
In Se|)tenlbt, r It.)_.t3, l+andsat (i was lallliCl,led l,)tlt l,ailcd Io reach orbil, raising addi-
tional concerns about ttht" loss of data continuity. That slunc tnonth, NAN+,\ ollicials con-
eluded that the costs of operating l+andsat 7 with tTRMSI wcne too large, given other
:MraillS <in Ihc Sl)a+`c agcncy's budget, l,n l)ec+entbcr 1,9_.121, I,)()1) cl,<'cidcd not to thnd tlhc
rcsultinlg, l+andsat 7 budget shorlt_tll. As a v+csuh of clisagreemcull over the l+andsat 7
rccl,uircments and I)udgct, DOll decided lo drop out <)f tiht' agrccmcnl al,log¢+lhcr. [11,-41,,
1,1-42, I,I-43, 11-441 Tl,lal left NASA Io fttnd Iihc develol)nt+`ml of l+ancl,sal 7, carrying <rely llhc
planm'd lhil'lV-lnel_.'l--l't'sohlti(:,ll ETM iPhp+. After some discussi_m, I)()I) llallsl+.'l+lt'd
7t.). In lilt, ill, John Knauss+ (',tllnnlt,rt t + litulm Secretary Ibr ()roans and Atlm+sphcn<., stated: +'()ul cxpt +-
lit+nt t + whh lht + l.andsat pr<_granl . . , [hasl h'd ins I<_ lht' COliclusiotl lhal t<mlwlcrciali:ation ol l+antlsat, as had
ouiginall?, bt'Cll t-llxisitmc<l, is iiiii possil)h.." I, _+_n_IIl_,P+, [ Flldtq _t'(l<'l_tl¥ lor ()t'C_l.llS and Atntosphcrt +, l)cpal Ini<'t+t
q>l (]<)iIinlt'it t'+ Slalt'mcnt l)clorc tht' Senate (:ounmitlt'c Oll (:i:,nllllt.rct,, ,M,(i¢,llt-t,, alld ['nansporlali<m, lunv I_,
l{t_,RI, ,%pat t' l><,lic)Institute D(>t ilnlt'lllar)|tisl(+iy (',<)th'clion, tv4t'astiilil_lOll, 1)(:.
_41). Ra) A. l, Villiailison, "l'lil' l=tillttslit l+t'l_acy: P,l'nllllt' <%tqlSiiil_ I>olity and Itie l)t'vt'l<lpincnl ol
( ;lllnlllt'l(iilt R¢'lllOlt' _t'llSill_," [J/lotoq_#ll#l##lellT( llq#ll_lllf,t,ll/lgr fl#ltl l_>##lfd_ ._+>ll_7#lg, (7<.1 CIIII )' 1_.t97): b1774.vl.
EXI'I .( )RIN(. 11 I1, I. !NKN( }WN ] 7. I'}
$90 milli{}n t(} NASA I(} assist hi (h:v{'h}ping Ih{' sat('llit{" ;m(I s{.lls{}r I}{.{aus{, I){ )1) w{}uld
I}{' a m;_j{}r {llst{}m{'r {}t (laHa from l,an(lsatt 7.
In early I{.){.),1,the {lU{'sli<}nl <}lwhith ag{'n{y w{}uhl actLually {}p{'rat{" l,an{tsat 7 h;L{I not
y{'t t}{'{'N r{.s{dv{'{I. NASA i}latH}{'d to>us{. I ,all(IsiH (hHa t(} stq}l}{}rl ils r{'s{'an'{-h in]t{> lan{[ Hs{'
and hind {hang{' as part {it Ih{' LT.S. (;h}bal (2hangc R{'s{';ttch Pr{}gnlm. l.an{lsat 7 is t_}l;
really ]low l};U! of NASA's Missi{>n to Plan{'l Earth. These {lata will also support many tf(I-
{'l_ll g(}v(q-nm('nt ()p{'Lati(mal I}l'()gFaHls aLL{I lhe (htla ll{'{'{ls {)lslat(" all(I h)(al _()V('l'llllL('lllS,
Ih{' U.S. ]lrivat(' s{,(l(}r, alld t_}r{'igll (Hllilh's.
hi .May 1{.)!)4, th(" (:lint(m a(hL]itlistration n's<}lve{I Ih{" {}ulslaul(Ihlg isstL{" (}1 l)r{}(ur{ "-
m{'LLI and {}l}{'rath}md (omml <}l ILL{" 1,_u){lsal syst{'m t)y assigning it .]{}h/lly I<} NASA,
N( )AA, alld the I}{,partm('Ht {>t lh{' hlt('rh}r. Un(h'r this i}lam NASA will l}r{}{tLr{' the S;Llcl-
Ill{', N()AA will manag{' aJl{l op{'ral{' ttl(! spa{'{'('l'al't and gmlm{t syst{'m, and ILL{'
l){']}arlm{qll {if lilt" hLl('ri{}r will ar{hivc and distribute th{" {lat;t at ILL{"matRMal {{}st {}t
r{,t}l{}{lu{li{}tL [ II-,l:"}] NASA hals s{h{'{hflc{I the laLm(h of I,an{Isal 7 t_}r l{.){.){.).I h}w{'v{'I, lh{'
tLHtHt" {}t g{}v(+rlLLIIt!nt-['LLll(h'd land I'{+IlI(}IC-s{?nSILI_ s;tt{'llil{'s I}{'y{>nd l+an(lsat 7 is still
LLIL{'(IIaII].
The Beginning of Commercial Remote Sensing
tlaviHg thih'{l ill sLLc{'{'sstully tnmsi{'rring th{? l,an{Isat systt'm l{} t)rivat{ ' {}wtlcrship and
{}l}{,i-ath}ll, g{B'{_rLlllllqll I)r(}glalLl_ :, all(t policy wen" Kl(}llethch'ss ill I}alt r{'st}{}llsibh' fi}r
m;tking {{>mmt'rcial rein{lit' s{'nsiul R I)ossibh'. The l,and Rt:m{}l{' S{.Jlsing Poli{v A{I {1t
19{.)9 ilwh,(h'd Tith' ll, which sets _}ut th{" t{,lmS f{}r g{mPrnn]{'tr'H li{{.nsing {if I}rivalt" ol}{'r-
at{its {d r,Pm{)t('-st'nsin g s;llt'llit{_ systems. Tilh" IV {}t th{" l{.)SI a(t had iLL{lud{'d i{h'ntit:al
w{}r(lillg,, rt'{llfirin_g th;-tl ]}{}t{'rHial I}rivat{: op{!ral(}rs of I'{!llLOt('-s('Ilsillg sattellitcs a{{luir{' ;m
ot}{.raling li{:{'l_s{' tmm lh(' li'd{'ral gm'eH]m{'nt iN a{'{{}r{htnc{' wilh i_H{,rnati{}nal obliga-
ti{ms, trot until 1!){.}2, n{} c{}ml}a m, had taken a{Ivantag{" (It lhat 1}r{>visi{}n. Th{" h,gislation
assign{'{l t{} Ih{' sc{r{qaFy {}I {{}mmcr(:c ill{" responsibility for {{};Lsi{h'Fing and glallling
such li{{'nscs, rc{luiring thai Ill{" SC(TPlaI'y act {)LI such appli{a_ti{ms within 1'2(} (I;_ys, "in
('{}IISLLIIHIhIII 'WIIIL (}lh{'L" allt}rt>l}riatc l,Tnited States (;OV{_I'LllIICn[ ilg(_ll(ie,',,; .... ,,,,i
In {}('t{}l}t't" 1(.}{.}2,sht)rllv atl{q I}rcsi(h'nl Bush signed tile I{.){.)9;:l(t. W{>rhIVi{'w, Inc.,
applit'd for a li{eL_se t{} {}pt'rat{" ;t {omrnerchll relll(}l{,-s{Hl.shlg systeln. WorhlVicw's plans
{allt'd for t}tfihliL]g a system {apabh? of colh_{'ting stere(} p;lnc:hronlali{: {Iala {)f thret'-lllcteL-
_('s<)hili<)n alld t|LLlltisl}{'{tral data (it tifle{'n-LtLeter rt's{)hLti{m in gret'n, re(t, aLL{I tlt'ar-
intrar{'d spc{tr+tI t};tn{ls, alth{}t_gh with at LlaU'r{}w th_hl ot" vi{,w# WorhtView's st.ns{}r was
<h_siRnt'd t{> {olh!{t stere<} pairs ah}ng th{! satellit{" trafk as w{'ll as sideways <}tl lra('k,
{,hal}ling a ral}i{l revisit {d ar{'as {)t parti{tflar iLlt{_rest. Technoh}gB' dcv,t:h>t}ed as t}arl (if
l.;m'r{'n{{' I,ivt:rm{}rt _ l_ad){)rat(}ry's t}allistic missile defense prograln supplied tll{' instru-
III{!ILI_L] b;_sis for a (-(}Inlllt'i{ial S}'sl{qII. Perhaps the _lca[esl iLILIOV_Ili{)l],h()we'VtH', was at (tala
mark{'ting plan based {},L {ommcrcial objc.{'tives, Ial]ler than {in meeting g{}vt-mmcnt
r{,quir{'m{'nts. WorhlVicw's ol]iciaIs judg{'d that tile LtlliLllat{ * iIlaiket f()l th{'se (tat;I was lilt'
int{}rmati{}tl in{IHstry, whi{'h was t)lamnil_g to use the lnlernet, CD-ROM, and {}lh{q int_}r-
mali{}_] t{,{hL_{}h>gi{'s to r{'a{'h customers quickly and {'tthi{:ntly. _:'Such plans {h'l}Cnd{'d {}_l
th{" al}ility of W{>rhlVi{'w alLd {}lh{q {'{>mpanies lhal t{}llowed l{} build and {)f}e|at{ • a sa_.t{'l-
lit{' ;H much h>w('r ({}st lhatL l,andsat. A c{}mmer{Tial data mark{'ting i}la_L im_{}lv{,s
gl, "lhe I+and Rtbm{,Ic+S{+_sh,_ P,)lhx A{t {}t 19!1_2 (I,'} IJ.S.( 2 ,"}{'_21, So<. 94)1 (<)}.
S2, "lh< + Ei+_ly Bi_d satl{'llil{ + '.*,ill I}t' <;q}at}lc {}I gathctit+R t};m{hI{>ltmli{ {latl;t ;d_}t_R ;t tht{.c-kih}m{'tc_
n',,.'atlh ;ill(| tllultisp('{ Iiatl ditlat ;ihm_ al I]lt{,(.ll-kih}m(qt'r swaflh.
,_3. Williamsot_, "1 h{' 1 .;m{Isat I ,{'_a_{ _,," pp. 883-81.
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collc(ting dam (rely of sut]i(i('nl quality and quantity to meet the needs ()f most (us-
tomersY+ This also rcdt,(cs costs (Oml)art.d It) a syslcnl such as l.andsat 7, which is
designed to collt'c! as much data as possibl(, to provide a global archive ft. tit(" |ttturc
ne('(ls Ill s(i('ntisls.
D('])arlmt'lll ()[C()Ittntcr('t" otticials cot)rdinated tit(' liccns(" apl)li('ali<)n with D()D, th("
C(,nlral Intelligence Agency, and Ill(" [)c])arlmcnl ()f Stale. By law 1992, national security
])I_innclT, WCl+CItt()lC in('liln'd tIl_tn Cvci l)¢'[()rc to case carli('r r('stri(lions on lhc i'('SO[ll[i()ll
limits of civilian data. Th('ir decisions w('n' moved in pan by lhe knowledge fl]a! the
F1"ench wci'(" ])]_lllltiilg + to iin])rovc tile rt+soltilion o1 th('il S])()T syst(.m, +tll([ Ill( + Indiall
Sl)a('(" Agency was also tnoving to higher i+t,sohilioll instrtmtcnts. Furtht.rntort,, the
Russian lh-m S()yuzkarta had begun to markcl high-resohtli()n nnlhispc(tral l)h<)togral)h-
ic data (tw()-nu'tt'r resolution) fr()m the liwmcrlv secret Russian KVI+,-1000 s('nsor+ ()n
,]anuary 4, 1993, thc Dcp+IrlilIcnt O1"(]OitlillCl'('C _,CilI ;t license to WorhlVit,w, allowing it to
operate a three-meter satellite system. [IH6, IH7, II-48].
()lht'r (mnl)anics sot)n tiled their own applications for systems thai would at'hit'v('
cvcn grcal('r sh,upnt'ss. In ,lunc 1993, l,ockhccd, Inc., fih,d with tlt(" l)cpartnwnt ol +
(:()iltiltCi't'C I()I _t license t() o])('ratc a s,vsl('m (alml)Ic <ff atlilt'ring onc-mtg('r l+(+s<)h|li()n.
Shortly al'lcr, ()rbita] Scit'nc(+s (:orp<,-iuion, in partnership (later diss<flv(+d) with (;1)E
Syslt'ms and lit'k, also filcd a similar lice,ts¢ + r,L'qucsl. The proposal to collccl hight,r reso-
httion data causc(I the (:linlon a(hninislration to reconsMcr desirable policy t+.>lcommt'r-
cial remote st'rising. Ahh<)ugh the salt, of such data abr<md l)oscd no tlu-eat <)I Ill<_'transE.r
of critical techn<dog_', in the view of somc, ()lIC-lit('Ici" (tara Wl'l'e to() (+I()SC 1() Ih(" rec<)n-
mtissancc capatfilities of high-tlying aircrafl and classilicd sal¢'llites. _, ()thcrs, whih" r('cog-
nizing Ilw risk of marketing these data worldwide, have argued that dam of high
rcsohttion can m()dcral(" t)otcmia] cont'li(t if Ihtw arc axaihd)lc to all si(tcs. _',
N('vcrtht'lcss, <)ll('-lnt'l(q data, dcliv('rcd ill a limply m;ulnt'r, ;tr(! of signilicanI securit_
utility lot surveillance, military planning, and flu' Cl-C,tlion of tlt(' up-to-(late maps nee(led
to tight baltics ('fl('ctivcl). Wh('n (ombined with the geolocational Cal)al)ililii+s of the g-l<d)-
al positioning systcln, thcsc data also make it l)ossiblc ft. l)elligcrcnt nations to targ(+I s11c-
cific l<wati<)ns for cruisc missile and <)thor 1)r('cisiott altacks, l](,nt(!, inttqligcncc ol]]cials
argued, if tI_(+ data wcr(" sold globally, there w<mhl have to lit. some sort of control over dis-
Iribulion. t]ltinmtt'ly, ;dt('r several m<mths of discttssion, officials (h'cidcd thal Ill(' t)cn(,lils
<_tkeeping such dala itndcr the (+ontrol ot tLS. mqll)liers were gre',uer than the risks post'd
b) possihlc daut misust'.
In March 1994, eighl months afl¢'r re(civing lh(" liccns(" api)lication, th(' Whit(- I lolts('
rt'least'd a policy :;,I;-ttClil('ItI concerning liccnscs lot connncrcial t+cn+ol(,-scnsing svst('ms.
Th<_' policy rcqttir(,d lht" satellite, ol)(+raloy to mainlain satcllilc lasking roe<mils and to
make them availabl(' st) thal the l+edcral g<)vcrnmcnl could d('t('rmin¢, who llur(+hascd
wh,il data, if It('('t'sS_tl+y. It _ilso authot+izcd tilt, ,_()VCllilltClll It) cut off o, leSll+i('l lhc l]()w ()l
data (hiring Iinws oi +crisis It) prolcct nati()n,d sccnrilv int('resls. 111-491 The l)cl)artm(mt
()1+ (]OllllI'lCl+t'(" h_ts gl'anlt'd scv(q+al license's Ilas(,d on this policy, including one t(>
l+ockhc¢,d, Inc. 111-501
H-I. F<)l E()SXI'+ tlt<' ol)t'ratot oi l,aHds_its 4 and 5, lhis mc_iH (<dh'(liHg l(+w(.i '_t ('llt% than goxcl nmcnt
opt'Highs +_otdd hart" (<dlct led. NASA told N( )A.\ v.tq t' illh'lc,,t('(] hl gathclillg ;|'+, lll;ln'_ ,,( ¢'ilt's ;|'., l)<Jssil)Ic to lih'
lht' ;ll(hixl' o[ I._|tldn;ll S+L'CIIt+S,
_5. V. (;t+pta. '+New Nalcllilc Images l_n _,ah+: Tht + ()pl)Cn Itnfitit.n and Ri,+ks Aht'ad," (:t'nt<q l+>u ",;c( tu it_
and lcchn<.h+g)Nlt;dius, l,avtrt.t+tt + lJvcln'.nc Naliomtl l.ab+.at<.y. U(:RI.-II)-I I_I,:I0. 1991, 5.,pate l'oli<_
Institute [)ot lll++clllat ', I list_+x ( :_dlccti<_i+. Washinglon, I)( :.
_li. B, (;<.don, "'TIH. Mo<Icr;tting l".lh'_ Is oF IIiglwr Resolution Civil Natcllit<" Im;tging _m Inlt'] nali_mal
Rt'lati_Hs," i):_p+,._ p_cscntt,d ;u the' 199<; .XF( :EA ( :onliq cnc(', Washil+Rhm, l)( :, lure . 1991i.
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Conclusion
()he nlight anticil)at_, that space apl)licali<ms l)v<_granns would ]law bcc'n tilt" least con-
ll()Vt'lsial aSl)t'(+ts <)[ th(' .+.;j)+l(" l)l()gT+tlll l)('caus¢" tht'y would sc'cm i_> l)c lilt' In(;,M ()J)vi<)u.'+,-
ly l)cnt'licial. All exanninatiot+ ol thcir history+ however, s,ttggt'sts thal apl)licatiotls salvllitcs
raisccl dilfict,h it+sliltltion;t] policy issues, rt.sulting parlicularly l+-om lhc ].trg¢+ nuIlll)(+r oi
Jnl,pr¢'stc'd <wganizations involved. A project such as Apollo serve.it prim;uily pul+li,c and
politi<al int,:'rc'.;ts ill a sI);l,c c r;tt+t ., For basic Sl)aC,p .s,cit'ncc, N:\SA had a clc;tr constiltmncv
,_,t st icnlisls. In Ih,p l!)70s, NASA sought to control l't'st'ar<+h aud clcvvlolmlcnt tbr satcllit(.
al)plicati<ms in the sanlt' way il c<>ntrc)ll,.'d spa(,p scient:c, Iml tilt' sl)ac,t, agency tOtlnd Ihal
l,st.r agcucics (,Xl)CCtCd to dincot rcscar(h t<) mtwl their own l)crcciv<.d t+c<:ds. It+ ad(lili_m.
lilt' tvchl.>h)gi<'al ])otenlials _f l]lC variolls applitations ticlds that s(icnlisls t<mncl IlIOY, l
illl<'l'cstillg Wt'I'C llOl nc<cssauily lhc ,c)nt:s with tht" lll<)Sl shtwl-lcl'lll pr,t<+lit'al valu¢'.
l)uring lilt' l!)8()s, govcrnrulcnt-luntlcd al)F, lic-;-iti<ms Sam'llilc s',st,.'m_, lhccd ,m in(rca+-
illgly difli('ull I)udgctary climal('. (_()nlinUillg (lt'veh+pnmul of satcllil(' t('('hnolot., T lll,ill'tc it
t)ossil)h • to <_fli.'r mort and m()rc s_>l)histicaled st'fliton, bill ill a thn(' (:,1 tr('ltlt'n(l()lls l.',rt's-
SLIIC <Ill Ill(' Ibtlclal l)tldgCI, thc ,_OVCl'llllICllt Ila|Y, t)CCll l'Cltl(+t_llll I() ['llllC[ IIIOl'C Cxt)('llSiV('
SVSIt.'IIIS, CVt'II if +lh,py v+esultcd ill belier SCl+vices.
{' _C,111111t'I('iHI illl('lt'Y,L',; ill land I'CIIIOIC SCll.V, illg alld illICl'lKIliOll_tl t'()()])(+l'_lti()ll ill lllClt'-
orological ,c)bst'rvatiolls have ]wlp,ed invigorate lhc'se two applications. As history dt'mcm-
SIIaIIcS,, huld renl+m.'-scnsintg al)l)li<ations have l)rovt.n mort tliJl]cult to inlcgrate i,ll<>
cxisting svstt'ms lh:.lll mt'woroh>gical or .'C'OllllllUlliCations satellites had l:,t'c'n. T]w ol:,staclc
was not l)vimarily a lack of uscluln<:ss of the (lala p,oduct+d by lhc satcllitcs: ratht'r, pro-
l)Oncnls of thc l,andsat i)r<>gram lac¢+d an intense debate over lilt' l_r<_F,t,r role of govcrn-
mcnl ill dcvcl<_l)ing and oi),eraling a system lh;.ll l)cnefits both pul)lic and l)rivatc data
uscrs. +: I1 the operation of (()llllltCl-{'iall I'CllIOtC-SCll,"4illg satellites provt.s succcsst+ul, it IIIH",
nt+s<)lvc ll<)t <rely the hmg-standing tensions between rt.scav+th and opt'rational uses o+I+
rvm<m'lv scnst.tl E;ivlh ,c:,l)s+.'rvalion clat.+l, but also tilt+ qucsti<m <_i tilt" prop+.,r role of gox-
crnmt,nl and tlt<.' private st,clot in supplying them.
In ('()IllI'HSI I() land ICIII<)IC St'llS, illg, Ill()Y,t OI)scI'VCI'S C()lllitlllC It) SUF,[:,ort Ill(' pul)lic
provisi<m of m<:te<_r<_l<_gic'al data. } |owl'vet, prcssurt' to t+cducc salcl]itc Nystt+lll ('()5;|N }l_IS
cndangcrt'd the rol)uslm.ss o[ N()AA's system. A changed political cnvironunev+t resulting
in a mcrgvd civil-military system and increased international c<>ol),..ration sholLld improv,p
lhc a])ilily of lht. g<)','¢'rnvn,vnl Io continue It) l:wovidv high-quality nwteorological data
while t+cducing sVsl,.'nl cosls.
DocumentI1-1
Document title: Dr. Harry Wexler, "Observing the Weather from a Satellite Vehicle,"
Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 7 (September 1954): 269-276.
7"ki._ artick, wa_ m'iKitlall _, pre._enled &, tlar_y Wexle_; Chie[ of the Scient(fic .%.rvi.'._ l)ivAion o/the
I :. ,g. I)epartmetd of Commtn'ce 1STalker Bureau, as a ,_pee(h at the 77_ird L_'?lq)O_ilI?ll O?l ._'pglCg: 7)'avel,
hem at Ike Ilawkm I'la_etarium in New }?*rk Cit_' on May 4, 1954. It i,_ mw o//ke eadie._t inquirie_
iP,t. the po+_ib:,,._,,s qf +alellile+ i++fim,ca_ti++g weather. Wkile correct in auticipatin£_ n +atellite '_ util-
it++iu obser+,iP+g" ImR>+cak, weatker paltern.+, it is interesting that lI+?,xler m'verlhek'_+ dkmi,s+e+ a +alel-
li-te!_ polential /br what are **ow rmttine oh.gerv:lliOt?L_ of p_v_+u_v, leml_ert'thtrq', and kumMily. 7"lu' lwo
,_7. F'hilil _ J. llih'+,. "I.andsal Naut'llint's 'l'cznnc<l In_,_alml_h. ol lq_)lital)h' ()l:,vnali,,nl lhi., (_cnlttu_,:
'-,ul)sl_mlial l)e,naml N_>I En.t_t_h I_ Ntp, lain_ l+,usinv'-.s, Rvpo_ ts Say," +lhO+i+'+_q.++ /',,+I. Man<In ]2, 19,S!I. i), AI.
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fiLmre_ accompanying the' article are omitted here, but their captions are im'luded, ahmg with the
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Observing the Weather from
a Satellite Vehicle*
Bv l)r. tt;irry W_'xh'r,
Chief Sckqllilic ,_c'rvic_'s Division, {].S. Dl'l)ai-lill('lll oI (]llllilil0i((',
_,l{'_'{i I h i'l iltil't'itii
Introduction
T() t)rcdicl the futttrc of lilt" illiliost)h('i't!, lh(" nl('lt'(irologiM nllisl kii()w its i)rcst'ill
sl_ili,--,is dcl]nt'd tiv the lhri't'-dilnellsional disliil)nlion ()t i)l('sslll(', lt'lllt)t>l_iltll(', wind,
huniidilv, clouds, I)l('cipilalion, i'lc. "Io (Io Ihis, ill hundrt'ds of slations linoughoul Ihl"
Noilll0r'il th'lnislJil('il', lilt' iilillOsl)llt'rv is ])r_ll)_'d I)v t)alloon-I_<)rne illslrulll(!lllS which
radio back Io E_irlh v_lhlf.'s of i)rc'sStlil', lt'lill)l'r_tliirl', hunlidiiy, _llld wliosl" i)alhs (_tli t)c"
liallSial0d into wiiid dirl'clion alld spt'cd of lilt' various iayt_r,s Ihlougii wliich llll" t)aliooli
iisc_,'lldS. Tll_'st' ol)sc,rvilliOli,_ _'xl)re,ssed as iitllilt)t'lS Ol- ,_ynll)ols, l)hls _tu×ili_uy iiit_)rilililiOli
of clonds, tilx'cit)ilalion, t'l(., _11(' I)]olit'd (ill wcaltic_i cilarls and syiilhcsiz_!d inlo _tll ill_;lltll-
t_ilit'OllS i)iclili-e o[ llll' allnOst)ht'it' whilh, however, is I)l-0Senlly inconll)lcil" 1)i,c_tu_;l" of
la(k o[" ot)sl'i'Vali(iliS ill litl'gt' l)()i'li()ns of lilt' illnl(Isl)hcl(', si)('('ially ()vcr ()(('itll_, itll(I
ilill)()l)ul_il(,d ill-t'_i_,. Kill)wing ill(' ])l('si'nl _,l_ll(' ()] lh(" allll(Isl)lit'i{' _ui(l ])itSl lll()li()ll_4 ()t ihl'
st{liiii,_ ('ilitt)h'_ _i l/rt'diclion I() I)c iliad{" t))' c'Xll-_tt)ol_iliOli all(| ol]liq t('(iini(tilt'_;.
A s_ltt'liii(" v_qiiiit" /ra_(qing _il)<.)lil tiit_ E_tilil ()ulsid{" lh(' itlmosf)ht'r(' Wotlld n()l _lssisl
in I)()rlraying ih(" I)r('ssur( ', lcn/i)t'ialur{', hunii(tily, and wind f]i'l(ts I)v, dir('(l lllf<,_i_illlt'-
lli('ill, | i()wcvc'r, I))' a 'q)ir(l's-i'y('" view ()t a gtt_)(I l)(lililln ()l Iht' Eailil's _lil-[]i(( _ _iliEl lilt'
cloud Sll-tlC'tlll'tL il slloitld I)t' possibic I)y ill|i'lOll('t" 11) idenlif}', locale, iill(l ll'il('k sliii'lll ;il-l'7ts
,ilid olht'l nit'lc'oiologicci] f'(';Itili'l's. ]'lit" v/'hich" Wollld then SOlVl" l)rincii)ally ;ts a "SlOllli
i)aliol. '' Th+<'r0 ('xisl_, ilildl!l liOUll;il condilions il c]laraclt'rislic cloud c_nidilion for it '3)])-
ical" ('xtra-lr_ll)ical _ltlllll.
:\ i)hul vil'w of ;I lylfical inid-lalilud_" sl<)llll shows cold and Will-ill []onls, whosc ll_w-
ijlt,,_Slll-t, (l'lllI-C" is al lh_'ir Vt.l-lt, x, illid their atCOllil);lllyill g cloud s)slt'lil,_.
A In;iior cv/lonic slorni4lOlid sySlcln visible [toni _ll)l)vl' will t)_" illt" Willlll tioni clolid
llOlii which lht' illaior ])orliOli o[ ih_" _,lOlill's i)rt'citJilation USli;lily t{tlls. In w_.'M-i'itsl vl'rli-
cal st'clions, lh(' cloud ;it Ill/' exli_.'liit' righl is coilitJosl'd of iligli-lt'vl'l (5-10 inill's) ll'nu-
otis (-ilTu,_ o1" (ilroslr;tlus (]olids which (halig(" Io denser ;tlloSlraliis ;il_d ;lho(ilillllhis and
[ina]ly Ill thick I)rccil)ilaling ninltloslraili,_ iis ill/(' apl)ro_lchl's Ihc ,%l(>1-111, If lilt' asct!nding
w;tllll air ilt)ovl' lhl" W_llm [lOnl is unslal)]_" ('nollgh, (llniuloilinll)liS ()1 lhiilldt'r.slorlii
clonds will l)t'n_'lralc al)ovc lhc top of IIw ninlt)oslralus cloud.
hi Ill(" W;lllll secloi, o1 In(' _ll-(';i tl(_lw/'_ql Iht' W_tllll trolil and cold flonl, Iht'lC will 1)c
_;lialliS and fog, if lhe ,Slil[_lcc" is coidl!r thrill Ill(' ;lit, or (tliilU]tlS c]onds, if it is warlnt'r.
Apl)l-Oitclling the.' cold front Ihc Iligher itilolnlnuln,_ clouds will [It'xl conlinlil'd on f)agc
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;t. I_l l.sl.iiit,d at tht" Third S'>tlil)llsitlili llll _l)ti(_ ' Ti ;0,t'l. Allll'ri_ all Miis('lllll, ] |tivdl'n I'lali('t_iriuni, Nc_ Mlik.
M_i_ 4, 1954.
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[270] Itigl,re omilledJ Fit;. 1. The Earlh h()]]l all ahilude of 100 mih's.
This piclllle shol, v tilt" Eallh'N (iilValllle all(l lllOlC [han 200,00() SqllaFc miles of
|lie [!._J_t. alld Mexico, and was [akeil [lOlll a V2 Oll Malc|l 7, 1(.),17. Tile view
slr(:lching to the horizon is a dislan(e of ahoul 900 miles, and Ih(' (lark b()dy (if
water ll('ar tile lop of Ill(' pi(tlnc' is the (;ill| of (:alifi)rnia, ;Ihol|l ()5 mih's wide.
The picture also shows Fi",reFS, isl;lllds ill the Gulf of (]alil¢)rnia, t}le p(.llillsula o[
lower (_alil()lllia and parl of tile I)acilic Ocean. The two cameras were installed
amidship in Ihv rockel as pall of 2,(_00 Lb. of scientific instruments. They uperat-
ed amomalically takiug piClllres tillOllgil an infra-red tl]l('r, tlse(I 1() cut the haze.
Th(' tim(: (if t]ighl t]'()lll ]atlllchhlg Io the break-up of file rocke! was 6 1/2 illhllltCS.
1271] {[igme omi{l(:(il FIt;. 2. l)iagram of area included in tig. 1.
api)car, closely tol]owed hy a narrow band of (lllnulollinlhtls anti then scalt('rcd fair-weath-
er (tlllltlhl'.; ill Ill(" cold air mass well behind the cold |]onl.
Th(" (hara(l('rislic tea[lllCS (if Ihc (-old and warm tr()l]l ch)ud syslems plus Ill(" adjaccm
air mass (hill(Is should ,t'nahle II]li(]ile i(lenlif]cation of a (ychmic siorln, cilheF ill il.s
maturing ()r fully (h'vel()ped stages. Tile incipielll, or enlhry()ni( Sit)I'll| will hc m()rc diffi-
('lth I() detecl he(atls(! of lack of thlly developed ch)ud systems, lt()wever, hecallse of Ill('
tcll(l('lt(y ()[" cyclonic Still'IllS l(I i'()['ltl ill "families," arrayed in a sottlhwcsl-Iiollheast line
wilh Ill( +()l(h'r st<)rms ]()caled larlher northeast and with a known art'rage spacing belw('t'n
sI()llllS, il lllliy hc p()ssihle it) ([('lecl an incipielll storm hy ils posili(m relative t<) Ihe inolC
noliceahl(_ IrJ;llure sl<_llns anti possihle clues from the cloud syslem.
hi Fig. ] is showtl ;ill a(tllal clolld photograph taken from a V2 v<)ckel at a he|gin <)l
100 miles above White Sands, New Mt'xico, on March 7, |947. Ulli{)l-lllllalely IheI-c was Ill)
lllaltll+e extra-tr()pical storm wilhin Ill(, field (if [2721 view ot +the (amcra, and lh(, ch)uds
sh()wn art' m()stly "tair-wealhcl" clollds caused Itlainly hv hcalilig of Ih( _gl-()llnd alld titling
()f Ill(' :lit-hy lilt' lll()lllllaillS. Tile Ill()sl pl'Olllillelll ClOlldS are Ih<)tlSall(lS <)1hlighl ('lltllttli--
ar]ayed ill roughly f)a]:.|]lel hands, (alh'd "ch)ud slrcels," which usually illdi(.'att_ dilc(+ti<)ll <)[
Ill(' Willd. "l'}l('SC ('](}l.[dS IlStlallV ()((ill Iwo !o tfighl lllilcs al)ov(" Ihe Sitl-t_t('(!, !hc }lig}lel cl()(id
lops I)('ing associaI('d with [hundersl_w]ns. The fuzzy clouds, st) [liuIspaFcIl| that tile ¢'[llllll-
lUS ('h)u(Is art" visibh' lhrt)ugh them, are the high-level cirrus clouds found al Iwights eighl
Io ten mih's. Far !() the west, off lhe Califi)rnia (:()st, art" patches of the characlerislic h)w
(;atitbrnia slralllS ch)uds (height one It) IWO miles) with parts of the ocean surl_ace visit)le.
Th(' Ill()sl Ih;tl a meleor()l()gist could ohtain hom sut-h a chmd view would he the neg-
at|v(' knowle(lge lhal no ln;_j(,r storm is present plus some indication (if Ill(- wind dirc(ti(m
al (l(md hcighl and possihly lilt" dislrihulion (_f thunderstorms.
In order [,) re(onnoil,(: the wt'aflmr most effectively, the Salellile _k'alher Stall(in
shouhl hav(" lhc following pr(}perties:--
(a) It should he h)caled tar enough away to have an insiantane()us tield of view (()ln-
paral)h- lo North America anti a(!jacent ocean areas---simihu tO lhc area c()vered
i)y lht" forecasler's "working" ¢hal'l.
(hi h should nol he st) high lhal cl()ud areas and geographical tk'amres are not read-
ily identiliahle.
(() l! sh()uhl m()v(" in su(h a manner as to have the same ch)ud system in the ticld of
view al h'asl twit(" in a 12-hour period to obtain a track of the slorm associal('(l
wi!h liw (l()ud system.
(d)II sllolll(i 11¢)l IllOVC so fast that in(lividual cloud systems cannol he located aCE!i-
rately with r('st)('('l It) known grotmd t}eatures.
(e) h should (over llrm (mille Eal-lh ill daylight at least once daily.
(1") h sh()uld havc ;.i westward compollelll of in(ilion lelalive 1o Ill(" I_allh's Stll[]tce so
as to d('lecl (llli('k]y ll('w SIt)FIllS which usually mm,e tr(ml west to ('asl.
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Such a vehicle is one which is localed at 9.01 Earth's radii t"ronl the Earth's centre or
about 4,0(10 miles tiom the [_]arlh's sur|ace and which has a period of rotation abottl the
Earth of exaclly 4 hours. If the Earth were not rolaling Ihe vehicle would move in the same
ntet+idional plan<++ through lh<+" Norlh and South Poles. Bill since lhe Earth does lOtate ;+Is
lilt' vehicle ntoves, its path t+elative to the Earth's sttrl_ice is a series of tin'yes.
L<+'t its assume that at noon on March 21 the vehicle is dire<+'ted p<_leward front tilt"
l:.qttator at the 951h meridian west, at "0" hour. Assuming no external perturbati<ms, the
orbit of the whicle is always nlailltained it+, a plan<+' parallel to its initial orbitary plane, lint
all;lobed to the tTClllle of the Ea|th it/ its ntotion through space. The Earth lOl_.tt._'s tllldt'l +
lilt' vehicle ill such a way lhat as the vehicle proceeds northwards, il crosses all latitttdes at
exactly noon and al_tcr one hour il passcs over the Not+th Pole; alietwal-dS it then m<wes
southward at all latitudes at exactly nlidnight. At '2 hours it is at the,' Equat<m at 3 at the
South Pole, after which it entt+rs into th<+' daylight henlispl+ere again (+l+()SSillg all latitud("+
at exactly noon in its n<wthward passage. At 4 hours, it crosses the 19731 l_qtlat<w al tilt'
155th nleridian, west, and repeats a similar path on the F+arth's surt_we, bill displaced west-
ward tiom its initial path. In '24 hours it reltlrtls to its inilial ptlinl of de[)arturt: atier hav-
ing made both a daylight (noon-tim<+') and night (midnight) surveillan<+e of the elllire
Earth's sur|'ace.
"l'w<+mty It(ill(lies after its depal+ture on its litst leg, when the vehicle has movcd over
Atnau-ilIo, "l_'xas, its hori+,.on will enclose an area ahnost i{lenti{a] to the weathel +chart use,el
ill preparati(>n of weather fi)r<+'casts li)t North Alll+`'l+ica and adjacent (>{e_tltS.
What w<>uld be seen £i'()nl lilt" vehicle at some 4,000 miles al)t)ve Amarillo, Texas, at
exactly ll<)Oll Oil.lime 217 :\|1 atttetnpt has been made to portray the SCelle below under lilt"
asst|tnption that th<+" St|t| is directly overhead. 111 drawh|g a chart belote sketching in lhc
cl<>uds, an attempt was made to indicate tlt<+' surl_tce l_.:atttres ol + the Earth, lakiltg into
account its |mr+real coh_ur and rellectivity (allmdo) of sunlight, and the scatterhig and
deplvting effects (lit the passage of light through the Earth's atnlosphere ill the tbllowing
w_tv;--
(a) Normal ilhnninalion xalucs at lilt" Slll+l_'tce were lit-st <+'ntered ill the chart ;+t{COld-
ing to zenith t+listanc{ • of lilt' Sun.
(I+.) Next, vahtes of tlt(' al}1+.arent illtllnhlalion or "bl+ight|tess '' were obtai|icd l}y taking
the pr<><|ucl of the stu1_l¢e albedoes and th<+" ilhm|inalions. For simplicity only two
albedo ligures were uscd: 4 per cent. for water and 15 per cent. Ibr land. This
then gives the brightness field <if(he Earlh belbre passage <tithe light up througIi
lh<+" ;tllllospllel'e.
(C) Next Ill{' l']arth's stifle.ice brightness was c<mtpuled alter d<+'pleti<m by Ill<++atm<+s-
phere, values tot which art+" known from the inconting st|nlighl.
(tl) Next was <+<mlp||led the atlnospheric ctmtributi<m It) the brightness ticld ill the
vehicle. This was done by eslilnating from available observations, the portion of
radialion conling I'ronl the sky to tile ground (i.e. tile (lowm_'ard ra<+tiatitm or "sk'+'-
light") and by assutltitlg I]i;.11 the Sallle lractiml of ilh|nfinalion is scallel+t'd
upward. This procedul+e aSStlllles that Ihe alt|msphere is a '*unitorm diltuse n.llec-
I<>l++'<it the 1}rightness shown.
(e) The two> bt+iglmiess vahu's--fiom the Eartll's Slll-l_lte illl.rl 1}'{;,Ill Ille allliosplie?-{'--
are added together to gixc a tolal brighlness.
"l'o dislh+guis}+ lh<+' over-all brigi+lness +`7ontl+._isl t)elweell oct'all illl<'l land, Ior exatnl>h,,
file t}atliOllal cl)lilrast F = 7 BI.- Bt)lllll_l be larger lllali }/][). The cl;,llll)i|led '¢ahles
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off (lll>l showll) itle co|lsid{,ral:,],v ]ill'gel-ihill) l}]is vii]lie, ex('t'l)l lit%if t}le 1)<+'rip}ll'r); indi-
cating Ih,il [or most <t[ lhe obsct+ved area lalld can be readily distinguished tt<tm <lct'an.
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(:olot,r contr_|sts ()f _l)jt+¢:ts <>n lbt" _r<_tLnd it'uffl to be SiLl)pressed in _tl least two ways:
s_'It'ctive st-?tllerin_ of tbe bluer (+otnl:,Ott('nls by atnt<_sl)bcric n+oh'cttles, _tnd "dihliion" oi
c<)lotlt-s by the wbilc dill+time cotnponent c<+niribttted b+v the him-selective li:)t_P+_n p;trticle
sc;tltcrin_ ill the attnospl+erc.
The elfeet of the first type <ff s(_tlt(+ritL_ is t() (leplei_' lht' bhte coh+ttrs relaiivel)' more
than tht" lot+if, or w;tvc-lcn<u, llts. Tht" <_vcr-all e[fe(t is to ctnplt_tsizc red [2741 colottt +cent-
portents t>fllte el+joel+ oil tbc gt<_ut+d, its compared to the bht_" cotnl_<>netlis; and to mort'on
bollt wiib diiTttse ligltt consisthLg oI a relati'+'ely Iarl_t" blttc contp<mcnt ntixed witb wltite
light+ "l'h¢" over-all rest,It wottld l)c to give a bltdsh tinge t¢> what is seen, since the blue scat-
tered t+<)tn Ihc incidcnt solar I)c:tnt would lnOlC tban make t,p t_tt tht" I)hte-dcph'lion of
light cotllin_ I't-_+m tltc ground.
As It> lit(" colour of the sky <,t, the Itoriztm, wc might c:,:l>CCl tlmt thet+(' wottld I)c ;t grt'y
l:tycr, c<)rresl)Ot+dhl g to ll+t¢• atmOsl)l+t're say in the lower I0,<)00 [t., with :it+ ttpl)t'r thin l)lut"
region in tile rt'gi<m of subslat+iial R_lyleigb scattering, and black ;tl)t:+'e that.
Titus, as a rcstdt of:ill tltesc calcttl;flit)ns, a reasonable picture was <)bl;dncd <)[the stir-
lilt t' I_.,;tlttrt-s of the Eilrtlt tmtlt'r tit)final conditiotls el'Ills<." 21 gt<ltMd c<:,,t'r illtmdn<tii<m,
:tlbcd<_ and atnlospberic ctt;,+cls, bttt with<)ttl clotttls. Ovt'r this cltart w:ts skt'tcht'd a hyp<t-
thetical clotld pattt't+tl nt_ttnally associ;flcd with certain ;tlnl<)spheric distttrb:tnces. Albcdo
valtt('s wct+t ` ;tssignt+d It) v;ttiotts <hmd types and Ibeir brightness as c<+mptttcd. Thesc "dis-
tttrl);littt's" inclttded the t_flh>wing:--
(:it ,'\ cv('l<lilc f:llliil)' t)l Ilir('t" stornis hi vlilriotls sl;ig/_s of d(+vt'loptil('nl extending- I]-<)ni
t hidson l/;ix' sotiili-'e:t'siward Io 'l]'x;ts.
(b) Th(" norl|t-t';islt!rn ];i;trl of iinf)ih('r slick c),clont_ l_iiili],v wliosi" oldt'si nit'illbf'l is in
Ihf' (;illf of :_dlisk;i, lilt' r('nlliining tnt_mbers io lho soilillw('si b('in_ invisiblt'.
(f) :\ hill),' d<'vf'h)l)Cd hlirriciinc clnbedded ill "strt'¢'ts" of trltdc ctnitiili ill tilt" _At,st
hidics.
(d) Tile htit'riropi( (]<lilVii"r_t'll('t' Z()li(" (f)r Eqli_llf)li_tl l;i-Olil)--_i ].olit, ()t iilt('rli(lion
t)t'lw('('n Ih(' ii_)rlli-('iisl Irlid('s ()f lbe _lorlllern b0nlispllcr(" iiii(l tilt' sf)iilli-(';isl
Iriidf's <ll lhf' SOillttf'rn li('ltiisl)ltf'it'--t+xlondin _ w('sl of [slbliltis t>l ])_lll;iliiii io lilt"
lnid-I>acilic.
(t') +'\ "lilio-squlill"--[tiv<luriit" br('f'din/zfg, round o| s(,v(,lC ++,,,int+l sl()l+iiiP+ _tiifl lOrltli-
do_'s--iil tlic cllsl('lli U._. iii_)vin_ ;ibt'ad el +lb(" cold fronl ;iiid SillTOllnd('d oil
It<till sides I))' Ihe c:iiilil]owerlikt" (+llnliililS coill_('sllis.
(I) Sc;itlt'i-cd ('iiiitilllis (loiids of '¢iir),ing thicknesses o'l/i,r lht" h('itl('d lblnd _tlC;is--
f'Sl)l'eillll ), iit tilt" inf)iilil_-Iins ;tnd oilier art+as wliert" dyllllini(" t, fft'cls <.,n('<ltlrli_,(" iht"
Iitiing _>f iiir in verticiil cohillins.
(g) ,-\ltttciitnuhis h'nii(iil;iris or lens-shaped clouds [()iiil<.'d bv lifting <)tlityt'i-s tit tilt;list
:iir i)vl-r lll<)iliilitillS and tisii_lll)' l()und where lhe "ieistreanl" (Tosst's lll<lllnl;iills, its
ovl'r Ill(" ii<_rlhi'rn (];ill:idi;tn Rockii's.
(it) l+_x++' slr;iliis iill(l t_l_ [_>lind <lit tile sotitb(,ril _lilcl 1owlet (]itiil_lrili;t (o;isls, ov+:r lilt"
(;rt'_il [,;tkcs, lit<." Nf'wtotin(llltnd ;lrt+;t, [orlned t)v l);iss;i_t • ()t W;tl-lll lll<lisl ilir ovt'r
cold surttt(cs.
Tht' <lliiitl]ilS clotid svslt'lllS ov('r lilt! elCallS will lend io t7111ill tTlhl) If+_ullir plilll, rns
<lr "slrf,f,ls"--l'vl'ii lliOi'(" s<l ill,in w_ls observed over lhe rf)ii_h terrain in the %,:7 l)iCliirt'.
Tilt' rcgul;irily of lh(' or(';.in cloud s,vsll:lns in the present sketch is probably ex;il._lz, t'i;ilt'd,
bul ils ])it,itk(Iowll iiilo _l tiler(" irrt,_illlir piillel+n fiver land is believed lft lit" i't';ll. Tilt' ct'n-
lif's ()l till" itlliil'vcl<)lli(" <)r "bigh pl'CSSlit'e" klre_Is ;+Ire marked by' little fir 11o (it)lid.
127F,I Tllis tilt'it is lilt" hypoitlelical picture visible from Ibe 4,000-mile high v('llicl(" o','cr
Atnltrillo, '[k,x;is. <_()lil(' (){" lhf'so cl(luds, such ;is lhc Trad0 (]llilltili, c<)ul(1 tll+i(tl)llbl('(ll) ' bc
ol)sf,rved <in _i]tiil)sl illlV (l_lv _tnd ol]lcrs, Stlcb _is Ill(" burric_tnt', st, el1 only I+_tl-f'l) '. |'b('
(')'('If)Ill," tiittlilil<!s wt>uld I>¢' <lt)st'rv/!d daily, bill their IocltliOll, lilt + itllnlt)f'l <)[ individual
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storms, size and intensity wouhl vat-y geographically. A meteor(_logisl given a oh'a, piclure
of the cloud dislril)ution, as here portrayed, could wit[l,ol,tl diflicuhy sk('t(]t ill, a velv tlse-
ful weath, el+ chitlt showing [o('ati¢)tl o[ the various stormy and fair wealher areas; in t_ct, he
would have a much ])etltT idea of the large-scale weather disnilmtion than his Earth,-
bound colleague, who is lotted to rely on scattered ol)servalions taken ill or near Ill('
Earth's Sll.r [+ace.
As for obtaining two or more "fixes" t)n storms with|u, 12 hours, this wouhl I)e possi-
ble as tile vehicle makes sttccessive passages toward tile Poles--and llte oh)set to the Pole
the slt)rm is h)caletl the more such t]xes could t)e made. For example, lit(' large tully devel-
oped storm depicted (,vet tludson Bay WotLld be visible lh-st on one leg t,l the l)alh, again,
4 hours later on the next leg, and again, 4 hours later on a lhird leg. This would, by rt'tbr-
ell,ce to knowtl, Stll-l_l(e tkall,tres, enabh' tratkin, g of the stornn in the 12-h<mr interval. ,.\
wott+d of caution, is necessary since the ch)uds whi(h on one hand make possible the visu-
al id('n, fitications of the sl()rm will hin, d(.r its h)cation with, resl)ect I() known sl,uLtce R'a-
lures. Nor would trying to track tile slornn by observing lhe edge ot its ch)ud shield
necessarily give an accurate track, since ill(: changing cloud i)attern associated wilh st,oh
large, usually dissipating stornns may give spurious motions, as Ihey li)rm ou one side and
dissil)ale on the other. Thus, there will not be too good an accuracy tor tracking Ihese
Iazzge stornns, I)ut this is not too important since lheir speed of motion is usually sh)w am-
way. ()n lhe othet hand, Ihe incil)ien, l ()r d('veh_ping slornn, so imp()rlaHl tbr future weatl't-
er (levelopnnen, ts, is i_asler moving and has a less exlt'nsive cloud system asso(iale{l with it
so that tll,<)te accttt-at(' t]xes should I)c i)ossil)le. Tile htHricane, with, its ch)ud I)an(ls, simi-
lar I<) tile arms of a sl)ical l,]]ebu]a, and its open, "(.ye" at th(" centre, will be an, nL(h easit.r
st()rnn to dete(t and fi)ll<)w accurately. Cloud systems associated with cohl frmlts anti squall-
lines will also lel,l,d themselves t(t ac(lttate Iracking.
As the days pass, hmvt'ven and tit(" Eatth moves in its ()rbital m<)ti()n aI)oul tit(' Sun,
the vehicle will cross each latitude at)out 4 minules earlier than, Ihe preceding clay'. Thus,
if moti(m northward is started at noon ()n March 21, this will change on June 21 I<) 6 a.m.
moving north, and (i p.nl,, nnoving SOtll|l,; ill this case, the t]el(t of view in daylighl will I)e
tl,tostly t() Ill(' eilst (going II()rth) anti I(:, Ih,e Wesl (going south) and the eflhiencv <)f lit('
vehicle as a ('h)ud [)atl+o[ will have (lira|ill|shed considerably. ()n S(:l)t(qnber 21 |Is ('tli(ien-
cv will increase again, as it moves south at noon, and n(lrth at midnight. |h)wever, on
Deceml)er 91 its {,fticicn(.y will drop again--and to its lowest i)oint as tar as the Nol,th(,vn
l tennisphmve is concerned. It will move n{trth a! () p.nn. and s{l,uth al 6 a.m.--Imt t)ecaus('
of the low solar declination at this time anti conse(luent lack of daylight both-s, its useh,l-
hess as a chmd and storm detector will be greatly impaired. This is a serious deti'ct because
the winler season is the busiest period tbr storms in tit(" Northern ttemisphwre. This slug-
gests as a I)etter [2761 sohution, lhat the i)receding plan, th(' initial Inoxetl,lent northward
or southward at no(m on l)eccnnl)et 21. This will then give optitllttll,l (traditions tor win-
ter weather patrol--excht(ling lhe Arctic ;trod some (tista,t(e south, where little <w no day-
light will prevail.
This visual ch)l,td tec(mn, aissanwe might be taken, autonnati(ally by a television camera
in an unnnal,med vehich" and relayed to Eattth to various collection centres toy stu(ly, attalx-
sis and exchange with <)Iher tore(ast otlices to obtain a Ituly global weather pi('ture. If till"
vehicle could be prot)erly man,rod attl,d equipped, then other valuabh' geol)hysi(al and
solar data could 1)e obtaittled as ti)lh)ws:--
(at 7_mperature of tit(" Earth,'s surface and a rough average teml)el,atla-e of th(" hl,l('v-
vening amlospherc I)y ot)scrvittlg tile infrared Sl)ectrmn.
(b) Precipitation A_'as (vain, snow, etc.) col,dd 1)e lie!coted by radar as well as the
heights <)f the|l, formation, above tile stlt't_l(+e; ills() th,e height ot the fi-eezing level
which, sh(tws as a I)righ! band in the radar scope.
EXPI()RINGIIlI'I!NKN()WN I_
(_) Thumle_:storm Area',,--1)v I(:,¢ali¢:,n of lightning .eilher visually (al night) or oh'c-
Ironically (al day).
Id) Solar ICadiali_m measuremenls, l)arlicularly in Ihe I|llra-vi()l('l, I¢) ((wr('l,_l(' wilh
WU_llh('l (']lilll_('S in an _lll('lll])l Io S('o if |lnllsllil] S])(_]]S ()[ W('_tl}lUl" ill'( _ s()j_ll-('(HI-
ll_dlt'd.
_r) Albedo Measu_,me,ts--l_) kee l) a global a((ounl _I th(! day-to-day chang(.s in rcllcc-
livilv of lh(! l+_arlh's stn[_u:(' Io solar r_:t(+lialion lr_wt_ lh(' ,_lotlnd and wat(,r sunl_wi,'n
(ilwhtdin_ snow and ice cover), clouds, atmOSl)hcric lurhiditv, l,ong-limc varia-
li()n:-+ in lh¢' ]:,_irlh's albedo could bc correlaled +,,,'ill] similar variali(Jnls ia climate.
For examph', il has bec'n ('slittmted lhal a on<.'-])oin! drop in Earth's albcdo [r_ml
its avertage valt.c of :45 per cenl. would lead to an ave'rage world-wide warming of
I (:. Th¢" fra<li()ll ¢d sky ('ov('1(_d l)y clcmds is of such critical iml)Orlancc in albe-
do c]lan_es lh;[l il has l)('('n ('stinnated a variation in lhe ,v_,eragc world cloudiness
from 0°,I t_ 0o6 would explain lhe whole range ¢d climatic chang(.s--from it("
ages to the int('rvcning wmm periods.
!/) Metm,'ic Dasl--samp]cs could bc oblained to l('sl it I'¢'C¢'_11+Vpr_p<_scd l]_('ory t]i;[l
lh('s(' partich's tmLx scrv(" as clotid-n('edir_g agents, thtlS cat,sing ill('l'('+ts('_, itl rain-
fall, ('sp('cially a[t('r mclcoric sh()wers. Samph+'n _d lh¢" dust Io l('sl in cold boxes,
l<)_'lh('r wil]t III(';JSIII'('III('IIlS ()f lheir natural ('Oll('('llll_lli<)ll would sht'd ([irecl evi-
de'nee on a problem which ll(wclo[ore has only bt.+,'n possible t<_ ll't'ill stalislicldly.
In stlmmary, it (at_ I)(" stal('d without question thal a salc'llit(' v('hich', moving al)out
the Earth at the prol)('r heighl and nmnncr would be <)f inestimable valtw its it weather
palr<d lhr short-rang(" for('caslin_ and as a ('(dl('(:tor of basic rt'sear(h infiwmatio1+ for solar
and g<'oldLvsical studi<+s, in(h,ling l()ng-t(,rm w(+ather (hanges and climaaic variati(+ns.
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[v l SUMMARY
The value of observing th(' weather owr ina(c('ssiblc areas I)y aerial w(+athev r('<(m-
naissance has bc('n n'(ognize(l tot many years. An ahcvnativc method of (>l)laining broad
(overage of tim wcaflmr, howev('t, is thought to lie in Ihc use of a special sat('llit(+ v('hi(lc
which could ot)serve ch)ud t)att('rns, h is obvious thai any ,n('u+orologica] rccom_aissan(+(.
utilizing only +)bscrvafions from such a high-ahimdc "cyC' (anm)t provide quantita+livc val-
ues for dm l)aram('ters normally asso(ialcd with standard weather ()l)s('rvati(m and 10re-
casting wchniqucs. In (tctcrmining the t('asil)ilily of su(h a system, thcr('torc, the
(lUesti<)ns that llltlSl |)(" ;IIISW('I'(+([ ;tI'C (l) _'h;tt ('xt(+tll ()f ('()Velag(' can I)(, CXl)ectcd li-om a
satcllilc viewing systt'm? (2) In terms of resolution and ((mlrasl, what can 1)e seen li()m
t11¢' satelliw? (3) (;iv('n i)l-()p¢'l - (ov('lalg(" _itll(| rcsoluti(m, what (,m a( tllalHv b(' (h'tcrmin('d
rcgar(ting 01(' synoptic wcathcr situati(m ti()m Otis intormali(m?
(;enmal (:onsiderafions of ease of satclliw launching and photographic covcrag(, sug-
gest an orbiting ahimdc of ?,50 to 500 mi.' For tim purpose of the t)r('sCl_t study, however,
(rely ill(" ?,50-mi ahim(h" was (onsid('r('(| t() any cxwnt. At this ahim(h', a vehi(l(" would
ha(v(' an ovbilal vch)city ()f about ,.4,8 J0 tt/sc( and w()uld make one (()mph'w circuit of ils
oft)i! in 1.6 hr. Assuming that any ,-cgr('ssivc motion of fl](" satellitCs orbit owing to tll(+
spatial moti(m and ()l)lat(" shal)t' of the ('arlh is (()nl('(t('([ for; and Ihal Ih(" al+ca it is desired
t() ()l)s('rv(. is in daylight during the v('hi(lc l)assag( " ti)J- an ('xtcnd('d i)eri()d, this m('a will
I)e covered and l(_hwiscd in a grid tashi(m (m(e cvc,y 2t hr. It is visualized Ihat, I)y means
()f mechanical scanning transvmsc to the path of th(" salcllit(', a continuous suip whose
wi(hh is equal in or(tcr of magnitude to the ahiltldc of lh(! v('hi(:h" will I)v vi('wc(I. As an
('xamph" of the sort ()f (()vcrag(" which could Im p,ovid(,d at mi(|dlc latitud('s, with a sawl-
lilt at a 354.6-1ni altitude lhc tia(tion of the _llC;.I.l)elwt.(m ,t5 and 50 lalim(h' which can
I)c (()v('rcd gri(l-tashion with a ](10-mi wide scanning i)ath itl 2,1 hr is one-third, and if tilt+
wi(hh of th(' path is in('v('ast'd Io ,t50 ,hi, lh(' 24-by (overage is complct('.
l?lilizing t)hot_)graphs ti'om rt'c('nl v('rlically tiv('d ro(-k('ls (V-2), an ('slimaw of Ih(+
(lim¢'nsions of th(' smallest ilwrmncnt m'(('ssary fi)r l)n+op('r (lotld id('ntili(ation was mad('.
This was tound I() t)(, apl)V()ximalc[y 500 fl and is t('],n('(I tim "usat)h' rcs()lulitm" in lifts
rct)()vl: l+_ntt-ring ['ablcs 1, 2, and 3, whi(h give r('s()luli(m vmsus ('()llll'aSl ti)l various val-
u('s ()[tLmm Sl)CCd, alp('l'ttll'(' siz(', :t11(t V:ll'i()ll"; types of ilhtminmtion, show('d l[/_ll it was p()s-
sil)h" t() ()blain Ibis valu(' ()t" r('s()luti()n in sunlight illunfinati(m with (()ntrasl ])tqw('tql
1. :\chilli(real illli)l nlali,)ll (Oll(¢'ll]itL'g the' l)lol>l('ms ot sah'llih+ Ol)Vvali(m is u,i_('n ill flu+RANI) Rt'lU.I
R-217. Apti11951 (,)ut ()1prinl).
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cloud and background ot h'ss than It) pcr cent. An cxaminaiion of Ihe albcdos from typ-
ical backgroltnd objects, as prcscnlcd in Fig. 2 .... compared widl cloud alhedos seems to
indicate lhal I0 per cent contrast in available ow'r a wide range of [vii l)Ossible cloud-
ground and cloud-clot,d comhinalions. This, therefore, appears Io establish the |k'asibili-
iy of cloud ideulification tiom high ahiludes, at least from the sland[)oint of contrast and
rcsohltiOll.
Owing l,, lhe lack of qlutniilallive measurements, the clouds llltlS! bt" utilized to their
illlllOS[ ill determining, the synoptic wealher picture. Experience and slalisli(:al clintalo-
logical vahtt,s play their parl in |orming this picture, and thc process inwllves a "hunting
Ic{hlliqtlC' Ihall oscillales between Ihc Ihrcc main tools at the analyst's COllllllalld. SOlllC
detailed t`:slilllalcs of various pHIatIIICICrS are possible from the visual doud characlerislics.
Items, such as moistttrc (()ll|CiII, tClllj)('ratlt|re gradient, slahilily, ma_niludc or direclion
of xcrlical prcsslu-e gradient, wind shva,; and wind direction[,] <ill show pr<mlise of yield-
ing good cslintalcs of Ihv aclttal valttcs to this type of analysis and of Iwlpiug Io clarity, lhc
Ihud eslinlalcd synoplic piclurc. For any [tlltlrc operalional use. ttiis SltldS has shown Ihal
such things as a cloud atlas ot clouds viewed from ahovc, com[)lclc climalological malcri-
all <m lhc art,a ill qut`'stion (including a possible slatisiical survey of t]ucltlations liom tilt'
nornuil of the variotlS ])Hr;IIIIC|CrS ;IS atlribllled to synoptic SyS1CIItS ;tlld bl-okcll (l<)_,Vll illlo
small regions of similar clitnalc and topography), and pcritnclt'r wcalhcr will imme;.tsur-
ahlv hclp lilt' |oh <>1the ohscrvcr and analyst. An aid Io gt'lling a "t_'cl" tor tilt" prol>lt'nl
involvct`l, l)holographs tioin lhrec rockt'l t]ighls were analyzed and lhc synol)lic silualion
was csliinalcd. Thcsc" rl'sillls and Ihl' aclual wealher for Ihc correspoi/din<_ liinl's arc prc-
St'lilCd in lhe st,clion cnlillt,d "Rt,sulis of Three Attempts al ,,\nalysis .... " In all allcnipl lo
corrclalt" [tlll|lt'l- lhc rockcl pholographs with the aclual synol)lic picliilt!, l)r..I, l_icrkncs,
of IJ.(:.I..A., indcpendcnlly iliads.' all analysis of photographs liik,pn Oil ;i tliRhl on July 96,
l%tX. In lhis ;ulaiysis, all olht'r synoplic lliCteorological (lal;t availahh' I_li lhal datc WClC
utilizcd ....
[11 INTRODUCTION
The I_lundalion of all utcic'orological forecasling sysleins is lilt' wclilh¢'r-¢lbserving nt'l-
work. _Vht'thcr tilt.: |_lret.:ast in "local" or for the entire Northern Helnisphcre, the starling
point nnist be an appraisal of lhe synoptic weather picture. Since storm systems al nliddle
laliludes generally move fronl west to east, a meteorologist who does not have good obscr-
valions fronl a ralher widt`" area (particularly to the west) is ala disat`tvantagc; and such is
ollcll lht.' c;Isc [or coaslal i-c_iOliS, since weather reportillg over tilt`" otcails is oflcn inade-
qulilc.
AIlh(itlgh ship rcl)orls it|ill wt'alhcr reconnaissance ])y aiiciati hel l) Io SOillC exlcnl 1o
fill tlit" t_)i]), Ihcrl' lilts l<)iig I)t't'il ;t nt'cd for cxlending wcalher <lbservati<lllS over lilt'
<lct,_lliS aiid inacccssihh' _ii-c_ls. A s<lhili<m to tills prol)lein |lily lit" in wcalhcr ohsciV;ili<tns
llilidt' I)y it|calls o[ a lelcvision caiiicra placed ill an linlnalilit`,d siticllhc vehicle. ,_,li(h ;l
liit'lhod has lht' at`lValilagt' <if pl-<)vidill_ a ineans of <lbst, rvalioll o1 Iht' over-all piClUlC o(
Ihc widi'-scalc wt'alhcr silualion thai is lacking in normal daily wt`'alher <lhst`'rvalions, and
sh+iuld give liCW insighl into tile behavior of the atmosphere.
h is ohvi<)us llial ill <lbservin<cT,lhe wealher throllgh ill(' "eye" of a high-ahhudc r<lhol
iihiiosl all of ihc icg, tllar qualllilativc ilicasiireinenls liSt|ally associated wilh incteor<)logy
lllllSl thll by the wayside, h is inlp<lssiblc to nlake inorc lhHll ;lll intelligcnl guess al thc val-
tit'S (If lt'lii|)crltllirl', prcssilrtl, humidily, and the rciliaiiliii_ quaniilalive nleleorological
]);ti:illicIcrs. llt.l'ittlSC' (ll <' Ihis, lilt`' ;til;llysl illllSl rely Oil lilt`" visible COlllpl)lICil|S OF iIicicoroi-
og-y Io asct'rlain 1o soil|c: uslih]c dcgg"t't' Ihc synoptic wcai|lcr siliialiOli.
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(;louds, being the objects most easily discernible fi-oln extrelne altitudes, l)econle tilt"
inlportant item and nlttSt be utilized to lilt" tltltlttst in fornlhlg a +ynt+ptic picture. It is
apparetlt that fi-onl clouds alone it will l)e hnpomsible to tell everything al-)t)ut lhe (Ulrel+t
s+vnt+ptic situatiol+. (]onlbined, ht)wever, with both thcoretical knowledge and that gained
through expelience, an accurate cloud analysis can produce surptisingly good t+esttlts.
The purpose of this reF, ort is to plesent nlethods of attack on tilt' above pr<)blenl, tt+
show what nlay 1)e actually seen t]om high-altitude pholt+graphs (pritnarily a tliscussit)ll or1
necessary resohttion and area coverages), tt+ discuss what may be deternlined fiom these
pht+tt)graphs (both directly and indirectly), and to give some results <el)rained. Altht+t]gh
all tile presell| analysis is based on data td)tained from vertically tired rockets, the experi-
ence gained therefrom permits recommendations on possible ntethods of lofnling a syn-
optic piclul+c fi'oln satellite-missile pht)togl'al)hs.
121 THE SATELLITE VEHICLE
()wing to tilt" everyhanging pattern of tilt' atnlosphere, tilt' nct'd |or ahnosl (+OllStallt
stuveillance must be l_>retn<)sl in any plan it+ |l-ace syn<)ptic weather situations. Any vt+hMe
designed Ibr such a pufp<)me tnust tl+lefefore have tilt" ability I<) make Illilny tt'ips over lilt +
at+ca in qucstiotl. Tllese traverses, nlort'ovel, must Ire made ill SUC]I a fashion that they. not
<)till' cover a fepreselltative portion of the area, but also c<)mph_te their cycle often ellough
It+ enable an observe| It+ notice any significan! chaY|ge t+t- shift in tilt + cloud svstcnls.
Such a vehich" is the satellite. Flying high abt+ve the sensible part of Ihe atnl<+sl)heve,
so that atmospheric ttt-;tg 1)<_,ct+lnes negligit)h,, lilt" satellite tlecolnes all unpalalleled instru-
nlent t<+t weather reconnaissance wl'ten scope of view is considered. For the purpose <+f
simplicity, all calculations and peff<+tmance c<msiderations in this report will lte based on
a satcllile assunled to I)e circling the earth at an altitude of about 350 mi." At lhis altitude
such a vehicle _wt+uld have an orl)ital vchwily equal It+ 24,870 ft/sec' and wtmld make one
ct)mph'le circltit of its <wbit in 1.6 ht +.Also, because t+f lilt" facl that this inissile is thcoret-
ifally moving in a stable orbit at-Otuld the eatth, the gh+l)e turning tinder tilt" vehiclc caus-
es tilt + tvaje(tory of tilt+ satellite to a|)pc;tr tt+ "el+eel )'' t)vcr tilt' l_tce of tilt' earth, thevel)y
increasing tilt+ area ill)fiefveil.' Depending tel) the efficiency, of tilt' p<+wer plant+ the <wdcr
of nlagnitude ()I+the tinle period li+t+which lilt" vehicle could be kepl <+iterating is thought
to lie I yr. llowevel, in auempting It+ decide tile satellite's litll worth Ibl- weather recon-
naissant+e, lilt" questions that must be COilS|tiered are as fi+llows: Can en<)ugh be seell t]-t+nl
such altitude t<) enable an intelligent, usable, weather cloud) <)t)servalion t<) bc tnath',
and what can l)e determined ltottl these <)bsefvalions?
2, Ibid.
3, The actual ;altitude Io whi(ll these figure,+ apply is 35,1.6 mi.
I. lhc at Itt;tl ,.ch)< it'+ ol a prt_iection ol the salt'llilt;s inlag,p ox'tPf the l;lt t' t)l the globc is icallx a xali
al>h' rcsttltittg ftom the chanlgt' it+ atlgulat vchwitv l+(_tt+ latitudc |iv(It l<_ latitude cir(Ic.
_). h sh<Juld bc noted lhat tht" t<m<'cpt t+f "tcpctifivc ;taxcvst's" in in it'..t+l| c_mH>licatcd it+ that, tt'_atd
h'ss ol lhc slab|lily ol tht' +,;_tellile <wbit+ lhe spatial tnc_xeHtt't]t and the oblate sh;q)e of tit<" t';uth impalt ;l it'_l(+_+ -
sixe motion to lht' vehicle tt'lativt' It+ fixed points on the earth. From a satt'llitc at apl>V<_ximalcl _, 350-mi ahiludc
in an _wbit set tangeHl to a latitudc <)l 5G, 78 da'.s will bc ;cquircd l<)l il Io appcal twi(c __%r_£1lilt" _;illllt' pOill[ O11
earth _It exat ll_ the same time. [his legicssivc m<+ti<+n tan lw paltiall_, (or _t'ttcd I>"+all adjustmct+t M lht" Sl)Ct'd
(thIcmgh altitH(h' thai|g|') ol lht" satellite. It lttrthct imparts a limitation <>n stlcccssfttl Qt'wing in th;_t I<>i apptt_x-
im;_t<'l,, hall _>I lht' 7_-da_, pt'ri_d (assumin',4 12 ht ol ph_l_+Rraphabh+ little otH ,+_It"¢tq _+24) lht' th'sitt-d aft';| will
ha".|" ]6ght al the lilllt' ill the sillt'llilt+'s pas_,;tgt+. Fc_] ;l _<_ml)Ictc dis| tlssioll i)[ tt.glt.ssi<_tl <d lht' <_hit, th<' iillt'i-
t'slt-d tt+adtq is _clct_cd Io RAND Rt'p<_rt R-217 (scc l_+<+Itlolt" l., .).
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131 WHAT CAN BE SEEN
N_[t|||'_|]ly, _'_|1_ r cstilll:4lc o[" l}t(.' _IIII(HII|I their C_lll 1:,(.seen from an cxtn-emv ahitud(" IIIIIsl
It(' ;d |'llll('ti()ll ()l I)olh the r('s()]viJig ]tower o| the (_lll)('i_! svsIclll _llld the arra Ih,II (_lll bU
scann(.(l and rrcord(.-I (or tch'visrd) and still retain usabl(, d3.11).. Much of Ihc discussion
and mosl of the figures in lhis section arc the resuh of previous RAND studies (_onduck'd
bv l)r. R. S. Wvhn|(,r.
AREA COVERAGE
Fig. l--Viewlng system
[_sinq tl|r rrlation (see Fig. l)
VL:- w = 2 tanl _,
F d 2
whrrr 14:- s('nsiliv(. (,'h'm(:nt width, in.
w- width of surface l)iclured F,:r frame, mi.
F - local h'nglh of camera, in.
d - optical rang(', mi.
a = angh' of view, deg.,
and using Tablrs l, 2, and 3, it is l),)ssil)h, to compute lhr widlh ()I squart" surfacr view('d
and lit(" angle of view fi)r any givrn camera and aperture. This has been don(" at|d is sum-
marized in "lal)h. 4. ,'ks can t)e set:n, ira limiting resolution" ()f 500 ft is [4] set, it is still i)<)s-
sil)lr t<) ()blain this r('solving ])owrr under su||light illumination with a contrast as h)w as
2.5 per cent (with a 5.0-in. aperlure). Under moonlighl, howcv('1, this resolution is possi-
bit' only wilh 100 l)cr (cnt (:ontrasl, a very fast IV 1.4 lens, and a minimum exposur(, tim('
<)f 0.25 set:; re)tier fight of the night sky illumination it is not possible at al]. Assuming,
lh('n, that lit(" ('hos(m limiting resoluti()n is correct, the probability oF oblaining identifi-
al)l(, (lotnd l)hotographs tinder any but sunlight iHuminatio|| appears Io be small.
6. Th(" k'rm "Imtiling resohnli()n," as used in ll|t' trhMsion fi('Id, reli'rs to th(' gr(.'atrst possihle t t's()lu-
lion) +ultai)mbh' l)x a gi_,rn rl'_: |)i(k-nil) |lll}( J i|]Id iN v, holl+, drl)v)v+l¢,nl on lhc nlt tl(ttl)al mak(.-u l) <)| lh(' ttlbt, it:,,cl|.
As us(.<l in thi +`,irp<)rt, limiting, minimtm+, ot tlsal)l(' r('sohlli+)n is a quantity dCl)('t+ding (m s(('))(' contrast sig+;al-
lo+n()is( + lati(). _ll)cllut(. , [ x+uml)(,l ()+ (A)tnt'la, ('t(.. m+d is t hI)n+,'ll I() l)i(k II I) lhc snmtlh'st <)l+jc( I thal il is (h'sit('d
It) x'i<"+,/.
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Table 1*
RESOLUTION OF CLOUDS BY SUNLIGHT
(Image orthicon f/lO {'anmra operated at 20:1 :+ signal-m-noise ratio
al Fates of 40, 10, alld 4 ('xposlll"e frames/see: and a salellilc hcighl of 350 mi)
Mill|mum Rcsolwd}lc Surface l)imcnsi(m
('amlrast Aperture 4(} Framcs/Scc I0 Frames/See 4 Frames/See
C_) (in.) (ft) (f0 {n)
I(}0
25
10
2.5
0.5 200_+ 100+_ 64_+
1.0 100_+ 50_+ 32+
2.0 50_+ 25_+ l &+
5.0 20_+ 10_+ 6+
0.5 800 400+_ 250+_
1.0 400 200+ 125_+
2.0 200 10(}_+ 64_+
5.0 80 40_+ 95+
0.5 2,000 1,000 6,10
1.0 l,(}O0 500 320
2.0 500 250 160
5.0 200 I00 64
0.5 8,000 4,000 2,500
1.0 4,000 2,000 1,250
2.0 2,000 1,00(} 640
5.0 800 400 250
0.5 20,000 I0,000 (i,400
1.0 I0,000 5,000 B,200
2.0 5,000 _,5()0 1,000
5.0 2,000 l,O00 640
* The material ({mlaincd in lhis tabh" was prcparc{I by l)r. R. S. Wchncr and is in{hul-
cd ill RAND Rci}ort R-217 (see t()otllOlC 1 , . .).
+ It sh(}uld t}c n<>tcd that this tal)lc (an(1 also Tabh's 2 and B) is utn-calisti{ + in that the
20:1 signal-to-noise ratio is apt}licabh, <rely to 25 per {'cnt (()lllV;lsl. For I0 pCI- ('('Ill
('()lHl'aS[, ::I signal-to-n(}isc ratio of 5{):1 is required. This w{mld mean a required lrans-
miitcr t}owcf in(fca.s(_" I}v a [a{l()r ot 2._) (a/SStllllillg ;I 2-in. al}(.rlllf{' 1000 "l_,' lin{.s, an(I
a frame frcqucn{y of I{) scc). This is slill nol prohibitive bill (|o('s t)('{()lll{? s() wilh a
sut}slantia] illcrc;asc ill cilh{q" |he lltllllbcl" ()fTV lines or {he fi-amc ticqucncy
_+ Values of comt)ulc{t rcsoluli(m smaller than rcali/al}lc wilh prcscnl c()mmcrcial image
(}rthi(ons.
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[5 ] Table 2*
RESOLUTION OF CLOUDS BY SECOND- AND THIRD-QUARTER MOONLIGHT
(hnagc orthic<m f/I.I camera oi)(watcd at 20:1; signal-to-noise ratio
at fate's <_f,I0, lO, and 4 _,Xl_OStnc liamcs/scc; and a salHlitc height of 350 tni)
Minimum Resolvable Stu'Lw,t' l)imcnsion
( ',<>ntrast AF_crltnx + 40 Framcs/St_c I0 Frames/Scc .l J:ramcs/S<:c
C%) (in.) (ft) (ft) (fl)
I00
25
5 1.08 0.54 0.34
11) /I.54 0.27 0.17
20 t).27 0.14 0.t)9
5 ,t.32 2.16 1.36
I1} 2.16 I.(}8 <).68
20 1.<}8 (}.54 0.3,t
5 10.8 5.4 3.4
11} 5..t 2.7 1.7
20 2.7 1.35 0.85
10
* The malt!rial contained it; this tabh+ is inchtdcd in IL&ND Rep<)rt R-217 (scc li)omot¢ + I...).
Table 3*
RESOLUTION OF CLOUDS BY LIGHT OF THE NIGHT SKY
(Image orlhic<m t/I}.7 camera operated ;it 20:1; signal-to-noise ratio
;tt Vales ol 40, 10, attd 4 exp<)sure franles/scc; and a salellite height of 350 mi)
Minimum Resolvable Surface Dimensi<m
(]onlrasl Al)erlu|-e 40 Frames/Sec ll} Frames/See 4 Frames/See
{'/,. ) (in.) (ft) (ft) (ft)
1O0 10 4.3 2.15 1.36
20 2,15 1.08 0.68
41} 1.1)8 0.54 0.34
25 10 17.2 8.6 5.4
20 8.6 4.3 2.7
41} 4.3 2.15 1.36
I(} 11} 43.(} 21.5 13+6
21t 21.5 10.8 6._,
40 11/.8 5.4 3.4
* TIw mawrial containcxl in this lat)le is included in IL&NI) Rcl)ort R-217 (sec ti+<_tn<>te 1...).
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16] Table 4
POSSIBLE PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES FOR VARIOUS IMAGE ORTHICON
CAMERAS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ILLUMINATION SOURCES
Rail() ol Focal Approx, Minimunl (:()ml)Ut<+d Width
[,cngth Io +\t)cIlul(' (',onl]asl Nc(t"-,sat'_ (:(mH)utt'd Angl(' (d S<tualc Sutla((.
Di:ml('h'L and Fotal It) (;i,.c at l,('ast Maximum ()t View (d Vit'w('d in l'_a(h
Ilhmlinati(m Apcttul(' l,vn_th 7)[)(),-FIRcs(duti()n Numb('l ol Eat h Flanlc I:lanlv-,
Somce _: (in.) (in.) (%) Frames/So( (de)Z) (mi)
1710 (amen a, 0.5 5 25 10 I ]A.! 70
(h)uds I .() I 0 I 0 10 ,').7,1 37)
illuminalcd hv 2.(9 20 I0 ,t0 2.8(:, 177)
sunlighl 5.0 50 2.5 ] () l.l.t 7
f'lA camera, 5 (:) (I) (_) (1) (_)
(Iouds 10 (:) ([) ([) (I) (++)
illuminlated t)v 20 2N 1()() '1 2.05 1.25
2n(I- and
!{rd-(luart¢'r
111()()11_
t70.7 c,mwva,
light ot
night skv
illuminatioul
( *, ) ( *, ) ( * • ) ( *, ) ( * • )
N()TE: For the ])urp()st" of conlputa.ti()n, ill lilt' r('lalionl wriltcn ()n p. 3:
W -width of tile targ('! in inches, which is taken t() be ('(tllal t() 1 in., the siz(' of Ilu'
c()mnlcrcial RCA imagt' ()n-t]lic()]l larg('l
tl -()l)tical rang(', which is takt'tl t()1)(' t'(]lLa] to 350 xtli (tile ht'ighl <)I" lilt' S;lt(']lil(').
All (()ml)utalions mat|t! assunling a minilnullt signal-to-n<)is,v ratio ()f 20:I.
* All (am(,ras mt'nti<)m'd hc,-c rcli'r It) th()sc using an imag(' <)rthi(()t) tulle.
+ Sin((' tlt(" (urvattne ()flirt" (+;tllh was ll()t taken into a(c()tml, lilt' figures in this c()l-
lltlltt art' h)wc," thill} th(' a('ttta] Iigtucs.
i N() rt's()lttli()n <)f lh¢' or(h,r of .:')00 It ()r less.
** N() rt's()hiti()n <)f lit+,' ()rdt'r ()f 500 ft ()r h'ss, rcgar(lh'ss ()I al:,t!rlurc.
[71 Cahtflatit)ns nlust also I)(" l)crlbrm('(l t(> rerive at lit(' p()ssil)h, m-('a c()vcragc. Since it
is apl)ar(_'nt that ch)u(l ()l)scrvali(ms, t<) 1)(' at all useful, ]lave t() l)c lltath' ()vt'l _t widc-
cn()ugh strip (at least as wide :ts tilt' ht'ight ()f tlt(" satellite), it shouhl be <(msidcrcd thal
tilt' C;lmt'va will ])t" mcchani(allv s(anncd. This max I)(' a(c<mll)lish('d l)v lllC_lll,_ ()l _l 4F)'
])lane mirror r()talal)Ic about th(" axis ()f lilt' camera. The mirror ,t(tua]l,, , (h)('s lhv "h)()k-
ing" and s(:imling lov tilt' (amvra, whi(h is m()ulltcd h()riz()]itallx, its a×is l)('ing l),U allcl t()
tilt" axis ()f lit(' mi,;sih'. Taking a st'qut'ncc o120 n()nt)v(,rl:lF, l)ing framcs ,,,,'ill l)rt)ducc :l strip
.3:")0 mi hmg, lralt:sxt'l+st ' It) thc tr_!jt'(l()ly t)f Ih(' salcllitc, and 17..:) mi with'. It Iht' calnlt'ra is
set h) take g) lranics,/sc( and lit(' rt)latal)h' ]nirr<)l +is lixt,tl with ;i lhsl snap-l)ack tlcvi(c, tilt'
system "++'ill lh('n l)c in l)()sition t() take a scc(,nd strip l)v tilt" litre' tilt' satcllil(, has m()v('tl
allt'ad apl)r()ximatcly 17.,") ]ni relative I() thc cavth. (Tilt' Sl)t'('d t)l lh(' )nissilt' rt'latixt' I<) thc
carth's su)l;t(c is al)()u! 4.4 mi,/scc.) This will l)r<)(hu( ' at <()ntinu()u_, ?,7)O-n6-_vith' _,tri I)
m()un(| thc ('arlh with each (()nll)Iclc lra'+t'rs¢' ()f tilt" nfissi]t,.
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The daylighl camera wilh an f/10 Ions and an image orlhicon Iclcvision mix'|,] and
whose performance is summarized in T_(blc 4, should have a 2-in. objective to give the
tnopcr gromld co,.'cragc per (tame. This combination allows a 500-t_ objccl to bc resolved
wifl_ only 10 per ccnl contrast/wifich is reasonably small. |1 should bc emphasized thai
these figmcs arc presented hcrc merely Io give some examph,_ of pcrtornmncc of viewing
sysicms and nol as a dcscriplion of tlw @tbnum syslcm Pcrformancc.
Some cal(ulalions o| the efficiency of tow'rage o( an hmccessihle area such as an ocean
wcrc also made by direct mcasurcmcnls (assuming diflcrcn! strip widths) on a grid map. ()n
this map wcrc projected complete cycles _ of traverses for two pn_poscd satellite lra.jectorics.
()nee again, cmvalure of the earth was neglected. The results obtainc<l are as follows:
1. For a satellite with 24-hr complete cyclc (354._bmi ahitudc, angular vclocity 15
fillies; Ih;tl c,J" earth, and IF+ljeClol+y l_ll]ff, l'llt to ]al. ,_(l'+N,)--
As_umi.g a lO0-mi-u,i<& _ca.niug baud (50 mi on either dde _![ path): In lhc vicinity o1
]a[. 45_-5ON., wc find din1 in 94 hr the smlhcc has bccn tow'red in a grid fash-
ion such In,it al)oul one-lhird of |Is area has been scmmc<l and presumably lclc-
visc<l.
A_wlmi,g a 2OO-mi-a,ide scanning hand (lO0 mi on either gde o/path): As may bc
expected, doubling the SCalillilig band does noi quite double the area covered.
This is owing 11>some overlapping of lhc bands. (I1 can be shown lhal, [141 lo
('OVCl- Itli" ;iF(.il collltilclely, a s(allnillg band approxilllall'ly 450 in| in width is
nee<led.)
As _t rcsiih oflhc grid-like CoVl'i_tge. the 100-mi-wMc band, _il ils worsl, should pick
ii l) al least llorli<nis of lhe largest, nlosl active wealhcr disiurl)anccs and ellonl_]i
of lhc rcniailiing cloud ((_Vel_l_tP Io orienl lhe sysl('nl hi i-cialioli Io llie glOlliid.
2. For a ,tS-hr c_nnph'ie cvch" (ahhudc 453.3 nil, angular vchlciw I,/.5 times thai o[
Ihc carl]i, alid lr_ticciory lan_enl io la[.._6°N.) -
A._._uminl4 a l O0-mi-wide .¥canning band (_50 on either .side o/path): |ll the viciniD, of lat.
45_-5(VN., wc find dml in 48 hr il has been covered, grid fashion, so that v_vo-
lhirds oF ils area has been scanned and presumably televised. (It can be shown
thai to <over the Hil'_i coniplciely in a 48-hr cycle, a s(71111tillg band approximate-
b,' 750-300 nli in widlh should bc required.)
The rcsulis so ol)laincd give an i<lca of thc areas which can bc covered (or scanned)
|ion| _i w'hich' in an orbil 3,_10 nli above tile surface of itlc earlh. The 351J-|hi-Wide slii|) dis-
cussed in ihc lirsl l):irl o[ l|iis section will ihereforc cover in 7't hr a laigc perccnlage of l|ic
;tl¢'il hclwl'ell ,|_l N. illld Fill:N/' with considerable overlapping of sxilllllillg, parlicularly
7. "l'hi_ ii,sl)hllillii _iltl| i'l>llll_tSl rl'l>lUSt'ilt_, lilt" IlllIXillllllll lil't'ds ol sall*llilc "._'l';llht'l lll)Si*l"Gl|illll, Thi_
i_ olllailililllc wiitl 75 pcrll'ul _ ollli;iq whcll IlSilig ;Ill f7 If) Ions wiltl a 7-in..bic_ live iil sunlighl ilhinlinalion (ncl'
t<iolilolc Io Tdbh. I lllalkcd ( + ).
N. InhiMh, fin. iraicl ml y of ihc satellilc is set Ililll_l'lil to _1 given ]aliltidc, ()_+int4 Ill Ihl' rclalivc dil|ci-
Clll i' ill ihc iili_llhi _clo_ itic_ bl.lWl>l'll Ihc Salcililc ail(I Ihe carlh iuid l(i lhc relllli'¢e slab|lily of lhe orl)il o| Ihc
mi_sih-, lilt" vchich"s lli!jc_ I_n_ apl)car_. Io "Clt'cll" ll_+'lq" the sult]u c ol the !4h>bc. A Cl_lllllllqt" cv(']l' is lhl" lime il
Iilkl ,_, |ill lhc Iraici lorv <if lhc s;ilcllih' llllCl' ;ig;iili Io bl'lOllll' lililgl'lll Ill ihc oligillal poinl, ( Fllis "ciceil" i'illi_.l's
Ihl. I1_t%1.1 _l,n Ill hl'l llllW iil<ill. _Gdch diSllCiScd _ls lhl" lii!il'lllli y allllFO;il hl's Ihc ¢'qilliloi. )
9. ,<_l I;ilgl' lll'lCt'lll;l_C Ill Ihl" ;11¢'_1 sliOllid Ill' co'.'l'led ill llw 7<t-hi Ii;!il.i l(ll % _llld illlllll_41 |ill shoilid t)l.
Sliliilil.iI iii iiil. l_-Iii Illlici hill.
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around the 56th parallel, in any event, the coverage, as mt'ntioned here, if achieved with
lilly III<_';.:tSUI'+`! O| SlLCC('SS, should pr<Mucc good we_tllwI" ic(olln_-lims;tnt'+`, I't'StL]tS.
RESOLUTION AND LIMITING CONTRASTS
Sine)' it is now obvious that clouds will lie the chief meteorological element directly
observable" fi(/m high altitude photographs, it nutst I)c as+`crtaincd how closely these ch)u(is
may be identiii+`'d and what may lie determined tiom them, either directly or indirectly.
As can I)c seen tiom Tables 1,2, and 3, when a set of(onditions such as a])crture, i[lu-
minalion, ext)ostnx" lime, and focal length-aperture diameter ratio of a given +`anlcr_l have
Iwcn established, Ihc remaining factor t_lr determination of the minimum r+`.solution
attainable is the contrast value. In ch)ud t)hc>ltlgraphy of th+`' type to be attt'mpt+`'d fiont
tim sat+`'llitc, one is unable to choose tile surr<ltmding photogral2hic conditions. Fcatttr+`'s
such as backgrotmd, lighting at tim+`' of o|)scrwttion, etc., arc exanlplcs of the ttncon-
trolled variables, and, as a consequence, any system of data gathering, by photographic
means must tie [lcxil)le enough Io give adequate results over a wid+`" range of limiting t_tc-
tots. The qucsti()n is: If the can+ler_, and optical system are ch(isen,"' and if the various con-
dill)ins (i[ lighting, t)ackgr(innd, etc., _lr+`,asstlm+`.d to) rt'ln;tin within Ihe limits pr()viding
[9] usat)lc rcs()htlim_, will the rcsuhing litniling t'(/llll';IM v;thlcs still mlal)le one to ()liscrvc
the' w+`';tlhcr und+`'r a wide-_mough range of ;tclt_a] conditions?
BetiH-t" endeavoring to answer this queslion il is desirable to d+`qin_ lhe lcllXl "us_dllc
r+`,soltHion." It was thottght that details of cloud stt+ucture as small as sev+`'ral httndrt'd I_+'+`'t
ill (lianl+`+tcr might possess significance when an attctnpt was made to .++ors a syn<)ptic pit-
ttnc l)y means o[ cloud analysis+ This was borne out when high-altittMc rockct pho-
togt'al_hs were cxamint'd. Further t-``,;)sons l<)r ;tSmt'liitlg this to bc the al)pr<q)riatt'
mininntm size I<) bc resolved wcrc [ound when a siniplt" test ++,'asco,lducted ,n )hi'st' pIt<i-
logr+lphs. (Tile h+`'ights at which these pictures were taken varied I)etwccn 50 and 7(t mi.)
Using an adjustahle viewer, the photograph was taken slowly out of tbctts until it w_ts
itnt)ossiblc t<) identit_ det]nilcly the fi)rms of clot.is <)tht'r than [)y saying )ha! they. wt'te
widespr¢+ad or w+`'re in small chtsters. For cxan_plc, I>t'yond Ibis point it was iml>ossii>h' t</
distinguish betwt'cn closely packed cmnttlus and a deck of altocumuhls, and also llt.lwctqt
a d(-,nst' layer of str_itus or altos)rat)is and tilt" librotts tt'xtttrt' ol (irlosttaltls. A sttldv ol
other parts ol the photograph, where recognizable or measurable ob.iccts were l<)c+tt¢+d _tz
l+attgcs al)out equal it) those of the clouds, showed that the limiting re+oh)lion at which the
clouds lost tlwir distinguishability was [+tom 500 to 1000 ft. This is what is meant I)v "tts_tl)lt.
lt'sohlliOll." +,ks In;sly 1)+`' itll;agin+`+d, this is at b(-+st only a It>tlg,]t apl)roximalion, but b+`'c_tusc'
ill +its ;_pparent ;igrt'ctncnt with previously t'stimated values it should serve very wt'll as a
working basis.
It was llwntiott+`!d _tl)ov¢" lh+tl ill (ll+d+`'l" It) ot)laill it known, Itsal)lt" R's()]tllit)ll, {)lit+(. • Ill+."
camera and lighting conditions are ch<iscn, the limiting contrast vahle must +llso b(-" spec-
tO. PI'I'Vi<IIIs Mlldit's +il I'L_ND haxc showJl tim[ onc ol lht' b<'sl availalflc tclevi,don t rant'ills I_+) us_ +in l])c
satcllitc would lit' t)llt" eun])lo_,illg ;in imt+_+' m lJ+i++mpi+k up lids. "]'ht" t ]+arat l+.'liMit_ o| this tttbt' _|])proat h th.s¢' ol
lht" tlttlllillt +.+t,t"O','(.'t pall ot its ()[)CI'_IIilI_ t_t+gc, it has it gr¢+atcl sensiti_i(}+ lhan (++tl]+(+l t'+p<+s, told il is _apablt' <+I
stablc <q)t'ratitm witht+ul +t(!itlStlll¢'llt ()V('I +l '._ridt' l_tllg(" l)] iHUlllillilli<M hstcnsit',. _ill(t' it is IIIH lilt + ])tlrpost+ ol
this rCl>t_nl t_> delvt + t_+o dot+ply into the technical ;Ill)ill'Is (+l'thc tltc llnol)lt+ms o[ a tt'h'visi<+i_ xicv,'in¢ ssstcm, _ml'_
if'suits o1" rt+s<+luti<m connptflati_+n ol the image orlhi,.tnl )tube all' ]>rcst'ntt'd h¢'1¢+. )'hi'st, ale _,IIIIHII('([ tLp in
'l';d)lt+s I, 2. and ?,. For technic al itllOl'lll;ttiOtl and cqttatiom+ in,,olvt'd, set' R. B..lames, R. l'L.lolms.n, and R. ,'*;,
Mo+>)c', I{CA I_5"+,,'+7r+V++I+ )O Jut+ l!l-i_.k pp. 191-22!:;: +_nd A. Roll,. '"]'t,h'vi_,i_n i'i_ ktJl.+ I'i+J)t+s +rod 11++' J+HA)h'm _>I
\'isis+," ,tdvam+:s in l(le+tnmit_, Vol. I, At ;t<h'mit Ptt'ss. New x+_+k. 19.18.
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illc<l. It is ot)viou,s thai if, lT>r various conlbinaiion,s of cloud-gronnd and cloud-cloud,
aillcdo clilti.rcnccs arc snch lhal lhcir coiilr_tsi values lall below the ]iniilhlg colillaSl, ihcsc
coiliJ)iil_iliolis caiiilol I)c ollscrvcd b)' hib_li-;llliilldc wcalllcr rccoilllaisS_lllCC.
tlc'w,_oil, in _tll arliclc in a niclc<lroJ<)gical .jotirlial II and in his book (writlcn hi col-
laboration witJi LOliglcy) ()ll lhcorclica] and applied in(-IcoloJo_,,', _ calcliJalcd and labu-
];iic<l cli]fiisc-rcllcction cotqficicnls t_li + clouds o1 various I|iickllcSscs. lit doiilg so, as a
iCSll]l of lhc cxtciisivc wlri_lliOll of cloud liquid-water dcnsilics alid cloud droplet radii, ll("
w_ls t_)lc('d 1o (]l()[)s(" (lilt P+cl (if v_lhlcs tilr Ihc,%c two l)al-alllelcls. ']'hosc Oil which his fi14-
ii1('_ ill(' ])a_icd iuc ii dcnsily of 1.0 _111 i)f liquid water per cubic lll{'lCl of [h)ucI illl([ ;4
drolilcl rlldiliS o[,r) X l(/-,l Clll. ()wing Io ihc f{tct lhal iiicsc rallies probably apply l<l ;i l;il_+,"
l)crcciilli_c of llic ii,_a])]c cJoiids o])scrv_il)]¢" flom cxllCmc aJlillldO,% lh('y ilia), ])c rc;ison-
iilily I10i Cliil)]Ovcd ill niilkin_ cslinialcs for this Slud)'. These values aic t)l<_ucd hi 1:il4. 7,
lh(' ordilial+<' add abscissa bcin/4 COllll-_iM alld ])ack_rOlllld Mix'do, rospcclivcly. Eltch cii1-'¢/,
l'l'])l'4;'s4;'lllS _t J)_ll-lictliill" albcdo aplilicablc to a particular clond Ihicklicss. A(cOl-dillg 1o lhc
dcl]llilioll <l[ COllll;isl,
where P#, t)ril4titncss (all)c<to) c>t'thc t)rightcst thing viewed (either ol}jc('l <)r l)ackl(r()nnd )
Pd- t)rib_hlilcss ()t (llirkcsl ol)iccl vicW('(l (all)c(h>)
(]- ('Ollll_isl I)I!IwccII lhl" IWo.
Frolii lhc ;tJ)()vc (l('t]niliOli, c;Ich (iirvc may t)c rci)rc,_cnlcd t)v lilt fTiilowin_ iclalion:
{1 - AD, f_)r A D < ,'l t
,41
(; { - 0, fk_t-A D = A r
{ 1 - A t, for ,41, > A t
A#_
WJl('I'C C : Colitr_lsl bctwccri object and background
A D - al])cclo of l)ack_roluld
,41 = albc<hl (if" c'h)ucls (if variollS liiicklicsscs.
It is thclc|_lrc sccii tlial, except ti)r the sniall rallge of" albcdo conlbinalions aroulld
ihc l)oinl <d dis(oillinuit)' Oli lhc cIiYV(>S, _t lai-gc ma.joriiy of possible eloud-backgroui_d
albcd<l COllitliliali()llS tall wilt_in the rallg(, (if' at h, ast 10 i)cr c(_ill coilirasl. As Call bc SCCli
li'oln "l<lblc 1, a,_SiliniHg al least a 7.0-in. aperiiii'e alid siinlighl iJiuininalioil, all f/10 cam-
i'l_t will j)crniii ai ](.ast l0 tier cl.'lH colitrast for approxinlatcl)' r_00-fi resollitiolls. _:' Table 5
II. E.W. Ih'ws()ll, Quarl.[ Rm;. Met S<,., Vol. 69 (]943), p. 't7.
12. E.W. ttcwsoH and R. W. I,on,e, lcy, /lleleorolo_,, Theomi<al and Applied>.]olm Wiley 8c Sons, Ira., New
_;_Ik, 19t4, pI L 73-73.
I:{. I !Silit4 tlic Cqllalioli (t_)r allitlidc ol _{,'31inii)
C = 1600
W[IClC (] ( Oil lr;-Isl
tl - ;illCl IIii1"
l : t,x]l(i/_lll(, llltll' (Ill" lilllC oi OIIC flallll')
_- illmmlllm it.solvable +ilirJii(c (Jilliclisillli.
il is l)_ssiblc Io (;iJl ill,lit. Iht- (Olilr_isl (lliillillllllli) iicl'dcd Io otll_iili _11h.asl 5(i() tt rcsllhlli<lil lilidt'l Ihc i(llicli
Ih)iis _ivcll iii Ihc cxalnl)h" of grolnid i o_.l'llib_( ' ;_]iil Ii ;t_MiillCd Dill da)'lil4hl iJhlinillalhlli. This "+;iJlll' Iiillis lllil Io
lie 3.51i i)l-i i fill. ()Wili_ Io Ihc tllll(';liit+lil ])<llvl'i rl'qllilClliClil_+ llCC cs_;_il)' to li;ili+41ilil .</.,r)() ])el (till (oillllIM, Itii_
xltltlc h;ls Jl('('ll r;iiscd l<l JO I)cr i t'lll.
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• . . gives the albcdos lot various ground covers. Applying these values to Fig. 2, it can Ix,
seen lhat, except tilt + the case of newly talh'n snow combined with chn,ds thicker than
600 meters mM the case in which the backgrotmd albcdo approaches very cl<_se Io chmd
albedo, 500-ft resolutions are obtainal+le over a wide ratNc of conditions.
There is one oilier |_l<:t<_l+thai mighl limit contrast and, ll++ereli:,lth resoluti<m. This is
aerial haze between the camera and Ihe ground+/ks has recently been shown in several
[ 111 Ioriginal placement of "Fig 2--Available conll'asl with varying cloud and backgr<mnd
allx'dos"] \t2 photographs, this pr<)blenl is almost completely solved by use of ,itl inliared
tilter it| |he oplical system.
Fig. 2 Available contrast with varying cloud and background albedos
From the toregoing section we may c<)nclude that, front the standpoinl of area c<lv-
t'i'age and resohllioil, wt-al|iei + ol)_;t'rvaliOliS t'rolii a salellile are a de|initc l)ossibiliiy.
[ 12 ] Table 5*
SURFACE ALBEDO AND SCENE CONTRAST OF CLOUDS
AGAINST VARIOUS BACKGROUND SURFACES
( ;rotlnd Stir |itct" Albedo + RelT<'relices +
Fresh snow .80-.93 1,3, 4
()ld _,llOW, st'it ice .40-.ti1) !_, 4
BloWil soil .32 1
Grass .10-.33 4
(;rcell h, avt,s .9.r) I
_ali(ly loalll .24 2
Sand .13-/18 3
Asphall i)aving .15 2
l)r)' earth .14 l
Rock .12-.15 4
Moist earth .08-.09 2, 4
(]uhivated soil, vegt'tal)lc .(i7-.1)9 3
Smooth st'a stlrtklce
Solill- t'lt'v ._ dt'g .40 '.+
Solar elev I1) deg .2,5
Solar elev 2(1 deg .12
Solar cloy 30 deg .06
Solar elev 40 deg .04
Solar elev ,5t)-9(I <leg .03
* This table was prepared by l)r. R. S. IAk'hnei-and is inchtdcd ill the tL,\NI) gcncl--
al lt'porl oil the satellite (see |ilOlllOle l . . .).
_- Vahles of allx'do apply Io ilhuniiiatioli by "white" ligh! or sunlighl.
-+ References:
I. htternational CPTtical "lhbles, 1929 ed., Vol. 5, p. 262.
2. ttandbook +T]Chemistt7 and I>ln'.sic+, 1{}42 ed., pp. 2147-2148.
3. I1. I.andsberg, Handbook _] Meteorol%9', Mc(;raw-Hill Book (:onlpany, Inc.,
New }|irk, 1945, p. 932.
4. J. (]barney, tta,;dbook o] Meteorology, Mc(;raw-ttill Book (;onlllany, Inc., New
_lbl-k, 1{t45, 7.296.
113t LIMITATIONSOF THE ANALYSIS
1I in a known I_wt Ihal |he reliability ot any torm of synoptic meleorologic,d analysis
dcpcnds on Ihc cxlx'ricncc oF Ihc analyst. ,,\n _ll]_l]_r_is ()f lhc ly[)t" dcah with in lifts report
is n<+ cxceplion. It anythinl_, it in cvcn m,,rc dependent <nl amtlvlical experiencc ht+cattst "
ol the Sl_arscncss of data and the dill+cultics in irllerprctati<nL "I+odale, lit+.' mclcorologi-
cal chmd atlas has l)(+('n btfih up ahm_st ('nlir('ly fr<)lll grout)d (:,l)scrvati<)ns. The
(hat+gt.over to "lo<)king d<++,vtF+ upon the clouds means that the donfinant |¢'atttrcs which
served to identify' types of clouds when ol+scrvcd l+-om the ground 3llC lit) ]OllgCf tO b++`
st+ell. The hal+`+ and cofoil+t thal served s<+ well Io classil_¢ cifroslrattls alld ah<)'+;ll_|ttlS,
rcspcctivcly, arc al>stq+t. AIs<_, lift +upptw surt;-tce ol Irego scale cloud decks is, toy lhc moral
part, c<>tnph'wly <-liflt+r,rnt in apl_caranc¢" from the lower surlhcc. Thcref<nc a complctcly
t_cw conccF, t of chmd-idcntification l<+'atutcs must bt" formed, and truly lilt)st' CXl)t'rienccd
oil tht'sc Ht'w conccpls +viii lw abh" Io make an intt'lligcnt analysis.
There in also datlgt'r of an incorrect inlt'rprtqation of the citusc I_r lht" cl<+uds, which
mighl Icnd 1o it <+omphqcly crr<>ml<.'ous analysis. 'Iakc, tOF cxamplc, Ihc case in which lhc
entire piclurc trader c<msidcratitm exhibits one complete th'ck of clouds. In this cast' th¢"
deck <>[clouds might bc stratus caused by radiali<ma] cooling and s<) might cotlstitulc ;tll
rntircb,' local i_hcn<mwn<m. An analyst looking at this situation mi_4ht .jUml) to the con-
clusion that lilt" clouds in qu<,slion wcrc of fr<mtal origin, possibl),' altostralllS, alld might
torccast accordingly. It in cvidcnt thai a |orecast made fioln StLch an crv<mcous ,tsstHHl)lion
(+I the cause would bc con]l)hqcly incorrect. (Melhods of attack on this prol)Icm of at]aly-
sis m-c treated tl]<)rc +fully in a lalcr s+`wtion ol+ this rcporl.)
There arc also many definite advantages to bc gained in the analysis of weather by this
mcth<_d; t hict among these in the lact tllal extremely large are;is may bc visually <d>served
in a rclativclv shorl F,cviod of time. The disadvantages of lat-gc gaps (between sIHli(IlIS) ()11
tht' ttstual w,t'athcv nutp and the comparatively limited thqd ofvicw of each grotmd obscrx-
cr arc eliminated. What is ol)taincd is, in ettk'ct, the cloud pattern integrated _r¢cr a wide
atca. Fu_ml many poinls <dvicw this in highly desirable, owing to Ihc tact that, lbr tilt" tirst
lilllC in the history <ff synoptic mctcorolob,O', the classical models _+Ivarious wcathcF situa-
tions may bc cxamined in Iolo. l'
14 ] WHAT CAN BE DETERMINED FROM HIGH-ALTITUDE OBSERVATIONS
CLOUD IDENTIFICATION
Assuming, from the previ<nls section, that cloud shapes of the order of :300 fl or m<nc
nn diameter arc distinguishable from an altitude of _;_50 nil, the problem of idcntifyitlg
lhcse ch+uds can l:,e treated. As slated previously, attributes and/or l)henomcna that
served to establish Ihc classification of ch+uds when vicwcd tiom tilt" ground arc almost
completely dilt_.rr+`,nt when these same clouds are viewed tYom al)ovc. The question is,
+vVh;LItall ;tctllally I)c dollC to tell th+`+various cloud fin-ms apart?
The solution tt> thin problem may lie in a new classification system formed by mcans
t)f +,'It)st" ct>rl+t'l;tlion t>t+obst,rvali<ms of clouds viewed ti<)lll ;.ll)ovt + with obstw'¢;.llit)ns t)t
these sa:nc clouds viewed from 1)clow. In this mannc'r, all atlas otidenlit_ng cloud tcatures
1I. This i<h'a ,+,1"lhc <r¢¢q-;llllook" was first t+h's_nil+,cdIts N'l;ij_,l). I.. (h,r_w+.,oiL_SAE it+;t n<+_rHt anti_It'
iH /:1Am:'_:.'+,lelr+n,o[.+_,+,Vol. _;0. No. I, J:'+nt_ary, 1949. tfis pfimar;' ol_ict t was Ihc ust' ot ,.c_ti_all_ Iht'd t<_tk<'Is
ill t i>llillnclioll with Iht +r¢'gll[_llnl<'lt'ofologit a] obs¢'rvatiolls ,Is a ".;llpplcl|lclll tJlht'l"1[I;111;Is ;t possibh' ncpl;t_<'-
mont. In Otis tr_ar<l, his analysis _d rl_ kt'! ph_tographs is very similm 1. llwit prcscnlcd It+ I)t..I. P'Jc_knc' it+
.\ppcndix I.
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as scanned tvoul ('xlrenw altitudes might he lmih up. Using this infornmti()n, a trained
obserw'r sh(mld have litlle trouhle in establishing the identity of almost any visible cloud.
The importance of such an atlas cannot be over-emphasized, because Ihe degree of con-
[idence in a synoptic pi('lure formed liom this type of ohscrvation or in the subsequent
torecast becomes extremely small if tile identity of the ch)uds cannot he estahlishcd. An
attempt ahmg lilt!s(_, lines has been made, ulilizing several series of photographs taken
from V-2's lired at _Aqfite Sands, New Mexico. It should be kept in mind, however, that dtis
auempt was made using data which were not originally gathered tor this purp()se, and the
necessary ground ohservations are dmreli)rc not available for positive identilicalion pro._
poses. Because of this, the rcsuhs presented here arc a classification and identiticalion
I)ase(t on the wrilet"s o])selvali(_)llal experien(e.
From a study of the al)ove-nmnti()ncd ])h()l()gral)hs it way ot)serve(l that two general
ch)nd forms stand out tiom each olher under the usable resolution conditions. Sin('e
these two fi)rms are also two types of cloud fi)rmations, most other ch)uds can l)e consid-
ered as l)eing a special form or combination of these and may l)c so categorized. This is
partially attempted in the table [beh)w].
It is noticed that ccttain formations ()1 (h)u(ls very often asseml)]e in over-all pallel'llS
peculiar It) dmse formations. Ch)uds, thereto,'e, may also be partially categorized accord-
ing to pattern. In the case of ch)nds tbrmed by gh)bular masses joined together to pro-
du('e a sing, le laym; the pattern is still apparent to an ot)server on the ground as a resuh
of the differences in light intensities caused hy the variations in ch)ud thicknt'ss. It is like-
ly, thcretore, fiom the section on ch)ud contrast, that these patterns will also be visible to
an obsew,er stationed above the layer, owing to the difference in albedo values caused t)v
ch)ud sections of (lifti:rent thicknesses. These patterns are very tiseful in cutting down th("
overlap presmlt in the folh)wing table.
[15] A B
Vertically l)tweloped Remarks Stratitorm Remarks
1. (hmntlus } Varying degrees of 1. Strattts }
2. ('amndoniml)us } vertical thweh)pnlcnt 2. Ahostralus }
In some [brms may
he very similar.
3. (;irrostlalus May he distinguished
lx'cau_" tihrons lexlltle
is visil)h" (wen when
viewed from above.
4. Niml)ostvatus When there is n()
vertical development
(m top this finm may
appear l<) he very sim-
ilar t() N()s. I and 2.
Combinations of A and B (forms similar in appearance are bracketed)
Cloud Formations Remarks
[Aho(umnlus]
[( :irrt)(umuhts ]
Ahocunudus cloud elements may exhil)it vertical devch)pntcnt, or
there may be just ch)sely packed globular masses. In tile tirst case, the
ahoculntthls may seem to be very similar to ahostralns or nimbostral0s
thai have vertical development in their tops, alfll()ugh the layer may
retain some semi)lance of orderly pattern.
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[Alt()stralllS]
[ Nilnl)<_slratus]
\bry often tilcsc Ibrnlations conlain _ <msidt'rahlc ve,-li(al dt,vel<>pment.
This S£'ClllS to tie csp('lially lru(" wh+,'n th('s(" li)tn+s art' associat('d willl
tilt" l)assagt • <ff a ii-onl.
h is clear tilat any alt(rml+t Io Ibrnlulale an atlas of ch)it(l apl+earance as sci'n front
tligtl altitltd<' is a lnaior ttndt,rlakillg. Till' work (l<lili- (in tile stli+i('cl in this tci)otq rcl/rc-
St,hiS, at hi:sl, ihc ht_gilinilig of Iht! w<)rk that initsl tit" a(Tontl)lisllt'd t_> Ittaki- higll-ahilud('
cloud pholograFihs a itsahl(' wt';`iltl/!l I(_<)i.
THE ANALYSIS
I laving on(t' cstalilishlrd tilt' idcnlity ofalnlost all the clouds viewed, lh/" ti.tnation ot tilc
sytl<)t)li( w('allR!r I)iclitl'l_ |)<'('Olil('S ill(' ttl'×l l)roblcnl. Tile Iolhtwing qltl'siion aliS('s: (;ivl'n all
<:V(,l_all ('h_ull [)i(lttr0, Wllal, in t_tll, Call lIC (lctertilincd, t+illll_l +dirt_lqly c,r itldir('clly?
According 1o (:(lllVt'lilioilal tlitq('oi+<)logi(:al practice, ttic v;iri_lits l)aratli('tcrs, sti('h ;is
]Jl-i.SSill-l!+ ll!tlll)(Iralllt+Cs, i'll',, al( + ill_lll('/l (ill a Inal), and ltll" suhs/'qtt('nt analysis <it llt(',_('
<luantitics iJl+l)(|ltC( • the synoi)ii( lli(:iiii+(+. Ahiiost the tcV(il-S(" is ll+tl( • in Ihl' ('asl" at haiid.
! [_'t-c lh(' syilOlllil silltalioti iilliSl litst |)l" cstablished, and ttll" variotis ilaraiiicl('rs iitttsl I)/"
('slilii;`ilt'(l fi+(_ill it. Jcttlally, it is tlol qtiilc so slraigilll()r'+','ard ;`i I)r<)(('dilr¢'. l_alhcr, it
hi!(<lltl('S a "ltilnliltg" ll'(hlli(lilt', ill which Oil(, ttiaki-s a th+st a])l)roxiillalilitl 1o lit(" ova'i--all
w('alti('l situalion, liSillg lit(' ('loitds, and, tl'<)lll tills, a first cslitlial(" of litl" vahit + of Ic'iti-
])trait(i+( ,, i)rl!sSttlt., lilt(lit(ill)', ('it. This t)icttlr(' of llrR. wealtit!r is tht'n nl<ldifil'd io fit 1161
_)i)'¢i()iis dl'viali_)tlS of lilt! ('slilnalcd vahtcs |iOlll those indirectly ()hs('l-V('(i+ Tills i)i+<)(t'ss
(-Olilitlti('s tlnlil a satisiact<iry siltlalion is evolved that appl'ars 1o lit all i'Xislittg (oitdiliollS
(all all(rnll)l ]l('ing ilia(It" to salist), tloih l)hysical and lh('lttcli(al ('Olisi(h'ralions); t+rlittl ill(s,
tinal i,slintatioils of tlic vati()li_, t)aralilClers art" IllS/de. (St'veia] I)ossil)lc al/proa(h('s to tilt'
f/t_ii)i(,ilt of al)[)ro×inlalitig lilt' s)'noi)lic piciur(" art! disctisscd ill Ill(' _;i,clion ('lliilll'(I
+',_iigg('sl('(l Me'(hods of Attack (in Ihl' t_l()tlll'lii of I)+lcriniililig Ihll ,"gyii<)t)iic _itualion,"...)
Th(" liOlllla] <)l)Sl'lVahll' lill'l('()r<)l()gi(al t)aiamctl+rs may |)/! divided illl() two lliaiil ial-
(,g_iii('s, "¢i/,, llios(' lilal iliay tit' (,sliiiial('(l in S()lilO lll#asiirl" diil'cli+ t+roili ol)s(,i',,aliollS ()1
tit/" ( iotllls alld/or gr()und, and lll<)Sl! liial ri'qtiirc a kno',_,']('dg(! of lit(! <w('r-a]l w(.alill'r pal-
l(!lliS hctT)rl! all t'sliilial(! caii hip lna(Ic. In the IllSt cz-tlf'goiy lllay I)c lisli!d wind, hiiinidily,
i)r(,(if)itatioli, aild a variable (lOt norliially +onsidcrcd hy itself as su('h--dt'gr/'l" <if stahili-
Iv. lit Ih<' s('((>ni[ ]isliilg liiay ht_ I()ilil(I l)r_SSllr+ (and picssur+ i('il(lCliCy) and i(qllpi!ralilit'.
l_('i_)i(' all allt'Itilll ai ils ailalysi_+ can hi! made, a (-OliSiderahil" alllOtllll (>t+l'xi)t'ricn(+l' aild
g('li('l-al kil<lWl('dg(' ()t +ill(' workings of ihc ainlospti_-+rc is rc'qtliicd COil¢-('l-ning cach ill, lit,
l/,_ar(|ll'ss <if which calt'/..r,<)i'y it ('Olit,'<'s ilil(l(_l +. It is fOllll[l thai this (,sliillalittn inl+liio(I is lit'i-
Ih('r a qiii(:k itor a siinpit! t)r<)(l'ss, icgardiess of the qualiticaliOllS of lll_." analyst+ Ralh/'r,
i.a(tl of lht" ill'ms rt'(iliir(!s a ',,,c,ry (arcti+il study and the weigtaing of all llll" t)ossiblc intili-
t'il(illg condilioils h('f<lrt" +ll)t)ro×iinal(r vat(its can 1)c asSiglll'd.
As _i r(!siih o[ this ifil<_t Sltldy, sl.¥1"lal siiggPsl(,(I ilieth<)ds of t'slintaling Iht' x,;`irioilS
iiit'l('<)i<_l<_<_i(al ])alainl_lcrs ',vt_i+t_evolved and arl+ discitsscd as t+<)llows:
Wind
I. Frotii tlli_ ('stahlislwd lncl('Olological models it is assuined thai ccrtain dctinite
w('altil!l-situations will piOdtl((" C('ltain sequences of clouds [)li_(:cding or t()lh:lWillg lht'ni.
This will Ihl'i(!f_llc trend to oii_nt the situation with iesp_tl Io the ground. ()lie(" lhis ori-
t, nlalion lias t)ct!il csiahli.sll('d, the wind dir('ction may be _lppro×iinatt'd througl+l a kn(iwl-
edge' of lh¢' thcor('iical ¢ir(tilali<)il ass<)(ial(+'d with a given s)'not/ti< wc;`tlli+-'l +siltl;`tli_lll,
7. h has h('l'n lloli(l'd in s('vcral l)liolographs thai, in Itll" t)r(+,_('li[t' of slrOli<_/it)i)t'r
winds, (tiiniilli_ (lolldS thai havl' l_>ilii/'(l in inoiiiilainoilS ('Olillll'y al)l)l'itr Io tilllit Io lit("
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lee of lhe mountains ralht, r than to lll_gr windwmd side. In lhe pv_'sence of very light
winds, it was noticed thal lhe cumulus tend_'d to f<)rm on the peak of Ihc mounlain. This
t)hel|()lll('ll(Hl r('(Itlil'eS IHrlher SltldV ])el<)re il,s de_ree <)1tlse['ll]Hess _ts _tll O])S{'rV_llioH_t]
toolcan Ix'det¢'rmmed.
:_. ()win_ Io lhu l'_l('l l]l_t.l cumulonhnllus clouds cxwnd from as low as 1600 Il lip to
40,00(_ t't. their s,lop_, t:,ec<)mes _l good indicati</n <)1 the vertical shear within the I_tvc'r. h
was tirsl thotlghl that this diretlion of slope would t:,e ;m indication of the direction o1 tilt"
upper winds, lhr¢¢ever, although lh¢" wind veh}cilv nortnallv increases wilh allitude, it ix
<dp¢itlus th;.ll I_)r ;11iv given case one sht}ttld I1<)t disregard thc possillilily th;tt the +",'ind
veh)citx mig, ht det'rt'ase with ht'ight or that 1he directi<_ll and vt'h)city <listrit)tHit>n in tht'
vertical mig, ht be of such ;t ll;llure ;1s to t'iltlS(' lilt' cmnul_)niml'_lJS I<l shq)c into Iht' Itl)pt:v
wind. Wllen this slope is combined with oil+mr Factors lh;ll indic;tie wind direction [171 ;tl
one parlictfl;u-level, it nlaV be possible to COllSlrll<?l _t F_iclure of If'it' ('h_tllg(" of wind dirt',o-
rion wilh height ill the 1;lyer under consideration.
4. A flu'ther inctic:ttion of wind dir<:clion (in lilt' Io+',+'t.r levels) was observed whcn
small, det;tched clouds were seen to tbrm in line, slrt'tchin_ from :1 tn<_unt:fin lop. These
could be due It) moist air being t_)tced upward I)_ lilt"IIIoUlll:lin ;111<1tllen 111ovitl_ dowll-
slope on the l¢'e side, c;tusin_ tilt" I_lrmati<m of sm;tll "rotors" or individual ¢¢+llular eddies
e:Ich capped by, sm:;ll ctmlulus clouds and extending I_>r a considt,rallle dist;lllCe down-
wind from tilt" nlount;lhl. This phen<)menon ix known :is :l '+,;latlding vv;ive" and is <dten
;iccompanied by <}ther sl:mding tlouds ;It higher _lhitutles.
F+. It has also t>et,n tlbserved in ;i layer of slratt|s <_verlyin g moulllaimlus terrain that
air turtnelirLg d<}wn ;t ",,alley and spreading otlt ill ;t rt'lativelv II_tt s(,fti()ll F,Fodt_ced lines
;tnd swirls in the toil of this cloud layer that closely nmtchcd lhe Froth the :.tir must ha,+'e
t:tken. This _lclion m;tv I)e very t_selul in delermhfing wind direction in sections c<)m-
ph'lt'ly covered by sheet-type clouds and may be l_)ut+d to lle ol further use <}xt'r ;uc;is dmt
are not parlicld;irly molmtailloUS. Although l)h<_togral)hs oflar_y flat areas were not av:lil-
able tot amllysis, it ix dlought Ih;.tl wind-dirccti<m del+.'rmin:ttion in tht,st, secti<_11s iIi;i): still
be accomplished it_ tlle lower levels. This may be d<me by utilizing many ot the ;tll<_vt'
meth<+ds ;tnd sever:tl others that could be :tn <>utgrowth ot such _m ma:tlvsis+ ()he sl,ch
method might ust, the inherent Imit_+rm strt_clttre t)l _t slr:tlllS sh¢'<'l. In Ihis case it is
Ihol_llt that if ;l sheet passes over tlat grotmd on which lherc _tte isol_ttt!d prtlllll)t'rall<:es
I)rt!jccting into tilt" sht't't, ,I wake will bt + pr_+duccd in Ihe cl<}ud lll;ll Ill,iv als+} show _q_,
when viewed froltl ;tl)ove and thai +,',rillstrclch downwind |l"<}m Iht • tll+ject.
Temperature
Thc st:It-tin_ point l_t +any determinali<)n of lenlper:itt.-e must Ix. tilt' st;Itislic_ll n<}I"
m;tl l_r lhat thne of lht' ,+'<';tr.The lhst e,slim_iti<)ll 111;i-++ then l)e modified by the +";11"i<Hln
;Iflt'ctin_ conditi<ms. The prevailing weather situation pv<ivides lht" first m<}dil_:in_ inl|u-
ence. This t'stilll;lliOll ix, of' ('Ollrse, dependent on tilt' analvst+s ;lbilitv to t'stilll;tle the syn-
optic conditions whh ;t degree of accur;-w,+' that ++'ill :mswer lhc question, Is the _;('<Ioi +
tmdt'r <d:,scrv,llion llein_ _ltt_'cled t:,y rel:llixcl,: _tdd <w warm ,liv? ('.hmd systcms, wind
dit-ecti_)lls. _lnd t'v+.'n lbrnls of gr<+tmd c<}xcr (stlow. t'l(.) will help in dccidin+_ Ihis. This is
Ihc I]rsl indic:ltiot_ of the over-all c<Hnplexity <_1 Ihis typt' <d an:tlvsis _tnd scr+,cs :is :m _tctt_-
al ilh_str;tti<ln of Ihe "httntilt_" technique met+ti<_nt,d above.
I!ppcr ;lir tt'nl[)t.r:_tttres tll;I.y I)e estimaled in Ihe s:tlnt, mAt+her, chmtls indicating lilt"
I:,<)tmdaries l:,t'twcen ;tir nl;tSses (fronts). A lurthcr hclll in ,0stim,lling this quanlil+v is the
t,lcl th;ll, oncc having decided on ;t ground leIllper:lttHe, tilt' d('grt'e of st;fl:,ilitv (indic;it-
cd I)v vertic:ll de,+'el<}p|nt, nl ill clouds) and lilt' prest'nce or at:,s_'nce <ff intervcnin_ fr<}nts
"+,+illenabh" one to COllSlrtl<l _tll _tpplic;_ble tellltler;itllr<., lapse t-;ire. (The de,_re¢' ot st:tbili-
tv will tletermint" the departure from :lt_ ;idialmlic I:l|lSt, ratt', while tilt" dt'_re(' <d t h_t_+li-
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m'SS (moismnc) will lwlp am analysl to decide whether to un<' lhc moist ov lhe dry adia-
t)atic lapse rau" as the limiting one.)
X.i't+tically dcvch)pcd chmd will also aid in dclcrmitfing the lClnl)cratut+t ' gradient of
the stnr_mnding area. This is Irtw bccmLsc of lh(' l_l(l Ihil[ lh(' vertical slwau, as indicated
[ 181 by the shqw of towering cmntflus and ( mnuh)nilnbUS c hinds, orients the dirc(tion of
the higher and lower tcml)(,ralurcs in the rex,as. This m_,tllod is cml)loy('d by laking the
dir,_.(lion ot,,'crli(a] s]war an being I'u_mn lh(' h)w h'vels toward the high h'vcls. Itonc then
|,wes in I|lc dirc(lion of shear in lhc norlhern hemisphere, the ]ow(!r lemF, cu'il.tm'e will t)_'
on the ot)scrw'r's left and the higher on the obscnvcr's righl (scc Fig. 3).
This rclationshil) hol(I.'-; ti-)r lhc noxlhcrn h(,nnis])her(', in the soulhcrn hemisl)hcrc Ihc
dir,_.(ti,cms oF decreasing and incr('asing [('lll])('l'_lllll'(' ill r('lalic, ns to vertical stwar mc'
l'('Vt'l'h('(l.
Fig. 3 Vertical wind shear--temperature gradient relationship
Pressure
1[ is _llJ[)_ll'('r|l ih;tl I1¢:, quanlitaliv(' values o1 pressure arc ti)rthconfing tiom thi'-, analv-
sis. Furtherm,:)r(', it is virlually impossil)lc even I() make a quantilativ(' (.slinla[,_' ()lh('r tllml
t() slal(" w|l(.lh('r lh(' al-('n is I]l()llgh[ l() b(" tinder |Ill" inlhn('n(c of a high- or a h)W-I)rCSSLLrC
svsl('m. ( :]w.rts _::,1av('ragc [)n,es:suncs fi)r van-i,c)us limes ,.)| lhc ycm ix'l ditt):r('nt m"('as (fl th('
v,,c, rld arc aw_ilat)h'. [ :sing th('s(' and [}1_.! weather situation al th(" time. Ircn(ts of l)rcssur("
may t)e cstal)lislwd. This inli_rmalion when apF, lied in ('ou_jiLnClionl with known weather
may bc a vcrv useful tool tier Iorccasting purposes. [.iltle work has I)cen atl('ml)lcd on lifts
snt)j('cl in Ibis I)ih)l slucly, and IIH' above should serve onb,, as a l)ossibh • starting point ti)r
any d_'laih'd ,-cscarch along these lines.
(L F. Brooks j:' points ou! so, me Irethor pressure inti_rnnation Ihat may 1)_, ,c:,l)laim'd
I)om clouds, l [(' says. ill ('[ti'([, till|l, since in the l)lescncc of any ('()IISHIll[ vertical shorn"
Ih(' culmlhls clouds will tend lo h'an or slol)c (the amount of d('l)armrc tiom flw vertical
I:,(,ing a r,.'suhant q)f th(' vcrlica] velocity and th(! talc ()| change ()t wind veh)citv with
hcight), any chmd IhIH has _1 mfili)rm raw of vcrli(al g,r/lwlh _111(1;1 (_10' sh)t)c l[/rougjl()ul
is an indication of flw "tmili)rmi_y of wind w'locily in all layers l)ierced." This indicaws a
oh'crease of horizonlal ])rcssur_" gradient with height. (Thi._ can be shown very simply by
_tll cxatnir_ati()n ()f the gc(_strophic wind eqttali(m
whcr(' V_
I,
i)p/d.
flw gcostrophic wind velocity
clcnsity _)air
horizontal t)rcssur(' gradi('nl
= (',oriolis paramclen.
[ 191 It can t)c seen that sincc )k, which depends on the sine of Ihe latitt_(h', will remain
c<msutnt and p decreases with height, O/dO, must also dect_'asc .fi, V Io r,mnain con-g,
F,HIIlI. ) This dectease turns out to be very small when a('tual valucs are used. in the case ol
a tmili_ rely growing cmnuhus l]lal slopes in its lower layers an(I then straightens or cvcn
I_vn,cls I:,a,cl_ on ilselt with incr,.'asirlg t'n('ight, lhe dect'easc of till" Imri/cn_tal ])l('Ssl|l('
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gradient with height is (as Brooks also poinls otll) much strongc, + than in tilt + l)rcxious
cast. If one assuntt's that the slope of vertically dcvch)p¢'d clouds may be obscrvcd from
3.r'>Omi altitude (at least at the cdg, es olscatlning strip), further pressure data may be gath-
cq'ed.
Degree of Stability
As has b+`'+`m menlioncd above, the degree o1 stability in a given layer may be estimat-
i'd fly fit+`' altt,I:,llllt of vcrlical deveh)pment present in cl<)uds. In any nuPchanisnl ofverlical
development, the stability of tilt' air plays a lm_jor part. (;onvcctivc, orog]aphic, ov upsl<q)c
lifting may pr<_duce clouds in the absvnc+`' of instability, Ill+l, till any largv-scale vertical
blfild-up of clouds, a great t+`'udency Ior tht + atlnosphcr(, t(> "<JvcYturn" must 1)c prestqH.
[original plat(,m+`.nt <)f Fig. 41 (Absolute instabilil)is takt'n Io m+`':m that the d+.'treasc of
tcmp+`'ralurt, with height is greater than the dry adiabalic lapse rat+`'. In Ill+`+ F,r+`.s+`,nc+`. ol
unsattlr:tlcd watci- vap<)l, lh+." dl'v adiabatic laps+" i-ltlc is aboul 0.W( ',/'kln, whcrt'as, ill tilt"
prcscnc+`, of saltu-,ttt'+`| walcr vapof, lit<+" smaller sattu-att,d adiabatic lapse iatt' with a It(HI-
linear variation of tmnp+`,ratur+`, is used.) In tlt+`+ presence ol water vapor, tilt" talent heal
(Cllel-g)O +If condensation that is released when tit+`+ air is forced lo rise and its moistuvl +
forced to +`ondcnse may 1)e sullicient to continue independently the upward motion. Tiffs
motion indicates it condition of instal)ility where none may have existed at lhc beginning
of tit+`' process. (;ontinuation of this motion, Iherctorc, iuditatvs Ihe inslal)ilily of the air
i]t tit+." pi'cSCltCe of sit.lUl-;ttcd w;ttcf valpol- and is cvi(|tHiccd ill t<)wcring ('lilllllllls ()l- Ctlllltl-
h)nirnl)us, if, on th<: othtT hand, contl<.msation oct+urs bill tilt, ascending air is not pro-
vided with a su|ticicntly large anlount o1' heat st) as to warnl it lo a higher tenlpterattue
l]lan that of l]Ic sulrt)unding air, lilt' laver is c<msidered al)soltLlt'ly stable and Inav bc char-
aCtCl-izt'd bv snlt)oth, flat-topped cloud fi)rms, usually arranged in layers or sheets. This is
also truc when a small layer of instability is '+cappt'd" by an inversion (antiease of Iclll[)ci-
alUlC with ht+ig, hl). This concepl of absolute stability, al)solltt+`" instability, and c<mditional
instability (t,nstabl¢' or stabh+ depending on whether the water vap<_r present (<mdcnses
or not) is pvt'scntcd graphically in Fig. ,t.
Fig. 4---Graphical representation of degrees of stability as given by lapse rate of temperature
It max by said thal, in tilt" presence of vcrlically dcveh)l)ed clouds, a dry adiabatic
lapse ralc (or very close to it) exists Imh)w lilt' b;Isc of tlt+`" cloud, it rvlativcly stccp lapse
I'att' exists within tilt" el<rod, and a relatively stal)lc lapse ratc t'xists atlovc thc cloud, in I_01
the casc of liar-topped or shccl-typc clouds, it may Ilc that, ahhough instability inav exist
in a small laver comprising the cloud, an inVClsion layer of vt'rv sial)It air exists immedi-
ately above, causing lhc cloud t_ slop it:+; vertical growth.
lit his paper on clouds, lhooks ''+ sug, g('sls the following furlher refint'nlents (>it this:
I. l)ctachvd, htmpy cloud with a [lat l)asc and rounded toll has (at atlial)alic lal>sc
i+atc below iL (b) grcat+`.r 1hall saturatctt-;tdiatlalic lapse t-ate (unslal)lc) within tilt'
ch>ud, and (c) ahn<tst tit+`" same lapse Iatt+ its (t.0 (unslal)lc) hom its lop to the
height that tilt" cloud will grow.
2. Towering, sharl)ly-1)oundcd cumulit<_rm cloud: Thc dianmler of cloud ill darter-
fill levels is am indication of thc l+clalivc steepness <d the lapsc rate (except ill the
I)resencc <)1 large wind shoat+). "The narrower such a cloud or cloudlet is, relatlive
to its height, I]lt" glC;llcf Ill+`' lapse lalc <_tlhe slnr<)unding air."
16. IbM.
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This provides one with very rough criwria tbr estimaling the degree of stability of the air.
T(> stnn tlp, w;ttt'r vapt)r in the air is a ]at(rill s<)tlrct' ()f heal etlergv. _¥hen inoisl air is
carried rapidly upward, lht _water wq)or condcnnt,s in the tbrm of liquid droph'ts and lhe
lalenl heal of condensali<nl is rehmscd to tlw stwrounding atmosphere.. It is this s<)urcc of
lalenl heal lhal fi+eds thtlnderst<)rnls and other types of vertically developed clouds.
(hmmlus chmds are an indicalion of moisture and relative instability, and, conversely,
when there is inoisttnc ill the' +tit tlwlt+ +rill be a greater tendency toward convection and
lurbttlence.
Moisture
(:Muds, being tompc)sed of water droph,ts, naturally indicate the prcsencc of sots-
lure ill lilt, almt_sphere (set + tilt' above section). Resulting liom lilt + (liI+l_wence in Ibrnm-
ties conditions, cloud types can give a further breakdown of nloistnrt, distribtttion. For
example, cmntdtts and cttnmlifbrtn clouds of vertical dcvt'lol+ment require the entrain-
sent of continu<_tts supplies of moist air to prevent their comph_le evaporation shorlly
attcr t6rming, h can thcrctin+c be said that with this type of cloud we may associate tairly
inoist air near tilt, sin+face. Ill like manner, positioning of lilt + moisture ill lht' atmosphere
may l)e associated with other cloud f<nms, and all over-all eslinlale may be made ['roln visu-
al <)bservali()ns. Once the syn<q)lic picture has l)een t'stablished, ch)st, r eslilll;llt,s llla%' l)t+
made utilizing tilt" other mett+or<do,'gical parameters, and tlw vahle of lnoisltn'e ('(Wllenl
may I)t" worked into the "hunting" technique previously nwntioned.
Precipitation
AIIhongh it will not I)e [)ossil)h" to obscrve any tbrnl of prt,cil)ilation tlirt'ctly, it is
kn<)wn lh_+tt lilt + hu+g('st am<_ttnts it+really Ldl f+rom two main types of clol,ds: cunnd(minilltts
(shl)wers--rain, sn<)w, etc.) and nimbostratus (steady precipilation, sh'et, etc.).
Ftn'lhermore, tilt" prlflmbility of precipitation in one term or atlolher, which arises when-
ever IIwse types are pltrst, nl, is higher that+ lilt any other types of clouds+ Fllrther in[in-
I21 ] Ination may be obtained li-om the tact thai it may I)e possible to distinguish between
newly talh'n snow and old snow, owing to a difference in albcdos (see Table 5 . . .), and
Ihe n+.,w snow may then be connt,cted with the proper form of cloud observed downwind
frets it.
1221 SUGGESTED METHODS OF ATTACK ON THE PROBLEM OF
DETERMINING THE SYNOPTIC SITUATION
Front the above discussion it can be seen that the+ analysis is based primarily on cloud
observations. I)uring the course of this study several systematic methods of accomplishing
these presented themselves. Ahhough neither time nor proper data were available tor a
complete study of these possibilities, the most promising were considered and are pre-
s_'nl(!d h('rewith as a guide to any more intensive study.
1. It is suggt.sled lhal a typing of clouds as to cau.se rather than appearance will grt+al -
ly [.Icililale tilt, identification of the synoptic sitnalion. Classification into two main cale-
g,ories would constitute a possible breakdown, as tbllows: (a) Regional clouds (those
caust'd by purt'ly local conditions), and (b) migraliug cloud systems (clonds that appear
I<_movc as a unit). The breakdown might then be coupled with a knowledge of the chmds
associated wilh various wvalhcr phenomena Io oomph+re lilt, synoplic picture.
2. It is a recognized lacl that similar synoptic simati<)ns <)cotsring un(hw difli'renl
climatic and/or tOl>ogral)hic c<mdilimls Inay produce radically dilf__'rt'lnl weather, A statis-
tical analysis is thcrctbre stlggesltxl, in which (a) lilt' desired area is divided into small
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regions of similar climmc, gcograt)hy, etc., and (b) a statistical survey of cloud types and
associated w(,al}l('t ti)tm(I wilh various wcalhcr siluati</ns (fr()nts, etc.) ill each region is
Ill _l+(|('.
3. ()wing to the' [_1(! that i(lentiiication of fronts as ti-onts may t)c very (litficuh, it is
suggested that it may be possible to identity, air masses ti-()m high-ahitudc l)iclur('s and t()
utilize llwm in the tmnndation of Ill(: synoptic pi('mre. Sill('(" general classiticalions ()i air
masses in(ludc as integral i(lcntit_'ing features the stability of the all. thu moisture, and the
type ()tch_u(is |)ro(htcc(| ill a given air mass, this should n()t t)e I<)<) difticult+ ill many cases.
An air-mass i(h, ntilicalion has ill(" Ireflier advantage ()f cslal)lishing mot(' closclv tll(" I)()_
siblc limits of the various mett,or(>h)gi(a] parameters.
4. A m_jor a(lvanlagc (>f satellite wt'alher ()l)scrvati()ns is tit(' rcpcat('(I IIr()a(I st)alial
(()v('r_tg('. Stt(h l)l+()itd (ov('rag(' provid(_.s the' mcl('()rologisl with all essential (+l(!lncnt ti)r his
analysis, which is generally reti+rred I() as rontinuiO_, h permits him to fi>lh)w a given sysl('m
as it mov(.s and develops over a perio(I of days. I1 is a relatively simple maner to |(lent|iV a
sysl('lll on('(" it is kll()Wll that such a s'¢SlUlll is ])l't's(qll, ()ll('O it W(!itl]l(!f sill|at|on is so i(h'n-
titicd, it can bc caNnarked fi-om high-ahim(tc pictures, all(| not only may it flwn bc tracked
a(r<)ss an inaccessibh' ar_'a like an oc(_il.ll, but itny ()V(!l+--itl] (hang(.s ()r m()(lifi(:ations l]l_l[
alli'(;1 the visible paranlclers may I)c almost immcdial('ly noticed. It is ills() likely that, hav-
ing a (omplete analysis of the surr<)un(ling l(:rritory ()n land, where <)bscrvalions arc |)len-
t|tiff, and many satellite ol)servations of tile unknown area (through which it is possible t()
get tixes on systems and l() examine visually the over-all weather [23] ])icture), a oomph'l(+
analysis ot the (h.sircd region will b(,com(" a mu(h siml)ler thing t<) construct.
Ea(h of Ill(' al)ovc suggcsti(ms afli)r(Is ex(ellcnl ])ossibililies ()f lJt_wi(ling Ill(' rt+(ltfit ('d
intiwntalion, it sllould h(" kcl)i ill mind, howl'vet, that Ih('s(' sngg('sli(>ns appear to o|]t'r
Ill(' best solution when systcmati(ally its¢'(| to<_(.tht'r....
[3 t I CONCLUSION
Ill tit<_' st'(li(>n entitled "VVhal (]an Bc S(,(Pn," . . . it was shown that, given at ]cast
5<)0-ft rcs(llution, it was possible I<> dil+liwt'ntiatc I)ctwecn the variotts typt-s <)f ch)uds.
Under "l+imitations of tile Analysis,"... tile possil)lc ]imitations to the tYl)C of analvsin t()
I)c st||(lied were indicated. (;iron the i(h'ntity of virtually all the chlud ti>rms viewed, it was
tin-|her shown, ill the sc(tion cntitle(t "What (Jan Be Determined l]om |tigh-Ahitude
()t)servati()ns,"... that it may i)t• p()ssil)lc to estimate tilt' various mete<)roh)gi(al parame-
tt'rs Illl(|('l" C('l-tltin conditions and itsStlmi)tiolls. Tilt' Ill+tin _tsStllll[)tion was lh+tt sore( + (-sti-
matt + of tll(" over-all sym)ptic situation could bc made initially and a "hunting" technique
(_)uh| I)(. applied. Several sttggcsted nwth(l(ls of estinmting the synoptic pi(ttn-¢' wt,re pr('-
st'nt('d and discussed.
This report has at|tint)ted t<l show what is tht)ught t<) bc n(+(('ssafy ill the making ()t
such an analysis, h is obvi(lus, ilowcvcl, that, with the limited data availabh +, many impor-
tant ])oinls may ina(lvcrlt'nlly |lav(" I)¢cn ovcrh>oked. An inquiry <)f this type can thcrcliwt +
serve _mly as a guide it) a lull-scale stltdy of the sll|)jc(1, in which every suggcsti()n and
mcth<)d is put to a t+ull test and is either a¢Ct'l)ted, mo(litie(t, or (lis(ard('(t.
The dcvclol)nwnt of all the suggested metht)ds mentioned ill this report apl)ears to
be ti'asit)lc. As any analysis (lc])cnds ()n its integral parts for its accomplishment, front this
sland|loint, if tiom no other, tilt' analysis ol ++synoPtic weath('r tiom salellitc ol)scrvalions is
also |i+asible.
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Document title: Hugh L. Dryden, for T. Keith Giennan, NASA, and Roy W. Johnson,
Department of Defense, "Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Regarding the TIROS Meteorological
Satellite Project," April 13, 1959.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Am+rag tile mi[ita, 7 space projects I>re,sMe.t Ei_enhower tm_s]erred in 1958 to the _ewl_ crealed
Natio.al Aeronautics and ,_'pace Admi.i._tration was the Teh't,i._io. a_M lq/mred Operational
,galt,/[Jtt. (TIIgO.%) meteomloKical salellilr prelect, p;v'viou,dy co.trolled I._'the Department o/ Dr>/ettse i_
Advanr',_d /¢esearch 1574er'ts .Ig'e;-3" Althougrh the l)_J_ql.se l)epartment rwnti,; ued to participate i. the
77ROS project am/ made ex+elh'nt use o/the in[Drmation returned./tom operational satdlite.s, thi.s
aKreem_'.I marked the be_'i..i._ o[ a permanent .split in military civilian meteorolo&o' that led p;r
mort, tha. th_'e rlecades to both the militat_ attd the civil _ector desi,_'.i._ a.d operali.ff lhei_ .w.
meteoroloL,'ir al satdlite systems.
Ill
Agreement Between the Department of Defense and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Regarding the TIROS Meteorological Satellite Project
I. F.th'clivc April 13, 1!)50, the Nalional Aeronautics and SlmCC Administration
(NASA) shall aSStllllC lcchnical and illalta_,('ll|(.lll dirccli,m of I]lC melcorological salcllilc
pmjccl dcsignatcd Pmjccl TIROS, as scl torlh in Order No. 10-59, dated July 25,1!158, and
Task No. l of ()rdm N_>. 17-5!), dated Scplembcr 't, 1958, of Ihc ,\dvanccd Rcscmch
l'r<!jccts Agcn,y (ARI'A) of thc l)epartm,ent of l)clcnse (Ill)l)).
2. In _lt<lt'r to insure tim COmliletc availahiliiy to D()D and NASA ill all int_irlnali<ln
dvvcl<_pcd iiiidcl l'l0icct TIR()S anti Ill instlre lhal lit+.! respt'(livc inlt'rt,slS o[ liolh art"
[lilly ictOgliiZ+.'d ill /arryili<ff, i)lll lh<' Proiccl, the tT)lhiwing arialig('lnt'iils ail' agrt.i'd Ill:
a. ,,_l(()llllllilll!l" will bc cslalilished under NASA chahnlanship, with rcprcst'nta-
lion hoin both 1)()1) allll NAS:\, Io advise NASA Oll Ic(hilical liiatll'rs rl'lall'(I ill I_i3!ivci
TIROS, inthi(ling 1)¢)1) rt!qtiilcinClllS, ali(1 lo Illake aiiv ii+.'c{'ssaly alTallgClUl'llls lbr Ihc
dosl' coopcralion ;ililt full t!x(haiige of inl_lrnialion bctwt'eli NASA and DOt).
b. (:opics +,t all NASA directives issued lo agencies of D()D in {'lHlili'('li<lll with
l>i+<ljcct TIROS will be fiirnished lit ARPA [i-ir inforinalion,
c. (;oph,s of all (ll>CUiiii'nls pertinent to the condtict i)f Prc!jcci TIR()S in Ihc
possession <if ARPA will be furnished to NASA..
3. (:omracls under l'rojec! TIR()S lo be thnded by DOD will continue 1o be placed
and adminisu.rcd by inocuring activities of I)()D, subject to the technical and nlanagclncnl
direction of NASA, and any fhcililics, cquipmenl and personnel of D()l) cmrently assigned
Io Pr0jcct TIROS will remain available to NASA to carry the Project to completion.
[21 4. ARPA will tired l'rojec! TIR()S up to a total of $11,649,000. An amotml of
$6,711,000 has alrcally tieen c<minlilted under ARPA Order No. 10-59, and $2,0(10,()(1(i
Ilildl'l Task No. l, ARP:'% OI3iiT Nil. I 7-59, ]caving a I)ahiliCC lit $<2,(.)38,0t)0 which will 1)c
_l'l aside for ol)]igalion I)y I)()I) lilt Project TIROS al Ih¢' request of NASA. These fllli(Is
art' t/ol, hliwi'vt'r, availabh' tor the cl>l/Sll'Ilctilill of t<u'ilitit's. NASA will l)rovidc ally fluids
l'('(lUil+('([ lilt + I'r(+jt'(t TIR()S ill ('x('('ss ()1"th(" $11,649,()l}l) pr<)vilt('d tiv ARI5%.
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5. Equipmenz acquired fi)r Projec! TIROS will remain availabh" m the l'rqic(t mHil
itsconclusion. The dispositionof any such equipnwnt at the conclusi(m ol lhc Projectwill
be as mutually agreed upon by NASA and DOI).
[hand-signed: "Hugh 1.. Dryden tbv"]
T. Kcith (;lcHnan
for NASA
[hand-signed: "Ray W. JMmson']
Roy W. Johnson
for l)_,partmcl)l ,>t l)eti'nst,
D0cumen111-4
Document title: U.S. Department of Commerce, Weather Bureau, "National Plan for a
Common System of Meteorological Observation Satellites," Technical Planning Study No.
3, Preliminary Draft, October 1960, pp. 1-3.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
l_qw..\\.1£4 i_.fir_t 77ROS _atellite prov,'d hilzhly usq/,l in .Wml'_,i.,_ linger.scale weather _y,_tem._, the
('.S. _4,ather Bureau be_,_a. /dan.i.g/br a./ul6_ operational national weather _atdlite .v_'Wem.The
tL}'ather Bureau propo.sed to remove ,\b'l&l fiom its m,e_vdl h'ad position to the roh, O/pe@.mi.g
research a,d developme,t i, _u/qmrt o/the operational ._)'slem. 1, O_lober 1960, ,\'A.SA m£raniz.ed the
/b:_t meeting +Ja, intera,gem7 panel to discus.g the issue o] an operatio,al ?_tem. At the meeti,g, the
"_l>alher /_uleau bout.rhl ./brlt_ its plan; lhe forewmd a.d /h:W _ectio. ,J the .Wudr ap/wars hem
l'lvdiclabh', NASA oOected to A,iving_ up as much control over the pr%_am as the l r.S. Weather
Bureau desired. 77w result was a compmmi._e pla, i._ued in April 1%1.
National Plan for a Common System
of Meteorological Observation Satellites
Washington, I).C.
O(t_d)er 1960 . . .
[no page number]
F()REW()RI)
The present r('ll()rl is a s/immarv of plmming lhal ('Olllmt'llCt'd sh<)rlly at]er the suc-
cessful launching and operation of TIROS I, April-June l(,tli(}. The rcsulls o[ Ibis remark-
ably succ(,'ssful mcte()r(d()gita[ Salcllilc clearly show thai satellites nmst b(' incht(h'd as atn
itltt'gral part o[ a COml)rt'hcnsivc, world-wid(' wealht'r ()l)scrving system. Fh('ir ability t()
give complete gh)l)al covcrag(', I() look all familiar rncleorologi(ud phcn()mcna tiom a n('w
vantage point and l<) reveal organized IlllIli<)llS and |)I-OCC,_Sl'SoV('I" at gr(.'itl l'itllg(" ot(lim('n-
sions will influence virlually all phases of m('tc()rological dcv(qollm('nt and ()p('rali(ms.
R(.'l)r('senlativ(,:s (.)[ th(" govcrnm('nt dt'l)artnwnts dirc(lly inlcr(.'sted m('I ill the
Nalional Acronauti(s and Space Administration H('a(|(luarl(ws (m O(l()l)('r ]0, l(.)()(l t_)l
discussions of how t() proceed with an Ol)erational meu.orological sat(,llile program. Need
I(n a nalional phm indicated a! dfis meeting prompted issuance of Ibis rc'porl at Ihe pre-
merit tilll('. It r<+'l)l'(:scllts all (qli)rt 1<) utilize r(,sulls ()1 studi(,s ma(Ic sin((: 1{)54, including a
lt,159 rcp<)t+t to the W()rM Mctt,o]<)l()gical ()rganizati(m, and cxpcricnc(' gained front
Exph)rcr VII and TIR()S I. This rcp<)rt dclincat(,,s a first approach t() dw design of Ill(.' s',s-
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tom, the re(luircd org;mizati()n and a m('thod (1t iml)h'menlati(>n tbr obtaining mid uti-
lizing meteortdogical satellite data as so(ill as possible for daily weather tiwctasting mid
Slol'tl] W;-|r IlillgS.
This plan, althmlgh preliminary, represents a startillg point in fiwmalizin_ a program,
portions ol"which arc already in operatiml. Thc plan is circulated mnong mcleoroh>gica[
groups fi_r die purpt)sc of inviting ct_mments and cooperalion on how bt'sl t_ t;tkt' _td,¢all-
rage ot lifts epochal i_ew memos liar observing certaill nleteoroh)gical phenomemt and to
assisl in phmning nlorc t'i'l_'cliw'ly liw |tmu-e pr¢)grams.
[hand-signed: "E W, Reichcldcrfer"l
E W. Rciclwlderfer
(;bier of P,urc,m
Novcmbcr 3, 1960 . . .
I I ] I. (;oals of a National l'lan
The" I'IR()S l Wealher Satellite has t)rought the objet'tivt+ ot tn¢'lt.tw<dt>gisls liw a world
wide _t:,scrvati<m;d network a long step toward ftdfilhllt'nt. (]<+nceived initially as ;:t
rescmch /;w<_i_'ct, TIROS ] de]Jl<]l]sll'_Jlcd immediate limited oper:lti<_nal value. This mc, n-
mnt'nlal scientitic achi¢'vemtml is a manifestatic, n of the policy declared by the (;ongrt.ss
in lhc Naliomd ,,\m-_matltics and ,_l):tcc Act o| 1958--"that ;ictivitics in space should tw
dcvoted to i)caceftd i)utpost's for the benefit of all mankind." The Prcsident <)f the l.]nitcd
Nt:Ht's ill his addrcss to tilt" [;l/tied Nations General Asscmhly, Septcmbt'r 22, 1960 pro-
puscd theft "'lr_ t_t'tlSS t_>_'_:t_'tl _'il 1_ ;_ program of intern:ltitm_tl ct>t)l)t'r,_tiotl fi>r CO'llSll'llC-
tivc uses of outer space under the United Nations. Better weath¢'l- tbrcc;tsting, improved
world wide commurdcatior, s... are but a few of the t)tq,,etits of such cooper;ttitm.'"
Sevcral additional weather satellite expcrimems are planned for tilt' next two years.
In vim,; o[ the impact oF the increasing operational aspects t>t'the expevimcnts, a national
i)hul leading it> :t fidly ol)cratimlal system is ii('(('sS_tly [(11 making maximum use of mclc-
orologic:d s;llcllite data at tilt" t'arliest possible time.
h is the [)urposc of this study I<+tt:qttltllitlt' :.t II,ltiOlltl] plan R+r a C()lllIllOI] SySIClll fll+
mcteor<d<>gic:tl ot)servalion satellites. This plan wotlld have the fi)llowing go;lls:
I. ('+<mlplcle global c<wetage.
2. [!nintcrrttpted contintfity in time.
3. Design ti)r maximum natitmal and intcrnatiorLal utilization for tilt" 1)encfil t)[ all
mankind.
4. Atlctltmlc rcatlout stations It1 insure timely receipl of all the data.
5. (:t)m[)lctt' communicalion t_cilities io transmit data from lht' rt-adout stations to
thc National Melcoroh)gical (]enter and mher user points.
6. Analysis of lhe dala received ",it lhe National Meteorological Center.
]2] 7. l)epiction tffthese ;malys¢'s in /orms suitable tot mmsmission ','i_1 adt'quatt"
cmnmunication tacililies.
8. (;ommunic:_tion of ])roct.sscd data to all (lolllt'._lit (civil and _J.)Vt'rllltl('llt'AI) and
inlcrmtlio_;d i_sers liw applicalion t(i their F,articular rt'quir('mcnts.
9. Intensive ru_,C_llfh tO illl[)lOVt! Wt'it|]lCl" tbrecasts I]ll'ough lhc apl)lication _)f satel-
lilt" data.
For phm,fin_, purposes il has bccn assumed thai:
I. With rcspt.ct Io Ihc Operational System:
a. The 1.!. %. Wt',lthcr Bure_ut as the Natioual Mcteorologic,d %crvice will have
program responsillility fi)r the opcrational mctt'o,ological s,llcllite ol>scrving
and (l:lt:l [)r_tt'ssing s_,tt'lll. This would includc t't]ttil)mt'llt l)r(>ttlFt'mt'i_l,
launching, rhth_ rt'tricval and processing, and disscnlinali¢)n to uscrs.
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I). All mganizali()n Io perii)rm all activilies relal('(l to Ill(" ()])eralional mt'Icoro-
logical sat('llile ohserving syslem would b,t. established as a sell:contained enli-
ly reporling Io Ihe (:hief of the %_k-alher Bureau.
c. Coordination will I:,(' acCOml)lish<.d IJy a "(:ivil-Mililary l,iaison (:ommilwC'
and resident liaison personnel.
(1. Th(" ()l)erali()md syslcm ",,,'ill I)c sl:arle(I I)y I]le ,{-lid of Fis(:al _i'ar 1962.
(A(h:quale funding is r('quire(l Io a((C)ml)lish lhis.)
2. Wilh r(.sl)<,('t [() R,.'s,.'arch and Dcveh)pmcnl:
a. NASA has die rC'Sl:,(msibility fi)r 1t1(' equil)m(.nt d(',dgn and (l(,vc.h)l)m(,nL
launching and data relri('val ass()(iale(1 wilh _.'xp('rinl('nlal sal('llit(,s. Th('
de'sign of Iht' operati<)tml Sl)a('t' (rail will 1)(' has('d (_n the rc'sldl:.; ()f lhi_ w<)rk.
b. The We;_ther Bureau has lhe reSl)<msit)ilily I_)r thc d;tla ;m,,Ivsis and met('o-
rological r('s_'arch.
3. In <)pe],lli<ms mM rese.u(]l mid develop])wnl, il is assumed l]lal tht' l)el:,arlmenl
of 1)eft'rise would bq: reSl)O]lsihh, ft.-:
a. Mililarv at)plicali<m of salellilc d'ala and NalMnal Meleor<)logical (:enler
I)roducls.
I). Speciali:cd c_mmlunicalion syslems and olher tacililie_, m ,ne_.t unique,' needs
not c<)vcred t)y the Nalional Salelli[e Mel('c,r<)logica] I:'rogram.
4. Inlernali,mml i:,articipalion will I)e dcvelot:...d hy exisling imernalional II.di,vs
such _s Ih(" World Met(:(:,r()]ogica] ()rgani/ati(m ....
Document11-5
Document title: Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, for James E. Webb, Administrator,
NASA, and Luther H. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce, "Basic Agreement Between U.S.
Department of Commerce and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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l'/Tu't_ the hllemge_u), Pattel on Operational Meteor, loL_ieal Satellites released a plan in April 1961
callino /br ,\:_SA to develop an operatio_ml weather _atellite ,_:t,_temto he ma_tag'ed t_ the [ :.S. Weather
Bureau, the hureaa wa,_ ,'m_eerm.d1_,the lack _!] i_/laence it had over the dm,Nopm_,_tal _tag_,_ <:/thA
_ext L_e_eration r_/weather ,satellites, v_amed Nimbus. Some _/these /ra_:_ were _valized a_ the" ,\::t.S?A-
manaL, ed Nimbus progTam st(//i, red numerous delays as well a,_ dramatic eo.s/._ increases. ()t_
.S'eplember 27, 196Z .frustrated with NASA's p_7/_,ntanee, the Weather Burem_ annoumwl thai it
wouht d:velop its owtt satellite __,stem Imsed o_t the 7'IROS de,_it,,_, with the Departme_t _!1I)/Jen_e pr,
riding laumh _erviees. Outmaneuvered, ,VA,S'A a[.rreed lo helpi_t.ff the Weather Buwau develop il._
TltCOS-based _]'stem, ag well a._krra_tting it a_ increased rol_o in developing the Nimbu_ _alellite, which
became an exp_q_mental rather than an operational _ys/em. 77ti_ a_reemettt cod(lied the NA,%A
Weather Bureau _Hatim_ship.
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Basic Agreement Between U.S. Department of
Commerce and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Concerning Operational
Meteorological Satellite Systems
NE{:I'ION 1. AUTHORfI'YANi) P[rRI'()NE
Recognizing lit{" su(ccss o1 the Natit)nal Acronauli{s and Spacc Administratitm
{NASA) r('s('ar(h and d(,v('lopwmnl (R&I)) mcte<)rological salcllJtc pr,)gram and Ihc uti-
lizali<m t)y Ill(' l)cparlmenl of (]uumwrcc - _'{';.tlIl(21 + BILI'('Hll (1)()(',- _,¥B) of '_;|lcllit{" flala
in wcalhcr allalysis and t()l('(':lSlillR; allld
Taking not{ Ihal (]oulgr{'ss, also recognizing this smccss, provided in lilt'
SUl)ph'nl('nlal Approl)rialion Act of 1962, and thexeaflen, h,nds authorizing 1)( )(]- WI_ Io
cslablish alicl o[}{'lal(.: ,i .gysl{'lll [(}r [tl(' {'(;llllillllO(lS o|)s('fv_lli()ll (tf l,v_irl{l-_vi(t{, Ill{'l('(ll()l()_-
ical condili<ms h-ore spa({ s:tlcllilcs :.tllCI t(IF lilt" feporling and processing of lilt' dala
obtained tbr use in Wcalher Ibrccasling . . .": and
RccogniAn g Ih(' broad rcsp(msibililies of NASA m}dm lit{ ,qpa(c Acl tot ('()lllil|llhl R :t
r{.si.'ar(h alld d(.'v{'l,)pm{'nl l)f(lgi_tlll till" the d(!v('loplllClll ()1 spac{'('rafl t(w{'hllt)l{)gy and
lll{'l('l)l'()l()_i(a[ >,al{'l[il{" s%!sl('lllS {()1" (1) ai)plicatioll It} ()p('rali()n_l[ _,y_;|('lll_, all'ld
(_) l{'s,_.'_tl'('h ;|{'livily ill [hi' alm()spheric sci('n('es; and
Takillg, II()t(_ lhal (]()ll_r(",;s al)i)r()prialed s,{,paral(, funds Io NASA t()r |he t)mpt)s(" t)f
_;llil[)ol'l}ll_ _;ll{']l _111R_.-'|) ])l'l)_I'ltlll o|" Sl)aCecratl |C'{'}lll()l{)gO _alld nl_.'l('{lfo]ogi{al sal('llil{"
SYSI{'IIIS[
I 2] It is, lht'r¢!t()r{'_ Ill(' puri)osc ()f this agrccnlcnl Io {t{:tinc lh(' relalionship II('lw{'cn, and
Ill(' rtlll(lit)Xl:,; it)h(" |)(qf()rxn('(I })y the 1)()(1- "WB and NASA (1) in Ih(' (olldu(t ()1 (:,p(.qa-
lit)llal lll('l('()r()l()_i(;al sall'llit(.' 1)l()_lalllS, alld (_) ill Ill(" (h'v{qol)nl(.'lll ()f Sllllp(H'lhl_ lech-
ll(}[()g', t_)l _q)('rati()lla[ mclc()rolog-ical s;,tlellil(.' l)rogralns.
SEt :TI{)N I I. FSTABLISH MENT AND OPERAT]()N ()F TI t E
NATI()NAI. ()i)I(RATI()NAL METEOR()]_O(;I(;AL ,%\TEl J JTE S_.%TEM
A. ()two{iv{"
Th(' primary objtwlives ()1 the National Operational Meteortll()gi{'al Sal('llit("
Sysl('m (N()MSS) is It) l)rt)vide m('te()r<)h)gical informalion for prompl and ett_.'ctivt" Its{ +
I)V lh(' rill'|OIlS llillJ(}llill mel('orologi{al services in weath{_r a(laly.'..;is ,Rlld l)rcdi(lion. The
t)i){'l;lli_)ll t)t N()MSS will I)c Ilase{t on, |)Ill not l)(: limited {o, tim le(hll()lt)g,_, I)rOdU('e(l in
th(" NASA R&I) Mele(nt)l()gi(al Satellite Prograllq and will sat|st}, lh(' nlel{'orol(igical
I('{tllil'('lll(qllS; ()l I1.%('1";Ig(:IICiCS, Sub.j(.:(;l tO linlitaliolls ()f t)tl(|g('l, rc,sollr((_s, ot I;l%_r. ']'}}(i
1)()(', - WB may nl()dit\_ NOMSS as appropriate and ill a('(or(|allC(, wilh Ih(" telIllS ()f lhb;
_l_l('('lli(!lll It) it('(()llllllt)(l_ll(! Challg('s ill Illt'leorolo_i('al l'(.'qllil',{!lYl(']lls allld d(*veltll)m{'xlls
in let hn<)l()_y.
[3] B. Basic Responsibility and Functions
I. The l)()(; - WB i]y law has the basic responsibility tot the eslablishm¢!nl and
operation ot |he N()MSS, which includes obtah]ing necessary funds.
9. Ea{h agcn%v aRrees It) perform fhe functi()ns anti f_llow lh{" lllaulag{'m('ll!
(Iuli(!s and pl()({.dtll{,s sel t()rlh ill i)aragraphs l) and E of lhis sc{li()n.
2()_ ()B_I,;RVING TI IE EAR.]'] I FROM St'_.{ :E
(2 Funding
The DOC - WB will std)mit requests for annual approl)riati(ms t() cafry out
N()MSS. The DO(] - WB will develop the plans and budget estimates and the justitication
lht'rt, of, with the assislance and support of NASA and user agencies, as appropriate. AIlht,
b+`'ginning of each fiscal year, or as soon thereafter as thnds are appropriated, or as pro-
gram changes require, Ill+`" 1)O(_ - WB will issue a lCitl+lbtH-sem('nt order to NASA for lilt"
full amoun! of flmds reqtfived Ibr the execution of the NASA porlion of lhe progtam in
accord:race with the approved pr<!jcct proposal l_r¢'pared under this agreemenl. NASA
will acccmllt t<) DO(] - WB t_+v the funds so lratlsi_,rred. NASA als¢_ ,,,+'ill pt+¢v,idc twc+,.ssarv
teporls 1o the 1)()(]- WB rcgmding the proposed and actual t'olntnilHl<:nls, obligalit>ns
and expenditure of these funds, s<) lhal D()(_ - WB [4] may meet ils fiscal responsibilities
with respect to tile titnds apl)roprialed to il or otherwise received.
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D. Functional Responsit)ilitics
Tile functions of tilt" I)()(:- WB and NASA in the colldllt't of N()MSS ave as tbllows:
1. The Department +`_t (k_mmerce - Wead_er Burt!au shall:
a. Determine overall meteorological program requirements (incltlding (<)st
and schcdt,le).
1). Specit_: quanlitics to tie tm,astwed by salcllile meteorological inslru-
IllCll|s.
c. Approve Prt_ject l)evch)pment Plan and changes involving schedules,
f('SOIll'('t's, illlCl'[';t('cs, ;_llld pcl']()l'lll;tllCt'.
d. Monil¢)r thc l)t'tl_.)rmanct" of lhe system for mecling mcleoroh)gical
vequirenwnls.
+`'. I)clevminc Ill(" need fiw replacing a spacecraft that has cxpcfienc+`'d mm-
ginal t_tihtre in providing meleoroh)gical data.
f. Opt'|'alt" Iht' "_,'(':tlll('l" Bureau Command and 1)ala Acquisition [CI)A]
Slati¢_ns, inchtdit/g c<_nlr<)l o[ the t)pcratiotla[ satellite alter NASA has
determined thai the satellite is ready tilt op+`'ralional use.
g. Manag(' mcleoroh)gical data analysis activilies at 1|1¢" CI)A sl:ltiolls.
h. (]ozllmtlni('a!t" operati<)nal data i]+Olll (IliA s!ati()t]s !o [Ih_" National
Weather Service (]¢,t_l+`'r and the (h)ddavd Space Flight (:enlcv ((;SF(:)]
and others, as al)prol)riate.
i. Process +`la!a for inlcgration in!t) w¢'athct :ill:llySt'S.
.j. Disst'mitlatt" data, allalyses arid f(w(:casts.
k. Archive the infiwmalion (processing, storage, retrieval).
I. Use the data for rt'seart'h and climatological l)tnnt)()s+`'s.
m. (|oh(hi('! svstt'm sttl(lies as rt'(ltfircd !o mr,e! its r<:sponsibili!i+`'s.
2. The Nati<)nal Aevonatltics and Space Administration shall:
a. Prepare" !hi" Pv@'cl I)+`+vclopnlen! Plan.
b. Design, cngine('t+ procure and quality, flight spacecraft.
c. Selec! ;Ill(| I)rOcurt" lalmCh vehicles.
d. Mainlain and op('rate launch siles.
c. 1)csign. (+(>llslttl(l, at+d itlsttr( + izfilial ()ptwatit)na| ,',.;!:t!llS ()1 (](mltnand and
l)ata Acqttisitiot! stations.
t+. Prcparc the l)ve-latmch of Sl)aCecraft and latmch vehicle.
g+ Col-!duct latmch <)pc'rations.
h. Track and dr'lorraine basic <)rbit during the t|scfttl lift" of the satellite.
i. Monitor !hi" t'ngim'ering sl;41l.iS o| lh+`" s_/It'llilc ;+tt](| ct)mma|_(| !ll+," salt, llilc
during initial tim(' in orbit, :rod, as rcqtk's!cd, dming periods _+t
tnalfun(li()_ using the Wt'a!ht'v l+?,t|r¢'at! (:(mm_;md and l)ata A((ltdsiti(_n
MiltiOllS,
j. (]onsuh, as appr_)pvia!ed, on technical ill,tt!ClS.
EX[q()RIN(; IIIV [!NKN()WN _09
E. Managenl#,'nt Responsil)ilili#,,s anti I'rocedur#,'s
1. Tile nlanagenl#,'nt of the functions of th((" I)cparinmnI of (:omnlercc portion
of Ibis agrccnlent is a rvsl)mlsibiliLv of tilt" Weather Bureau under tilt" authorily delegated
t)V thu SC(TI'IitFy (:,t' (:Ollllllt'lCt' to tht! (',hief of tilt' Wcalh#,'r Bur(('au Inld#,'r Departm#,:nt
()r((ler No. 91 of May 23, 1963. 'I'll#,' _'ather Bureau shall l)rovid#,, or obtain tilt" IiCCcSS;lly
1)()(; resources JOy N()MSS and shall serve as the official 1)()(: COlltatl tk)l-this progranl.
2. Thc nlanagement of tilt: NASA portion of this agrccnl#,'nt is tilt' resp<msibilily
of t lvadqumwrs, ()Ilk#,' of Space Science and Appli#,ations. It shall prt_vidc lilt" n#,'((essary
NASA tesourct's Io N()MSS and shall serve as tilt' official NASA conlacl fin- this i)r<>gtam.
?,. The tollowing sp#,'cilic manag#,mlenl thn((li#,ms and proce#,lures are agreed ill)On:
17I a. The I)()(: - WB will flwward nlission reqttirem#,:nts Io NASA lot review
and acceptance.
b. NASA will lorward till(! t)asic plan oFapl)roach Io tilt' D()(: - WB Ira- review
and al)l/roval.
c. NASA will torward tht_ Prttjt!((:t Prop<lsal lo the I)()(: - WB for rcvicw and
:lpprt Jv;ll.
d. NASA will tkww;u'd requesls [k_r proposals to Ih#,' !)()(: - _A'|{ Ik)r review and
t'Ollllll#CII I,
e. A rvprcst'nlalivc of Ill#," I)O(] - _rl{ will bc assigned to the NASA (;SF(:
Ih(!jcct ()tfic((' and will l)articipai#, • in review for source ev,du,ttion, dc[]n-
ilization of statelnetllS of work alld prt!jc#,t status rcvi#,'ws.
f. NASA will ntak((+ tilt" final sour#`#`" selection, and will negotiate with and I)#,,
the single hllertace wilh the contractor.
g. NASA will submit to DO(: - WB tot review and approval the d#,q]tlitized
cotllract wtwk stalelllellt, scheduhes and cost.
h. NASA will lot+ward lilt! final Project l)evelolmmnt l'lan to tilt" I)()(_ - WB
Ior review and al)proval.
i. M;!jor (hail<l_es involving schcdul((!s, costs and svsl#,!Ill l)#,!rtorlllaiice will Ix'
I_)rward((!d by NASA Io lhc DOe - _rB tt)l" I'(('vi(('W and approval.
ISl i. All ((]lalllZ,#,'salfi'ciing lhe inlerlate l)t'twt'en NASA I)rovidcd cquil)nl(('nl
and |)( )(]- !_,rII eqllipnlelll will b#e|_)rwarded lo Ill#," I)O(] - WB fin- revk'w
and approval.
F. hllt'rag(('ncv Relationships
The I)()(:- WB will furnish a statenlent #,)fnlission requir#,'lnenls to NASA, and will
eltSiilV thai such ieqtlilcin(('lllS alid ill#,' resultinl_ proiect plans Ilit't't lilt' n(('#,'ds of 1)()1)
and other uscr a_vilci(('s,
SE(:TI()N Ill. TIlE I)EVEI,()PMENT OF SUPPORTIN(; TE(:ttN()I,()(;Y
FOR OPERATI¢)NAI, METEOR()I,()( ;I(:AI, SATH,I,ITES
A. Scop2£
This section deals only with tilt" developnleni o[ space lochnologry which is specit:
it'ally ideniitied as applyill_ io N()MSS.
B. Basic R#,:sponsil)iliiy and Funclions
1. NASA has the basic i#,_sponsibilily for supporting civilian salellile t(('chnologry.
7. The I)O(: - WB will submit Io NASA esliinalt's of filiur((" llR'l(('orological sal(('l-
liic r(('quii(('invliiS and lilt' [)()(] - WB estimates o| t)reseili lechnological linlilaiions to
int'l'lili_ Ihclli. NASA will di_lW u f) its R&D plans with due COliSidel-atioll of lh((' slated
%_t't.allici ]l_lll-(.;tll r(,qtiil_l,lllClllS alld will keep 1)()(: fully ill[_lllli(('d on RS;[) ])io_iaill i)];ilis
and dcvelol)niClilS.
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[9] ?,. The 1)()(; - WB may conduct st.nsor dt.vcloPnlcnt but will maintain c]os,v liai-
son witt+ NASA to t'nsmc co]npalit_iliiy with ittlm-c Sl_a¢ccraJl c+)nJi,ff,luittions.
(;. Funding
NASA will tmld f(w the sUl)Dmting tcclmolog)' for operational mt'lcorcdogical
satellite dcvt'lot)menl programs.
D. Management Pr(wcdures
I. Sul)porting tt'chnoh)g)' for Opcralional Meteorological Satellite programs is
Ill(" responsibility of the Oflice o[ S|)acc Science and Applications, in NASA ] icad(luartlqs.
2. NASA will maintain _l coordinating nlechanism whorl'by lilt' (ontributions o1
Iht' _.Vt'_ltht'r ]D)u+-(+_l+l_l +d ()thci- (+()It+It(It'll( agencies can bc considered in Ilw dcvclopmcni
pr()gram. II will consist of tivc mcmbt'rs, two nora|hatted by NASA ((:hairman), two by Ihc
\'_'t'_ll]ll'l" l)_lll('ilt+, _ll/(I ()11C +'t'[)F('SCI/tillg tilt' II()l+-(;oV('l+ll+ll('nl mclcorol()gi('al ('Olll+lltll+liI'¢.
3. Tht" NASA, aflcr considering HIc advice ()[ lht" coordinating mechanism, will
oh(lone, anti alh)calc sp,tcc ill mclcorol()gical satt'llitcs tilt tlighl t,vsts ()f t'Xl)crinlcntal
meteorological st, nsors. NASA will fund ti)r Ihcst' It!sis, including lht' costs of tlight hard-
WalC Ill'st)n+[ the' I)l('l)l'()tot_,'pt ' slitgt', I)lll Ih(' cxc+'ution will I)t" tilt" rcsl)_,lsit)ility of Iht'
experimenting agcncy.
[10] E. l)aul
t. l)ata [ionl proven mclcorologicld sensors flown in NASA rcsciuch and dcvcl-
Ol)mCnt mctcmoh)gical satellites, such its TIROS (amera data and Nimbus AVCS (lilt,+. will
I)c ma(It' avaiLd)h' at lht" rt'(lUt'sl ()tthc _Vt,_Hht!r l_lll+can ti)r o|)(.liili(inal list' +)n a cost r('im-
I)ursal)lc b,tsis, fi>r snch acldcd coslS as may rcsuh ti()m iht" Ol)('rational rt'(Inilt'mt'nt.
2. Data li-otn cxpcrimt'nt;d mclcorological sensors flown in NASA R&I) mctt'o-
rological satcllitcs, such as tilt' Nimb+ts I IRIR and other new sensor (IcvclolmWnts ol
l)Ott, ntial operational use, will bc nutdc availal+Ic to tilt' Wt'athcr btncau as moon its l)racli-
cal)Ic +)n a non-intcrl_'rcnct' basis to NASA mimsi+)ns fi)r thc conduct of Ol)cratiomd cxl)cr-
inwnls. Ill the cast" of thcsc data, the cxpcrimcnting +lgtqlcx F(+lilills t'xchlsivt" l)ublication
rights fi>r a l)cri<_tl of cighlct'n months, but tllc Weather l+tnt'att tnil'¢ con(luct +)])(+ralional
t.xl)critncnts (h+rin_ this period wilh tilt' l)t+<iviso that dimsmnination <ff thcsc data is
rcstrit ted Io such l)tUl)OSt's and It+at scicnlilic pld)lic,ttiml will not rcsuh withmn it+t+ con-
cttrrmlcc ()1' tilt' CXl)tqinlt'ntcr. NASA will bc rcimlltnst+d liar all additional costs inctu-rt'd
in making such (lala available to the W<_+atht.r Bltreat+.
SEt XI()N IV. MFTFE()R()I+( )(;I( ',All SATH,I,ITE PRO(;IL.\M REVIEW B()ARI)
A .Mt+Icoroh>gical Salellitc Program Rcxiew Board is hcrel+v establishcd. [II] The
B<mrd is COml)<+sed of two members each fi-otn NASA and I)()(; - WB with the Ass_wiatc
Administrator lot Sl>;tcc Scicncc and Apl)licalic)ns of NASA .rod the (_hit'l oi thc \&r(';il]lt'l
l+tnt'_ut scr'+ing its co-chai,mcn. Ihc Board will tnt'ct qnarlcrly +)r ilt the r<'qttest (+t ('ilht'r
('<_-chairtnan t<) Ft+'¢it'w thc l)ttlgl_llll ;tll(l ('l)llSi(lt'l" +lllV stLbstantiv( + issues which re,iv itl'is('.
h lll_iy ltl_tkt" rt-c_,mncndations to tlw I)()(_ - WB on the rt,s(dution of issttcs tOllt+t+t+llin_,
thc ol)crational I)rogr_uns, _itl(t tO lhc NASA ('l)il('('i'tlillg tilt' l('St)t)llSiVt'ilt'+S (it" th+ + NASA
R_'|) t)rt)_lilill Io tilt' llC('ds <ll" N()MSS. l<,iihi'r ch_iilinLtn lli+ty rt'tt'r _tliX issti(' io lh('
Asslitiat(' A(hnillistr_it()l + tit NASA iilltl to tilt' Assislant St'tTt'l_il'V 1)1"( ]()lliln('l'('t' tiir Scit'n(('
+tli(t Tt'('hll(ii<l_ry t()i I-('_,Oltlliliti.
l,_Xl,l,()RIN(; I I II_ [ FNKN( )_AN _ 1 ]
SECTI()N V. AMENI)MENTS
This agreement may I)¢' mm'nded at any lime by I11¢"mulual conscn! of the Agencies
ccmc¢'rtwd. The agr('t'll|(',H will h<' re'vii'wed fiwmally tot necessary changes at least onc<"
t.verv lwo years From lhc (lal,.' o[ lh<' agreement or as required at lh¢" requesl of either
agency. For Fmrticuhlr l)rograms, a Mc'morandum o[ l_!ndersmnding may be used al lhe
working level Io clari[_' mU,, of tli¢' l1,ncfiomd responsibililics and procedures.
SE(?I'I()N VI. RH.EASE ()F t'UBI,I(: INF()RMATI()N
Reluase of public inlbrmalion on the operational and R&I) programs may be inilial-
i'd by either th¢' V_k'alhcr l_ur,t'iut or by NASA. Before any [12] rclcas¢" is issui'd Io lh,t" lml_
lic, however, ch'aranc¢' and final al_l)roval must he given by the agmwy having flw assigned
luFiclion listed in Seclion 2 ]) or Sc¢liotl 3 B. (:oordinawd or.join! rcleast!s should l)e
i,,su¢.d wh¢'rc apl)ropriaw.
SE(:TI()N VII. INTFRNNFIONAI, REI_NI'I()NS
I. Regm(lirtg llw inlet,rational asl)cClS of meleoroh)g,0 and Sl:,ace salt'llilcs, inlcrna-
ticmal negotiations may bc carried out by either agency according Ioils basic rcsl)onsibil-
ili('s lind ['uncli(ms as (It'[]l_¢_(l in ll_is ilgl'CClllCnt, with (hlc r('gm(l t() tilt.' l_,r()visions 2 ml(I
3 below and subject u, normal Staw l)el)artmenl policy guidmw('.
2. Where st,oh n('g<_tialions imply ob]igalions or [)llt((" (<)mmitm,.'nHs Ul)ml the other
agency, that agt'll(y will I)<' c<>nsuh(.d in advam'e o[ irttt'rlmliotm] ,Igl'('('lll(']It ()I commit-
lll('lll.
3. 'l'h¢' dcsign el opc'rmiotm] mt'teor<)l,_)gical systems ,,,.'ill give dtw (<msiderntiorl to
('olllltlilltlCllls ah('ady cxprt'ssed or implied by the [!nitcd Sliitt's.
thtgh I. l)rvd('n
l)clmty Administrator
h_r.JAMES E. WEBB
AI)MINISTRNI'()R, NASA
January 30, 1964
laHhcr H. Hodgcs
LUTHER t !. l t()I)(;ES
SECRETARY OF (X)MMER(:E
.January 30. 1964
Document 11-6
Document title: Robert M. White, Administrator, Environmental Science Services
Administration, National Environmental Satellite Center, U.S. Department of Commerce,
to Dr. Homer E. Newell, Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications,
NASA, Augttst 15, 1966.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
T_n,see, diag the furl battles that ma@ed it_ relationship with NASA in the early 1960_, the I:.S.
We:tiber Ihtreau made proL_ess during the later half of the decade in refininff its requirements/or an
operational metemolog'ieal satellite program. IL_ing information gathered ffom three separate satellite
proffmm_--77RO,% Nimbus, and the Advanced 7kchnolo_, Satellite (AT'g)--in Au/,m.st 1966, the
Weather Bureau is._ued to NASA this _tatement outlining its o/?/ectives /br an operational meteorolog-
ical satellite prog_'a m.
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Ill
l)i >. tloilier [. Newell
Asset|ale Achnillisirator fi)r Space
Sliellce lind Applications
N_ilion_tl Aeronl.tutics {ill(| Space
AdniinislralJOli
_,V_lshil/gton, I).(]. 20546
[ rut)bel sllunl)ecl: ",'\U(; 15 1960']
])l'itl I [oiill'r:
1 w_luld like to thank you for Ihe biiet]ng given by NASA on its proposed FY 196X
itlele()roh)gil:a] iesel<tl(h _llllt ileveli)l)lllelll pl-ogr_illl l.tl the ] Jtlly 1966 llleelill_, ()| the
Meteorological Satellilt! E_'l'Oglitlll Review BOal'd (MSPRB). As in the past lwo ve;tl_; ()Ul
i()llilll_.,lllS _tlt" directed loW_ild _ill ev;ihi_llion el Ilie efEi,ctiveness o[yOtli l)i-Ogl;illi l)hitls ill
llie devel_)l)llielil _li/d iilil)rov_.qnenl of ol)ei_ilion;il illeteolologic_il salellite svsleins.
Ell al-ii',:ing _tl i.)tll c()inlllClllS (ill |he NASA RSzE) iJlOgl;llll, we liavc reviewect ()111 lel-
tcis of lhe ])_lst lWo ye;iis, E)_ised Oil siinilar I)riet]ngs. _41'l"||lid lhai signill/anl ])l()giess was
iii_ide I_isl ye_ll with resl)el't lo ililCl_lgency piogi;tin de'¢t'lOlillienl _ili(I ellt'ctivc use ()t avail-
able resoilif(-s in +illeinpling t() ;ilia|i| i)rogl:<llil ()bjcctiw's. ()Ul |)i-Jlll;ily objectives ]l_ive
nol c|laliged alice renlllin _is fi)llows: ( 1 ) "E'h0 t'siablishnlent and lil+tiilleiiltllce of :t salellile
svslelll I() ol)taiil gh)b;/l ol)selV;lli()ll+ C)ll _1 I-egtll;tF basis, (2) iliele_.)l-olt)<lg, i(+_.l] oE)selVltli()ns
tl()lii SVlichl-()n()tlS _lllilude, _<iilCl (3) global ()bselv;<iliOllS ()t aliliOSl)|ieric slrtlclui+e ll('eded
t_)i + litilileric;il weatEitq t_li+t'c+isiing. P()llowilig _ll-e slice|lie (l)llllllelllS wilh resl)ecl t<> elich
of ttiesc.
1. (,lobal ot)selwitioii_; on ;i regiillti I:l_tsiS.
The illilial clel)h)ynleiil of the Tilos ()[)elati()llal Salellile (T()S) sysieln, wilh lhe
laulicii _)fIhe ESSA 1 aild ESSA 2 slilt'lliles, lids beell quite Stlccesst'iil aild is l)rovidillg vl'rv
usl.'[_.i] cl_lla Io llie xnele()rological coil||ill|lilly lhloughoul lhe w_)rld. Laliilch of I_]S<_A !_ is
flOW iillillinenl du_." Ioa lC(-Clll C_llli('l_l t{/ihire ()ll I_SSA i. ti4i'e _ll'e very pleased wilh Ihe
et}{)l-l, direr'lion _lll(l [)rogl-es,s E)ein_ ill_ldt' in file "TIR()S M" ])rogr_tiil. %{_e look t_lr_,_'ard I()
iliis cleveh)pinCill solving |he in_!jor I)roblein laisecl illldel IElis obieclive in (llll-lelltq llisl
vt'iir. The ])rogliilii rl'view showed a line ileili t_)i "inll)roved I[RIR day/nighl iliiagilig ill|el
hil4her resohllioil," I() t)e accoiiil)lished I)v _l lwo-cil_iliiie] radJolllel0r (visible _tlld 11
liiicl()lis) of high ii,s()hlli(lll. Also, fuilds were shown [()1- deveh)l)llieili ()[ii 12i Iliullil'hlili-
ne[ r_idioliielel iilider |he Nil|it)us B tlighi l)roglalli _tlld in liie TOS iilll)r()veiiielil pro-
<_liilll. [hanclwrilteil Ulldel-liiliiig Oil (wigillal] Wc would like io delerlnine whelhei o1 llOl
aclditioil_tl radionlei_w cir.'re'loping'ill acliviiv is needed Io iileel |he T()S syslelil require-
iil_'nls. :_tlso, lherc is :4 Sll()llg requirelnenl to iii(TClts¢<" |he ll, sohlli()li of saicllile cloud pic-
tiires I() Olll" |nile (pholo Iesohllic)n). Vi_e would like io c×iiliiJnc witil you |lie possible
ll'chliical al)i)r()_lciles lo ilieelJiig lllis re/liiireilielil wilE|ill the [r_tinew()rk ()f file T()S ,'+VS-
leill ;IIICi lhi" [)l'O])iil)]e ('()sis ()[ cl()[il_ so. It" _l l'e;isonllbh' ;t|)l)ro,il'h ('itll ])e li)lllllt, fl'Olll lhl'
l)oinl (>fview o['l)olh cosl alid lechilol()_', we would W_tlll l(i |)roceed with Ihose Slel)s iie_'d-
ed io I)r(ivide lhis iliil)rovect ol)er_ilioilal c_ltmt)ilil ). _iYe coils|tier I|ll's_." ])r()gr_iins essenlia]
1() Ihe fill] _lll_iilillieill o| lhe t]rsi oi}jeclive :,llld hope lh,it il will be p()ssil)le fi)r .NASA lo
devote ildClilioli_ll i'es(iill'(es +ltid illl'lettsed I)riority in the NASA R&I) I)l()_l_llll ll,) lht'lll.
2. Mtq_,oloh)14Jcal o|)sei-v_ilions tr()ill sytlrhr()llOiiS altitude.
The /oillLintied I)lOgiess (lli liieleoiohigica] _'xi)eiililelil.S with Ille XI'S series is lliO,_l
gralit_'iilg. The iI_tl_l r('lli)' _.!xE)erililenls t)eing t)]illllled jointly by NASA all(l I_SSA. ill C_)li-
jlincti(lli wilh lhe sl)insc_lii Cillllel_l, will ill_iki' ,I iii_!ior il)llll-i])lili()ll I() the dcveh)l)llienl el
Ihe \Vorlcl _At'iilller \_l\ltlh.
]'_XPI()RIN(; IIIF. _NKN()WN _l _]
We are pleased with the pr.mplness and lhoroughness with which dw (;oddard Space
Flight (:enter conducted the feasibility sludy tot a Synchronous ()peralional
Meteorological Satellite which could be huih and launched in a shoN time period should
strong National interesl dictate such a move. It now appears likely that 111("earliest we will
obtain funds tor such a system will be ill our regular FN 1968 bu(lg,.'t. Therefore, with the
e×lr;.l lilll(' availal)le for l)hmning sttl(lies, it would seem wise to ex',uninc Ill(" trade-oft_ of
spa(ecl-ait and _round slalion cost alld l)erlornmnce as a function of systenl design, espe-
cially with re_ard to frequencies and data tormat.
We c(msider the continued Stl'Ollg emphasis and Sll|)p()I'l ()t" NASA in lhJs area |o h_'
very Jnnl)()rt;ult.
!_. (;Iohal observations olatmosphvric structure needed tot numerical weather torec,tsting.
An cited in last year's letter this goal continues to carry the highest priority to ESSA
fr(ml a meleorological poinl of view, because of the importance of des(rilfing lhg a[nlos-
phere adequately in terms required tot numerical weather prediction. The scheduh" of
dew'lopmetn of the W_rld _]'attl('F System is crilically dependent upon progress in this
area. Therct;.e, we stq)porl ongoing Nimt)us flights and those o|olher advanced salellites
ill the NASA ])l'()gl'alll [!:_] which are devoted to attaining this ol_jectiw. Because of the (Tit-
i('a[ inlporlan('e of this portion o[ the NASA program, we are hopeful Iha| adequale |)ri-
orily will con|ira,' to Ix' supplied in support of this program elenlelH wilh respect to
others in Ihe Nalional t)tldgel. _'(." hope NASA will ('onlinu(.', alld Jl" possihle expand its
support of the development and tlig, ht tesl of the new sensors anti suppor|ing sAil)systems
in its R&I) program in order to provide |he techno[()g_' needed It) meet this ob.jecliw'.
The Environmental Science Services Administra|ion is now examinin_ how ils present
and f_.lltlre ()l)eratiOtlal satellites ('all salJst}' environmental dala requitements ill <)l|lel
aleas than meteorology,, t!n(hml)tedly there will be a need for R&I) supp<wt t]om NASA
in these new areas. ! suggest we review this mailer after our needs are established and dis-
('llssi(lllS have heell held under flu' leadership of Messrs..Jatt> and l). S..]ohnson. We have
heell inosl plea.seal with the.joinl e/tot( this past year in resolving prolflems and in allo-
cating awulat)le resources to meet operational and R&I) meteorological satellile needs.
We are looking Iorward |o the ('Olllillllation of this excellent coopeFali(lll.
Sincerely yours,
Robert M. White
Administrator
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Document title: George E. Brown, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, to D. James Baker, Acting Under Secretary
for Oceans and Atmosphere, U.S. Department of Commerce, February 22, 1993.
Document 11-8
Document title: Jim Exon, Chairman, Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence, Arms
Control and Defense Intelligence, U.S. Senate, to Ron Brown, Secretary of Commerce,
June 2, 1993.
Source: Both in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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These two letters, one[tom ('ottgres_ma_t (;eorgre E. Bro_J_, chair _[ the llou.se Committee opt ,_'eie_,e,
,Space, a_d Tech,do_, a_d the other .[_om Nebraska*l ,_enator .tim l'_xot_, chair r?[ the ,_e_ate
,S't_brommittee o_ Nudrar l)eterre_ee, A n,'zs Cont_vl mid Df,[_'nse Dztellit_e*m_, _tr_e_t Natio,al Ocea_it
attd Atmo,_phe_# Admhlimatio_ (NOAA) Admirals(later 1). James Baker ad Commerce ,getre(at 3'
Ro,_ Brow_ to evatt_ale the eo_teept t,/ eo_tverL,i_g NOAA _ Polar-ort_iti_g Operatiortal E_virottmetttal
,_atellite ,S)',gtemwith the l)epartmet_t _]l)(']i,nse "_Del},_tse Meteorological Satellite I'rol,,ram. 7"ke,se let-
tet:_ helped establish the political ba._is _t_ilhi_t (',ott_,re_s /br the cot_ve¢_e*_ce to take place.
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Fet)ruary 22, 1993
1)r. l). James Baker
Acting Under Secretary tor Oceans and Attttospher¢ •
[!,S. Deparllllellt ()t (]oIlllltel'ce
Washitgton, 1).(L 20230
l)car l)r. Baker:
I wahl ill congratulate you on ),our selection Io becmnc tile next National ()ccani(
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Administrator. 1 look torward t(i workiug witli you
Oil tile VeFy inlportallt ploglalns NO_ has planlled f0f tile ftllUl'e. "I]le (]Ollllnittee (ll|
S('iel|('e, Space, alld Tt:(:l'tnol(lg,_' intends to consider a ilulnber (ifdllal-use te('hnd(.,,-y and
defense convergence issues during tile 103rd (:ongress. Ill thai l'egaF(I, !a,,(-believe that tile
issues related to the conwrgence ¢11the N():kA Pdar Satellite Program with the Dctimst"
Meteordogical Satellite Prograln (DMSP) should he rc-exami.ed to look tor l).tential
opp(irtunities tor re(iu(ilig overall costs. )cs you know, recent signifi(ant (hanges in agency
teqllhelnents alld pdides Inay be lilt)f(' condttdve 1o a merged syslelll t]lit.II was lilt: Case
in the past.
in atldititm, 1 feel that the relationship I)etwet'l_ NOAA's ctmtimtitig operational gld)-
al ill,serving system and NASA's planned 15-year Earth ()llscrving System should also lit,
cxamilied to delcrmiue the potemial 1)enctits alid liat)iIitk,s (_l closer c(_perati(m (m
these [)l'()gFalllS.
I l)eliev(" iliai it woiild t)c prudent to eXitlllin(' Ihese opporlunilics J0r (OllVel_,eli(t"
ali(I possibh, COsl saviiigs at the salne lillie raliler lhail separalel,v. Tht!rt,tbro, [ ask lllal
N(),_l, and as SOOll as appropriale, NASA alld I)()l),.idnily Slli(k alld ;tssl'ss lli¢' possilllc
t)t'neliis and nledianisins tot illeigiilg all or i)aris of the iiiree pro<10aliiS and provide a
.jdntly dt'veloped p]an It) tile {]Omlllilt¢0 ()It Sciell('(', Sp,tct" iilld rlt,('hiltlhlgry.
Thank yOlt t()r ,Voilr ('()opeFation.
Sincercl_
(;E()R(;E E. I_R()WN,.]R.
(]hairnian
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Ill ,June" _, 1993
]'lit" ] lonor_ibl¢! Ron Br<twn
_(,(-l(,lltlV ()|+ ( ]()Iiiii1(,1+(( ,
[ !_ l)i'Diii+l ili<.'ll I ot ( ;llln ill('r(i"
ltcrl)t!rl (], I I<>over liiiilcliii_
141h ,_ltlC(!i _ind (;on+lililli<)li A'¢l,llllr.,, N._ r.
|)t'_lr _+.'(l-t'l_iry Browil:
I l)l+ln to lil_,ikl, bl sl+lll'llll'lll <)11 lhc ,_i('ilalt" t|oor +(lOll +lt)4_tit the weather sal<'l]itc s)'s-
ttqlls +l[)el-alcd I)v the<' |)cl)_lrllncnl _)f ])etT.'rl_e {])oD) and Ilw N_llimlal ()cc'mlotOaphi_-
mid :\ttnosfihi'ric A(hllilli_ill'_lli<lll (N(),'4kA). I (l<l not bclicv¢" lh;,ll lw<) si, l)_lr;_tlr<" [I.S.
(;ov¢'rnnl¢'lll wt'+llhcl + +++tlellil¢ + _;vst¢,llts ¢+ll+l Iic.iu.,ilit]i,d ml+v I<>nl4er t_iv¢'n lhl' budlz, et pt+<d> -
h'ni_+ ,,vl" J_ice,
[ht' I)o[) o])t,i_ilc+_ +i c<)li+lcllali(in ell lwo wclillit'i + +_ilci]ilt'P+ caih'd the l)t!t_.'ll+t'
•_ll'lCOl+<l]<)_ica] _ill'llitc! llro_-r_llii (1).M,_P). ']+heP+c s+'ilt'lliIcs ill'<.! |]own in +llii-+71+lClll+<til<lll_,
polar +lrl)iis (1111++111ii1_ lh+ll ihl'v ct+<l,_,_ Ihc +_llllt + pohll al)<)vt+ the [_]ai-lh twice" +i d+tv at the
_,_illit" iinles t'Vl!lV day), Tht')' _ii+<.• buih l:l), tilt, (it, nt,r+i] l_]h,cil+ic (]Ol+[)Ol-;<ili(lll. Tht'y _ilt'
i'<lnil>i)cd with _+lt'll_,<)r_ tor ilil_i_ill_ cl<lud% tli+l+.,rlniliin+_ inoi_lilrt, _llld ll'ilil)('r+llllrt" ill lht'
;iliilo+]lhl'lt', ;liiCl t_ll liit'_i+llrill_ <)ll'+ili (ilrr<.'lil_,. 'Nit' i[;il_l Ir<)ln I)MSP i._ I)l+l+i<-l(_l_t I<) l_i<.'-
ii<+il il+l'l_, ()Vt'l _iil t'ncr)plt'd link +ili(l at lhc +_llill' Iilnc Ihc dala i,_ r_.+lll<.llt'iv re]+i)'cct Io
()liiiih+i'P+ 5,4,+l!iil]lt'l (;t'lill-lil t<ll C<)lll[)ri'hl'llSivl! ++lll_l])'P+i+. tti,_t<lrically, the l)oD s+v+telll's pri-
liiiiF,X' (llsl(llill'r xvlis il c'llissilit'd inl<'lli_cncc _tIiici+hil4 ])ro_rain.
Thl' Nnli<liiiil ()CCallO_Tal)llic iiiid ,.%.lnl<)+l)hcric Adniini,_irlllion (N()AA) oJ + Ih¢"
l)c[)_iilliiCiil <ll (]<linliit+rcc +i]+o <ll)cl-_il(',_ +t constcilation of lw<_ wc_ttht'r +alt,llht,s caih'cl
TIR()+. Tlic+c s+il<'l]ilt's _il-t" +i]_ill t]own in +llii-S)'lll']ii'lllll>iis polar ol+l)ils, arc btiili I>)'
(it+llt'r+ll l+]lt'ciric, Jill(| h+i'¢t' _,t'll_,Ol'_+ I_lr illi_i_in_ clouds _iild llikili_ ri!adiii_,_ of iliOiSlllrt'
_llid ll'ni|)l'rlilur<' in Ih_' +tlnl(l_+phcrc. TIR()+ el+ira _tl+o is bro+idca,_t dh-ccll 7 t<l tlS+.'r+ _lr<luncl
Ih_' world _is w_'ll it+ to a c_'nir+il ])roccsshilz, localion in lhe [!nilcd <%l_ltcs, TIROS ctat+i, how-
t,v(,i-, i,_ c<)inl)h'l+.'ly illiCLIssiticd,
hi ICrlii_+ <it C_illaCit) _, Ilrl_' Uilitl_d _l+ilc,_ doe+ nol n<_cd t_ltir wt, aliler +_ttellhe,_ in orbii.
In ]ltsl y('{ll"+ di'lcn,'+(" _lillhori#+_tlion +tel, tht" con|'l.'l+i'0s directed the _ecretal)' of De|+en+( • t(i
d_'vclo I) a COliiiJrchcll+ivc _+l)_i.c;l." iliVt',_lilicnl ,_traleh_,'. As [7] p_li'l oJ + this ell'ori, thc COli|<.'r-
i'<'+ din'ci_'d l)ol) to c×_iltlint. _-iii(!w lht' l)cllcntia] for _i('_tlor cclo[)cl+_lli<ln I)t, iwt, cn civil _iiid
nlilil_u) r Wcalh<.'r s_ilt!l]ilc ]lr_>_rlilns ili ]i_]ll o|" chan_c_i ill thl' w<lrid +ind I+lid_'l ])rt'+P+tlrc+.
_'l('i-_iil_ Ihc lw_l ,+_tlt']lilc i)l+O_l++tiTi,,+ will lakc liino--linit + 1o (lc,_i_n _i coinlnon ,_)',_lt'ln,
I<) <l('t++'i+liiilil • lli_tii+i_l'int'lil +ii-r_ti+i_t+lllt+iiu+ |)l-l;w_'cil [')<ID anti NOAA, l(t build ri_+w +_+itei-
lift's, +illd ll;I ]_tiincil lhcln. Bcllh i)oD bind N()AA will obviotl.,+l) _ Irl_lve Io cclnliiiilC l<l I_ttlilch
_tiid <tl)t'r+tlt' lht'ir OWli _i),_l(,iti_, llnti] thi' lll+w sy._ll'rli c_in be del)io)rl'd.
i<lc_ill),, 1)ol) and N()sT+l would run Oill of their (ilrrcnl satt'ilitt+,_ +il i)i+t+ci,_cl) < ihe ++llllt'
liint' lind pr<'cisel)' when liil" iicw _,),_il('iil bt'c_iinc opt'i+llion_l, h appt'ars lhal this is pos,_i-
hie', I)iil ll+ll wilh<llll _,(lilil+ l)]_lllilili_,
]=ii_,l )'l.'+il + (]on_i+<.,,_,',i direci_'d N()A_I to proctlr_' Pvvo lllOrf TIR()S ,_atellite._. If thi,_ hap-
])t'il+, N()A, A, will till'l,+c, "7 mitellites, which could last until 2005, ;ind [')oD'._ invi>iitor 7 o|
9 I)MSP Salclliit!+ will la+l iinli] 2l)()7 <li + ]on_t'r. Thai would lll(!_tll wailin_ l? Io I._ v<;;.il,% Ill
dt'lllo ), +l ('<llliill(lil, liit,i_l,i'| +_+tll'lliie ,'+,7_,I_.'iil _lnd waiiin_ _,t'v+,'l+i] yl,+il_ I)t,t_)le +l;-Irlin_
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develol)lllell[ w(wk oil a new, COllll|lOn satcllite. The (;()verlllllCill Ol.lgh[ I() exalnint,
whether it would make more sense 1o speed things up.
I propose thai DoD consider transterring to NOAA two 1)MSP buses, which N():L,k could
then modil_ _tot the TIROS contiguration and add to it Iht' TIROS sensors. This would give
l)ol) and NO.,_,\ 7 sawlliws each. It would save money in lhe short term, some of which
could be used to fund d(.weh)pmenl ofa tonl[non salellite system. This is important because
Imdgcts are so tight |or l)oth DoD and N()AA lhal nt,ilht'r may be able 11) allk)rd modern-
izalilm 1)n their own. It would also mean that I}ol) and N();L\ would likely use t,p dmir
illvelllOlies al al)oul lilt" SalllC lillle, t()r a stlloolh lrallsilion lc, a new (()lnln()ll syslcln.
! am writing to urge you and Deputy Secretary of I)efense Perry to create a tormal work-
ing group under appropriaw senior officials to allcmpt to resolve any outstanding issues
slan(lhlg in dw way of merging flu' two g()vermnenl polar-orbiting weather salellite systems.
What is required is leadership tiom both agencies lo resolve issues of data encrypti(m;
management of a lnerged systt, m; potential translkw of DoD assets t() NOAA; integrati()n
with European metec)rological satellite efforts; and coo|)eration with NASA on Ihe Earth
Observing System t)olar plattorm.
[3] To take one example, without the personal involvement of you and Secretary l)erry,
stll)()rdhlatc I)ol) olticials will C()lltinlle t() insist that (|ata lllllSl 1)(' (!n(rypted and NOAA
will insist thai entry||titre is not acceptable. My suspi('i()rJ is that the case fi)r encrypth)n
rests on weak arguments, given the availability of geosyn(hronous satelliles, and
Eur()pean, Chinese, Russian, and NOAA systems all I)r()ad('asling in the clear. On thc
otlmr harM, N()._-\ may be shorlsighted in disregarding other nati(mal inteFesls that
might justi[_' some form of cheryl)lion capability. Resolving this type ()f |)rol)lvnl requires
creativily ti()n) top policymakers.
The nation cannot attord t() maimain and modernize two satellite weather c()nslella-
lions. Working togethcn ht)wevev, l)oD, N()AA and NASA could p()()l resources, achieve
etIiciency and impr()ve capabilities at reduced cost l() tilt' taxl)ayer.
I look lorward to hearing your views.
Sincerely,
.]im Exon
t!nited States Sellal()r
co: l)eputy Secrctary ()f Defense William I)errv
Vice President A1 (;ore
NASA Adnlinislralor (;oldin
Document 11-9
Document title: National Performance Review, Department of Commerce, "Establish a
Single Civilian Operational Environmental Polar Satellite Program," September 30, 1993.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This docume,t spells roll the,finaneial advantages o/ aehieving the cm_solidation _] the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Pola)=orbiting Operatioual Envimmnental .%ttellite
System arid the l)efi'n_'e Department _ l)e/i,nse Meteorolog'ieal Satellite ProL,ram. It aL_o point_ out that
a consolidated or eonve)Eed ,_7¢stemwith NAN4 il_volvement _vuM make (,[fieient use O/_\;,1S.,1._ (level-
opment ¢_/ new t",arth ohservalioll in,struments. Thi_ documel_t wa_ part 0/' Ihe Clintmt admini_tra
lion i_National l'er/mmanee I¢lq,iew.
EXI'I.()RIN(; ]'lIE [iNKN()WN _1 7
i)el);tllln('lll ()[ ( _()lnllierce
Acc()mpanying Rel)ort ()f die Nail(real Performance Review
()t]](e ()f the Vice l)r(!si(Lt.'lll
_F%'ashi n_|ol|, I)(;
SCl)teml)(w1993
1)()(:12: Establish a Single Civilian Operational Environmental Polar Satellite Program
Background
The [hilled Slates is (on.hilled t() an opcralioilal envirollnlelltal polar satellite pro-
_l'alII betatlse of the (rhical vahl(, <)t ltle data tile satellites (ollect.(l) ])ol;Ir satellites col-
h'(t I('illl)('ratlll(" all(l lll()iSltlY(! illeastllelllents (key inl)tllS I<) ('Ollll)ntel wealhel l)redicli()ll
m()(lels _('nel-athl_ all ]]aii()nal |hlee- |o five-(lay weather fore(as|s); illeaStllelll(.]l{S of Ihe
A]]|a](lic OZOllC levels; h)ng-term ellvir(mmental nleasllrelllell|S 115;('(] i() SUl)l)()rt global ('li-
lllil|(! chalice SILl(lies; st'a stlrl_t.(e [elill)el'atllre itleastlreii1ClllS.; all(I gh)t)al ('l()ll([-(()ver
illla_('s, l)()]al satellites als() l)r()vide other valuable suppo,t missions, stl('h as lll()nilorill_
elll('Fgeil(_, (lislr(.ss b('.t(ons 1() aid seal-(h anfl resclle lnissi()lls and w()rhlwi(h" (lata (ollec-
ti()t+ t() s.i)l)orl a wuit'ty of a('liVi|iCS, sit('h ;+isendanger('d sl)('(i('s lll()llilo['in_,
I h)wevev, at ])resem, [h(! Ilalioll maintains two l)olar-orbiting nlclt'()]ologi(al S_llellile
s'_y,t('ln:_: (l) the Nati(ma] ()(ealli( an(i Alnlos|)]leri( A(hilinisll-a|it)ll (N().,'_) Polal'-
()l])ilill_ ()perathmal I_llVil()lllllelllal Satellite (POES) for civil I()le(aMillg ail(l rcsear(h
l)llll)<)st!s: all(I (_) the I)el)alllllellt of Defense (D()D) l)ef(!llSe Mete()r<)l()gical Satellite
]']-O_l'alll (I)MSI') thr llali()llal s(!(lllily purposes.
III a(l(liliOl_ [o these |)rograms, the Natiolla] Ael()natlli( an(l Sl)a(e A(llllillistraliOll
(NASA) has illiliate(l a climate resear('h program (ailed Missi(m t<) I)lal}el [_alth (MTI)E).
A key l)(_rlion o[ this elfort is the l_arlh Observing System (E()S), a seri(+s of six (liffk'ren!
satellites illeasttl'illg Val'i()llS i)aralnelcls critical to tlllflerslall(lill_ glot)a] ('lilllale (.'tlatlge.
()lit? ()[ tll(+se satellites is callc(l the EOS-PM (PM indicating t]lal the satellite l)asst.s ()vel
Ill(' e(lual()v in the atiern()<)n). The (limate monitoring instruments ()n EO_PM are basi-
(ally more modern versions ()f the meteorological instruments (mtentlv flying ()n the
N().,L* weather satellites. Ill essen(e, tile nation will have three dirt(went satellite svstt'ms
with very similar capal)ilities.
()_r(+_"lhe f)ast 20 years, tile I)()ES and DMSP programs have tnade ntnlltqous alleml)ls
l() (()llv('rge to the gl'calcsl ('xlent l)ossible.(2) The programs have sitnilav spacecraR, use
a (()mm<)l_ launch v('hicle, share products (leriw_d from the data, fn-ovide c<)mf)h.menlary
envir()mtl('nlal data to lh(' nati()n, and work closely together (m research and deveh)tl-
lllelll el[illIs, h} all. Ih( _ l)v()gvams achieved sul)stantial (;olnnlonalily, but nalional se(urily
(()ll(elllS have l)recluded t]dl c()nvergence.(3)
I)()1) has state(I it wonld manage a converged system, bill a sillglc: plograill Hill I)y
1)()1) was and still is unacceptable given international concern over Ill(" nfilitarization of
space. (,I) Today, howevt'r, with the end of the Cold War, the issues whi(h have l)re(hld(,d
(+()ml)lete convergence seem to have (timinished in importance.(5) With both programs
t)lanning a new satellite design, tile time is appropriate to consolidate their efforts.
The E()S-PM (limate research satellite is being designed with the idea thai many ()f
lhe iIIslrunlellts can lie tlse(I by NOAA within the POES program. This (onlintles a his-
tori(+al N()AA-NASA r('lati{)nship wherein NASA (levelol)s new tt_(.inloh)gy all([ (lenlotl-
straies l)r<)t{_type hav(Iware, all([ N()._A buys identical ntlils li)r (:()lllitllle(t (q)erati<)nal
Stll)l)()rl.(li) l l<)wevel +,('tllr('ll{ l)]alls inv()Ivc flying E()_PM Ibr I-;, yt',trs, <+hlrillg wlli(+h lilll++"
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I'()ES also will have operational satellites.(7) ()vcr nlost of this period, both program,,,
would be tlying duplicate inslrunlents. Tilt" nation wouM I)t' more efficiently st'r_cd if
NASA would develop and lly tile prototypes once and then transti:r the systcnls to N(),-_.Vs
opt, ralional prograln tbr tilmrc Ilighls.
(:onvcrgence studies began in 1972 and havc continued ever since.(8) NOok& ix'centlv
pertin-nled an illtt'rnM study of the opporlunitit's as aihlble through t<mvcrgcllCC ot (he pro-
granls.(9) Recently, initial talks have 1)(gun among lilt" three agelwics with the goal of pcr-
liwlning another study of convergence opportunities among lilt" linee programs.(10) What
is needed, however, is a clear decision to creale a single, civilian polar satellite progranl.
(:urrently, the N()AA POES I)rogranl, thc DOD DMSI' f)rogranl, and tilt" NASA E()S-
I'M progranl all arc in various slages o1' developing new Sl):l(('(l-;ltl ;tll<t illSlrlllll('lltS. Ill l]:lt'
next 10 years, lilt" estimated total cost ti)l Ihcs<: thrcc ctliHts exceeds $6 billi<m in dt'vel-
ol)nlent, production, and operations costs, t lower(r, nlany policy makers ti'cl that Ill("
nali<m CilllllOl afti_rd to develop three separalc satellite `%vstt'lllS wilh such silnilar missions.
For example, C<mgressman George Brown of(:alifln-nia has slated thal a converged
systenl seems more achicval)le than ill lhe past. ! It" lheretilre has direclcd NOAA to work
with DOD and NASA to 'jointly study and assess Ihc possible benefits and mechanisms tier
merging all or parts of the three progratns.'(I 1) Senator Jamcs Exon of Nebraska was
more direct ill his It'tlers to I)()D and Conlnlcrce: "The nation tannol: atti_ld to maintain
and nlodernizt' two satellite weather constellations."(12) Recently, at lilt" National Space
()utlo<lk (:onti'renct', Air Forcc (;ent'ral (:haHes I lornet; (:onttnander l.!nilcd States
Spacc (:<mlntand, slated: "1 htw you do convergence is really the qucstion, not if y<m <h)
convergencc."(13)
A single ot)t'ralional polar satellite pr<)gram could int'et the nc('ds of all users by incor-
porating key D()I) rl,quiir(,nlt'nls inlo tilt" N()+,k,\ POES program. Ftirtht't+nlor(', till" svnt'r-
gry acilit'vt!d ihl'otlgh DOD and N(),%-\ coopl!ration could allow bOtll ilgt'llCie`% Io lllt'('l
critical opt,ralionai rt!qttireln/'nls (such a`% collccting oc(,allOgraphic and global lrOl)OS-
])((eric wind d;ila) whicii neither agency lilts I)(_ell able to atlord alOlle. The clnlv¢'rgt'll
operational prograin could ,save additional co`%ls tly using liic NASA E()S progranl's siaic-
oi:lhc-ait Sl)aCt'lTafl anti inslrunit'nts instead of [i>icing N()AA Io design and build its own.
The re`%uh would t:lt, a `%ingit" developnient prograln (coinl)ared Io Iht' lhree planned
today) and inininial ovt'ria|) t)t-tween NASA's eli(nail" rest'arth and l|i¢' N(),,t, VI)OI) con-
verged operalional nit'lcorologieal niis,sions.
Thc difticuhv will tit, Io sut:tt-sSttllly incorporal(! [)()l) requill'inenl_; into the i)rograin.
Based upon historical studies, key ;if('as requiring (onsidt'ralion are dala denial)(lily, orl)it
sclcttion, inlt'rnalional tooperalion, and adCqtlale _tvt!rsigiil to i'llStlr(" 1)()1) COll((.llis illt'
adequalt, ly lilt't. (l 4) The Ill(lowing SUIlllliitiizcs how c;tcil of lhest, can Ill! addre,sst-d:
l)ata denial)(lily. The salt'(life 11111,%I t)roadca,%t data ti+cc to C/'t'ryoll/" but also hitvt" the
(apal)ility Io (It'll)' data Io specific adver,%alie,%. New It'Clnlology, such a,%lilal used to deny
tallle-'I_, ,r pay cil_lnlIcls to llOll-Slll3S(Ti|)t'rs, lllakt'`% Ihis lask t'asit'l:
()rl)il `%cleclion. (:urr('nliv, lilt" I)()D dl'sii't's the capabilhy io change its salellitt! ori)iis
tit,pending on ini`%sion rcquirenlenl`%, l'asl `%ludit's have identil]cd a ltnee-saleliitl' (onslei-
lation a`% `%iif|icit+nt tin (heeling all orbit nccds.(i,"l) Allowing I)()1) io int]ueiice orb(l`%
selection should alleviatc their ctln((_rl]`%.
hllt_rnational cooperation. A N():k-%-lt'd svstt'nl could easily (nail(lain and t'vt'n
in(prove inlt'rnalional cooperalion hi environinenlal data ex(han<_e, ttowever, `%inct"
NOAA plan`% to use [ineign ,satellites as par( of the CllllVCl-_i+d plO_lalll, 1)()1) may |)(l reluc-
llinl Io rely IlpOll tTireign `%alellites for iinpollaiil data. This toil(('rn could I)t' allcvialed I)v
inaintahling one or Inort' groiind spare U+S. `%atcllite,% at all liin('s lhal could I)e launched
if a foreig, n-conlrolled salellile ever bt'canit" unreliable.
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()v('rnighl. 1)()1) will re(luhc some mcchanisnrs m ensure lhcir requirements (err(in-
uc to bc reel. possil_l(' imp]('mcnlalion dclai]s could involve including Dill) user and
ac(luisilion experls in lhc N()AA program offices and opcralions thci]iti('s, alh)wing DOD
m )toldand nurmtgc l')(H)-uni(lUCparls <ifthe pr%gram, aid establishingan irlteragcncy
oversiglngroup m whi(-h flu'program would have m rcpor| periodicallym mlSln'Cfilmall
agency r('quir('mcnts were adcquat<'ly met. Such ovcrsighl mechanisms should not be dit:
l)('llil[{)a('hicvc.The driving for(('l)ehind flliseflorlisch'arlyd.' d('sircto reduce (osts.
Furl her ((isl reduction could be achieved Ihrough ff,rcaler imernational parlicipaiion.
According to l)r. Ray A. Williamson of ihe (if tic(' of Technology Ass¢'ssm(-nl: "(;rcaler
ini('rmrlional (oordinalion and collalloralion on s(,nsors and s).'sl¢,ms.., will eventually be
needed in ordm Io reap the gr('alesl benefil from Ihc world-wide invcslm('n! in rcmole
sensing."(16)
N()AA is ahcady workirrR err such arrarrgenwnls in ils PilES Program by asking die
Europ('ans 1o assume a grcal('r role. An aRrecmenl in print)pit" has bccn rca(hcd bclwcen
N()/'u-\ and the European Organization for the l:.xph)ilalion of Mclcorologi(al Sat,.'|liles
(EUMETSAT) whercl)y E[;MH'SAT will purchase, laun('h, and operau' one of lhe Iwo
current I'()ES Inissioris Ilcginning in tire }'ear 2000. This will save the U.S. nlorc lhaur $l(.i0
nlillhm t_)i-each latlrl(h tl| one tl| lhcsc satellites. Such coopcralioul wilh Ihe Europeans is
all illll)orlall! (Ollrl.lOllelrt O["cosi-efficienl operations and in []it" Ihsl step tti a truly int('r-
nalional environlrrcnlal salellile observing systcn/.
Action
l.cgislalioul should bc ('ulatlcd It) eslablish a siulglc enrvironm('nlal polar sal('llile pro-
RI_IIII Illrdcr llrc (litcol)on of N()AA.
('.oligr('ss should ciia('l lcgishrlion to estal)lish a single /,nvir<)illili'lrlal p<dar salel]itc
illlfh..r lhc dircclion of N(),{,\. The li,gislalion shori]d dirccl NOAA, NASA, aild Dill) to
liildCrlake aciivhics io establish lhis i'f|(irl within their exisiiirg pro_ranis,
Implications
The proposed ctlalrlles would allow for a nlore etticienl, Icss-coslly ghtl)al salellitc
obscrwrtioil progranr, iX slrOrlg, efficient U.S. polar environnlental ilionilorirrg program
would I)c Itl(' ttilllldaliOrl for a cooperative international systein. The Frlr(ipcans already
plan Io ill(Tease tiindilil_ for art element of Ibis system. Whh a solid, unitied U.S. )rational
proWlall) iii place, other colinlries May align their pro_rarlls to conlpielirelll ihc t)asic sys-
leiri. The rcsiih will bc adlliliona] cnvironnlental data collected al rllinirlia] cosl to Ihe
nali()ll. Tile (tinver,ff,('ll(:c ('Oll(ept provides a teasible and cosl-elfc('live oplJor-ttlnil.y it)
accuralcly lnouit(n aiid prc(lict the hnpact of the environment (m dic world's s(wicties.
The t_,rcatcsl ditlicuhy in the proposal will be io enlllre thai a siirgic, national pro_ranl
iilider civilian leadership will be responsive to nati(ma] security needs. H(iwcvcr, liiesc (oit-
ccrlis tall t)(! Illel milch flier(" easily now than they torrid have in Ihe pasl.
Fiscal Impact
(;osl savillgs over lclr ),ears would total about $1.'_I billion. This is based err a thrce-
salcl[iic svslcill (wflh [+:trrop('arl participation) relying on NASA t(i dcvelop new har-dwtlrc.
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Budget Authority (BA) and Outlays (Dollars in Millions)
Fiscal kbar
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
BA 0.0 0.0 -75.0 -75.0 -75.1) -75.0 -300.0
Outlays 0.0 0.0 -50.0 -70.0 -75.0 -75.0 -270.0
(;hange
in RYEs 0 0 1) 0 0 0 0
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1. Introducti<m
The [!nitcd States opcrales civil ;it+el military polar-orlfiting cnviromncntal satellite
s+vstcm,+ which collccl, l:,roccss, avlc| cli,,+tril:,t+tc rctnotclv-scnscd tvwtc<>ioh_gic;tl, <><'can+>-
gr+_phi¢', and sp_tcc csivircmmcs+i_d dat+t. The Dcimrtmcnt _+[(kmmtcrcc is responsible t_r
tint Polan-ort>iting ()l>cnation;d Etlvirc>wmcntal Satellite (POES) [)rogram ml<l the
Dt'l;l_ii'liiil'llt of l)ct'ciisc is rcsl)onsiblc l'_ll the l)c[cnsc Mclcoiohlt_ical ,_aic]liic PII)_I;illl
(I)M,_I>). Thc N;ilionlil Acron;tllliCs _iild _])_lt.+.+ ..\dlnillisli_ilioii (NASA), ihrotigh hs l'];irt|l
()J)sl, tx;iilg <_},sl<<'ill ([_;()_-|IM) dcvc']O])lllCtll c|]¢)rts, provides II('W I('lllOl(' SClISiii_ ;til(i
_it);ic'ccrat7 lcchilologit's Ih+tl conid t)<llciiti;tlly iinprovc tht' c;l[)atiiliiics <)t lhc <)l)ci;ilion_i]
_+'¢slciil+ While ihc civil ;iiid lliilil_tl+X' liliS._iOli_+ of P()[_]_ _iiid I)MSP icinliili tlilch+lil_t'cl,
cst_ililishint4 _t s{n<ff, lc, t'oli'¢Cl_t!d, o|)cr;ttion;tl sx+'slt'lll (3<tit rCdtlCt" dtil)lic_ltitiii tit cttorls ilt
lilCCliiig <'OllililOn lCqilii+cmcnt.s while s_llisl_,iiig the liiiit+lill • ic<lilii+ciiiCliiS of [he civil _ilid
lilili<lii_ll ,_clillil}, colilillilliilics. +\ coilvci_cd s X'SlClil C;ill +l('(<)iillli()d_ilc ililCl-ll+iliOli_il i<l<)[)-
cr_tti<)n, inchldiiig the open dislribiltiOil o[ cnvironilicnia] ct_lta.
I[+ C)l_icctkc_ mid l'lincil+lcs
"[lit" [!nilcd ,i_l_ilc<_ will _,ct'k Io 1-CdtlCC the COsl cll+ +tcqtliriiig _lild olicratinl4 l)ol_tl--
ol+t)ilin_ t'l/\'il<)nillt'i/l_ll ,smcilitc +'+'_+lt-lll,_, while t't>lllinilili_ I(/ ,_itiist_, , 1.7.S. <)[)t'l-itiioli+tl
I+CqiiirclilClits tOl" cl+il;i lioln Ihcsc ._)'._iCliiS. The Dcp_irtliiciil of (;OlilliiClCC _iii¢l tlic
l)c[);litniClll of l)cfcilsc will iillcl_r_llc I|lcii + l)lOt4l_illiS iillo +i siii<_ll', COlivcrgcd, il_ili<)ll_l]
[)cil_il-orl)ilhlg ol)Cl_ilioll+i] ciiviioiiiiicilt_il S_ilt,lliic ,_V+ll,lli. Addili_)ii_tl s_iX'ill_+ lll+tV I)c
achicvc<l I))' itlcorlior+,iling - _lplJl<)[)li_ilc +tst)crls of NASA's F;+il-th ()t)_+Cl+Villg Svslcill.
The c_lilvci<_cd |)rogialll shrill tit" c¢iilductcd ill _lcctii-d+tiicc with the |_dltlwitlff, lithiciplcs:
-- ()[)cr_ilioli;il ciiviioiinicill_i] <tal;i tioiti i)<llai--Ol+bililig ,s_itcllilcs itl-t' inll>ortlliil t<l the
achicvcniciit of I.!.S. CCOlioinic, ii_tii<)il_il <_ccuritv, s<iclliit]c, alid t<llcigll policy llo+lls.
-- Assulcd _i+.({',_+ to ()|)Cl-litloll+tl t>llviroliiiit'lit_tl (llitli will bc pr()vilh'd to lilcct civil ;tlit<l
tl+iti¢)il sccurilV rc<itiiF('niclli,_ +til(l intcriialion_tl obli/4-1itioiis.
-- The [!nit('(l ,_llitll'+ will t'llSUlt" il,S _lt)i]it)' 1<) st,lcctivcly dell)' cTilic_i] ('llX'il-()lllllClll_il (t+ila
Io +111 _i(lvcrs_ll') , (hllill_ cri.si+ or w_lr V('l Cil+lil(' Ihc li+(' ()t +_,tl(h (l+ll+l I)_, ' I++._. +illd Allic(l
ll_ilii_tls,' |Ol'ccs. ,l_tlch d_ti+t will bc ill_t(|c _tv_til_tli|t' Ill othcl + tlSt'is "i_,'llCll it IiO |tili_t'r h_l++
inilit_u)' ulilil); The inli)lclncnlin_ _tcii<lns will bc _tcconiiiiod_ilcd wiihin thc over<ill
i+c,_oilr(t ' ;ill(| ])olic) ' _tlid_tll¢C of ihc Prc,sidciit.
111. hnlJJcincnting ,\ctiolls
_t. [litcr_t,_t!iic,v ( ;_ordin;tti<_ii
I. hilt,<_l-lilcd lll<lgrliiil ()tt]cc (11>())
lhc Dt'l)_irlllit'illS lit( ;t>il/ilicict • _llld |)t't)<'iist' tiild N,:\_A will (lt'lltt" ltil liilt'_l_llcd
PlOt4T;ilil ()]]]/c (IP()) t_li lhc ii_lliOli_i] [)ol,ir-<llbilii+ig ot)Cl'llli¢)n_i] cnvil'OlllliCill+il slilcilitc
_v+It'lli liO llilt'l" liiiiil ()tlol)ci |, ]tJ.q4. +l'hc IP() will t)t" i-csi)onsiblc fol lhc iil;liiltl_,ClliClll,
i)l;tlliiili<_, dcvt'lol)lliCnl, [iil)l+iC;tli(lil, _iiid o[)t'i_tlhiliS _)llhc ¢OllXCl-<_cd svsil'lil+ The IP() will
hi' tlildCl-lhc dh+t'¢lioll otii _x'sll'iii llr<)gTitlli 1)iic<lol (SPI)) who will rt'l)Orl Io _i li'i_igt'iic)'
ExccUliX'c (]<ii/ii/t[llcc viii lilt' [)cl/_iitiliCtll <it + (;_liliilici'cc+s {rtidcr _c¢i+ct;trv t_ti- ()co,illS
;iiid ,,_tlitio_,i)h ClC.
7. l_Xt'i.'tlii_,C (]()illlilitlt+t" {EX(;()M)
"l'hc l)cl+l_irliliCills o['( ]_>llllllCl+('t! ;ili¢l l)ctT<'liSC _iiid NASA wil] l<ll'lll _i COliVCFg('ll('C
|+_X( ]()]%,'1 ill Iht" I.;lidl'l + _l'Cl+Cl+ll'V h'vcl. The illClill)ClS 1)t the EX(;()M will CilSlli'(' ltml lib>ill
c'ivil lind iiiili<)liill s+.'Cili'il}' i+CqtlilClilCills _ii'c s<ltisficd ill the coll','crgcd [)l'O_T_llii+ will <o<_l-
flili_ilt' I)i+o_riilli I)l_tliS, tltl(lgt'l._, _iiid ]lolicics, ;iiid will cil,_iirt' lhal _lgCliC,v ttiil<liilt4 coili-
iliiilll<.'i/Is ,trt' t'<|tiit_ll)lt' _llld stisi_tiilt!(|. "['lit' ihl'cc iltcilll)cr _l_+,,il,,ic_, ¢1| lht + [_;,'_'_( ;().%,| will
dcvch_[) ;i I)i_K+.'_P; t<lr i<lt,iltit_,irig, vliliclalilig, iiiid do<ililit'lilin<_ ot)sciV_iliOlilil _iiid s',slciii
icqttizcliiclil_ t(_l the il_iliOli_il f)olar-ovbititLff o|)cl+;llioli_il ciiviroiiitiClll_tl s;ilcllilc _'+'_lClii.
Ai)l)r<_vc<l <l[>l'i;itillli_ll rcqtliiClllci/l_ will tic't/lie l]ic ¢'oll',l'r,_/'d s'+'_+icili I)_tsc]hic whic'h iht'
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IP() will t,st. t<) dcveh) l) agency 1)(,d gels Ior rest'arch and dev<+'hq)mcnt, sysl``'m acquisitions,
;lll(I op('l'iilil HIS.
t). Agency Rcsponsihililies
1. i)eparlm('nl of Comm('rc('
Th(+ l)cl)arlmt'nl of (:<JtHt]It<+'zc't', thr_mgl +,N(),:'_'\, +',,ill ha','c lead agent T r<+'Sl:,onsi-
l)ilitv to the I+:X(:()M fi)r lht' convcrg_'``l systt.llL NOAA will hilv``, lead itg<+'_t(+vr<+'sp<msil)ili-
Iv to stqtl)orl tlt<++II'() Ibr satcllilc Ol:,erati<ms. N()+,L._ ++'ill u|<)nfi|tat(' tlt,.' Sxstc|n Program
I)i|'ecto| wh<) +viii bc apl)fovcd t)y the EXCf)M. N()AA +viii also have the lead responsil)il-
it'+' fi+tr itttctliwitl_ wilh ttatiot+tal arid internatiotlal civil ttscr (otunutt/ili<+-,;, consistct+tt with
nail<real +<'cm ily and tbf('ign p<)licy reqtfirt'menl+.
2. [)t'l:,_ultt+<+'ttt _)I l)('|k'tis('
The l)epartnt('ltl of l)t't('ns¢' will have lead agency rcsponsilfility to sttpl)()rt lit<+"
I1'() in mi_jor syslc|n iwqttisi|iqms ne<'t'ssmy t<) lhe t],;llioYtal p_)lm-ort:,iting ot)c|ational <+'11vi-
t<)nn_cnlal salcllilc system. I)()!) will tlomirlat+`' the Pritwil)al l)cF, t,ly Sysletn l:'rog,imt
I)it'¢'( It)l wh() will t)(, al)t)r<y¢<,d by lit(" System Ptogrant l)irc<+t()r.
!+,. National A('t<)natHi('s and Spa('<+" Admitfistratiott
NASA will hay(' I('a(l ag('n(y |csponsil)ilily It) stq)l)Ort tit<+" IP() in th(ilitating lh('
(l('veh)l),m',H iutd ins('rti<)n ()f n('w (<)st cl]iwtiv(" l<+'(hnologi('s (hal <'t|lta]t_<+" lh<+' al)ilit)(if
lh<' (()nv('rg('(l svst<+'ttt l<) |n<+'t't its ()l)('rali(mal r('qttirt+nt('nts.
(. hH('rn,,li<),tal (:<Htl)('rali<m
Plans li)r and iml)l('m('nlati(m +)Ill mttiot+al i)(thtr,)|-l)iting <q)t'rati<)nal ('nvir[)ltltl('nt;t]
sat('llit( +systent will h+`+has<+'d ()u t !.S. civil and t+tati(mal st'(+tttit+v r(.qttir(,tUt'lltS+ (:()t++sist<+,ttl
with lhis+ lh(, t!nit('d St;:tli's will s('('k t<_ itttl)]cttwnt tlt(" (<)llV('t+ge(l sysl_'m i_+a tttanlt('r that
<+'nt_)tu+ages (+<)_)l)<+'v_tti<)_+with li);('igtt g()V<+'ltilYtt'llts ;a|l(I ilttt't'lWIti()tt:,d t)t'g_tlli.,'itti'[)ltS. Thi,,,
<()<q),:'|,|li<)t| ,,',.'ill t)(' c(_H<ht(l,:'d itl sttl)l),')vl ()f lh<+'s(" r(,q_lir(rtt_t'HIs ill (+o()r(linali,c)n wilh the
l)C}):,tl'llllt'll| t:+l Nlillt" _lll(| ()|ht'l + illlCl't's|t'll 3tg<+'lt('il.'S.
d. l+,Hdgcl (:oo,(limtli(>n
I',ttdg('_ar+v l)l',mninu, ('stimal<+'s, d<'v('lot)('d I)y tit+.' IP() at|(l al)pr()vt'd I:,y tit<+' EXi:I)M.
will tory( + _ts the l)+tsi_, lit! agt',|(y :t]t_tttltl l)tt(Ig('l r(!(ittcsls It) lit(' l)r('si(Ic,tl. The II'() phuP
ning i>r/)(['ss will he (()Hsist(',tl with ag(',t(i('s' i,tternal I)lt(lgt'l li)Hltttlatiotl.
IV. lntph'mctHing l)<wtm_tm,s
a. The "hnt)l('m('t+lati<)n Plan Ibr a (:onverged Po]ar-ort)iting Etwir<)nt_('nlal
Sa,<'llite Svswtn" l)rovi(l('s gr('awr detit|iti(m to the gttMelines contain('d within this p<)licy
(lir('(tivt' ti)v (r(.aliHg and (<>H(ht(ting Ih<+'(:<mv('rged pr()gratn.
t). I+y ()(loiter l, 1994, tit<+"l)(,partm('nts <)fComm('rce and l)('ti'|tsc and NASA will
((_twht(l(' a triag('n( T In('tlt()t_tn(ltttt/ ot agre,tmlent which will f()rmalizc the details o1 tit<+"
,tg('n(i(',+' integrat('(l working fchttionshil), as detincd t)y this directive, Sl)('(il_'ing ca(h
_tK_,_t(),,'s _('_,l)()tt_,il)ilitit's +ttt(I (+otmttitt+_tctits to the cotYvcrge(l systctt+L
V. R('l)+)rling Reqttircn_(.nts
a. l+,v N<)x(,ml)cr I, 1994. lhe l)('partm(rrH of Contnwr(c, the l)c[)arlm('l|l ()I
l)(,li'n,,(., and NASA +,,'ill st,bruit an it|tegraled report Io the Nail(real St'if'it((' lind
T('(hn<)l<)gy (:+)H_,(il (m the itnl_It'm('ntalion Stal_IS of the national l)()la_()tl)iling (_l)``'ra -
It<tHai (.nvif<)nmental satcllit(' syst('nt.
h. For tim lis(al y('ar 199ti bt,dget t)r<wcss, the Dcl)artments of (:()nttm,rce and
I)('ti'ns(' and NASA ',,+,illsul>ntil a q:cn( T I:.t_dget reqtt('slS based <;n tit``" co(tx,(-rgt,d systt'tn, in
a((_).(lall((' wilh Ih(' nfih'stott('s cstat:.lishc([ iH tim lntplct_t(.|ttati<)n ]'lan.
(. F<, tis(al v<'a|' 1997 and h(T.t_(t, lit(' IPO will i)r<wi(h', i)rior _<) tit``' submissi<,_ <)t+
ca(h lis¢:tl _eltt"s htt(Ig('t, ;:tit attnttal rclt(wt t() tlt( + Nati()ttal S(i+`'tt(( • and Tcclt|t(A(_gy
(:()tH+(il +)n th(' Maltls <_l th(' t+ali()|tal l)()laP<)rl)iting <tl)<+'rational envir()nm('nl,d ',,_t¢'llil<'
SVNI('|II.
224 ( )I',S|,2RVIN{, TI IE _2\RI! I FR{ }M SI'A{ 1.:
Document I1-11
Document tide: D. James Baker, Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, U.S.
Department of Commerce, to John Morgan, Director, EUMETSAT, May 6, 1994.
Document 11-12
Document tide: D. James Baker, Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, U.S.
Department of Commerce, to Jean-Marie Luton, Director, European Space Agency,
May 6, 1994.
Source: Both in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
These lette_:_, which ]idlow /rom the Pre._idential Deci._io, Directive of the previou._ d_ O, IMcty 5, 1994),
re_pectivel 3' invite EI'METSAT to join the to,verged s_ttellite _)'_stem and .]ormal 6' i_{/i,m the,
Europe_t, ._mce Agent)' _!] the i,vitatio,.
Document I1-11
l r ul)ber stazl:i}c{l: "May (i, 1{.}{.)4"I
Mr..John Morgan
l}irc{t{)r, EU METSAT
Am l'2lli.iigrtm{l 45
1)-6 1242 Darmsta{h-E|}{'rsta{h
{ ;_ll']]l;_l]) r
l}{'arl{}tm:
] am I}h'asc{l I{} invil{" th{" Eur{}i>{';_n {)rganisali{m It}: the Expl{}ilalion {}t
Mctc{}roI{}gical Satellites (EUMETSXF) I{} consid{q- cxpail{lcd {'{}{}l}{'rati{}ll as an im|}{}r-
l_ill! t}artncr in Ih{" l_!nitcd Stat{'s c{}nv{'rgcd, p{}Ia:;orl}iting {)l}Crali{}nal cnvir{}nm{,ntal
satcllil{'s pY{}gYam.
This wet'k, the Prcsid{qlt b.a,s {Ihc{'l{'{l flit- NaIi{}nal {)c{'ani{ and Atm{}sl}h{q-i{
A{tn]i:listrati{}n {N{)AA), the Dt'|}arlmtql! {}f l){_I{'nsc (I}(}D) and Ih{. Nali{}nal
A{'ronattlics and Sl}a{'c Adntitfistratiotl (NASA) t{, work iog{q]]l,_l - to iml}l{'tnt'nt a c<}tl-
verg{'{I syslem which illtt'gl'tltt.'s NO:M\ and DOD s}rNI{?I|IS while capitalizing {}n NASA tt'ch-
nol{}gy. Bttildil]g {}n ]o:lgslan{ling plans to COOl}{'val{' wilh Eur{}l}{';u] i)a:lll{'rs ill lhis ;u't';L
l|]c I!.S. {;{}vcrnm{'nl's ]}ref{qr{'{l {}]}Ii{}lt lor such {{}{}f){'rali{}n in{hl{t{'s [h{' MET{)P s;_t{'l-
lit{" series assuming U.S. missions rc{luircm{q]ts t{}r such {'{}oi}{'r;_lion can 1}c achi{'v{,{l.
{2{}{}p{qati{}n with Ihe MET(}P satellite series and our EUMETS£I and ESA i}arln{'vs
is criti{a] t{} our efi_,)rts I{} {'tflmn{{' |uvchcr {Icvch}pm{_nt {}f a glol}a[ {}t}{wati{}lml {d}s{wving
syslt-m. Inclusi{}n {}f MET(}P as on{" {}[ lhve{, {_]ellltqlls ill lit{' i}r{.li, qT{,d {{}nverg{'d s:llcllilc
{{}nstt'Iiati{}ll Ull{it'lSC{}z{!_ Ill{' itilt){}ltilll{{' wP t}la{{_ {}ll {+tlvil-lilllllt'lit;d sat{+llitc {<}{}l){'t,t-
li{}li with Otll EIII+{}|}{'_III i};tl+lll{'lS,
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Recognizing these imporlan[ benefits in coopevalion, we propose lhal EUMETSAT
join us in ('X[)]()l'ili_ lh(" ;t('('(;,llllll()(lltli()ll ofcot_verged systelnmissioll i('qnil('lnelllS ill lhe
.joim polar syslem planning Ihal is already underway.
Sincerely,
[hand-signori: 'iJim"]
D. James Bak('r
cc:.lean-M:lviv la.()n, ESA
Document 11-12
,Mr..Jean-Marie I,uton
I)ivector, European Space Agency
_-10, vm' .Mario-Nikis
7"373_ Paris (;edex 15
Fl'illICe
[ruhl)ev staml)e(l: "May 6, I(.)(.)4'']
l)('ar J('an-Marie:
l am wviling It) you in recognition of the important roh, ()f tl)(' European St)ace
AgenCy (ESA), together with the European Organisalion for the Exl)h)italion (if
Mcw()rt)]<igical Satellites (EI.!METSAT), in the MFTOP satelliw series.
This week, the l)vesidcnt directed the National Oceanic and Alm()sphevic
Administration (N()AA), Ill(' I)el)artmenl (if" l)efense (D()D) and Ill(' Nail(real
Act(thin,tics and Spa(c A(hninis/ralion (NASA) to work lt)gelh(w I() implement a c()n-
v('rged s,vslelll whi('h inl(.gra/es N(),_X and DOD systems while capitalizing o. NASA lt'ch-
noloh_'. Building on our longstanding plans )o cooperate with E.ropean partners in lhis
area, the IJ.S. (;t)vernment's preferred filture satellite constellation inchldes lhe METOP
salellite series.
Cooperali()n wilh the METOP satellite series and our EUMETSAT and ESA p:ulners
is critical to our efforts t() enhance further development of a global operational ol)serving
sysleffl. Onr long-lerm understanding is that METOP-related cooperalion will be
addressed in a N(),_L&/EUMETSAT Agreement closely associated with an Agreement
helwe(!n EUMETSAT and ESA. Our desire to include METOP as one of three elen'JeVJls in
lhe converged salellite constellation underscores the importance we place on envir(in-
menial salellile (()operation with our European partners.
Re(()gnizing Ihe iml)(irlant 1tenet]Is Io cooperation, we are proposing lhal EUMET-
SAT j(/in N()AA in exploring the accommodation of converged syslem mission require-
/nenls into lhe .joint United States/European polar system planning that is already
ilndelway.
Sincerel_
co:John Morgan, EIJMETSAT
[hand-signed: "Jim"]
D. James Baker
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Document 11-13
Document title: Peter C. Badgley, Program Chief, Natural Resources, NASA, "Current
Status of NASA's Natural Resources Program," Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium on
Remote Sensing of Environment held 12, 13, 14, April 1966 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan, 1966), pp. 547-558.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
NASA tu;¢an its natural resources program in 1965 with the [_oal o] _ludyiJ_g the l:'arlh flora space,
l _nsure O]what observational technique off(red the greate._t utility, the agen O' c<mducled a number o/
e, cpeJ4ment._ /?ore aircrqfl in an attempt /o de/elmine optimal instrument des|fin ]m _atellitev I'et,'_
lJadLrbT, head of the Natural ttesourc,'._ l_rog'ram at NASA, prew, nted lhe re._ults o/the expe_7metd_ rtl
a svmpo._ium on remote sensing sponwned tO' the l)epartment o/the Na_ 7 k Office o/Naval lIegearch
att_t the Air I')_rce ('amb_Tdge Reseawh l_aboratm'ie.s. 7"he result.g helped clar!iy i.gsue_ abmtt coorditta-
lion lwt_u,en NASA and the lh_hartme_t _![ the Interim; which wa,s intetwted in beg4_tnin<,can Earth
resoutve .gitrvQ prok,nam r_' ils own.
[547]
Current Status of NASA's Natural Resources Program
l'cter C. Badgley
l'rogram Chief, Natural Resources
National Aeronautics and Space Administration l leadquarters
Washington, D.C.
ABSTRA('T
Thc National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is supporting research
activities in those areas of renlotc sensing lioin Earth-orbiting spacecraft which aft' rchlt-
ed io the study of ilalillal cultural It_SOllrces. These sensors ale believed io possess a nlllll-
bcl o( uniqut" advantages t_)i the discovery, invt_nlory, evahialioll, devt_lOl)lnenl alld
COltst'rvalion of such it, Sollr(es. Mally (;ovt'illnielll agcnties, univt'rsilies, and rt,st'aicl_
inslittilions aYe cooperaliilg wilh NASA in this cf|orl. ]'lit" curlenl slaltlS i)f lhis pro/_ralll
is di'scritietl in this paper.
I. INTRODUCTION AND OB.IE(;I'IVES OF NASA'S NATUIL,\I_ AND
CUI3"UILM, RES()UR(;ES i'R()(;RAM
Natural resotirccs are dclined as lllose llalurally oceulring illalcfials, sticll as nlineral
deposits, lilnbcistands, and fresh walCl, which are of value to inankind. (]ullural res()illCes
arc delined as those items of valile Io Illali which result fl'Olll Ilis own aciivilit's and alC in
geneia] derived frolli lilt" naltira] rl.souftt,s.
_illce World Year I aiil)ofnt_ illapping t)y ]lllolograpliic niealiS has Ill!eli lised eXlell-
sivcly for tilt' sltidy of llallllal alld cllilulal reso/liC('s. Radar ;tlld |fillareal SellSOl-S havt'
I)een ilsed io a lesser t,xlcnt, l tistofically, lilt" dcvelol)lllelli ;llld list" of Sil(h ll'chlliqllt.'s }l_tS
been tosicred by Illl' inilitary, bill in ie(elll years llltwe ]iavt' lit't'li widest)read applicalioils
1)t'yond the lnililary tield, l)uring Ihe pasl lhlet" dt,cadl's civil and cOlnlnl,r(ia] inleresls
have also used airliOllle inlaging devices very SllCtessfullv. hi addition, gravity, illagnelit,
and radioaclive illeasuring illslrUllit'lilS have ill'i'll apl)iicd 1o Ihc st'arch t_)l Illinefai and
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petrolettm (lel)(>sh.s. It+ the F,ast l_+w years hnaghlg sensors in ttnnlamled and rammed
Sl)acecrall have been emphhved to lmwide lhe firsl Irue synoptic coverage of the lilhom-
|)here, hydrosphere, and atmosphere.
The <)l+jectives of the NA,+';A N;itmal Res<mrces lh<_grmn m+e as f<)llows:
I. 'I'<_d,t'lermine those itattnal and (ldtura] r('s(mrce data which can be acquired
best from space(raft lot the l)cneI]l ol+ mankind.
2. To test and deveh_ F, the l:,est comh, ination oI+ ohservati<mal ]jt_cedm-es, instru-
ments, sul)sysl(,ms, arm interF, relive techniques Ibr the acquisition an(l slu(h of
l,t'rreslrial, ]tlHnr, _|lld F,lanetary natural and ctdtura] resource data from Sl)_tce-
,r_rMl.
3. T<+ determine how lhe increased frequency and syn<_l)tic <<wetage mligueh;
all_wded hy SF,acccrall _d)servalhms can aid the sltulv m>ftim,.' variant and lelaliv( (-
ly unchmlging l)hetmmena on the stufa(+e of the EaJ+th.
4. 'I'o develop impr_ved methods of displaying m+d (lissenlinating space-acquired
naluritl and ctllttn+a] resonrce data on a gh)ha] l)asis sttitahle for utilizali+>n 15'IX]
by scicntifi( +, technical, mid commercial interests.
5. To deternline whbch nattn-al and cuhlmtl resour(e dala ('an be most etib(livelv
and ec<momicall+v _dmtined by manned sl>acecraft, unmanned satellite, interr<>-
gati()n ()f Slll'l_l('e SellSl:,lS, ()I"the lllealIS (tlrlellll_/heill_ llSed.
(+. I'o dis('ovel', l)y vh'tue of trained scientists hl spacecraft, what unloreseen natural
and cuhural l+es<)ur(.+.,s <:,r g,eos(+ience F,hen<)mena ma,y be ol)servaMe lr<ml lit("
overvicw availabh., al <_rhital ahitutles.
A large numl)t+r ol l)otenlial users having interests ill a VmJely (it geoscientilic pl+<d_-
less told apl>licalionm ]+ave been identified:
I. Agriculture/Forestry Resources,
2. (',e<Nral>hy ((:uht_ral Resources),
3. (;e<+h_gy/ltydr<dog_, (Mine,al and Water Resources),
4. ()cean<_gral+_hy (Marine Rcsomces).
2. P()SSIBI+E PttEN()MENA WHI(:tt MAY BE ()BSERVEI) AND
RE(:ORi)EI) AI)VANTA(;EOU SI,Y FROM SPA( :El ;ILM_F
Eigure I gives a partial listing <if phenomena which can tie advantageously "slapped"
tr<iln space and those types oF sensors that may be used, based on the state-olUthe-art. As
new ()r h<'llcr sens()rs are devel<_fied, the listings of observable i)henomena will t:tnd(mht-
edly grow. The word "maplmd" is used here to mean that certain natural and (uhttra]
resources phenomena are observed from space and recorded on photographs, images,
tapes, or other data storage media. After these raw data are recovered and analyzed, the
perlinent inti>rmalion is plotted on appropriate hases which become thematic maps.
These lhetnalic maps, together with written reports, constitute one of the princit)al end-
t)rodtt(:ts expected of the Natmal Resources Pr<)gram.
3. t!NIQI rIs'+AI)VANTA(;ES OF SPACE FOR NATUIL&I, RESOURCE STUDIES
There are many advantages to obtaining imagery of the entire Earth or tnajor parts of
it hy tile;illS ot Sl)acehol'ne geosci(tn(e SellSillg systelllS. These systenls ellCOlllpHSs kl Illllll-
her of insn-unlents and techniques applicable to many disciplines+ hoth cuhural and nat-
ural, and of use to scientitic and applications users. 'I+hese systems have the unique ttlililv
of <+omtih,menling one another in their resttlts, hence their hroad appli<ations.
For sizahle areas within the tield of view of the sensor, spacecrafl coverage is trttly syn-
optic he(mtse lhe high ahitttde and speed of the sl)a(+e(Tatt t)el+lnit tile scientist to ohtain
inl()rnlation of large areas ;it a single instant of time. This is of great advantage to research
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workin tileEarthsciencesandinnaturalresources,whichhavebeenhamperedbythe
timeandspacescalesthatarisein the mcasuremcn! of the variable under inw_stigation.
Further, there is iufi)rmation in (he wh()le pattern of an imegrated Stlllcture which can
neither t)e derived ti()m elements of the whole nor considered simply as tile sum of the
e]c'lllel) Is.
An important advantage of satellite photography is the aspect of real-time data acqui-
sition. With this characteristic remote areas of special significance could be canvassed <m
shol't notice, thus providing inlbrmation on impending disasters such as tsunamis, and
forest fires, and studying disaster areas which resull fixml storms, earthquakes, etc. Many
of these problems stwh as earlhqtmkes, volcanoes, air-sea interactions, fish migrations,
crop growth, and disease, etc., a)e global in nature and are consequently best sludied by
globe encircling data gathering systems.
15491 For complete aerial photo,graphic coverage over largc areas many technical prob-
lems pertaining to data reduction exist, fiw example, the assembling of broad-scale
mosaics. Here the photos must be nlatched, and corrections in densit,,, scale, or <ol<w
rt.l)roduclion I)e made, and tinally the joining lines must be reduced as much as possible.
Using space photography would reduce these tasks to a minimum since one space photo-
graph, depending on scale, will cover many times the area as most aerial photographs.
The long duration of spacellights and all-weather operations are highly advantageous
aspects of remote sensing from space. There ave many regions of the Earth that are cov-
ered with clouds for long periods of lime. Tile cloud cow,r not only absorbs and reflecls
a large parl of the radialion t]'om tile Sun to tile Earth, but also absorbs radiation fi'om
the Earth out into space. In a manned orbiting satellite the problem can be partially over-
¢<mle since the scientist on board file craft will be able to see when an area is clear enough
to make observations and to also employ those sep, sors which can penetrate certain types
of ovelcasl. A less obvious but highly significant advantage resuhs t?om the clearer images
ix)ssible where lhe obsevvaliol_ is znade ftom faf above the turbulent refiacting and ¢lit:
fusing layer which otten seriously degrades aerial observations.
With orbital sensing, it al)peaYs Itl;)1 the costs will be considerably less than even a sin-
gle synoptic global coverage with aircraft. This is true because of the great amount of data
that can I)e rapidly acquired, of the more complete coverage, and of the superior quality
of some of the data which greatly reduces the effort needed tbr processiHg and analyzing.
[,ow-altitude photograllhy applied to natural resource surveys and expltwation has
proven It) be of great value. However, up-t(_tate and cOtllpl-ehellsive data require ti-etluent
overflights and near blanket coverage; thus extensive aircraft acquisition is prohibitively
costly. Since the resolving power of remote-imaging instruments from satellite altitudes
will be sufficient to permit identification o1" many different parameters of Earth resources,
a potential means of economically acquiring such data on a world basis is offered.
A tmlher advantage of orlfilal sensing is tilat global coverage (:an be obtained by u))i-
foim types (If eqtfipmenl and mclh()(ls of calibrati<m and measurements. This will insure
Ihat data will I)e collected ullder controlled conditions and will nol bc sut)jected to these
uncertainties. Obvious technical ;),1<1 operational advantages resuh from lilt" precise reg-
ularity of spacecraft motion, from tile lack of vibration, and from the high rate of speed.
The Earth-orbital missions are also of gre'al value tier lhe experience gained and the
testing of sensors and techniques prior to the conducting of lunar and planetary orbital
missions.
World-wide resource management through the use of operational spacecraft will pro-
vide a combination of scientitic, sociological, political, and economic benetits. Through
resource managemem, man is able to monitor tile total resource availability, make effi-
cient use of existing resources, protect existing resources against damage or loss, and
uncover new resources. To be effkwtive, action must be taken well in advance of the deple-
lion of available resources. Thus accurate data on CUl-it?llt inventory and rate of depletion
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furnishes llw Imsi¢ inlortnation required to anticipatt+ f<wth¢oming prcsstnes on
rcsottrc_s and to indicate appr<)priale steps to be lilkcll.
4. A(;COMI'IASIIMENTS T() I)ATE
With the assistance of disciplinary groups in sew'ral Fedt+ral agcncit+s and institutions,
l+rogram definilion activities tlaw" been initiated in the four disciplinaty areas. Many of
lhe l)h¢'n<mlena which each n_:ltlll+il l'USOllF¢(r disciplitle wishes Io <)bs¢'rvt' at+<l record liom
Sl)a¢c have lwen i+h'ntili¢'d (Figure I). The instruments and their frt'quencies needed to
gather these dala have also been 155o1 identilied as closely as possible (Figure I).
The coordinated r_,qtfirements of the several natural lCS<itllC¢" disciplines for l)hotog -
taphy mid rlidat" on inilial liights havc l)+,+etl compiled ill <+h)cttnltqlt Ibt+m. A d<>¢ument of
inliared itlstrum_+tH r_rqtfit+trmClllS is l>cing prepared. All)urns of imagery acquired by this
ilircrilft program togt'th_'r wilh SlJaCt+craft-acquircd image,r), r (from (;<:miHi, Nimbus, etc.)
of value to II+tllll';tl l(+SOlll'((t scielltists are beitlg cotnl)ih'd. All <ttlas which analyzes thc
l)_llc'tilial o[ l[lis dallt [br ilalUlal rtrsOtllOf scientists is in l)repatalion.
()ll_" of lh_ _ t)rill¢il)al lltsks <)t" this Program is the deitwmination of tht" best conil3in_t-
li_tl of ittstrUllt_'HIs itllfl lht" b,t'sl tt's<_hllions fol+ obst'rving II+lll.ll'ill I'('sI)lll'(tt I)h('ll()lll<.'llit.
"I'hc'st' <u+t• ctHv¢rntl): t)t'in_ id¢'tltified, lloweww, t,ntil several gcn<'talions of insllunlt'lilS
hav_' been Ilown in sl)act' and tIw d;tta analyzed, it will 1)c iml)ossibl¢" to I)c. c<mlplett'ly pre-
(-is(,()n Sll(]l illSlFUlll(!lll Sl)e¢ilic;tti<ms.
'I'hl' valiollS lt,lllOlc, sl,nsing illSll'ttllIClllS I'(+¢Ollllll_'lldl+d t)y lilc+ discitilinary gl-l)tlpS ill('
t)l'ing tlowii o'¢tq+ (+alx'fililv sl'h'('lod l_'sl sites with aircr_tl]. Thl" Elilllt ot)lainl+d fi+oill Stlch ll'sl
sill' <lvi'i'llighis ill'(+' Itl('ll studicd 1o dl'l(!l'lnill_.+ Ill(" best ¢<lnibinali<)ll of illSll'tlillt!llts till+
st)acc'tiighl alld tht_ I)cst _tnalylical i)lOCtlSses f<)F acqtliFilig ihe ilKtxilillilli alnOlllit of +inlili--
ill,ill,in ll<liii lilt! d+ila. A¢¢<ltlll)lishilit'ilts in tilt'st <" areas ilrl;, desci+il)t,d iii detail below.
I. I AIR(;RAFI' I)ATA (;;Yl'l IERIN(; SX+%TEM
Thl+ Naltnal Rt'sotlrct+s f)iograill I<lgt'th0f with tilt' MS(; IMainlt'd Space Ct+nlei'l
I']nginl'l'i'ilig _iild l)l>vt'l<lf)liil'iil I)irt,ctOliitt, is I)rl'st-nlly tqlgligt,d ill ,_alht'riilg dala <)'¢_'1
ll'sl sili+s with a ntiillt)t'l <if ilirl)<iint, ¢'lectronie and oh'¢tro-<)l)lical i_'inot_" scnsoi-s li)i il
llliliitit'i ol +ilSl!l- iigl'li(ic+s iiiid ¢oo])+<'ialill_, scientist+s.
This l)r<lgl+iinl Ii_ts lll,t,ii st'l ti i) Io obtain l)reetlrSOf daia till thc ¢alibi+ali<ln <if illSli+tl -
lilt'ills ovt'r kiioWll tt,liltirt,s illitl |<li + ihc dcvelopnienl of th+._ l)cst ot)st'rvational and illlt'v-
t)rclivc it'ctini<:lUCS iii Iht' t)twiod I{t(i5-1988 preceding thc carlicsl (1968) Ilatillal
l+CSOililt! st)acctlighi lliissiolis. Ftllltlt'l +, ihe costs of devclot)in _ stich ;.i data gatheiillg sys-
tCili inilially wiih aiil)oln+.! inSllillnents is substantially l¢+ss lilan pl+oceeding directly lo _i
st)+i¢lq)oiiit! syslt,lii. The t!×l)0iit'nt:o gabled in tills aircraft phast+ (196r1-1968) is already
tiiovidiiig a solid basis liii plannilig <)f the spaceflight testing pilase.
It is e×pocit'd lttai aii+(Taft-aCqlliled data will also be obtained OVel + _1 nlllnl)cl of key
lt_sl sill+s sinitiltant!OllSly with the initial spaceflight data ill ordei + thai the spacetlighi
iliSlrlliilvnls lii+iy 1)_' calil)raled +tild in order ihat tile aircraft and si)a¢l'¢iafl data ll+iity (oill-
lih+iiit'iil each <)lilt'i" Io Ihc Ill_lXilllllln t'xl(tnt.
<t.2 S'l'Xl'trS ()F TIlE ]\IR(:RAI:I" PRO(;RAM
It ¢itli t)+<! st't!ii llxlin Figure I that each siqls<lt has niultil)lc lists, and in inosl cas(,s ii
¢oilil)iillili<lil of s('llSlilS is d_'sital)le l<i f)rovide Colnplel_" ditl+i oil +iilx' p_ulicular ol)st'l"¢t'<l
frail til_'.
"I'll ¢itlly Olil lht' ll'liiOll' StqlSillg ])l-ligl'itlll in a satisf{iclory lllanlll'l, il is llt'¢t'sslii-v 1<)
(Olldli¢l iiii¢litfl ll,slillg tioili st,vl,i-lt] iillilildt's (low, iilll'rlnt'dilil/', _illd hi<_h) <w_'r it llt'riod
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of several years. Thc low-altitude phase, _thitudcs u l) to 2(),0()0 I+.'t't, is presently being con-
ductt'd rising tilt" N,.\SA-MS(_ (_onv;tir 240A (NASA 926) OVeF sites in lit(" (;<mtinent_tl
t;nitod Statt.s. It is l>Im+n<:d to condtLct thu sect)rid l_has<.• +Italtittld('s ti]) t_ -40,000 l,.'c't <_ver
tlt<.' sltln¢' tt'st sites _tnd ovt_r scveral <)v¢'rseas sites. The lllir(l phase' should I)_' c_indtt<Icd at
high altitttdes, possil)ly t, F, to St+),()()() feet over the same. test sites, t;Itinmtely, it inav ];,t'
highly desirable dnring the early Eartll-orl+ital missions l<i have lh¢' ,_rotmd trtltli t('_itn_, on
tht" site+, lind the aircr+tfl ov(.rht'ad al thc time the+ orbiting, sl;,a(ecrait overllvs the mea.
[551 ] (;om,'air 240A
Iml)lcnwntation of this airF, lalw was initialed in October 19(+4, lind initial sm-vey oper-
ations <)vt'r gt'_)l,_)gi,_ test sites got tllld<:rw_+t'v ill c_li'lv [)cceml),t'l + 19(H. First flights wt't-("
madc tlsili_ only 1h¢" c_itnera systt'ms; olhCl- iilstftlltWiltS W_+'I'(" installt'd +is lhev l)('(_lill( +
avail+tl+le. The airplane is now schedttled to its full capability of S('llS++ll'S [llld li<) a(lditi<mal
ones are being plmmt'd at this time for this aircraft+ Following is a list ol lhose sensors
inst_tlh'd on board:
I+ Microw;ivc rltdi<+m('t¢'r,
7. Mr'trio clitnt'r_t systt+in,
?l. Mtlllil),llid (illiit'i_t svslt'in,
4. tlhravioli't ililli<_l+r,
_'l. Rt_(oii IV iiilli<_in_ iR,
6. Rt,d<_p s(_ill('rollit'lt'l +,
7. I)ol)ph'r ctiirl)hit4 r_ldlii;
l,ockht'ed P-3A ([lectt+a)
This _lirl)lail¢" was +icgnh+ed in I)t,c¢,tnl)t,r 19G5 and is idc,allv stilted as a rc,nl<ltt, st, nsor
It'sl _iircr_tli t_)r aililudt.s tip t<l 41),()01) t_'el _litd (oiil+iin+ intich <)1 ih(' t)+lsic inslfltnii'nl_ilioii
iil,lt,ssliiv l<l iiit'<.'l tilt" objcctivt's o1 lhl' Niillll'_il ]_.C'SOIIIt't's ])i'O_i',iill. "Hit' iiltvi,_iliOll s'+'slt'lil
<'Olil_iins lh(" I<)lloxviii<_ ilt'ms:
I. APN 153 dolspl('r iiltx'i_tlot++
2. ASA 47 +til-lllllSS <.'Otiti)til('l\
3, ].N 17 +iililudt" it'ti'iencl • syst_,iil+
4. In('riill] I)]iil lot+In,
._>. AS(_ _0 wt',ilh+.'r iitld ,_rotttld ])oil/l rlidltl +,
(). APN 7t) L()IL\N ovcrw+iicF navi_+ilioii svsl('in,
This c(]uil)ntt'nl will l)rovidt, Ih(' tli<Rht ]),ticiinl, l(,rs sucli its r<d], l)itch, )'it,,++", _l-+llllld
si)t't'(I, lit'_idiil_, ttililtldt', ])osilion, t'l(+., I<)r S0llStir <ll)('rltlion. dlllli ('l)lT('l+ili<lll, +lnd illiVi-
,R+ilion of lht, iiircr,i|i. "flit" _iir<:r_ifl has bolil il ]_tll_t ' c_tl)in _ii-('a _tiid +t l)<)itil)-I)+tx' ;ti('ii whll a
iilililbl'r of r_idolilt.s +iiid iilSllUllit'lil lil<)tliitiii<_ i)r_lvisions in which to install st'iisor svs-
lt'nis +liid ol|it'r t'xi)('riitit'iils, Wilh lit(' installation ot till iuixili+trv l)owt'r tiiiil, o])('ialioil
wilhoili tht" us+.' of _i-Oulld-t)ast'd sl+irtin_ equil)lllcni _iiid oth0r _rolind siil)i)orl i'(liiil)-
Ilit'iil will be p<>ssil)h!. Tht" P-3A is liOW l)t'ill_ iilil)]('ni/'iil/'d 1o i'('cl'iv(' ii i'<)inl)iimt'iil Isi<l
<if S('iI+';OI+S Imsicallv as dcscl+ilx'd hi I;i_tlr¢' 7 lind is i)iann¢'d to I)c ill oi)crltlion by.lilly or
Ail_tisl o1 19(16.
])ou,_hts A-3B
This airi)lan(' contains a Wcslin_lionst' ANI'APQ 97 (XE-1 ) sidc-l<iokin<_ radar svstt'in.
]1 h_is c_)lni)i¢'l('d st'v+<'iil,,-lW<) hliuls <if t]i<Rhi lillit' iic<ttlilin _ r_td_tl ilillt_('l)' <)vl'r ii Iiliiilt)l'l
of Jr'st slit's _tiid olhl'r iilt'iis ()|+ iiilt,rt,sl. All additional sixtx iiolliS of (]i/.r, hl liint" h_ls I)(,t,il
i-t'(lilt'Slt'(t (lwt'lilv hotii's in 1+]: 1{)1_6; t0rt+_ ' ]i()tiis ill PY 19ti7),
F+XPlx )RING I IIE [. rNKN< )'¢¢N _'I l
[ _,_2 } t._ ()l_l E( ;'rIVES ()F TI I E 'lEST SITE I'R( )(;RAM
The prime _>l_iccti\'cs _)t ihe Nalm_tl Rcstmrct,s "h's/Site Program arc c;tlil)vathm of Ihv
rcm()tc sens()rsaud th<.dcvch_pmcnl (_Ia calmhilitylhv supporlin_ the use of i-cm<_itcscn-
s()r,s in l>('rJ<Jritrlirlg n;ittzl++fl r('s<)ttrc('s im+¢,sliK;lli<ms. T() m('('t this ol+i('(iti'+'e, scienitisls ;u('
(tav+r(!rllly g_llxer/vt_ (htta with eh'('lv<)ni¢ and (+]('(Ivo oplic_tl r('mott' st'nmvs i!n _It|([ <)v('r
;11"('+Is<)l" SF,et'ific intei+('st. Ex;tml)h's <d ;th-('l-_l.l'l illld (h.'vlihii-;tcqttircd ,flutist +ire sltmvn ill
Fi_urcs _'_-7. [ Fi_Hv(',s :'_-7 omitl('(l] Thc dat_l lhus ;tct'IHh'('d ++'ill tht'n l)t' tried m:
I. ,\d',,amt, <>tlt kl++:,',+vh,d_t' (;,f tht' c]h'cls <)l l('rl3lill [+)[tl-itlH(Plf'l'S ()it SCllSOf d_Ua,
'_. Pl'<:,.'h'h • it tilt'SillS <)I (';lli])litt]ll_ thtta l('ltn'll ll(Hll s('tlSf)l'S ]I] ;thx'r;th ||lid sp+tc('cntl't.
_+. |)t'l'lltC st'its(H + ()])('l+titit)l+l_:t] |)_tl_ili)(,lt+t',':, _tl+([ _])itt't'('|'+tl'I ilUt'_l;Ili('+,,ll l't'(]llil+(!lll('l+l+.
I. l)evtqo I) data h_tndlin_ att(| hltel+prc't,_tti<)tt tc(llniqtlt',s.
:+;. l)('fin(' ,,+cnsov s',sl¢'ms It+>meet the sch'nitifi( ol_jectivcs <)1 Eavth-orl)it_l missi(,r+.
6. Provide +t _r(mp otsch,tllists skilh'd in iiF,plic+lti(m <)t' r('itnt_tt'lx r st,nscd d;tm to nat-
Ill'it] I'('S(llll'C('_, hix'csli_ilti()itlS.
,I.+I131'ES ()F TEST AREAS
Expcrichtt" in s;itudies t<l date have indicated that Im_ lyp_'s <it"It's| ill'|!|is of sit,.',,; ;ux,
ncc(,ssllry. The Ihsl type is dr'signaler[ its all "hlslrutncllt (:ill|Illit|it)it Tt'st Sit('," and t_)r
at:,l>rt'viiliti<m ptlrF,<lS<:s is r(qi+,rr¢,d t<l as it "Test Stile." The scc<md l+vp(' is th'sigliated its il
"N;Ittmll Rt.somces Applicllti<ms A!r('ra, "'and filr abbreviilti<m F,m+p()s('s is r('fi'rre(l to its ;in
"Apl)lic,m<ms Art.it." Figurt's 8-1+2 zive it complete list of the currcmlv pr<)poscd
Apl)lhilth)ns Art.its ;Ind +]('sl Silcs till(| Ith(! llltlil('s of lilt, s('i('misls r('sp(_nsil)h' i_ll (hill|
iumlysis ill lhcst" silcs. [Figur<'s _-I 2 <)ill|lit(l|
A Tt'sit Sit<' is ;in iux'a wht'l'e sltidics iuw coliduclt'd h/ Ihe calilmlti_ln _)t tilc insitrli-
lilt.lilts, |hose studies will |test iilslrtllti(_'llt resl)otisc Io wi'll-ih'thicil pit'sch't il, d condili(itis.
'lhsks will htichldc lilt' d('v('hJi)ili('lll ill inll'il)rtq_ilh)n aild corrl'htlioil ll'('hiih|ii_'.s, ;iil¢l
iilvcsiti[iiliOliS ()1 lhc rl'sl)<)il_t" o1' Ilit" IX'illl)lc St:lllOit's hi lerliiS ill' hh)l()<_i_iil, ch('llihiil, iiiid
])h),si(_li C()ll([ili(lliS in Ihc ;lit'i'll. Ai)t)iii;_llions Al(!_i_, _tl'l! ilrl'ii_ Wilt'r(.' t'xlcilSiV(" ilive.siil41i-
lioliS ;irl> (Oil(hillcd ilSill_ fllll):-dcvt,h)p('d hl_;lriiill('iit_ Ill [;<ilhcr |till[ illl('rpl't'it (hiit;i hi
ICrlii_; ()t lh(" _ill'ii+_ kllliWll conditi(ms ;tiid t'e;tllll-i_s, i%g., _t[ri('itllttit_il, <L[l'o[rlil)hh++ <_e()h)_-
ic, hyihxlh)gic, itllll ()(t,itlll)t._,rill)hh. These ipplic_llions Areas It'l_llalhely include il llllllibt'l"
ill" illl('l'll;lli<lll;tI sill's which hlm" |)(:cil chi)s('n prillcipalIv t<l prm'ide (lllllt till prohh'lllS ill
lit(' v;IriOliS l']ili+lh sch'lices, lhal ill'(.' g iol);t] ()1 tt)illili('nlli] in s(()])(" ||lit[ Io l)iXlliiol(" hlitcr-
Illiliolllil i <lopi'rltlion ill liil(' with N'ASA's policy.
Tt'sl Sil('s sh<Jllit[ h;ivt! the ti)lh)wintg ch_lracteristics:
1. Tht'v intlSl s;ili.sl_, lh(" reqilii+cnit'iits (it+tht' spccith; hlslritnleiit i_) l)(" leSl('d ill whal-
('vl,r dt'vl'li)pllli'nl s,tli_P il ¢'xisls.
7. Thcrt, s|i<)til<l t)t" itvltil;il'Jh' till t'xlen.sive mll<)lllll lit _rlilllld (lliitli st) lht'Y d<) li(il
ieqllirt' cxit'tlsi','c hltsh sltl(t).
'3. rhcv sh()uhl hc its uiiil(irill it.% pmsil)h', (()li/int, llsttr_tl(" with Ithc I)tlilt()s_,' tilt which
scli'cii'd+ s<l _ls to p('rinit i(Icilliti(athm of thl" rt'lll()Ic Si'llSitl + ri'Si)l)llS( , will| ;t
_;ilil._]t" {<)l illininllnil illllli|)('r O|) ti,_iltll'e.S.
:\])[)li(itti()tls/\l'('ilS shotlhl tie:
1. AI'('ilN hi whhh slllflie's t)y Ill(" l;lltl'liciplilhlt_, itgt'llC),' (of ()lit" ()fits ('()()p('l-illhl_ liter'li-
tit's (ir instiluti<ins) ill-i- takhll_ plat(" ()it h;avc i_i.kCll plae(" in th(' r(x;('lll l)a,si.
I r>;>'._l7.:\ t';is Ill' l)i'olid mtiul_tl i'('s()tlr('t's ill- sch'i/lith' hllt_i't'st, whh scitmiiih' l't':.;,liill'l't's
l)r(lhh'iilS wli(lst" s(ihlli(litl will ('()lllFihlll(' t(I the pro_,ress in the _'iN,]itllll'ii] Rcs(iitlr('<'s
[)ix)_ritnl.
:_. Al-('iis with wt'il-(h)(tinicititt'([ t('iilllr(.s ;tn(l t<)r whhh lilt'r(' i_ lilt ii(liv(' s(i('nlisl [)re-
t)itr('(I I<) ;ili;ilv/(' _,('11,%t11- {hill| ||lid r(_p()ri Oli r(,suhs hi ii (()till)tit'|it lllilliil('r.
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lnlernati.nal At)pitt:aliens Areas should:
1. (;omain features and conditions not well-devehl|)ed or availal)le in lhe U.S.
2. Be readily accessible to all accre(tited scientists of other (ountries inv(ih.ed in the
Program and should not be located it, ('(-*tltllFies WllCle political instability c(,tt/(l
adversely Mtk_ct the Program.
3. Be areas in which studies can be a(leqtlalely supported and which pl+esenl ml
logistic problems.
4.5 SELE(;TION (iF SH'ES
Pr(ispectivc Test Sites are proposed by the instrumenl and/or disciplinary scientists
wifll al)t)roval tieing vested ill an ad h(I( .... l'est Site and Aircrati (_(mmlittee." This
(:ot/l[niltee is tilailt'd t)y lilt" Chief, Nalura[ Res(itirces Ihogranl, <)r his deputy, and is ((>hi-
posed of lhe l)rogrilnl illlilia_ers (if the several tlattiral all(| clihilral resotirc(.s disciplines
alld tile ('liairliieii (if the "l('aiiis." A(lual invesiigati(ins are (atTied ()ul I))' scienii._is ilflili-
tiled with Iii(" hi.qrunicnl leains, in lhc 1)arlicii.i,iliiig Federal agenci('s, iuid at univcrshies
linder NASA cliiilra(l.
4.6 CURRENI' STATLTS (iF TEST SITE A(:TIVITIES
Studies of Test Sites started in 1964 wilh inliarc(I studies at tile Pisgah Crater Area,
(]alilin'nia, for geohigy and at tilt- Purdue Fal+ill [or i+l<_riculitlre. '1]1(" nllnli)er ()1 stu(lit+s
in(Teltsl'd ill 1{t65 with a(Idiliotlal studies in _slern Kitnsas; M()il()(haters, (ialiti)rnia;
[)avis, (]alif(irnia; Weslaco, Texas; and Will(ox Piaya, Arizona. (]oiw(iniilanlly, file work at
the <)ri@na[ was I)roadene(l Ill illchide other _ellS()l-S.
_7ork itl tile Test Sill's is being carried out [)rint:il)illly I)y scicnlisls of file illslrullleill
l('iiillS workiiig ilil(|er NASA COiltrltcts or gralllS. (]lirr(-iil _la01s (it "Tesl site' sludii's is
given in Figlire ]3. [Fig,ire 13 ()nlilled]
+Millly o1 these nleastirelllelllS aild ])riibleiliS require the (lcveh)l)nleni ()t new siti(|y
concepts. For e×atnple, statistical salnpiiilg ])rogra[lis are being developed t)y geologists at
N()rlhweslern [hliversity. (;e()st+ietllists ti'()lll the University (if Neva(|a art: workillg with lh("
illSlrlilllt'ills and Ilser scientists to (|elernline lhe illtltiellce ()1 the not usually lllelisllre(i
])ilr_lillelers on rein(ile sells(ir data, as well as t)roviding very de,ailed geol(igica], miiler-
al(igical, anti micriinwlt'(ir()higical dala. Similar slu(ties are tieing carried (till in tile other
discit)linary _lleas.
Aiit)(Wllt' r('llllile sellsor tLtla itle 11()1_%beillg il('qliired liver a lllilll|)ei" o1 Ai)i}li(:aliolis
Art',is, alid are tieing slu(lie(I lind cvalual('(1 |)y I)arii(il)ating lix(>r ag(+il(iy sci(>nlisis. +,%+lilt,libel-
of |)reliinhiary tel)|iris have ]9('('11 wrhit.n des(Tibilig the liSeS o1 lilt" (lala. Aiiliougli lllis pro-
,_rlilli is in its illlhli(y, il al)pear$ lliai llie ol)jeiiives o1 lhe All|,lira,,(ins AI-eas are I)(,ing llll'l.
4.7 I)ATA PR()('.ESSIN(; AND I)ISTRIBUTIN(; UNIT
The l)ala I)rocessing and l)istrii)uihlg thlit (Data Unil) tias been (,stat)lished it) hall-
die lilt' dala recorded I)y severill kinds (if retllote sellsors, I)()th electr(inlagnelic anti |iir('i.-
tield, on,,(lard NASA-ci)n(hlcle(l air(Ta|i aild littler c()()])eralillg |lights over seh'(ted
geostience test siles. A(l(lili<ina[ calil)ration and gr(nln(l-refi'reilce data is also (<llie<l(.d ill
S()llle specitic grotltld-sile hlstallalioti_; using (()nta(l or sh<)ll-range sellsors |iir correlatioil
ali(l (()rr(iborllti(_ti <it the ilirborile rt_in()l('-selis(ir dala. The |)lii|)o_(" (l|'._ti(h ((lliecli(iiis is
t(/ aid in evahialillg lhe iise|ilhiess (if al)l)arallis ai_(l dalli anlilvsis lechniques t(_l ielii(lle
sensii,g <)r155,ti ilalllrlil iill(I (till lira| reslitlr(0$1iv llle_lliS oJ sl)a(el)orlle ilislriliilelilali(in.
This iliVlllves a tiiiinl)('r ill ([i|tT<q+t'ill data t(lilllals ([ihll, l)apcr, lal)es, ('tiart_;, ell,) lii-(ivi(l-
hlg ret'<irds whi(h preseilt lhe data hi a variety <if tornls, i.e., digilal, anal(ig, alpha-
lllitllei'i(', elc.
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Tile Data Unit will in'rl<)rm the li)llowing functions ill SUl)p()rl <)f the NASA Natural
R(!sonl( es Pro|rain:
1. Process, reproduce, catalog, class|t}; index, disseminate, store, and tel(|eve |co-
science data (original, reduced and/or analyzed, including preliminary, interme-
diate, and final relmrts ) received flom NASA-sul3ported, or cooperating renlote
SCII,%iIIg O1" ilalnra] l('S,l')llrue5, Jnv(:stJgators.
2. Provide supl_lcmcntal SUl)l)Ort by maintaining an adequat<.' supply of charts and
malls relating l() test sites anti I)y condncting file searches and relate(I services.
Sucb (ha(Is and malls will ))e supplied t+ronl standard sourc('s.
3. (',Omllih" and furnish l)eriodic access|tin lists of (lata to cooperating investigators.
Accession lists will indicate type and size of lormat, originatol; sensor type, geo-
grapbic area, altitude, lime and (late of acquisition by originaloJ: This int;mma-
lion may |)t' h+ tit( +fin-n+ of computer prhlt-onls.
4. l)('sign and snl)ply che(k lists to investigators ft," sul)nfission of data t<) the 1)ata
|!nit. These +hock lisls will COlltaJn minimum ternls, descriptions and inl<)rma-
tion re(inired to l)rovi<h+ a basis t_)t + data cataloging an([ (.tllry into a conlFqltt'r ()r
<H ht+r rell-[(,val syslelllS.
5. Design a I(]Hllal for qlmrit,s to the l)ala [_llit +nld make copies available to inves-
tigators Ik)t + their use.
6. Process, repr()dttc(', associate wilh related sensor data, catalog, classil_+', index, dis-
seminale, slore and relrieve all] ground control data from test silt + stlpplied by
hlvesligators who snl)l)()rt the NASA Natural Resomces P,-ogranL
5. E( ;()NOMI( : BENEFITS T() BE I)ERIVEI)
It is dilticuh to establish the economical importance <)r yichl <+[a sysl(+tn which is vn-
lually nnlri(-d anti nnteslt'd. ]_[con<)lni( benefits, howevm; cannot be derived t+ronl a nat-
ural resource until that resc, nl+(e is h)cate(i and nntil sttflicient kll()wh'clge and
troth,(+standing of thai r(:s()nrcc and its environnlent are ()blained to l)ermil eflicient
exphfitati<m.
As t'xanq)h's _+l areas ()t p<+tential economic t)enefit, Ill(" National Aca(h:my of
Sciences, National Research Council (NASCO Publication 1228) cited tile following:
_--The shipping industry cnrrently transports about $40 billion per year ill
<argo. it is expected to rise abont 48 per cent by 1970. By 1975 lhe shipping bill t<w trans-
porting this (argo will be ab()ut $5 billion with the added costs of $500 million per year
It)l- new conslrnction. Even at small hnpr()venlent ill ship ronting te(llniqnes resnlting
fr<)m increased knowh'tlge derived fr<nn spacecraft concerning high waves, shoaling of
channels, exislen(+c of tmcharted sht>als, icebergs, and pack ice distribution, elc., will con-
tril)ul,_! at signilicant dollar savings when compared to tile expected overall cost.
Fisheries--U.S. tisheries production has increased less Iban I() pet- cent in tile past
det+ad( +, yet the imll(,ting of + fislleries products into the United States has resuhetl in an
ativerse t)alance of payments <)f approximately $500,0(i0,000 in 1965. In |:act, improved
domestic tleveh)pment of fisheries in our near shore area could resuh in doubling domestic
lno(hwtion in the nexl ten to litteen years and bring about a marked red(tel|on in the
adverse gold flow prol+lem. Although dependent on many factors, any aid provided t)y space-
(rat1 _wt+anograt)hY t<) locating, delineating, predicting the productivity of tishing gr(mn(ls
globally (oukl produce larg<: dollar payoffs to the entire industry and hence the nation.
15551 Another example of interest relates to the field of water resonrces:
A singh', m(+dium-sized, Canadian hydroelectric plant saves $1 million t+nr each I per
cent increase in accuracy in predi(ting April to Angtlst fl<+w. Tiffs am<rant of power Wollld
<)therwise be lost becanse ()l the need It) waste wilier to pr()vide rot)m tbr unanti('ipate(t
llo<_d conditions.
_:_| OIL_,ERVIN(, TI l i_ E\R'I !] ER{)M SPA( :1_
Bas,: and lhetnatic mapping l}y convcnti<mal acrial survtTs is an extremely costly _)l)cr-
ation. It has bccn {'stinlat{'d thal {}v{'i + Sl billion is sp{'nt annually to obtain the aircraft-
acqnirt'd data t]oin which such inal)s _ilC inade, and vet only a very small i)('rc{'illag{ ` <it
tho E+liill'._ l+t'<_t>tll{t's _llt + st) covert'd in {lily oIle +VC{IF. Tht" E_tI'III's P4tll|]l(t + consists of
504 million _iqll_tlC kih}nl{-lers, of which 146 million is land itlt+_t. the toih}wing tal)nlali<ni
_iv('s Jill idea of th(' costs hiv_>lv{'d to (oVt'l + Ihc land mid adiacent sliallow s{'a ;ll-t'iis
(I 50 million sqnal+t ' kiloint+lt'rs) Oil((" I)+%'aircrali.
ESTIMATED C()SI ()P AERIAl, St ;R\.'Ek_
"l'yl)cs <ff Stii'vt'vs (]ost/kni_ ( ',t)st t<} ( 7rOVt'r I +and
+tlld Adiaci'nl/_ll(,itPs
A. Siliall S{'+iI{" Mal)l}ing and $ll.0() $!)(i0,1)()(),|)t)()
St l]+l|)]t'ltl t?ii llil+y Phologt-al}i]y
and II_lrart'{|
B. Magnetic-(,ravily 5,0t) 750,0t)0,01)0
(:. Sidc-l+ocking Radar 1.1)0 lS(J,ltl)(),000
S 1,800,0(I0,000
[[ Iht' l(-lil+(illing occail _(lt'_ts WelC covered only in a Syllol}lic IIl_illll{!l usiiig lll_tgllt'l-
ic-gravhy, in|rarcd, tllicrow+lvt', _tlif| st'lt:{'livt, |)ht)togral}hy at an t'siiiliait'd t'_}sl of +14) |)l'r
s(liilll-{" kihiineit'l; this would add $3.5 I)ilih}n Io thc land c{iv{'r_i,_c tlgnr{'s. Thus, ii <)iic-
liin{" aerial SillV{,v <it lht" E_irlii and iis fore{! fields would {'<)_,I al){lill 7.. _} billi<>n. 1 tow{'vt'r,
In+lliy ot tile l)heilonlt'na allT:cliilg it_Sotlrc+.,s itl-e tinit" varianl and tt'l£1{'ali!d (ovt'rltgt- is
nt'{'d+<'(I. Ev+:n if r{'pt'iilivt' +inn(la] (+ovt'ragt" Weit" Iiinitcd to at)out 2(i pc'r Ct-lll <)t l|it- world
(1()(I tiiiili{)ii sqtitut" kiloltlt'tet+s) and if only .'_yiioptic s{'ttsitig totaling $10 |)t'r kilotli+:tt, r
wei-c |)t+rti}rnl{'d, lli{_ |)rograni nlaintcnanc{" cost would I)c $1 billion annually. These tig-
tllt's (oVt'l+ i)ll|'_ Iht" cosl tit iI_il_i acquisition+ I)ala l+t'dtlitil)ll {lllll {li_+St'liliil_ili{)n WOll|(I
iiivok,{" costs |'iir excccding l]lo_i_.! of the acquisition pliasc.
TIlt" cosl o[ iliountilig _iil ol)eraliOlial i-¢'Soilr{_{--._{'nsiilg s|Jao<" |)r<)grain ciiniiol 1)t! _iCCtl-
ralt'ly dt'lerlnin{'d al this iiinc. Paianit_tcrs, sn<:h as Ihe payload, power, inode (nlaliil{'d _li
ililin+iiint'd) hay(" liOt t)t'{'il tiiliy defined, ttowcvcr, if ()lit' _iSSlllll{'S lhai lll{_s{" ])iti_ililt!lelS
will be c_lin|)alihlt" with (lilt" o1 lil(IFc o1" iht" sl)+t{'{+ vehiclcs tieillg dt.velol){,d, tht'rl iht" ((IM_
altril)nled Io I|R" Niilill'+il Ri's<iillC('s Prograni for ._p_lt:iP-acquirt'd data WOil]d l)c rt'asoilal)]{'.
(]Olil[}+ilill_ Ill( + fllsls of _t space i)iOgl_tlll to o11{ > (Jt COllX{'llti(}ll_ti _i('l-i+tl ._tllVi,+v_i (toc_
ilOl provide Ihc tolal iliiSwt'r. _/i+iliy ahcraft Stlivi,ys will still 1}c i+l!(]llil{'d _ilid SOlill- lylJ_.'s lit
anticil)alcd Stllvt.ys niight li+.ll lJl-OVC practical 1)y eiiht'r aircralt <>r Sl}aCt,crati. ttowevt, i;
indicalioiis _llC Ihal, wh{'r{ + ('o'¢{'F_t_l+ of_l gh)l)al r{'|){'tilivt.' ii+tllll-t" is rcqnirt'd and ot)iaili-
able t)y I)oth illodes, +l sl)act" s)'sl{'lii has uiiqu{'slioii_il)l{P {'{:olioliiic advaiilagt_s, h al}l){'ais
thai ltw cost will be on thc oidttl ol+a niagllitudt" less l{)i tht" s|)a(+t" i]_()(l{'. The l)ot{-lltial
e(<)noiliic ;t(l'¢alit_igt's of utilizing spat{" li)i +ll'SOill-C{, iili_ii)'si,% i,_ ilOl linlitcd io tht" a(:quisi-
tion p|ias{', biit h is also hni)orlanl in tliie (tara rcduction i}has{_s. Siii('{" sl)a(t,-acqiiircd {l_it_i
will be of a tilii|{)i'ili alld sysl{.malic naltlr(', its (oiiv(.rsi{)n inl<) niai)s ali(I st+ilisli(s will bc
t'ilOlinolisly sinlplili(-d w|i('li coiill)ared Io ('oiivtPnlional int'lhods.
l'll{_ qli+.'slioil o|'wht, lhi'r Ill{" Pioglain is worlh ihc cost ofa sl)ac{'l)()rii(, data _,atht'i-inl4
svstt'ili liitisl ])t" considcrt'd Oil tht" I)asis of |tltlli+t , (t{'lii+ill(ls fi)r ii_itllr_tl res()UlCt'S. (]IIIT('lll
ilitli{'_tlioils .'ili't)llgly stit)l)ori the llt't_d for llt'x_ itwo|titit)li_il.V liit'_iliS, ,_tlCh _t_,oil)iliil_ +_])_tct'-
ci+ati, Io lii{'l,l rapidly ill(i+{'iisill_ dcniands t_;)i n_iltLi'_il i'('._Otli't'('_;. The daia of sci{'nii|ic value
t}oln such _i pr<)grani will also |}+_"t'llorlliOtiS, bill iint_}rlllnal{'lv canilOl li_ix:t<- ii price I_i_ |)ill
oil it _il this liinc. Tht" full i'Xl/'iil of ihc t'({>iioilii{ I){'nl't]Is i_} _t{'{i-il+., ti-<lin Ihis i)iogi+_illl {_tli
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bc l+r_l_c,ly cvahmtcd only I>7 the scientists trod ccon<+tnists associltlcd with tilt' vluious mtt-
urlt] and <nltural rcsotnccs. This cvMn.ltion has b<.'cn initialed its its 15F,61 int,cgral part ol +
this Prog_ranl, and l]+Cl,t' iilt' indicati<_ns that thc ])olcntial bcnciits +,,:illglt'itt]y cx¢:ccd t]tc
c<)sl of lhc l:'rogrlun. | lo+..v(.vc,-realist+< CXl>C,imcnls and i,dditio,+ml rcsciu-ch must bc con-
<hlclcd l)cl_rc any spccilic d_>llm vMttcs can bc placed <_n thcsc l)cn+.'lhs+
6. tit !lURE PR()(;RAM
Ideally tilt' lh<_g,am sh<_tth[ pr<_cccd throttb,;h the Iolh_wing, l_,Itascs:
Fcasil+ilitv--This Plmsc (in Progrcss) is basically one otcxF, crimcntation t+rom iti,cra[l
I<_ d.t'Icl,lti,l.'t' sib'+,,tltttl,('s .i+l ,,itttl,'itl ,'t+s()t,t'Cc l}hctlOtlti+,tit ill It',HIs o|" itsstt,ttt'(l spitcct',it[l
scnsm" rcs_dtnh)n, l)u]ing this l+lmsc, citrcl"ttlly selected and controllcd It'st sites a,+c l>cing,
ulili/cd, t+sing, av.tilal+Ic ai],_]Mt insl]tnncntation, tlt<." corrclation +tnd relative valtlc of
cach scns<_r to the l+hc,to]ncna in qttcsti<+n arc bcin/_ studied. Snl)<>rbitid and <n-l>ilM
llig,hts also will bc tttilizcd It) <)l>t;tin sonJc liniilcd sensor responses. Thcsc arc l>cin<_ amt-
lx,_cd lind nscd its a Imsis for relating MrcrMt to spacecraft ohlMncd si_,,itlt,l'Cs, As i,lSt,-t,-
mcnlM x'itlti<' is cstahlishcd, design itnd procurcnlcnl of Sl+aCC Imrdvta,c arc l)cing
initialed. Fit<ililics Io, data handling, and reduction nnust also hc cstal+]ishcd dtuing this
slag, c. This includes l)rovisio]ts l<ll Sl>itce-acquhed data +iswell its MrcrMl-acqlfircd dlttil.
.,\hcrMl testing,-, of scns_>rs is cxpcctcd Io b<."a continuing, attivity, and will c_mti]mc hcvond
this l)hasc to pro>vide dltla [ro,n l>ollt ititcrlt|l ilnd spacccrM+t shntlltatlCOltsly dinhi/, lltc
Sl>i,<'ccrMt Icsti,lg, l>lmsc.
Sl+itc<.'ct'itll Tcsting--l)nring the 1968-1972 period the Illst [lig,hts wit}t |hi" l+ritnary
l)tnp<_sc ol scnsing lhc F.ili-th's t-csotHccs +t,c expected. Thcsc ;uc cxF, cclcd to inclndc
llig,hls <d the ,,\p+>ll<> Apl>licalimts l:'rog,ram, where m:anncd Sl>aCccrnft will tarry a sizM)Ic
]lllinllcF <d st.its<_rs whi<h titn l>c dircctcd at various pa,ts of the Earth simttltanconsly. ()n
these iniliid Sl+itccllights, c<+vcrltg,c will bc concentrated over iuclts such its t]lc tfnilcd
_tnlt's wltc],t, g_t-<_tmt[ <<)ntr<_Is ,flitS+'l)<.' tlsc'd t(> vct'il_, the c()ncltlsiotts dcrivctl <hning, lh(' lea-
sibilit_, siltS<... Art.tic. trOl>iCld, and ,_lher representative test sites +.++illalso bc hlcltt(icd. ,.\s ,I
rcstth oi these llib_hts, ii is CXl+CCtCd list mffficicnt hll_)rtnati<+n +,,'ill hc avi_ihtblc t<, dctcr-
l]til,(' Ihc ()[)titlttlltl:
I. M<_dC--tltlttlltttll<..(l. lltltllltt+(I of llllill-SCt'Viccd;
'2. ()rl>iml,uonligtuation_md flightdtuatiott:
B. Extcnl lind ",,'+ll-i<+'t_t OJ' S<+'ItS<]I'S;
4. Motto oldata rcc<)rtling, and return to Earth;
:"). N|cll+l()tls ()f tllttlt rc(ht(tion +tn(I (lissemination.
Dttl+illg, this sllt_(', the basic cCOtlOlllics o| l+csonrcc sensing ttont stmcc IIIIISI l'Jt' deter-
mined. This will involve w(!ig,hillg Ihe besetits as opposed to the Costs <d" the pl'Og,l'itlll
t'lllcriitg into lilt opcrational slil_('. Although not an o]+cratiomt] phase, it is CXF,CCtCd that
<onsi<h,rablc data of ccmtomic importance will be obtained in lid<Ill|on to it targc +nnotmt
<ff scicntit]c inli>rmalion.
()l>CVlttiotmI--Thc existence and extent o| this stage +.+'ill <lcl)cnd on the cc<>n<>mic
imMvsis math" <hnittg, the t+r<'vious stage. Indications arc thin it will bc nnthidisciplinc in
llltttll'<', _]()l)+t] ill ('XICIII, itllfl TIIOFC OF leSS <.'C_llIiIIItOIIS SillCC lllillly <It" tilt" illl])Ol-tltll[ phc-
tt<nncnlt ilssocilttcd with lCSOUt+Ccs arc tinte variltnt. Opcrlltional llig_,hts silty wcll bcb_in
while the <>rhital tc_iting, stag,<.' is still in pros,tess--perhaps dttring, 1971 or 1979. By It.172 it
is cxltcctcd thin testing, and opcratiorlill spaccflig, hts will bc ctmtbincd.
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A contin ual problem in the _\'_1.%4Earth ICe+mtrces I¥ogram involved conflicts between tlw drvelope_:_
and the u_er_ O/technolog), relgat#ing ,_pacecrqfl desil_rn. NASA wanted to develop lart(e, complicated
.satellites, which reqltirrd considerable time between inception and .[liLrhl. The variou_ us¢>r
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cOmml++li/ies, +m the olheP haml, were willi++g to +elth" fi.' le+.sadvamed hardware so as to ]l+' eadiel:
This report, reqtte_t:'d tn' ,\+AX4 l)eput_' Admini.slPator Robert C. .%ama_._, .]_:, a_d prepared tO'
l)irector fi_r ,%}mc,,Application._ Leo_mrd Jaffk and Natural l#_,mrce._ l'ro<_,ram Chiq Peter BadL4,3',
demott._lrateg NA,+_Ai_ bia_ loward large experime_lal _atelliles amt im'ludes a rather len.qrlhy i_tglru-
metll "wi._h list."
Ill
Prepared byJaffe and Badgley at Seamans' Request
NASA Natural Resources Program
[rubl)er slaml)ed: "May 13 1965"']
O__l_eclive
I"oColldttcl an expelinlelmd progranl to detel+mitw and develop the fi:asibilitv of the
list" ()t' s_ite]lite I)orne iIlsll'llllletll3tlioll to make Ille_tStll'elllellls ()t lilt(| aSSiSt ill stlrve'¢illg
the earth's llalUlal ariel ctthur_ll resources (i.e. amlOSl.qlerics, agricuhure, forcstry, hvdrol-
<_gy, geol<_gv, geography, oceallOgr;q)lly, ,rod so torlh).
I. Sttldies by llS¢'l+ agertcies <ff the apl)licalfilily of Sl)acel)olne instltmwnlatiotl I<_
the|i needs.
2. Acctunulatiotl ofdala fi-oln an inslrttnlented aircr_ift |light tesl l)r<_grmn over cal-
ibre|ted lest sites.
3. ()rlfital flight tesling <_litlslrtiilleiltatiOlX and (h'veloplllellt ofre<ltlirt+d dal,l _|l|_|I'+r-
sis techniqttes to detertlfine feasibility and practicalfililx of lhis space aF, plic;ition.
l.!ser agencies h;tve exF, i-essed ,in urgenl need It)l- itlq)rovenlelllS in their ol)serv,tlion-
al and Stll'veyillg capabilities m hel F, mainl;tin ;m adequate SUl)ply of natural resolll-Ces. It
vigorottslv ])tustted, the lecllnology llf Slmcel)l,lW systems could be provided El) fill lll_,tly
<Jl"the eN.l)iessed flee(Is l)y 1975.
R¢'qttitelneIHs of Kilt' Exl)erilnelmd l>rogt+an+
The spel+ific :Uld uhilnitle requirenleiits ol Kilt' vari<)tlS tlSels inllSt llecessitl-ilv l)e ,+I
Iestllt<_f"the <.,xl)erilneiH_tlprc._i-,un.This ,q:.lllic,ltiOllwillrequire data collection and
almlysiss'+stemsof the m<_st advanced types with an <q)tittltmlmi× of high leSO]Ution
(Sltlallare,ldelailed data saltlple,+oI resolutions l)t'h:+,.'20 meters) and m<)del+alert'solu-
ti<m (broad areas, resolutions ,tt)ove 20 Illetel's) (()vel'_lge. hlsll'llllletlts I'eCol'dillg ¢lallt
|]|)in inHlly poitions ol+ lilt" t'leclr<ml+tgnetic speCtl-ttln m-e I)t'ing considered ilwlI_diI+g
optical (visil)h'), inlr_Ired, uhravi<+h't, and microw_ive radar. (Relbrenot,: "()l_jectives,
lnslrulnel_talion, and Flight Time Reconlnlendatiol+ of tlser Age,|tit's and (',<_<_per;ttil_g
Sciemisls Involved in Kilt" NASA Natural Resources Piograln").
The currellt NASA experilnel;tal F,rogtam began in 1964 with tile irtitiation of discus-
siolls with and sludies I)y Kilt" llSel ;igellt+ies to ;iss<.'ss their le(lllil-eltlents +flit| the applicabil-
ity <ffspace derived d,lt,_ l:,y mlalysing Isitl avaihtble resuhs fr<ml existing programs (Tiros.
Nilnl)us, Mercur). and (;emini) ;tied sin+ttlated restths [ronl iltstrtune]ited aircraft tests.
12l The illStrumetlted Aircraft Flight "lk+st Program bcgal+ in lnid 1964 with flights ot an
inl]ared iIl_aging system o'_er calil)r_tted agricultttral gl+OUt_d lest sites near Purdue
l.[lliVel'sily+ Since Ihetl we have added ntultispectl-al C_[lllel-_ts, active ilnag, illg and sc;+.t-
ter<mleter r;_dalS, passive Illi<.'l+()wilve radiometers, and t IX,' linc seal+hers in 1965 and plan
|'IXI'I ( )RI X( ; I I IE I iN I-:.N( )WN _!{(.l
[() it(|(| IIi()I-(' _ldViill('('d lllll]lispe('ll'a[ (aill(.'las, Ill('ll'ic aild pall()l'aill]( callleras, lll<)l'("
_(]_r_ _ ] ('('(l [llfl'al'('d s('i'lllll('l:+,,, [lll'l_H'l.'d sp(.'('lF()lllelt'l'S Hlld passive lnicr()wave illlii_els ill
1(.)(_6. The studies and II_<,aivcva{t pv()gvam are planned t<) h<" cm-vicd out ()n a continuing
hasis t() pr()vide fi)r ('c(m()mi(al It,sting of instrum<:ntati<)n ()vm sites ()f kn()wn (hara(ter-
isli(s p)i()r I() <)vl)ila+l If'sling.
As a resuh of lhcse activili(,s lh(' user community has identified and sl)e(+ilied (andi-
dal(' instntun('uts fi)r ()rhilal test. Th(' inilial and m<)sl urgent ()f thcs(" are a wid(" rang("
Sp('t"tFH| s(+Itlllel (0.'._)--I _+) llli(T()ll_,) ('()_,ei-il]_ the ll+._al- l!_/, visi|)l(., _tll(| parl <)f |he IR spec-
tlltlll (190)n('[('l" r('s()]llli()ll) all(| a lYltl]tisp(:'ctral syn()l)ti( l)hOt()graphic system (<)l'
appr()ximawly 30 meters res()htfion). NASA is currently plan)ring int()rl>()ratkm t)l dws('
i,lstt uments into an ah-('adx planned lligln in 1969.
A rath('r (<)mplewly instru,nc.wd natural resources sat('lliw is h('ing c(msid('red for
|light in 1!)70 ()r I(,)71 inv<)lvh_gthe f()lh)wing instruments:
M,.'lric ( :amcras
])iIl]()l'itllli(" ( :IIIII('I'IIS
Muhisp(.cn-al Tracking Teles(<)p('
Mttltisp('clral Sytl<)pti(" (:am(')+as
Imaging Radars (_.0 go)
Radar Ahin+Jt'It.r,/S(altt.r(m|('tcrs (0.4 :and 0.R g()
Wi<h" Ra.ge SI)('(I ral Scan n(', (0.3-I 3 microns)
lnh+ar('d [,()n R Wavcl('ngth Spe(l)()mt'l('r ( I :"+-I6 microns)
Inlrar('d Sh<)rt Wavelength Sl)('ctr<)meter (0.4-_2.5 mitt(ms)
Infrar('d Radi<)mcl('r ( I 0-I 2 micr<)ns)
I)assi_c Mi(r()waw' lmager ((.).() go)
I'assivv Mull|channel Microwave Radiometers (0.4-_I cm)
[ !\,' Imaging Spectr(m|('ter (3()00-4(,)00 Angstroms and 5800-68(}0 Anw+troms)
l +ast.r Allimeler//,'S(+atler<)meleF
Ahs()rpli<m Spc(l)()m('l(') (+t }V+vi,dble, IR)
(:hirp Radar S+vst('m (75-,150 me's)
(;rarity ( ',Fa(li()In<+'l(')'
N1agt_ett)mt+ter System (n-iaxial lluxgate and ruhidium vapor)
Flight t(,sl ()f this entire gr<)up of instruments simultaneously is highly desirable
h,c(:aus(_ the (ross c()rrtqalion ot dala t]ontt various porli(ms of lhe eleclromagnelic spe(-
trum acquir('d under similar lighting and wcalher conditions will yield Ira more infi)rma-
lion than data acquired at separate limes by individual inslruments.
11 successful and needed, a repeat of this satellite is being considered t+<)Rtlighl in
I(,)71-72 to continue the deveh)pmenl of the lechnolo_, and the ahility to handle and
analvs(' /sicl a((u,nulat('d data.
13] ()rl)ital Rt,quiremenls
l)t.ing |he exl)erimcnla] phase of Ibis l)r()gram (pre-1975) the nalttral resource users
require data t(, h(' collected peri()dically over a number of natural and cultural r(,sottr(t,s
tcst si,<'s. Th('s(' sitt's must he readily a(t'essihle and availahle for study by well trained sci-
enlisls. Many t)f the sitt!s essential It) this program fall within the United Slates h()lh
I)('(ause <)f lh(' subject realtor itwolved (such as land use in metropolitan areas, waler pol-
]uli<))l ill (;t4,'_tl I,akes, wal('r IeSOtllCes ill northeast and arid west, geothelllla] power sites
in I'a(ilk N(uthwest etc.) atxd hecause of the ready availability of trained persomw| t_)r
groml(I control studies. (),bital inclinations ofal least 480 are Iheretore extremely itnl)of
lath dtuing the experiment,tl phases of this program. It sh(mld he vmphasized howeve);
I]IHI ;t lltlll]h('l ()1 illl])()l'l;+lll[ IIS,('I".; ((:alladiall gl)Vel'lllli{'lll, Ar('li(" hlslitlll( +, st'V('l31[
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oceanographic groups, tile Nalional Science Foundation and the U.S. Geological Survey)
have expressed strong recommendations tor polar orbits. The U.S. Geological Surw T and
the National Science Foundation requirements relate to their work in Antarctica.
Although requircmenls for polar orbits are not mandatory during the cxperinmntal pha+
es, they are nevertheless highly desirable. HoweveL data acquired during such flights can
be controlled so that it is collecled only over well studied end well specitied lest siles.
(\inclusions
l. The discourse with the user scientists is well underway.
2. The development of an operational capabilily requires thai experience with
orbilal dala be built up over a hmg period.
3. In order m make progress in Ihis field it is necessary flint we have the widesl par-
ticipation of ('c,111t)elenl scientists and this can only be accomplished by unclassified access
to data and the pertincnl chmaclerislics of the instrumental|on and Ihrough availal)ility
(o lhe program of already developed technolog3: and hat-dwave for incorporation in _he
NASA experimental tligh! program.
4. Many of the data colleclion instruments required tot the Nalural Resources
Program ave also vilal to Ihe broad exl)loration of the moon and planets and therelore
should be made available to NASA in any case.
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,is d![J_'rent govermnenl and mmgovernmental itcstitutions &came interested in the potential/m a
satellite Earth resoun'es prog_nm, NASA came under pressure to deliver u._er-m_ented wmhing_ _atel-
liter rather than large experimental spacecraft. The State Department, as one t_ thew inU'rested insti-
tutions, ahmg with its A,¢em 7 ]or International l)evelopment, vieTved resou_ve _atel.lite._ as a way to
a._si,st third-world nations. Interested in providing a lesolove satelh'te /or South Ame_fca, the
l)epartment._ o.[ State, Agwiculture, mM the lnte_Jor used the threat oJa non-NASA satellite prog_am
based on a proposal to'/he Radio Corporation of America (RC4) to prod NASA into a more r_spon-
._ive attitude.
[no pagination]
[rubber stamped: "SEP 6 1966"1
AD/l)eputy Administrator
Tt tRU: S/Associate Administrator lot
Si)ace Science and Apl)lications
SA/l)irecmr, Sl)ace Applicalions Programs, ()SSA
]'_XpI,( )RIN(; "11 It' [!NKN( _rN _t ]
Meeting at the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Au tst 25,
1966, regarding Remote Sensing and South America
The enclosed is a [_tirly c<mq)h'lc mcuForandunl <m the subj,'c1 meeting, but 1011owing
C{)ItFln+`!nls ill'C ill OldCl'_
(l) US(;S is aF, parcnlly Ill+`"prim+`" mover ill soliciting the Ag+`'ncy ti_f International
l)t'xHopnFt'nl (All)) to i>rornt)tt • Soulh Anwrican ttsc of orbital remote s+`'nsing tcchnitlues
in g,t,ncral sul)p<>rt <d lht" Roslow Rt'l)ort recomm+`,ndali<ms approvt'd as the National
S+`:curily Action Menl<wandum 349 (NSAM 349) enclosed.
(2) US(;S would like to budget tor an "operational +' satellite its soon as possible l<_
establish jurisdiction.
(3) F'lan based on the Radio Corporati+`m of Ameli+`a (R(:A) proF, osal to dt,vclop
l)t'lhF class sitlellilc wilh "iX" camera of 5,000 linc rCSOIIFIi,I:,IF.
(4) US(;S and I),:partmvln of Agri+`uhure agre+`' thai lilt" S()lFlh AlllCl'i(';+tll IICC(I is
Ul'_,Clll itlFd Ihal lift" S+VSlt'lt) prot_t_s,t',:l by R(;A would t:w useful.
(5) "l']l,:' R( :A proF,<_scd camera is t_u-I:,eyond the NimbusfFIROS sial+." of lilt" atrl.
(()) ]_]: lllltdC lit)It' _FI Ihu llFcClillt.. { thai there is some agreelnClll belw+`'cn l)ct)arlnlcnl
_)t Sial+`' iilFd lttc National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) thai NASA
should i,slablish and chair an inl+`,ragt'ncy comrnitte+`', to develc, p governmenlal thoughls
on lit+`' subjc'ct.
(7) I suggeslt'tl that tht' agencies pull Iogclh+.:T requirt'mcnls tot such a hm,'cr rcsohl-
lion system and comvv th+`'m to NASA. NASA ,,viii then delt'rnlinc hmv such it devcloF,-
mctFl migln proceed [rom a technical standpoint and in tilt' interests of overall cc<m<m D
in tilt" space budget.
(8) I suggest that lift: [)trl)tlly Administrator lAD), NASA, organize lhc conmfittec |+ct-
omnwntled ill Ihc Adlninislrator's memorandum to AD, dale<l August 12, l!}{i(+, (See also
NSAM 3t9) and lital tilt' agencies' t+eqtfiremenls +tnd tit+`" NASA suggested approach lo
+`h,vchqmlcnt t:,t" sui)lnilled to thai conltnitlee. This will insure that NASA is lilt" total p<)inl
toy advice th,ring tilt" ,:levclopnlcntal period. This is tn<)sl appropriatc--l:,ecause <if lhe
multi-agt.ncy inlert'sl, NASA is ill the best pt)sition to serv+` + all of tlw inl+`'resls of tit+`" gOV-
CF'IIIIFCIll.
[rubbe," slanlped: "l.eonard.latt_'"l
I .eonard Jafli:
Enclosures
NSAM 349
The Frontim-s <ff South America
M+`'tno For tit+`: Record, from SAR/Reeves, dated August 31, 1966
SA/l.+lat]c'/nw 8/31 / 66
bcc: S/Ncwell
AX( :
( _()ll('lIIICIICC:
tton,cr S. Newell
Associate Administrator tor
S|)act" Science and Applications
l/Morris(m
lhandwriut'n note: "9/1"_/6(i"1
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[ 1} For tilt" Record
SAR/Roht'rt (;. R,vev{,s
[rttbbcr stamped "At_l(; 31 1966"1
Meeting at the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),
10 a.m., August 25, 1966
A meeting was called by Mr. Ettgar It. ()wens. {:hief, Planning l)i,,ision+ Butt'art tiw
[.;flirt Atncric,t, Dcl}artmenl {}[Slat{', Agency liom Intl'rnali{mal l}cveh)pmcnl (AID), and
was hl'Id in tilt' Dircctor+s (:{mli,rl,n<c Room. I2S. (;cological Survcx. Alll,nd{-{+s Wt+l+t,:
Edgar I. ()w{'ns, Slate/All)
Kcnncth Milow, Stale/AID
l.{'<mat+d Jalli +, NASA/( :{+tic' SA, I}ire{tor
James R. Morrison, NASA/(',odc I
R<_l)ert (;. Rt'cvcs+ NASA/Code SAS lUSt,S)
Ar{h B. F'ark, US1}A/Agricuhural Rest+arch S{wvi{t.
Jam{+s Bailey, I +.S. Naval ( )ct+ml_+graphit ()[]ice ( (1SN()( }}
I+{'<}V. Strces+ (rSNO()
William A. Fischl'r, US(;A,/Ottic{. of till" Dirc{mr
M{}n tie R. Kh'l}l}{'r, I. rS{ ;S/Ass{wialc ( :hiel ( ;t'{}l<}gist
( _harlcs J. R<}t}in{}v{', (!St ;S/I lydroh}gy Pr{}gram ManaR<.'r
J{}hn Phtc{'+ (rS{;S/'{;l'ograt}hy Pr<}gram Manager (Acting)
R{}l}crl f'cplics, t IS(;S/(i{'<}<_ral)hy I'r<}gram (East Tl'nncsse{, Stall + (lnivl'rsily}
Thl" std_je{t of till" meeting was t{} dis{u,+s the p<}ssil}ility <if using Remote S{+nsl}rs tiw
res{mr{t,s smvevs in tilt' All} I}rograln, l,atin Anleri{a. Sl}{.{ilically, prcl}aration {}t a papcr
explaining tit{' It'{hnilltll,s {}t ICIII{}Ic sensing, suital}lc fi}r use by hight'r {}fticials Statc 'wa_,
rC{lU{+stc{I (S{.c ct]lh}s{'d h'tlcr I,{} _+_Q/k.Fischer li{>m E.I+. {}wens}.
121 The Ine{'ting {}l}l+ncd with ;.t 1}l-i{,f rl+,,i{,v+, <if the r{'{<}mmlqlltali{>ns {}1 Ihc R<}'q{}w
Rcl}{}rl, whi{h in{ludes t<wmalion {}f all inlcragcncy {{}mmht{'c t{), alll{}llg {)lh{q + thing,,,
hlvt'stigatc tt_l + <}1sI},t{{+ t{}r t+eS{}ln+ce_+mitt{lit',, in [.atin Amtwi{a. l'hl' 1)cpartn]t'nt {}f St_.tt{'
(Assistant S{'crctarv fi}r I,atin Amcrilan Alt;ths) ha'+ ,t{ti<}n, ac{<}_lling t{} NSAM 34<,}, m
{{)IP.,'CIIC sll{'h a {'{}llllllittc{'. I'h{' NalhmaI Acl{}nmltics and Si}a{{...\/hnhlislrath}n (I)r,
S{'anlam+) will t}r{}bal}ly chair + th{' {+{}lnlllitt{+{'. A "w{}rkmg groul}'" {hawn pr{}bat}ly tr{}m
am{|rig th{}st' in ,tttettltan{{ + al this ml'l+ting (anti inlhMing {}th{'rs, n{} {l{}tll}t) will i}roba -
1}Iv b{' {{}nslitttt{+{l; rcsuh_+. <if this inel+thlg will t}rohal}ly hdhtcn{c Ih{' {h.{ish}n wh{,lhl,r {n
II{}t It} rc{{}llllil{'lld {{}llstiltlli{}ll ,{it+ a f{)rlll+iI w{}rkin,_ _r<}tll},
Mr.,lafti" caiHiolw{I al}{ml {}v{'rt+nthusiasm {}n part {if tmdl'rdcvl+h}i)cd hall{ms ti}r n{'w
,llt{[ {'x<}ti< tc{'hni{itt{,._, whh {{}nc{}milatll <.'xcllpd{}n {if i}r<}v{,n m{'th<}{ls+ It{" gavc ;t++,an
cxaml}lc till" rlqiancc <}n satt,llitcs fi}r t+(}mmtmication in I+atin Anwrica. Work <in a
Illi{T{)WIIVC IICI C{)llllCClillg S{}llth Alll{.ri{+aJl {ai}ita]s wits st{}l}l}e{I wh{'11 {<}lilllltllliC+lti{}ll
sat{'llitcs Ina{t{" thcir apI}caranc{+; h{}wcve_; till + South Anl{'rican c{}untrh"_ have n{}t 1}ccn
,lblc It> ttsc satellites, and ncitht.r {lo tile,+' have a mitt<|way{, link.
F'{}liti{al slqlsilivitv {if rcnl<}te s{'nsing was I}rit'fing di,,{ttssc{l. Mr. M<}lris<}n m<.'nti{}t+{'d
tilt' Brazilian t)r{}t}osal, and I t+cvi{'wl,d a rclcnt m{'nl{wandtml tiom l)r. F{'rnand{} {It+
M{'n{h}t_ca (Tl'chnical l)irccmr, P,razilian Nafi{}md Spat{. Activities (:{}mmissi{}n) stating
Illlttt th{' un{hq-taking {>t tit{' i}r{}p{}st.d Brazilian Remote Sensing Pr<!j{.{+l has I}{'cn
al}I}rovcd 1})the Brazilian Nati<}n,d Sl,{tu+ity {:<}tmcil+
_',XI'I+(IR[N{; [|I[: I. TNKN,{}%'..'N 94B
Mi', Fischer r{wit'wt'd the US{,S tiri{qin/4 t{} Sc{l'{'t;iry Ud;lll {luiliniu+ ;he US(;S views
{m +lnt+l n{'{.{l.,+ li}r ml '+t+v{Jhiti{}n+uv'" E+trth R{'s{}tu+{:es (}t}s,.'rv;Iti{}}i;tl F, al+_'llit{" (ER{)S).
Thl+ R( :/\ pr{}f}{isitl w;is I}ri{'tlv {lis{usse{I. It wils ;tgi{+{'{t th;It il is I) +l c{}innlt'rci_ll i}l+{i -
i}{}slil, th{'rt'tiii+{; S{lli}{" [){Tli}rliiiili{'{" ('];iinls ;in{I {'1}_,I {l_il;i ;il-{" _,ll._I}{'{'t 7) p{}ssil}ly t}ey{}lld
l}r{.+{'ni simile {}J' lh{' ;ill.
l)r. P;trk Sl;ti{'{l ill+ell {}il ]};irl <}t' ;t/._,ri{ultur;ll/lTir{'slry +{+i{+iitisis hi I ,_ilin Allleric_ _tild
<llii{!i ++{h'v{'l{}pili_" ((}iilitli{'s l{}i ili{}l+C +;lilt i}ii|}l{B'{'{I {l;il;t.
I h ++ils{} si;ii{'{I lh;it [ PSI)/\ II+i+ +i ill'i'll for +l "tr{il}i(PM" Icsl site +iil{I {llht'r aciivilit's it} _{'I
i{!lii<}l{. _,{'il+<li f4i/_il_tltll-{+_ ;til{l {{}l+i{'l;tli{)n+ ;itl{l dcv{,l{,p iiHt.rl}r{q;tiiv{' lt'{hili{lU{'+. Thi+ i+
ii{.{{,s_+li_/i<} fulliIl {_SI),,Vs ilii_si<}ii {it k{.t!pili_ ll'a{+k {}1 w{irl{Iwi{It' _i_l-i{tl]llll_ll ;i+liviti{'+.
l\]i; l;is{'ti{'l Mitl{'d lii+tl I ]S(;S Ji;is s+iiii_' ile{'.d ;+is USDA f{}i (l:tl;i, I{) fultHI iis liii++ilili_ _}t
_iil}i}{>rlin _ All) ill its_,iSl;lii{'{, i}}{}_i'+iins ill iind{'i'd{'v{Pl{}l}{'{l (<}tililrit's ;{li(t :-;is<) Slil{[}'illt_
/4-<'{}1<}/4i{f{'+illll'{'+ +llld i}|i{'n{}lli{'ll_i ;ind inillt, F_.i] r{'s{iill-{-{!s li}+il ;il{' _h}bill ill {'{}lll+i{'l+
IBI ._i,. Rt)l)hi{)v{, _,l+tlt'{| lh+l.I lillLil't" {li;tDl, {}J" the type [>{}s._il}l)' lll}l;Ihl;il)h" t]+liill +l);l{{ ", ill{"
II{'{'{'++;lrv t{}l + hydr{ihl<14i{ ,_llidh% Th{',_{: t<}<} +ire _l{}b_ll hi spa{{,.
It w;tn 14{'il{'l_tIl) ;tt4ri'{'d lh;il ill{W{" _ill{I inil}r{}v{.{I {];il;i ;it'{" ll{'{'{'S_;li"_ t{} ;tssist ill [,;lliil
Atil{'i i{ ttil _ttl{lit'_; {'{}llilil(lli[%' th{" |}lctl|{ll'ili i_ {l|'ii{I ilttei't'sl t{I Ih{' tt._{'l" _{'it'iIIi_l_, {lilly Ill{ill
{I;il;i+ l I<}w{+V{'l, lh{' l}l;ill<}rlii {t{>l'+ {'ff{'{+l Ihe {tl+ii+;i{'t{'risli{+_ <}J {l;il;t _ili{I it s{'{+il}s likt'lv Ih+il
{I<ll_i II<}ll} +l};i{'t' I}Kiv I}}{}vi{h • +il ]{'_i._l +{}111{" <lJ" ill{' II{'('{'_i+;ll+V I{'_{}lll'{{'.'_, hlf{}rili;tli{m hi ;i
l<}rili +lli}{'ri{}i I{} _tii'{T+lfl {[_il;i: +lil(t Ih+ll tht'sl! (];il+i _li'C ii{'{!{h'{I J+0iit
'!'{} ]}r{ivid{" th<' li{'<{'_._,_ii'v "l}+l<'kl_l-{}llll{l" lll_il{'i'i_ll+ v_ti'iDil_ d{l{'lllii{!ilt+ ;llr{'_l{iy ill I}{'in+
{>l ill pi'{']);ll;lli{}ll Wt'lt' {lisiu_+s{'d--{'hit!lly Ih{" OSSA-SA-SAR pi+iis|>t't'ltis ;ill{| _lllill+ll{'l ,'+,tud)'
l}r{i+l}{'{'til+. (2{.rl;iili k{'v ill'illS ;in{" il{'{'{l{,{l--iii lily {}I}ilih}n+ it Ill;iX' t>{" I}{ql{'i t{} t}}'{']};u{' it
'_{'J)+i}_il{' _lllillll;llV. "lh{.._{, ill'Ill+ ill'C:
( I ) Sl;ll{'lill'ill {}| II+{'fllhi{'_,_ <}J I{'lli{}l{" _{'11._{}1++ t{}r ll.'+{>lll+{{+_ ii}v{'+til;ilhins ((lis{iis+
t}{llh ;lirti<irii{+ ;ili{I _f);i{ {'l}<}ili{').
(7) \%'h_ll is iili{I{'i+xv_i\ ili {l{'viq{}]}ili{'lil +iil(I iis{_ Slli(Ii{.+ {)1 I{'ill{}l{' S{'liS{ii+s 17}1 }{',_{}ili{+{,s
iliV{'+l l_{;il i{}il+
{<l) _i_l']i_ll I}i'{'{Is i{} I){! {l<lil{', ill +l{l{liti{>i] i{> work _th{,;i{ly uildt'r xvlix'.
(4) ('ill;ill}I'll'ill i' ;lil{I ;ihilili{'s {_t1 +;lliil Aiitt'i'il'_t s{'i{'iilisl_, ;til{I {}l'$;tili/;ili{ilis I{} till(l{'r +
I;ik{' liils i}r_!i{'{'l. (AI_{}, {1{'_i1{'_, _}1 v+i}+i{illS {'{}illili'i{'s sh{}iild I}{' {'<nlilli{'iil{'{l (}il--
tT}r {'×_unl}l{',/\l'_{'Iilhi_l, it; i}{'rs{}n (}1 Ill{! 1)ii+{+cl{}i {it lht'ir (;{'<}l{}_i{+i] SiliV{'),, l)r.
I;t'li× il{>ii{}liii<} (;{}iiz;ll{+s, i+ v{'ry inl{'rest{_{I hi lhis i}r{}_r+iiii.)
(.f-}) (]{}+1 <}1 "ll+ililrll] l-{+_,{}lll{'{'s '' +;tt{'llile i)l{>l._r_.illl lind how thn{l{'<l.
Mi +..]aili+ lna{h- tht" ti)ll{}'_vin_ |+{)illiS;
( I ) Th{" lls{'r ;i_{'n<-ii+s sh{iuld {{lliiC lip with their {l_il+l l_{]ilil{+in{'ill: res{}hitiOli, +ire_t]
l+i{i ('<}V{'l;i_{', Sl}{'{'ll';i] I'HII_{', t't(7. Espociitll), ii{'l'(t{'{I ;t1"{ + l+{'{|ilii'{'ili{'lllS Ih;ll ilii_|il
t}{" In{'t t}y ::l sTsteill such _ls lhal l}i'{}p{is{-d By R(]A.
(2) NASA will {'×_iliiil]{" i{'qilir{'liil'lilS ;tli{I d{'tt'imili{" how, |i+(}ili +l i{'{hni(it] +llili{l
]){}ilii, till'), {:_ii t}{,sl I}e nlcl: {!sl}t.ci;tlly, how th{" 7 {T!.il hc m{q{I{-{l wilh Oil-_Oili_ pl+{} -
_r_lii]+, wilh InigiliitliII {{}sl.
(B) Th;tl, tillli{itl_h tl+{}lil _i It'chnic_tl si_lnd p{}inl, N{). 7 coul{I I}{. {l{}iil. in il few wt'{'ks,
{{.;Ill.ill {|t'{isi{}il_ ;t1{' t)eing llla{|t" which w{itlld t4reatly atlTc'ct auy t'×amin;iti{}t_ {)|'
l} I:1 tll{'l{qi}r{., it w{}uld t}{, t){,tt{'r t.{} await th{ + results {}f ttl{-se (le{:isions. Thes{"
d{,{i_i<ms ;ti'{ " {,×i)e{-[{.d hi at)oul _l m{}nth.
[,I I Mi: t;i_{h{'r _lt4r{,{'{l l<}f}ull tol[,{'lh{'r IJSI)A+ USNO(}+ :<ul{lUS{;S r{'{tliir{'n}{'nt._ hit{} {}ill'
{l{}{tllli{>llt, I_}l r{'vi{'w 1}v th{' us{'| + _i_cll('i{,s _ul{! sut}nlissi{}i] t{} NASA for {'llt+hl{'{'rhlt4 {'×;tll}-
ill;Lli{}ll.
Mr. M{}ITiS<}n _l;tl{'(I lh;ii il is NASA l}<}licy |'Oi" i%rcil.Tn c{}untri{'s ID 1}t" ",_{'1t siil}|}{)il-
ilia," ;tllti<}u_h NA<SA ;t_sists hi t}lx}vi{lint._ SOl;i{" {'{liiil}i]l{'ni, liilh}ili_, ;ili(I i{'(hiii_';il _{'lvi{'{'+
It Ihl! t{ll{'it._ii {l}tiillii{'s h;iv{' i{i |};ty lh{'ir ._|l_ll{" {}t i|ll" {-{l_l_ {ill _|};l{_{' |}r{}_r;llll:% lh{') ihl.il
l}ilik{" {,V{.ly {'t]{}ri i{> {'ii_,iii+{" lh;il ih{' i}i{}_lilili_ _il'{" t}i{>|}{'rl) {_iiTi{'{l llill. Mi. ()w{'ns
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gencrally agreed with this NASA concept, although AID does have limited technical coop-
oration funds to assist where absohHely necessary. Mr. Fischer made the point that it's bel-
ier 1o lie any space resources study pro iecls to on-going program, to take adwmtage of
United States and counterl)art scientists already working in an area or on a proiect. I sug-
gested that even if scientists are ah+eady at work in an area, it will probatfly bc necessary to
furnish scientific technical advice on tim application of remote sensors Io the problems at
hand.
The meeting pointed up the tollowing:
( 1) t!SDA and US(,S agree ¢m die immediate lleed [br dil{a, which might bc obtained
from spaceborne remote sensors, tot domestic and toreign resources investigations.
(2) The less costb,, the illcAre the chances of success of any program involving tim use
of remote sensors tiw resources investigations will be.
(3) ttigh resoltllion is still a very touchy prol)lem. An "il'Jtcrnle(liate" I('so]ttli(i, ll evo-
lutionary system has a good chance of being accepted, whereas a program using
high resolution illslrttllletlls might run inlo great political diflicuhics.
Robert (;. Reeves
E H,closul'e
SARR/R( ;Reeves:mc 8/31/66
bcc: S/Newell
AX(:
SA/.lafti'
SAD/Tepper
!!S( ;S/Fischer
USDA Park
NAV()CEAN()/Alexiou
SAR/( :olvo
SAR/Badgley
1/ Morris(m
Document 11-16
Document title: Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior, "Earth's
Resources to be Studied from Space," News Release, September 21, 1966.
Source: Department of the Interior Library, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C.
I'}Tu'n the Department o] the Interior i_sued this press )elea_e anmmmmg 15oject Et¢OS (Earth
I_ewurce_ Observation Satellites) o_ September 21, 1966, it not on& lacked a satellite supplie_; trot
also.fi_lMs had yet to be algocated lbr the pr_{]ect. Proposing the EROS pro/ect was actually a hoM move
b3:the Intmor Department to,/orce NA.%_ into providin_ a,i inilial Earth resource surve)' _atellite i_1
s'hort orde*: Although NASA moved to comply, budget battles between both o_]tzanizationLS a_M the
Ilareaa _?]the Budget delayed laa_ch q/the fir_t gatellite until./uly 1972.
ExPI .{)RIN{; TI t1., I _NKNI )WN 2_4,"}
Ill For release: SEPTEMBER _ 1, 1{.}6{_
Earth's Resources to be Studied from Space
Pr{_je{t EROS was announcc{I lt}day t}y Secretary t)f Ill{' lnlerior Slewarl I,. U{lall.
EROS (l_]arl|] Rest}ur{es Ot}s{'rvalit}n Satellites) is a program aimed al galheriug facts
ab{}ul Ihe Flalural res{}urces of the earlh fr()lll earth--orl)iling salelliles carrying St}llhisii-
cal{,d r{'lllt}l{' SellSill_ {}l}st,lvali{}n inslrlliTlen|s.
"Pr{}j{'{l EROS," said l!dall "is 1}ascii up{m a series oF t2casibiliiy exl){whnenls carric{I
{ml t}y Ill{: I_. S. {;etdt}gical Survey wilh NASA, univershies, and tither inslilulions over lh{'
past lw{} yt'ars, h is t}ecaus{' tit the vision and supporl {if NASA that w{' are able to plan l)l{} -
je{l ER{ )S."
Udall said lhal "ttlis pr{}.jecl will provide data useful It} civilian agencies tit Ill{"
( ;{}_r{l_i__ {b_l I S_(']_ aS lh{' I)eparllnenl t}JAgrictlllllre who are ctm{el-ned with many tacels oF
our nalural rt.st}urces. The SUl}]}t}rl {if these agencies is vilal it) the su{{{'ss {)[' Ihe progranl."
The [nlerit}r Se{Tel;lry said lha! "lht' lime is now right and urRenl It) apply space lech-
n{}h}gy l{}wartls lh{! s{dufi{m o[ many pressing nalural resources pr{}t)huns I}eing {onl-
i}t)un{le{l 1}y [}{q}ulalion anti induslrial grt}wlh."
Udall said Ihal I]l{' Inl{'rior l)el}artnleni pr{}granl will prt}vi{te us with an Ot)l}orlunily
Io { oIl{'ci xahlable r{,s{lUlCe {l;ti;t and use il to impr{)ve lhe {lualily t}f our envir{}lmi{'nl."
]2] "Facts {in Ihe {listril}ulion {if n{'t'ded minerals, our walt'r supplies ,in{1 Ill{' {'X|elll {}'["
water l){}lltlii{)II, agricuhural ClOl}S and [oresls, and ]nunan hat}itatit}ns, can t}e ol}lain{'{l
on ;t gl{}l}al I}asis, an{l used for regional and continen|a] ]{}ng-l-allge l}lanning, '' hc sai{I.
S{'{r{'lary l!{lall named I)r. Wiltialn T. Pet{ira, Dil{'cl{}l of |hi" I_!. S. (;eol{igi{al Survey,
It} head the pr{}granl.
"A I{'aln of knt}wl{'dlgeabIe s{'ienlists and fesoluce dala usels will gut{It' governnlenl
and prival{' agen{i{:s in nlaking their data needs known, and I{} hel t} t}lalll a ma.jor el]brl
in the {'xl}l{}ralitlri {it lilt" {'arth tbr tiuman 1}eneliI," Udall said.
Per{ira and his earlh s{'i{'n{{' {olleagu{,s described sl)a{t'-sensing , {}t Ill{" earlll as "lhe
al}ilhy It} "see' nit}re easily I}ent'alh the waleF a.llft forest or soil cov{'r, anti the at}lilly It} view
al{.as tif Ih{" {'arlh lel}etilively at various limes and seas(ms. An{ilh{'r I};lsie advantage is |he
I;l{'l I}lal {{}nll}aral}le {}t}st,rvali{)ns can be made all {}ver the earth."
"AhhouI.Th we are now gaining vahiat}le information from existing satellites," Pecora
said, "nt}nt. are {apat}h' tit prt}viding gl{}l}al coverage {if the lyi}e required for successful
I'{'St }Ill-el' at}l}licalion."
Wlt' visualize ER()S as ltll {'v{}llllitillary pr{}granl," said Pec{ira, "l}{'g[llllill_ with lelevi-
sitill {alllel';ts flown in all ort}il Ihal will c{}ver the entire Slllt_lce {l| Ill{' earlh it'l}{'al{'{ll)',
under l]{'arly-idenlical ctm{lilions {if illunlinati{m."
I>ecor;t sai{I Ihal "we l}lan It} fly the first satellite in 1969," and lhal "the c{)sl {if launeh-
ill_ Ill{' tlrsi EROS vi'hi{-les is il{)l expected io exceed $70 nlillion--I;u- less lhan Ihe c{}sl
{}| l}h{)l{}_ral}hill_ Ill{" eailh liy {{}nv{.nlitiilal aerial means."
"Vthal we It;iv{' ]{';u-n{'{I ti{}in l}|itilol._,raphs lakell receilliy _it)lll {}i-I}iliiig sl}acecrafl,"
lhe Survey ])ile{li}r said, "in{licales thai the lands {an t}e exan]ine{t, t'valuatt'd, and
real}lie{l, anti Ill{: iyl)e and '¢igor t)f plants Call be delerlnilied. In addili{}n it} the Calll{'r;ts
lhal will i}lovi{t{ • lhe l}hologvaphic rirc{)rd, the first vehicle will also have a small lelec{im-
inunicati{}ns unil st) l|lal we may relay data to and fronl gr{iund slali{)ns |hal will aid in
iilI{,ri)reling Ihe television images. These relayed ground data will inchide seismic and
{}lh{'r inlT>rlnalhin llial, h{}pefully, will enable us to predict soine nalural disasters."
Per{ira exl}iained I]l;il "tllllll-e sensing syslelns will {'llll}]tiV tl{';ll-lll{';tSlll'ill_ {levices l{i
ln{}liilor lh{' t'arlh's vl}lt';lllli{'s ;illtl Se;ll'{'h t{}r st)tlrces {}tge{}lh{,lili;l] l}{Bvcr, radar Ihal will
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'see' beneath the t louds, at+d eventually can+eras with suflicienl resolving l>owei" Io pernlil
timely up-dating of <nu national topogral)hic map series."
I:+I "It; addition to savings it+ the <.<tsl <if Ul:idating these tnaps," ++aid Pecltra, "the avail-
ability of updated <naps ++'ill i+esult in a savings of over $I00 milli<m annually to the
Alllel+i(all pulflic. Aplflied <m a global basis, the s;.i+ving+ would ¢'xc¢'ed a billion dollars a
VCIII'."
The earth scientist i+nltlliasi:ed the inll)<ti+tance of feasiliilily exl)el-inlents thai have
been carlied <tilt ])+v his iigency with NASA aild othel + lese_trch itiid lecllnica] ;t+gelicit'_+.
"These exi)eritllt'nis cn,lltle liP+ 1o sl,ifl the ER()S Dl-l)_-i-_llll wilh ionf]dt'nce il1 its ilS<,J]i]
;tl)t)lic_tlion |<)i the bent!(il of lll+til," lit' said.
hi aiinouncillg the I<]R()S ])rogl-_liii, St'ci+t'tai+y Udall ])ointed i<l Ihe ]ilige nalioli;t]
ieqililX'inenls for ll;tltllal tesoulxes iiecded l<t fc'ed <till ietlinoi<igic s<tcicly +is well as lilt'
<iced Io collst'vvt' tile N;iliOli'S lands. '+Ii+%+<,IIltlsl iilsure l|iat wt. list' OIlY I't!SOlII+CCS wisely," tit'
<'_uili<)ned, addillg tti_it "lhe inlitrtnlili<tn gailied (}-<llll [_]R()S vt'liith's will be _+yillllesized
;ind iiiade _t'neial|+v itvailal)ie; it will hcl]_ <IS _ichit've in;l×illlliill liSe ill itui + l+es<lui't't's with
llliniitlllln wasle."
"Iv4(e t]linly belicve," said the ]nlcrior Se(l+el_tl++V, "lhai lhe list + of Ihe Earth RcsoiilceP+,
()hst'l+Valion ,Salellile will pfovide technological su|)])oi+l for the c<>ntinualioil of our soci-
ely of 'l)lt'niy' filf geiielittiOllS Ill COiliC. [_'R()S will bc ]llSl the 1)egiliiiiil_, <if +ii _ieat de(iidt+
in latld iilld resoillce iillal)'sis I_)l ii t)Ulgel)ning, ])ll|)ilialit>ll.'"
Document 11-17
Document tide: Charles F. Luce, Under Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior, to Dr.
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Deputy Administrator, NASA, October 21, 1966, with attached:
"Operational requirements for global resource surveys by earth-orbital satellites: EROS
Program."
Source: Department of the Interior Library, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C.
Shortly after the September 21, 1966, I)eparlment <?]"the hllerior pres,s _vlease annouming I'r_fie¢t
EROS, NASA served notice that it wa_ t_,iHint4 to dm,elop the smt <_]redo u roe s u rl, O' satellite that the
[ :.S. (_eological Surv O, required. 77w l)epartment (_ the Interior wasted littb" time, quickly sePtding
,\51SA its specific _wuirement_ [br the initial satellite. Although the Department Of the Inte_7or hoped
to be mceivingr data f_vm a satellite within two year_, budgeta Or and mana:(eme_tt dispute,s delayed
the laaltch ut_til 1972.
[liO ])_it.r, iil_lliOli ]
()clol)er 21, 1966
1)car Bob:
In nly letter t<t you of ()clobel 7, l indicated thai lhc (;eoh)gital Sltfvey was t)tel)aied
to sut)tnii a docuinent of "perfoilnance sl)ecificalions" of the I_]R()S Prograni for evahl_i-
don by your staff. 1 +ill< pleased lo ll+alisinil the enclosed do<iilllenl which sets fill-ill
Illlefiol"S i)l)eialional fequii+elnt,nls as _l basis |_)i exlensive discussions.
Siil('e Otli iileeling, Di +. Pecoi+i ]la._+ allen(led IWO lilet'tiligy; al NA<_A DiC|)al+al<tix lit site-
cific ieiOlnlllendaliollS oil tile Mexico-li>iazil _igl+eCllielilS and Sl+ile-<t|-lht'-afl ali_iivst's.
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,_ecrclary Udall is very hal)py 1o know lha! our coordinalioll is progressing s() t<tv_mlbly
and hopes illl's_' discli_sioils will lead io all'as otCally a_iC'l'lii(qll aild acliOll ill lhc COil-
ll'xl o| Ill(" I+]R().('; (()ncel)l.
Sin(ercly yl)lllS,
(;tlarlcs P, l,uc('
Under S('rrelary
1)1. R()I)('II (',. _('aviiaiis, _1,
])('puly ,.\(hniiiislralor, (]()(h' AI)
Nalioiia] Ai'r(inailii(s ail(t
Si)ii((. A,rlininiM ration
ti_i'aslihl_lOll, 1).( 3. <-)05"16
En(+histnr( ,
Operational Requirements for Global Resource
Surveys by Earth-Orbital Satellites EROS Program
The ER()S Pl(l_ralli lif lh(" l)t'l)arlili_<'nl (if lhc Inlerior requires Sl, ilsois to hi" l)l,tced
Ill ()rt)il I() liblaill sysli'lllali(' synopli(: and rcpelilive illlagillg Ill" llalllrill _tlld cllhilral ft'a-
llircs whose descriplhin and un(Icrslandhil_ is vital Io Inli'rior l)_.'l)alllilCnl inissions ill
ilially discililiilcs. The Inlcrior I)cparlinem is ('oriviitci!d liial lii/" carliesl l)ossilllc ac{luisi-
lh)n _)t saicllilc dala is of gi'(.al ilill)orlaliCC and lht'ict()rl! Oilllhles lhe foilowiiig requirl'-
lll('illS t_)r ihc ths! ER().% satcllile (ill a "l)t'rforlllaliCt." specifiralion" basis. All l)lesl'nlly
availat)h" qualiticll saicilile plalfornis, Sl'llSOrs, and 171cililies should be evaluated for Ihcir
capabililics Io fultlll hileliOi Departnil:'nl requiremenls. We hope to he,hi a(qilirin_
i('S()lllC(! (lala ti-()ll} ltll Opl'rali(illa] s,)'sl(_ill bv lhe (?nit ot ]9(i.().
Th(' tirsl nalellilc, pianlll'd as an lii)lilnlllll glilli, lal plll-p(ise data collcct(ir, should l)e
Iidhm,cd }))r il s('lJl'.s ol []R()S salellilcs (all-yill_ lllol(' sophislicaled sf,lisl,_l-S llSillg{ f)llfli'r
icgions o1 lhc eh'c'ironlagnt, lic sl){!clruni and also nlc'asiiring force [i('l(Is. A ic'Ulalive pri-
orily for I|i/> lalcr Sl>llsors is I ) high rcsohllioii ilitiarl'd hliagc:r, 7) radar iiila_('r aild sc'al-
Icr¢)liil'l('l-, _) uhravioh'l hllliinesc:i'n(-i, sensor, 4) Inicrowave radi(ilnelel; alld ,rl) <_l-aVily
t_,radil'lil and liia_llClil s(!iiS¢)l.%. Spccific rl'quiri-lnenls fiir ihese seilsors are nol slali'd al
171 lhis lhnc, tiui will be clevclcq)ed as llie enginei,ring of lht" SCllSOl-S and inlerpr/qive
capat)ilily develops (}f IlSi'rs ()F daia.
Basic R(.cluir(,nl(,nls
a. Year global coverag("
I/. R(,imliliv(' _)t)serwition al Salll(" hi('al lime
(]. Ph()llil_-l_lp]li( ()1 illlaghlg- (lala
1). Vcriiial viewing i('(|Uil-t'd hi nornlal oi)cration but oblique viewing (t('sirah](" tor
supplcmenlary c()vera_e
IC <%lighi (ivcrla|) q)l iilia_l's in direction lit t]i_hl alld sidclitp al ihe (,qualor
_. Milliiiliini opl'iali(nlal 1i1_" oloii(! y('ar
(',. Allahi_(lala returil
I1. (:al)at)ilily [{)r in-llighl (()niiilan(l i)rog, l-aliilliin_
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I. Capat)ility of carrying addilional unspecified instrumenls widl weig|n of 5(}-100
pounds
.]. l)ata telemetering capa|)ility from ground-based instruments lhrough salelliic
commUlfi(ations ]ink Io central dala-reduciion ta(-ilifics
K. I.!nclassified systems and data
11, Sysleili collstrainls ilnposed by basic reqtlirl!liit'nls
A, Sull-svlic|lronoils orbit whh sun an_]e al 30 ° al 5[) _ lalillid(,, al vernal eqtiilio× al
2.t) hoilrs (local sire lime) 1)l'f()it_ or atler Iriie noon
I:_1B. i>,,w<,i - supply sutlicicni [_/i- s¢,llSOl-S alld dala iransniissioll and relay
C. Stat)ili/.alioil ,_tif[lcicllt i<l lllailliaill a lliillillltlill (it l ° poiming accuracy at vcrtical
1). ()n-board dala sloiage as iequir('d l)y i('lalion ofort)ii allittide, and lr;tckiil_ stalions
l']. l)ala ral_! colilillensilralc" wilh resohilioil aiid niliiii)t'r o[('lcni('iils in |inal di'sig, il
Ill. Syslt'nl rl'quirelnenls for ol)liinunl dala acqliisition
A, Iiliagery
1. (_rolilld ic.'solulion of 100'-200' per l-csohltiOll (']l'lil(!lil (Oil a side)
7. Field of vi¢'w of at)Oill 100 slattil__" mih's Oil a side (Sqilare foriiial)
_/. Sp('clral r_.'sohlliOll
a, a|)oul 100 illl.I sl)cciral iill.r('lllt, ill peaked al 3111 ili).l
t), ]._0 lnlA spl'clial iiicrtqiit'lil ])eak_c'd al abotil 700 ililLI.
4. (;lound recoFdlllg in two iIIo(l_.'s ((l[it:cl ailalog illla_/." illl(t illagil¢,tic lap(')
with the least linage degradalioii possibh'.
B. Data conllniinicalions relay
1. (]ai)ablt" of relayiilg digila] data lioin earlh-1)ased sC.'llSOiS Io ct'illial d_ila-
rt'duclion alld COliiptllillg tacililics.
[41 2. Required dala lranslnissiOll lo hi' Oll a basis of ill ]cam daily lt,adolil lit data
slorcd at grotind Slalioils and co]lccled al intervals of 1-5 holllS, l)ala rale
and voluliit, Wollld I)/, low.
_zl. (irotlnd st-nsors ilia), include, bill i1ol t)(, lilniicd Io:
a. inso|alioll ii i t_tt!lS
|). sir_.'ain gagc's and walei_qilalily recordcrs
c, tihmeters
d, lherinal t)rol)es
t'. st'islllOlllCtcrs
f. sl i_iili gages
g, displacenienl i l l (" l (" i._
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[!.,_i. (i(,o]. SiilVCV. 196ti, l)elaiicd plan alid sllllilS rl'l)()rl I)t U.S, (ll!ol. SlilV(!v l%'s('arc]l ill
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Document title: Irwin P. Halpern, Director, Policy Staff, NASA, Memorandum for General
Smart, "Earth Resources Survey Program," September 5, 1967.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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l_t 1967, with no elear mi.ssion ,/or the post-ApoUo era, wine NASA (_[ficials beta n to talk ahou t .spa ee
activities that could be ,ju.st!fied in terms O[ public benefit. As the head o[ the l'oli_y Sta[]£ Irwin
Halpern pointed out to As.sistant Administrator /br l'oli_.]acob 1'2 Smart in thi.s memoramht m that
the Earth Resources Surv O' reprew'nted the sort t!/i]u.st(/iable profitam the ._pace aL_em_ needed.
Ill NATI()NAI] AI_2RONAUTI(:S ANI) SPACE AI}MINISTILXI'I()N
WASt l lN{ ;TON, 1}.C. 20546
September 5, 1{.}67
MI'2M()RANI)UM t{}r (;eneral Sntarl - 1'2
Sul}jecI: Earth Res{}urles Stxrvey Pr{}gratn
i would str{}ngly re{{}mmen{I, from a i}l}li{y point of view, that tit{' Earth Resources
Survey [ERSI l'r{}grant and ils i}lace in Ihe {wcrall sl}a{e I}lt(lff,et iiow lie reassesse{t.
II is impelalive, ill Illy.judgntent, that NASA make plain thai it is titling illll)orlalll
things tot lie{lille. This is wha! the I'resident and lhe Congress are {'{}twerne{l ahi}tlt. This
is the lest t{} which tit{" taxpayer is putting Federal pr{}grants. This is why, in essence, our
btt{Igel has been cut s{} severely.
The ERS program would score well in this test: with proper emphasis and direclilm,
it could l}rovi{h ' m_tj{}r (lem{}l]slral}le ecl}nomi{ returns in the near as well as distanl
lilltlr{'. The need now, il seelns It} the, is to {apilalize tt]}{}n lilts ass{q, It} ]}tlrstle lhe t}r{}-
gram with a grealer level of etIorl Ihan now i}lanncd, and thereby to seize an importanl
{}f}I}{}vlunily (whih' Ihere is slill flexibility ill lhe FY'68 bridget) lo strengthen the basis f{}r
i}ttl}lic SUl}i}{}rt fin the" eltlir{" s]};t{'e i}r{}gral3] ill all ele{;li{}lt yeal2
We sh{ml{I, in iny.jtl{lglneltt, take the lead of the Vi{e Presidel]! (who r{'{'enlly v{fice{l
{{}ll{erll lha! l{:,l} lillIc was being {h}tle in the ERS Program) attd the recet]l Wo{)ds Hl}h'
(:l}nt_.'ren{'e (whi{h called fi}r f}r{}{ee{ling apace with an aircrati as well as satellile ERS
devch}I)n_enI i}r{}gram) an{l ensttre that this pt{}graill is ptHsued wilh a higher level of
ef[orl. "Fh{r I}el}artntevtls {if Agriculture, Interior and Na_,T have asked NASA for supporl
lot R&I} ill Ill{' ERS atca. _re are responding by providing italy 25 percent o[ the $8 mil-
lion {}r st} that is rc{tuive{I. Such resp{}nsiveness 1{} the inleresls of potential {onstmter
agen{i{'s may well give rise I{} charges tltat NASA, instead of leading the assauh {in a whole
new ar{';l of techn{}l{}gy, is in lhe van dragging its feel. In my view, tinding goals in com-
Hl{}l] with {}lh{'v F{'deral agertcies and programs is lantamount t{} tin{ling new bases {if SUl)-
ill}r1 tor the sl}a{l' llr{}grant. This wl}uld argtte, in turn, |or increased resp{}nsiveness t{} lilt"
interests {}f {}lh{'r ageit{ies.
12] I)esl}ite tit{' h}w level {if ettbrl gn{}tmted t{} date, the NASA ERS Program has already
made a std}statllia[ {'<},llvihttti{>lTt Ill the ec{}n{}my it] stimulating a nati<}nal awareness i}f the
t}{>lenllial <}l remote sensiwg. It is pr{}hably lair to say thai NASA has served as a {atalyst ill
lhe [iel{l {if {'xl}l{fiting thc whole ele{Ttr{}ntagneti{; spettrtlm for e{l}nonai{ uses. A new
indtJslvv is aborning [sic]: Tcledyne is l}lanning to {'stablish an ERS scrvi{e c{}ml}any thai
may irwlu{le from six to twenty twin-engine aircraft equipped with muhiban camera sys-
Ictus; Westinghouse will soon hold a {{}nl_.wence on the use of side-looking radar f{}r nat-
ural res{}ur{e exl}h}i|ati{}n. In my view, NASA has the opp{}rttmity and lit{" {}bligalil}n t{}
toIh}w thr{}ttgh ;m{l rentain al the {lilting edge {}["the flew tcchnoh}gB/ (t{} the exIell! se{ll-
rily cottsiderali{}ns ]}ermit), itt {}rder I{} give ttew imi}ettts to itl{htslvy's a{lva_te in Ibis liel{l.
Ftlrlherlll{}re, what we {It} el fail t{} {1{}in this area may impl}rtanlly at]i'cl our w{}rl{I
i}{}sitilm i}olilically and e{{}t]{}mi{all). The ERS Program {}[]_.q-san {}i}]}{}rttmity Ill stthstatt-
tially exl}and internali{mal {{}{>l}erati{m (Brazil anti Mexico have ahea{ly s{}ughI It} work
wilh tts in Ibis area), l'2n{{}uragin R the {leveh}I}menl {If ERS capabilities at air{rafl levels in
9.r)() ( )I',SERVINI; "1t 1I+:E?,,RI'11 FR_)M SI',\< :1-:
tile course of developing a salellile capability would altord the United States rich Ol)portu-
nilies Io assist less developt,d countries in ways that are wwy meaningt+ul and beneticial to
them in the near term. At the same time, t)y shirking lcadcrship in the ERS tield, we risk
being upstaged by the Soviets, who have lately indicated an itmrresl in Ihe economic uses
of sawllite I)hot<>graphx. On the security side, the NASA program holds out the promise ot
contrilmti<ms Io a more slal)le worhl by helping to gain wide acceptance fiw "<)pen skies."
In conchlsion, l believe lhat by strengthening the l:arth Resources Stll'Vt'V Program,
CVell ill the expense of certain scientific or hardware pr<)jecls, we wouM strengthen the
lotal space program ,tnd l)rotecl its fttture. Such a step wouhl draw pul+lic attention to
meaningfttl post-At_ollo a(tivitx and possil_ly even away ti-om the moon mission ilself.
Above all, it wouht ofti'r the President an opp<wtunity Io single out a tangit)h', indeed
exciting, examph' _t how tim space program is supl)<)rting other important national goals,
such as lhc war on Imnger, a+nd Ih¢,rel)y helping people I)olh at beret' and abr<md.
[hand-signed: "hwin P. llalpern"l
l)ireclor, Polio.'Staff
Document 11-19
Document title: Jacob E. Smart, Assistant Administrator for Policy, NASA, Memorandum
for Dr. Mueller, et al., "Earth Resources Survey Program," October 3, 1967, with attached:
Draft Memorandum for Mr. Webb, Dr. Seamans, Dr. Newell, 'qgsues Re: The Earth
Resources Survey Program."
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Throughmtt / 967, A:4SA debated maki+lff the Earth tCe.soun'es Survey (EIU;) proKram a high priori
ty .[m the po_'t-Apolh, era, perhaps involvi_g the activitie._ o[ a human crew. Although lhi_ proffram
O[]i'wd a nu tuber o]pote_tial payo[]._ fin the agem); it amlai_ed several liabilitie.s a_ wall. l)edrm_
ageno,-wide +wnsen+u+ on the proper ap[nvach to the l"d¢S program, As.+i_tant Administmtor fin Poli_y
.]acob E. Smart .+ent thi_ a+sessment q/he3.' ]A'SII,OL_involved with a _eq+te_t /br fi,edback to As._m'iate
AdminiL+tralor [or Manned Space Fh'g'ht (;em_ze t'. Mueller and other high-level NASA officials.
[no pagination ]
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Subjecl: Earlh Resources Survey lhogram
|g)r s_)me lime, Ibis oftict, h:_s bec_ auempling I<) understnnd _t_t, full ramifications of
tilt' policy and procedural aspects ,_t the ERS Illall_t!r. ()lie l)Urposc is Io idcnlit)' and arlic-
illal(, isgtlt'S, to assisl ill establishing proct,dures to ellsurc thai Ill(' illlpollalll issues arc' leC-
ognized, ewlluated, and viewed ill perspective by NASA's decision makers and by lhc
specialist and generalisl staff members whose thnction it is Io advise decision makers. To
grasp the" significarlce of earth resource sensing, of ils cr)mph'xitics, and allendanl I)rob-
Ictus, requires the best lair'hi that NASA can muster. We solicil your personal assislanct'
and the c_opcralion _d vf_ur tfffice ill the development of policy on this matter.
Atlacht,d is a first d]-afl apl_rcciation of Ihc issue as seen 1)y lhis office. We requcs! that
v_u review :rod conslruclively criticize, eilher verl)ally or ill writing, Ibis drafl and contin-
ue u) share with us a sense of resp_)nsil)ilily tbr the developmcnl f)t pf)licy guidance with
respcct tf_ NASA's inlcrnal and exlcrnal activities.
[hand-signed: 'iJac<)b E. Smart"]
Assistanl Adnlinistt-ator
fi_r Policy
IJI NATIONAl, AER()NAUTI(]S AND SPACE AI)MINISTIL&TI()N
WAStlIN(;TON, D.C. 2(t546
()FFI(]E ()F Ti IE AI)M INISTRAT()R
I)RAI:I"
MEM()I,L,\Ni)UM for Mr. Wcbb- A
Dr. Scamans - AI)
l)r. Newcll - AA
Sut_ject: Issues Re: The Earth Resources Survey Program
The qut'slion _t NASA's involvement in the Earth Resources Survey Program has
rcacht'd a critical jtmcmrc at which fundamental decisions and overall guidance now
sct'm imperalive. ()n the one hand, ERS constitutes an important technical, political and
economic challengt" in which NASA could play a tormidable role. On ihe other hand,
diverse and complex illl('l'-agt!llt'y issues which bear direclly on seCtllily and other key
uatifmal policies, as well as the requirement to arrive at internal managerial decisifms,
need Iobc weighed very carefiflly betbre any broad NASA go-ahead is given.
The positive aspects of the program break down into three: compelling polilical real-
itit's, potential ccot_on_ic and social contributions, and fairly widespread scienlilic, _ech-
nical and industrial inlerest. ERS offers NASA a unique and timely opportunity m furnish
Ih_: President :rod the Congress wilh demonslrable evidence lhat ihe space program can
t)e cltk'clivcly applied to crilic;d national and international problems such as poverly, over-
p_)lmln/i_)n, urban sud>ilization and the enhancement of nalural [21 resources. If it is to
sln-vivf" in Ioflav's 1)uclgclary environment, NASA must be responsive to lhese very real
pr_)hlcms, as well as COIllJllll(" wilh its vital efforls It) reach out and explore lhe solar sys-
Icl_. Wilh rt..,;pccl Io lhe lulure, lh<'s<, problems will itl_ haulll the ncxl Adminisuatifm--
and Iht, ncxl. Thc [LS.S.R. ;llso slands in the wings, readying itself to exploit aerospace
science and lechnoh_br, y liar political and economic gidn. AI holn<', olhcr goVt'lnnl<'nlal
2r'_) ()B%ERVIN(;T IF_AR'I'ItFR()M_PA(_I,_
agencies,theSpaceandMarineCouncils,dwNationalAcademyof Sciencesandolher
bodiesaheadyareembarkedm_whaladdsuptoanationalERSprogram.Andsegments
ofinduslryarebecomingincreasingly imerested in lhe prospects of such activity and are
beginning to invest their own resources in this field of endeavor. (;learly, there is no ques-
tion of iurning or holding back the lechnologn:,, a! leas( as far as aircraft-borne sensing is
concerned. Moreover, the unclassified lechnolog,g,', including the release of Gemini pic-
lures, has made plain that the st_ue-<)l:lhe-arl is ready for such a development.
(]onstraints: The controlling issues which must be resolved fall inlo the categories ol
( I ) securily and foreign policy implications, (2) multi-agency management and funding,
(3) the need lot a sound lechnica] ti,asibilily program to determine precisely what aero-
space system|s| can and canno! accomplish, and (4) the several ahernale organizational
Ol)lions which NASA could pursue in the event a go-ahead is decided.
['{I The conflict with DOD and olher natiomd agencies extends beyond die securilv.
issue--itself a knotty one--into lhe eventllal roles and missions of the military and civil-
tan space agencies. Moreover, lhe Stale |)e|)artment has beexl chary to date in its ('n(h)rse-
ment of an international ERS, even nn bilateral lines. At issue is whether tile objecli_ms of
lhose [}owetftll agencies can be overcome and whether a mutuall_ agFeed-up<m program,
delinealing respective responsibilities and sol|oiling mutual cooperation can be evolved.
It llltlSt I)e ina.lde cleag in add|lion, lhat many of lilt' conslr,dlHS are policy (ollslr_.lilllS
retie(ling a dated policy environmenl that needs to be examined in tilt, lighl oi Ill(' envi-
I'OlXlllell[ ()J lO(|i[y till(| [o||]()rr(ll, v.
With respect to other governmental agencies such its the Agriculture and Interior, lilt'
essential problem is delinilion of NASA's role: whelher to behave as the lead agency, all
leas( through Ihe R&D phase, ulilizing an inter-agency Program Review Board chaired I)y
NASA as a coovdinalion instrumenl, or lo consider muhi-agency funding and manage-
menl wilh all its alten(|anl p,oblems as Ill(' program proceeds. An example of a lonRer-
rang(! (onsi(|ex;.ltion is what NASA's conlinuing role sllou.ld I)e: Should we phase ()tit as
soon its an operatiomd system is developed? Shmdd wc participate in operations beyond
providing launch services?
In the lechnical arena, while mucil l(,s(,;llch ill seleclvd areas has been accomplished,
Ill(" [)racticabilily of remote sensing of aerospace systems remains to I)e demonstraled. We
llltlSl also examine the po[ilical, economic and social [4] consequences ot ERS, as well as
lbe le(])nological aspects, in mu('|l grealer d('pt]'_, lesl we prematurely build up public
expectations. The fact is, however, that NASA and ()lhers ha.ve aheady pro(:laimed lhe pro-
gram's promise.
Finally, ERS looms as a major underlaking |or NASA if lhe above issues can be met.
This warrants lop-level review of HeatdqXlallel's COllll'O] ;tlld (]elll('l" plnlicipalion wil]lin
NASA and a firm inler-agency arrangement t(> meet the myriad ()t problems and objec-
lions which occur.
We come then to Ihe primary points at issue: At what pace should this nation pursue
an Earth Resources Program utilizing aerospace systems and whal should NASA's role be?
_VVhal opportunities exist to extend our demonslrated capabilities in communi(alions,
weather and navigati<)n satellites lo llle ERS area in order Io be more respires|re to prob-
lems of crucial concern to (he Executive and la'gislalivc Deparmwnts? Should NASA con-
tinue lo be the major source of non-(lel_-nse funds and resources? And in the same vein,
should NASA [ulfill a cenlral role in a national civilian program? Should theFe not be a
clear national policy which allocates responsibilities for an integrated approach?
EXPI.()RIN(;TIlE[_NKN()WN 253
Document 11-20
Document title: Edgar M. Cortright for George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight, Memorandum to Assistant Administrator for Policy, "Earth
Resources Survey Program," November 17, 1967.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Mme _o than mint other programs, NASA's Earth Resource._ Surve), (I"RS) pr%,ram was an ittlera-
gen O, endeavm: 7'he l)epartment._ of Ag)#ulture, the Inte_qor, and State all had active stake._ m Earth
re._ource surveys, l'l_th the pos._ibili(_' for tu_f disputes in mind, NASA approachwl pTvL,ram dm,elop-
met_t with a mixture o] co_tfidence a_ul caution. Responding to an av_e._.sme_t o] IH¢S is._ue_ I_,
,l_i_tant Administrator for I'olic_, (;eneral.]acoh E. Smart, As._ociate Admini_trator fi_r Manned
Space I"light George E. Muelh,r ._uggested that NASA should take a firm leadership position. (;iven
Muelh'r_ positiot_ as head o/the portion of NASA in charge _?fhuman_ i_l _pace, it is not suq_ri_ing
that Maelh.r seem_ to ag_utnr that _\; L_'A _swmote-sen.sing activities woubt be conducted aboard occu-
pied plot/otto,.
Ill UNITEI) STATES (;O\_]RNMENT
Memorandum
T(): E/Assistant A<lminislrat()r I)ATE: N()V 17 1(.)67
li)r ]'()]i('v
FR()M: M/Associate Adminislrator
tot Manned Spa(e Flighl
SUB]E(71": Earlh Res()m'('('s Surv(Lv Program
REFI:REN(:I:.: _'bur memorandum ()f ()(tober 3, I(.)67, same sul)jecl
Thank you li)r the opportunity to (omment on your draf! memorandum regarding an
Earlh Resour(:es Survey Program. The draft staten the issues and t)rings them into [b(us
quilt well. I lherefi)r¢' have a linliled nunlber of commenls which are applicable Io lilt"
(hafl as such.
Accepting y()ur invilalion [i)r assistance I have extended my remarks in several areas
t() I)r()pose some s()hnions ti)r consideration. Ahernatively, I have suggested so)he facu)rs
which l fi'el must necessarily be accounted for in any approach to resolution of several
qlt(:slioIlS raised in your memorandum. These suggestions are based (m three years ()f
sludy a(livily ('on(htcted by the Advanced Manned Missions Program Oflice, study in
which participali(m of potential users has been encouraged. This work, which is continu-
ing, has sharl)en('d ovr in|uition and provided some knowledgeability which l am pleased
l() share wilh you.
Scope ()J[he Meln()r_l[Idull|
Ahhough f:h(" u'rm "r('s()ur(('s" is being used by some NASA spokesmen in a broad
s('ns(' Io include (uhma] resources as well as natural rt'sources, I suggest l]l_ll lh(" s(()j)e o1
lh(' mern<)randuln be expli(itly broadened by choice ()f other terms in title and lext. It is
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n()l ol)vioun, for inslanc(', that a s(h('ine lt)r malaria control in wilhin purview (ll lilt' Iml)('r,
till(| lh('lC ill'<`' <`'ll()tlgh pt'_)l)Ic wh_) us(' Ill(' l('rlns "rc_,()lll-(cs" illld "nilllll'il[ l'('s()lll'(('s" illl('l-
changeal)ly that tonius|lilt is likely over tht' ¢'xtcnl o1 lit<_' stlb.j<`'ct tnlill('l+ involv<`'d. A till<`'
such ,is "Eai+th Al)plicalions Slttv<`'y," fiJr iltstlin<`c, would have wider ilnl)lilafions ahhoilgh
I ;lilt stir(`' this can b(" in|l)roved.
[hc list" o[ th¢" l<`'ttlts "itCl+OSl)il(c s_,_sl('ttiP.+', itll(l"it<`'r<)spacc t<`'c]tn<d<_g_'" lilt(++ ills() It(' llli_,-
leading sine(" I Ix,liovt" you arc principally (_)tw('rn('d here with lhos<`+ aspects of stt<h pro-
grants which tlti]i+,<`" sl)acc-l)_wn<`' t<`,(ltnoh_gy.
[21 l_rcsttnl;d)ly, itir¢rall w<}rk l)t'llorntt'd I:, NASA as a phils<`' ill tlt<`" (l<`w('l<qmtt'Itl <d Sl);tc ("
t<`'chnology do<`'s not l>OSc poli(y ill|+fill'ins <d tlt+.' +|line gcttt+c _It all. NASA dcvch)l)im'ntal
w_wk directed ill air--l:,ornc :,;ySlClltS |is such (ltws not a})l)ear to lttn lit<`" slmt(" gitlllttt <)[" p<d-
i(+y (onsi(l<`,ratitms as the Sl)aC('-l)orn<`' work, nor is it al)parcnt too that, in al(,as o[ _iv<`,rl;ii>,
tlt<`' Agcn(y will nc, c<`,ssarily wish to al)l)roach Ii'soltttion of tlt<`+ issues in tlt<`' Saln<`' wax'+ I Stlg-
g<`'sl ill;It issues rel<`+wull to air-bortt(" svst<`'nls Ill, Sel)al+at+:d lr<>in lhos<` + r<`,lcvitt|l to Sl)all'-
borI1<`' systclnS. The folh>wing (<)Innt<`'tlt+Irv has l)<`'<`'tt dcveloped in th(' context of lJi-_d>l<`'nls
pertaining to spacc-1)ornc systctns.
]+l'CS<`'tll St;lilts
The as.s<`'t+tion on pilg(' 2 that th(' t!.S. vil+tttally h;Is a national ERS l:,l-ogram r<`'quirc_,
('Oral((('tit. \Vhilt" it is tI'tlt + |hilt it nttmbcr <)[agcll<`-ics, dtt+l)itrtni('nts, (otttwi]s, t'tc., ill'<+"lit()t'c
or h'ss aclivcly ('ngag('d, lh( + col]('ctiolt o] <`,[]/>rt+s lltcks Ill<`' ¢_dwsiv('n('ss and l('adClsldl_
charact('ristic of;( progratn. MoI'<`'ovcI', of l)artictdar relevance in this (<mu'xt, th(' ong_iltg
(,|flirts arc tl(lt h<`'avily (I<`'I)<`'ndcttl t)II slm('(' i<`'(hnoh_gy. In add|lib)n, most of th<_sc pr<+i<`'tls
oii('ntcd toward the apl)licalion of spa((' l<`'l'lltlcllllb,_ ar(' b(fing stilnulalcd bv NASA, usu-
ally with NASA ftunds. Thus, NASA is in it tltdqtlC iuid sir<trig l)t>sititln it+ lh(' iq)plil ;tti<Jn <_[
sl)iicc-b()rlIC l<`'l'hllologx t() ('itrlh ()li('iil('d l('(lttirt'lllClllS.
N,-\SA P<lsition "+'is a "+'is ()th('r Ag('nci<`'s
In tcrlns <ditSSUln('d l_dc, its well its ill tt'rnls _J <`'Xl)('I'lis<`', NASA is in Ill(' lit' l_tcto l)<_si-
lion <d I<`'ild lilt'lit')' filr ih(" Sl);ict" al)ltlicali<ln <)f a<`'lOSfia('<`>liorll<`" sCtlsol+s. It is logical and
it|ill|i-ill, |is w<`'ll |is adlnhlistraliv<`'ly ntili<`'ri_>r, t()l NASA Io toni|lilt(" ill this r(ll('--_it ]<`'lint
Ihrou<_h ill<,' R&+[) l-+hliscs. Vx'ilh (oliliiiu<`'d (<)<ll)Cl+;ili<)n t]-oli/ lht' [)<`'])iirllii('nis _>1
:\griciilllil-t', Illlcri<:q +, ;llid olh¢'i s, this _irrillig('lliClll +v_ttild grciilly t{icilil;ti(' ;i _.ll_)lig N,\S,\
h'ild in dciiiOliSlrliling tit<`' llcn('l]ts of t'xl)loiliti g ih<`" iidVitlilligt,!,, it| lliis iicw iii('diillii, h
wiluid also hc Ihl" ill/ill <`'ftlci<`'nl wll+ I<) |ill)idly llriilg ill+," ll('W it'(+ltilidO,_, ") iililii_ lilt I)ch;tll'
()1" lJOtClllial ilscrs who ;Jr(' wilii<tlll <4ll(lli_ R_+_|) orit'nl;ilion+.
_iii((' il is .+'ci"_ iiil]ikt!]'+ _)li ihc I_i(c lit h lhlil it _+('l)_ii-ltlt' ++iilt'lliic sv_il(,ill will t)('(()ilil' it
r<`'alilv filr ('v('rv ilSCl, Ill<`' Inulli-I)iirl)oS(" st)tic(" t)];lllilrlll is ('Cl'l+lill Io ])lily ii lliai<lr ll;ii'I iii it
[lilliFt" <lt)cI-;lli<)nli[ tinic I)cii_ff[. Ptirlh('l-ii/orc, ill<`' tlticl Ih;It lilt" c<lsl l)cr il])[)]i(iilioii Otlghl
I_l g<l (h)wn ill+irkt'(liv a,_ ill<`' tot;t] it/illli)('r ()t aciiviti<`'s Oil t)oiiid Ill(' ]tilill_lrni ilicrc+lS('s
w('ighs h('a'+ilv ill I{tvor of ,++ill'It ;tit iil)i)i+<l;i(h. Tilt" cslli])lisllnl('nt of it [('lid ;l<_t'll(,'+, lit I<`'itsl
ihr<lu,_h ill(' R&I) l)tilis('+ is i'ss('iililll to (<trrying this kind <)1+t'nit'rl)ris(' lilt-ward ;tiill ii
would lx' a ilii.+,llikc f(ir NASA Ill Itlrli ;isid<' I](llli ih(' h'ild l)_lsili_lii itir('ii(t"+ i'stal)lishl'<l.
131 Although .N+,\S+\ nlight acc<.'l)i R&I) hinllhl_ [i,lili i)olctilial tl_,('l_,, ii is (l<`'_>iiillih' i_l i ()ll-
fill|l(' |hi' i)l;l(li¢c ()1 NASA tiln(tiil_. This is [);irli(til;irl,'+ Irilc ill (;is(++ xvh('rl" ll()l('lllilil ii_l'r_,
la(k R_-[) tUlidili_ <)1- Ill;lllil<_('lllCIIl (Xi)('l+i+,ql('t'. Th('v, C;lllli()l It(' t'xll('cll'd Io < I+iillk till lira) -
_l-liiil_, xvht'lt' lh(' t)cncti(illl ()tllC(>iil(' 1<_ Ihcill i_+ llOl i(';i_Olllil)lv it_.+dlrcd, xvht-i(,il,4 ii is wl'll
wiihili N,\S,\'s charl('r tit (,Xl)<`,iid fill)tic'+ t_)i Clidt'iivlliP4 whcl(, ii _()()([ lil('ii_,illt' (>t t_iiih ill
lht' t'xl.+('tl;ilil)li t)l t{i"+oral)h' it'_tlltS iP+t('(itlil('<[.
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In llw later <q:,('rati<mal p('riod, afl(.r practical+ carth-ori('nlcd _q)l)lication_, of Sl:,a((.+-
borne systems have b('('n (l(qt)onslr;at('(l cost-t'lfi'ctiv(', users shotd(l l)c eXl:WCted Io pay
lh('i| ()_+Vll+_,:_lywith NASA ])('aring r('sp<msil)ilhy fi)r ]attnching, Ir_t(kit+g, data acquisition,
and data (lisstqnin+iti<m.
S(wurilv +tnd the l)('[)artm('nt of l)tq(,t_s(+
[t ]nay h(" thal th(' l)cl)mlm('tH of l)ct+bns( ' must h(' ¢onsid<__r(+'d a special cam(+ in lh("
_<wl of siltmtiol) ('nvisag('d al)()v(, l)ut il would s('('t+ n('ith(.'r tw(('ssaiy u()r desir+11)h + ft.
NASA to a'l-)ml(l()l) lh(" fi('hl. NASA's charter is c](+ar in mHhorizing military stq)porl +re(l,
iJroperly handh'd, such tuldt'ttakillgS ++ill enhanc( + l)ubli(: c()nfid(.'n(-( + in lh(' w<wth of
NASA programs. NASA's l}t-(+dcc+++ss()t, tlt(' NACA [National Advis(.y (',(munitt<.'e I_.w
:\<'ron+tuti(s], SUl)port('d th(' tni]ilmy without (linlintHi()n <)1 its l)ul)li( image or illt('rna-
ti<mal r('l)utalion. In a(l(lili(m, workabl(" arrang(wri(mls (,xist with resl)tWt to (];issilit.d
und(wl;ikit+gs and lh('s_+" cat+ bc (+xt('nd(,d into the n(+w at('n+t.
l'r,+)posals hart' bt.(+u +_dv+m(ed th+_t NASA l)e r,t+stri(l('d from using son+(* r('a(lilv av+til-
_ttl)l(+lt'('l'm()l_)h_ +_,:s,li)l +t,xmnph +, camt'ras larg('r lhan 6 inch apt'rltnt " fl)r galhcwing t'arlh
data 11om ()rbit. Such blank('t proscripti(ms nmst twvcr I)<' allowed to bc(+ome estah]ished
l)oli(y sin(<' this w(mld r('H(h'r sorer" very l)romising r_'m<)t( • s('nsing l('(hni<-itl(+s itm(ccssi-
hi( + to ally<m(' hul l]i(' I)()I). rh(+ t,xist(+n(-( ' oflh(, l(+chn()l()g)whi<-h ,,v()uld h('ust'htl, and
its ('+q)abilili(+s, art! <)|)('i"dy kt+i()wtL hctlc(.' s(!('ul'ity l)olicv _,h(>ul(l (<)n(('mrat( +on lh(' (()l-
h'('li()tl and uliliz_Iti<m <_l (('rtairl dam and not (>n lh(' t'(luipmt'nt. M()r(,ov('J: NASA has n()
n('('<+l f_+)l-a((<.'s_,I(:, Sl)t'(ial t('(hn()h)gi('s which are ()I tmi(lu(+ly military (hara(tt'r at](l whi(h
at(' tht'r<.'fi)r(' tt(:,l al is.,,+tt(+.
hll(.rnati()lml ( :<)nlsi(l(,l+ll i<)1/_,
Th(' r('hl(tall((' ill v,triotL'-; s(+('t()]+s Io COllsi(l('r im('l]mli()_ml spa((" al)l)]i(ali<)tis i)l() -
_rams t'mt_,t I)(' hr,t_+ktq+ (|o',xt_ if v++'¢+art" not t<) |_+t<++g,_)at_ t'xct, lhqH opi)ortttnhy to |+os|(+.r gt'n-
tlill(' int(+ll|;lt+<)II+il c()()l)('rali()r_ as well as t() greatly (.'llh+lllC(+ ollr prestige ;+ll'Ollll(I tilt'
w()rld. rhcr(. i_; ample stt('('(.ssfid pr('(('<:l('tH fi)r il)l(,]-ii_tti<)n,_ll (o()])(+r_lti()l+l ill S|)+I('( + _ll)(t it
W()III(I t)(" +1lnistak(' 11()1 I(} expand <m it. Wh+ll("'¢(+r l)('(uliar prot)lelns +iF(" posed I)y an
('J]0rt lik(+ +tll Earth Rt'sour('('s .";tu+v(T, our ex[)('ri('n¢{ • with Jlll('rll;+tti()rl_l] ('ft()ll_ ill
¥('s(';I.rc|1,i|I 111('|('{)|'1)|o_r_,ill COlllnlmlicatior_s, an(| hl nl_111l]{'(| ]]ig}_ll ()|_'rs aFl (-x(t-ll('m
basis Ul)()H whi('h I() l)r<)('eed. It may be possil)le to initi;m" viable c|]Ol+lS <)rl a nalion;d
basis, bill 1}1(' ['u]l l)ot(qHial of "t)(.ncl]ls for all mankind" will not b(, achieved with()ttt sub-
sl;irlli;ll Jnl(qll;tliotl+|l p,lrti(ip+|liol).
14} F('asi'l)ility, l)t'vt'h)l)m('nt , _n(I OI)(walions
It is qttitt' im|)(wtattt l(_ (till+.'t-,_q)tiat( +b(.'tw(wn th,:+sc phas(.'s (ff l)t+ogtatn ¢.[[ort sintt' tit( +
l)olic ,' t<) I)(' i)tusut'(I, as wcII +islh('I)r()mis( • of r('suhs, may 1)(' quil(' (liffiq-('rH in each (as<.'.
l'lw (mr(.nt itir(l-+lt+[ ])r(_,li-tl]) :-+l])dearly Apollo AI)pli(ati()ns tr]igllts itl'q _till)('(i _tl tL"q+tl)]i_,ll-
il|t_ i})t' fi'asil)ility ()t I'('ln<)[( • S('llSillg |ronl orl)it ill ill(' I'l]iIIly S])('('lI'+ll l)ands <)1"ill{('l'('sl.
I+,_ls<'(I<m (;(']nilli []l;tlldwrill('n ins('rtion i11th(" original: ", mct('()r()l()gi(al salcllites,"l
al+([ ahl'r_llt ",+,,'orkto (l++l(', hov,,,(.+s;(,|, | l){.]it",+'c that 'sttl'ficit'm lcdmical l_.'asibility has l:,t't'n
('sl;tl)]ish('(l t{) w;ArIHIII laying Otll +t (h'v<.'h)l)m(+tH i)rogram. Such a program platming ('tfi)rl
w(_ul([ l>r()vid( + [_)(1|% all(I I)(!I'SI)(!('IiV(+ for oil-goiNg all(I ftlttn'(! t_'asil)ilil+_ ('tJ<)l'ls. It WOtl](I
hlFlliJ",]l H _ll [l([[lI(' ill|() whi<'h th(' r(',+ulls ()f th('s(" ('ff()]ts (()u]d I)(" tilt('(], IIIUI'('})V |];tS|('I]-
ill_ I})( +(l_l++' ()]) which ;I d('v('l()l)m(,m })r<)gram ((_td(I I)(, initial(,d. ])()l(,ll[i_ll tl.%('r i|<_(.'ll(i(,s
sh<)uld o[fi(ia]]v ])_u+ti(ipm(' il) t})(." (tev('h)l)tm'nt:d p]()gra]n })|_+llll|illg "N}l]('h W()III(I
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delineate progranl ol_jectives, the bencfils which can be expected, and the (:<)sl efl_'clive-
ncss o[ different ways of achieving the bene|hs, all as rela.ied to an eventual operational
program.
Much groundwork directly applicable t() such pr()gram planning has been laid in the
normal course of our advanced studies ])rogram. These slu.dies, which embraced both
techtli('al and progrannnali(: aspects, inch)de the Manned ()rl)ilal Research l+;tl)oralory
(NAS1-3612), an ()RI. Experiment Program (NASw-1215), and Spent Saturn ,%IV!),
Utilization (NAS8-21064). In conjunction with these studies, we have examined how such
programs ccm[d be implemented organizationally, emphasising [sic] the use o| NASA in-
house capability and tile application of special, user-agency capabilities. We are currently
pursuing a more definitive description of pomnfial economic benelits through COlllra(-I
NASw-1604 with the Planning Research Corporation. This sm<ly is expected t<> provide
greater understanding of this (liflicuh area and yiel(l a meth()<lo[()_' which could suppor!
a [Planning Programming 1))u(tgcting System] type of analysis. These types of studies must
be continued and expanded or we cannol hope Io compcle suc(essl],]ly in l])e l)]amling
Programming Bu(lgetitlg Systems wil]l quantilalive assessments of promising applications.
in closing, l should like to request that you keep me inl()rmed of your progress in this
tnauer. You may COllla(l lilt" l)irectox; Advanced Manned Missions Pr{)g,-am, ti)r informa-
tion and assistance in support of your elt()rls.
signt'd by Edgar M. (;(wtrighl
lot George E. Mueller
(c: See attached shee!
Document 11-21
Document title: Interior Department, "Appeal of 1971 Budget Allowance: EROS,"
November 25, 1969.
Source: Record Group 255, Records of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.
l)espite overcoming_ tech)Hcal and boundars' problems, amt _uccex_[ull_' .selling the utility o/an Earth
)'e._ources _urve_, s'_'stem to a vat|e(1' 0/user_, NAS,'A and the Department _/ the Interior encoulltered
almost i)_trmtrtble oppo._itio,_ to the initiative wit/fin the Nixon admini._tratio_'_ Bureau O/the
Budget. The Bud t(et Bun, rtu tlearly diminated the l,,arlh lCe_oun*)._ 7_,r/tltolog7 Natellite (ERT"_') pro-
,gram, but it reletded when ,Settator Krtrl Alu_Mt, ph'a_'d l/tat the l)_terior l)epartme.t_t had de_ided to
locate the dataJnmv'._._i)_L_ /acili('_, i,1 hA home .state r_]South l)akota, led a dtiz,e lo ._rtve the proLrram.
[no pagination ]
Appeal of 1971 Budget Allowance
EROS
Requested increase - $7,500,000
All(m'cd increase minus $3,900,000
The most temperate comment that can ])e made about tiffs allowance is that it must
have been based on incredibly bad advice.
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Follow intensive review in the early days of this Administration President Nixon pro-
posed in his 1(.t70 budget start ota m;!jor earth resom-(es satellite experiment. In his
speech tleii)re the (;enera] Assemhly _f Ihe Unile(l Nations on Septemher 18, 1969, the
Presitlenl reaffirmed his (ommilmenl to an earth resources satellite program.
Ambassador Yosl has undertaken ttlrlhl'r initiative with Se(Tetary (;eneral U Thant to
implement lhe President's (ommilmetH.
l)uring November 1969, l)r. DuP, ridge discussed wilh (:anadian representatives tile
[lasts of their collaboration with the Ut+tite(l States in the earth resotlrct, s satellite progratn.
l)r. PainCs supporl liar the program as a major high payoff component of <>tit space
ettbrt was Imt)licly stated m_ a National TV appearance within the past ten clays.
The ERO_ERTS program has exceptionally strong stqlp<>rt within the C<>ngress.
Interim It.)7() budget propt>sals were not only approved but increased. The thmse
( ;ommittee on Scien(:e an(+l Aslr(mattlics terms tile program "... perhaps the best possible
opporttmity to achieve langil)|e econonli( returns from the substanlial investment aheady
mitde I)), the American taxpayer in the U.S. space program." The (]Onmliltee has been vig,-
orous in its advocacy of the earth resources concept and has urged expedited actioll <)tl
lh¢" ER()_ER'I+S programs.
The program has attracted widespread professional, public, industrial, scienlitic, and
academic interesl throughout the Nation and tile World.
The abrupt (hangc it+ Administration policy proposed by [the Bureatl of the Budget]
(+lllnol hell+ bul become a m@>r embarrassment to the Administration. +I'll(" BtMget
Bureatl has advanced no adequate rationale in support of its action. Accordingly there is
n<> basis tiw its deti:nse Ily mysel| and my stall befi+t-e the (]ongress or Ill(' public.
] tmderstand fimds ti>r the NASA ERTS program were cut t_ecause Ilhe Bureau of the
BtMgel ] clainled the resohttion capability of the proposed system did not meet needs of
the use[r] agencies. This is not the case. Dr. Pecora and other user agency authorities
wrote NASA clarit_/ing lhis l)oint and l believe these letters have been fmnished t<) your
examining stall +.We support the lechnical discussion provided by NASA in deli, nse of the
ERTS program. The questions posed in the Interior "passback" have been previously
,lnswered ])y the ntl.ln(.rous independent appraisals of the eaNh resonrces concept and
program and the Issue Papers pr<:+,ided by this Department in prior years.
The course of action proposed by the Bureau of the Budget affects our '70 program
as well as our 1971 budget. For lifts reason a decision mnst be made as s<)on as possible.
IL atter consideration of this appeal, you are still unable to recommend thai the program
proceed as planned, I propose that the issue should be discussed by myself and
Adtninistrat<w Paine with the President at his earliest convenience.
Document 11-22
Document title: Robert P. Mayo, Director, Bureau of the Budget, to Honorable Walter J. Hickel,
Secretary of the Interior, April 14, 1970, with attached: "Statement for Senator Mundt."
Source: Record Group 51, Records of the Office of Management and Budget, Federal
Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.
Although the Bureau of the Budget wanted to blo& spending on an Farth resmtrces survey _stem,
NASA and the Department of the Interior maintained moderate program support through congres-
sional pre_uvv as well as throut,_h direct appeal_ to the president. NASA was given the go-ahead to work
+m two experimental satellites, while the U.S, Geological Sunpey in the Department o/the Interior wouM
buiM a dala-proceL_.sing fiu:ili Or in Simtx k?zlts+, South Dakota, trot only if the .satellite._' pe_fi_rmame
demonstrated the _wed Jhr it. +lT_elatter devel+qmwnt was made possible with the intervention oJ South
Dakota Senator Karl MutMt, who h_bbied _trenuou.dy for l'2RTS' funding i>_the lh]mrtment q/the
Interim" after Sioux I'?dl.s wa_ desig_mted as the preJerred location fi>r the data-processing/atilt&'.
2_)_ ()B_,ERVIN(; I'ttF. EARTII FR()M ,_1'.',1;t.
[l] APR 14, 1970
ttonorable WahevJ. ! lickel
Secretary of the lnwvior
V_,ktshington, D.C.
Dear Wally:
I am concerned that you and your stall feel lha[ yon |lave experienced embarrassinen!
in justit}ing the Administration's position on the EROS program. I want to reassure you
thai the President and the Bureau carefully reviewed this program and we believe that the
approach developed in a realistic one for the development of tiffs new technologT'.
In our informal communications to your stall on the FY [971 alh)wanccs, and also in
material prepared li)r your review with the President on the F_' 1971 budgel, ill<- r:+lionale
[i)r lhis approach was explained. Wc note from your congressional justifications fin- the IW
1971 budget that you have supported lhe Adminislration's decision on this program by
emphasizing the lacllhallhe program isstillexperimental and that no substantialinvest
meritswillbe made now [m l:acilitiesand equipmcnl which would be needed fin a l>ossi-
hie follow-up operational system. Wc hope that this letter will [tlrlhel clarity' the
Administration's posifi<m and be helpful to y<,tl in any ncccssaty strengthening ot YOUr
presentation to Congress. It is important ti)r all of us thai Ihc interested members in
Congress clearly understand the Administration's position.
This Administration is placing high priority on lhc dcw'[opmcnt of praclical applica-
lions of space technolog?'. Surveying earth resources is one of t]ae applications which
appears to be potentially productive. In an effort to explore this potential, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration is seeking authorization from (;ongrcss to proceed
wiO_ the <levelopmenl oF Iwo experimental Earlh Resom-ccs Techn<)lok?, Salelliws.
However, the space program of the Seventies will no! be characterized by the pmsuil of a
singlc goal. Wc arc allempting to dewqop a space program wifll a balanced emphasis on
exploration, science and appli<'ati<ms.
We recognize thai the FY 1971 budget allowance tot the EROS program is somewhal
smaller than yore requesl. In our.judgment, a conslructive program of prel_aration tot
useful application of ERTS data can hc developed within the resources provided. [ am
sure that you are aware [21 lha! NASA's request was also realmcal. While an increase has
been allowed for actual satellite development, Ihe NASA budget does not provid.c fi)r
increases requested [or other parts of their earth resources pr<>grant.
We lnust emphasize Iha! this |)rograln is an experimental effinl. We do 1)O1 believe
that it is prudent It) invest sUbslantial resources at this lhne in preparing for an opera-
tional uslem capable of analysis of all ERTS data. Present tim<ling fin- NASA will [beus on
satellite development while Interior and Agriculture will concentrate on conlinucd
research relating to potential applications of ERTS data and preparation tot use o[ rite
data once it becomes available.
The Adminislralion does not want to move heyond Ihc experimental phase of this
program until we are confidcn! lha! the benet]ts of lhe program are more than the expecl-
ed costs. Moreover, the evidence is urn'lear its to the technological capal)ilityof ERTS lo
provide pictures with sufficicnl res<)lution to give the payoff claimed in some studies tim[
have been undertaken thus ta_; I_!ntil we have grealcr assurances on fl_esc points, the
financial commitment to the programs should remain at a nfinimum level.
We have previously furnished to your staff it copy of the enclosed statemenl which was
supplied to Senator Mundt's office. The statement outlines the Administralion's [>ositim_
with respect Io location and <onstrtwtion of facilities.
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l know thai you and your slat] recognize thal Ihe need tor fiscal reslrainl requires
seleclivily and great care in our commilmenl io claims on our limiled fulure budgel
resources. I appreciate the contimdng supporl you are giving to lhe Presidenl's program.
If you desire Io discuss lhis mal lvr lhrlher I and my slaff will make arrangements.
Sincerely,
Robert P. Mayo
1)ireclor
]_:II (']l)Slll'(!
In- l>agilmfion I
Statement for Senator Mundt
In 1972, lhc Nalional AerCmaulics and Space Administralion plans m launch two
exl)erimenlal salelliles designed Io conducl experiment.s in the survey of agricullm-al and
geological resources flu-ough tim use of remote sensors on the spacecraft. If flwse <'xper-
imenls are successful, lhis program may have consideral)le polenlial for flnure al)plica-
lions in lhe survey of earth res<)urces.
A review of lhe fiwilily requiremenls for the Govcrnmenl's earth resources survey pro-
grams has indicate<l lhal Sioux Falls, South Dakota, will [on lhe original, there is an edit-
ed p<ntion where ,I_<" word "will" has been crossed out and replaced with lhc word
"would"] be a <lesirable geographic location for a data processing an<l dislril>uli<m [acili-
ly Ibr lhis program.
The Adminislralion will propose inilial fimding to be use<t tin- site selection and
&'sign of lhe proposed fiwilily The Sioux Falls earth resources data processing and dis-
Iril)ulion facilily would be designed Io process data flom later satellites if lhe initial exper-
ilnenls are snccesslul. For the initial Earlh Resources Technologp:, Satellites (ERTS), NASA
will supply dala to inlerested governmental and private organizalions. Actual facility con-
struction al Sioux Falls will depend on the resuhs of the experimental satellites.
The oily of Sioux Falls has agreed to supply the land and construct lhe building under
a leasing agreement with the Government agencies involved if the ERTS satellite experi-
mcnls prove promising. The facility will be designed to meet the specifications of the
(;overnment agencies involved so as to serve the data reduction and analysis requirements
()f i)rivale and (;overlnnent organizations which contemplate the ilSe ()f the earth
resources surw'y data. Furore management arrangements for the Sioux Falls fi_cilily will
be developed by lhe Federal agencies currently involved in this experimental program.
Document 11-23
Document title: Arnold W. Frutkin, Memorandum to Dr. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA,
et al., "Some Recent International Reactions to ERTS-I," December 22, 1972.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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One persuasive arg'ument ./or creating an orhital Earth re.sources surv O' system was that this .system
would p_vvide sigvzificant her, e]+ts to third-worM nations in areas such as accurate mapping and
re.source location. _,S'A was suitably pleased, therefi)re, _t_th fitvorable international responses to
these type_ qJdata fTwn the fir_t ERTS satellite.
Ill NATI()NAI, AERONAUTI(;S AND SPACE AI)MINISTIL.\TI()N
WAStIIN(;T()N, D.(;. 20546
1)E(_ 22, 1972
MEMOIL,\NI)UM TO A/l)r. Fletcher
All/l)r. l,ow
AA/I)r. Ncwell
ADA/Mr. Shaplcy
E/Mr. Mathews
SUBJE(:T: Some Recent hlternafional Reactions to ERT_I
We are lisling helow a few of the early foreign reactions to ERT_I on the basis that
they may he of some intercsl.
a. Thailand: "The best of the (ERTS) scenes received are excellent; lhey appear to
demonstrate clearly Ihal our decision to participate in the ERTS programme from its
inceplion was wise, _ltld that there is much to he learned and mtlch work to be done ill
order to exploit the new lechnolog T fully..." (fiom November 23, 1972 letter to NASA
fiom Dr. Pr_ldislh Chesosakul, Secretary General, Thai National Research Council).
h. Mali: "The Malians expressed warm appreciati<m for the opportunity t<) partici-
pate in the ERTS and Skylab programs. Minister of Industrial l)evelopmetn N'Daw was
particularly pleased with the information aheady being derived from ERTS ilnagery.
Schweitzer ((!S/AID) observed th;it the Malians take a very practical attitude toward
ERTS results, which they already are heginning to utilize to make maps of remote areas,
for guiding water exploration efforts and for deciding routing of new roads. They have
quickly recognized the experinlental nature of the ERTS project and are l)roltd 1o be par-
ticipating in Ihis pioneering effort .... The ERTS projecl is a wonderful example of how
tilt" world's most il(t'viln('ed COtHllry C_tl <.oo[3,el-;_lte with the poorest to our llll.ltlla] bene|]l.
For two air tickels (AID purchased airline tickels for the Malian Principal Investigator),
tile U.S. (;ovelnlll.Cnl ]l;tS gained a million dollars WOllh of Malian political mileage. This
is an exciting project which should have increasingly important benefils lot Mall and
should also l:,e applicahle to other [2] developing countries. It deserves every hit of sup-
port we can give it, now and in the follow-up period." (November 17, 1972 Stale
I)el)artmenI telegram from the U.S. Embassy, Bamako, Mali.)
c. (_amtda: "I have just seenl the ERTS imagery for the first time and I wish to con-
gralulatc NASA on this fine achievement. We consider it an important t)reakthr()tlgh in
providing data fi)r the tmdersumding of our environnlent. I would ;dso like to express our
appreciation fi)r having an ()])portttnily to participate in this experiment." (August 2
telegram to 1)r. Fletcher fronl Mr. Jack Austin, Deputy Minister ()| EnergQ_, Mines and
Resources, (;overnmenl of Canada.)
d. Brazil: l)n Fernand() (It" Mendonca, the Director-(;ener;d of tile Brazilian Space
Agency, reported a! the IAF on a wide range of vahnable information pr()vided by ERTS-I
in an experiment relating to mapping of the Amazon system. I le has stnnmarized Ihe thsl
preliminary findings in a letter to NASA. The following excerpts are of relevance lot illus-
traling the value of ERTS-I :
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"1. Tile course of the trihutarics of the Amazon River are very difti'rent fl-om Ow
ones shown ill tilt: most recent available charts. The difference in position is sometimes
off by 20 km or more and the ditterence in direction is sometimes off hv 90 degrees.
"2. Islands with more than 200 km 2 exist which are not shown _m maps.
"3. Some lagoons which are shown on maps as 20 km long are in reality more
than I00 km long.
"4. Small villages and Iowns are located wrongly on the maps by several tens of
kilometers.
"5. The <|rai.ag¢" sy'stenls of some areas _re et_6reh' wrying and this tlas <aus<'(t
alnOng _lher things, the construction of roads (Manaus - Porto Velho tor instance) with
extra expenditures |or bridges. In tact, the mentioned road is placed wrongly (hy more
fitan 2(i kin) in recenl maps (I 971 ).
[31 "6. l,arge unsuspected geological features have been detected, which might pro-
vide new insights into the ]ormation of tile basin.
"7. [,arge abandoned river meanders are shown which were not present in exist-
ing maps.
"8. Even with high percentage (75%) of cloud cow'rage in some images one can
still make good use of the obtained intormation filr correcting maps.
"9. Unmapped lineaments and fractures have been discow'red.
"10. The entire Amazonian region was cow_red las! year with a Side I,ooking
Airhorne Radar (SIAR). The c¢)mpleted controlled photo-mosaics will not he ready for at
least another year. Over 150 people are working on tile SIAR project which has cost Brazil
about 20 million dollars. Since tile region is rather fiat the ERTS-1 MSS channel 6 pro-
vides practically the same intbrmation as tile SLAP, imagery. If one considers the other
MSS channels, lhen one has substantially more infi_rmation from ERTS than the SI,AR.
This without mentioning file repeatability of ERTS imagery. The cost of ERI'S imagery
per square kilometer is about two orders of magnilude less than the SI,AR if the satellite
operates fiw the expeclcd lift'|line of one year."
e. FAO (Food and Agriculture ()rganization of the L!nited Nations): "NASA deserw's
FA()'s compliments on a successful launching of the satellite which will remotely sense
earth resources ti>r the heneth of mankind tor the first time." (letter <)1'August 3 to NASA
[i'om Mr.Juan Yriart, Assistant Director-General, Development Departnlent, FAO.)
l[ Jr;ill: "_i_ have located several lakes which do not appear on the Watershed Map
of han. This phenomenon is presumably due to this year's relatively abundant rainfall ....
In tile extreme southeast part of Iran (near the Pakistan border) several igncous bodies
have heell observed which do not figure on the . . . geological map of lran .... By <onl-
l)at ing images taken tiom the extreme southeast part of tile Caspian Sea with a map of the
region prepared in 1945, it is quite noticeable that the shape of the 14] Bandar Shah
peninsula has changed. This is possibly due to lowering of tile Caspian Sea by ewq)oration
which exceeds lhe inllow otstream waters. (Novend_er 12 letter to NASA fi-om the Iranian
Principal Investigator.)
g. Unite(l Nations Secretariat: "h also gives me great pleasure at this time to extend
my c<)ngratulations t(> you on the successful orbiting of this tile first dedicated earth sur-
veyiug satellite. It is a cause of particular satisfaction to us here at the UN that NASA an(t
the other United Slates agencies involved in the programme have, by their imaginative
approach, laid a sound basis |or the international cooperation which will he such a thn-
damcnlal requirement in order that this new application of space techno[o_' may st'r_r_. ,
as we ,11 hope, tor the benelit of all mankind." (July 28 letter to NASA from A.I t. Abdel-
(;hani, (:hie|, ()uter Space Affairs Division, UN.)
h. Egypt: (Meguid) called ERTS a "significant technical achicvenwnt" in the trN
(;eneral Asseml_ly's First (_ommittee dtuing the week <ff ()ctoher 30, 1972.
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i. (;hana: (Boawn) commended the Food and Agricultural ()rganizalion in COOl)-
eration wiih NASA for applying space technologff to problems ill desert locusts and food
in Aftlea, Asia and l,afin America in the same meeting.
j. The All-African Seminar heht in Addis Ababa in Augusl 1971 made a rec_mmwu-
dalioll on the itlventorying of natural resources readillg in part as tbllows:
"Recotll tllelld,S:
- thai a cotnplele iliVelltl)t-y o| llatllla] teSOllrces, Sllch its water, soils, vt'gtqatiOll,
wild lilt +, be undertakt+n eveDwhere in Aft|ca, and thai particular itttentioll hi'
given to this reconunendation at both national and regional lewqs;
- thttt the most m<Mern techniqttes be used to achieve this ailn, such as remote
sensing t|noltgh satelliles; hi particular noting |hal the two earth resources lech-
liOIO_ry salellitcs will be lailllched in 1972 alld 1973."
[ hand-signed: "AWF"]
Arnold W. Frtttkin
Documen111-24
Document rifle: James V. Zimmerman for Arnold W. Frutkin, Assistant Administrator for
International Affairs, to Dr. John V.N. Granger, Acting Director, Bureau of International
Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, September 12, 1974, with
attached: "Foreign Policy Issues Regarding Earth Resource Surveying by Satellite: A Report
of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Science and Foreign Affairs," July 24, 1974.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Potential benefits to deT_elapinl4 nations had been a key' component in the A'AX4 campatffn to obtain
Ihe Nixon administration q apprm,alJbr an Earth resources surv O" sy._tem w_lellile, tloweve_; a nnm-
ber q/nation_ objected to having lilt& control over the dish, era|nation qf _atellite in]ormalion A_athered
about their cou tltr'_. NASA proceeded with ERTS without a /ormal itlternalional rel_nme, ba_ing it._
po,_ilion on a broad intet[)relation o  the previously established "¢rpen _kie_" dot'Dine. The Adl,i_ory
Committee on Science and Forei l,m A/Jhirg O/the Secreta_;_ o/State su£_esled in ilL]u(_' 1974 repmt
that additional l'.,_, action was required to avoid conflicts, particularly at the Untied Nation_, over
( _.S. renlote-sen:dt_ff activities. NASA_ re,spe,l,w arLmed that the ,,];.,are agem)" had anticipated ¢tnd
was e/Ji'ctive(v addressin_ any .finHAm poll 0, repena__ions o[ the 1+)177S pr%,Tam.
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Dear John:
This is in response to tlcwman Pollack's leller to I)r. Flelchcr of Augusl 2, 1974 fi>r-
warding the rem<>te sensing policy report prepared h,y du" State l)cpm-tmenl's Advis_vy
(]ommillce on Science and Foreign Affairs. The report, in our judgment, is a welcome
c_)nlribt|ti(m fo the on-g_ing discussions of policy allevnalives in this i|nl)()|laill area ()f
space activity. There are, however, a numl)er of points arising _mt of the report which we
suggest be t)|o||gh| u) lhe am'mion of lhe Advisory (]ommim'e.
_--'l'he Advisory Committee's assumption that the (()st and lechnical sophisti-
cali_m _)l the appropriate ([al_l analysis is generally hey(rod the reach _t developing coun-
Ivies does n_>l acc_wd with our dew'l_)ping country experiences. In ct]i'ct, lhrough _mc
device o| another (U.S. or other aid), use of lhe dam is in tact being made. _,i" cstimalc,
tt_r example, thai 19 Alllean countries are directly or indirectly inv_dved wilh the analysis
of earlh s(mrccs imagery of lheir lerrimry.
Page 3 and 17--_k" suggest the report retlect a dislinction belwccn ERS data them-
selves, which the L;.S. makes ti-eely awfilable, and analyses _1 these data, which could be
heM proprietary as desired. This distinction could apply to all potcnlial ERS data users--
goverlllnellla] and private, domestic and fi>reign.
_--[t is important to note (ha! Article I of the 1967 Oufer Space Treaty provides
Ih;,I _)tller space shall be free ti)| exploration and use by all Slates willie)ill discrimination
of an} kind. The "open skies" principle, thereti)re, can be considered a "cornerslone" of
international as well as 17.S. policy; no [i_rlher international political commilment (dis-
('tossed on [)age [) is _l¢_(¢:ss_tr_r.
_----In view o/ ftl_' overall developments at f|le February-Mmch 1!174 (I.N.
Rcmole Sensing Working (houp meclings, as well as the recent positions mkcn at lhe U.N.
by the rcprcscnlaliw_s of(;anada and Sweden, we lind it difticull |o draw the conch|sio||
tl'lat there is increased advocacy in the U.N. of r_,slriclions on cilllel the acquisili_m _)z dis-
sezvlinalion of ERS data. Such advocacy contint|es to have a very narvow base (the USSR
and France phls Argentina, Brazil and Mexico).
Pages 1,1 and l li--We believe lhe most elTectivc means of enhancing imcrnafional
I)arlicipalion in U.S. earlh resources programs and acceptance of the "open skies" con-
cept is lhrough the esta])lishment of additional foreign EgI'S data acquisition ground sta-
lions. To dale such lacililies have been established in Canada and Brazil. This spring an
agreemcnl providing li)r a similar facility was signed wittl Ilaly. Discussions are c|||re||lly
underway wilh ;I nmnber ofcomltries including han, Venezuela and Ihe Federal Republic
oi(;ermany. Foreign gow'rnmental agencies establishing a gr_mnd station sign a memo-
vandum of mlderstan(ling with NASA which includes an open data dissemination provi-
siam; they arc, in effi'cl, ralit}'ing the "open skies" principle.
_---The Advis_ny (;ommillee sh_mld know that a U.S. t)tlin m provide (sell) n)
;m :_ccd int_,|national disn-ilmlion center a masler copy of all F,RTS imagery was made
m the [).N, in,lmmary 1973. We understand tha! the FAO is currently studying the tk'asi-
bilil} _)t (,slablishmg a world-wide ERS data su>rage, processing and dissemination cenler
which ctmM milize the [!.S.-_fftk'red imagery.
V_' l'|o])e lira above co|nmcnts prove usetid and would welcome the ot)porlunily to lm--
ther tlisc|_ss NASA's remote st'rising aclivities wilh members _)t' lhe Advisory C_nnmittee.
Sinccrcl},
_,]ames V. Zimmerman ]
[tin'l Arn_)ld W. Frulkin
AsY, isl all I ,,_¢h 11i 11isl i;i I ( )y
fin Inlcrnali_mal AFtairs
co: l)v.,Jamcs (;. Fh'lchcr
2_]4 ( )I_,_,ERVI N(; TI IF] F+AR'I'! ! FR( ]%,1 SPA( ]E
Ill July 24, 1974
Foreign Policy Issues Regarding
Earth Resource Surveying by Satellite
A Report of the Secretary's Advisory
Committee on Science and Foreign Affairs
Slll]l IIlal-V
This report considers lhe options fi_r U.S. foreign policy regarding tile acquisitiml
and ¢tisseminati<m of earth resource surveying data oblaincd tiom satellites (ERS).
Foreign policy issues have arisen primarily in the course of debate in tile Ottter Space
Conuniltee of the UN(;A, where tile Brazilians, Soviets, French and others have intro-
duced "principles" which would limit State's rights to acquire ERS data from space or Io
disseminate suctl data without the prior assent of the countries affected. Wiail(" ERT_I
experiments have been accepted trader lhe principle of t]eedom fill unrestricted space
observations, often called "()pen Skies," there is no international political cmnmitnwnt to
"()pen Skies" in the ('Olllexl of "operational" ERS syslems.
For a variety of reasons, including national sectnity, tile L!.S. (with tile tacit support of
tilt' LTSSR) has insisted on the unencumbered right to acquire data ft'Olll space. Tids l)OS-
[liFe llltlSl fie maintained.
The present paper deals with appropriate tuture directions file lilt" ERS program, and
in particular with the policy of dissemination of ERS data. The aulhors point out thai
[2] experience with ERT_I and Skylab have indicated lhat space teehnologD' has great
promise lot generating ttsel:tfl data hearing on agricuhttre, tc),r'esll'V, fisheries, the location
_.,t natttla] l'eS{lttl'('t.'S, land use planning and in nlany ottler areas. However, experience to
date is wholly inadequate to establish tile economic value of ttlese data or tilt" cost-t)ene-
Ill charat'ler of its space ,wquisition :as compared wilt] other means. Extensive turflwr
experimentation is required to develop techniqttes for the interprelati(m and analysis of
ERS data and tor optmlally confl]ining that with data fiom other s_)urces bef(_re its eco-
nomic potential can be reliably assesse(l. Tile (osl and technical sopllistication <_t the
appropriate data analysis, at this point, is generally beyond the reach of individual devel-
oping countries. (;_.>operative projects with l+l)(Ts could be important elements ill U.S.
strateb, _' to devclop fin tile needed applications of R&D thai arc tilt" pacing elements in
future progress. Ew.ntually a viable commercial activily in dala amtlvsis may matm-e.
With respect to tilt" policy issues, the authors tile tltree [!.S. ahernalives with regard
to data acquisition and dissenlinalion:
- assertion of tulihtleral rights;
- negotiation of internationally acceptable principles, ofl},wing technical COol]era-
lion and assistance as an incentive; and
[31 - abandonment of an open program and reliance <m classified data.
The attthtws conclude tltat the it]ether work necessary t_+ establishing tilt" economic
tttility of ERS requires the cooperation of <)thee Ilaliq;HlS, and t'.S. participation m and tcch-
nical sttpp_wt oI their eiforts to develop data analysis techniqttes suited to their siluation.
We siu}uht COlltilllle to asserl tile right to acttuire and dissemimm" primary data. But
to encouragc applications R and D+ lilt' [U.S. go'¢ertunenll should be willing Io permit
an<_the,- c<mntry which so reqttcsts t<> rcstricl joint rest'arch Io those applications the
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resuhs of which they are willing to 1)uhlish, Thus NASA and other agencies would contin-
ue the policy' of full disclosures of both prinlary and secondary data in which l]n." [I.!.S.
governnlenl] is involved, I)ul we wotlld i(_s])('cl lhe rigill of anothel- conlllly lO ohlahi the
primary data lape or read lilt" salellile dii-ecli.v it tk)r o/n t)Wll ptnposes we energize it over
lileir lerritorv, and niake whal use o£ tile dala lhey will.
U.S. policy lnllSt lheFel'Ol't" focus Oil lhe dislinction helween prinlary data, and |nil)r-
ill,ilion availahle after processing. Policy should t)e directed to obtaining inlernational
acceptance of |'ree(l(iin ()f acquisilion and free(Iota ofdissenlinalion of primary (|ata lapes
if the potenlial benefils [41 or lifts ll'c]lnologry are It) be realize(l. Tile Sllale_' ['or advanc-
ilig lllt-se goals shotild I)e based tin recognilion that ERS should nol I)e prenlalurely
descrihed as "operaliolla]" and in no event unless _ti)d until inlerllalional acce[)lanct' of its
polenlial I)ent,i]ls is oblained.
15 } Inlroduciioll
For niore than a decade inlernaliona] acceplanec of "Open Skies"--lhe right t)t" ally
conlilry 1o e×alliilie lhe earlh Doin Oilier space wilhoul prior reslrainl--lias been a col'-
ilerslone of [T.S. space policy alld sllould he continued. A nlllnher of []tclors rein|'olTe lhe
inlporlance o| relaiililig this freedoni:
(a) SAI;I' {tgleenlenls t/)l(e increasing reliance t)n I_alion_fl technical ineans lit"
verilicalion.
(I)) (;rowing inleresl in Ihe possitfility lhal Failh Resources Satelliles (ERS) inig]ii
provide ('COllonlic ])t!nefils ill lhc fiililrc niakes lhe conlinued viahilily of Open Skit's of
special interesl. Since filrcign CtlSlolners £()r salellite data analysis inilSl find ltle inilial
acquisition of dala acceplable, eilher Open Skies policy lntisl be niahllained or else agree-
reel|IS or same lilt-ill of inlelllalionalizalioil of the space seginent |nay he reqllh*ed.
(c) Many new space lechnologies will have l(I call for SOllle ()hservaliOllS |lOln space.
Restriction (lil open ohservali(/ns will create harriers to of If'clive (iperalion.
"()pen Skies" is lht" pret(,rred allernalive, since it is necessary Io suslain tile ]egilima-
cy of I-l'lmtle seilsilig fin llaliolial secilrily piirposes. In addition, il provides the nlininlllln
ilnpedhlielll I() lhe developlneill of ERS as a potenlial economic asset.
161 While ERTSI has been accepted under tile Open Skies principle, there is lie inter-
naiional political colnlilillnelll It) Open Skies in the context of "operational" syswms.
However, as advocates of ERS hecome more vocal with the view that "operational" systems
arc economically vial)le, lhere is increased advocacy in the U.N. of reslriciions on the
acquisition and dissenlinafit>n of ERS data and in the [U.S. governnlentl on the possible
vahie of restrictions on ERS dala in order to capture more of the econonlic benefits.
Thc policy qneslion reqlliring reso]lliion is: vl_l/]lal postnre toward acquisition and dis-
sl'inillalion i)| ERS data is oplhnal today ill tilt" lighl of the present slate t)f eYohlliOll o|
ERS t'xperience. _
The allSWi'r tlel)entls subslaniiaily on an evaluation of thai slate of evohliion and an
alialysis of file requireinenl io bring the EP_ prograin It) econonlic viability.
Experience with ERT_I
A liille over one year of e×perience with ERTS-I, plus some data |loni |nail|led space
tlighl pl'Ogl-alllS alid considerable tomn_ercial experience witti airborne pilolography,
have cslahlished hoill politically anti connnercially molivaled interest in civil applicalions
of reniole sensing. Froin a lechnical poinl o[" view, the capability for linage acquisilion is
well advancetl and Ihe polenlial fi)r hnproveilienl eslahlished by very expensive llalional
secilrily pl-Ogl-ams.
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171 The spatial resolution achieved with multi-spectral scanning sensor in ERTS-I is ade-
quate to produce raw imagery that suggests a wide range of comnmrcial/civil applications.
it is not the <ase, however, that ERTS-I and Skylab/Ap<_llo experiments have given its the
experience to pernfit the design of a remotc sensing satellite appropriate to an economi-
cally viable, operational syslem. This is so primarily because of inadcquale experience with
application-specific image processing and interpretation. But eveil the space segment is in
an early stage of deveh>pment.
ERT_I is deficient in resolution for applications such as land use planning.
Frequency of abservalion era given point is not sufficienI given tim random inlerruplion
of chmd cover, tot lime-(lependent problems in flood control, agricuhural monitoring,
iceberg/racking, etc. As a rcsuh, turnaround time between observation and analysis is too
hmg lot many purposes. Ahhough technology, exists to remedy lhesc deficiencies, wc do
nol ]lave enough syslenis cxpcrieme, wiib l>olh salellite conl]gurations and image dala
processing and analysis, to Illakc the Iradeoffs l)elwe('ll Ihese fllllCliollal attribtiles and sys-
[ellis COSIS.
()rie must renlenlber that ERS applit'atiotls are in their infancy. Although the Icchni-
cal capabilily to aC(lllire images, geilerale geolnelric and radiolllelric corrections, and
CXllacI inthrmation by iniage eIihancelllelll have been 18] demonstrated, the majority ot
applications research projects to (late illvoIve nianual (visual) processing c,f primary
images. These images are available several weeks alier data acquisition.
A fully operati(mal systenl would have to provide digital prinlary imagery to widely di>
persed ctlslonlers ill approximately real time. This primary imagery is only the firs! slep.
The ground-based image tilteril_lg and contrast af!justment, ildbnnalion extraction and
interpretation impose hea_ T data processing requirenlerits. (;orrelation with ground truth
dala and final interpretation are tasks requiring very high levels Iot] professional exper-
tise, and extensive experience with end-use problems, institutions and customs. Since
these interpretation services are the key to obtaining the benefits fl-om remote sensing
technology'l, ] decisions on the maior internati(mal [)olitical issues and on lhe characler ot
Ihe tollow-on space projects must be made with file desired institutional structure tot the
service delivery system clearly in mind.
The first step is the study of the economics with a view to evaluating the commercial
potential tot developing the services. At this time the institutional stru(mre for exploiting
an operational remote sensing system does not exist. A t+ew commercial compa,des with
substantial support fiom government R&I) contra(ts are hoping to create a service busi-
ness ()tit of proprietary satellite photo ilaterpretation. Several not-tor-protils are develop-
ing experience, also on goverlmient contracts.
[91 It we(rid appear that the (end|lions require(l t(, make inti)rmation services based on
remote sensing technolo_' economically viable call tot:
(a) Realistic cvahlalion of lhe total (:()sis of processing, interpreling and marketing
informal|tin as well as its inilial acquisition. ()n a per-image l)asis, the s|)ace segment of
the system may prove the least expensive.
(I)) Identification of applications with very high economic leverage tot which remole
sensing t+r<)m space is more economical than groun(l or airborne (ibservation and :ti)r
which a inarkel Call t)e aggregale(l.
(C) I)eleriniliing the extenl to wilich Ill(' eCOll()llli(- leverage (tel)ends ()li exchlsivip,
of access to either the raw data or io the processe(l and interprete(l (lata in order I() ];ler-
mit a proprietary advantage,
(d) Definition of [U.S. government] policies aiR'(ring the applications system eco-
nomics-as well as international issues--and the establishment of the p(fint of respo,lsi-
I)iliiy in die IU.S. g(_veriinlent].
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(e) Definition of lhe optimun+ salellite system with respect to economic and other
considerations.
The [()trice of Management and Budget] sponsored sludies now under way may shed
some light on those matters, t lowever, the level of development of application services is
so rudinmntary at this time that much reliance will have to be placed on judgment--based
otl experience with similar new ,whnologies.
I lt)l ERS Applications
II seems likely that ERS applications will have several characteristics:
(a) Satellite data will usually have to be combined with data from nvany more con-
venti<mal s+mrces t)eli_re useful, commercially saleable [sic] results are obtained. Thus it
is tmlikely that nlany applications will be fimnd that do not require complex interfaces
wilh exisling service organizations--both in the regi<m raider sludy and in the client's
(()lnnlllility.
(b) Exclusivity of the intormation product may be achieved througll the quality of
inlerprelation and amalgamation with other data, but exclusivity based on primary
invdgery requires either Imning lhe satellite operation ow'r to a private monopoly or find-
lug legal,justificalion and an administrative mechanism for exclusive licensing of imagery
by the govermnenl. In any case, exclusivity is a will-o-the-wisp, since allernalive platforms
exist fi)r smwwing most areas of interest, and primary imagery alone will often prove inad-
eqllale.
(c) Some applications may prove cost effective in the developing counlries bet_)re
they do in lhe U.S., herause o[deficiencies in logistic and communicalions inl'raslructmc,
extensive poorly studied areas, lack of institutional structures for ground-based dam col-
lection, etc. (Flood managemcnl is an example.)
{I 1 ] (d) The most wduable applications are probably still ml(liscovered, and may depend
heavily on very sophisticated automated image processing. In general, the computing
requiremenls would apt)ear 1o pose serious problems for developing counlries and very
small organizations. A number ofyears of subsidized operations will probably be required
b_'lbre commercial incmHiw,s will produce the required develol)menl investmenl.
Policy Issues
In light of lhis background, the policy issues requiring clarification are:
(a) Whal is lhe "critical path" impeding progress? Other than lhe obvious necessity
tot a tbllow-on program to ER'I'_I. which is inadequate in resolution, re-observation rate,
and is nearing end of usethl liti_, it is experience in information extraction and use raider
realistic economic conditions thai is mosl needed. A follow-on experimenlal satellite is
wellj,stified, and would permit several years of applications R&D, without which no viable
commercial activity can occur. Thus, end-user programs would appear to deserve govern-
men! priority. The second element in the critical path is the resolution of concerns of tbr-
eign nations with respect to acquisilion and dissemination of data.
(I)) Is there a relationship between the well established acceptability of nmteorolog)'
salelliles and lhe viability of ()pen Skies for ERS systems? U.S. policy in ill<"meleorolob,_ ,'
112] field is firmly and necessarily committed to flee international exchange, am well as
tmilateral rights <)f obse, rvation. 1"his is well accepted internationally t)ecause tim benefits
to all depend <m intormation interchange. Many ERS applications have a similar depen-
dency on glohal access, as well am exchange of "ground truth" data. If our ERS policy
moves away t_om commilmenls to international cooperation and disclosure ofspace data,
characterislics of lnOSl NASA programs to elate, the possible inlpacl on the U.S. weathel-
satellite program llnlst be clearly tbreseen.
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(c) I low can wc take host advantage of the U.S. lead in most ot the prot(*ssi<)nal end-
user skills (oil exploration, plant <liscase stu(lics, airbornc mapping, elc.) plus the lead in
digital image processing? These assets may ofter sufficient "exclusivity" to adequately pro-
tect national economic self interest if we move ahead to develop and apply thcsc skills. "I'o
facilitate this process, we should make imagery generally available to encouragc Itwthcr
<levclol)ment of both ittsliluti<ms and te<hnoh)g_'.
(d) Should primary data lapcs trom ERS systems t)e made tully availal)le to anyone al
very low cost by government, or should Ihe operating enlily t)e enq_owered to restrict dis-
sctniDati(m, all(l offer excltlsive access lo economically motivated customers? Which
appr()ach would develop most rapidly the tc('hnolo_, instilutions, and capital and markcl
slrttcitwes l() deliver useful services? The answer hinges on [ 1_-I] whether th.e work to <talc
wt)ul(t.jttsti[_' private investment in a satellite and ground facility syslem, in which case pro-
tnielary rights in primary data might encourage investment. In Ollt judgment, the work
to date would notjustil_ +t)rivate investmcnt: particularly since the character of most appli-
catiotls is such that the benefits are not capturable [sit'] 1)y individtlals. WheD the product
of an enterprise is an indivisible public good, then it is certain that governtnents will I>t+
tilt' primary CllStomers. Examples are: land-use plannit_g, t]ood (-olnrol, crop estimation,
iceberg tracking, pollution moniloring, etc.
(e) What policy regarding acquisition and dissemination of imagery twer other coun-
tries has the best chance of lea(ling to a stable basis tor global access t)y the U.S., maxi-
mum cooperati(m in the exchange of ground data, and best opportunities lor U.S. firms
t_ Illarkct services abroad? ()bvious ahernatives include:
( 1 ) Unilateral assertion of satellite data acquisition rights by the U.S., coupled with
either an assertiota of the right not to disseminate, or a commitnlent to do so.
(2) Proposal for an international network (like Inlelsat), with the first U.S. oper-
ational bird as Ihe thst prototype. This would doubth'ss produce serious
delays. This is also the most aggressive torm of internationalization.
[14] (3) Effort to negotiate inletnational acceptance <4 "Open Skies" without assert-
ing the unilateral right, perhaps with the c<nnmitment to share primary
"(Master)" data [hlly and an offer of help to I.DC's in image processing and
interpretation as an incentive.
(4) Cancel the NASA program altogether and rcly upon classified sources for
U.S. national requirements.
(t) What is required to maintain the credil)ility ola unilateral U.S. program in which
we oltcr lo dissentinate primary data internationally? lf, occasionally, data are withheld,
what will be the political consequences? Ix there any merit to an extension of the "Master
Tape" proposal to inchtde tile production and dissemination <)f ph<)tographs tiom the
tapc hy a U.N. ageno; in parallel with [!.S. govertunent distributiotl (hnncstically? Ih)w
can the U.S. enhance the sense of i)articipatit)n and equity of other countries in the new
teclmolog3', an a toundation f<)r viabh' international ntachitaery in the ftHure?
In azt tmderstandal)le desire to sustain or at:celerate tile public investment itt ERS, its
supp<)rters are alh)wing policy atHItorities to tmdcrestilnate tilt+ technical, institution and
economic obstacles to I)e oVerCOlllU beliH'e a widespread, cost-ettk-clive usage of remote
sensing in civil applications can be sustained. The temptation t<) call the tbllow-oN
[15] i)rogram to EKI'S-I "operational" reflects this tendency. Political sensitivity <4 other
ltalions to unilateral remote sensing both grows on attd enhances this optimisln. In +hot,
a great deal more research and, more importatlt, more applications experience in a real-
istic economic environment is needed betore an econontically viable "operatiotlal" ERTS
program can emerge. Requirements for tiffs fllrther experience itl¢htde:
(a) (]olltitltlcd access to reltl()te sensing and grotllld lrlllh dala on as close Io it glob-
al basis as possible, clearly calling t_.n- cooperation 1)y other nations.
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(b) (;ontimied broad availabilily of prinmry digital data al a subsidized cost fiom a
NASA R&D system ill which operalional conlinuily is ilsstn'e(l, and ill which systenls con-
tiguration tradeotl]s can tie evahialed.
(c) Expanded public sllpporl |Tie user al)l/licalion and image processing lecllll(llo_> 5'
develol)nient.
(d) A public conlnlilnleill I() lhe policy basis for flltnre syslelliS, _;lionld ihey prove
ec()nolilically viable, on lile basis of wllich inlern;llional cooperalion and f)lJValt" invesl-
inenl will I)t" forlht-oining.
Thus we ill-_e lhal policy relleci lhe f;lcl lliat, while fiirlher developlneni of I']RS sys-
leiiise'Sllecially llie _1-OI111(1 segnienl--is desirable, the U.S. is 11()1 liret)ared Ill lll()ve now
io an "operatioilil]" s,vsleiii. In a((oldall(e whh (el 3 above, [161 Ihe {T.S. should seek Io
establish deiaclo ;u'ceplancc of()l)ell Skies through the inevitable gradual developnleni of
lhe technology and ;t privale seclm inslilulional base for delivering []IS service,s I)olii here
?lnd abroad.
The t)it('iil_ eh,lnenls in colnlnt, rcial exploitation of tile ERS technology/ are imago
l)locessill_, illleri)relaliOll, illld service markelillg. Here lilt! U.S. eltioys Ihe IIlOSI hnpor-
lant elelnenls of lechnoh)gical exchlsivhy. Rapid progress ill iniproving and dis,selninaling
lhc bilsic illl;t_e daia dislribuli_m will niaxiniize lhe opporlunily 1() lake advanlage of Ihis
ilniqlien¢'s_;. TInls ;i ilnihilerii] ofti,r of ihe l)rilnary dala lapes Io all iil)prollriale hilerna-
lional body inay well achieve Ihe inaximlnu polilical advanlage _>t iliVOlvelneill of oilier
coinilries and lhe UN ill an early slage al a lniniinuni cosl lo Ihe developinenl of lhe svs-
It!ill. In addilion, we should consider S(lliie forln of expanded hel t) Io developing COilll-
lries in lhe iiiia_e l)rc)cessing illid hilerprelalion area. In lhe t!.N. we ,sholild develop these
aciivilies in Ihe privaie seclor, inilhtlly encotlra_ed I)y _overnlnenl conlraCl,S.
This policy tralnework could lead Io acceptable negolialed agreeinenls wilh oilier
nalions. _e should conlinue 1o asserl ihe righl io acquire and disseniinale primary data.
llul Io eiicolira_e applicalh)ns R and I), Ihe [U.S. governnienl] should be willing Io per-
inil oilier couFllries Io reslriCl joini researcll [i 71 wilh the [i.S. Io lhose apl)licalions l|ial
ihey ille willing Io publisll. Thus NA,_A and oilier agencies would COlllilllle ihe policy of
full disclosures of t)olh i)rhnary and secondary clara in whicll [Ihe I!.S. governinenl] is
invok,ed. We would resllecl ihe righi of olher counlries to el)lain ihe priniary daia lape ()1"
read lhe salellile direcily, if tbr olir OWll pnrposes we energize ii over thch terrilories, and
iiiake wtilil Ii_;e of lhe dala ihey will.
Finally, in order Io inaxinlize privale sector conlidence in lhe cc)nlinuily of ihis ino-
_laln mid io li/ilihilize polhical prol)lelns, the mosl rigid separalion possible shonid I)e
inainlained belween lhe organizational and managerial cnvironnlenls tT)r civil ERS sys-
lelliS and ilalional securily syslems. At the lechnolo_ry level only conlint)nalily hi l/oih
space and gl-Otllid se_lnenls can be considered Io the exlelll lhal sectirily reqllireinenls
_ilid i,c()li(lliii(-s perlllil.
Document 11-25
Document title: Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman, Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, U.S. Senate, to Dr. James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, October 14, 1972.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, WiLshington, D.C.
Because threatened trud,¢et cuts k+_Jt the Jhlure 0fNASA's ERTS pr%,'ram in a state o[ doubt, the _pare
atgen: 7 wa._ under .steady pres_ure to demonstrate the progTam's utiliO,. ,\_ISA had eampaiAmed pr the
proL, vam on the gv'ounds that it wmdd provide solid bene/it_ to varimts user communities, ttoweve_;
i_ the month_ /ollowinff the launch o/ the fir._t I(I_'IN, NA&4 ./ou_ul that providin_ C the spee!/Tr data
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required t_ the user_ was m many wc(vs more d!]ficult than buifltinL_ the hardware. NASA :_ limited
knowledKe oJ ma,y fieMs hi,Meted its abili(v to spec!fically tailor data. Nontechnical communities,
particularly ._tate a£_eneies, dM *_ot under.stand the technolo_" well enough to realize its capabilities
and limitations. Many potential users, unable to effectively rvmmu nicate their precise need._ to NA.S; a,
and unaware _[ what was available, were m_t profitit_g flora I':I¢73; data. A note on Senator
AndeT:_on _ letter to NASA Administrator Jame.s Fletcher re[brs to a "('buck " and "Frank." "('huck"
was Charles Mat)hews, the ,\_4SA Assor4ate Administrator in char£_e t?[ the I".IeTS prognam, and
'7')ank " wa_ Se_mtor A ndet:_on :_aide P:rattk l)il.uzio.
[ l I October 1.1, ltJ72
Dr..lames (:. Fletcher, Administrator
National Aeronattlics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546
[handwriuen note: "Chuck, I'm inclined to think Frank is right here. $ is a problem t)ul
I'm aftaid NASA has to take the leadership heve---:](;F"]
Dear.Jim:
For quite some time, fl)is office has been fifth)wing Ihe progress of the ERT_A
Program, and, specifically, the transfi:rving of inlbrmalion gadwred 1)y l])e cameras and
sensors on 1)oard ERTS to end users. II is obvious fiom !estin)ony, news slori(..s all(1 public
news releases of NASA thai the initial users of the data will be the Corps ot Engineers, the
Environmental l)rolection Agency and the Deparlments of lhe Interior, Comm('rc<" and
Agricuhure. These are (;overnment agencies will) statutory mission assignments 1]lat can
utilize the data. It is ;)Is() lrllC that Io a great degree, they have within their agencies the
needed expertise m inlerprc! and apply su(h data to sl)e(ific programs. This is a talent
which i (to n()l I)clievc exists in other potential user groups which need assistance and
which are not t)eing given the prope, attention. These groups incltt(le stale planning
agencies, slate regulalory agencies, vegi(mal compacls, stme and regional industrial and
educational groups and resource planning groups.
I lirn)ly believe that full and prolitable utilization of ERTS data will ()nlv be act',)m-
plished when il is made available 1o individual stales, regi(mal c,m)pacls and consorlia, l
further believe that unless there is a more (:on(entraled eflorl Io make Ihe intormation
available to lhe end users, nothing dramatic is going m happen regardless of how valuable
and useful the collected data is for land use planning, lh)od phm conlrol, forest land man-
agelllelll, resollrces identification and dew'lopment, cir.
This pr()blem was perhaps besl illustraled a! a recent meeting of the Federation of
Rocky Mounu)in Sum's in Boise, Idaho. h was very evident tha! while NAS, _,, has done a lair
job in se!ting up sources to which users could write fi)r "imagry," [sic] the locations and
capabilities of these centers were not well known. Also, !he potential users did not seem
to know what was available and, therefi)re, could not ask for specific "imagry" [sic] with a
precise reference.
[2] I (lo not mean to criticize NASA, bul merely to reiterate that it has always been very dit:
ficuh 1() lake new technt)l<)b, _' and make it easily available in tmderstandable and useful
torms !() the end users. This has I:,ee]). true with lllkt.lly new le('hnoh)gies, and it also is !rile
w'ith ERTS. it is very difficuh to initially infi)rm and keep informed the several diflm-en!
uhimate users, and it also is dilficuh a! times !o even identity, !he ultimate user of su(h data.
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1 have bc{'n int0rmed lhal lh('re is an agreclncnl t)elwe('n NASA and lh(, several
(;ov('rlllncnlaI di![)artln(mls invdvd alS lO lhdr Sl)t'(ili( rdcs. t low(,wr, I thinly bdi('v("
that thor(" Inust hc a lead al4ent:y in lh(.: apl)licali()n ()fany new tt'chn()log)?,, or it has a ten-
dellcy it) drift and drihl)h: ratht'r lllall Ibllow a l()gi(al l)r<)+:ess of applicalit)n which proves
oul hs vahi(, I() lh(" (:()lllilfy.
l would af)l)i(.Cialt, il v('ry lnurh if NASA w()uld lake ;t look at wha! is now hdng (l()n('
in l{'rlns ()f inakilllg lht, "hna_r)'" [si(l and data availal)le; and pcrhal)S wilh Ihe assislanc_,
lif |lll('riiii; Agri(uhur(!, (]oliilii('rr(', Ella and lh(' (]()rps of l+]l_ili(!crs, devise a in()r(' ('iti-
(i('lll lil('lll()(l ()f a(('()lnpii,_hing Ih(" IT)ill)wing:
1. A ('leaf id('nlilkation ()f illt()flllalion available, (lisst'ininal(,tl in a Ill()i{" di{'cliv(" wa_,,;
7. All ()l)])()rlunil) , [()i slal(,s and r(,_ionaI ilSCis Io ])arlidpal(, in idenlifvin/_ lhe chal-
;t('I(T ()f hlIOl'llialiOll net'(loll alitt ils [Olili--liOl hi lieu t)f, bill in addili(in l()'lh(, l)rintiph ,
I iiv('slil._al()r llro(=t'ss;
_. A sysit'lli whcr('t)y local ilSt'fs Call ()l)lain (:onsuhalit)n wilh kn()wlt'dgcal)lt, i)(,oplt ,
Oll Sl rt'gi()lla], d('tt'lllraliz(:d I)asi,_ sis 1() whal is available and hi wlial shall(, or (()llll;
<t. SOliiC (lir('(l l('(hni(al assiSlall(e Io lhe stales and io polt?nlial and a(lilai rcgiou-
al ilS('fs its I() h()w lhis tlala (ali ])t" aflillicd in [h(!ir ])lannhlg and l)rol)l('lns; and
,_. Soinc lu('lil()d whcrcl)y slalt! and rt'giOllal ]lt,()])lc ran Ill' Iraint'([ s() Ihal lii('y, in
llifn, (all assisl ()lh('fs.
li si'(<'lilS Ill nil' thai il is iinl)craiivc ihal SOllle (ii)VCl-lilnt_nla] dtllal-llnt,lll whi(h
dll'('Si(ly ]iSIS ('illi('r [a] rcgi()lla] ()r slitl(' ()Mci's Ilelwofk lic ([t'sigr)llalCd I:$1its lhc f(i(:al [)()hil
lhr()u<_[i whkh all s('iviccs ('Sill h(" I)r()vided in Ih(' inilia[ al)i)litali()n alid ('valualiou of
[_]RTS dala. Iain (t'rlain lli;il as lii()r(" and inort" (lala is aCCilillulal('d and slales and local
iis('rs ])('(()lii(! lalniliar willi liic (]larsi(lcrislics o1 lit(" sysl('lll, Iiicr(' will ('v(ilvc l)cllcr aild
iil()rt' ct]}cicnl rilannt'ls of Iranslnissi()n and assistance Ill lit(' local cn(l iisefs.
II lllay lit" thai lh(" ]()(al (;t'ol(igical SlifVey ofllt:e of Ih(" l)('l)arllli(,nl ()f lh(" hlterior
inilghl w('ll s('rv(, sis lh(' inilia] f()tal l)()illl if il were adequalciy siaftt,(l and ils tile of ERTS
dala wer(' iilainlahic(l Oil a (urrt'nl I)asis. I kn()w lhal Ihcy llavl, lht" t'Xl)Crliso Io ])r(ivi(Ic
lhc a(Ivic(: and illl('rpreialions llC((!ssar%' ti)r Ihe early al)piicalions of ];R'F,q (lala.
IJill(,ss s()inclilin_ is dont. <i]()n_ lh(" lhii!s lhal I have been ()utihihig, wc may t{lil i() ilSC
this llOW (al)al)ilily whidl I:,RTS is giviillg its tor COllS[ftictk,(,, f)url)()st!s. Plirlht'r) wc iliay lose
In()r(" supf)orl |i)i lh(, space l)r()_ralli t)('('allS(" t)f the inability to iranslnil spa(e-l._alhered
in|oriiialiOli on a lilll(!Iy basis t() ilSi_i-s in order Io hdp solw spedk earlh t)rol)lelns. ]'hi"
('xt|iaii_,(_ of hltorlnali(in liiay wdl load it) ilili)foved ER'F_ hl._lrUilielilali()li and lechniques.
I t)r()tiose i() ialk Io Ihe (]hairint'n of the ]nlerior and (]t)illniefc(. (]Ollimhl(,t,s ab()ill
joining ine in ()t)lainhi_ _fealef (ooperaliori from lhe olher respectiv(, (it)v(2rnlllelll a_eli-
(i('s hivolv('d, I do ilol hilend lhal tile inilial s(:'tup wllicti I alll f(2('oillniell{Ihl_ is in any
way a pie(:edent sell(,i, lilil ii may buy thn¢ for Ihe Fe(leral a_eilcie,s Io cvok'e a lnore dti-
dcnl system iif (lisseniinating ERTS infT)rnialion in a form usable by the end tlst-r until
such tiili(" as a lina] (:(lililnuni('alion system hal been devdoped by Ihe slates and agen(ies
hlvolvi:tt. ()n(: su(h apprt)ach nligilt be the regional setup proposed by the grolip fft)lil
l lot)bs, New Mexito, with which you are familiar. That plan has greai merit, and even
NASA slalt lllt,illlit,rs agree with il.
In vi('w ()t lh(" [_i('l Ihal lht' (]()tigress will a(!jt)urn prior 1o an), action on ihis letter> I
w()u](l ai)llrt'rialt, it vcly Ililich if you w()uld keep Frank DiLuzio ('llrf(,lll on yOilf lhinkinlg
and y(illr r('aclioiis t() Ihis Idler, as lit! will he ill llkirashhlgitin at least thfoili{_h Deceliil)er.
Sint:er('l), yours,
[ handisign('(l: "( :linlon Andi:rson"]
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Documen111-26
Document title: Walter C. Shupe, Chief, GAO Liaison Activities, NASA, Memorandum to
Distribution, "GAO Report to Congress 'Crop Forecasting by Satellite: Progress and
Problems,' B-183184, April 7, 1978," April 21, 1978.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
In its e[_nts to promote Landsat, ,_L4SA p&ced much emphasis on improved cr_¢_Joreca_ting. Together
with the Department _?/Agricullure and the IVeather Service, _%]4,S'Aembarked on a project to demon-
strate the system '_ abili O' to ac_trately predict crtyp yieM and quafit_'. The project, titled 1,4CIF (Large
Area Crop Inventmy t(_periment), expe_4enced some success, but in ffeneral it/idled to m_eetexpedation_.
[ I ] National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washinglon, D.('. 211546
[rubber stamped: "At'R 21 1978"]
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MEM()Fb\NI)t!M
TO: I)istribtttion
FROM: 1,(;(;- lg/(ihief, (;AO l,iaison Activilies
SI+rBJE(:T: (;A() Report to (]ongrcss "(h-op Forecasting by Satellite: Progress and
Problems," B- 183184, April 7, 1978
This office made advance distribution of the enclosed report via route slip on April
11, 1978. Additional copies were obtained and arc now being distributed to those who did
not receive one at that time. A copy of the (;omplroller General's Iransmittal letlel, dated
April 7, 1978, is enclosed, Iogethcr with a separate copy of the report Digesl.
(;AO re'ported lh_+.t USI)A, NASA, and N()rL'_ are cmrently planning a ioir_l research
ptogram that will deeml)hasize wheal an<l expand IACIE tcchniques to other crops and
appli<alions, such as early warning of crop damage and crop condition assessment. (;A()
recommended thai Ihe Secretary of Agricuhure provide cognizant congressional commil-
tees wilh periodic assessments of the [A(;IE projcct, the experimentation with c)lher crops,
and the experiments: with early warning of crop damage and crop condition assessment.
Inasmuch as lhe report recommendation is not addressed to the Administrator, it is
no! necessary t+<w NASA comments to I)e pn>vidcd tbr the ()PVIB, t_)r (;A(), Of t]W
(:ongvessional commitlees, unh.ss requesled at _ later dale.
[hand-signed: "Waller (:. Shupe"]
Ellc]ost [r_.'s
l)istribttlion attached
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(_OMPTROLI+ER C,ENERAI+'S REPOffI" T() TIlE CONGRESS
Crop Forecasting by Satellite: Progress and Problems
I)I(;EST
A 3-y('at. lhrt'c-agcncy Federal pr<)jcct is developing technolog,_ Io improve estimates
of f()r(!ign wheat cr(>ps. It is called the I,arge Area Crop Inventory Experiment (IACIE)
and is (arri('d ()tit as; fi)lh)ws:
-- Th(" Nati<mal Aeronatttics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Earth Resources
T('(:hnolog 3, Satellite (l+andsat) provides data for estimating wheat acreage.
-- The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provides information t()
assist in estimating crop yield under various weather conditions.
-- The Department of Agricuhure--the user of wheat crop estimates--provides his-
torical data and dctincs rc<lttircments fi)r the pr(_jcct.
IMPOffI'AN(;E ()F WORIJ) CROP INFORMATION
To dale, I.-_.(:IE has had mixed success in achieving ils performance goals. Fat+mt,rs,
iml)()rl('rs, eXl)()rlers, agril)usiness comt)anit_s , Federal and Sial(! policvmak¢!rs , f'()reign
gt)v,vrnmt,nts, and inlernati()nal organizalions use fi)r(qgn agricuhural itff<)rmalion. Bul if
m<)l'(" a((ural(' and timt'Iv i)tl_)rmali()n were availabh', these parties could bett(,,r at'hit,v(,
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theirgoalsbymakingimproveddecisionsonplanting,fertilizing,harvesting,storing,and
exporting.(Seep.5.)
Agricnltureinitiallyplannedtoimplenlenlanoperationalwheat-t_recastingsystemif
IACIElecllnolog,__couldproducecost-benet]cial,mprovedestimates,ttowever,this
emphasisonwheathaschanged,andAgricultureisplanningaresearchprogramwhich
willdefinethepotentialoftilt"IACIEtechnolog3_[orolhercropsandapplications.(See
p.2.)[iil TheCongresshouldbekeplawareoflheresultsofthisprogramandoftileexperi-
mentalionwithothercropsandapplications.
HM;IEI'ERFORMANCE
The IACIE project is developing new technology and, as to be expected with new
lechnolog 3. has had some technical problems, such as
-- ditficulty ill distinguishing spring wheat iiom other grains (see 17. 12),
-- slow progress ill developing methods tbr machine classitication otwheal areas to
reduce the need for heax T manual involvement ill identit_'ing wheat-growing
areas (see p. 13), and
-- using current yMd models which use highly aggregated wealller inputs that are
not tidl), responsive to we;.lther changes occurring for short periods over localized
areas. (See p. 14.)
I+ACIE pel'li)l'lll_tllCU lleeds lo be improved lo meet its goals of 90-percent accurau"
production estimates, 9 out of 10 years. Ill the most important lest ('Ollll[l'y, tile So'de!
Union, tilt' I_M;IE production estinlate _,';ts close to the ofllcial estimate; however, this
resulted from oflselting errors; i.e., tile wheat area estimate was high by over 12 percent,
and the wheat yield estimate was low t71, nearly 15 percent. (See 17. 8.)
IJ\CIE (_()STS
I_,\(_IE and related efforts planned through fiscal year 1978 will cost about $54 mil-
lion, not including NASA personnel costs. The total costs of tile f(_llow-on research pro-
gram inw)lving the three agencies have not been determined, ttowever, Agriculture is
investing a substantial amount of funds in COlllplllel equipuwnt, and ill wograms and
related items to establish a l_acility near the Johnson Space (]elllelk whel'e llll.lch of the
research will be carried out. (See 1717.16 and 17.)
[till CONTINUIN(; EFFORTS
Agriculture planned to implement the Application Test System----designed to tesl
I.A(]IE wlwat-estimating techniques ill an operational environment. I1 has, however,
decided to extend experimentation to other crops and applications, such as early warnin R
of crop dalnage and crop condition assessment, h w'ill also defer a Landsat-based wheat
inlormation system until furtl1.er experimentation and evahtali()n is (:ompleted. (Set" t7.
17.) Projec! plans ill 1974 called for the perfi)rnlance of a cost/benefit analysis t() evalu-
ate tile usefidness and cost-efl_'ctiveness of a l_-\ClE-lyf)e system in providing ti)reign crop
information. Tilt: analysis will assess benetits based on expected imlTrox,ements in timeli-
ness and accuracy of intiwmalion tiom a IA(]lE-lype system for torecasting wheat.
Accordingly, the reasonableness of the benetits sel torth should be carefully examined it
tile analysis is used ill deciding whether a crop-forecasting system based on I.ACIE tech-
nology should be carried out. The analysis will be carried otlt in 1978 but will not be com-
pleted by the end ofthe I.ACIE prc_ject in July 1978. (See p. 18.)
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RE(JOMMENDATION T() TIlE SECRETARY OF AGRICUI3"URE
Since there havc t)ccn technical pl<>hlellis in reaching IACIE objcctivcs and the
research direction has r.lilallgt'd, (,A() rt_tTOllllncllds tilal the Secretary of Agriculture pro-
vide COgllizallt congressional cOlnlllitt_._t.s with periodic assessnlellls <>f the IACIE project,
the experimentation witil other crops, and tile expcriinents witii early warning of crop
damage and crop condilion assessilqenl. (See p. 91 .)
A(;ENCY COMMENTS
The isstlcs in tills rcl)<Wt have hccn discussed with IACIE officials in the three partic-
ipating agencies, and their comnlents have been incorporated as appropriate. NASA
believes that IA(:IE area and yield estimates for tile Soviet Union should not he compared
to tile Soviel's figures tT)r art'a and yii_ld because [iv] the latter are suspect. However, the
IA(;IE pr<_ject makl!s tills colnparison, and Agriculture rt'ports tilt" llgilres ill its regular
tlciiodic reports ....
Document 11-27
Document title: CharlesJ. Robinove, Director, EROS Program Office, Geological Survey,
U.S. Department of the Interior, Memorandum to Staff of the EROS Program,
"Optimism vs. pessimism or where do we go from here? (some personal views),"
December 10, 1975.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
hi ba,14aittin g with the Bureau o[ the Budget to gain approval ior an Earth resource surv_ satellite
system, the l)epartment _?]the Interior was ]oreed to accept an initial provisional program rather than
the/idly operational prog_am it sought. 7b become fully operational, the program would have to prove
its utility'. As time passed and progress was slower than anticipated, this bargain hung like Damacles'
._word over the program. In an effort to &rest severely sag_,ffing morale in the EROS program +_]ice,
Charle+ ]. Robinove prepared this memorandum.
111 l)ecenlher 10, 1975
MellloralldUln
T<>: Staff of the EROS Program
Fr<)nl: (;harles+l. Robinove
_llb.i(+Cl" ()piiniisnl vs. pessinlisnl orwhere do we go from here?
(some personal views)
In tile past months tile staff of the EROS Program has shown increasing pessimisnl
arid discontent regarding the future of tile EROS Program, tile thrust of research and
operations, prograttiltialic alld administrative probh'ms, and the pl;we of the scientific
sia|[] All of iis, iiolil top to hottOlll, ilave at times hcell discouragt'd ill olir individual
i)rogrcss and ill lilt" progrt'ss of lilt" program--this is only natural ill a growing and evolv-
ing area of science within lhl" Federal hureaiicracy.
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Certainly many things have progressed more slowly than any of us would like. In tilt"
ten-year span since tile EROS Plogrmn was announced, only two satellites have t)ee,i
tatm(hed, no ccmnnitment has been lnade to an t)perational system, t)rganizalional
prt)gress has seemed tt) be stifled, and hudgels have never been large enough It) do tilt'
things thai we have all teh need tt) be done.
Pessimism in the tate of slow progress and setbacks is a natural human condition, hut
why is it st) prevalent now? Probably it is because all of us believe ill tile EROS Program as
a soundly based scientific and technical franwwt)rk lhat is good fi)r tile [Tnited States and
tilt' world, relll()le sensing iS a scientifically exciting field to work in, our contacts with tith-
ers in a vast area (if scientific and resource nmnagetnent disciplines is a broadening and
ctmtinuing learning experience, and thrtmgh our efforts we can build a sound and
respected scientific reputation both individually and tot the program.
Let us It)ok at the progress that has been made. Landsats 1 and 2 are operating at per-
Iortnance levels higher than expected, Landsat-C is planned for humch in 1977, and
Landsat-D is heing planned. Other more specific missions such as Magnetometer Satellite
(Magsat) and t lear (:apacity Mapping Mission (I I(:MM) are being phmned.
[21 Users of relllOte sensing dala are incrcasiug rapidly, and applications of dam It)
resource antl environmental prt)hlems are proving Io be practical and henelicial. Tile
EROS Data (]elller is all operating reality with increasing lllllllhers of CilSlt)lllers fi)r data
and training. The individual freedom of the stall to dr) research in both hasic and applied
remote sensing is a privilege envied by many ot;_tside the Survey. Bill ill spite of these p()s-
itive tactors, pessimism seems greater than optinlism.
Scientitic progress is like individual freedom--both must be fought l))r day by flay.
Neither can be taken for granted. Regardless of the quality of our work or lilt" necessity
fi)r such work to benelit the country and the worltl, there will always be those who say our
en(Icavors are of lillle vahle, lha| ()ill" c()ncepls won'l work, and who hattie against Its in
private alltl in public, either to eliminate tilt' EROS Program entirely or to reduce iI I() all
unworkable level.
Are these reasons fi)r pessimism? No--they art" reasons to increase our eftorts and It)
convince our detractors, hoth by our resuhs and our statements, that what we dtl is of
value. This nntst he done continually. It is ntlt enough to know we are making progress
and helping others. We hills! show it and tell it and he proud of it.
In accomplishing tile things that we have done, we have solved many pr()blems--sci-
entific, administrative, and pt)litical; we haw buih a constructive and useful phase (if sti-
ence and techn()h)g'T; and we have overcome many (ll)slatles ill doing so. There is every
reason to continue I() tl() so and every ability avaihdlle to continue and increase our
progress. In the context (if pride ill our pl,rpose and t)ur acconlplishnlenls, we can put tlp
with eneniies, misunderstandings, and continual nitpicking in small mailers.
()ptimisnl derives tiom our purpose and our accomlllishments; pessimism derives
only lit)m ti-ustration in reaching {)ill" goals. I believe we can overconm our pessimism hv
h)oking at our purp()se and our gclals, rec()gnizing the hard and ()lien frustrating scien-
litic, administrative, and political roadblocks in our way, and trying, day by day, to over-
('()lilt* [helll.
If we remain firmly ctmnnitted to our broad goals and confitlen! of ()lit" allilily, lhell
t)ptimisnl will aid us in achieving our goals and in t)ve,coming the pessiniisnl thai (all h'ad
us Io th'l(:at ourselves.
|hand-signed: "Charles.]. R()bin()ve"]
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Document 11-28
Document title: James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, to Mr. John C. Sawhill, Associate
Director, Office of Management and Budget, October 19, 1973.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
7"he Bureau o[ the Budget wa._ Hven expanded re,ponsihiliti¢_ and renamed the ()[rice z?/
Management and Budget (OMB) in 1971. rl'his natne change did not result in a more welcome atti-
tude toward the Et¢7"S" progTam. 77_e second satellite, ERTS-B, wa_ origffnally scheduled flJr launeh
in 1976. Fearing that a /ailu_e in ERTS-A might cause a potentiallt, dama/¢ing gap in data, N4SA
requested permission to advance the launch date l_ two years. OMB resisted, tu,lieving that an earli-
er launch might imply a premature decision to deHare the program operational and therel,_' increase
]_znding. In this letter to OMB Associate Director John C. Sawhill, NASA Administrator fltmes
Fletcher prese_ts NASA _ case.
III NATI()NAI, AERONAI!TICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Washington, D.C. 2054,_
0(71" 19 1973
()ffice of flw Adminislralor
Mr. John C. Sawhill
Associale l)ircclor
()flice of Mallagcqlwllt and Budget
Execuliw' ()ffice of lhe President
Washington, IL(:. 205113
Dear.John:
I am writing to clarit}' and explain in greater detail the reasons to accelerate lhe
launch of ERTS-B tiom 1976 Io 1974, as communicaled in my leller to Roy Ash <)f
Sel)lenlhcr 5, 1973.
Firsl, let me address lhrce points on which discussions with your staff indicate there
may hawr been some misunderstanding.
I. The acceleralion of ERTS-B is required for continued experimental work and
does not depend on approval of the interagency pilot projecl I suggesled to
George Shuhz in my letler of September 5, 1973. Ewm if it is decided not to
tmdertake such a global agricultural experiment, the earlier hmnch of ERT_B is
required lo continue erarent experimentation with Ihe use of the ERTS data sys-
telllS 1"O1"applications in agriculture and other fields to provide a hetter hase of
experience for the planning and design of possible fitture operational syslems.
2. The launch of ERT_B in 1974 does not require or necessarily imply an earlier
decision to commit to an operational ElLS satellite system than envisaged with the
previously approved 1976 ERTS-B latmch date, nor does it reqttire or necessarily
imply a decision to latmch another experimental satellite in 1976 Io maintain con-
tinuit}, of data colleclion between the acceleraled ERT_B and an eventual opcn_-
titmal salellite system. NASA and the user agencies generally 121 believe tha! an
earlier commitmen! to an operational satellile system could bc made, and 1 have
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recommended thai continuity of data collection hc maintained with another
experimental satellite (ERTS-C) until an operational satellile system t)ccomes
available. HoweveL even if neither an operational system nor EKI',%C is approved
al this lime, ERT_B should nevertheless he lattnched in 1974 to extend the exper-
imemal operalions conducted with ERT_I. If there has It) be a gap, it would be
preferahle to get a stronger experimental hase sooner and accept a hiatus between
a more meaningful experimental phase and the operational system, rather than
introduce all unnecessary hialus hlto the middle of the e×perimental phase.
3. Tile acceleration of ERT_B, even if combined with a decision to proceed with
EP, T_(_ tot launch in 1976, as 1 have separately recommended, does not have
budgetary implications that go heyond p,'eviously planned committed levels tot
space research and teciuloh/b,O_. The additional cost of ERTS-(; can easily be
accmnmodated within a Iotal NASA hudget well below the planning level of
$3.2-3.4 hill|on ( 1971 dollars) agreed to inJanuary 1972, as shown in my I'_: 1975
budget leuer of September 28, 1973.
Now let me explain more tully the reasons ti)r shitting the launch <latc o1 ERTS B to
1974, independent of the related cmlsiderations discussed above.
R&D Strate_'
"File research and develolmlent stvateg T for the ERTS program, lbr which NASA and
tile associated technical agencies are responsihle, must be based on recogniti<m ofthe fact
that a muhipurpose devtqopment program like ERTS cannot he treated like a chtssical
hardware systems deveh)pmenI with clearly identitiahle decision points tot separate phas-
es of research, develop,nent, test, evaluation, an(I operations. We are dcaling will1 a system
and many potential applirations [31 in which tile experimental phase has to include (ill
different ways for each application) a whole wlriety of activities, including among others:
• Development and test of sensor perfi_rmance capabilities.
• Developnlent and test of satellite hardware capabilities.
• l)evelopment and lest of data collection alld relay capabilities.
• Developnlent itlld lesl Of grottnd data processing t<) provide data in useftd torm
for each of many applications.
• Development of dala analysis aids and methodoh_gies to convert data il'llo useful
intormation.
• Test of inlbrmation utility in each application for nlanagemenl and decision-making.
Two key points milS/he stressed: First, the satellite dala requirements tor experimen-
tation necessary to achieve an adequate hasis |or evaluation are ditfi:rent fin each class of
potential applicalion; aild second, some of the most important potential applications
reqtfire a data base of repetitive coverage extending over several years and/or quasi-
operational testing rising current, nero=real-time data.
There are two major areas of ERTS applications Ihat clearly appear to have great near-
term potential value and which illustrate the importance of tile continuity t_t data an
ERTS-B 1974 launch would provide. These are the areas of vegetation and waler bound-
ary discrimination. It has been denlollstrated, tot example, that ERTS data can be used to
identity and separate different crops, monitor crop vigor, end meastne crop acreage. To
be usetul in the development of systenlatic crop yiehl [4] predictions, these techniques
need to be applied to current growing seasons that are inlluenced by current climatolo_'.
Tile same holds true tot measurement of forest stress under insect attack and tbr exact
delineation of coastal wetlands by grass species discrimination: tile dynamic nature of the
problem requires current data lot current use. For hydrology applications like flood nlap-
ping, seasonal lake and pond assessments, water sedimentation and pollution measure-
ment, and sea ice nlonitoring, nero:real-time data is even more critical, since the dynamic
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phenomena themselves are shortilived and the period fi)r action in response to observa-
tion in also short. An early ERT_B launch will provide assurance that the immcdiale val-
tws in these application areas can he realized.
These lwo examples illustrate how the first phase of ERTS investigations has been
spent discovering and understanding the flfll extent of the inf<)rmalional conlellt <>I sl)al'e
data; the nexI phase now needs Io focus on nlaking tillS)Final)on exit+action routine and
on learning how the new inlbrniati<nl can be integrated into nianagemenl and decision
processes. This next phase requires experiniental support and conlinuity in the flow of
ERTS data. These are the considerations that led the Interagency (_oordinati<)n
Committee Ibr the Earth Resources Survey Program in its annual reporl to your office
suhnlillcd on October 4 to identify the acceleration of ERTS-B to 1974 as the best slep in
Ihe overall Iransition tiom R&I) to operations.
A [irsl-order analysis of the tradcofl{s I)elween the two lamwh dates shows lhe following:
• Thc earlier launch lnaintains the nioulenttun dewqoped in the investigator and
lisl'r conununities, a ln<llllentUFll that would have lo be reestablished at a cost in
money and pertorniance it a serious gap in data Ih)w were pernfilled.
15] • The earlier launch in likely to provide earlier definitive, experience among lnanv
diverse us¢'rs and applicati<+ns upon which decisions as Its operational systems liming,
conliguralitm, and henefits can 1)e reached.
• The earlier launch (if ERTS-3 means that the fifth ( 10-14 nlicromett'r) MSS chan-
nel wotlld not lit. carrit'd until a later time; the dcvelt)pnicnl schedule fin this
Ihernlal tR channel would nol be a|tecled and the inslrunlcnt couhl be th)wn in
197(i if a suitable spacecrati is availahle. A twt)-year discontinttity in ERTS dala
availability in c()nsidercd more serious than the potential dr'lay in the tlight lesl (if
the additional experimental channel.
• The earlier launch date i)rovides the possibility of near-(+onlinuotis coverage tol-
lowing ERTS-I which has exceeded its design life and can lie expected to t,dl at
any time. A latcr gap in data flow following ERT_B in the period 1975-76 could
lie filled with a tollow-<ln experinlcntal or operational sySleln an [ have already rec-
Ollllni'ildl'd; how('ver, this in a lnatter for a separate decision which can lie inade
on its inerils in die F)' 197:"1 budget process, independently of lhl, decision on tilt+
I_RTS-B latinch dalt'.
• The earlier launcil results in lower FY 1975 and total program cosls.
I would like io reiterate a basic point: the objective of the EITS progi-anl, to idenlil)'
whelher all ol)eralioiia[ approach to ERS is warranted, is earliest and mOSl economically
SCl+Vcd by acceleralhlg ERTS-B.
161 (k)ngressional I)irection
The lbur C<Jtnniittees charged with the NASA authorization and appropriation have
clearly and unamhiguously gone on record on the ERTS-B mauer. The FY 1974 autho-
rizati<m act inch,des $8 million specifically targeted for this purpose. Quotes are: "The
I I louse] Commiltee, however, places the highest priority tin the ERTS pr_ject." "... the
11 lottse] Committee believes that ERTS-B should be prepared tor lannch as soon a prac-
ticable." "... the [Senate] Committee concurs with the House in adding $7 million to the
Space Applications Program to bring ERTS B into a ready status for lannch in its present
contiguration .... " "... the [House] Committee urges NASA to reprogram the necessary
funds It) launch ERTS-B as early as possible." [bracketed material in the original]
The basis fro (]<lngressi<)na[ interest is not political in the usual sense. Data t'roiii
ER'I'_I in tleginning to be ilsed extensively hy many di|'lk_it'llt Slate agencies, and a serious
gap in data availabilily would Callse these Slates to abandon thcir analysis Iealns--lnally {It"
2_q0 OP, SERVIN(; TIlE EAR'I'II FROM SPA(:I.:
then1 before /bey have had tilt" opportunity of working with real-time repetitive data.
Perhaps the States were wcmaturc in building up their capabilities in response to an
experimental satellite, but, o1_ the other hand, it seems that ERTS-I has more wdues _t an
operational character then Isic] bad been anticipated.
In addition, I have been personally inlormed by a number of both House and Senate
members fiom both sides of the aisle that tailure to accelerate ERT_B would be consid-
ered a serious disregard of Congressional intent and would result in political and pro-
grammatic repercussions it would be in the best interests of the Administration to avoid.
While tile appropriation bill was still ttnder review, it has been possible t<) point to that t:act
as a limitation on NASA's programming tlexibilities; now that it has passed, I am immc<li-
alely accountable to the Committees on the matter of the FY 1974 prograln content.
[7] International (k/nsiderations
International interest, on the part t)l US agencies and lirms, as well as numerous tor-
t'ign governments, demonstrates a wide-spread positive evaluation of the ERTS program
and a very strong concern for its continuity. The tollowing are examples:
* President McNamara of the World Bank hloks torward to an early launching of
ERT_B, has established a special Bank oftice for applications of space surveys,
and has requested the Bank it) be designated a special (user) agency.
• AID is utilizing ERTS data in specilic projects of technical assislance and has
requested continuity of coverage lor some of tbese.
• The l)epartment of State's Bureau of African +Mfairs has given special attention It)
ERTS data tot the drought-stricken Saltelian area and dlere has been a positive
response, specitic to the ERTS program, trom the (;<)vernments of Niger and Mall.
• (;anada, Brazil, attd Italy have committed to substantial investments il_ ERTS
ground stations and data processing t_lcilities, implying a clear expectation of the
continuity of ERT_type data li-t)m whatever source.
• Brazil conw)ked a meeting in May of this year in which some eleven cotmtries
expressed tlteir interest in tile continuity of ERTS data.
• More than a dozen countries have inquired regarding the establishment of ERTS
stations.
• The Bendix coral)any Itas intorlned us that US commercial advantage in overseas
sales of equipment for ERTS data reception and analysis depends heavily upon an
early start for ERT_B.
18] 1 can provide you fttrther data on the international aspects ityou desire, ttowever, tny
own asscssntent is that the I_IS stands to gain much by ttte earlier launch of ERT,%B and
stands t<) lose, in both tilt" near and the long tern), if this lattnclt is deti:rred tbr reasons
which ignore US international policy interests.
In conclusion, 1 have decided to request apportiolm)ent of I')' 1974 funds on tilt +basis
of a 1974 ERT_B launch. Time is already becoming critical it +we are to assure the
smot)lhest and most economical contractual and schedule changes.
The separate question ofwhelller It) dedicate some parts of the ERT_B capabililies to
a special pilot prt_ject should be decided on its <)wn merits in the context of national needs
and national policy; it sltould be n<)ted that the pilot prt_ject would not intert_we with
domestic data actluisition or with use of the satellite by those countries investing in ground
stations. I am confident thai tiffs proposal is inherently sound and I urge your assistance in
helping assure that it receives appropriate consideration within tilt" Adminislr_llion.
Sincerel)_
James c. Fletcher
Administrator
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I)('C: A/l)r. Fletcher
AI)/l)l: I,ow
AA/Dr. Newell
AI)A/Mr. Shapley
B/Mr. l.itly
E/Mr. Malhews
AAA/Mr. Williamson
AXM-B/Fih's
Prepared hy: AAA:D_!Ir:(!js:I0/19/73
Document 11-29
Document title: Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Director, Johnson Space Center, to Associate
Administrator for Applications, NASA Headquarters, "Private Sector Operation of
Landsat Satellites," March 12, 1976.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Wa+_hington, D.C.
l_(/a,ua O, 1975, ,M4SA *vnamed the El¢TS program l,and_at. By 1976, with two Landsat satellites
i, orhit, another _cheduled fi)r launch, and a.fourth under _vmstruetion, many people associated with
the I",arth re.source._/Survey proffram Jelt the expeffmental phase had continued long enough, and it
wa_ time at least to beff_n to di_cus,_ wh_qe the progwtm_ ultimate home shouM be. Many thought it
wouht be best to l#vt,,sfer the entire program to private industry,. Others, including Christopher Kraft,
l)ireetor o/ A_I,SA _.]ohnson Space (k, nte_; argT+ed that it was prematu w to decide m* an operational
_tructuPe /hr l.andsat, _iven the character o]the market Jar its products to dale.
[rubber stamped: "MAR 12 1976"]
T(): NASA I leadquariers
Aun: E/Associate Administrator |or Applications
FROM: AA/Director
SUBJE(',T: Private Seclor Operation of l,andsat Satellites
The [hi[owing comments are provided in resp<mse to your request al the rectal APIB
Meeting regarding possil)le non-governmenl operation of the Landsal system.
I have no doubt thai private industry will eventually play a major role in the opera-
lional earth resources sltrvey system. I believe this will make for a hcahhy situation and
should l>c retained as a fmure option, ttowevm,,jus! what that role will be is not at all clear
at lifts lime.
It appears likely that fi)r the next 5-10 years the Federal Government will [)e the major
liSel Ot l,andsal-type data. Ahhough many others use the data lot a variety of purposes,
lhey probably would not be willing at this time to contril)nte signilicanlly to supporting
an operalional I,andsal syslem. Possible roles for private industry would be to huild and
olielale l,andsat as a conunercial venture or under a long-tern) lease hack to the Federal
( ;overllilleilt.
( ]onsiderinl4 the high risk allendanl Io tl_{" currenlly uncerlain conlnlercia] lllalkel, ii
is doiit)ltii[ lhal iildltslry would he willing to tniderwrite lhe l,aiidsai dev{'loplilenl alld
oper,ilion. The i;,rosi)ccls [Tn negolialing a illilltially acceplahle Ioi)g-lernl ]case arrange-
Inenl--{ onsideiing lhe iiudgelary prol_ess--are also high])' ulicei-laili al lhis lime.
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Therefore, I would suggest Ihat no changes be made to presem plans for operation of
l,andsat (: and D. As operational data use develops in tile next few years, this climate may
change and a broader-based demand ti)r l,andsat-type data may emerge. The option tb_-
private seclor operation of the l,alldsat systt'ni should be reassessed at ttlal linle.
(3uistopher C. gaaft, Jr.
I ll)/]FMitchell'mnm')/v7/76.375,. . ., , I
('(':
BD/E. B. Stewart
t|B/O. Smistad
HC/R. A. Hoke
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Document title: Bruno Augenstein, Willis H. Shapley, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "Earth
Information From Space by Remote Sensing," report prepared for Dr. Frank Press,
Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, June 2, 1978, pp. ii-iv, 1-14.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
$_Twn this report came out in fltne 1978, the United States had been engaged in an "experimental"
I"arth resources oh_ervation prowam since 1966. Although L9, 1978 the prownm I_ ultimate viability'
was still not clear, most invoh,ed felt it was time to make a poli_y decision rewuffing whether or not
the program shouM be canceled, declared operational, or maintained on an experimental basi.s until
.further results made a choice more olmious. AmoNg the issues Jaeing decision maker_ wa_ deciding
which government agenQ' shouM take the lead, !f indeed an @erational O,.stem was desired. This
report from the O[fice q A'eience and Teehnolo_, Poli 0, qthe Fxecutive O[[iee Of the President exam-
ines the is_ue_ at hand and recommends NASA as the ap]m_rriate lead ageno_. The three authm:_ oJ
the n])ort were consultants to Presidential Sdence Advisor P)ank Press. Bruno Augenstein wa._ a
I_lNl) Coqmration sr4m_tist with earl_, invoh,ement in Earth ob.servation .n'stems. Willis ,Shaple_; wa.s
a long-time top staff oJficial at the Bureau of the Budget and _\]4SA. Eug/ene Skolnik:_/was apolit-
ical _cience pr@,ssor who ._pecializ.ed in science, technolo_, and Joreiwt poll 0. issues at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technolog),. lncluded here are the executive _untma_;v and.fiT:_t two chap-
ter_ q/their report.
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Earth Information From Space by Remote Sensing
by
Bruno Augenstein
Willis H. Shapley
Eugene B. Skolnikoff
June 2, 1978 ...
EXE(3UTIVE SUMMARY
The aim of the constfltants in this report has been to develop policy recommenda-
tions and options tot U.S. civil l'Clnol¢' sensing activities.
EX,t'I+()RJN(;1'111_[JNKN()WN 283
2. There is an urgent need tbr a clarification of policies (m tile future evolution of U.S.
activities in civil remote sensing. Executive branch policy has supported lechnt)h)gica]
R&I) and some experimental applications, but has up t(i now (tefk'rred as premature
connnitnmnts to operational uses and decisions on policies for operational systems.
(;emgressional committees have urged that at a minimum the Executive Branch pre-
pare clear policies to guide future civil uses of remote sensing ti'om space.
3. The report addresses lit'st the basic question of the U.S. policy auitude It)ward civil
remote sensing from space, and conclndes that U.S. policies should be based on
acceplanee of the proposition thal the U.S. should and will continue to be actively
involved in civil remote sensing tiom space for the indetinite liuure. This conclusion
is based on the manifidd U.S. interests served by civil remote sensing, which include
a wiele variety of technical, public, economic, and international interests. The consul-
rants recognize that there have been exaggerated claims tot benelits and the times I)y
which they can I)e achiewrd, I)lll are nevertheless convinceel that Ihe many potenlial
values lullyjustil_, a continuing U.S. effort to achieve them.
()ne important consequence of this conclusion is that the U.S. should, regardless of
the program level approw'd, make a policy commitment to data continuity. This is
essential to redttce present uncertainties among prospective users and to help tore-
stall the gr_)wing threat of foreign competition.
Policies on U.S. civil reln{it[" sensing must recognize the dynamic nature of the tech-
nologies involved and support strong continuing research and developnmnt el't_rls.
Operational systems, however, shotdd take advantage of existing and low cost tech-
nologies when they are adequate to meet the needs of the risers.
A If) t) priorily should be given to the preparation and periodic updating of a com-
prehensive plan, covering the expected technical, progranmuttic, and institutional
evolution of U.S. civil remote sensing for l0 to 15 years in the future.
An equally high priority should be given to the designation of a lead agenc_r: This ix
needed now to develop the initial version of the comprehensive plan tel guide prepa-
ration of tile FY 1980 budget and the accompanying legislative proposals. For the long
term, it lilt] is essential to have a qualitied single agency with authority and ,csponsi-
bility for leadership and management of U.S. activities in the collection and dissemi-
nation <_t civil remote sensing data and for serving as the intcrl_we widl the private
sector and international interests in civil remote sensing. Federal mission agencies
would et)_llintm It) be responsible fl)r their user interests in rentole sensing intorma-
tion.
After considering the criteria that should be applied, the consuhants have concluded
that the lead agency responsibility should be assigned to NASA, provided NASA is
reconfigured to ensure that a user-oriented service outlook is given an equal footing
with NASA's importan! present R&D missions. Lower ranked alternatives would be,
firsl, flw National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the
Department of Commerce, and second, the Department of the Interior.
The report notes lhat U.S. civil remote sensing activities nnavoidably have signiticanl
international aspects, because of the global nature of remote sensing from space and
because of the: strong existing foreign and international interests in the technolog D'
anti its uses. The'. consultants believe that there are many potential values to the U,S.
(e.g., ill dealing with lesser developed countries problems) in actively seeking con-
strnclive international involvement. The preferred institutional allernatiw's appear to
he a U.S. owned and operated system serving international users or the establishment
_t+an international consortium in which the U.S. and other nations would particilmte.
10. The c<msul|anls pr<+pose a twit-tiered concept for the U.S. National Systenl tor civil
relllOte sensing. +fhis w<mld include (a) a core segment consisting _t the assets and ser-
+,ices re+qttired for a ntttltilntrlJoSe+ open access syste_tn which w<Htld serve in|ermtti<mal
4.
6.
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as well as domestic users and which might become the nucleus of an international sys-
tmn if one is established, and (b) a segment composed of specific national means,
which may be proprietary, for adding to and enhancing data and knowledge useful to
interests of the U.S. This approach permits flexibility for international arrangemenls
while assuring the availability of data services needed by U.S. interests.
11. There is a wlrie%, of modes in which the U.S. private sector can participate, ahhough
' such participation, especially as it relates to data collection, will generally be under
the supervision and authority of the U.S. (;overnment. Private sector roles may
include major systems management timctions, systems engineering, or delegated
operational time!imps, in addition to normal contractor roles in dewqoping and prt>-
ducing system hardware and software.
[iv] 12. The final chapter of the report gives tonr ahernative scenarios which indicate the
range of options for the continuing involvement of the U.S. in civil remote sensing
within the terms ¢)1"the policy conclusions of the reporl. The scenarios difter in the
level of U.S. commitment and the degree of international involvement soughL
Scenario "A" is a "minimum" scenario, providing some degree of instimtionalizalion
of current activities and a policy commitnaent to data conlinuity. Scenario "B" pro-
vides for some significant commitments to a quasi-operational or operational system
in the mode of a tiered U.S. national system permiiting international participation in
the core segment. Scenario "B" is the same as '%" except thai it includes a U.S. invi-
tation to other countries to participate in an International System. Scenario "(;," a
"maximum" scenario, goes beyond "B" to include active U.S. eflorts t_ bring an inter-
national system into I)eing.
13. Finall); the consultants recommend approval of the conclusions and recommenda-
tions of the report and the selection of Scenario "B" as the general guides for the
thture conduct of U,S. civil remote sensing activities. They ftuther note the impof
tame of announcing this approval no later than the smnmer of 1978 to permit Ihe
lead agency to prepare plans in time for incorporation in the FY 1980 budgel deci-
sions and the accompanying legislative program to be submilted 1o the Congress.
Ill CttAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
A. Aim and Scope
1. The aim of the consuhants in preparing this report has been to devel_p policy rec-
onmmndations and options to guide decisions on United Slates policy with respect to civil
remote sensing from space. The topics addressed include Ihe future involvement of lh("
tr.S. in civil remote sensing, institutional arrangements in the Federal (;overnment, inter-
national and private sector participation, and a proposed concept tor a U.S. national sys-
tem compatible with several policy options.
2. The report is intended to apply to civil remote sensing systems using ctlrren! and
future sensors of the Landsat type and other types of systems for obtaining intormation
on or ti-om the earth from space. National security inte.rests are taken into account but not
discussed; the policies, oplions, and recommendations in the repor! are consislent with
current statements of applicable National Security Policy. The policies, options, and rec-
ommendations in the report are also compalible with cttrren! policies and arrangements
regarding meteorolt_gical satellites; questions of possible changes in these arrangements
are not addressed.
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B. Background
1. Official central policy in tile Executive Branch has heen somewhat amhivahmt on civil
renmte sensing fi-oln space. There has been support tot technological R8.:D and some
exp¢'rimental applications. Bul operalional nses have been trader a cloud--decisions on
"operational systems" and even on policies for a transiti(m to an operational mode have
been regarded, up to now, as premature. On the Congressional side, however, and in
other sectors there has heen support for an early transition 1o an operational |node and
Sll'()llg delllallds Ihal al ;.I inilliml.lln Ihe Executive Branch propose clear policies to guide
||it: fnlllre civil uses of remole sensing fr<ml space.
2. There now appears to he a consensus that the timv has come |o formulate and adopt
policies to govern future U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing from space. A<.:lions to
relortnttlale overall hall<real policy in space are underway, Tile Director of |he ()llice of
Science and "l+echn<_logD ' Policy has agreed to presenl an administration policy on civil
remote sensing Io the Congress later this yeal: The consnhants' report is intended as one
ot Ill(" sleps h'ading Io dvcisi<ms <m whal these policies should be.
3. Some of |he concerns which underline the urgency of the need for policy decisi(ms
<m civil remote sensing are the tollowing:
[2] a. 'l'he ahsence of a U.S. policy on |uture directions and inslilulional alr_+.ngelnents
has creat(+d an almosphere of uncertainty and Dustration. The t i.S. agencies con-
(etned an(| other prospective users, domestic and fi)reign, are tinding it ditlicuh
lo make svnsihlc decisi(ms on their future plans and commitments+ No single
agenry has had at,hority and responsibility for leadership in developing national
p<_li(y on an overall plan.
b. i,ead-limes are rnnning out. l)ecisi<m-making on Ihe syslems and servi(+es Io tol-
low l,andsal D should starl this year; significant opportunities and options may
otherwise he Iosl.
c. Foreign competilion is hecoming a real threat. U.S. indecision in the t_lce of
strong, terhnologically advanced eflorts by Japan, France, or the European Space
Agv,cy could rcsuh in loss of U.S. leadership in civil remole sensing and the
opportuniti¢+s that would go wilh it.
d. F+xisling U.S. policies are now having some counterproductive ett+ects. The limi-
lali(>n o| civil remote sensing from space to R&D and experimentation, combined
with the practice of incremental program decisions without a long-term plan for
operalional services, is calling into question the flmlre of U.S. involvement in civil
remole sensing. This is adding to tile uncertainties, discouraging prospective
users, and encouraging foreign conlpetition. Decisions on uses beyond R&D are
no longer ])relnalttre; they are timely, even overdue.
e. Finally, there is a widespread feeling that the time has come Io make a stronger
et|_'>lI to realize br_.nef]ts (:.f value from civil remote sensing.
C. l)ethlitions arm Dislinctions
I. in lhis reporl, we will be dealing primarily with "Civil Remote Sensing from Space"
activities and systems, by which we mean the totalily of activities and syslems required for
Ihe colle(lion, production and initial dissemination of data on the earth ohtained from
space hy civil remole sensing systems. These activities and systems are generally regarded
as having a space segmenl and a ground segment. Tile space segment consists of the
|)ro(htction acli_ities and syslems required tor lhe collection, initial processing, and deliv-
erer}r _t earth dilla [I-Olll SpACe. Th<," ground seglnen| consists of dissemination activilies and
systems r¢'quired fiw making the processed data availahh+ ill appropriate I()l-inals I() risers
and |or maintaining archives of rcnlole sensing dala.
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2. "1_ a lesser extent, the report will refer m the anal_ aclivilics or systems required by
users tor the analysis, entlancenmnl, or display of remote sensing data and its <onsolida-
lion with data fi-om other sourtes. These are tile activities and systems tha! convert
processed remote SCllSillg data--the output of the production and <lissom|nation svs-
tcnls--illtO inforlnation, tile [)rothlcl that is used by users and beneficiaries.
[3] 3. Each of tile above types of systems (prnduclion, dissenlinalion, analysis) may he
operated in one of thlcC inodcs:
a. Experimental, lot R&D, test, or demonstration purposes (I)cncli<:ial operational
uses may also be madc of data from such systems).
b. Operalional, tk)l lilt., provision of scvvices on a continuing basis ill accordance
with a slated plan.
c. Quasi-operational, tot the combined or simuhan0ous condUCl of experimenta-
l|on and provision of operational services.
4. The availability of Ihe data output of I'cmotc sensing pl-odu(tion syslelns IllaV t)c:
a. Open avccss, when all interested users are given access to the data on an e<luilable
and non-dis<Timinatory basis.
b. lJmited access, when access to the (|ala may be lilnited by the system <)pelator <m
a nalional ov proprietary basis.
141 CI tAIq'ER II - U.S. INVOI_VEMENT IN (:IVII.
REM()TE SENSING FROM SPACE
A. The Basic Policy Questions
I. In this chaptel; we adchess tile basic question of tilt" U.S. policy auitude toward a (¢m-
linuiug future U.S. involvement ill civil remote sensing tiom space. Policies and options
Cm Ihe conduct of civil remote sensing--to be discussed in succeeding chal)lt:rs--ale heav-
ily dependent on lilt" intentions of tilt" U.S. with regard Io a continuing future involv¢'-
IlIent, tilt' reasons ti_l Srtlt:h involvenlent, and expectations vt'galding benelils and olhcr
conseq ttctlles.
9. The fundam,,'nlal question is whether t LS. policy sh<mld I)v based on lilt" prt.misv that
the U.S. will conthme to lie actively involved ill civil remole smlsing t+om space, in some
mode and at a scale to be determined, tor the indetinite timtre. If the basic policy attitude
is thai there are expected to be significant benefits, advantagt's, and opportunities o1 value
to file U.S. [iom such inw_lwrment, then institutional and other policies should t)c divt'ct-
ed ill the best way of realizing these vahles, lf, as a second ahernative, the policy allillldt'
is that this is a le_'hnology of lulCeltain vahle to [_J.S. inlcrcsls that should vclnain indeli-
uitely in an experimenlal triode, policies should newwtheless slill be directed at achk'ving
lilt: Illaxin|lllll VaIIIcS t_}l" U.S. interesls tiom the continuing exl)tqinle,md program.
Finally, if the l)oli_y altitude is thai the expected values (io not just|t}' recognition of a Iong-
tctm (!.S. involvenlenl in civil ,emote sensing, then lhc implicalions I_)r all U.S. inlmcsls
should be squm-cly l,wcd.
3. '1"o allire at Itw al)l)vopriate polk-y altitude loward dvil remote svnsing at this lime
and the implicalions of the allmnadves, we will, in lhe ti)llowing sections, (a) rt'view Ihe
wide variety of U.S. intelests that may I)e sevve(t t)y civil remote sensing tr<ml sllacv, (I))
giw lilt" ('t)llsllhltlliS' vil.'ws oil the considerations l|lal should dell'im|he the !.LS. policy
altitude, (c) slate lilt" conclusions on U.S. policy atliludes reached by tile consuhanls, and
(d) indicale the consequences of these conclusions which will I)e discussed in lilt: t-emain-
dev _[ the rel)ovt.
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B. The ManitoId U.S. Inleresls ill Civil Remote Sensing
I. The U.S. interests that can be served by civil remote sensing tiom space are of many
difl_wenl kinds. We will group them trader lhe headings of technical, public, economic,
all(I illterll_itiotlal interests.
2. Technical Interests
a. Basic scientitic knowledl.le and understanding. Remote sensing fi-om space pro-
vides a means to learn at)Olll lhe earih on a global or regiomd basis, t,pdale such
intormation, and pr<:+,ide data tm+ basic research on various aspects and ti.'atmes
of the earlh. Current administration policy properly stresses the national iml)or-
lance of basic research. Remote sensing from space is a unique tool tot a wide
range of sciet_tific research interests.
lSI b. (;Iobal capacilies. Remote sensing from space has tmique capabilities to provide
inti_rmation needed t<_ deal <)n a global basis with national and international
problems, such as filod production, enerc,o' and mineral resources, waler avail-
abilily, and olhers, especially in relation Io dew'loping comnries.
c. ,";ul)porl Ibr U.S. decisionmaking. Remote sensing from space can provide infiw-
marion and dala useful tbr U.S. decisions, such as cnrrenl informalion on crop
production in m_lior agricuhural coumries.
d. "l'echltoloh,_: development. (',ontinuing R&D in remote sensing systems can pro-
vide a w'hicle [br achieving techn<llogical advanct's of significance in other fields
as well as m remote sensing.
3. Public Interests
a. Specific Federal needs and functions. Earth infi>rmati<ln derived by remote sens-
ing trotn space can make significant c<)ntril)uti<ms t() lhe needs and ttmctions of
Federal agencies and programs in many dift_'renl areas, such as weather, crops.
climate, geological rcs<_ttrces, topographic mapF, ing, land use, and environmen-
tal tomtit<wing. Signilicanl contributi(ms by remote sensing inlormati<m systems
haw' been demonslrated or are clearly foreseen in these and other fields.
b. l'ul)lic interest needs and 1)enelits. The broader public inlerests of tht" United
_lales, as disliilgilislied from specillc Feder_ll f)rograilimalic inieresis, are served
I)y inaking availatile earth information tiom space l_l Slales, Iocaliiies, universilies,
and Ihe puhlic ai large, in usable |<)rm al a reasonable cosl. Slale, regional, and
local aulhorilies and universities and oilier public inleresl grollpS Call ilse such
intTirnialion in a wiriety of public irileresl flirlclions, such as land use planning,
elivirolliileiilal ilionilorin_, denlographic siudies, iqc.
4. l_]COliOilliC hlleresls
a. Econolliic inleresls of U._. private sectoi- The availabilily of earih int_)i-maliOli
derived t)y l-elliOle seiising fionl space can I)e Ilsed io the overall econoinic advali-
la_e (it" Iht" [!niled Slales |)v privale enierprise in a varieiy of fields, oil and lliin-
eral e:'<ploralion lieilig lwo olilstanding exainples.
l). [I.S. colnpelitive position ill space technology. Wilh lhe enlergence in l';ur_ll)e
and Japan of slrong colnpelilive capabilities and interesls in space lectinology,
illchldillg relllole selising syslems, il is clearly ill ihe U.S. econolnic (as well its
political) inlerest to nlainlain a leadership posilion in civil remote sensing.
(;onlf)elilive areas inchide lhe manufacluring and servicing of satelliles, sensors,
and ground equipmeni; lhe dissemination of dalai and the provision of iechnical
services aiid assislance in Ihe analysis, ellhanceinent, lift and inlerprelalioil el
relllt)le sellsing dal;i. In each of lhese fields, U.S. in(hlsiry alld privale colll])allies
Call illl(lOill)led]v COlllpele sliccessliillv if lhe [I.S. ('_overlllllelll lnailllailiS ii itlli-
iilliiiill_ acliVl, iliVoivelllelil ill civil relilOle st'lisiilg.
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c. Reduce some U.S. infiJrnlation costs. Civil remote sensing systems in a routine
operational mode may result in redttced data collection costs for some [!.S. gov-
ernment, State and local, and private infi)rntation needs. Such possibilities can be
nmaningfully explored only if U.S. policy calls tot continuing active U.S. involve-
ment in civil remote sensing.
d. Contribute to general economic growth. The availability of civil remote sensing
data aim its appropriate use in resource planning and other fields can be expect-
ed to contribute to economic gr<:_,th, especially in the less developed countries,
which should have a positive eftk+ct on general economic growth.
e. Return on space investment. Civil remote sensing is an area in which there are
opportunities [or realizing tctttrllS, in the torm of economic and other kinds of
benefits, on tim very large national itlvcstlnent in space of the past two decades,
lot relatively very small additional investments.
U.S. International Interests
a. Support of U.S. toreign policy. U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing from
space can provide opportunities and a vehicle ]or the support of many U.S. tor-
eign policy objectives. The strong interest of many ti)reign countries in earth
information derived by remote sensing, combined with the current U.S. h'ader-
ship role in I)roviding such intormation aud related services, make this an area of
positive potential in U,S, toreign relations.
b, Maintain U.S, leadership. Civil remole sensing is an area in which the U.S. has
developed and demonstrated a benign technoh)g_' of obvious potential benel]t.
Active continuing U.S. involvement--exl)loiting a dramalic space capability clear-
ly developed by the U.S.--w<mld help ntaintain the fact and image of U.S. lead-
ership in space. Conversel+, if other nations take over leadership in this field, the
overall leadership position of the U.S. would be impaired.
c. Support U.S. position with I,l)C's. U.S. cMl t+emote sensing activities can provide
a c<mstrtlctive way to suppt)rl IF.S. commitments of technolog_ to assist less devel-
oped cotmlries. They can buttress the I_!.S. positi(m in Norlh/South dialogues, in
the U.N. and other lorums. For example, initiatives involving civil remote sensing
might provide a oc)nstrtlttive opp<_rttmity for U.S. leadership at the U.N. 1979
Conti_rence on Technolog)' tor 1)eveloping Countries.
Support international cooperation in space. U.S. commitments t<_service ti_reign
l+andsat gfOtllld stations, while contractually limited to support trolll U.S. experi-
Illental satellite systelllS, have resuhed in to,-eign investln(.qlts alld expectations
based <m the assuntption that U.S. l,andsat or other generally compatil)le satellite
data +++illcontinue to be available. It is genewdly in the U.S. interest to fullill rather
than disappoint these expectalions.
e. Promote openness. U.S. civil remote sensing policies and aclivities can bc used to
SUl_,port the general objective ()f treating <)pen information its an internati<mal
good, and contribute to the development ()t" international law to that end. They
can also continue to supl)()t-t the IJ.S. policy to preserve without limitation the
legitimacy o[" remote sensing tiom space, especially in the context of an active
U.S. ef[_)rl lo permit and help other countries share in the I)enet]ts.
f. (;eneral internalional cooperation. The developntent of international working
arrangements in the field of remote sensing from space can provide the U.S. with
useftfl opportunities to ellcOtllage inlerllatiotlal cooperative +.tll+allgelllellls I<)
deal with broader international c<mcerns. It also ofl;vrs opportunities to inllOV;ite
in bttilding international institutions to develop models <_f eft_'¢.live working bod-
ies l]lat also Illeet requirenwnts of participation and equity.
[71 d.
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C. TheGuidingConsiderations
I. The consultants believe that the considerations presented below should guide and do
in tact largely determine the basic policy altitude that should be taken toward a tonlinu-
ing U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing.
2. The Basis tor/Lssessment
a. The assessment of the wdue of the contributions of a continuing U.S. involvement
in civil remote sensing to each of tile 19 I.I.S. interests listed above is necessarily a
matter of judgment. Few cases at most are susceptible to quantitative or other pre-
cise analysis; even in such cases the assessments also depend on judgments regard-
ing objectives, criteria, and fiflure eventualities. An overall assessment of the
combined value of remole sensing to all 19 U.S. interests is all the more a lnaller
of.judgment, a.judgment thai must take account of the impact of continuing or
not continuing U.S. involvement ill civil remote sensing on each of Ihe dill;trent
U.S. interests idelltil]etl.
b. The final assessment would be simplified if there had aheady emerged a dramat-
ic single beneficial use of civil remote sensing which provided an overriding jus-
tilication tot an operational system that was clear to all conCerned (or if there
were a clear overriding reason fiw discontinuing U.S. civil remote sensing
[8] activities). (;iven the present siltmtion, howeven in which there is room for
disagreement on the wdues and henefiLs that can be achieved, it is inlportant to
recognize thai reniote sensing systems from space are generally muhipurpose in
nature; in [act, their utility arises in good measure from the wide variety of uses to
which the data and inlormation they provide may be put. The final assessment
has to take the whole range of prospective uses into ace<rant.
3. A i'ositivc +_ssessmcnt
a. Taking into accomlt the manilold U.S. interests and the variety of beneficial uses
Ihal can be served, the consultants believe that lhere is anlple.justification [or a
con_tinuing a<tive [!.S. involvement in civil remote sensing [rom space. The poten-
tial technical public interest, and economic and international benefits and oppor-
umities, while not provable or even fully definable in advance, now seem clearly
to .jusli|), the continuing federal investment and operating costs likely to be
required (see paragraph C-5-b. below).
b. In making this assessment, tile consultants recognize and have taken account of
the tact thai exaggerated claims have been made tot benefits of civil remote sens-
ing systems. It will take limeImany years_to begin to realize the full potential.
"()wwselling," especially with respect to how soon experimental demonstrations
can lno<luce definitive results, has frequently been the response to critical bud-
getary policies which threatened the extension of R&D progrmns while demand-
ing an early determination of the value of operational uses. Policy acceptance of
a continuing U.S. program would have the effect of removing such a threat It)
"survival" and encourage more realistic long-term planning.
c. The dilficuhies of tmambiguousjustilication must be noted. Estimates made to <late
_l the eCOllonlic benefiCs properly attributed to use of remote sensing have pro-
duced wide assessment variances. In part this is due to use of diffiuent baselines,
accounting diffi:rences, and the need to predict future user markets from a starting
posilion of a currently highly fragmented user commtmity. Other problcqns arise
fiom the Sul)position that some users may tend to disguise ,>r con<cal their own
authoritative benefit eslimates for commercial reasons. Finally, there is no agree<l
method for estimating the value of public services where remote sensing can pro-
vide new or improved responses to hitherto inadequate service availability.
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We consider that there are unique attributes of remote sensing systems, and that their
utility resides ill a complex mix of: (1) direct benelits presumably quantitiable by
conventional cost benefit analysis, and perhaps less direct heneliLs accruing [i-ore
an increased tax base resulting from new ventures prompted by the availability ot
remote sensing services and products: (2) general benetits tor [9] better decision
making hy intormed societies; (3) the payoffs to the public good by basic invest-
ments in information services; and (4) in some cases, by fimdamental structural
changes in economic and social weltare not capturable [sic] by conventional cost
benefit analysis (e.g., here a general equilibrium approach is relevant, vice the sim-
pler and much less encoinpassing cost henetit assessments).
We believe that there is both merit in and opportunities for additional analyses l)v
which the utilit); in lhe broadest sense, of remote serlsing systems can better bc
measured, particularly in the case (rf the latter three ta.ctors of the preceding para-
graph. For tire immediate |lttrtre, decisions to pursue remote sensing intlst ilr part
be founded on intuitively based social and political rationales. The current lack
of fully quantifiable utility assessments does not outweigh the preponderance of
evidence that remote sensing systems should be pursued.
4. (;onsequences of not c(mtinuing. The consultants have also considered the implica-
tions of ahernative U.S. policy attitudes, e.g., a decision not to continue indefinitely a U.S.
involvement in civil remote sensing or a decision to deli_r still longer tire making of a deci-
sion on a continuing ftllltrc U.S. involvement.
a. A decision not to continue wotrld mean loss of tire benefits and opportunities that
are the basis (>f'the favorable assessment given above. The corlsttltanls believe thai
the potential of many of these benetits is widely recognized both in the U.S. arr<t
abroad. Any U.S. policy implying or presaging U.S. withdrawal, now or in the
ftHtrre, from all active role in civil remote sensing from space would tmdoubted-
ly be met by the early deveh>pment of foreign systems designed to meet U.S. as
well as foreign needs. The consultants believe that such a loss of benefits, oppof
tunities, and U.S. leadership is unacceptable.
b. A decision to defer a decision would permit turther erosion of U.S. opportunities
and leadership and could lead to results like those cited immediately above, h
would also perpetuate the current unsatisfactory situation of general uncertainty
and generate ftnlher dissatisfaction in Congress and among State, local, private
and international users of remote sensing data fiom space. The consuhauts are
convinced that the time has conte to make a positive decision.
5. Some concerns ;tddressed. Two recurring concerns that have played a part in policy
consideration of the U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing need to be noted and dis-
cussed briefly:
[I 0] a. Reliance on a market test of value. In the determination ot the Executive Branch
policy toward U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing there has been a ten(Ichor
to,judge the value of possible operational uses in te,ms of the willingness of the
user to pay tot the establishment and operation of the system, and, theretilre, It)
defer a policy commimlent to continuity of data services until the users are will-
ing and able to commit themselves to providing the funds required.
The logic and appropriateness of this approach have been criticized on many
grounds. Thus, it has been pointed out that in the private sector individual ctrs-
tomers are trot expected to linance in advance the im'esttner_t costs t_ecessary to
produce a product or establish the capability for providing a service, h is also
pointed out that making data c(mlinuit 3, dependent op, demonstrated benefits
and user comntitments to operational use tends to place the program in a "(;arch
22" situation because of the lead times involved: the decision on data continuity
has to be f_rced betore the demonstrations needed tier at COmlnilmenl have he¢'n
compleled.
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Another criticism relates to tilt" tendency to regard tile principal R'deral user agencies
as the "market" for civil remote sensing and to judge the need for an operational
system based on their willingness to budge! tor the cost. As shown by our listing
of the many U.S. interests in civil remote sensing, the direct mission interests of
federal agencies represent only a fraction of the overall U.S. interest. No federal
agency has mission interests broad enough to represent !he total "market." In any
case, the tederal budget process is at best a very imperfect "market place"; to give
one example, federal agencies do not have the oplions for separate financing of
capital investment that are normally tollowed in the priva!e sector.
The consultants agree lha! users of civil remote sensing should pay a reasonable charge
for the data products they receive (transparencies, prints tapes, etc.), and would
expect such charges !o cover !he out-of pocket costs of producing them. The ques-
lion of ftuther recoupmen! of costs should receive flnther study; such stutly must,
Imwever, give full recognition !o !he pul)lic interest |)ellet]ts ()[ civil remote sensing
for which !here may he no! identifiable customers to charge and to the broader
national U.S. in!eres!s served by civil remote sensing thal are not the budgetary
resptmsibility of any federal department or agency. The hasic policy decision on
continuing U.S. involvement in remote sensing should 1)c made on an overall
national policy basis and not depend on user funding c(mmfitments or resolution
in advance ()f the compk'x (it,estions of user charges and cost recoupmen!.
[ I l ] b. Scale of funding and other commitments. The budgetary costs of a con!inuing
U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing are a mailer of legi!imate concern and
deserve carelhl consideration; an early priority should he given !o the develop-
men! _)1 (ost i)r_¢j(,ctions tot the principal programmatic options.
Curren! rough NASA projections (which require validali(m and refinement) suggest
!hat a c(mstruc!ive evolution of operational civil remote sensing data services,
including produc!ion and dissemination of data to primary users and analysis
centers, could I)e accommodated within a budget averaging somewhere in the
range of $150 to $300 million per year (FY 1979 dollars) over the next decade. In
additio,1, !here would I)e a need for strong continuing R&D and expe,'imental
applicali(ms e[li)r!s (where some savings might result tiom the availal)ility of Ol)er-
ational services) and some added user analysis costs required as federal agencies
h'arn !o take |nil operational advantage of remote sensing and to combine these
data with data trom their conventional sources.
(]()sts of this magni!ude, while considerable, do not constitute a major or "uncontrol-
lahle" budge! threat. Insofar as they go beyond R&D, they can be regarded con-
cel)tually as a necessary new element in the Nation's continuing overall
investmen! in space technology--an essential step for realizing benefits from this
investment that would otherwise be lost.
The imt)lications of an "operational commitment," in the sense of an assurance of
continuity of data services, may sometimes be exaggerated. On the space segment
side, the provision of contmnous data services would not, in principle, have 1o
represent a major expansion (wer a continuing R&D eftorc Reasonable data con-
tinuity has been maintained--in fact if not by policy--by R&D satellites since !he
launching ()f I,ANI)SAT-I; the additional costs required in the furore can I)e min-
imized by (arefid integration of R&D and operational planning. On the user side,
the necessary expenditures by each using agency can be decided on a case-by-case
has!s, since each use has its own timetable of operational need and readiness.
Policy decisions assuring data continuity and a continuing fitture U.S. involve-
men! in civil remote sensing should be backed up by the budgetary supp()r!
required, ttowever, the commitment level ti)r a continuing U.S. involvemen! and
the c(mmfitments ()f each federal user can t)e controlled th,ough the regular hud-
gt'! pr()(ess.
_99 ()P,M:RVIN(;TItEEAR'HIFR()M SPA( :E
It. Conclusions and Consequences
1. On the basis of the considerations discussed above, tile consultants' conclusions <m
tile basic question of U.S. policy attitude toward civil renlote sensing are as tillMws:
[ 12] a. U.S. policy should accept that the U.S. should and will lie actively involved in civil
remole sensing from space |kit* the indefinite tmure.
b. The Federal (;overnment should establish and nuppor! attirmative policies in !Is
continuing involvement in civil remote sensing ti-<nn space, directed at realizing
the potential beneths and taking advantage of the opportunities, both (hmu'stic
and international.
2. Six significant policy consequences the connuhants see as flowing [iom tile above con-
clusi<)ns <m the basic policy attitude are <)utlined bel(iw. The litst three are <tis<-usscd
brielly below; the last three require more extcnded discussion and are addresne<t in the
succeeding chapters of the report.
a. The need tilt' data continuity. Using interests require, in varying degrees, reasorl-
at)le asSlll-iltlces on the nalllle, tre(lllellcy, and ¢)[hel characteristics of ieill¢}le
sensing inlilrmmion that will be available and on the period of lime in the thture
tot which it will tit" available. As noted above, it has been unreasonable to expect
significant investment or other operational type commitments by using interests
in the a/thence of a clear expeclatitm t`m tlmir part thai the intbrn_ation or data
nee(Ic(l will he awulable for a perio(t that will just!t}' the commitments they have
to make. User lead times tot operational preparations, and remote sensing svs-
tents lead times for maintaining flow of(lata, dictate lhc necesnily <ffa brag-term
plan ti)r data and continuity.
The consultants have concluded that ( l ) wilhout a long-term (periodically up&u-
ed) plan tilt data continuity, U.S. remote sensing from space activities are not like-
ly to generate the user commitments needed to realize the potential benetits, and
(2) a policy co]nlnitlnent tO such a plan is an essential cornerstone of any con-
tinuing U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing. The planning of the technical
characteristics of the data to be provided should take accottll[ of the needs of
Federal, Stale, local, piiwue, and international users. The COllStlllants lit,lit.• thai ill
the nature of things there cannol be an absolute or permanen! commitment, and
that a policy comnlitlllelll Call always be rescinded in the event that a [llttlle zt`'l-{_-
|)ase l-eview shows that it in I1O longer warranled.
b. The need tot continuing R&D. It nntst be recognized that renlote sensing systems
are based on a very dynmnic technology and that new i_ossibililien tor data col-
lection and henelicial uses will continue to be discovered in the yearn ahead. This
makes it essential that and the collsttltallln conclude that:
[131 (1) Strong and imaginative programs of technological R&I) and experimental
applications nlnst continue 1o receive a high priorily.
(2) Remote sensing information systems should not I)ecome frozen 1o a pmticu-
lar lechnolog_,.
(3) At the slt]m" time, the strong [iiCtlS (in advancing technology' lllllnl It(ll t)e pcl-
milled m (>t)struct the tin{, of existing or lower technologies in operational sys-
Ictus when it is economically or technically advantageous to do so.
(4) A close coupling must be maintained between R&I) and operalMnal activities
in cemote sensiug intocmatton siwletns. Provisio_ s}u_¢tld be made ;_'het_cvcr
ti'anible lilt operational uses of remote sensing intbrmation produced by.
R&I) systems o," in experimental applications. Conversely, the use tot experi-
mental purposes of operational data and systems should tie encouraged when
operational uses will not be unacceptably downgraded,
EXI'I .()RI N( ; I IIE U N KN( )WN 9()_._
c. Ne¢'d !or a c<,nlpl+ehel+sive plan. (;iron acceptance olth¢ ' fact ofa conlinuing U.S.
involvenlent in civil reln<)te sen,ring, tilt' (onsullants con(htfle thal a high pIi<)ri -
ty should he given Io the devrlt+lmlent, approval, and periodic ill)dating of a COln-
pl+ehensive l)lan to guide [LS. (;overllnletH activities in civil relnole setlsitlg.
Prel)arati<m of an initial version of the compi++`qlensive l)lan sh<mhl bc tilt + first
order of Imsiness <mte there has been Ca) policy acceptat|ce of continuing U.S.
inv<dvenlvnl in civil remote st'nsing and (b) a leatl agency has hren dcsignalett
(st'<.' next scction). Ill the ('()llsllllalllS' view these lWlt actions can and liiilSl he
taken prior 1o Ihe developnmnt of an mitial oc, mpreht,nsive plan, t:,ecause a lnt+al'|-
ingful i)lan calmol lie dexelol)cd without a decision on the U.S.'s basic policy atti-
lu(le towal+d civil Iem<)le sensing, its pleviously tlisct|ssed, (>l withonl a lead agen(y
with the necessary authority and con|peteltC+`:, as will he discussed below anti in
(;hapler Ill. Essential characteristics of the comprehensive plan should include
lhe tolh:,ving:
( I ) Tht, plan should c<rver F,rogranunatic, tet:hnical, and procedural l.:,lans for tit+.'
collection anti dissenlination of civil remote sensing tlala and for providing
assistance anti other services to users. It should cover R&D and experimental
attivities as wt.ll as the l)rovision of services on an opt_rational basis.
(2) "fht+ plan should also (:over institutional plans for tile condtlCt and appr{>priate
evohlli<m of Federal activili+`'s relaled to civil remolt' sensing, inchtding pr<tvi-
si<m for el]i'ctive parlicilmli<m by all l>(leral agencies c<mcerned an(l oilier user
11+.I int¢'r{'sls (Slate, local, l>rivate, and international) in the decision process
<,n thr Irvhni(al antl other characlrrislics of lit<.+data services to Ix. provided.
(3) The phul lnust ht, ;is rt,alistic as possihle, bolh in technical expectations and
pr(!jrctrd schechtles.
(4) Thr plan sh<)ul(t reth'ct a I)hased appr(tach to tl.ttttre decisions alld conunit-
lilt'IllS, i.e., it shonld avoid l)redetcrlnit|hlg irlatters lhal (all he`' tell Ill fllttlrt,
de('isi(m anti sit(mid in(lica|(: as clearly as possihle the timil+g, extent, and
ilnl)licati(ms <)F lhr C(mlnlitnlenls re(it|ired.
d. Nred toi- designati<m ()t a lead a geIl(y. Acceptall(e of the p(di('y thal there will I:,e
at c<mtintting U.S. involv('tncnl in civil renlote sensing un(lcrs(ores lhc ingent
ne('(l--(me lhat has been evidenl for some tin+e--for the designation at the eal +-
lit'st p()ssible date <d a h'ad agency for I.:.S. civil renl(tte sensing activitirs. (;hal)tel +
III l)elow is (lev(>ted t(> a (lis(ttssi()n of the needs for a lead agency, the fruitlilts
it shonld perlornl, tlt+`+criteria and options for its selection, and the constthal_tS'
conrlusi(ms on the agen(y that should be designated. Chapter V it+(:Indes some
further distussi,m ()l l)t+oposed lead agency activities.
r+ The need Ioi + attention to inter|latiol|al ir|volvement. A t+ontinuing ftlttlrc U.,q.
involventenl in civil relnole sensing will clearly cellulite attenti(m to international
inlera(li<ms thai ill'+`+ (I) necessary becanse of the gh)bal nature of remote sens-
ing, existing U.S. international c<)mlnitinents, and actions that have I)een or nlay
tie taken b+x<)lher cotullries, the U.N., ESA, etc., or (9) desirable tot U.S. illterests
or li)l +general inlel+national interests as seen by the U.S. Ahernalb.'es lor interna-
tional institutional arlallgelllelltS are discussed in Chaplet +IX,:.+fit+`+proposed c(m-
cept [or a l.!.S, nail<real syslenl t)resented in Chapter V provides for interlnttional
ilIVOIV(:III(:lll lln(ler sc',,'el'al scenarios.
1. 'I'll,.' need toY a U.S. systenl concept. Finally, there is a need to develo l) a vial)h:
c(mcel)tual franlcwork for the continUillg future involvement of tit+.+U.S. in civil
relm _le SCllSing. (3ntl)ter V |)reSelllS it pr()pose(l cont:ept of a t !.S. nat it)hal svsl¢'ln
that is consislenl wilh thr l)olic, c<m<lusi<ms of the l)receding " chapters, discusses
some l>,di(y issues inv<dvr(l, and outlines alternative scenarios tor intl)lenlcnlin g
Sllch a SVSIt'III.
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Document 11-31
Document title: Zbigniew Brzezinski, The White House, Presidential Directive/NSC-54,
"Civil Operational Remote Sensing," November 16, 1979.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
l_IT_en the Nixon administration _ Bureau O] the Budget agreed to finance an experimental multi-
ageno, Earth resources observation program in 1970, it was on the condition that such a _ystem
wouM have to prove its f[fi'ctivene._s hefore any rvmmitment to an rrpontional progTam. In 1978 and
1979, the Carter administration _wnmissioned studie._ to detmmine what ._houM he done with the
Landsat pro_wam. The,first study (Document 11-30) concluded that the fi, deral government shouM
move to an operational system rTtn tO' ,'_S;4. The _econd study, howev_, Jbcused on the Jeasibility q
turning control q[ the Landsat system over to pt4vate indushy. It was this second _tudy that carried
more weight in the delilmrations leading to lYesidential Directive/NSC- 54. This dmTtment outline_ the
Novemher 1979 decision by,President Jimmy Carter to name the Dqmrtment of Commerce _ National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) the lead a[genO',[or the Land_at program. Also,
NOAA wouM he responsible /br exploring ways to increase private-sector involvement.
Noveml)er 16, 1979
I)residemial l)irectivc/NSC-54
TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Interior
The Secretary of Agrictdture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of Energy,
The I)irectoL Oflice of Management and Budget
The Assistant to the Presiden! ti)v Domcslic Aftairs and Policy
The Administrator, Agency ti)r International 1)eveh)pmew!
The 1)irectov; Arms Control and 1)isarmament Agency
The (;hairman, Joint ( :hiel:s of Stall
The Director of (:entral Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator, Environmental Proleclion Agency
The I)ireclor, Oftice of Science and 'lk-chnolo_' l'olicv
The Director, National Science F()undalion
SUB.IECT: Civil Operational Remote Sensing
The President has approved the civil space policy discussed below. The policy ampli-
ties thai established in PD/NS(:-37--National Space Policy aud PD/NSC-42_:ivil and
Furlher National Space Policy....
Jill the original, there was still a "blacked-out" classified area of the document in this position]
2. I,AND t'RO(;RAMS. The National ()(eanic and Atmost)heric Advninislralicm
(N(),+L&) ()f the l)epartmcrtl of Comnwrce is assigned Ihe management resp<)tlsibility tor
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civiloperalionalland remote sensing activities in addition to its ongoillg atmospheric and
oceanic responsibilities. Initially, the operational land rcmolc sensing sysl(.m from space
will be based on I,_NDSAT techHologG. Commerce's inilial responsil)ilitv--in coordina-
tion with other appropriate agencies_will he to develop a lime-phased transition plan
covering: (1) a Program Board (discussed below); (2) organization for management and
regulation; (_) system finaucing including pricing policies tbr the users['l sharing of
costs; (4) technical programs: (5) eslablishmenl of privale and inlcrnafional partieipa-
lion; (6) identification of facilities (including the EROS data center), hardware, and per-
sonnel that should he Iransli'rred; and (7) identificalion of actions such as executive
orders and legislation required. Conunerce will submit to OMB a preliminary implemen-
lali_n plan by Decemt)er 15, 1979, covering any required Fat' 1981 I)tLclgel a(!itlstmen ts and
a tinal Iransitinn plan by.June 1, 1980.
3. Federal Management Mechanism. Commerce will est,tt)lish and chair a Program
Board tot continuing ti_-(teral coordination and regulation with representatives from Ihe
inwflved tk'deral organization (e.g., Defense, Interior, Agricuhtnc, Transportation,
Energy, Stale, NASA, CIA, All), EPA, and Executive Office t_t the President).
()rganizatk_ns such as the National Governors' Association and Nati¢_nal Conference of
Stale l,cgislalnrcs will bc asked to participate as necessary. The t_,o,trd will tbrward rec-
ommcndalions on unresolved policy issues to the Policy Review Connnitte(' (Space) tbr
consi(leralic)n an(I atlion.
h. Private Sector Involvement. Our goal is the eventual operation by the private sec-
tor of our civil land I'Clnole scnsing activities. Comnlerce will budget tbr frothor work in
F_' 1981 Io seek ways 1o enhance private seclor oppovlmfiti('s (e.g.,.i,,int ventnre wilh
illclustry, a qtmsi-government COrl)Oralion, leasing etc:.). Commerce will be the cc',nlacl t()l"
i)riwlte industry on this inallt!r and with the Program Board will _|ll_l]yZ(" a]l_ r proposals
received prior to submilting policy issues to the Policy Review (:ommille(, (Spat(') fi)r con-
sitlcralit_n and action.
c. International Participation. The United Sl;t.l('s will g('ncr;dly stq)porl non-
discriminatory direcl rcadoul Io tbreign ground stations to eonlinu(' our l)resenl policy
and lu tn_widc dala Io ti_reign users under specified conditions. Pricing policies musl I)e
developed thai are consistent lot toreign and domestic users. We will promote develop-
mcnl of complementary nationally operated satellite systems so as to limit US program
costs, but protecf against unwarranted technolog T transfer:
3. WEATtlER PRO(;RAMS. Deti'nse and Commerce will maintain and coordinate dual
polar orhiting meteorological programs. We will continue l)rocnrelnenl of current salel-
lilt" syslt'ms with Defense and Commerce each operating separate salellites to meet the dil:
ti'ring needs of the military and civil sectors. When any new polar orbiting satellites are
.justified they will I)ejointly dewqoped and procured by Defense, Commerce and NASA to
nmximize technolog T sharing and to minimize cost. An appropriate coordination mecha-
nism will be eslablished to assure effective cooperation and to prevent duplication.
4. OCEAN PROGRAMS. lf a decision is made to develop oceanographic satellites, joint
l)el_,nse/(:ommerce/NASA dewqopment, acquisition and management will be pursued.
A (:Olnlnillee will be eslablished, with the above representation expanded to include
Slate, (:IA, alltl NSF. The Comnfiuee will forward recommendations on policy issues to
th(" P_dicy Review Comnfittee (Space) for consideration and action.
Zhigniew Bvzezinski
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Document11-32
Document title: David S. Johnson, Chairman, Satellite Task Force, Planning for a Civil
Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite System: A Discussion of lssues and Options (Rockville,
MD: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
June 20, 1980), pp. 1-16.
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Rockville, Maryland.
E_'lablished t_' Presidential l)erision l)irective (1_I)1)) 42, a_t ip_teragrenO' task fince chmL_ed with _tttc(_'-
ing option,_ -]or privatizing all or part Of the nation i_ remote-_ensing ,_3"stem_ concluded that _uch
action wa_ prematu_v, but thai more p_'ivale-_eclor involvement was appm/n4ate. (;mt,seque_ttl_', in
Novemher 1979 Ibe_idential l)irective 54 de(_eed that NOAA temporarily manage the l+andsat _l'_-
tern while also ,_tud_in[_ ways to increase private-sector int,olvement. The resulting_ study wa_ relea._ed
in June 1980, but il,_ recomnwndations wetv swepl a_ide as the ]¢t'a_,r_ttl admini_tratitm tittered _ffh'e
with its own alzenda fin Lal_dsat. What/bllow_ iF the executive _ummat), o/I/tat ,study.
Planning for a Civil Operational
Land Remote Sensing Satellite System:
A Discussion of Issues and Options
June 20, 1980
Smellite Task Force
David S. Johnsol;, (:lulirlnatl
Ill EXE(;UTIVE SUMMARY
This (Ioctnnt!nl discusses tilt' issues aud oplions relating to a zmli_mal civil operational
land iemotc sensiug satellite system i)ursumll Io Ilic" Plcsidtllt's decision Io assign to tilt"
National ()ccanic and AtnlosI)]lcl'ic Administration of lilt" l)el)artmcnt of (]Omlnt'rce lhe
i|l,m.tgt'nlt'nt rt'sl_onsibility [br civil o])eralional land rcmott' sensing satellite aclivitics.'
This (Iocumtqu, prt'pmcd by Ihtr (]olnrnt_rct" l)t'partnltmt ((;ommerce), in coordination
with other intelt'stcd agencies,: discuss¢'s tilt" issues inw)lvcd in iml)ltrlncnling an opt,ra-
tional land rtqnott' sensing syslcln from space, initially based on l+andsat technolog), with
the goal of ¢wentual plivatt' scClOl + owntwshit_ and opcralion of tilt" syslctn. Sorer' policy
and ttwhnical oplions related to inq)ltqnt+nling an OpClati<mal system artP contained in Ibis
doclunent, but decisions on these <q)tions will, tbr the nlosl part, awail the
Adtninistration's FY 1982 l_udget rt'vicw and sut)sequenl actions.
A land renzott" sensing sattqlite sysl_'tn plovid¢+s intbl-tnatiol+ about the condition of
tilt" Earth's surface by a [)l-OCt'ss of st_using iildiatiot_ [ioln ol_jects on tilt" Earlh. The sys-
lclll list's SCllS()l'S located on saltqlitcs which lrilnsinil the _l+tt.t to ground ltw_'ix'illg M_ttions
I. Th,,+ Whirl' I louse' Ih t.ss Rclcas¢' _1 No,.cmb,,'_ 20, 197!1, mmotm¢ ing fl_i_, d_'_ isio_ is alq)¢mdt.,:l _+ fl_is
_[lllllllilI"_ ;IS mlt_lchlll(,lll A,
2. The Nati_mal At'r_+mtulics ;+tnrl %l)at t ' Admit+ist_ation, the l)t'l)m tmcnts <_I Ag]it tdluzt., lit+,' ]ntt']i_m
l(lll'Ig'_,, _I;ll( +, am:l l)<qt'nst', the Agt'llt'+ [bt h+It't natiotml l)t+,,(.h>lm_¢,_it, lh(' Enxiz_mmtqxtal lh_,tc< lion A_(+n(x.
and tltt" l)i_ectot ot(]t,txlial [ntt'llig('nc('.
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fiw processing into usable data products. The cmTent systvm is largely an experin_ental
pr<+gt+anl called [+andsat managed by tilt' National Aer(mautics and Space Adnfit!istratiml
(NASA). Intbrn+ation from the sySleln has proven o1 value to a variety of public and pri-
vate sector users in the United Slates allt] abroad tot helping to make decisions related t<,
such areas as agricultural crop fi>recasting, rangeland and lores< management, mineral
and petroleum expl<_Fation, mapping, urban and regional hm<l use planning, water qual-
ily assesslllent all<.] disaster ;1ssessnlelll.
[21 Background
The issuance of the President's decision regarding civil operational remote seusiug
tiom space cuhninaled a two-year Administration review of the nation's space policy.
During this period, the Policy Review Committee (Spacc) was established and national
policy on space programs was claritied. In May 1978, the l'residenl announced that tilt,
United Stales will enc<mrage domestic conunercial exploitation <ff space capabilities
trader appropriate U+S. authorization and supervision. Flu<her, in Octt)ber 1978, the
President made a connnitmertt to ccmtinue the availability of data [tonl the Iandsat pro-
gram fiw all classes of users, in his March 27, 1979, Science aud "I>chnolo_' Message, Ihe
President reiterated his Administralion+s commitment to the continuity of land remotc
sensing satellite data over the coming decade. Subseqtwnlly, l)r. Frank Press, the
President's Science Advisor, in Administration testim<my |)e[ole thc Senate Stfl+connniltee
on SCiellce, Technolog T, and Space on April 9, 1979, stated that +'the Adntinistralion is
('c0111111]lled to an operati<mal remote sensing system, ahhtmgh yet /redefined."
From October 1978, thrcmgh the summer of 1979, Exeeutive P,ranch agencies exam-
ined the potential tot integrating II.S. civil remote sensing satellite programs and tor pri-
vale sector involvemenl in U.S. civil space activities+ They recommended tllat all U.S. civil
operational remote sensing programs be managed hy a single ag(H1Cy. The agencies also
reported thai tit<.! privaI<" seclor would he interested itl ,tsstmling more responsibility tbr
land renlOle sensing liotn spacc if' Federal policy and markvl uncvrlaintics were chuilied.
Its N<_vcmbet + 197t.), tit<+ President provided the tramcw<wk within which a civil opera-
tioll;-l] I:llld renlole scnsing satellite systcm should be illlplelllt'lllt'd, alld assigll.t'd tit) the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in Ccmunet'ce the manage-
ment responsibility tor civil operational land remote sensing activities in addition to its
ongoing atmospheric and oceanic responsil)ilities. N()AA's related ongoing responsibili-
ties include managing the national civil operational meteor<dogical satellite program and
the (]ommerce l)eparmwnt's responsibilities for a joint operational demonstration hy tilt +
l)epartment of Defense (Dol)), NASA and Commerce of a Nati<mal Oceanic Satellite
System (NOSS).
{3] The Executive Branch's review o[ remote sensirlg satellite programs and policies ,,,,'as
paralleled by a series <ff Congressional hearings during tile 96th Congress on operational
land remote sensing ti'om sl)ace, including hearings betore tile House Sttbcotmnittee <m
Space Science and Applicati(ms of tile (]ommittee on Science and +Ik,chnolo_' and the
Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technolog W and Space of tile (_onnnitlee on
(]ommerce, Science and Transportation. Two bills before the 96th Congress fl)cused on
operational land remote sensing: S. 663, introduced by Senator Adlai E. SteverJson, which
proposed lilt' estahlishmem of an Earth Data and Int_rmation Service in NASA, and
S. 875, inlrt_duced hy Senator Harrison Schtnitt, which proposed the creation of a
Iot-protil Earth Resonrces hdbrmalion Corporation.
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±Lssunlptions
This <tocument was developed in accoMance with tile fbllowing assumptions, which
reflect the policies, established in the President's decision oil civil operational remote
sensing and previous space policy pronouncements, anti the prerequisites to their
achievement:
• The Federal gow_rnment will ensure continuity of data during the 1980s;
• A national civil operational land remote sensing satellite system should ensure conti-
nuity of data and the appropriate reliability and timeliness of standard data products;
• User requirements, projected levels of demand and the cost of meeting these require-
mcnts shotfld deternfine the design of the operational system;
• The Administration's goal is eventual private sector ownership and opcration of the
operational system, which includes the assumption of financial risk, as well as opera-
lional control by the private operator;
• Prices tor land remote sensing satellite products sh<_uld I_ set at levels that ensure
tnaximum recovery' of system costs consistent with tile public good;
• The practicc of the widest practical dissemination of l.andsat data on a puhlic nondis-
criminatory basis will be continued tbr the data and standard data products tiom the
Interim and Fully Operational Systems in accordance with prevailing U.S. national
policies;
{41 • Eventual private sector ownership anti operation of the U.S. program will be con-
ducted under Federal government regulation, consistent with U.S. policies and interna-
tional obligations;
• Tile civil operational land remote sensing satellite program is a national program
responsive to Federal interests and U.S. user requirements. Due regard will be given
to toreign user interests and to foreign participation in the U.S. program;
• N(X_ will manage the operational system until a new instiluli_mal framework is
established.
The Present Landsat System
The existing Landsat system consists of one satellite, I,andsat 3, launched in 1978,
which covers the Earth once every 18 days and transmits sensed data fi-om an on-board
muhi-spectral scanner (MSS) and two return beam vidicon (RBV) cameras back to Earth,
either directly to U.S. or foreign ground stations or indirectly from an on-board tape
recorder which stores data until the satellite is within range of a U.S. ground station.
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center controls the satellite and performs thc initial pre-
processing of the data transmined to (;odtlard from U.S. ground stations via domcstic
communications satellite (DOMSAT).
At the Department of the Interior's EROS Data Center in Sioux Falls, South Dakota,
the (;oddard preprocessed high density digital tapes are archived and further processed
into standard data products (either computer compatible tapes or photographic images)
for dissemination to <lomestic and foreign users at the cost of processing the order and
reproduction. Similar preprocessing, processing, archiving and disscmination functions
are perfbrmed by the nine foreign ground stations that now receive data direct from
[.andsat 3.
Two additional satellites, l.andsat D and D', currently are under construction, with
I,andsat D tentatively planned for launch in 1982. The l,andsat D series of satellites is
designed to carry a new sensor, the Thematic Mapper (TM), which will provide 30m
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resoluti(m _ for the first time, as well as tile MSS, and to use the Tracking and Data Relay
[5] Satellite System (TI)RSS) for relay of data direct li-()m l,andsat to a single U.S. gro|md
station at White Sands, New Mexico. To provide continuiff with data fiom previous
landsats, the muhispectral scanner (MSS), which provides 80m resolution, will continue
It) be deployed on l,andsat D anti D'. Direct readout of senso| data to toreign gr(mnd sta-
tions will be continued.
Because of difficuhies in developing the TM and the associated ground data process-
ing system, NASA is considering launching Landsat D withtmt TM in 1982, to be lollowed
by l,a|)dsat D' with TM later. _ Ct|rrtmt estimates fi)r the operational preprocessing of
Landsat I) anti D' data at (;odtlard a|e 200 MSS scenes per day I)eginnitlg no earlier than
1983 and up to 5(1 TM scenes pe| day when the TM system becomes operational possibly
no earlier than 1985.
The Interim and Fully Operati(mal Systems
A flllly operational hind remote sensing system that meets optimal perlbrmance stan-
dards can be i|nplemented at the earliest in 1989, given best estin)ates of the state of the
art advances ill sensors and the tinre required for Federal contracting procedures if they
are used. Until that time, extension of the l,andsat D system can ensure that, atter 1983,
the commitment to contimtity of data during the decade of the 1980s is met.
From a technical standpoint, tire fi_llowing performance standards have been identi-
tied as applicable to at high quality operational system:
• Sensors designed to generate data meeting a broad range of use| |equiren|ents at a
reasonable price;
* A_ssnred continuity of satellite c_werage without break, with one backup satellite in
orbit at all tin|es anti another on the ground;
• (.)5% confidence that, averaged over a two-day period, all data will I)e processed and
made availahle tiom the ground station within 48 hours (_f receipt; and
• Ability to identil}, anti process certain data nut of o|der to meet r|rgent user needs.
16] ttowevel, the extcnt to which these compabilities [sic] are purst|ed will depe||d upon
their tull capital and operating costs and tim demonstrated existence of an adequate pri-
vate and Federal market to justify such costs.
While sensors specifically designed to generate data meeting a broad scope of user
requirements cannot be provided until the late 1980s, the l,andsat D sensors can be used
as the basis for an interim system which will help to ensure contimfity of data during the
1980s and meet many user needs.
The Administration is currently reviewing the Landsat D system to see where improve-
ments may be required to e|tsure data continuity during the 1980s. For instance, tire cur-
rent l.andsat system includes ])o satellites after Landsat D'. Anticipated gaps in spacecraft
coverage of several years between about 1986 and the initiation of a fi|lly operational sys-
tem may have to be filled hy the construction of one or more satellites or by the reftn--
bishment of Landsat 1). in addition, changes in the Landsat D ground segment may be
required to minimize the risk of losing some data or having an excessively long delay in
processing some data. The Landsat 1) system, with any foliow_m satellites and ground sy_
ten| improvements, has heen designated the "Interim Operational Systent."
The earliest possible date by which all four performance standards for a high quality
operational system could be met is 1989, when the R&D necessary for the new solid state,
::;, The term "resolution," as used it'J Ihis d<)cument, rel_.q-s to th(" intslantant'cms +fold o+ view (IF()V).
4. The Adminislralitm is als<) considvring oth('l" allcrnalivcs such as delaying Ihl.. launch ol I .;m<lsat D
unlil 1983 when the TM sensor will f>_" V('adV.
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multilinear array sensors should have I)een completed, and the sensors will have been tS.b-
ricated, tested, arid incorporated into either an existiilg multi-mission modular spacecraft
(MMS) or a new spacecraft. The I,andsat D system so modified is designated the "Fully
Operational Systeln."
A decision on whell to illll)lelllellt Ill(! Fully ()peralional Systelll ieqtlires Cal'eflll
examination of the Federal goveFnlUelH'S priorities, needed f]nan(ial assistance, private
sector willingness [o invest in and take over the systelll, Ilse[- (lelnallds during the interim
systeln and the potential risk of foreign satellite syslems obtaitfing a l)orlioll of the dolne_
tic and fiweign land lt!lnote sellSfllg Inarket.
Management Arrangemellts for the Interim Operational Systenl
(;eftain changes in manageme.I reSlmnsit)ility will take place as t]lc Interim
()peratiol*al System is itnplemented. Although the exact dates tot transferring manageri-
al responsibility to N()AA ave sttbject to changes in NASA's schedule lot l,andsat 1), N(),&&
plans to assume the following responsibilities from NASA and Interior on the following
schedule:
17] • NOAA will asstillle responsibility flOlll NASA ill FY l _il'{:{ it)l" l]le (Ollllllali(t and (Oli-
trol of the systeni and will t)egin prt)viding MSS data ()n an operational basis afler the stlc-
(t:sslii[ launch alld check-out of [,andsat D and the MSS grt)und system and after NASA
has demonsirate<t that the systenl is operati(nlal. N()AA will assume responsibility for TM
data when that poltiOll of the system reaches an initial operational h'vel of peil()rmailce:
• N()_ will assulile responsil)ility t]'oin NASA and the ER()S Data (]entl'r in []"
1983-84 fi)r Ill(' generation mid disseinhialion of data and slaiidard data t)l'Oducis.
A_sslllllillg it is cost-effective, a llt!w taciliiy Woilld t)(' coqocaled with the l.andsai 1) pfe-
processing facility at (;oddard and would be the sole sales ouliel in Ihe lluited Stales
of data and slandard data producls from the hileriin Operalional System; and
• N(),.t.\ will take title it) the Lalldsat archival lnalerial at Goddard itll(l the EROS l)ala
(]enter ill FY 1984 alld will be respollsible t_>l arclrival alld disselliillatioll ftlllCliolis t_,l-
the Interim Operational Systenl.
During the interim operational phase based on the [_andsat D series of satellites,
N()AA will matlag,(' the system in coordiliatiotl with an int0ragency Assistant Secretary
level Pfoglalli Boal-d. lit addhion, the Secfetaiy of (]Ollllllerce will eslablisll a 1,and
Re((lOre Sensing Satellite Advisory (]oiilnlittec with repres(!nlalives (if slate and local gov-
einilielltS, other donieslic iloil-Fe(teral liSefs, and inieresled doniestic privale se(lOl-
gioUl)S. _'iihiu N()iL/k, a now major line (OlllpOllelll, (lit" National Eaiih Salellile Service,
has been proposed to have managerial responsibility tot the civil operational land remote
sensing satellite program.
User Re(luirelnents [or the Fully Operational Systeln
User fequireiliellts should deternihie the design of the fully operational land rcinole
seusing satellite sysleln. A survey of governnltqllal add l)iival(' users indicates a wide raii_,_.,
of possible reqlliieilien{s, depending on die iype of applicaihm bl'ilig considered, which
couldjusiit}, ditt{_ring types of satellite syslelliS.
"['o assisl N()i_4l or an eveiitual private owner to devch)l/a responsive of)('ralional sys-
lelll, a prelinlhlary survey of possible user iequireillents was iliade. This survey indicaled,
lSl t_lr exalt(tilt', l|lal ageiicit's thai ale iillcresled [Jfiiilaiily ill I-eilewal)le resoiuce appli-
cations such as agficuhural crop assesSlliOlll walil t]equenl observalitlns, delivery of dala
within 414 houls in cerlaiu cirCUllislances, sl)e(iral I)alidS lhal discriininaie l)eiweeii various
types of vegetatioll aild r('sohitiOil higher Iliall thai provided by Ilie cilrreiit l.alldSal svs-
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tern. Slate and local governments, requiring dala Ibr land use managemCml and protect-
ing environmental quality, rcqu¢'st higher rvsolulhm over tu-han and stdmrban areas and
lime-series analyses to dele<:l detailed clmnges. The U.S. mineral extraction and r<_qated
industri¢.s call ft. stcrt'os(opic:' capabilities, glot)al coverage, thirty to torly trleler resolu-
lion and proc¢.ssing ofclala within a f_+w weeks. Foreign users[ '] interests app('ar to be sim-
ilar to those of their U.S. counterparts, ahhough area coverage requests ohviously differ.
Furlh¢'r analysis ;rod sorting of these requiremenls with respect to resolulion, spectral
bands, stereo coverage, frequency of observation and limeliness of product delivery will
be m'cessary as plans are developed for lhe operational syslem.
PertOrmance ()[)thms fi)r the Fully ()pcrational System
t Iypolh¢'lical system l)eribrmance ol)li¢ms have been identified to illeet some or most
of the l)reliminary user requiwments idemilied above. These options range from design-
ing _t sysk,m wilh capal)ililies similar to the l.andsat 3 with MSS only, at an estimated I 0-yvar
cosl of $1 hillion, to huilding a new system which meets mosl of [he currently slated user
requirement.s, inclmli_vg two meter resolution, at an estimawd lO-y(mr maximum cost of
Sill hillion? Stereo coverage can he provided at an additional cost of up Io $700 million.
A thml decision on the syslt'WJ design to be pursued tot the Fully ()l)erational System
(ml be re'ached only after fm'lher analysis of user requirements, tedmical options, cosl
comparisons, system linancin_, and the efl_xl of potential t_)reign compefiliml.
l:ll Reven tws, Pricing Policies and Financial Assistance
Reliahlv l)mjt.ctions of r¢'vent.'s li.m sales of standard data products, and from tilt'
direct re('ellli¢m l(+es I<) he paid by foreign grouml station operators cannot he made at
this lilnc since the ch;ir;veleristics <ff the hllerim and the Fully OlleralionaI Systems. tit( +
users' level of dcma]+d at various prices, the impact of a market expa,sbn program and
the impact <.qlbreign compcliti<m are no! bow knt;,wn. Tentative F,rqjectitms indic'ale thal
this system may not and i)r<d:,ahl+'+ will not be selfthmming before the' end of the century.
Th<.'rt'f<_rc, cut.it'reed Federal fitmncial c<mtrilmlions to sllpport <_t"the system liktqy will
b¢. ]wc¢.ssarv for the foreseeahl¢' ftlture.
System revetmes, g_'nt'r;tled I:,y the sale of+standard data prodlvclS, and fi)rcign _r<mnd
staliOlV _4('('css lPes, vl(p,,'4 itlIlOllIll to ()lily $(i million +a year. + (+IVITeIII f('es ('olvsist <)l';i llotlv-
inal $201),00l) ac(ess li:c lor toreign ground stations and cost of repn)dtuli(m charges for
standm<l data i)rodwcts--$200 tier a computer compatible tape and belwet'n $8 and $50
lot various lyfn's of I,andsat imagcs. The projected costs ot +the Fully Operational System
ranl4e hom $100 to $400 million a year. +I+oachieve the ohjectives lot the sharing of costs
hy users, and 10r tlw ¢',+vnlual owvwrshi[) and operation l)y tile private s_'ct<.; l)rices must
he in<Teased to cover, over time, tilt" capital and operating costs of tile system and the data
and data products treated in a proprietary manner.
The system's manager could charge three types of fees ti+r data and standard data
im_<h.Is:
5. 3.s uscd in this _untt'xt, st<'rt'i)SCoF, h mcaus two or nmre images, lakuu It_>ttl di|It'tenl an<gl¢,s, I_+ pet-
rail ilflewm c _d Ilw tclati'a + hciqht (If'x.',tlil)llS t¢,l)o_ral+hic ti'alurcs,
6. All _ ¢_nlnale iu F'Y ID80 ¢h_llm s.
7. All tew+ntws m<" in I:Y 1980 d.llars,
K This tigute in(Imh's $2.7 milli,>u fr<m+ salt's, $1.8 millkm tiom ti)rcign gmtmd st;trim1 access tees
and $t .3 million atllibuh'd t_ the vahw ut lhc data dislrilmlt'd wilhl>lll charge to I:cdt.ral agt'ncv u+,ern.
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• Basic Fee. A ti'e l)aid by each user on each standard data product it purchases tiom
tile U.S. system operator. These R'es would vary in proportion to the costs incurred in
producing that product. They would be paid by users of both real-time and retro-
spective data. Other t_tctors such as timeliness, tile placing of special orders and spe-
cial handling could be reflected in a surcharge schedule.
[ 10] • Royalty Fee. A fee paid by each U.S. and ti)reign user and toreign gromld station
operator on the reproduction or resale of l,andsat standard data products.
• Direct Reception Fee. One or more ti'es paid by toreign ground station operators
receiving data direcdy from U.S. land remote sensing satellites. Examples of such fees
are: ( ] ) an mmual access fee like the $200,000 fee per station per yeal currently being
paid by I+andsat station operators, and (2) a transmission ti_e paid by toreign ground
station operators ti)r data transmitted to and received by the fi)reign ground stations.
This latter fi:e would be based on the amount of data requested.
Upon the completion of pricing studies, a proposed pricing schedule will he devel-
oped based on these types c,f fees, and possibly others, fin consideration by the Program
Board and the l,and Remote Sensing Satellite Advisory (:ommittee.
Since a sttbstanlial shorttall is projected between annual revenues and the estimaled
anntlal costs of running an operational system of hetween $100 and $400 million per year,
Federal tinancial assistance likely will be required. In lhis event, the Federal government
could provide various types of capital and operating assistance to a private or government
c_rporafion, whichever institutional option is eventually chosen. Such Federal capital
assistance could include grants, equity gtlaranlees, and Federal loan and loan guar:mtees.
Federal ,_pefafing assistance could include Federal support of research and development,
I)urchase guarantees, appropriations, fi'ee serviccs and tax incentives.
Whether lot tile Interim or Fully Operational System, three possible options lot
Federal agencies to share in the costs of financing the operalional land femole sensing
system are under consideration:
• NOAA could budget tbr all "core ''_' and special sy.slelll (;()SIS;
• NOAA could budget tiw "core" system costs an<l user agencies would budget fiw
special system capabilities; _''
[ 11 ] • User agencies could fund individually a predetermined portion of all "core" and
special system costs.
A decision on the preti.q+red tinancing option will weigh, on dm one hand, the bene-
tits of having a mechanism that torces agencies to make mtde-oflls belween land remote
sensing data and other sources and, <>n the other han<l, the advantages of ti_cusing rest)on-
sihility tot the program and budgeting in one agency.
Institutional Approaches to Eventual Private Sector Ownership and ()peration
I. Institutional Ahernatives
Several institutional options exist for achieving the goal of eventual ownership and
operation by the private sector of ore civil land remote sensing satellite activities. The [imr
l)rilwipa] institutional options discussed in the docmnen! are:
_). "I'ht' "tOl-t"" _;y:.;tt'ln lilt ]lld+.'s lilt- spilt t' illld _,IOlllld SCglll('ll[ ('If'lilt'IllS llt'(e_-,Sitl Y Ill I11('_'[ lilt" ('OllllllOll
needs o| the majority of users.
I0. Slwtial _;yslt+lll t apabililit's mchlde SlClCOScopic (t)'¢C'l;igt'.
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(1) A privau" corl)<n+atitm (or cons<ntitnn) selected competitively to own and operate
all <>r part of tilt+ civil <>l)erati<mal land remote sensing satellite system and to sell
data to Federal agency users under a guaranteed purchase contract;
(2) A tin-protit privme corporation, authorized by Federal legislation, with lnivate
equity and privately and publicly appointed Board members;
(3) A wholly-owned governmen! corporatiou authorized by Federal legislation, with
(;oVelCllmt'nl equity, reporling to the Secretary of (;ommerce, with provision ]or
sllbseqtletl! lransli+rlnatioll to a private stock corporation as syslem revelltles
warranl; and
(4) Federal agency ownership with private contractor operation, and provision tin
su]r)setlUelll II'allst_H" to a private sector owucr sis sygleln revenues Walranl.
()plions I and 2 ot+hq the earliest possibilities of private sector ownership and assmnl.'+-
ti<m of risk. Options 3 and 4 delay iml)lementation of private sector ownership unlil the
next decade.
[ 12J These opti(ms will be examined t)y the Administration oww the next sew'rat nt<)nths
It) evaluale which ahernative besl st'ryes Ihe Federal, state anti hwal g<)vernment att(I pri-
vate sector itnerests in having an <Jperational land remote sensing satellite program.
2. Establishnwnt of Federal Policy to Encourage Private Sector Investment
Several policies impact the likelilmod or willinguess of the private sectt)r Io own the
operalional system. For exsunple, under present policy, a system owner has no ownership
rights in the l,andsat data and slandard data products. Without a change in this policy, a
private owner w<mld be denied the <+pportunity for prolitabilily; therefine the Federal
g¢_vernmcnt would have to autl._rize the privale sector to own and sell civil operati<mal
land remote sensing satellilc data and standard data products on terms that eventually
permil a reas<mat)le return on investment. Other tactors that affect private sector invest-
ulelll are competition tiom ongoing Federally fimded R&D land remote sensing satellite
systems and the dttration of the Federal government's financial contmitmenl 1_ the land
remote sensing satellite program. (]onversely, a private system owner should be required
to abide by the government policy of widest practical dissemination of data and standard
data l)roducts on a public nondiscriminatory basis at prices that are consistent ti>r domes-
lit" and tiweign users.
3. Regulation of Private Sector Operation
A private owner of the land remote sensing satellite system could enjoy a monopoly.
"1_ pr<_tecl the national interest, the priwlte owner's activities should be regulated to the
extent necessary to c<mtiwut to national space and other domestic and toreign policy
objectives. ,+%private or gOVelnlnen| entity owning the operational systent should be
required, ]iw example, to con|ply with international treaties such as the ()Ulel" Space
Treaty ti)t the conduct of peaceful activities in outer space; continue the widesl practical
dissemination of data and standard data products on a public nondiscriminat<wy basis;
me¢'t the needs of [!.S. g<>vernment users; and refrain fi'om misuse of insider knowledge
obtained front lhe land remote sensing satellite data.
Market Expansion
The sys|elU manager should undertake a market expansion pr<+gram to increase rev-
enttes, reduce required Federal [13] tinancial assistance, and enhance decision-making
thr<mgh the ttse of land remote sensing satellite data. An important element of this pro-
gram is assuring ctmtinuily ot land remote sensing data.
A lltarkel expansi<m program tbr the operational systenl can build on the types o1
training and techn<Jlogy Iranst_.'r activities now being conducted by NASA and lit<.'
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I)epartnwnt of the Interior. N()AA could arrange fi>r reimbursable training prc_gramn,
enter into joint applications demonstration pr_jects with risers in all sectors, encourage
univernity land remote sensing inntructional programs and work with domentic and inler-
national asnintalR+e agencies to promote ilew opporttlnities fOl+American I)llsiness in tile
land remote sensing satellite field. As part of its ongoing R&D responnibility, NASA could
continue lo develop and denlonnlrale to usern Hew techniques and tec|mologies t0r uning
land reniole nensing satellite data.
International Anpectn
Tile United States shotdd continue to encourage internati<mal participation in tilt'
U.S. civil opera||<real land remote sensing satellite program by fttrther developing an
international community of data users and by continuing discussions with prospective for-
eign land satellite s),stt'm operators Io exph)re the prospects for encouraging comple-
liic'ntar)/and compatibility among future operational land satellite syntelnn.
The United Staten nhould CllStlle that tiara fiom tilt" Interim and Fully Operational
Systems are made available Io foreign risers tllrotlg[l hales of ntandard (lira productn Oil a
iiondincrinlinatorv ]):isis. N(L_, working clonely with the I)epartllRqlt of State and olhcF
interested agencies, nhould take the following actions:
• (;onnider fi)reign user requiretnents in planning the Fully Operational System:
• (]oncltltle agreementn with those foreign agencien wishing to receive data directly
from the Interim and Fully Operational Systems:
• Eslablisil pricing policien for data sales and direct reception ti'en that ale {'ollnislenl
fi}r domestic and foreign ttnern; and
[141 • (]ontinue tile Landsat (;round Station ()perations Working (;roup an a forum for
the exchange of technical inlormation.
The land reniote sensing natellite sySlelllS being developed by other countrien olfiq-
the ])ros|)cct of ])otil competition and cooperation wilh the I I.S. Tile colnl)elitive clml-
lenge t() [J.S. tecimologies lea(lershi]) in likely to OC('IIF ill nuch areas ;is Ihe development
of mull|linear array sensor technology, and sales of ground equipment, services and data
tirodtlctn. N(),,L\, working cloned with the Department of State and other interested agen-
cien, nhould encourage thc expansion of world-wide marketn fi)r U.S. eqtfipment, servicen
and dat;t products, and pursue prospects lot complelnentary with foreign slttellite opera-
lots in order It) dew:lop conq)lemenlary system characteristics (e.g., orbits, (7overage pat-
terns and repeat cycles) and compatible system outputn (e.g., standard data |)rOd|lit
tklrmals).
Legishttion tot the ()perational Svnlem
I.egal authority ill tour principal arean may be required in order to implement a civil
operali(mal land remote nensing satellite nystem:
1. Authorization lot N():U\ to develop, own and manage the civil operational land
relliote sensing satellite syntelll until tiR_ responsibility is lrannferred to a |)rivale
O1" olhel elllitv:
2. Estal)listmwni ot+lhe institutional nlructttrt,, financial assistance and trannilion to
l)rivate sector <_wnernhil_ and operation <)t tilt" U.S. civil land remote senning slitel-
life syst elll:
3. Establishlnent of a regulatory nyslem I() ells|ire that a l)rivate ne(lOl- ()wllel"S act|v-
itien are in compliance witil U.S. laws, policien and internalional ()bligationn; and
4. Fstablishnlent of proprietary inttwests in operational land remote hens|rig data
and standarcl data prochwts.
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S[lllllllal'yOf Issues
The fif_llowing is a mmunary of the issues tllat have to tit' addressed as lilt" Federal gov-
Cllllllenl illOVt.S loward all o])erali_Hl_l] lall(] renlot<`" sensillg sate]]ilc systen:l:
[15] I. (_<mlinuityofl)atain the 1980s
Operations
• Whether to fund, c¢mslruct and launch adtliti<mal l+andsat l) series salellites
with tal)e lec(Hdels [() provide continuity in the acquisiti¢m of data fr<ml
space until a Fully Operational System can be depl<lye<,l?
• Whether to hnprove tit<,' existing l+andsat D grottn<,t segm<,'nt at Ill<,' (;,oddard
Space Flight Center to provide continuous processing of the acquire<,l dam
into timely and reliable standard data products?
• _:hether |<:+llansl_,'r tesponsibility for command arid control of the I+anclsal
D space and ground segments front NASA to N()AA?
• Whcth<,q to transl_w responsibility fk>r archiving an<,t disseminating land
rem<_te sensing salt'lille stan<,iar<,l data pio<,hicts tiom the Del)arlmettt of the
ltilerior Io N()AA, and wheth<,'r to co-local<,' these functi<ms wilh lit<,' satcllite
command and C<mlrol and prepr<lcessing t,tcilities at the (;oddard Space
Flighl (k'nter?
b. Mallageinenl
• When to submil to (;<regress an Administration bill that authorizes NC)AA to
own arid manage an operational land remote smtsing salellite system unlil
that system is transferred to another entily?
2. Initiation of a Fully Operational System
• I [<e,v to validate us<,'r t('tluir<,'nmnls and their priorilies?
• When to establish a Fully ()peratiotlal System ulilizing new sensors (hal lllt'('l at
broad rang<`+ of ust'r nt'<`+ds, p
I I(_] 3. Pricing Poli<,ies and Financial Assistance
tlow to establish initial price increases fi)r direct reception and tor data and stan-
dar<,l daia producLs flint are consistent for foreign and domestic users, provide ade-
<luat<, ' advance notice of price increases, and encourage potential users to im,est in
SUl_l_<n't cquilmmnt and re<,luce use of conlpeting meth<)ds of data collection?
When to imphement price increas<,+s?
How to ftmd the capital and operating costs of the Inte,'im and Fttlly Operati<mal
Systents lhat ex<,;eed reventtes?
4. Instiluti<)n tor Privale Sector Inw)lvement
• _iVhai, if any, institttlional tiamew<,)rk for private sector ownership sholtld l)esub-
inili_'d Io (]ollgiess_
• +ii'ttai mt!chanisnis till regulating and providing Fed<`:ral tlnancial assistance t<t the
privale seclor sttoul(I I)e provided ill ally bill autllorizillg an inslituiional frail(e-
work tot private sector iitvolvenlent7
• li4(lial policies sholild coillrol lhe aclivities of any private seclor owiier [_)1 owIter-
sliip of tiara an<,l standard <,lala pl+<iducls, |_)i conditioning their diss<,'niiilali<ln on
ltle paylnenl <1t appropriate [i, es, li)r nlakiitg pos+ibh" the ilsers' sharing of syslent
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COSTS beyond tile costs of reproduction, and lor requiring consistent pricing and
ensuring nondiscriminatory availability of standard dam products.
5. Market Expansion
• 'rqmt market expansion should be atnhorized for the Federal system manager?
6, International +'kspec ts
• How io encourage lhe growth of worldwide markets for 1LS.-produced equip-
ment, services and land remote sensing satellite data and standard data products?
Document 11-33
Document tide: Ed Harper, Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum to Craig
Fuller/Martin Anderson, "Resolution of Issues Related to Private Sector Transfer of Civil
Land Observing Satellite Activities," July 13, 1981.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
77,e neTv Reagan administration, eager to reduce tbe ffderal budget and to transJer as many govern
ment ]i_nctions as possible to the pr4vate sectm; quicM_ r_ersed the k O' elements oJ President Carter's
approach to creating an operationaI J_amework Jot remote sensing and _ought to _vmmerrialize the
progvam as won as possible. In response, Comsat pro/rased that the government transfer the operation
of both weather satellites and remote-sensing satellites to the p_Jvate sector, arguing that the profits
from selling weather imagery, bark to the government _vuM be used to finance the long-term commet_
eial dtnpel@ment O])emote wnsing. The Bqfite House.Jormed a Cabinet Council workinLr ffrou p to con-
sider this propodtion.
July 13, 1981
MEM()IL,XNDUM T(): (:raig Fuller Martin Anderson
FROM.: Ed Harper
St!BJE(TF: Resolution of Issues Related to Private Sector Trans|_'r <)t (;ivil
I,and Observing Satellite Activities
The purpose of this memo is to request that a working group within Ihe (;abinet
Council system be established to consider the ti)llowing two issues related to private sec-
tor transfer of civil land observing satellite activities:
- What is the best mechanism to implement the ctnrent policy of transl_q of civil
land remote sensing systems (I_.XNDSXI') to the priw_tc sector as soon as possible?
- Should tilt" Administvatioll consider simtthaneously private sector transl('r of both
civil weather and land remote sensing systems?
Background
With the revisions to the 1982 Budget the Administration explicitly stated its intention
to hand-off operational responsibilities for land remote sensing to the priwite sector in the
mid-1980's or sooner, if possible. This policy retlected the judgment that the Fcdcral
investments in the IANDSAT program contained in the revised budget were sullicient to
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evaluateheusefulnessof this data and that, if the operational uses were significant, tile
private sector would provide follow-on satellites--there would he no need for the Federal
Government to purchase additional satellites beyond the two new NASA budgeted satel-
lites (i.e., LANDSAT D and D l). Thus, the Administration withdrew the Carter commit-
ment to data continuity through the end of the decade and decided that additional
satellites beyond the two new NASA satellites would depend on the private sector's will-
ingness to invest in and operate follow-on satellites. We are not asking the Cabinet Council
to revisit this policy.
The Department of Commerce (N()AA) is currently developing draft legislation
designed to facilitate private sector transfer of land observing satellite activities, This leg-
islation needs to be consistent with tile policy decisi<ms on the issues being referred to the
Cabinet Council.
A potential private sector owner/operator has requested that the Administration con-
sider transfierring simultaneously both the civil weather and land remote sensing satellite
,systems t(> the private sector, and that selection of a private sector proposal or combina-
tion of proposals be based on the merits of the total package.
What is the best mechanism Io implement the current policy of private sector trans-
fer, as soon as possible? The options available to the Administration seem to be the
following:
Laissez-faire approach--continue NOAA operation ot satellites consistent with cur-
rent policy and do nothing to encourage or discourage independent private sector
I n III kit ires .
A decision to consider transferring tile current (;overnmenl inventory of civil remote
sensing satellites and ground equipment to a private corporation or consortium of
private corporations in return fi)r cash and/or fulme considerations.
A decision to Drovi(le some fi)rm of subsidy or long-term data contract (details to be
specified consistent with budget of user agencies) in order to facilitate private sector
transter.
A combination of the two previous options.
A decision to establish a federally chartered for-protit private corporation to own and
operate a civil, land remote sensing satellite system--along the lines envisioned in the
Schmitt Bill introduced in the previous Congress.
Should the Administrati(m simttltaneously consider private sector transfer of t)oth
civil weather anti land remote sensing systems?
Transfer of the civil weather satellite program to the priw_te sector would place more
emphasis on the private sector and market forces in determining the level and scope
of these satellite activities. However, the assertion that such a transfer could reduce
the Federal budget and increase the Federal tax base without incurring significant
additional Federal risks has not yet been validated.
The Administration probably will no! I)e al)le to determine if such a private sector
transt;er can be achieved on terms accel)table I_o the (;overnment until proposals are
received and evah,ate(l.
?)(}_ ( )P,SERVIN (; TI I I( [_]ARTI I FR( )M ,_I'A.( :I,_
• The sub-issues thltt will ))0ed serious revi(-w and consideratio)_ includ(':
What type of Federal (onmfitnlent, if rely, would be appropriate for purchase ofeither
weather and/or land satellite data? To what cxlenl should the Federal (;()vernmenl
continue related techn()logD' development (e.g., R&D on advanced sensors)?
What type elrelationship should exist between tile (;overnment and any potential pri-
Vitte _ecl()l OWilCi'/opei'ttlOF?
What Federal assets lind data rig_hts should the (;overnment ctmsider lransti:rring t()
the private sector?
Assumplions
hi light of the t_e('d for [iscal restraint, an increase in the Federal commimlellt to land
remote seHsing from space should be considered only t() the extent that user agetwics
are willing to make tradct)ffs against previottsly approved activities f()r 1(.)83 and
beyond in order to fi_cilitate an expanded Federal commitment.
Since there are other options ft)r reducing tile Federal expenditures for needed
weather satellite data (e.g., combining civil/military p()lar-()rbiting satellites, reducing
the tlulnt)er of civil weather satellites in orbit, and placing wcalher sells()rs on com-
mercial conmlurticalioi_s satellites), il should be asstuned that the 1t.)87,-86 budget
pro.jections for civil weather satellites may I)e revised downward.
The agencies affected include:
Area At]i_c! ed
l)('parlllleiH of (_<)I)I/IlCI'CC N()AA opera/loll <)f w¢'iilhi'r itnd land s;it('llilc
SVSICIIIS,
Department ()f Agricuhttre Agriculture tbrccasling based on wemhcr a,l(I
land sale[lile data.
Dep;utnlellt of Del'ensc l);lla fi'on), civil weather satellites (in addition
i0 ([iltll fi'Olll military weather satellites).
Depili-llllenl ()l" [lllet-iof (;et)logical, mineral and land managenlcnt
activities list" laild satellite dalai.
l)epltrllnelit of Slitle h)ternational agreelnc)Hs on sate]file i'cl)1ole
sensing.
Centrld IntelliFynce Agency National sectirity.
Nati/)nalAerona/iticsand R&D using satellite data and Ilew sensor
Space Administritti()n develt)ptl_ent fi)r weather and land satellites.
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Document 11-34
Document title: Government Technical Review Panel, "Report of the Government
Technical Review Panel on Industry Responses on Commercialization of the Civil Remote
Sensing Systems," November 10, 1982, pp. 1-25.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
147Jih"the ICeagan administration wa.s quite intent on DanL_ferritlg control 0[ the nation is civilia_
Earth observation _atellites to p_fvate industr% implementin K this poli()" wa_ a ._rmidable task.
Membe+:_ o] Co_gres,_ mi,_ed a number _?[oOeetions , particularly to the ,sugge_tion qlselling off weath-
_+ satellites, as well as the l+amlsat Lsystem. Private industry, the supposed bem:firimLv +?]this propos-
al, was b<_._than enthusiastic, a,_ evidenced I_' this report _!+fthe (;over_+ment Technical Review Panel
e_tablished to revmv variou,_ oplion._ lot e,_tablishing a new remote-_ensing polio,. This report is based
on cmporate r:,_po_/_ to a Department :_] ('ommoce request/or it!/brmation concerning the tran,_/r,r
q/ remote-,_en_inLr .satellites to pP4vate industo,. Re,spondenl,s were placed into _mr categories based on
their det,n'ee o/,support ]or the co_cept o/the privatization t?] _vmote sen,sinff.
Report of the Government Technical Review Panel
on Industry Responses on Commercialization of
the Civil Remote Sensing Systems...
November lO, 1982 . . .
[ I ] 1. ()VERVIEW
The" l)ancl convi'ncd +)n 26 Ocl<_t)er and reviewed tourlccn rcsponst's to the Request
for Inti)rm_liiotl [RFil tlmt apl_Caw'd in the (]ommerc¢' l+,tlsim'ss I)+fily (CBD) on
St'i)lt'mbt,r 11), 1982. N¢J atlt'mpt was ma¢lc to solicit additional infilrmation or claritica-
til)ll |]'()ill it'sl)_)lldtqlts.
The resl)onst+s varied in sco|)c ati(I sophistication Ii+<)m a handwritlcn postcard to a
I_firly compvt,hcnsive, all in('lusivc submission. ('riteria tbr twahmtion (otdd nt)t, thcretorc,
t)t" apl)lied unil6rmly t(> all l)rOl)<+sals. I h_wt'ver, thc following general crilcria were ttst-(l,
as al)pli(al)h':
( 1) R(,sponsivencss to It'(feral nee(Is;
(2) (:<mtinuiiy of (tat;+. services;
(3) Feasibility.; and
(4) Nalioli;tl security nnd filreign policy conch'ms.
I_CSll_liiscs w('l+c gl+Olll)l'd illiO t'ollr (4) n_litlral citlt'gorics iclll'clive <)f ihi+ir hasic
Ihrusl:
( l ) 'l'hlisl" t.+.vorillg nt.;+.i-lt-rrll conlll+.clci_tliztltioil t)t existing civil lt-nlolc st_ilsillg capa-
hililies, t'nlirely or in part.
(2) l'hosc t'SpOllSirig independent t+ntrcprenet+.rial interests alld advocating a c]ilnatc
c<)ndiiciw' 1o Iicl" nlltlk¢'l conipi+lilion.
(3) "l'h<)sc [{+.voring government icl(+nlioll ofthe existing system, at least for the iinlilC-
di_ilc ftiliirl'.
(4) ()lher.
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[2] II. SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS
It could t_airly be stated that a simple evaluation of responses Io the RFI would tidtill tile
charter of this panel and that fiulher connnent is gratuitous. Nonetheless, our study of this
issue and the responses produced a consensus which we would be remiss not to surface.
Insofar as the responses are positive toward the isst_e of commercialization, they tend
Io assert rather than demonstrate an ability io satist}' whatever criteria we might establish.
Nonetheless, the panel harbors signilicant doubt as to whether all U.S. government inter-
ests could be satisfactorily protected if the approach is simply to substitute one inonopo-
listic organization for another. Perhaps, it will take an RFP [Request fi_r Proposals] to
answer tile toughest questions.
The RFI elicited more interest than nfighl have heen expected and surfaced a strong
body of opinion that urges restraint and caution in proceeding with commercialization.
There is an underlying theme common to the submissions l?om several large, responsihle,
and knowledgeable entities that commercialization now could inhibit the free markel
process. They sugges! continued government operation of the system while toste/ing an
environment conducive to an expansion of flee enterprise activities.
One of the collcerns which permeated our discussions of a noll-government monop-
oly environment, was tile potential lack of vigor ill the R&D effort and lack of incentive t()
adopt improvements which may materialize. This has t)een the case in the satellite com-
munications tield. It is our belief that the best answer to the emerging |oreign competi-
tion lies in the continuation of a dynamic U.S. govermnent R&I) system.
It is also the belief of the panel that there is considerable financial, policy and pro-
gram risk to the government in commercializing weather satellites and that lhere is no
clear policy or tinancial benefit to be realized. Too, there is no clear consensus among the
respondents as to the desirability or feasihility of commercializing at_ of our civil remote
sensing systems at this lime.
13] Additionally, crealion of a single, governnlent-charlered, suhsidized firm toe this pur-
pose would seem anlitlletical to the tm(lerlying economic phih)sophy of tile Uniled Stales
and, in particular, this Administration, as we understand it. If regulate(l, it would resuh in
the creation of a "utility" without the competitive incentives for reducing operating costs
or increasing efliciency. If unregulated, the chartered entity would tend to assume the
characteristics of a legislated monopoly.
Finally the f<_ll()wing general nalional security concerns exisl in commercialization of
remote sensing from space even though not specifically addressed in the individual eval-
uations:
(1) There is some [)otetHial tbr military and intelligence al)plication of cttrrcn._t data
pro(hwts, and
(2) with possible system improvemen! llll(]er private seclor ('()Ifl.l'()l |ties(' COllc('rllS
would increase.
(3) There are technolo_,_' transfer issues which might t)e exacerbated ira private sec-
for operator bccallle the world wi(te SUl)plier of remote sensing equipment and
spares.
(4) Controls over data dissemination, and provision tor DOll emergency use would
require very carefid stipulation in any transfer of civil remote sensing activities.
(4] II1. EVALUATION OF TIlE RESPONSES
1. CATEGORY ONE - Those t_tvoring neaHerm ('ommer(ialization of existing (ivil
remote sensing capabilities, enlirely or in part.
COMSAT, Environmental Satellite Data, Inc., and Control Data Corporation are will-
ing to proceed now in assuming at least parl of tilt" existing land and/or weather satellile
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systems. (:OMSAT proposes m lake over both systems in their entirely. Control Data
Corporalion proposes a phased take-over of the I,andsal ground processing and distribu-
lion system, while Envirmnnenlal Satellite Data, Inc. suggests operating specific segments
of the (;()ES ground system. All hough l he magnitude of lhe private sector lake-over varies
suhslantially among these firms, sufficienl delails were provided to F,ermi! an evalualion
under all Ibm general crileria. A t_.)tlrth respondent, Ih<" American Science and
Technology (:orporation, proposes to take over the command anti control of the Landsat
satellites. However, the lhrust of this response focuses on new entrepreneurial interests
and is lheretore reported under(;ategory 2.
A. (knnmunications Salellile (:orporation, Comsat (;eneral Corporation (COMSAT)
(;()MSAT has suhmitted the only proposal advocating total commercializalion of
civil remote sensing. Additionally, COMSAT emphasizes a "concern fi_r urgency" in such
a Iransti'r. While COMSAT presenls the most detailed proposal (due [o the magnitude of
lhe IrallS[(,_'l), it reilerales ils earlier position of requiring both Ihe civil weather and land
remote sensing salellites to insure tulure commercial viability.
( l ) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:
The (]OMSAT concepl involves private sector purchase of the curren! assets
in the governmenl's land and civil weather systems. These wottht h,e enhance(l in
Ihe futtne by incorporaling additional sensors upon idenlification [5] of Ihe spe-
cilic user needs. The federal government would pay most of ,he incremenlal
(()sls. For examt)le, COMSAT suggests adding sensors Hint woul<l collect oceanic
data on water color, winds, ice, and wave conditions.
Ii is not clean Ihal l.andsat's coarse (80 meter) nmhispectral scanner data,
which are used extensively ti)t nmking agricultural _lssesslnenls, wollld he includ-
ed as part ()t" lhe basic dam colh, ction package that COMSAT suggests for tile I)OSl -
1.andsal 1)' era ol lhe late 1980's. However, if this need is idenlified as a
<onlintning tk'deral user re<luircnlent COMSAT would provide this capal)ility, at
additional cosl, if it were Hot part of the projected array of imagery collection
capahilities. "Fhus, from the viewpoint of system technical capat>ilities, this con-
cop1 would be more than fully responsive to the current and future level of fed-
eral user requirements with reference to timeliness, extent and tiequency of
coverage, imagery characteristics and data formats, and timeliness.
However, dw proposal would not appear to meet another critical user
requirement--assurance of data availability at reasonable cost. The COMSAT
concept would require federal data purchases at an anmml level of about
$315-330 million per year. For the government to meet this amount, it appears
lhal there will have to t)e eilher a substantial increase in the cosl of hind an<l/or
wealher data or there will he substantial direct subsidy payments to COMSAT.
Anofller t_.ctor flint is less significant than either of the two preceding factors is
the nlaller of proprietary rights. The COMSAT concept also calls for the system
owner/operator to have cop}Tight and proprietary rights over the dam/hat are col-
lecle<l. Such rights, while desirable fiom the viewpoint of helping make the syslem
sell'financing, have the disadvantage of inhibiting the use of the collected data.
[61 (2) Continuity of Service:
hnplemcntalion of the COMSAT concept would appear to satisfy the nmjor
consideration of maintaining continuity of data flow. However, the concepl does
atlord lhe systeln operatt)r a loophole for (a) restricted liability only if lhe "l)esl
etforts" are not ma<h', and (h) also for pertormance being conlingenl upon the fed-
eral government meeting extensive financial commitments for a 15 year period.
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Sh<)uld changes occur in tile international price structtLre which adversely
ef|c'ct prolitability, i.e., undercutting of U.S. conmmrcial data prices by a foreign
con_petitor, a conunercial operator might elect to abandon the enterprise, or use
the "best eftbrt" principle Io demand increased federal price subsidies.
(3) Feasibility
This proposal would replace existing weather ground systems, which need
technical improvement, and would use current I,andsat tacilities and equipment.
In addition, a centralized facility is proposed tot both land and environmental
data based on I.andsat-type hardware. (:entralization is technically valid, but does
not exploit what is currently known about the advantage of distrilmted processing
architecture, insotar as service to users is concerned[,] i.e., throughput, availabil-
it}', and accessibility of data. The proposed technolog 3, to be employed on
COMSAT's IANDS'I_\R, the successor to I_A.NI)SAT, inchldes linear array focal
planes and on-board data compression capal)ility. These are needed improve-
merits if high rt'solulion solid-state sensors are adopted. Not mentioned, I)ut w_'r_r
much tleetlcd <m any toIlow-on sensor, is the additi<m of cooled total planes [or
short-wave and thermal infiared data, and a capability of off nadir poinling tbr
more tietluetlt coverage of the same scene. The addition of synthetic al)ermre
radar sensors for data set merging is very appealing as is the integration of weath-
er and land remote sensing systems ti)l 17] more eMcient programming of data
acquisition and low-orbit collection of environmental data. C()MSiVF recognizes
lhat guaranteed progress in techm_logical advances and maintenance of U.S.
technological leadership can only be realized if governmen! retains an atlive role
in advanced lechnolog 3, development, either ahme or in some joint role with tim
operator of the systems.
(4) National Securily and Foreign Policy Concerns:
The (;OMSAT f)roposal is based on a "hest etli)rl" principle which does not
commit the (',orl)oration to provide continuous services over the liti'timc of Ihc
contract. A disruption of land remote sensing and weather services could have
sut)slantial toreign policy implications in lerms of traditional U.S. international
data exchange policies which emphasize c<mlinuity and nondiscriminati<m.
(_OMSAT states its intenti<ms It) broaden the primary data market by limiting
secondary reproduction and distril)ution of data. This could uhimately.jeopar-
dize tilt" continuous and reciprocal international exchange _t meteorological
data ttpotl which this cotmtry is vitally dependent.
If a national emergency required disruption of commercial service in Melsats
and/or 1.andsals, the governmetlt would have to reimburse the commercial opt'r-
ator tot lost revenues. This would entail an additional government t'Xl)ense not
incurred under govermnent ownership and would constitute an additional c_ml-
plicating tactor in making national security and toreign policy decisions.
(:OMSAT l)roposes t¢> sell "surplus" DCS (data collection system) capaciLv to
commercial users which could t)e used tor non-environmental purl)oses.
However, by agreement in tilt' International Telecommunications Union (ITU),
D(_S frequencies are to be used exclusively lot environmental monitoring.
No contractual or legislative stipulation should preclude the govermm,nt
tiom developing its own salellite systems for national security lmrposes.
18] B. Environnlcntal Satellite Data, Inc. (ESD)
ESD does not address I.andsat <)r the overall weather satellite system. Instead tilt'
company offers Io aSSllllle responsibility for a small segmenl of the GOES data processing
whih" tocusing on the distribution of (;()ES imagery to commercial users. The proposal
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would terminate tile currenl (;()ES-TAP "no-cosl" service and replace it with a larger,
more etficienl syslem requiring a commercial user conlractual ice. This concept could he
implemenled under existing policies and regulations.
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:
Wilhin the limited scope of tills proposal ESI) appears m salist}' federal needs
all(l [o })e responsive 1o increasing illllllhefs of ilsers.
(2) Continuity of Service:
Phased imph'menlation should assure conii,mity of service.
(3) Feasihilitv:
This proposal contains no technical detail, but it does asserl that the Visihle
and Infrared St)in-Scan Radiometer earth locating program can I>e improw'<t to
ihe point thai one pixel location accuracy of lhe grid on the satellite imagery can
he ohtained within nix hours after completion of maneuver of the salellile, vice 10
pixels and 24 hours. Since larger and faster computers than those currenl]y used
are availahle, this should be readily achievable, tlowcve_; no conclusions on capa-
biliLv are I)ossil)le without specifics on c<>mpuwrs and data management.
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:
ESI) proposes to distribute only a small part of the total (;()ES weather satel-
lite imagery. So long as any government agreement with ESD includes provision
Ior equal, non-discriminatory access to data, no toreign policy issues arc raised.
No natiotml security pI+<)blenls exist.
19l C. Control l)ata (;orporation, CDC
CI)C proposes a lime-phased, joint government/induslry venlure hcginning with
ground processing of l,andsat data I>y 1<.184. This would lead Io economic validation of a
iransilion fi-om a sut>sidized, goverilment service operation Io a produci-1)ased, prot]l
making venlurc. The fieasit)ilily of transfer of the space segmen[ for Yemole land sensing
would lie evahmled during Ihe transition. Weather data could he included in such a
ground data processing system.
(1) Responsiw'ness to Federal Needs:
(:D(Ts.joint venture concept could he designed to meet specitic t_.'<leral needs
throughoul the transition lo private ownership and operation.
(2) Conlintntv of Service:
Nol specifically addresse<l, but preceding comments are apl)li<able.
(3) Fcasibitilv:
Cl)(;'s slated experience with data processing and analysis and will> I)OD
space systems would attrihute to CDC a technical credibility sufficient to warrant
serious consideration of their suggestions on commercialization. However, no
derails of a technical nature were provided. CDC's concepi represents a conserv-
ative, low teclmical risk approach to eventual commercialization. CDC, ahmg widl
COMSAT and Terra-Mar, explicitly recognizes the greatly improved information
exlraction potential in merged or "fused" data seis from <lifl_-rent paris of lhe
electrolnagnelic st)ectrtinl. C1)(: recognizes Ihal leclinological l)rogress can only
I)e aSsllred if ihe _overilllleiil maintains all aciive role in advanced iechnohlg T
deveiol)ineill, eilher alone or in soniejohll role whh lhe opei-alor of Ihe syslenis,
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The data provided on concepts fi)r user services facilities illustrates at least a basic
understanding of how such facilities should function in data processing, archiv-
ing, and distribution. The highly buffered system concept presented represents
state-of-the-art thinking on high-rate, high-throughput, timclional requirenmnts.
[10] (4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:
CDC's concept does not pose a foreign policy concern if ttle suggested user
service scheme sat[sties [)resent policies on data access and distrilmti<m, and if)
discriminatory inicing system is not imposed. Howevm, the response tiails to
address these issues. No national security concerns are raised.
[ 11 ] 2. CATEGORY TWO - Those espousing independent entrepreneurial interesls and
adw)cating a climate conducive to free market competition.
Three tirms--Terra-Mar, American Science and Technology ('orporation and _)ace
Services, Inc.--advocate a free enterprise environment which permits a natural evolution
and competitive deveh)pinent of the private sector remote sensing industry. Their premise
is that successful commercialization will occur only in a competitive market where gov-
ermnent regulations and guarantees are held to a minimum. System development would
be driven by market forces and user requirements rather than tectmological capabilities.
While Terra-Mar looks at the philosophy underlying the development of free-marke!
remote sensing, AS&T and SSI outline their respective entrepreneurial concepts and
future plans concerning satellite remote sensing, satellite latmch and associated services.
A. Terra-Mar
"Ikwra-Mar is <tevcloping an earth rcsources data service aimed primarily at com-
mercial clients. The company's data service plan is based on extensive in-house market
research. Terra-Mm states tim! the exploitable market in remote sensing is based on com-
puter and infi_rmation technology. The), adw)cate an open market for data within the
value-added industry. This company is concerned that the immediate transfer of the exist-
ing l,andsat assets could be as much a hindrance to commercializalion as a benefit, unless
the government takes prudent steps to smooth a gradual transition to private operation.
Terra-Mar is opposed to near-term transfer of weather salellites because o[ the vital nature
of weather inlormation in serving the national interesl.
(1) Responsiveness to Fcdcral Needs:
Not specitically addressed
[ 12] (2) Continuity of Service:
Not addressed.
(3) Feasibility:
No specitic systems were recommended or discussed in detail. Comments
regarding the desirability and feasibility of a dislrihuted processing system, and
the probable advance of computer technology are well within the current con-
sensus of industry and government on this technology. The efticiencies of a dis-
trihuted system regarding throughput and availability of data are recognized. In
addition, a distributed system can provide many lewqs of complexity in analysis
capability, which will permit superior tailoring of prodt|cl and intormation exlrac-
lion capabilities.
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:
No concerns were noted.
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B. American Science and Technology Corporation (AS&T)
AS&T proposes to take over ctmunand anti control of Landsat-4 and D' while pur-
suing the development of their own remote sensing satellites. They do not plan to process
or to distribute l,andsat dala, but will build their own grotmd segment to serve flmne
AS&T space platforms. AS&T does not express any interest in civil weather satellite sys-
tems. Additionally, they do not believe fllrther government regulation or legislation is
required or necessary for the implementation of this proposal.
NOTE: AS&]" has beeu working in conjunction with SSI in planning the launch
of AS&T remote sensing satellites as early as 1984.
l]:_l ( 1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:
AS&T would assume operational control (not ownership) of landau-4 and
landsat D'. These satellites would be integrated with AS&T's own low-cost Advanced
Earth Resources ()hservation Satellite (AEROS) earth renl()te sensing satellites,
which would provide complementairy data. Thus, many user data needs, e.g., data
ti)rmat, compatibility, resolution, frequency of coverage, would be initially salistied
by the (ombined I andsal-AS&T system. AS&T's proposed flat ti'e lot access Io sen-
sors and (Iata t]()ws is atlraclive, and on tire snrlace, very cost competitive, itowevm;
data tiom non-U.S, areas would have to be relayed via TDRSS, or obtained fiom [or-
eign ground stations----with potentially high additional costs. Foreign coverage, lack-
ing TI)RSS capability and ti)reign stations, may prove inadequate.
The stable of sensors which AS&T proposes to build and launch by 19,85 can-
not, by themselves, satist}_ CtuTent and projected federal requirements for muhi-
spectral data since the specitications do not include the spectral coverage or
spectral resolutitms required. Spatial resolutions which are comparal)le to
I.andsat do not solve the problem, since the large majority of analysis is with spec-
tral, not spatial, intbrmati(m extraction.
(2) (:ontinuity of Service:
(:ontinuity of service appears to be assured, provided AS&T can maintain
development, launch and operational schedules.
[141
(3) Feasibility:
AS&T proposes the take-over of existing Landsat-4 ground subsystems relating
to command, control, and maintenance of the health of the spacecrati, l towever,
AS&T apparently does not possess the broad range of experience and expertise
necessary to maintain highly complex spacecraft such as I.andsat, nor is there a
1)ersonnel anti t_wility resource extant in AS&T upon which tire company could
rely in any spacecraft emergency.
Statements nratte previously by AS&T in public fora, but not included in this
submittal, have allutled to probable costs of replacement or complementary sen-
sots which are unrealistically low, in our estimation. Teclmical risks associated
with space activities to be undertaken by companies new to this activity are very
high, and translate directly into the necessity for large cash contingencies. In
addition, the probability that complex sensors can be acquired, integrated,
launched and checked out in three years is very low, as discussed in the compa-
rable section on feasibility fi)r SSI.
(,t) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:
AS&T does not wish to pay lot TDRSS. Unless the U.S. government contin-
ues to support TI)RSS tot Landsat, it is unlikely that a current l,andsat global data
base could be maintained for U.S. or foreign users. This has both national secu-
rity and toreign policy implications.
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The AS&T proposal raises the fi)llowing additional tt)reign policy and nation-
ill security concerns: (at Possible assumption of U.S. fi>reign policy obligations by a private
tirm; and (b) Data distribution in a nondiscrinfinatory manner I_ all cstlsl()lstlels.
C. Space Services Incorporaled of America (SSI)
SSI ix developing launch services tot space aclivilies and is no! imerested in file
ownership or operation of Landsat, related data acquisition or dam distribution. SS!
beli<:ves land an<l wcathcr satellites should n<)l be c<msidered simtdlaneously lot lransleF
to private industry, and further Ihal weather systems slmttld not be commercialized istl this
lillle. NN[ stales that any II'allSfest- Io private ilst(lustry should not creale :st tnOllopoly, I)u[
all<_w opportunity to cmnpete in tile free marketplace.
[ 15] NOTE: SSI has been working in conjunction wilh AS&T in planning the launch
of AS&T retllole sensing saltelliles astsearly as 1984.
( 1) Resl)onsiveness to Federal Needs:
Nol specitically addressed.
(2) Continuity of Service:
See AS&T proposal.
(3) Feasibility:
This proposal stales all inlenl to latmch privale sensors as early ists 1984 which
would "complemenC or "overlap" existing l.andsal capabilities. The developmenl
lind acquisition of free-flying space remote sensors typically rake six to eigtn years.
However, disregarding government delays and procedures, and assuming state-of
lhe-ari lechnolog_', the fabrication, lest, integration and latmch migh! lake lhree
Io live years given tit(" illOSt Olltimistic estimate. In istdtliti_m, tit<.' inclusion of
cooled |ocal planes ab<+ard the sensor, which are inq;,(>l-t;u/t in geology and other
space iqJplications, are unlikely to be iwhieved in this time fl+ame, therel w elimi-
nating the majority of t>deral and other SoF, lfisticated users of thermal data.
I,astly, SSI has not demonstrated a capal)ility to latmch a 1000-2000 Kg payload
into orb|l, nor does SSI appear 1o have the capability to command and tonlrol lhe
sl)acecr;tll , check ostll <m-board syslems, or prtwcss sensor data. SSI makes Ihe
statement thal it "supports the concept of |allowing the private sector u) use gov-
ernment tacilities and equipment already in place." tiowever, existing [acilities
and equipment can (rely be used I)y expert, experienced personnel with ist(((.ss to
a very broad range of resources to solve problems, mainlain syslem cat)al)ilities
and provide conlinuily. NS1 does isto[ appear to possess these allril)lHes
(4) National Security att(l Foreign I'olicy (;oncerns:
SSI recognizes g,_wertunent responsibilities to allthorize and supervise private
retn<)te sensing activilies in accordance with the 1967 ()tiler Space Treats and
national security illleresls, th)wever, Ihere is concern whether further commercial
space launch services, from within Ihe LI.S., be permitted until a wcll-detined
national policy and regulatory framework dealing with such activities have been
established and apt)roved.
[ 17] 3. (]ATE(;ORYTttREE - Those l_woring governmenl retention of list(' existing system,
iu least tiw the immediate/imu'e.
The University of Massachuseus, RCA, lh,ghes Aircrafl, (,encral Eleclric and ()cean
Routes Inc., supporl continued goV(_l'llHlelll operalion and ownership of the 1-(rlllOlt" SellS-
ing system Ihrough the next len years or more. "l+hey inesent alternatives that could lead
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toeventttal((mm)ercializationofI.andsal,butllmscinvolvextensiveg<Jvernm('nlparlic-
ipali<mlhroughvariousmanagement,.joint-<>l:,crat<)ror [lllallCill_ opti<ms. These respon-
denis are opposed to commercializati<m <)[ the weather satellite progratns, +is well as the
crealion of any motmpolislic c<)mmcrcial entity for land sensing. It should be nott.d that
three of the nation's nmior ac,+ospacc industries (R(:A, GE, and llughcs) share lifts basic
position.
.,\. Reins>It Sensing (;enter, University of Massaclmselts ([!Mass)
The t !Mass pv<q>osal is somewhat aml)iffuous l:,ut looks to an evolulionary, step-
h_,-stcp approach h'ading toward (ommercializalion. floweret, lit<.') l)<:licve lhe ctnT<.'nt
+'+'stems wol,hl requiv<' extcnsive Ibderal support if a transfer to privalc hldnslrv wer<_*
attempted it+ th,t. n<'ap-tcrm. It+ the t!Mass plan, h+idividnal segm(:nls of the current systems
wouhl be m<_dified and gratlually tel)laced by the private scclor until ftdl ,commercial+/a-
ti<m of the land sensing systcm was achieved. They doubt thal total l)rivatc-secl<)r own(+,t +-
shiF,/<q:,cralion ol +the w<.+athcr s<.,nsing syslem is feasihlc now or in the lorcsceal>h, fUIIH'C.
(1) R<:sp(mmivetless to Fcd<'ral Needs:
]nsttlli_h.nt inlbrtnati<m is provided to permit an evahlation_ ht:,vev,pr, a
phas<:d lakt'-<)ver sh<mld fulfill tlser liCe(Is initially.
(2) (:ontinuity of Service:
hdbrmation pr<wided is indeterminate for evahtation; comments in lhe pre-
ceding paragraphs apply.
[IXl (3) Feasibility:
The plan for slepwis(: commercialization can I:,<: iml)lem+_mled within curretlt
technoh)gQ'. The snbsyst(+'ms of data receive record, command and control, imagt"
processing, asscsslnenl and analysis, and comnnmications and distrihution alc
readily separable. The distributed processing proposed is sul_ject to lhe Sal|l(. com-
mcnls as ti)t +Terra-Mar. The (apparenl) desire for a central archive, as well as local,
limited archiv<.ts, is t,edmically feasible; it requires only a data managemcnl deci-
si<m. Since lhe "exisling systems would be unaffected," t_'deral glohal modeling
capacilies would nol be afJt'cled in the near-term (8---10 years). However, the pro-
posal poslttlates eventual replacement of g_wernment sensors by private sensors
which could acquire "I+andsat-like" data. It seems unlikely that lhe recltfiremetlls
tor more advanced sets of multispectral data can be satisfied hy l,andsat-like pri-
vale sensors. For example, geological researchers are finding that spectral rcsolu-
lion,+ (m the order of 10-20 nanometers within the short wavelength region
(1.1-2.6 tnicromelers) and 30-50 nanometers within the thermal region (8---14
Illict<)llletet+s) arc showillg CllOrlllOUS promise for exIracling tltliqlle si_,nattlres of
stnticial minerals, thereby allowing inferences <m subsurface content alld slrtlc-
tu]e. These capahilities are beyolld the spectral resolutions on I+andsat.
(4) National S<:curity and Foreign Policy Concerns:
This response mentions some aspects of national security and foreign policy
issues--e.g., providing priority weather service to DOD. Howevm, the entire con-
('ept is drawn up in the context of U.S. c(werage only, with no provision for meet-
ing fe(leral nt'eds for foreign area data, or for serving foreign users.
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B. RCA (RCA Astro-Electronics, RCA American Comnmnications and RCA Service
(;ompany)
R(:A believes that Landsat is a candidate for future transter to private industry
only if there are significant government commitments and financial [19] guarantees.
_hile stating that both weather syslemS (polar-orl)itcrs and gcostationary) lnust remaill ill
the governmellI, RCA offers an alternate t]llatlting proposal, i.e., leasing of GOES all(l
TIROS spacecraft, tracking, data reception and data distribution. The leasing option does
not provide cost savings over the long term and does not include provisions for R&I), data
processing, or latmch services.
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:
Not adequately addressed for evaluation, ahtmugh a leasing arrangement
could stipulate those reqtdrements to t)e met.
(2) (]ontinuity of Service:
l,andsat is not addressed. (kmtinuity <)f metsat data is assured for the dura-
tion of 0. lease.
(3) Feasibility:
RCA has well-established technical credentials to perform as they have out-
lined. The proposed changes in operations and system upgrade do not represent
teclmical risk or significant technical development. The postulated 3-axis stabi-
lize(l version of (;OES appears reasonat)le, I)ut not enough informati(m is given
t<) assess the weight inargin t)r iml)lied lifetime. The prt)l)osed Satellite
Operations Control (]enter (SO(]C) flmctional tlow is credible and actdevable,
but whether or not higher ataomation will result in "minimum on-site stq)porl"
catmot be ascertained. A particularly attractive aspect was the approach to dis-
tritmted processing architecture, sitlgle-point fa.ilure recovery, and redundancy.
Somewhat questi<mable was the claim made tk)r optimized real-time versus oft4ine
partitioldng fi)r telemetry analysis, since it is not clear what may be optimum for
SOC(] ftmclional allocations.
[20] For data distrilmtion, the proposal indicates that satellite communicatitms
are the best tbrtn of consolidatiotl of National Weather Service (NWS) require-
lllelltS, but tire L-t)and fiequency allocation would require a variance t}oiIl the
FC(;. The relay capability proposed for the GOES satellite requires new design
work phts development effort on the Marisat traveling-wave-ml)e, not an attractive
prospect from a technical risk standpoint. The electr<mic specilk:ations given t_)r
power, freqttency, gain, bandwidth and sidelobes were not analyzed in detail, but
appear reasonable.
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Issues:
There are im national security or foreign policy implications in the R(;A
response.
C. Hughes Aircraft Company (Hughes)
Hughes does IlOt propose it) participate in comnwrcializalion activities and states
that both land and weather programs should remain in the federal governmem for at least
ten years, thtghes recognizes the national importance of land remote sensing data in
international trade and global strategic resource inventories. Therefore, they propose thai
if" transfk'r of land sensing should proceed, thell: (a) The land and weather programs I)e
addressed separately; (b) Vendor selection tie done competitively; and (c) No dominant
entity or motmpoly be created.
EXPI.()RINGTFIEILJNKN()WN 319
(I) Responsiveness Io Federal Needs:
Not al)t)licalile.
(2) (;ontinuity of Services:
Not applicable.
[21] (3) Feasibility:
Nov applicable.
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy (]oncelns:
Not applicable.
1). (;eneral Electric (;onlpany, Space Systenls Division ((;E)
(;E states, "The I,alldsat program continues to perfornl as a significant national
;iss(,l." mtier (,xlt:,ilSiVe analysis, (;E finds that priwlte sector takeover of |,ail(Isal has linac-
ceptably high btlsiness risks at this iiine. However, "... continilation (it l,andsat tinder gov-
ellllllenl sponsorshi I) is imperative to protect tile $1 billion inv('sllnenl . . . and to permit
t'Vel/lllal private sector illvolv/'nlellt if it proves econonlically ti'asible in the tillIli+e. ''
!¢4,'ealher satellite systelns arc li<)l addressed, and there is ilo basis tot stlbslanlk'e evaluation.
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:
Not apl)licable.
(2) (;ontinuity (if Service:
Not applicalile.
(3) Feasibilily:
N/it a|iplicable.
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy (]oncerns:
Not applicable.
[221 E. ()cean Routes Inc. (OCEANROUTES)
This coliipaily strongly opposes the concept of transferring weather satellites to/lit'
private sec[ol-, since Sllch an enterprise would have to be regulated and run as a nionopoly
with government subsidies or guarantees. They do not address land remote sensing.
(1) Responsiveness to Federal Needs:
Not applicable.
(2) Continuity of Service:
Not applicable.
(3) Feasibility:
Not applicable.
(4) National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns:
Not applicable.
[23] 4. CXI'E(;()RY FOUR - Other Responses.
Three additional responses were received which rio not fit the criteria used in this
report or e'<pliciily address the questions outlined in the CBI) anllolincellielll of
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Sel)Wml_er I(L 1982. (kmmwnts on dwse respouses are indudcd tu express flw addition-
al interest generated by ttw Commerce atmouncement.
A. i\utometric, Inc.
Automelric favors the move to COlnmercializc civil remote sensing systems but
believes a ncaHerm mow, is premature, i.e., industry is being placed in a position of bid-
ding on an unknown elHity. If industry miscalculates the market, the government may have
Io "... bail Ihcm Otll." All|Ollle[li( does propose a (itlanlilkttiv(" evaluation of tt_' relative
merits of flw I,andsal 4 Thematic Mapper, the French SPOT [l[allle (ttigh) Resolution
Visible <m SPOT] tlRV sensor, and the Large Formal Camera that will be t]own <m the
Space Shuttle. The evaluation would be used to ascertain the commercial value of file
Thematic Map[:,cr data. No commercialization proposilion or comments are provided.
B. Compu_,cr Sciences Corporation (CSC)
CSC has been involved with file l,andsat program since |Is inception. They do not
cmnment directly on private sector ll';:ll]Stkq', t)tit staltt a keen intmcst in the future of |mid
sensing and request inclusion in lmther discussions whicil may be ileld with industry.
(]. Robert (;corgevic
This individual described himself as a l.!niversitv Professor from southern
(;alitornia. llt" did not respond in derail, but adw)cates retaining dvil remole sensing sys-
tems in the [I.S. govermncnl.
1241 IV. I.IST ()F RESI'()NSES
Scclion Rc_S.l._<ms,:
1.A Report, "(:ommevcializatiou ot (:ivil Remote Sensing," Comnmnications
Sawllitc (;orpmati_m ((;()MSXI'), ()ctohcr 22, 1(,t82.
I.B Unsolicilcd Proposal, Enxironmt,ntal Salellite Dala, Inc., September 17, 1982.
I.(; While Pal)el; "Civil Operational Renlott" Sensing t;roni Space," (;onlrol Data
(k)rporalion, Oclobei 1989.
2._,\ I)<)cunlent TMA l 0-011-82, "( :|vii ()peralioital Remote Sensing Fr<nn ,cipacc,"
Terl+a-Mar, ( )tlo|)er ] {)87.
2.B Rcl)urt, "Response to the Request Ior Inforinalion With Respecl 1o (]ivil
()l)erational Reiiiole _eilsiilg Prom <Space," mnierican ,Stir'nee aiid
]'echnolog}: (]orl)oration, ()clobei 92, I (,ibm2.
2.(_ l+ettcr to l)r..lohn I I. McEhoy, Re: "Civil Rt'niote Sensing Satellites: Rt'qtu'st
t_n- h'il_)rlnalil)li," ,Space St'l+Vict's Intoi-i)oratt'd of :\nit'rica, ()tloi:ler '.)7, 1¶t82.
?,.A l)ocunlenl, "<A Plan t_ll (]olnnit'rcializalion _lt" the U.S. (:ivil Reniolt" Sensing
_yslCili," Rcniolc _t'nsiiig (]eliler - tlaslz, roilck, [!liiversity o| Mas.sachti',;clls,
Oclober 71, 19_7.
3. B Report R-4412, "Private Sector lnwilvenicnt in (:ivilOperational Remote
SeliSillg t]'Oill Si;,acc," R(]A, ()ctober 22, 1982.
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3.(] Report, "(kmunercializalion of United Slates Civil Reulole ,_(,nsil|g SalelliI('
Systems," ! lughcs Aircratt (',ompanv October 2 l, 1982.
1251 3.1) l,ellerto l)r.John II. McElrov "(;ivil()F,t'rathmalRemote _ensing from
Space," Space Systems Division, (;cneral Electric (:ompany, ()cIober 2], 1¢.1_2.
3.E Ix'ller 1o l)r. John It. McElroy, Response lo Secrelavy's Request for
Intormalion, ()cean Roltles Incorporated, ()cl()]/Cl jr'), 1982.
Precis, "A Quanlilative l::¢ahmlion of Ihe l.andsal/TM, lhe SP()T/HRV and
Ihe I.argc Forma| (_aluera," Aulonlelric, Inc()rporated, Oclol)cr 2(), 1982.
,t. B l.clter to Dr. John II. McEhoy, (]()ml)uler Sciences (_orl)on-ation, ()ctol)cr 21,
1982.
4.(: Postcard 1o l)r..]()hn tl. McFIroy frtml l)r. Rol)erl (,corg('vic, San Diego,
(;alitbrnia, (){lol)er 12, I(.)g_2....
Document 11-35
Document title: "Transfer of Civil Meteorological Satellites," House Concurrent
Resolution 168, November 14, 1983.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Wa.shington, D.C.
Whih" Crmgwe._.s was willing to consider trctnqfi'rHng control r!/ the l.andsat ,s3',_temto the private seg-
tin; il did not want to do the ,_anu" with the weather satellites, citing the arg_tnu.nt that weather set
vire_ were clearly' a public good. There/ore, /louse member Don Fuqua _f FIoHda introduced ttouse
(',omurtwd Ite_-olution 168 in _,)*vemlmr 1983; the resolution would C[fi'ctivel_' exclude weather satel-
files ./?ore the privatization procesL Because the issue Of weather ,satellite._ zttas impeding proKres,_ o.
the trans/Pr °/ Earth ohw*rvation satellites to the p6vate sectm; 15-esident Reagan sig._ed the resolu-
tion, thus opening the door fi. the I.and Remote Sensing Commercialization Act _,[ 1984, which wa._
pa_.sed just seven months later
H 9812 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--HOUSE November 14, 1983
[no pagination] TIL,\NSFER OF CIVIl. METEOROLO(;ICAI. SATEI.IXI'ES
Mr. FUQL'A. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent reso-
htlion, (t !. (3tin. Res. 168) expressing tile sense of the Congress that it is not appr(_l)riaw
al lhis lilll(! Io ll';lllS[},'l" ownership or lllall_tgt`quenl, of all}, civil meleorological salellilc sys-
lcm and associated grolnltl system eqtlipmenl to the private sector.
The clerk read as tollows:
tl. (:(m. Res. 168
Wht.r(.as lh(' Fed('ral (;overnmt'nl has Iraditi(mally I)r()vided weather forecasls which
r('ly signiti(antly upon (lala gathere(I t)y civil nwl('oroh)gical salellites;
Wh('rcas wilhin Ihc United States lhe Federal (;oVell/lllell| is lilt,, principal user ()f
(lala ga|her('(l l)y civil nl(.l(,()r()h)gi('al salellites:
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_ereas tile Federal Government has the responsibility tot providing torecasts and
warnings regarding severe weather in order to protect property and public safety;
Whereas tim United States has engaged fi_r over one hundred ),ears in tilt, free inter-
national exchange of meteorological data;
Whereas civil meteorological satellite systems and associated ground system equip-
ment are essential components in ensuring the national security of tile Nation through
their use in conjunction with satellites operated by the Department of Defense;
V_qlereas transfer to the private sector of ownership or management of any civil mete-
orological satellite system and associated ground system equipment would likely create a
(;overnment-subsidized monopoly and jeopardize the cost efficiency and reliability of
data gathered by civil meteorological satellites;
Whereas it is highly unlikely that, under the current plan for transfer of civil meteo-
rological satellites, any significant new commercial venture involving marketing of weath-
er data would develop;
Whereas skepticism in tile Congress about the transt_'r of the civil meteorological
satellite system cottld complicate and delay the pressing decision about the tutnre of the
civil land remote sensing satellite system; and
Whereas no satisfactory explanations or proposals haw" been advanced for the trans-
ter of ownership or management of any civil meteorological satellite and associated
grotmd system equipnmnt to the private sector: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved _ the flou_e of Representatives (the Senate concurring), that it is the sense of the
(;ongress that it is not appropriate at this time to transli_q- ownership or management of
any civil meteorological satellite system and associated groined system equipment to the
private sector.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to tilt- rule, a second is not required on this
motion.
The gentleman from Florida (Mr. FUQUA) will be recognized tot 20 minutes and the
gentleman from New York (Mr. CARNEY) will be recognized for 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman tiom Florida (Mr. FUQUA).
Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Speaker, l yield myself 2 minutes.
(Mr. FUQUA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Speaker, House Concurrent Resolution 168 expresses the sense of
the Congress that it is not appropriate at this ti,ne to sell this Nation's civilian weather
satellites to the private sector. The purpose of tile concnrrent resolution is to bah tile
administration's effort to sell these satellites by sending a clear and tmanlt)iguous signal
to the administration and to U.S. industry that the Congress does not consider such a
transfer to be in the national interest.
Mr. Speaker, our committee is of the view, after reviewing both the pnblic testimony
on this issue and tim administration's plans for transfer, that the proposal to transfi-r
weather satellites is not sound and that considerable time, el]nrt, anti resources will be
saved by halting this proposal immediately. Our committee reached this conclusion for
several reasons:
The public service nature of weather services:
The danger of establishing a federally protected monopoly;
National security considerations; and
Tile need to concentrate the debate on commercializing land remote-sensing satellites.
In sum the conmlittee concurred with the view presented in a November 10, 1983
Joint NASA/Department of Defense study:
There is considerable financial, polio,, and program risk to the Government in commercializint4
weather satellites and there i.s no dear poliQ or financial benefit to be realized.
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Mr. Speaker, llouse Concurrent Resolution 168 currently has over I B0 co-sponsors.
The resolution receiw, d strong bipartisan support in our committee, and an identical res-
olution passed unanimously in the other body last month. This has not been, and it
should not he, a partisan issue in the (',ongress, and I urge my colleagues to support pas-
sage of the resolution.
Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. SCHEUER), the chairman
of the subcommittee that handled this concurrent resolution.
Mr. SCHEUER. I thank tile gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, the chief Sponsor of this measure, tile gentleman from Texas (MI:
ANDREWS), has done an outstandingly fine leadership job in promoting this resolution
and in developing the support thal the chairman just mentioned. ! yield such tinle as he
may c(mstnne to the gentleman to explain the resolution, what motivated him, what the
resoh,tion means, and tot any further explanation tim gentleman might like to make.
(Mr. AN1)REWS of l_.xas asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
M__ ANDREWS of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.
MI: Speaker, 1 rise today to speak on an issue that I suspecl many lhoughl tell by the
wayside long ago. Back in March of this year when the President arlnotnl(:ed his intention
to commercialize our Nation's fonr weather satellites, there rose from the public and fronl
(]OIIgI('SS air outcry that was so loud, so overwhelmingly clear and devoid of partisanship
that 1 would haw" thought the administration would haw' understood that this ill-
conceived proposal would never gain the approwd of Congress. In hearing after hearing
held this year by tile Science and q>chnology Committee, we have received testimony and
reports which have been consistently negative with respect Io this proposed sale--tiom
sources which include Ill{" President's own private sector survey on cost control, NASA, the
I)eparlnlenl of l)et_mse, three congressionally chartered panels, a (:ommerce
l)epartment Advisory (]onlnlill_'c, and the World Meteorological Organization.
Representative of the testimony was Ihe conclusion of a joint DOD-NASA study:
There i_ considerabl_e financial polhy, and program risk to the (;ovmnmenl i_ commelwializing_
weather _atellite._ a_M there i_ no clear poll O, or.financial benefit to be _ealized.
Despite tile testimony, despite Ihe |act that the Senate has passed not only a resolu-
tion idenlical to this one but language actually prohibiting the use of Commerce tt,nds to
write a bid document including the weather satellites, despite the introduction of this res-
ohtlion in the Ilouse; despite its 1_0 co-sponsors and its overwhelming endorsement by
the Science and Technology Committee, the administration is moving ahead fldl speed.
The I)epartment of Commerce is drafting a request for proposal that includes weather
satellites and thai docnment is due to be released to the private sector ira final |orm in
I)ecember.
Selling the weather satellites does not make economic sense. The National Weather
Service accol.llrls tor 9.5 percent of the lirst use of our weather data. By what logic should
the (;overnment sell its $1.{) billion weather satellite system to a private company at a
greatly reduced rate, only to sign a long-term monopolistic contract |or data services
which could end up costing taxpayers more than $10(l million per year?
Furthermore, such a sale would have serious national security implications. Selling
Ihesc satellites would necessitate significant, and perhaps unwieldy, oversight and regnla-
lion by the DOD which relies on civil weather satellites both in its routine operations and
in military emergencies.
The sale would threaten the quality of our weather data since a private operator would
have tilth" incentive---other than price-gouging perhaps--to improve services. Stagnant
technolog, T would hurt everyone who relies on weather information: tile I'arn]el; the pih)t
and the citizen dependent on Federal tornado and hurricane warnings.
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In a(lditit)n, while st)me weather inf()rnlation is cmnmercially mark(:ted now, tile sale
of our satellite system would not enhance that market one iota. ]n reviewing the initial
(Irati of(:t)nnnerce's RFP, the DOD insiste(l that a provision be included allowing the tiee
and open distribution of weather data to our allies around the world, as we have tradi-
tionally don(:. Th(: I)OI) insisted on this provision because of their tk'ar that should the
[!nited Slates begin selling weather data to toreign g(wermnents instead (ff()tD:ring it tie(:,
Ihose tbr(:ign governments would limit the data they provide It) the United Stales, (lata
which in crucial t() U.S. military ()peralions. This lea(Is inescapat)ly to the c()nchtsion thai
the transfer (if these salellites is neither militarily prudent nt/r c()mnmrcially viable. For if
weather data fl'onl U.S. salellites in made availal)le internationally, il can lie transmitted on
public airwaves tt) the United Stales, thus (lestroying nol only tit(" international market,
but the tlonwsti( malk(:t as well. The den(an(Is of our mililary and the requirenlents t)f
c()nnnercialization are irreconcilat)le.
But perhaps the most coml)elling reason to disassociate tile weattmr sat(:llites fr(>m tit("
RFP tlro(+(:ss now in that th(: exit:haled t+onsideration we are giving t<) their sale only (lelavs
Ih(: decision to (t)nmler(ialize land remole sensing satellites. The continued COUl)ling of
Ih(: land and weather satellites only guarantees that the land satellite issue will n()l lie
res<)lved t)y C()ngless until as late an mi(1-1(`)85 at which point we may have ti)rti+ite(l to om-
c()mpetitors ov(:rseas what l)romises t() t)e a multit)illion domestic nlal+ket.
Thanks t() the Bateman amendment tit the NASA bill, the a(hninistratit>n will have to
come to Congress s<)t)ner or later tt) seek al)pr(twd tor that RFP. And when they th), I ti'el
sme the weather salellile l)orti()n of it will ntlt survive tile scrutiny ()t thin ('_()ngress. M)
concern in that the privat(: se('tor be a(teqlmtely f(wewarned, h in disingenuous and unfair
to ask Am(:rican companies ttt spen(t their vahlal)l(: time and res(Jmces resl)(mding l<) a
l)roposal that has no hol)(: of getting by Congress. h is time that we send a clear m(:ssage
to the administrati<)n anti t() the t)(>ardrt)<>ms of those companies that w<)uld bid ore
weather satellites. They are not ti)r sale. That in the st)It: purpose <)f this vest)It(litre, h
tteserves to pass and I urge its prompt approwd.
Mr. SCI IEUER. Mr. SI)eaker, I yi(:ld myself such time us I may ct)nsmn(:.
(Mr. S(;I IEI.!ER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Nil. SCItEUER. Mr. Si)eaker, as thc gentleman ti-om Texas (Mr. ANI)REWS) indi(at-
ed, this proposal to sell tit(" weather satellit(:s in truly a m)nstarter. It in truly a propt)sal
wh()se lime will never conw. And it is a dangerous [)r()l)osal, nol just a sill), prol)tlsal. It is
a (langerous prt)p()sal because it in diverting our att(:ntion from th(: main game, fi-om th(:
main conq)elilive glol)al arena in which U.S. enterprise reallyc:ani)lay a dynamic success-
lid role and that is in tilt" area of l,an(lsal, in the area of l,andsat that in al)prol)riale ii)v
(ommercialization. And if we dilly anti dally with this absolutely prepost(:rous idea ¢)tc(mt-
mer(ializing weathersal whi(h 13 out of 14 (,()vermncnl-industr)' respondents have toltt
us in intrinsically a (;overnnwnl timctit)n an(t should never t)e conmwr(ialized, if we dilly
and dally, tiddling about with this, we are going to continue to let our i)()sition in I_anttsat
erode to the point where the French and the Japanese are going to tleat us to the t)un(h
and l)reempt our leadership ill spa(:e in the vet-), arena where private (apital could pay a
dymuni( and su(cessthl role.
Mr. Speaken 1 would like to expand upon a point raised by tit(: gentleman timn
Florida (Mr. FUQUA)--Ihal pursuing the sale of weather salellites needlessly (oral)litales
the urgem need to) maintain I_!.S. leadership in land remote sensing.
The u.s. (;t,vernment has operated civilian land-r(:m()te-s(:nsing satellites, or Lantlsat.
since 1(.)72.
Since thai time, I,anttsat has provi(led a weahh t)t intbrnmlion on: Natural res()mces,
mineral (It:posits, and agricuhural ])rt)(hwtivit)'.
At h)w ('()st to: Federal ag(:ncies, to l)rivat(: industry, and (.wel 40 nations ar()un(I the
w_wl(I.
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The |Irob_r_lln h+ts Ile¢,n nn _+norn+<itLs sc[entil]c sucot+s.s, and it has been +i _l'e,tl P';Oitl(',{ +
lit international good will for our Nation.
l+andsm, unlike we;tther satellites, mighl I)i-ofit;tlily bc operated by tile priwtte sECtOl,
Siil¢t' tht' data that it l>roduc¢'s are of use tim mdv Io scientific researchers mid to
(;,overlllilt, llt agencies, llut also to +l niunller of [iriv_Ite conll)mlies, including oil mid min-
eral exllloration l]rnls and vm-ious agricuhural interests.
I agree with tilt" administratiml tlmt the time is right to investigate our ill)lions l+<)r
commercializing this emerging technohi_,, T, especially since the United States ++'ill lace stiff
colni)elilh)n in the tield <ff I;uid renlote-st'nsinlz , t]oni the Prench and thi'.iai/anese tly the'
mid- IO I_tie-l{tSO's.
I disa_rt'¢' ,+lroli_ly, howeV¢'l, with the _idiillilisir_llion's I)t'rversl' _il)t)ro_llh to ihi_+ inlc'r-
ilali¢lii_il chlilllui_e--iiiilill'i,v, to kill iinnil'di_tlelV all flinfliil<_ t_)r lh¢" I.;iiids;it [)r_)_rliin _ilid
Io i/tit ¢>iir ¢ivili_nl ,,vi,;llhl,r _ill!llil<.'s, _lil illh_'Fenll), ,_overtiini'nl_tl svslt'lli, ill/ tTtr _+_tl<'.
'Hie _tdininlsir_tliOli i)ilrslil'd these policies linder lh,t" aSSUllii)liOli lh_ll U._. iii(hlsll+V
wiltild ru_,h illlO coml)etitioli with subsidized French +lnd.Jilli+lne,'+,e _x'slems by liilinchili_
fn]l),' |/rivale land i-l.iilole-+i!iiSiil_, svstl.,ins+
I_redictabl) , the ganll/le tttiled.
N¢) I I._. iiidu,>li)' Coilh-t possibl)' entei +this tieht +it the i)l+eSenl lime without ,soilie |+elill
o] leliil)or+trv ('.<>veriiliii'nl Sill/Sial),+
'l'his subsid)' is ii ll('ct'P,;_,+ii-'¢ t'vil irwc h<ll)e io avoid t._ivin<_ nil iill<lthei i/<llc-niinlly hi('l_i-
live i:oinlnt'rcilil Olli)olliiilitv Ill olli" COlil])ctitor+.
The ir_ii)' ill Oiil +delt'i-ior+ilill_ _ilu+ltion, of cotirso, is Ih_ll this colninerciitl Ol)tJoi+tii -
llitv exi_,t_, OllI.v t)e(+iiise the [!._+ t;<ixp_+iyci ",ovcr tile past 12 ,ve+trs, tl_ts sUt)l)Oi+ted a l+_lil(|P+_+.t
lllll_l;iiii which lilt:+ cl)iiviilciii_l): dellit)n,+.ilr_ited the feasit)ility <if C<)liiiiieiciltl I_lnd relnol<."
seilslii_,
Mr+ _l)e_ikl<'i, iii+iii)' lit tlS _h_iie +i deep concern lh_il the United _t+ilcs i,++,_tt)otil to l]h-
let _.i'e¢_iyits technological leadership in _ti} Pil',e_ where, over the next _)<) Ve_li'_, we c×peci
to see li+eillt'ildous global collliiier(:in] exi)ansion.
In this c_lse, <lilr hldtistri_l] eXl;,+ilision +illd ability to coinl/el(" ill ,ql<d/lt] ill+it-kelp; in lhre+il-
('lied tier tl+v ;I lack <ff le_;Otlile_;, not by a lack of cre+ltlvilv, noF t)y ii lack of t)roductivity.
!i41'<.!_il+17• lhlt'iileliefi solely by (iliVClriillenl inaction.
I l)(qicve we still h;.ive liill,_" to Dreserve olir remote-sensing ill(hislrv, but only if we +tel
exllt,dili<lusly on two tTonls.
Pirnl, wt, need to hall this +ibsurd prol)os_t] to comniercialize we+litter satc'llites. Ii is a
silly diversi<lli froili Ihe lnain global ganie--I,and+_tt. +l&:e lllil+l gel Oiil +eve on lhe ball.
Nl!xl, we need to _t_iee on _t l)olicv which will +tti'ct a ration_ll tr_lnsilion belween
(;<)vernnielil ot)eralion of Lind i+elnot0-sensin,l_ svsteins _lil(l fully privati, ol)eralion of th__'se
+vP+lelll'4.
],asl week, the genlh'inan ti-<lnl Missouri (Mr. VOLKM[+]R) and I held 7 days of ioint
hl'itrilig+ <ill dr+il'i ll'_,i_;l+llion _iini¢!d _tl elf_ciing such a lr+insltion.
(]<liicllrrt'iil with _)tir i<lli_id_<!l+_ilion of this draft let_isl+ilion, the _idiiiilliSllitii<)il h+is.
t)eeii [_,rl'l)ilrilig +l rl'llile.'+t-[or-I;Ir<.lt)os+i] (RFP) lo solicit indti+lry bids ot+l ])resent and tiilure
I+lli(l renl<)lt'-,+.;eli_,ili_, s),st(tln+.
I +,++'it+,qrl!+iily he+lrlened hi' the ieslinlony lh_it wt! received ell the legi,_l_lli</il, both froln
wiliies+l's rl!l)i+tlsl.'illin_ U.<_. indusir,v _lll(I from the adnlinistr_liion',_ witness, Mr, R_lv
I_.+iliiliit'r, who i+ cliiiirili+lii <it the _Oilice Ev_lhii.tlion Board foi Civil Reiliote _eii_,illl. _.
Mr, K_llitiilei t_>iilid lillili)' [)iii++tllels and f+<tw major inconsistencies t)elween hi,_ I'fforls
_nid tht' t)rovisioils _lf till + lel4islation, and I look forward to working with Mr. K_tlllllll+!l _lll_l
others in the _idniini_li;llion to insure lh+ll, +is (]ongros+ ;trlicul+iles _l coherenl policy for
coiiiiill'rci_ili/ill_ Ii.tild r,t'iiioll'-s<+'ilsiiil2 , _tciivilil's oVt'l+ the ll+.'xl ti lliOlilli_, Ihe _ldilliilisli-ltiion
a_ll'snixl'l)' ini[)leni<.!nl_ ihni [l_)li<+v.
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h wottld be truly unlortunate to see a repetition of the cirrumstances surrounding the
weather-satellite issttc, wherein despite rel)cated signals fi-om tile Congress, Ihe adminis-
tration contimled to pursue a policy which had little, if any, supporl in eilher House of
Congress.
Mr. (]mirman, I strongly support the concurrent rcsohltion sponsored by the gentle-
man t+r<mlTexas (Mr. ANDREWS), both because selling weather satellites is a bad idea and
because we need to proceed quickly toward tile resolution of tile real issue of this
debate--namely, how to transfer, in a rational way, our land remote-sensing capabilities to
tilt'private sector.
l urge my <+olleagues to SUpl)<)rt House (;oncttrrcnt Resolulion 168.
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Mr. Mc(;RATt t. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time an I may consnme.
(Mr. Mc(;IL&Ttt asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Mc(;RATtt. Mr. Speaker, I rise in Sll])I)Ol'l t)t" this resoluti<m, hul I <1o so with some
rcscrvalions. Right now I do not feel that the transti..r to the private sector of tilt+ wcather
satellites in in the national interest, ttowevcr, I would like to withhold tinal judgment on
this isstw ttntil tilt' RFP process ct|rrcnlly being conducted by the Det)artmenl of
Commerce is complete.
Af+tcr the rcsl)Onscs to the RFI' arc in, we will haw a great deal more infbrmatiotl
about whether or not to go forward with this transf;_q-. Wc will have the factual basis tbr
determitfing whether the weathel_satellitc system is suitable li)t transtk_r to tilt- l)rivatc see-
tot or it, as I believe will be the case, the), are not suitable.
Mr. Sl)caket, I have bccn following this issttc very rarefully [br the past 2 I/2 years.
The civilian weather satellites itl't" essential to the pr<)tet+tion of i)ublic health and sal_'ty,
and they serw as a backup to the defense mcteot+ul<)gical system. The weather satcllites
are inherently govern]ncnlal, an t'vidcnccd by tilt" [_tct that over 95 perrent of the ]narkct
li)r lilt" data from these satellites is the t!.S. (;ovcrnmenl. For these was<ms, I do not think
it would 1)e wise Io l]anslel- this system to the private sector.
In the (;onllniltcc on Science and 'l+echnolok_ ', wc held tivc hearings on lhe COll;uner-
cialization of the land and weather satellites, and while the consensus wan that the land
svstctn should lw commcrrializcd, strong opl)osition to tlw ll'alls[(+l" <)f the Metsal system
was cxl)ressed I)y a wide range of witnesses from both the public attd private sectors.
Mr. Speaker, it in my hope that once the controversy of the Metsat transti:r has been
removed ti<ml considerati<)n, the (_ongress and the athninistratiun will bc able to con-
ccntratc <m tilt' commercialization of the land remote-sensing system which in more ratio-
nally in tilt' public iHlerest.
Pvln Speaker. I yield 2 minutes [or myself.
(Mrs. SMITI I of Nel>raska asked and was given i)el+missi<m to revise and extend her
iclnarks.)
Mrs. SMIT!t of Nebraska. Mr. Speakel, I rise in strong su|)port of this lcgislati<m
expressing the sense of Congress with regard I<) weather satellites.
I am a c()sl)<msor of+this bill which i)uts (:(regress <m record in Opl)osition to the trans-
l_.+rof ownership or manageme[:it of the Nation's weatht.r satellites to the private sector at
this time.
In March of this Fat, the l)epartment of Commerce proposed to commercialize civil
weather and land remote-sensing satellites. This proposal has had rcmarkabh, little slip-
port especially with respect to weather satellites, h is no wonder +.()'vet +99 percent of the
dala generated by the weather satellites in in fact used bv civil and military agencies of tilt +
U.S. (;overnment.
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TheproposedsaleoFweathersatelliteswouldnotsavethe(;ovcrnmentanymoney.
The l)cl+_'nseDeparmlent estimates thattilesalewould costrex-payersabout $80i)nlillion
Inl,lre l,lver 10 years than it would <_osl the (;<wernment to continue to operate tllenl.
Congressional hearings ]lave brottgllt (lilt considcrabh, oppositil,ln to selling off tit( +
(,overnmcnt's salelliles. The a(hninistration's own priwlte sector survey on cost control,
the l)cparlmezll of l)el;_'nse, NASA, and other (_overlllltellI grl,mps ;ill lhld <hal there is no
advanmgc II,) comnlcrcializing tile weather satellites.
My nlain concern at)<ltlt the salellitc sale proposal is the eflect it would ]lave l,)n l,luf
t_trmers and ranchers, pihtts, and other citizens who depend on ac+,urate and timely
reports on the w+`.athcr. The el,titre <if tile present weather reporting s)'stexns would I)+,"in
dl,mllt with the sale of iour "eyes in the sky." There are no answ+,'rs to tht, questions at)ou, t
[tl.lllrc availability <if wcath+,.r inlormation, the national s+,'cnril), implications of selling our
salellites, or thc safety impli+,atil,ms because tiffs idea has not had enl,)tlgh study. Ix+t us
adopt this simph, resl,dution an+,l give tile whole issue of w+,'alher s,l,lellitcs and l+andsal
thorol,ngh stttdy.
Mr. M<:(;RATII. Mr. Spt+akei, [ yield 2 lllilltltes, for debate only, ll,l tile ,_entlcnlan (i+onl
Virginia (Mr. BATEMAN).
Mr. BATEMAN Mr. Speaker, l al)precial+," lhe gentlenlan's yielding fills lille to lit+.'.
l wl,>uld like t<l associate nlysclf with the renlarks that ]lave l)eell lllade b+v tilt" distin-
guish+,'d Members who pI+,++,:+,'dedIll<<"who spoke in l_tvor elf tilt' I+es<duli<m and against tilt"
prop<)sitil,ln of cl,)lllln+,'lcializiltg otl,r weal]let +satellhe s+vstelllS.
As tilt+ g+,+ntlenlan frl,ml Texas (Mr. ANDREWS) obseiv+,+d, earlier this year I offcre+,l an
ants,rod<nell which was adopled and has passed both H<ittses of tile (:ongi-+,.ss which would
hay+," nlade tile prior cl,)tlsent <ff tile Congress as tlo It+it comln+,'rcialization of tilt + w+,'ather
satellilcs a +,:l,mdilion <ffsuch a step being taken, hi view <)1tilt" tact thai the other body has
conclusively and umulimous]y indicated lhal il is nol displ,)sed and wo/,]d not cl,nls+,.nt tl,I
any c_mnncrcialization/of the weather satellites, it is Ill), t_'eling, which ] share with the ,_cll-
tieman ('l(llll Texas, <hal private industry and tilt' (_l,YV+,'llllllellI itsclf should not It+," [)Ill
tlII<_tlgll a l+rivl,)h,ms exercise, with the expcnditurc of a greal deal of inl.lntv, research,
invesligation, and study, all to come to absohltely naught.
For those reasons Mr. Speak+,'r, I think lllis fesolulionl is well cl,mc+,gved and should be
suppl,)rted.
Mr. Mc(;RATI I. Mr. Speaker, [ reserve lilt+ balan+,+,+ of hi)' time.
Mr. FttQI!A. Mr. Speaks. I yield su+,:h time as he nlay cotlsume Io tht, distinguished
gentleman from FlorMa (Ml: NEI,S()N), a menlb+,+r of tile committ<<.e.
Mr. NELS()N l,lf Florida. MI: Speaker, [ thank the chairman o| tile committee [or
yielding thin tin|c It) Ill+.'.
l jusl want to say that this resolution sponsored by the genHleman fronl Tt'xas (Ml:
ANDREWS) is a resohltion that we should not have to I)e debating here. Bul }lere is con-
stiluli<lnal government working at its best, <lne branch balancing off against tile other
t)ranch. The exe+,:utiv+,, branch has simply made a nfistake. Anti they have to be brought
back +lira) lhe correl,:l (ourse t)y tile congressional branch.
With set+urity at risk, wc shottld not be sending ou, r weather satellites to tile +,:l,)nmlcr-
<ial seclor where in a time of enlergency tilt, (;overnnwnt nlay nl,lt haw, access to lllaI
weathef inti)rnlation.
S_), Mr. Spcakel. ! certainly urge a yes vote on this resolution.
Mr. FtrQUA. Mr. Speakel. 1 yield such tinle as he may consume to thc distingttishcd
delegate from Puerto Rico (Mr. CORRADA).
Mr. (:()RRAI)A. Mr. Speaker. 1 thank the genllenlan lot yielding lifts time lio me.
Mr. Speakel. i.jl,lin in voicing my strong support for tfouse (:l,)nctur+,ml Res!oltnion 168
whi<]l expresses lilt+ sense of the Congress tl'lat tilt, civil m+,'teorological satellit+," sysl+,'m
sh!ould re,it be sold or transti'rred to the private sector.
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The ilnporlanl data and work collected I)y lhcse satellites undersc<_re the need tbr
nlaintaining thetn in (;overnnwnt hands. Thc t,ollcction and dissemination of weather
intkntnati<m is crucial to ;,'very person across tht," Nalion, from lhe |mmcrs in Nt,'braska to
vacationers in Ptwrto Rico. The need l_lr prct,ist," and reliabhc access must bc protected
and preserved to t`'nsttrt,' not only ;tic health of our pc, pttlitti<lll but also (lltl" c¢}tllitltti'd ¢'cc,-
nomic vitalilv.
'['t+lt,• [)lltn to tt+imstk't +tilt +welt;her slttcllites to the private s<.,ctor is misgttided and inim-
ical to the publit, 7 good. I mge my colleagues lo vow in t_tvov of this rt,.soluti<m ant,I thus
send a clear signal to tile administration at)tntt ollr position on this important issue.
Mr. Mc(;I<L\TI I. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutt,'s, I_lr debate proposes, lo tilt" gentleman
l)otn Pennsylvania (Mr. WAI+KER).
Mr. WAI+KER. Mr. Speaker, in his book "Tht,' High Road," Ben Bova lalked al)¢mt the
proposition thal there arc two t?,t)cs of pt,'¢lplc thal approach policy in this comnrv or
throughotlt history. They art`" Ihc Promt`_lhians and the IJtddites. The I'ronwthians arc
csst,.ntially those people who look toward Iht," futurt,', who Ir)+' to lind Wil+VSin whit,'h to use
that whit,'h is m the. l/rcsem to promote lht," futtuc. The l+uddiles are those people who art`"
wedded to tilt,"pasl, who t|'_ r 10 hold on to exactly what is ',vithtnn having any cont,cpt of
the future al all.
I submit, Mr. Speaker, lhal this is a [.udditc bill. 1 say that I)v stating that wc art,• tmwill-
ing to IlIC,',dCtorward toward t,-omnu_rcialization of weallwr salelliles; wt," are t+x¢,m])ting
one large area from commercialization that has the potential of being ctmunercialized
immediately. If there is one thing that wt" should I)e all at)out in <)ur space program, it is
lllO'¢[tl_ otll of lt,'S,t,'itl'ch illl([ d(.vt,'loplnellt tOWald t`+t)lllllltCl'C[il]ililli¢tll. The morc Ct)lllllICl--
cializati<m wc pl'OlllOte as, il. nitlioII ill (lult,'l" Spilt't,', thc IIIC,,lC t]hilllt'C WC hitv¢' o[ l't`'il]lil]k_ tht'
t,!tonomic rewards that t,Onle |)+ore that.
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Tht,'st' iut' not mitlor ccononlic rewards. T]lcrc are sorer" [)_'oplc who art' [al-si_lltt,'d
t'llC, Ilgh to belit,'vt," that cmmncrcialization of otllt,'t sf)ac(' over /he next 20 t(i _5 years, if
givt,'n the pvoller investment at/itttdc, could rcap a trillion dollar economy front otm'r
spat,;,', a spat,'cd-lms('d economy of a trillion dollars. ]lilt; ill tt,'I'lll_, ot lt.}8!+_, thitl is tht."
t,'qttisahcnt of 55 million,jobs,
We often sit on this House floor and we ht,'ar dt,'bating about tht' fact, where art' the'
.jobs going to ¢,()111<+"tll)nl? How arc wt,' going to providt,'jobs for the fl.ltltl'C? Whert," arc th("
.jobs for people who do not hay;,' them? With hi-tcch ;,'merging, where art`" the j<_bs _,,lin,g
to ('(llll(' tl'()ltl?
On;" of tilt," plact,'s ILht,'7,/_tregoing to ¢t)ln(( • ]_lOlll is by propcrly industrializing and conl-
mt,'rcializing OUICF sp_tcC. 1,:VhCtl WC pass bills of this type, when we say that wc art`"going to
I;tkt" its a nlalter of public polit,+v and X-otlt o[ ¢ttll considt,'ration wcath('r salcllit(,s, wc art"
taking the first stt,'p toward limiting tile amotmt <ff investment that will t,'vcv bc math' in
outer Sl)aCC and thtc amotmt of lolls that can t)t" ¢rt,'alt,'d.
I think that is wrong. I lhink this is a sad bill and 1 hope l)t,'ol)hc will votc against it.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Si)cakt,'r, this l)ast March the l'r¢'sidt,'nt annomlct,'d his inlt,'lltion tO
¢ommt,,rcializc onr (;ov¢,rnmt, nt's weatht,'r and land rt,qnotc st,'nsing, salcllit¢'s, h was clear
from tht" l)cginning that lht" ofl<.'r to s¢'ll thc wt,'atht,'r satcllitcs was simply an ancmpt t<_
makt," tht," mahc of the land l'('lIIOlc St'lISillg satt,'llitt," ltlOlC af)l)('aling.
I find this t,'ntir¢' connnt,u-cialization t'fl_lrt trios; 1)otht,'rs<)mc and hay;," t)ct'n vocally
opl)<)sed to it t_orn the vt,.ry beginning. While many of its may disagree + with tht," desirabil-
ity of retaining a land rt,'tnott" sensing slttellitc program within the (hlvt,'rnmt,'nl, I know of
lit) <)11¢"who disagrces with Ill(" wisdolll of t+elainillg, ('_'_ >V¢'l-nlllt,'llt till/trill oV¢'l- Olll" Nation's
w¢'alht,'r satt'llitcs. Manv of Its hay; _ made thi.'; lact known to tilt" administration during the
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t)asl fi.w m()nlhs, and y<'l lhe l)rocc'ss It) commercialize lh('m c()nlinues. AI risk, if lifts
process continues i_) oomPh'lib,n, is Ihe very securilv and sw,ll-bein_ of our Nation, fiw wc
dot)end daily upon our al)i]ily 1o _aljv.'r arid an_flvzc w_'nlh_'r dala tlolll :4roulid Ih_' colin-
IfV a.¢, wCI] as lhC g]ot)C.
I urge all of you to supPorl lhis I-esoh.HiolL of which I am a cosponsor, and hope lllnl
Ihe adminislralion will tinancially und¢'rSlalld and nccc']_l Ihnl our Nniion's w,t,alllcr salel-
liws will nol be sold.
Mr. Mc(;RATI [. Mr. SpeakcI. I yield back flw balance of my lime.
GENERAl, I.EAVE
Mn FUQUA. Mr SIx'akcr, l ask unanimous consent that all Mcmt)ers may have 5 legisla-
live days in which Io revise and <'xlend Ihcir remarks on I louse ('.oncurrenl Resolulion 16_.
The SI'EAKER I)r(, ICiil])/ltc. Is lhl'r0 ob.jeclion Io Ihc rcqllt'Sl of lht" gcnllc'lli;ui fronl
Ploridn?
Thcr<' w_i_; iio obicciion.
.%'1i-.FI!Qt!A. Mr. _lit'iikl'l, I hlivl' iio flirlhcr rCqllCSls tTir liilic _illd I yield back lilt' I)al-
_illll' I)t llI,V linic.
The SPI{AKI_]R l)ro It,'lili)_lll'. The quesiion is Oil the lliOlioii oflT<,rcd I)y lhc <_t'llllcili_ill
[llilii t:hwidn (Mr. I;I !(:_)/!A) Ihlil |he l toll_;C _u_])Cli(| Ihc riill's alid ii_il'_' Io lilt' coiiclirrcnl
rl,slthlliOll, | IOllS('( ]()llCIIlfl'lll Rl'sllhilion 161"I.
The qlieslion wn_ l_ikcii.
Mr. (]ARNI_]_; Mr. S[)cakl'f, on lli_ll I dcinan(l ihc v('_l,% and ii_lV_;.
Thc yc;ts 7111(1llTi,v_ WCFC ordert'd.
l'hc SPEAKER, pro Icml)oF('. ]lllFSllalll Io lhc provisions <)["('LilI_;I' D 0[" rill(' l and lhe
(]bait's prior _illllllllllCCIliCnl, furlh_'r [)iocc/'dings on Ibis nlolion will be poslponcd ....
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So (lwo-lhirds having wil0d in thvor lhereol) the rules wcrc susl)c'ndl'd and fill" con-
('IIITCIII rcsohlli()ll Wil_, agrccd I().
'l']ll! lCSllll o[ Ihc vlilc W;i_ _llllll)llII('l'(| _IS _il)I)VC r<'cor(h'd [yeas 377, llTI,V:_ 7l_, lll)l vlll-
iil_ 291.
A m()li()ll I() rt,cOllsid('r was laid on lhc labl('.
Document 11-36
Document title: "Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984," Public Law
98-365, 98 Stat. 451, July 17, 1984.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
7he l.a.d Remote-Sensi.#( Commercialization Act Of 1984 was the ¢_dmination o/many yem:s qf debate
m,et who shmtht ;vmtrol the I"arth remote-,wnsing system :_n.rated through the Landsat satellites.
Allhmt,_h thr ICeal4an administration had advocated the outright sah" q/the entire I.andsat .s_stem as
well as the nation's weather ,satdlites, the Remote Se.si.g Act of 1984 was much more limited in so.pc.
,spec!Ticall_,. it L_ave the Secreta_ 7 Of Commerce attthority to <vmtract to p#ivate industry the marketinL_
o[ u.e.ha.ced Land,sat data. Suhsequently, the <vnlract was awarded to the Earth Observation
,_4atellite (.7.npany (EOSA?), a )oint venture &tween R('.4 and ttuLrhes Ain'rail Co_poration.
330 ()I_,SERV1N(;TIlE EARTll FROM SPACE
[ no pagination]
Public l.aw 98-365
98th Congress
PUBLIC LAW 98-365--:]UIN 17, 1984
98 STAT. 451
An Act
To establish a system to promote title use of land renmte-sensing satellite data, and tor
other pro-poses. [citation in margin: '_loly 17, 1984 (H.R. 5155)."]
Be it enacted tu the Senate and Hmzse of lqff_resentative_ of the _ _nited States 0fA merica in Congwes._
assembled, That tl-fis Act may be cited as the "l.and Remote-Sensing (;ommercialization Act
of 1984." [citation in margin: "l.and Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984.
(_ommunications and telecommunications, i 5 US(] 4201 note."]
TITI_E I--I)E(]IAILATION OF FINDINGS, PURI'OSES, AND P()I_I(;IES
FINDINGS
SE( ;. 10 I. The (]ongress finds and declares that-- [citation in margin: "(;<mgress. 15 USC
4201."1
(1) the continuous civilian collection and utilization of land remote-sensing data
from space are of major benefit in managing the Earth's natural resources and in plan-
ning and conducting many other activities of economic importance;
(2) the Federal (;overnment's experimental l,andsal system has estahlished tim
[rniled States as the world leader in land remote-sensing te<hnolog_,; [marginal note:
"l_andsat system."]
(3) the national interest of the United States lies in maintaining international lead-
ership in civil remote sensing and in broadly promoting the beneficial rise of remote-
sensing data;
(4) land remote sensing by the Government or priwue parties of the United States
att_.'cts international conlnlitnlents and policies and national security concerns of the
United Slates; [marginal note: "Detense and national security."]
(5) the broadest and most 1)eneticial use of land remote-sensing data will fesuh from
maintaining a policy of nondiscriminatory access to data;
(6) competitive, market-driven private sector iuvolvenwnl ill land remote sensing is
in the national interest of the United States;
(7) use of land remote-sensing data has been inhibited by sh)w market development
and by the lack of assurance of data c<mtinuity;
(8) the private sector, and in particular tile "value-added" industry, is best suited to
develop land remote-sensing data markets;
(9) there is doul)t thal the private sector alone ('all ('lllTellt]y dew'h)p a total land
remote-sensing system because of the high risk and large capital expenditure involved;
(10) cooperation between the Federal Government and private industry can help
assure both data continuity and United Slates leadership;
( 11 ) tile lime is now appropriate to initiate such cooperation with phased transition
to a fully commercial system;
(12) such cooperation shovkl be structured to involve the ininimunl practicable
amount of support and regulation hy the Federal Government and tilt maximum practi-
cable amount of competition by tile private sector while assuring continuous availability
to the Federal (,overnmenl of land remote-sensing data;
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(13) certain (;overnment oversight must be maintained to assure that private sector
activities are in the national interest and that the international comnfitments and policies
of the United States are h<)l)ored; and
(14) there is no compelling reason to c<mnnercialize meteorological satellites at this
time.
I'U RPOSES
SE(:. 11)2. The purposes of this Ael are t_---- [citation in margin: "15 1.TSC 4202."]
(I) guide the Federal Government in achieving proper involw'mcnt of the private
sector t)y providing a fia)nework fbr phased commercialization of land remote sensing
and by assuring continuous data availability to the Federal (;overnment;
(2) maintain the United States worldwide leadership in civil remote sensing, preserve
its national security, and lid/ill its international obligations; [marginal note: "l)etense and
national security."]
(3) lnil)ilniz(! the duration and amount of fitrther Federal investnlent necessary to
ass(lye dala continuity while achieving commercialization of civil and land )elnote sensing:
(4) provide fiJr a comf)rehensive civilian program of research, development, and
demonstration to enhance both the United States capabilities for remote sensing tiom
space and the application and utilization of such capabilities; and
(5) prohibit commercialization of meteorological satellites at this time.
POLICIES
SE(:. 103. (a) h shall be the policy of tbe United States to preserve its right to acquire and
disseminate unenhanced remote-sensing data. [citation in margin: "15 USC 4203."]
(b) It shall be the policy of the United States that civilian unenhanced remote-
sensing data be made available to all potential users on a nondiscriminatory basis and in
a manner consistent with applicable antitrust laws.
(e) It shall be the policy of the United States both to commereialize those remote-
sensing space systen)s that properly lend themselves to private sector operation and to
avoid competition by the (,overnment with such commercial operations, while continuing
to preserve our national security, to honor our international obligations, and to retain in
the (;overl)n)e))t those remote-sensing flmctions that are essentially era public service
natnre. [marginal note: "l)eli'nsc and national secttrity."]
I)EFINITIONS
SEC. 104. For pvrposes of this Act: [citation in n)argin: "15 USC 4204."]
(I) The term "l,andsat system" means Landsats 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and any related
gr<)tmd e(lUilmwnt, systems, and facilities, and any successor civil land remote-sensing
space systems operated by the United States government prior to the commencement of
the six-year period described in title !II.
(2) The tern) "Secretary" means the Secretary of Commerce.
(3) (A) The tern) "nondiscriminatory basis" means without preference bias, or any
other special arrangement (except on the basis of national security concerns pursttant to
sootier) ti07) regarding delivery, lot(nat, financing, or technical considerations which
would [_)vor one t))lyer or (:lass of buyers over another.
(B) The sale of" data is made on a nondiscriminatory basis only if (i) any offer t,,
sell or deliver data is lmblished in adwmce in such manner as will ensure that the ,)fli'r is
equally available re) all prospective I)uyers; (if) the system operator has not established or
changed any price, p()licy, pr()cedure, or other term or condition in a manner which gives
332 ()BSERVIN( ; TI IE EAR I I I FR( IM SI'A( :1;
one buyer or class of buyer de facto f,wored access to data; (iii) the system operator does
not make unenhanced data available to any purchaser on an exclusive basis; and (ix,) in a
('_:tge V+,'|tt'l'e a syslein ()peialoi of|els v()ltiine discounts, StlCh discotlnts are no gl-ealeF than
the demonstrable reductions in the cost of vohun(" sales. The sale of data on a nondis-
critninat(wy |lasts does not preclude fltc svsleltl opeialOl + fl-om of It, ring discounts other
than vohune discounts to the exlt!nl t|utl such discounts arc consistent with t|tc provisions
()I this paragraptt.
((:) T|te sale of data ()it a n()ndiscrinlinatovy basis (locs n<)l requirc (i) that a sys-
tem operator disclose names o||)UytTS or t|leir purchases; (ii) that a syst(qn operator main-
tain all, or any particular subset of, data in a working inventory; or (iii) that a system
operator expend equal ef|ort in developing a|l segtnents of a ntarket.
(4) The term "unenhanced data" means unprocessed or minimally processed signals
or fihn prod|tots collected ti(ml civi| remote-sensing space systems. Such minimal pro-
cessing may inchtde rectification or distorlions, registration with respect to |i:alures of lhe
Earlh, an(l calibration o| speclral response. Such ntinimal processing does not include
conclusions, manipulations, or calculati(ms derived from such signals or tilth products or
combination of the signals or tihn products with other data or infiwmalion.
(5) T|te tcrtn "systenl operator" nteans a co|ill-actor tln(|el title I| Ol+ lille ||l or a
license holder under tit|e IV.
T|TI+E II--OPERATI()N AND DA'IS_, MARKICI'ING ()F IANI)SAT Sk:';TEM
OPERATION
SEC. 201. (a) The Secretary shall be responsitlle |or-- [citation in margin: "15 USC
42| |."]
( | ) the l,andsat systent, including t|te or|fit, operation, and disposition of I+andsal sys-
tem, inch|dins the orbit, operation, and disposition ot +l.an(|sats 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5: and
(2) prt)visiota of data to forcigtl ground stations under the lernls t)l" agreements
between the United Stales (;overnntenl and nations thal operate su('h ground stations
which are in force on the date of conmtencenmnl of the contract awarded pursttanl
to the title.
(b) The provisi<ms of this secti<m s|tall not atfi+ct the Secretary's attlhoritv to contract
lot the operation or part or all ot t|le l+andsat system, so hmg as the United Stales
(;()VeI'IIIIICII t retains--
( 1) m,mershill of sttc|l syslClll;
(2) owncrs|fi I) of the uncnhanced data; and
(?,) authority Io make decisions conccrning operation of lilt" system.
CONTRA(:T FOR MARKETIN(; OF UNENHANCED I)ATA
SEC. 2(}2. (at In accordance with the re(|uirenlents of this title, the Secretary, |:,y means of
a cotnl)etitive |)ro(ess and to tile extent pr<)vidcd in advance by appropriation AtIs, shall
(tlllllaCl with a United Slales private seclor party (as dethwd by the Secretary) tot I|le mat +-
keting of unenhanct:d data collected by the l+andsat system. Any such contract-- Icitalion
in margin: "t5 US(: 42|2."1
( | ) shall provide thai the contractor set tilt' prices of ttnen|lanced data:
(2) ntay provide for financial arrangements between the Secretary and the (ontrac-
toy inc|uding fees f()r operating the systenl, payments |)y the contractor as an initial
fee t)l" its a petfentage {_[ sales receipls, or O|]lel such COllsidelalions;
(3) shall provide that the contractor will ottiw to sell and deliver unenhance(| (|ata to
a|| p<)tcntial buyers ()it a nondiscriminatory basis;
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(4) shall provide lhat Ihe contractor pay io 1he lhlhed Stales (;ovcrnmenl ihe filll
1)ur(has( ' price of any unenhancvd data Ihal (Oll(l_t(lOl- elecls 1o tllilize for purposes
i)lhcr than sale;
(5) shall be emered imo hy die Secrclary only if the Sccrclary has dewrmined lhal such
COilll-a('[ iS likely 1o resiill in nei cosl saviligs for lhe United Slilles (_ti/elilllleli[; al/d
((7) iiiay lie reawarded coinpetilively afler lhe praciical deinis(! ot lilt" space segmenl
of ltie [,aiidsal sysleln, as deleriiiined by ihe Secretary.
(I)) Ally cOtllracl aulhorized hy sul)section (a) nlay st)ceil }' ltlai Ihe coillraclor list,,
aiid, at his OWll expense, iilaiiilaill, r('l)aii, or illodit}'> Silch elenlenls (if lilt' l,aiidsal syslem
as lhe COlllldclor finds ilecess;<ll-y till- commercial operaliolls.
(C) Ally decision or prol)osed decision by lhe Secrelary Io eli[('l Jllll) ;lily Sllch c()li-
li'a('l shall lie irallsnlilled h) Ihe (:olnlilillee on Colnillerre, Science, ,tnd Transi)orlalioil
of the Seilate and the (]ommitlee Oll S('iellce and Teclniolog_' of lhe |h)use (if
Rcl)r(,seillalives tor lheir r<'vicw. N<l such decision <lr prolJOSed decision shall lit' ilnple-
niented unless (A) it period of lhii+iy calendar days hats passed afler lhe receipt by each
Stlch (:Oliliiiillct" of Silch lrallsniillal, or (B) each such coiniililtt,e tll,t(ire Ill(" expiralion of
siith period has agl'eed Io lransltlil and has lranslllilled to the SetTelary writlen nolice to
the t'ltt'ci thai sillh coillinillt:e has ill) ob.jeclion Io itw decision o1" proposed de('isi<lil. As
l)arl of Ihe li-ailsiilitlal, lhe Se(:l-el;tly stlall iilellide in|ornlalion (ill lhe ICllllS of Ihc ('lllt-
Iraci desciit)ed ill silhs('clion (a). [marginal note: "(:oilgiess.']
(d) In d(!llning "l.Jniled Staled private sector parly" tbr purl)(ises of lhis A_i, lhe
Se(Tl.'laiy lilily iakc inlo ac(Otliil Ihe citizenship of key personnel, locali(m of ,lssels, lor-
eign ownership, conlro], intlucnce, and other sucii faclor.
(;ONDITI()NS (iF (:OMPE'ITI'ION F()R CONTRA( :'!'
SI'](L 203. (a) The Se(TetalV shall, as part of the adveriisenienl for the coinl)eliliOll tilr Ihe
(OnllaCl allllil)ri;,:('d ]iv s('llioll _()2, ideniit}, alld publish the inlerliltli(liia] llbligalions,
llllliOllal s(,(llrily (-l)ll(('lils (with ilpl)rol)riale pr(ilectiOl] of sensilive iilfoililalil)ll, d(iilles-
tic l('gal collsidi!raliilllS, {lil(l till%' oilier sialldards or condilions which a l)rivale ('()illl'{Icil)l"
shall Im required to Met'l). [citation i/l margin: "15 use 4213.")
(hi Ill selecting a (:olilraclor till(let this title, lilt- Secretary shall COllsidei'--
(1) abiliiy to niarkel aggressively iinenhanced data;
(2) lhe tics( overall tiilallcial relliril to Ihe (;ot;erlllllell{, iil(hl(liilg II1c [)ell'filial (os(
savings to lhe (;overnilienl tilat are likely to restllt from itle coillract;
(3) ahility to ilit_cl [he obligations, concerns, considerations, slandards, and tend(-
lions idenlilled ull(lel subsection (a);
("t) le(hnila] ('Olll|)elellCe, indliding lhe ability lo aSSlll'e (7OlliinliOllS and [iniely deliv-
civ lit dala fr(lili lhe [,aildsal sysft'lll;
(5i ability I() cfl;vcl a silioolh transilion with the contrat'lol selected iliid(-r lille llk alld
((i) sii(ll olilel- talillls (is Itle ,l_etT('lal'y deems appropriate and rclevalll.
(c) Ill (is a result of the colnpelilive process required hy seelion 202(a), lilt" Secielliry
receives lie piot)osal wilich is acceptable lillder the provisions of Ihis title, the _t'clelary
shall so c('riil}' arid tiilly lepolt silch tinding to tile (:orlgress. As sooil as f)raciicahle bill
llol lailer Ihan thirty days afler so ceriit}'ing and reporting, the Secrelar'¢ shall rcopeli the
c()inl)elilivc process. The period tof 1lie subsequerit (onlpelitive process shall nol cxcet'd
()lie hllildred all(| iWellty days. if; after stlch subsequent competitive process, ihe Seclelaly
rl'ceives li_) proposal wt_icii is acceplahle under the provisions of lhis lille, ihe SecJelary
shall so cerlit}' and |'ully re|lOll slich finding t() the (]onj{iess. In the eveill thai nil accept-
able prol)osal is rec('ived, lhc _ecr('laiv shall coillillUe 1o i11arkel data flonl Ihc l,andsai
sySlCili, l iliargiilal iiole: "Rt,porl.'l
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(d) A contract awarded under section 21}2 may, in lilt" discretion of the Secretary, bc
combined with the COlltl'aCt required by title Ill, pursuant Io section 3t),|0) ).
SAI,E ()F I)ATA
SEC. 204. (a) After the dale of the conmmncement of the contract described in section
202(a), lhe contractor shall be entitled It) revenues from sales of copies of data from tilt'
I,andsat system, subject t<) the clmditions specified in sectitms 601 and 6(/2. [citatitm in
margin: 15 US(] 4214."t
(b) The contractor may continue to market data previously generated by tilt' l,andsat
system after the demise of the st)ace Seglllell[ of the sysIeln.
FOREI(;N (;ROUN1) STATIONS
SEC. 205. (a) "File COlltract under this title shall provide thal (kmtractov shall act its tile
agent of the Secretary by continuing to supply unenhanced data to foreign ground sta-
tions for the life, and according to tile terms of those agreements between the United
Sl;:llt"s (/overnmenI and such toreign ground stations lhat are m force Oll the date of the
commencement of the com,act. [citation in margin: "l 5 US(; 4215."]
(b) I !pon the expiration ofsuch agreements, or in tile case of Ioreign ground stations
that have no agreemenl with the United States tm the date <d commencement ot the con-
tract, tile contract shall provide--
(1) that unenhanced dala ti'oln l]le l.an(Isat system shall be made available to foreign
ground stations only by the contract<w: and
(2) Illat Stlch data shall be made awdlable on a nOlldiscrinlillatory basis.
TITtlE III--I'R()VISI()N ()F I)ATA C()NTINUITYAKI'ER THE I.ANDSAT SYSTEM
PURP()SES AND I)EFINITION
SEt'. 301 (a) It is the imrpose of lhis title-- lcitation in margin: "15 US(" 4221."]
(1) to provide, in an orderly manner and with minimal risk, for a transition ti-otn
(_'(_V{'l'lllll('lll opt'ration to private, comlnercial operation of civil lalld ielllOle-sellSillg
systems; and
(2) It) provide data continuity for six years after tile practical demise of lilt" spate seg-
IIIC'III {}f the Lalldsat syslelll.
(b) For purposes of this lille, the lerln "data continuity" means the continued avail-
ability of unenhauced data--
( 1) inchtding data which arc from lilt" point of view of a data user--
(A) tilnrtioltally eqtlivalcnt to the inllllispectlal data gellelale(t tlv tilt'
Landsat 1 alld 2 sate]liles; alld
(B) compatihle with such data and with equipment used t<} veceiw and
process such data; and
(2) ill an annual w)hune at leasl equal It) the Federal usage during fiscal year 1983.
(c) l)ata continuity may be provided using whatever technologies are available.
I)XD _,C()NTINUITYAND A\'%IIABII,ITY
SEC. 302. The Secretary shall solicil proposals tiom Unites Slates private sector parties (as
defined t)y tile Secretary pursuant to section 202) for a (tmtract for the (tevelopnwnt and
operation ofa remole-sensing space system capat)le of providing data continuity fin a peri-
od of six years anti for markcting tmenhanccd data in accordance with lilt" provisions <)t
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seclions 601 and 602. Such proposals, at a minimunl, shall specil_'-- let(alton in margin:
"(Jonlracts with U.S. 15 US(: 4222."1
(1) the quantities and qualities of nnenhanccd dala expected from the system;
(2) the projected date upon which operations could begin;
(3) the nmnber o| salelliles to be constructed and their expecled lifetimes;
(4) any need tor Federal tim(ling to develop the system;
(5) any percentage oF sales receipts or other returns ofl'ered to lilt" Federal
(Jovcrlunenl;
(6) plans for expanding Ihe market for land remote-sensing (lala; and
(7) the proposed procedures lot meeting the national security concerns and inter-
nalional ohligalions of ihe l.!niied Stales in accordance wilh setlion 607.
AWARI)IN(; OF THE (tON'I'lL&( 71"
SE(]. 303. (at ( I ) In accordance wifll the requirements of this title, Ihc Secretary shall eval-
Itale lhe proposals described in secliol/ 302 and, by means o|a conlpelilive process and to
Ihe exlenl provided in advance hy appropriation Acts, shall cOnlla(l with the United
Slates private st"clor party for the cal)at)ility of pr<)viding data contint,ity for a period <_t six
years and lbr marketing tmenhanced data. [citation in margin: "15 US(; 4223."1
(2) Befi>re comtnen(ing space operations the c(mtractor shall ohtain a license un(Icr
tith' IV.
(h) As part of Ihe evaluation descrihed in subsection (at, Ill(" Secretary shall analyze
Ill(' exl)ecled oHl(ome of each proposal ill |ernls 01 _
(It the net cosl Io the Fed('ral (_-OVelilnlent o| developing lhe reconunended syslem;
(2) lhe technical conll)('lence and financial condition of Ihe contractor;
(3) lhe availabilily _dsuch data afl('r the expccled lernfination oflhe I.andsal syslem;
(4) the quantities and qualities of data to be generated by the rcconuncnded system;
(5) the conlraclor's ahilily to S,l)l)lemerJt the requiremenl fi_r (lala c(mlintfily hy
adding, at lhc contraclor's expel'Jse, rernote-seusing capabilities which maintain
t !niled States leadership in remote sensing;
(6) the potential to exl)and the market [_)r data;
(7) expecled relnrns to lit(, Federal Government based on any percentage o[' data
sales or olht'r slwh financial consideration off(wed to the Federa] (;overnment in
accordance with section 305;
(8) Ihe commercial viahilily of the proposal;
(9) the proposed procedures for satis_ing the national security concerns and inler-
national obligations of the Uniled States;
(10) the conlractor's ability to effect a smooth transition with any conlraclor selecle(t
under till<:, ll; and
( 1 I ) such _nher tat(ors as tile Secretary deems appropriate and relevant.
(c) Any decisi<>n or proposed decision by the Secretary to enter into any such con-
uact shall be transmitted to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transp(n'tation
()f lhe Senal(* im(l the Comnlittee on Science and Technolo_' of the liouse of
Representatives for their review. No such decision or proposed decision shall be imph'-
tnented unless ( I ) a period of thirty calendar days has passed after the receipt hy each
such c<munittec of such transmittal, or (2) each such committee before the expiration ol +
such period has agreed to transmit and has transmitted to the Secretary written notice to
lilt" ('fl_'('l lhal stwh c()lmnillee has no objection to the decision or prol)ose(l (lecisi(m. As
par! of the tr'ansmittal, lt_e Secrelary shall include the inlormation specit](.d in snl)se(:tion
(at. Imarginal n(_te: "(_(mgress."]
(d) If, as a resuh of the (Oml)etilive process rcqnired by tilts st'(lion, tilt' Sec,-elary
receives no proposal which is acceplahle under the provisions of (tits title, tilt' Secretary
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shai]socertit_,andfuilyreportsuchfindingto tile Congress. As soon as practicable but
llOt laleI" lhan thirty days after so cerlii_4ng and reporting, the Secretary silall reopen the
competitive process. The period tot the subsequent competitive process shall not exceed
one inmdred and eighty days. If +,after such subsequent competitive process, the Secretary
receives no proposal which is acceptable tilldeI tire provisions of this title, the Seci'clai'y
shall so teltit)' ai/d fully Iepoi't stich [hldillg to tile (]Oil_,i+ess. Not earlier than nhtety days
after sucil certification and rel).ort, the Secretary may assure data continuity by procure-
sent atnd operation by the Federal (;overnment of the necessary s),stems, to the extent
provided in advance by appropriation Acts. [marghlal note: "Report."l
TF.RMS OF CONTRACT
SE(:. ?,04. (a) Any comract entered into pursuant to tiffs title-- [citation in margin:
"15 US(; 4224."]
(I) siiall be entered imo as soon as practicable, allowing for + the competitive pro-
ctnement process required by this title;
(2) siiail, in accordance with criteria deterntined alld publisiled by the Secretary+ rea-
sonably assure data continuity for a period of six years, beginning as soon as practicm
ble in order to minimize any inwrruplioi+ of data availability;
(3) sitali provide that tim c<_)itti'act<)l- will oiler to sell and deliver un('nlianced data to
;ill potential buyers <in a n<mdiscriminat<+rv basis;
(4) shat] not provide a _,tiaiantee of data ptlicitases tlOill tile coltti+actor by tiw
Federal (;overnment;
(5) may provide that tire contractor utilize, on a space-available basis, a civilian
United States (;OVt'Fnlllelll satellite or vehicle as a platters tor at cMI land I-etllote-
sensing space svswnl, it _-
(A) the contractor agrees to reimburse the (.;overnntellt inunediatelv for all
related costs incurred with respect to such utilization, including a reastmabh'
and proportionate share of fixed, piatforin, data transmission, and launcil
<+.:()sis;and
(B) such ulilizalion would ilol intert{'re whh or olherwise coinproniise
ini<+ulded civilian (l()verilllleill iiiissioils, as delernliiicd t)y tile a_eil(y resl)on-
sible for ilie civilian plailorni: and
(6) lllav provide financial Stll)p<llt bv the [3itited States (;oV/,l+nilieni, it)i a porliOil ill
the capital (<)sis r('quired to provide data continui W fill a period of six veals, in the
forin o| +ioalls, loan gtiaianlees, or paynlenls purslianl to section _()5 of tit( + Pedcra]
Property and Adnlhiistrative Services Act <)| i949 (41 U.S.(;. 255).
(b) ( ] ) _¥il]lolil re_ard io Wbcl}ler ailv t:l)nlracct i-iliered inlo iiildei" this title is (-l)lli-
bined witlt a conllact iiildei +tille it, life Secrelary shall proiliptly deleiiiline whether lhe
(+oitlracl eillered into uiltier this tith" reas<)iiably effecttiatvs the imrposes and policies <ff
title iI. Such detei+ininatioil shall be stibmilted to tile President and the (]Oilgi'ess, toget]l-
er with a full stateint+iit of titc basis till +siit'h deterininalioil.
(7) If the _t'cit'lai+x' deleriniites ltlal sucli Coilllaci does nol i+easoilat)lv eliT<+cluale the
requh(-nlcills ot +tide lI, the ,i_ecrelarv shall t)i(miplly carry out tile provisions o1 silch title
lo die ,:.×leiit provided in a<lt,allc(" hi appropi+iaiion Acts.
MARKETIN(;
SEt;..<105. (a) lit order it) i)ronlote aggressive ntatketing of land rcniote-sensing data, any
coillia<.l ellll'led iiilo i)tirstlaiil 1o this iiilc iilaiy provide lhal lilt+ peicenla_e (if sales paid
by the coiitracloi tit the Pedcrai (;oveliiiilenl silail decrease accordhtg to stipulated
hicicase in sales levels. [citalion in nial+gin: "15 US(; 4225."]
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(h) After the six-ye,u- period described in section 304(a) (2), tile contractor inay con-
tinne to sell dala. I[lic_'nsf'd under title IV, tlt<_'conlr_tct<;ir may conlintie to op_.'ral+." a civil
lell|o|e-scnsillg space systelt1+
REP()RT
SE(L 306. Two years _dtt'r the date <+Ifile c<;inlnletlcement of the six-year period descrihed
in se,tli<>n 304(a)(2), the Secretary shall report to the President and l<l the (]ongless <;ill
the pr<_gi+ess <;it the transit;oct t¢;, fully private financing, ownership, and operation <;il
t+eniote-sensing space systetns, tf)gether with any recotnlnendations ;or aclions, including
,wti<Jlls ii¢'<essary Io etlstire l.Tniled States lcadershil> in civili,nt I,tttd remote sensing tionl
Sl:mce. [ citatiol+ in nlargin: "15 t.!S(: 4226."+
TI"RMINATI()N ()F At!T] I()RITY
SE(]. ++,07.+l'h¢' authority gra,_ied t_;i lhe Secretary hy this title shall terminate tel+ +veat+s
after the dale <>fenact sent of this Act. ]citation in margin: "l 5 [!S( ; 4227."]
TITI .E I\:--1 .I( :ENS! N(; ( )F PRIVATE REM()TE-SENSIN(; SPA( :E S_t.'STE MS
( ;ENERAI+ AUTI tORITY
SE( ;. 4<)1. (at ( 1 ) lit consltltali<)n wilh other appropriate Federal agencies, the Secrelary is
at<thor;zeal If) licenst' private sector parties to operate private rentote-sensing space sys-
tems tbr such period as Ihe Secretary may specify and in accordance with the pl'flvisions
of Ihis title. [cilation in thaigin: "15 [3S(3 4241."]
(2) In tile case ofa privale space system that is used tbr rclllole sensing and other pin-
poses, the anlilorilv <it the SCCl+Clal+y under this title shall he lint;led only to the ;'eChOIC-
sensing operati<ms of such space system.
(It) No license shall he granted by the Secretary unless lhe Seclelaty detetntines tit
writing that the applicattt will comply with the requirements of this Act, any regulations
isstied pursuant to this Act, and any applicable international obligations and national
security concerns of the United Stales.
(c) The Secretary shall review any application and make a deterniination thereon
within one httndred and twenty days of the receipt of such application. If final action has
not occurred within such time, the Secretary shall inform the applicant of any pending
issues and of actions required to resolve them. [marginal note: "Review date."]
(d) The Seci+elary shall l+<;ildeny sttch license in order to protect any existing licens-
es frottl cfinil)etition.
C()NDITIONS FOR OPERATION
SE(;. 4t)2. (at No pers<m who is stlbject to the jurisdiction or cf)ntrol of the United Stales
Inay, direclly or iln+<lugh any suhsidiary fit afliliale, operale any private l+elnole-sl_nsiiig
sl);i('e systeln v¢ithotli _t license ptirsilant to section 401.
(h) Aiiy ]i(ense issiie(l pursuant to this title shall specify, al a ininiinunt, thai the
Ii(ense siiall c_;iinl)ly with ;ill of the<, reqttirements of this Act and shall-
( 1) <Jpl'lale lhe system in milch manner as to preserve and promote the national seen-
iity ot lhe t!llited Slates and Io observe and implenient the international obligations
<)t the t!nited Slates ill acff)ldallCe with section 607;
(2) ililtke ilni'llhaliCed dala ;ivililiil)le Io till polelitial /isel-s Oil a iil/ndisclinliliall;ily
hasis;
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(3)uponterminationofoperationsunderthelicense,makedispositionofanysatel-
litesinspaceinamannersatislhctorytothePresident;(4)pronlptlymakeavailableallunenhanceddatawhichtheSecretarymayreques!
pursuanttosection602;(5) [hrnishtheSecretarywithc()mpleteorbitanddatacollectioncharacteristicsof
thesystem,obtainadvanceapprovalofanyintendedeviation|tornsuchcharacter-is-
tics,andintormtheSecretaryofanyunintendeddeviation;(6)notifytheSecretaryofanyagreementthelicenseeinten<lstoenterwithatoreign
nation,cntit),orconsortiuminw)lvingtorcignnationsorentities;(7)permitileinspectionbytheSecretaryoftirelicensee'sequipment,ta.cilitics,and
financialrecords;(8)surren<lerthe licenseandterminateoperationsuponnotificationby the
Secretaryl)tlrsualrto tilesection403(a)(I); and(9)(A)notit_'theSecretaryof any"valueadded"activilies(asdetinedby the
Secretaryb regttlatitm)thatwillt)econductedbythelicenseeorbyasubsidiary
or affiliate; and
(B) if sttch activities are to be conducted, provide the Sect+etary with a plan tbr
compliance with the provisions of this Act conceHfing notrdiscriminatory access.
AI)MINISTRATIVE AUTI I()RITY OF THE SE('RETARY
SEC. 403. (a) In cwder to carry out the responsibilities specified in (Iris title, the Secretary
ma_ [citation in margin: "15 USC 4243."]
( 1 ) grant, terminate, modit_', condition, transfer, or suspend licenses under this title,
and upon notitication of the licensee may terminate licensed operations on an imme-
diate basis, if tile Secretary determines that the licensee has substantially failed to
comply with any provision of this Act, with any regulation issued under this Act, with
any terms, corrclilions, or restrictions of such license, or with any international oblig-
ati(ms <it+ national sectnity concerns (if the United States;
(2) inspect the equipment, t_lcilities, <)r tinancial records of any licensee under this
title;
(3) p,t)vide penalties fi)r noncompliance with the requirements tbr licenses or regtda-
tions isstted nn(ter this title, incltlding civil l)enalties not to exceed $10,000 (each day of
operation in violation of such licenses or regtdati()ns constituting a separate vi()lati()n);
(4) compromise, mo(lit_,, or remit any such civil penahy;
(5) issue sttl)penas lsic] tot any matetials, documents, <+r records, or t0r tire atten-
dance and testimony of witnesses lot the purpose <it conducting a hearing under this
section;
(6) seize any object, record, or report where there is probable cause to believe that
such object, record, on report was used, is being used, or is likeh, to be used in viola-
tion ot this Act, or the requirements of a license or regulation issued thereunder; and
(7) make investigations and inquiries and administer to or lake tr()lll ;dlly person an
oath, affirmation, or aftidavit concerning any matter relating to the evdorcemenl ot
this Act.
(b) Any applicant or licensee who makes a timely re<luCSt tbr review of an adverse
action pursnant to sul)scction (a) (1), (a) (3), or (a) (6) shall be entitled to adjudication by
the Secrt'tary on tire record after an opportunity for an agency hearing with respect to
such adverse action. Any tinal action by the Secretary under this subsection shall be sub-
ject to judicial review ttnder chapter 7 of title 5, United States (;o(le. [citation in margin:
"5 USC 7(11 et seq."]
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RI_:(;UlwYFORYAUTHORI'IT ()F THE SECREJARY
SE( :. 4{)4. The Secretary may issue regulations to carry out the provisions of this title. Such
regt,lations shall be promulgated only after public notice and comment in accordance
with the provisions of section 553 of title 5, United States Code. [citation in margin: "15
USC 4244."]
A(,ENCY ACTIVITIES
SE(:. 405. (a) A private sector party may apply for a license to operate a private remote-
sensing space system which utilizes, on a space-available basis, a civilian United States
(;overnment satellite or vehicle as a platlmm tilt such system. The Secretary, pursuant to
the auth<)vilies of this litle, may license st,ch system if it meets all tim conditions of this title
and-- [cilation in margin: "15 US(; 4245."]
(1) the system operator agrees to reimburse the Government immediately for all
related costs incurred with respect to such utilization, including a reasonable and pro-
portionate share of tixed, platform, data transmission, and launch costs; and
(2) such utilization would not intertkrre with or otherwise compromise intended civil-
ian (;overnment missions, as determined by tim agency responsible tot such civilian
plattorm.
(b) The Secretary may offer assistance to priwtte sector parties in finding appropriate
optJorttmities fin- such utilization.
(c) "l'o the extent provided in advance by appropriation Acts, any Federal agency may
enltw into agreements for such utilization if such agreements are consistent with such
agency's mission and statltlory authorily, and if such remote-sensing space system is
licensed by the Secretary before commencing operation.
(d) The pr<wisions of this section do not apply to activities carried out onder title V.
(el Nothing in this title shall aflkecl the authority of the Federal Communications
(:ommission pursuant to the Commtutications Act of 1934, as antended (47 U.S.C. 151 et
seq.). Icitation in margin: "47 US(: 609."1
TERMINATION
SE(:. 406. It, five years after the expiration of the six-year period described in section
30,l(a) (2), no privale sector party has been licensed and continued in operation under
the pr<)visions of this lille, the authority of this title shall terminate. [citation in margin:
"15 ITS(: 4246."1
T1T1 +E V--RESI+_RCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(:ONTINUED FEDERAl+ RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SE(:. 501. (a) ( I ) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Adnfinistration
is directed to c<mtinue and to enhance such Administration's programs of remote-sensing
research and deveh_lmmnt. [citation in margin: "15 USC 4261."]
(2) The Administrator is authorized and encouraged t(r----
(A) conduct experimental space remote-sensing programs (inchtding appli-
cations demonstration programs and basis research at tmiversities);
(B) develop remote-sensing technoh)gies and techniques, including those
needed for monitoring the Earth and its environment; and
((:) conduct sttch research and development in cooperation with other
Federal agencies and with public and private research entities (including
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privateindustry,universities,Statcandlocalgovernnmnts,foreigngovcrn-
Inents,andinternationalorganizaliOllS);Ill(|to ellleFinlo alTallgelllelllS(includingjointventures)whichwillloster such cooperation.
(b) (1) The Secretary is directed to conduct a continuing program of
(A) research in applications of remole-sensing;
(B) monitoring (:,f"lhe Earlh and its environment; and
(C) development of technology tin such monitoring.
(2) Such program may inchMe support of basic research al mfiversilies and den)on-
strations of applications.
(3) The Secretary is authorized and encouraged to conduct such research, monitor-
ing, and developnmnt in cooperation vdth other Federal agencies and with public and pri-
vate research entities (inchtding priwtle inchtslry, tmiversities, Stale and local
governments, foreign governnmnls, and international organizations) and to enter inlo
arrangements (including joint venltll'('s) which will toster such cooperation.
(c) (1) hi order to enhance tile Uniled Slales ability to manage and utilize its renew-
able and nonrenewable resottrces, the Secretary of Agricuhure and the Secretary
of tile hllerior are autllorized and ellcouraged to Colldtlct programs of reseal-(h
and developnlent in tile applications of remote sensing using timds appropriated
tot such purposes.
(2) Such programs may include basic research at universities, demonstrations of
applications, and cooperative activilies involving other (;overnnmt_t agencies, pri-
vate sector parties, and ti,reign and imernalional organizati,ms.
(d) Other Federal agencies are authorized and encouraged to conduct research and
dewqopment on tile use of remote sensing in tulfilhnent of their attthorized missions,
using timds appropriated tot such purposes.
(e) Tile Secretary alld Ill<." Administrator of tilt" National Aeronautics and Space
Administration shall, within one }'ear atier lilt: date of enactnlent o[ this Act and biemfi-
ally thereafter, jointly develop and transnlit to the (;<regress a report which includes (1) a
unitied national plan ti)r remote-sensing research and development applied to the Earth
and its atmosl)hel+e; (2) a compilation of progt-ess in the relevant ongoing research atnd
devel<lpnwnt aclivities of the Federal agencies; and (3) an assessnlent of the state ot our
knowledge of the Earth and its attnosphere, the needs for additional research (including
research related to operational Federal remole-sensing space l)rOglmns), and ol)porttufi-
tics available lot further progress, tmarginal note: "Report. '+]
USE OF EXPERIMENIAI, I}A1A
SEC. 502. Data gathered ill Federal experimental remote-sensing space programs may be
used in related research and development progranls funded by the Federal C,overmnenl
(including applicati<ms programs) and cooperative research lwograms, but not Ior com-
nlercial rises or in competition with private sector activities, except pursuant to setli<m
5(13. leitation in margin: "15 USC 4262."1
SAI.E OF EXI'ERIMEN_I_\I, I)XI)X
SEt:. 503. l)ata gathered in Federal experimental remote-sensing space programs may t)c
sold en bloc through a competitive process (consistenl with national security interests and
international obligations of the United States and in accordance with section 607) lo :t 1_ r
United States entity which will inmkel lilt' data on a nondiscriminal<_rv basis. ]citation ill
margin: "15 t _S( ; 4263." ]
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TITI,E VII(;ENERAI+ I'R()VISIONS
N()NI)ISCRIMINATORY I)ATA A\Sx.II ABII+ITY
SE(;. 601. (a) Any uncnhanced data generated by any system operator under I]le provi-
sions of lifts Act shall he made available to all users on a nondiscriminatory basis in "a<cof
<lance with Ihc requirements of this Act. I<ilalion il_ mavgitl: 'q'ublic wcailabilily. 15 I_!S(;
4263."1
(h) Any syslem o])eYalof shall make publicly availahle the prices, policies, procedures,
and other wrms and c<mdili<ms (tnu, in accordance with section 104(3)((:), not neces-
sarily the names of huyers or Ihciv prochases) upon whi<h lhe operator will sell such <lata.
AR(;I IlVIN(; OF I)ATA
SE(;. 602. (a) It is in Ihe puhli< imeres! for the Uniled States (;ovevnmcnt-- [citalion in
margin: "l 5 1!S(: 't272."]
( l ) 1o maintain an ar<hivc of land rcmole-sensing dala tbr hislorical, scientific, and
wthnical purposes, inclu<liag long-term global environmental monitoring;
(2) to control the ('olllellt alld scope of the archiw'; and
(3) to asstH'c the quality, integrity, and continuity of the archive.
(h) The SccretaFy shall t_rovi<lc tot long-lerm storage, mainlenanct, and ul)gra<ling o1
t>asi_, glohal, land vemolc-scllsing data set (hereinal]er rcR'rrcd to as the "basic data sel")
and shall [blh_w vcasonahle archival practices to assure proper SlOl-agu al/d i)reservatiotl of
the I>asic <lata set and limely access lot parties requesting data. The hasic data set which
lhc Secretary assembles in the C,overnmcnt archive shall remain distinct fiom any inven-
tory of dala which a system operator may maintain for sales and tot other purp<_ses.
(<+) In determining the initial content <>1; or in upgrading, thc basic data set, the
Sc_ rotaryshall-
( I ) use as a baseline the data archived on the dale of ellaCIlll¢'ll[ ()U lifts Act;
(2) lake itlto account llHtlne technical and scientitic develol)ments alld nweds;
(3) consult wilh all<l seek the a<lvicc of users and pro<htcls;
(.i) consider 1he m'e<l [iw data which may bc duplicalive in terms of geographical cover-
age hut which difti:r in terms of season, spectral hands, resolution, or other rele'_-an! tac-
t<)rs;
(5) include, as the Secretory considers appropriate, unenhanced data generated
either by the I+andsal system, pursuant to title Ill, or by licensees under lille IV;
(6) include, as the Secretary considers appropriate, data collected by toreign ground
stations or by foreign remote-sensing space systems; and
(7) ensure thal the content of the archive is developed in accordance wilh scclion 607.
(t'l) SIIbjec! Io l]|c availability of appropriations, the Secretary shall request data need-
ed [_>1 lilt" hasic <lata set and pay to the providing syslem operator reasonable costs for
reproduction and lransmission. A system operator shall promptly make requesled dam
availahlc in a term suitable tiw processing for archiving.
(e) Any system operator shall have the exclusive righl to sell all data lhal the opera-
tc_v provides to I]lC United States remote-sensing data archive li)r a period to be deler-
mined h v Ihc Secretary hut not lo cxcccd ten years from thc <late the data are sensed. In
Ihc case of +data get_cvaled from the l,an<lsal system prior to the implementation of the
Collll-aCl described in section 202(a), any contractor selected pursuant to section 202 shall
have the exclusive right t. marker stlc|l data on behalf of the l_!nited Stales (;overnnlenl
toy the duFalion of sHch (OlllracI. m sySIClII operator nmy relinquish the cxchlsive right
and consellt to distrihufiotl [i-ore the archiw" bctore Ihc period of exclusiw, right has
expired hy levminatillg the ottiw to sell particular dala. [marginal note: "Marketing."]
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(t) atierdmexpirationofsuchexclusiverighttosell,orafterelinquishnwntofsuch
right,thedataprovidedlotheUnitedSlatesremote-sensingdalaarchiveshallbeinthepuh-
licdomainandshallIx_madeavailable to requesting parties hy the Secretary of prices rHlect-
ing reasonable cosls of reproduction and transmittal. [marginal note: "Public availabiliLv"]
(g) In carrying out the functions of this section, the Secretary shall, to lhe extent
practicable and its provided in advance by appropriations Act, use existing Government
[_tcilities.
N()NREPRODU(7I'ION
SEC. 603. Unenhanced data distributed by arty system operator under the provisions of
this Act may t)e sold on the condition that such data will not he reproduced or dissemi-
nated by the purchaser. [citation in margin: "15 US(] 4273."]
REIMBURSEMENT FOR ASSISTANCE
SEC. 604. The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
Secretary of Defense and the heads of olher Federal agencies may provide assistance to sys-
tem operators under the provisions of this Act. Substantial assislance shall he reimbursed by
the operator, except as otherwise provided by law. [citation in mmgin: "15 USC 4274."]
ACQUISITION OF EQUIPMENT
SElL 605. The Secretary may, by means of a competitive process, allow a licensee under
title IV t)r all}' other private party to buy, lease, or otherwise acquire the use or equipment
from the l,andsat system, when such etluipmenl is no longer needed for the operation of
sttch system or for the sale of data fiom suth system. Officials of other Federal civilian
agencies are authorized and encouraged It) cooperative with tilt" Secretary in carrying out
the provisions of this section. [citation in margin: "15 USC 4275."]
RADIO FREQU EN( :Y ALLO(_ATION
SEC. 606. (a) Within thirly days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Presiden! (or
the President's delegee [sit], if any, with attlht)rily over the assignment of frequencies of
radio stations of classes of radio stalions operated by the United States) shall make avail-
ahle for nongovernmental use spectrum presently allocated to Government use, for use
by United States I.andsat and commercial remote-sensing space syslems. The spectrum to
be so made awfilable shall contorm to any applicable international radio or wire treaty or
convenlion, or regulations annexed thereto. Within ninety days thereafter, the Federal
Communications Commission shall utilize appropriate procedures to authorize the use of
such spectrum ti)r nongovernmental use. Nodfing in tiffs section shall preclude the abili-
ty of the Commission to allocate additional spectrum Io commercial land remote-sensing
space satellite system use. [citation in margin: "President of the U.S. 15 USC 4276."1
(b) 1"o the extent required by the Communications Act of 1934, its amended
(47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.), an application shall be filed with lhe Federal Communications
(]ommission for any radio facilities involved with file commercial ,emote-sensing space
system. [citati(m in margin: "47 US(; 609."]
(c) It is the intent of Congress that the Federal Communications (]ommission com-
plete the radio licensing process I.lllder the (]Oltlml|nitatiolls Act of 19q;4, as amendt-tl (47
U.S.C. 151 et seq.), upon the application of any private sector party or consortium opera-
tor of any commercial land remole-sensing space system subjecl to this Act, within one
hundred and twenty days of the receipt of an application for such licensing. If final aclion
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has not occurred within one hundred and twenty days of the receipt of such an applica-
lion, l]le Federal (]{/lllllltllli(ati(ins (]tillllllission shall ilifOrlll the applican! (if ally pending
issues and of actions required to resolve them.
(d) Authority shall not be required from the Federal Commtmicationis Commission
fi)r the developnneni and construction of ally United States land remote-sensing space sys-
tem (or (component thereof), other than radio transmitting facilities or colnponenL%
while any licensing determination is being made.
re) Prequency allocations nlade purslianl to this section by the Federal (]olllinuni-
calions (]onunission shall lie consistent with international obligalions and wilh the public
iillercsl.
C()NSUI_TATION
SEC. 607. (a) The Se(Telary shall consult with the Secretary of l)eRqlse on all mailers
ilndei illis Act affi'cting national securily. The Secretary of De|c-IlSe shall be responsihie
for delerinining lliose condilions, consislerii with this Act, necessary 1o nleel naliona[
seciirily (oncerns of the Untied _tales and |Tir notifying the _ecrelary l)ronipliy of sii(h
conditions. [trial|on ill lllargin: "[)ef_.'nse arid national security. 15 I_!S(: 4277."]
(hi (1) The Secretary shall consuh with the Secretary of State on all matters under
Ihis Act affi'cting international ohligations. The Secretary of State shall be reslion-
siblc tk)l delerniining those conditions, consistent with Ihis Act, ilCCCssary to meet
inlernalional ohiigations and policies of the Uniled Stales and for notifying the
Secrvlary prolnpliy of such eol-iditions.
(2) Appropriate Federal agencies are authorized and eliC()Ulaged to provide
remote-sensing data, technology, and training dew:loping nations as a component
{if" [)rogranis of international aid.
(3) The Secrciary of Slaw shall promptly tel/err to Ihe Secrelary any instances
oulside lhe [.In|led Stales of discriminatory distribution of data.
(c) If, as a rcsuh oftechllical ,nodifications imposed on a system operalor on l]ie hasis
of ilatioila] securily concerns, the Secretary, in COllsuhation with the Se(Telary of Defense
or with oilier Pedt'la] a_,cncios, delerinines that additional costs will lie ilicurrt'd by the
svslelli operalor, or trial past development costs (including the cost of capital) will not be
recovered hy the system o|)eralor, the Secretary may require the agency or agencies
requesting su{h technical modifications to reimburse the system operator for such addi-
tional or dewqopmenl costs, |)tit not for anticipated profits. Reimbursements may cover
costs associated with required changes in system performance, but nol costs ordinarily
asso(iatt:d with doing busiuess ahroad.
AMENDMENT TO NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPA(:E ADMINISTRATION AUTttORIZATION, 1983
SE(L li08. Suhsection (a) {if section 201 of the National Aeronautics and Space
Adlninistration Authorization Act, ! 983 (Public law 97-324; 96 Star. 1601 ) is amended to
read as tbllows: [citation in margin: "15 US(: 1517 note."]
"(a) "Flit' Secretary of (]ommerce is authorized to plan and provide for the manage-
nlellt and operation of civil reniote-sensing space systems, which may include the l,andsai
,t and 5 satellites and associated ground system equipment transferred from the National
At'ronautics and Space Administration; to provide for user fees; and It) plan for tile trans-
fi'r (if the operation (if civil renlole-sensing space systems to the privale sl:ctof wiieil ill the
llaliolia] inleresl."
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AUTHORIZATION ()F APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 609. (at There are aulhorized to be appropriated to tile Secretary $75,000,000 tot
tiscal year 1985 li)r tile purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act. Such sums shall
remain available until expended, but shall not become availal)le until the lime periods
specified in sections 202(c) and 303(c) have expired. [citation in margin: "15 USC ,t278."]
(b) The authorization provided for under subsection (at) shall be in addition to mot>
eys [sic] authorized pursuant to title II of the Nail<real Aeronautics and Space
Administration Acl, 1983. [citation in margin: "15 USC 1517.']
TITI.E VII--PR()I tlIUTION OF (X)MMER(;IA1JZATI()N ()F WEATI tER SNI'ELLITES
PRO1 tlIMTION
SEC. 701. Neither the President nor any other otticial of tile (;overnmenl shall make at W
effort to lease, sell, or translm to tile private sect¢m commercialize, or in any way disman-
tle any portion of the weather satellite systems operated by the Department ot(kmmmrce
or any successor agency. [citation in margin: "President of U.S. 15 USC 4291."1
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
SEC. 7{)2. Regardless of any change in circuntstances subsequent to the enallnlettl of this
Act, even if such dtange makes it appear to 1)e in the national interest to conmmrcialize
weather satellites, neither the President nor any otficial shall take any action prohibited by
section 7111 unless Ihis title has [irst been repealed. [citation in margin: "15 USC 4292."]
Approved.luly 17, 1984.
I.E(;ISIATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 5155:
tt()USE REPORT No. 96-647 (Comm. on Science and Technology).
SENXFE REPORT No. 98-458 (Conmt. on Commerce, Science, and Tr;msporration.
(;()N(;RESSION;U. RECORD Vol. 130 ( 1984);
Apr. 9, considered and passed ttouse.
.]tme 8, considered and passed Senate, amended.
Jtme 28, ttouse concurred in Senate amendment with an amendntenl.
.June 29, Senate concurred in ttouse anH'ndnlent.
WEEKINC()MPII_'\TION ()F PRESIDENTIAl, I)()(]UMENTS, \q_l. 20, No. 29 (1981):
Jttly 17, Presidential statement.
Document 11-37
Document tide: Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, "Statement by the Press
Secretary," June 1, 1989.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
By mid-1989, EO&4T had been operating l.andgats 4 and 5./0r more thmi three year_, but EOX4.T'.s
income from data _ale._ did not quite equal, let along exceed, its operating co_ts, tlence, I(OSAT _till
relied on the ,sat)port O/ w'veml million o/ dollar_ /Jom the /_,deral government to conlinue to collect
l.and_at data. ,% single government aLren_y wa.s willing to provide this _'lalivelr _mall ammtnl o/
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morn3,. Because o/thi_ di,_lmte, l.a.dsat @erations were in danger of bei.g clo,_ed down. Tbi_ pPe_i-
dential decision settled the immediate /uture O/l.and_at and ,set up a mecha.i_m /br later reexami-
.ation o/its _tatus.
[ no pagination ]
For hnlnediale Release June 1, 1989
Statement by the Press Secretary
The President today announced he had approved timding for continued operations
of l,andsal satellites 't and ,q and fin the completion and launch o[ l,andsal 6. The
I_residenl's action endorsed a recolnnlendation from the National Space Council chaired
by Vice President Dan Quayle. The President also directed the National Space (:ouncil
and the Oftice of Managelnent and Budget to review options with the intention of con-
tinuing l.an(tsat-type data collecliollS ariel Landsat 6.
l.andsat, which takes detailed photographs ot + the earth, in the U.S. (;overlmlent's
civil, space-based, land renlole sensing program, l+andsat-type imagery data in important
tor such aplflications as global change research, environnlental inonil<wing, law el+tbrce-
inent, llaltlra] resl)llrce estinlales, llaliollal security and a variety of private sector list's. In
addition, l+andsat provides a visible symbol of the U.S. commitment to, and h'adership ill
the IlSe of space till the COllllnon good.
(),,er recent years, it has I)econle increasingly evident that commercializillg the entire
l.anttsal prograln would not lie tk'asible until al least the end of the (elllury. Since earlier
goverlllllell[ plannillg was based on commercializing the entire progranl, the al)sellce of
ileitr-terlll comnmrcial viat)iliw threatened continuity of l,antlsat and jeopardized conti-
lluity of l,andsat data. The National St)ace Council, at its Ill-st Ineetillg Ol/ May 12, reconl-
mended lilt' action elldorst'd t)y President Bush today.
(_onlinlled operation of l+an(lsats 4 and 5 will require and additional $5 million in FY
8{) and $19 nlillion in FY 90. (_osl oF completion and launch of l,andsal (itIy 1991 has
ah'cady been included in the (;onunel-ce l)epartntent l)utlgct.
Documen111-38
Document title: Office of the Press Secretary, The Vice President's Office, "Vice
President Announces Landsat Policy," February 13, 1992, with attached: "Landsat Remote
Sensing Policy."
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The National Space ( ;ou nci l is detailed reexamination o] the l.andsat program in late 1991 prompt-
ed the Bush administration to release this poll O, statenwnt about the Landsat ._stem's [UtuTe. The
pla. calh,d ]or transferringr the develapment and @erations of Landsat 7 back to the government,
l.a.d_al 6, on the other band, wouM still be launched and operated f_.,EOSA?I which also wouM be
respon_ibh'/or overseein¢ I.amt.sats 4 and 5 until l,andsat 6 became fuUy @erational.
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For Immediate Release February 13, 1992
Vice President Announces Landsat Policy
The Vice President announced today that President Bush has approw_d a National Space
Policy Directive which reaffirms tile importance of l,andsat-t_qoe nnfltispectral imaging and
provides a plan for maintaining continuity of l_tndsat coverage into tile 21st century.
l,andsat is an important satellite program which provides mnhispectral pictnres of the
Earth. It supports U.S. government needs, including those related to national security and
global change research, and benetits the U.S. private sector. In May 1989, President Bl,sh
directed that contimfity of Landsat-type remote sensing data be maintained, and
approved a series of near term actions to implement this policy. The new National Space
Policy Directive, which was developed by the National Space (3ouncil chaired by Vice
President Qnayle, establishes a comprehensive, long range strate_' and assigns agency
responsibilities for the future.
A key element of this strategy is the assignment of management and flmding respon-
sibility for the nexl satellite, Landsat 7, to the agencies which have the primary require-
ments for the data, NASA and the Department of 1)etense. The strateg T seeks to minimize
the cost of Landsal-type images for U.S. government uses, calls on agencies to eliminate
unnecessary regulations governing private sector remote sensing activities, and fosters
deveh_ptnent of advanced remote sensing technologies to reduce the cost and improve
the performance of future satellites.
#####
Attachment
Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy
I. Policy Goals
A remote sensing capability such as is currently being provided t)y l,andsat satellites 4
and 5 I)enetils the civil and national security interests of the United States and makes con-
tributions to ttle private sector which are in the public interest. For these reasons, the
United States government will seek to maintain continuity of Landsat-type data. The [!.S.
government will:
a) Provide data which are snfticiently consistent in terms of acqttisition geometry,
coverage characteristics, and spectral characteristics with previous l,andsat data to allow
comparisons tor chance detection and characterization;
b) Make l,andsat data awfilablc It) llleel the needs of national secttrity, global change
research, and other federal llsers; and,
c) Promote and not preclude private sector ctnnmercial opportunities in I,andsat-
type remote sensing.
II. Landsat Strategy
a, The l,andsat strate_' is composed of the tolh)wing elements:
(1) Ensuring that l,andsat satellites 4 and 5 continue to provide data as h)ng as
they are capable of doing so, or until l,andsat 6 becomes <)perati(mal.
(2) Acquiring a l_andsat 7 satellite with the goal of maintaining continuity of
Landsat-type data bey()nd the projected l+andsat 6 end-ot:lilk_.
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(3) Fostering the develoi)nmnt of advanced remote sensing technologies, with
the goal of reducing the cost and increasing the performance of future Landsat-
type satellites to Illcet U.S. governlnen| needs, and potentially, enabling substan-
tially greater opportunities t<_r commercialization.
(4) Seeking to minimize the cost of Landsat-lype data for U.S. government agen-
cies and to provide data for use in global change research in a manner consistent
with the Administration's Data Management for (;lobal (]hange Research Policy
SlalelllelllS.
(5) Limiting U.S. government regulations affecting private sector remote sensing
activities m only those required in the interest of national security, foreign policy,
and puhlic safety.
(6) Maintaining an archive, within the United States, ot + existing and fimtre
l,andsat-type data.
(7) (]<msidet'ing ahernatives tor maintaining continuity of data heyond Landsat 7.
b. These strategy elements will be implemented within the overall resource and pof
icy guidance provided by the President.
III. Implementing Guidelines
a. The Department of Commerce will:
(1) Complete and launch I,andsat 6.
(2) In coordinalion with OMB, arrange for the continued operation of l,andsat
satellites 4 and 5 until kandsat 6 becomes operational.
h. 1"he l)epaftiiient of Defense and the National Aeronaulics and Space
Administration will:
( I ) l)evelol) and lalilich a l+andsat 7 satellite of at least eqtiivaleill performalw¢"
to rel)lace l+andsal t) aild dellile alternatives for inaintaining data conlinliily
lieyond l+an(lsat 7.
(2) Prepare a plan by March I, 1992, which addresses nlanagelllellt and fllnding
responsihilities, ol)erittil)llS, data ardliving and dissemination, and ¢Olnlnercial
considerations associated with the l,andsat program. This plan will be cooidillal-
ed with other U.S. governnlent agencies, as appropriate, and reviewed by the
National Space (]ouncil.
(3) With the support of the l)epartinent of Energy, and olher appropriate agencies,
prepare a coordinated technology plan that has as iLs goals iinproving the pert_)r-
iiialit:e alld reducing the cost for fllttlre l+andsat-i)]0e renlole sensillg systems.
c. The Del)arlinent of the hlterior will continue to niaintain a national archive of
[,andsai-lype reniole sensing data.
d. Affected agencies will idenlil)' funds, within their approved tiscal year 1993 bud-
get, ile(eSSaly to inlplenlent this strategy.
IV. Reporting Requirements
U.S. government agencies affected by these strategy guidelines are directed to report
t)y March 15, 1992, io the National Space Council on the implementation of this slrategry.
Document 11-39
Document title: Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, "Management Plan for the Landsat Program," March 10, 1992.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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Thi_ management plan spell_ out how the Bush ndmi_tistration planned to manage the continuation
of the Land._at prog'ram. It rm_ghly split the fi_mncial re.sponsibilit_' ]or Landsat development and
operations evenly betweeu the Dqmrtment _!f l)e]enw and NASA over the pn_]ected I!fi'time o/the _atel-
lite. Acrwdinff to the agreement, the Department t_l)efi,n_e was to procure the satellite and NASA was
to build and operate the data reception and distribution ]m4li(v.
[l]
Management Plan for the Landsat Program
Introduction
The l+andsat Program benelits a wide community of users, including the privalc see-
ton, the global change research community, national securily and other (',ovcnnment
users. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department
of I)cttmse (l)oD) agree that the program provides a unique capability thai should I)c con-
tinued. The two agtmcies will thcretorc cooperate in tile continuation of the [.andsal pro-
gram, including tilt" dcvch)l)mcnl and opt'ration of a I+andsat Iollow-on (l+andsat 7)
satellite, as wt'll as in planning tot tuturt" operations and advamud tcchnologn,/dcvclol)-
Illellt will+/ other appropriate agencies.
This plan responds to the President's National Spac<+, Policy l)ireclivc 5 on l+andsat
Remote Sensing SIl'_llCgry, dated February 1992. It outlines an integrated approach to the
management, developmcnt and operation of a newly structured I+andsat pvo,'gram laih,t'd
to be more rt'Sl)onsive to nalional sccttritv and glot)al change research needs through tilt"
year 2002 and potentially bey(rod.
To implement this plan, the involved agencies will work with the (]ongu-css to ot)taixl
any necessary enabling legislation.
Concep_t
DoD, represenling the national security community, anti NASA, representing lilt" [r.S.
(;lobal Change Rt'search Program and the civil/l)rivale I+andsat use (<mmnHlitv iul gt'ut'r-
al, will dividc lilt' manlagcmcnt responsilfililies and (()sis for lhc program witil approxi-
mat(" ('quality.
General Description
The program will:
• Be consistcnt with the tollowing goals:
- Maintain l+andsat program data continuity beyond I+andsat 6 by:
- St:eking to launch landsat, approximately 5 years after tim launci_ of l+andsat 6
- (:ontintting to l_rovi(Ic data which are sulficit'ntly consistt, nl in tt'rms ofacqui-
sition gcometr]x, calibration, coverage characteristics .lul(l spectral character-
istics with previous l+andsat data to allow comparis¢ms lot global and rcgi<mal
change detcttion and ('haractt'rizatioll
- (;ontinue to make such data available lot U.S. civil, national sccurity, and pri-
vate sector uses
- Seek to expand the use of such data lbr global change rest+arch and national
st+Clltity purposes
• Acquire a I,andsat 7 satellile which is, as a mininnml, t+tmctionallv equivah.nt Io
the l+andsat (i satellite, with the addition of a Tracking and Data +Relay Satellite
[System] (TDRSS) communicati<ms capatfility. Additional improvements will I)e
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sought if tht.v +Io not increase risk to data contimlily, and are attainablt, within
agreed-to ftlnding. Pott.ntial iniprovements could include ti:atures such as
inlprovt.d spatial or spectral resohttion, stereoscopic viewing and other capabili-
tit.s that cot(hi improve tilt" <>perational utility <if lilt' data.
Evahlate the need, attd altt.rnative means, for implementing follow-on salt.lille
systents and improvt.ments beyond Landsat 7. This would include evahtation of
potential changes in program management, fnnding responsibilities, data man-
agement/utilization, system configuration and operational conct.pts, as well as
ttst. of advatlc<.'d tt.chnohNies to improve perl+ortnantc and red(ice cost.
Program Management Responsibilities
131 •
• 1)oI) will havt. the h'ad rt.sponsibility for tht. acqttisition and latmch of lht.
[,andsat 7 salt.lille, and wilh NASA attd Del)artmenl of l':ncrgy' (DOE) parficil)a-
lion, will l/rt.l)art, a t_'clmoloh_, demonstration plan ti, p<_sl-l,andsat 7 satellilt.s.
In addition, Ihe I)ol) Pro!joel Office will pr<widt, gt.neral systems level engint.cr-
ing and inlegrati<m st.rvices in support of both the NASA and 1)ol) Project
Mariagers, Tht. 1)ol) portion of the program will bt. administered under Iht.
l)irt.clor, I)eti'nse Sul)porl Project OJilce, as part of tile Deti'nse Recoimaissance
S(tpport Progratn. NASA will provide approllriate l/articipatitm in tilt" rcsl)onsihlc
!)ol) pmiccl office its required.
NASA will havt. lhl" lead resllonsillilily tiir the develol)lnel(t and operation of lhl."
l,andsal grotlnd sysit.iil, it|chiding data proct.ssing, archivilig, dislrit)lllioll, riser
Sillltiori aiil:l iiiissioil opt.raliolis inanagelnt, nl. Tht. NASA porlion (if lht. f)rograin
will he adniinisit.rcd iindt.r the l)irectol, Earth Science and Apl)licalions Division,
()trice of St)act. S(ien(:t. an(t Applications in coortlinati(in wilh tile Mission t((
Plat|el Earth Progr:4ili. l)oD will provi(le appropriate pariicit)aihm in lhe rt.spon-
sihh, NASA l)r(!jc('t office as required.
• :\jointly chaired I+andsat (:oordinating (;roup (I,C(;) will be ti)rmed, wilh appro-
priate rcl)rt.st.ntati_ln ti-mn hoth NASA and DoD. The group will be rcsponsihlt"
ti)r <<l<ir(linating top-level progrmn plans, budgets aiid polities; handling inlcra-
gency matters related to the progranl; staffing any issiles reqniring a+!iudication
at senior deparlnlenlal levels; and coordinating rt.ports Io Congress and other
tasks r_'lalt.d to the llrogram. Participation of other governlllent agencies in I.C(;
activilies will be soughl as appropriate.
• The Assistant Secr<.!lary I+)fDet_etise for Conimand, (]<)nlr<ll, (:olniliunications and
lnlelligt.nc<' and the NASA Associate Administrator ti(l" Space Scienle and
Applicali<ms will be tile st'nior agency officials responsible for progranl oversight
and isstlt, res<Jhttion. In addition, the Directol, Defense Research and
Engint.ering (I)DR&E), the NASA Associate Administrator of At,tonal(tics and
SllaCc Teclmology,, and the Director of tile DoE Otllce of Space will be consulted
(in (nailers related to advanced technology.
Funding Responsibilities
NASA and 1)ol) will each ti(nd that portion of the pr<)grani ti)r which it is it'sl)<)tl-
sit)hL Thus !)oI) will fttnd the procnrenlcill and Ill|itch of thc Landsai 7 satellite,
;llitl NASA will flllld satellite opt.rations, data processing, archiving, alld data dis-
tribulion (inchiditlg any ground hardware and facilities I]lal art. reqnirt.d). A
niulnally acct.ptat)lt, cosl I)aseliiit. will be devt.h)pl'<t, with cach agency's total fnnd-
ing resliOlisil)ility appro×in(alely eqiial as spread ;.ttTl>S:+the devt.lopillelll alltl
opt.rational liti, _tt l.alillsal 7. ,Jill)' significant |iinding disparities illtnrred in pro-
grail| planning or Cxt.(tllilli/ will be resolved throttgh tnutually accct/t,ihh'
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flulding adjusinicnts as agreed t<) by 01e Deputy Secretary of l)ele'nse and tlic
NASA Administrator (tit(, cost baseline, retlecting this approach, is provided in
Attachment 1).
• Any iniprovemenls over a Landsat 6 thnctional equivalent capal)ility tor l,andsal
7 will be funded by Ihc sponsoring agency, if the required fundiiig exceeds the
baseline defined above. If it is agreed that improvements benefit the interests of
both agencies, the v would be flmded based upon a mnttmll v [4] acceptable shar-
ing arrangement approved b v the Deputy Secretary of Del;:nse and the NASA
Admitfistrator.
• NASA and l)oD will coortti_mle ll)eir interactions with (;oJlgress with regard |o
the l,andsat program.
• Agency tnnding and management responsibilities tbr sttbscqucnt I,amlsal satel-
lite(s) would bc the subject of a separate agreement.
Data Management
151 °
Data Access and Acquisition for l_andsat 7:
- U.S. (government (iTS(;) civil, national security, commercial and nom<ml-
mercial users, including global change research users, will have near-real time
attd/or archival access Io all data acquired. Collection scheduling tbr such
users will t>e "arcomplishedjoinlly by NASA and Dol), through the NASA pro-
ject ott_ce.
- Commercial users will be giveu iHt)tt! into collcction schettulit_g and act'css It,
data through NASA.
- US(, users will have tmrestricted rights of redistrilmtitm within the 1.!S(;.
Data from Landsats 1-6. NASA will seek to negotiate an agreement such Ihal data
from l+andsats 1-6 are made available to US(; civil, national securit v, connnercial
and n<m-cotntnercial users, including gh)l)al clmnge research users in a in:tuner
similar to Ihe arrangemcms for data acccss and acquisition t0r I:an<lsat 7,
described above.
Data Pricing. The program will scck to limit the cost of data for US(, civil, tutti<m-
31 secmit v, and global change research use to the marginal cost of +ti_lfilli+_g the
specific user reqttest. In doing so, it will make such data available to the global
change research connnnnit v ill a tnamler consisiellt with the Adtninistrali<m's
Data Managcment for (;lobal (:hange Research policy statements. Data will be
provided f<)r comtmwcial use, with the goal of encouraging l,andsat remote sens-
ing commercialization and economic growth. Prices, policies, procedt_res and
other tcrtns and conditions tor the distribution and salt+ t)f tntenhanced l .atltlsat
data will be ma<le publicly available.
Data Archiving, NASA will work wilh the Departmenl of the interi<, to develop
att<l maintain a pcrmanem national archive for all l+andsat data.
National Security and Foreign Policy Considerations. As a general principle, all
l+antlsat <lata will rctnain unclassifie<l. Spccial data prioritizati<m, (listril)ution pro-
cednres or restrictions might be necessary tmdcr certain national security and tor-
cign policy comliti<ms, or if thitlre system iml)rovemetlts snt)stantially increase the
nati<)nal sect_ril v or tbreigtt policy sensitivity of sotne I+andsat <tala. 1)oI) anti
NASA will develop t)rocedures Io minimize the impact of potential restrictions <m
Landsat sVSlel]l nsers,
Other Considerations
• International Cooperation. NASA will have the lead responsibility, with l)ol) sup-
port, tot cvahtating opportutfities tor imernati<mal cooperation and utilization of
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l,andsal. NASA will havc Ill<" h'ad rcsponsihilily for arranging for foreign ground
station operalions.
Commercialization. NASA will have tlle lead responsihility, wilt) support ti-om
I)oI) and other agencies, for promoting and periodically assessing U.S. commer-
cial opportunities, to the cxlCnl t_'asihle in the l,andsal program.
Advanced Technologies for Landsat 8 and Beyond. NASA, 1)oI) and other US(;
agencies at(" pursuing a(lwmccd technologies thal hold significan! l)r<)misc fi)r
future land r('motc sensing systems. C<mducting an advanced tcchnoh)go _(lclnon-
slrafion and evaluation cftbrl, with the goal of allowing fi)r t('chnoh)g,O' insertion at
an api)ropriate point in d_c progrmn, is desirable. Ac((wdir_gly, with the suppor( ()t
NASA, lhc l)oE and othcr F('dcral agencies, Dol) will have lhc h'ad rcsp<)nsibilitv
tot preparing a coordinalcd lcchn<)h)gy plan that has as a g<)al iml)rOVCd t)crlor -
manet and reduced (<)st tot thlurc Landsal-typc systems. The plan will i<tcnlit_, rcl-
cwml agctwy activilics and tim(ling that can contrilmtc t(} this goal.
]61 Approved:
[hand-signed: "'Aaron (;ohcn for"]
Richard tl. Truly
Adminismm)r
Nalional Acr(mauli(s and
Space Administration
[hand-signed: "l)onal(IJ. Alwood"]
Donald J. Atwood
Deputy Secretary ot" I)ctimsc
3/10/92 3/20/92
l)alc Apl)r<wcd l)ate Approved
[7[ Attachment [
Cost Baseline (Then Year $M)'
DoD Costs:
FY (.)2 93 94 9:5 (.)() 97 9__88 99 OO 01 02 'li)ml
30 80 158 134 52 6 2 2 2 2 2 470
Includes:
• l)cv<'h)pmcnl of One I,andsal 6-Equivahml Pcrformancc Satellite
- Fnhanccd Thcmalic Mapp(,r-class Sensor Pcrtormancc as a Minimmn
- Baseline includes TDRSS C<)mmunications
• 1 ,atlnch
- Planned for FY 1997
- Titan II--class launch vehicle from West Cost (Vandenberg AFB)
• Program Supporl/(;('ncral Systcms-l.cvcl Engineering and Integration (SE &l)
NASA Costs:
FY (.)__2 93 (.)__4 (.)__.,5 9(__i (.)__7_7 (.)__8 999 ()() O1 0__2 Total
7 25 59 61 48 30 32 34 36 38 40 410
1. SubW¢l Io enabling h'gislalion and conlra('l neg[)tialions.
.'_52 ()BSI,:RVIN(; "[rflF:_:,\RIII FROM NI'A(:I-
Includes:
" (;round System l)evclopnlcnt
- Enhanced (:ommaml/Connotflk_h'mclry System
- Enhanced Data Processing/Producl Generation Capability
- Archival Rcstoration
,, Mission Operations
- l.andsat 4-6 Operations, with l.andsat 7 Operations Beginning in F3( 1997
- Landsat 4--7 Data Processing, Archival, and Distritmlion Beginning mid-1993
- Program Supl)ort/(;round Segment System Fngincering
- Mission ()pcrations Managcmeln
• TDRSS l.ink Added to I+andsat 7 Satellite
Documen111-40
Document title: "Land Remote-Sensing Policy Act of 1992," Public Law 102-555, 106 Star.
4163, October 28, 1992.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
7his bin, cod!fled the substantial changes in polio_ toward the Land_at program that had d_q,eloped
in the ear(y 1990,_. It returned the development and operation _?[the l_andsat program to the govern-
merit at the end q lhe operational I(/P o/'Land._ats 4, 5, and 6. It aAo reiterated/he/edeml gro_,ertt-
merit :_ willinffnes_, Jir_t ,toted it* the l,attd Remote-Se_dn,,_ Commercialization Act o/ 1984, to ,_,ant
an op_,ralinL_ licen,_e Io ope_a/or_ q/private remo#,-,wnsi_g _a/ellilt:v.
lno I_agination I
I'l!l'dJ(: lAW 102-555--()(7E 28, 1992 106 STAT. 4163
Pttblic Law 102-555
102d Congress
An Ac_
*I'o croft)It the Uniu'd Slates u) maintain its leadership in land remote sensing I)y lm_ -
riding (titl_l conlinuily tbr thc l,an(lsat program, to establish a new national laud rcnmtc
scnsing policy, and for othcv purposcs. I(itation in margin: "()trot)or 28, 1992, tt.R. 6133"J
tie it enacted by the Se_mte and ttoase _l tCepre._entatives O  the l*nited States o/America in
Conffre_s a_sembled, [citation in margin: "Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992. National
dct_.'nsc. 15 USC 5601 note"]
SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be oiled as Ihc "I,and Remow Sensing Policy Act of 1992."
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The (;ongrcss linds and declares thc tidlowing:
( 1) The continuous colh'clion and utilization of land 1(!111()1(,sensing dala [I-O1ii space
arc of m_!jor bclwti! in slu(lying and un(h'rstan,tling human impacts on thc gh)l),d cnvi-
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ronment, ill managing tilt" F.arth's natural resources, ill carrying out national security
tunctions, and ill planning and conducting many other activhies of scientific, economic,
and sotill importance.
(?) The Federal (;overlnnent's I.andsat system established lilt! United Slates as tilt"
world leader in land remote sensing technolog T.
('3) The national interesl of lilt' United States lies in nlaiutaining internalional lead-
ership in satellite land remote sensing and in broadly promoting tilt" beneficial use of
I+<,'lll()le SellSillg data.
(4) The cost of I.andsat data has impeded the use of such data tot scientific imrp<)s -
es, such as tot global enviromnenlal change research, as well its fin otht'r public sector
applications.
(.q) (;iven lit(' inlportancc of the [+andsal program to the United States, urgent actions,
including expedited procurenmnt procedttres, are required to ensure data continuity.
(6) Full conlnlercialization <)t the I.andsat progranl cannot be achieved within the
loreseeabh' thture, and thus should not serve as the near-ternl goal of national policy on
]a]ld l'(!lltOte Setlsing; however, connllercializa.tion of lalld relllOtC sellshlg shonld renlain
a hmg-lerm goal ()t+United States policy.
(7) l)espite tilt + sn(ct'ss and iml)orlance of the I.andsal syslenl, funding and organi-
zational uncertainties over tilt" past several years have placed its Imnre in doubt and have
jc<_pardized United States leadership in land remote sensing.
(8) Recogni/ing tilt' importance of tile [.andsat progranl hi helping to meet nalional
and commercial oI_jectives, the President approved, <m February II, 1992, a National
Space Policy l)ireclive which was develoF, ed by the National Si)ace (k)tmcil and <onnnits
Ihe ! !hired Slates to ensuring lilt' continuity of l.andsat coverage illtO the 91st century.
(9) t+ccattse [+andsat data are i)articttlarly important for national security i)tuposes
.rod global enviromnt, nlal change research, management responsit)ilities fi)r tilt' program
should be t,-ansfl'rred ti-om the l)epartnlent of Conunerce to an integrated in+ogratn man-
agemenl involving tilt: Deparlnmnt of Dell'rise and the National Aeronautics and St)ace
A(hninislrali<m.
(10) Regal+dless of management resl)<msibilhies tk)r tilt, l.andsat program, the Nation's
broad civilian, national security, commercial, and toreign policy interests ill remote, sens-
ing will 1)est be served by ensuring lhal l.andsat remains an nnclassitied program1 that oper-
ales according to tile principles of open skies and nondiscriminatory access.
( I 1) Technological advances ainled at reducing the size and weight of satellite syslelns
hold file potential tor dramatic reductions in the cost, and sul)stantial improvcments in
lhe capabilities, <Jt tutttre land retool( sensing systems, but such technological advances
hayer not I)een demonstrated tor land remote sensing and there|me (+alnl()l be relied
up, m as the sole nlt,ans ,)f achieving data continui D' for the I+andsat program.
(12) A technology denlonstration program inw)lving advanced remote sensing tech-
nologies couht serve a vital role in delermining the design oF a tollow-on spacecraft to
l,andsat 7, while also helping Io determine whether such a space(rail should be funded
by Ihe (Tnited Slates (;<)vernment, by die private sector, or by a international consortinm.
(13) '1'<_n/aximize the valne oF the Landsat program to the American i)nblic, unen-
hanccd I,andsal 4 Ihrongh 6 data shottld be made available, at a mininnml, to United
Slates (;-overlllllt'tll agencies, to global environmental change researchers, and to other
researchers who are financially supported by the United States (;c, vernnlellt, at the cost of
fulfilling user requests, and unenhanced l+andsat 7 data should be made available to all
users at tim cost of fnlfilling user reqnests.
(14) To stimulate th'veh+imwnt of tlt(+ commercial tnarkel +br enhanced data and
yah(e-added services, the United Slates (;overnmenl should adopt a data policy lot
l.andsat 7 which allows colnl)t:tilion within the private sector lot distribution of tlnen-
hanced data and ','alue-added services.
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(15) Devek)pment of tile remote sensing market and the provision of conunercial
value-added services based on remote sensing data should remain exclusively tile tunction
of the private sector.
(16) It is in the hest interest of the United States to maintain a permanent, compre-
hensive Government archive of global 1,andsat and other land remote sensing data tor
long-term monitoring and study of the changing global environment.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. [citation in margiu: "15 USE 5602"]
Ill this Act, tile following detinifions apply:
(1) The term "Administrator" means tile Administrator of tile National Aeronautics
ant| Space Administration.
(2) The term "cost of fidfilling user requests" means the increnlenta] costs associated
with providing product generation, reproduction, arid distribution of tmenhanced data in
response to user requests and shall not include any acquisition, amortization, or depreci-
ation of capital assets originally paid for by the United States (;<>vernment or other costs
not specifh;ally attributable to fiflfilling user requests.
(3) The term "data continuity means tile continued acquisition and availability of
unenhanced data which are, fronl the point of view of the user--
(A) sufficiently consistent (in terms of acquisition geometry, coverage character-
istics, and spectral characteristics) with previous l.andsat data to allow compar-
isons for global and regional change detection and characterization: and
(B) compatible with such data and with methods used to receiw_ and process such
data.
(4) The term "data preprocessing" may include-
(A) rectification of system and sensor distortions in land remote sensing data as
it is received directly frortl tile satellite in preparation for delivery.to a user;
(B) registration of such data with respect to fk_atnres of tile Earth; and
(C) calihration of spectral response with respect to snch data, hut does m)t
include conclusions, manipnlatiorls, or calculations derived f'rom such data, or a
combination of such data with other data.
(5) The term "land remote sensing" means the collection of data which can he
processed into imagery of sin'|ace features of the Earth tiom an unclassitied satellite or
satellites, other than an operational United States (;overmnent weather satellite.
(6) The term "Landsal Program Management" means tile integrated program man-
agement structure--
(A) established by, and responsihle to, tile Administrator and tile Secretary of
Defense pursuant to section 101 (a); and
(B) consisting of appropriate officers and employees of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, the Department of Det_-nse, and any other United
States C.overnnlent agencies the President designates as responsihle tor the
I:andsat program.
(7) The term "l:andsat system" mcans I,andsats 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, and ally follow-on
land remote sensing system ot>erated and owned by tilt" United States Government, along
with any related ground equipnlcnt, systems, and facilities owned hy the Unitcd States
(;over nllleIIt,
(8) The term "Landsat 6 contractor" means the private sector entity which was award-
ed tile contract for spacecraf! construction, operations, and data marketing rights |or the
l,andsat 6 spacecraft.
(9) The terrll "Landsat 7" lneans tile follow-on satellite to l,andsat 6.
(10) The term "National Satellite l,and Remote Sensing Data Archive" means the
ExIq.f)RIN(; 'IIIE [!NKNt)WN 355
archive established by tile Secretary of the lnlerior imrsnant Io the archival responsibili-
ties delint'd in set'don 50:_.
(11) The term "noncommercial ])nrposes" refers to those activiti(,s iiYld(,rtakt-ll 13)_
individuals or enlities on the condition, upon reccipl of uiit'nhallced data, lhat--
(A) such data shall not be used in connection with any bid for a commercial con-
tract, development of a c(mnnercial product, or any other non-Uniwd Slaws
(_,overntllent activity that is expected, or has [he potential, to be protitnlaking;
(15) the results of stlch activities are disclosed in a timely and complete fashion in
tilt, open technical literature or other method ofpublic release, except when suth
disclosurt, by the United States (;overllmellt t)v its contractors would adversely
altk'cl the Ilationa] security ()r foreign policy of the United Stat('s ()r violate" a pro-
vision of law (, i+egtllatioii; and
((:) sm'h data shall not be tlislril)uted in c()nlpetili(m with tnwnhanced (lala pro-
vided hy th(' l,antlsat 6 COlltractof.
(1'2.) Th(' term "Secret;try" means tile Secl'etary of (_(lllnJlel-(e.
(13) The tt'rm "mlcnhanced dala" means land remote s('nsing signals or imagery
pr(_(h,cts that are unpr(_cessed or stthject ollly tt) data prcprocessing.
(14) The term "United States (;overnment and its affiliated users" means--
(A) !. rnilerl States (;overnmcnl agencies;
(B) researt:hers involved with the United Slates (;hlbal Change Research
l+Jograln and its international colnlterpart progralns; anti
((_) ()lher researchers and international entities lhat have sigm+d with the United
Slates (;overn[nent a co(Jl)t'valive agr('emellt involving the i,se of l,andsat data for
H()_I- t'omHwrcia] pJlff)oses.
SEC. 4. REPEAL OF LAND REMOTE-SENSING COMMERCIALIZATION ACT OF
1984.
The l,and Remole-Sensing (2)mmercialization Act of 198,1 (15 U.S.(:. 4201 et srq.) is
rcpeah'd.
TITI+E I--IANDSAT
SEC. 101. LANDSAT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT. [citation in margin: "15 US(" 5611"]
(;t) ESTABI.ISIIMENT.--The Administrator and the Secretary of l)elcnse shall be
responsil)le t(w management of the Landsat program. Such responsibility shall he carried
Otll ])y (.slat)lishing an integrated program management structtu-e for tile I+an(lsat system.
(h) MANA(;1;+MENT P[AN.--The Administrator, the Secretary of I)eti,nse, and any
()lher [hlite(I St;+.les (;overnment official the President designates as responsible li)r t)avt
of the l.antlsat program, shall estal)lish, through a management plan, the roles, resp<msi-
bilities, aml funding expectations for the Landsat Program of the appropriate [!nited
States (;<)vernment agencies. The management plan shall--
(1) specit), that the thndamenlal goal of the Landsat Program Management is the
continuity of unenhanced l.andsat data through the acquisition and operati(m <)f
a I,andsat 7 satellite as quickly as practicable which is, at a minimum, fmlctional-
ly equivalent t_ the l,andsat 6 satellite, with the addition of a tracking and data
relay satellite (:ommtmications capability;
(2) include a baseline funding profile that--
(A) is mutually acceptat)le to the National Aeronautics and Spate
Adlninistralion mid tilt" l)el)artmenl of [)et('nse for the period covering tile
d('v(q<q)menl and operation of l+andsat 7; and
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(B) provides tiw total timding responsibility of the Nalional Aeronaulics and
Space Administration and tim Deparlnleul of Defense, respectively, Ill be
approximately equal 1o the timding responsibilily of llw olher as spread
across tilt" development and operational life of I.andsal 7;
(3) speeit_' that any improvements over the Landsat 6 tunclional equivalefll capa-
bilily t_r I.andsal 7 will be funded by a specitic sponsoring agency ov agencies, in
a manner agreed to by the Landsal Program Managemenl, if required funding
exceeds the baseline funding profile required by paragraph (2), and lhal addi-
lional improvemenls will be sought only if lbe improvements will nol.jeopardize
dala continuily; and
(4) plovide tot a Iechnoh%o' dcmonstralion program whose objective shall be lilt'
demonslralion of advanced land reinsure sensing technologies lhal may polenlial-
ly yiehl a sysleln which is less expensive h) build and operale, and more respon-
sive it) data users, Ihan is the Ctllrent l.andsat system.
RESPONSIBIIJT[ES.--The l+andsat Program Managenmnt shall be responsible
( 1 ) l.andsat 7 procufeme111, launch, and operations:
(2) ensuring that Ihe operation of lhe l,andsat system is responsive 1o lilt" broad
inleresls of the civilian, national security, commercial, and ti_reign users of lilt'
Landsat svslem:
(3) ensuring that all unenhanced Landsal data remain tmclassitied and lllal,
except as provided in see/ion 506 (a) and (b), no festrit:lions are placed on lhe
availabilily of unenhanced dala;
(,t) ensuring tha! land ienlole sellsillg dala of high priorily locations will be
acquired I)y Ihe I_andsal 7 systmn its required to meet Ihe needs of lhe l.lniled
Slates (,hlba] Change Research Program, as established in the (;h)bal (3_angv
Research Acl o| Igt.R), and It_ Inet'l the neetls of nalional securily users;
(5) I,andsal dala iesponsil>ililies [)llt'sllatll Io Ibis Acl;
(6) oversigh! of l,alldsal contracts entered inlo under setlions 102 and 1{)3;
(7) COol'dillalioll of a lechtlology denltlnsIFalioll pl'Ogl'alll, })ttFSUalll Io sectioll
303; and
(bi) ellSlll'ing, l}lal copies of dala a(-qllired by Iiw l.alldSal syslelll al-e provided m
lhe National Satellite l,aud Remote Sensing Data Archive.
(d) AUTII()RITYTO (;ONTI,b\CT.--The I.andsal Program Managemenl may, sub-
ject to apllroprialitms and only under the exisling contracl aulheHilv <1t 1lie Uniled Stales
(;(ivelnlllenl agencies lllal (c,111})ose Ihe l,all(Isal l)l'Ogl'alll Managelllelll, elllel" inlo C(:,ll-
llacls with Ihe privale sector for services Sllch as, bill not limited to, salellile operations
alld dilia preprocessing.
(el IA.NDSAT ADVIS()RY PR( )( :ES,S-----
(1) ESTABIJSIIMENT.-- l.andsal 15-ogram Managemenl shall seek imparlial
advice and comments regarding tile status, etlecliveness, and olleralion of lilt"
l,andsal syslem, using existing advisory committees and other appropriale mech-
anisms. Such advice shall be sought Dora individl,als who represent--
(A) a broad range o| lmrsl)etlives on basic and al)plie<l science alld opera-
Iional needs with respecl Io land remote sensing <lata;
(B) the full spectn,m of users of Landsat dala, including represenlalives l)'om
United SIales (;OVellllllelll agencies, State and local gOVelnlllenl itgell('ies,
academic iiistilulions, nonprot]l organizalions, value-a(lded companies, lilt"
agritullural mineral ,pxlraction, and other user intlustries, and tlle i)ublic:
all(|
((;) a broad diversily ot" age gl'oups, sexes, and races.
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(2) REP()RTS.--Whhin I year aftcr lhc datc of the eliaCtnlClll <_,f"fills Act and
biennially thercal_tcr, the I +an(|sat Program Management shall prepare and Stll)lll+l
a report to the (kmgrcss which--
(A) reports the pul)lic COllllllCllts l'cccived l)ttl'_,ttalll to paragraph (I); and
(B) includes-
(i) a response to Ihc public COIIIlllCIIIS received pm+_,tmnt 1o paragra[)h ( I );
(ii) int_)rmation on the v<)lumc of use, by category of data from the
l+andsal syslcm; and
(iii)anv rcconnucndatior_s for policy or prol4ranmlatic changc._ to
improve the utility and operation of the l,andsat system.
SEC. 102 PROCUREMENT OF LANDSAT 7. Icitation in margin: "15 [!,";(: 5612"1
(a) ( ;()NTRA(;'I' NE(;()TIATI( )NS.--The Landsat Progrmn Managcniclit shall, .sul>-
jcct Io al)l>roliriation+_ arid only Iltl(|Cl" ihc exisling coiltr_tct aulhority ot lht! United ,_Utlt's
(;ovcrlllliCiil agciicies thai COllll)Osc the l,andsai I)rogralll Pi|ailagCillCiil, cxpcdiiiously
coiilracl wilil a [!nilcd _talc_+ privalc scclor cntiiy tor ihc dcvclopnlcnt and delivery of
I+alldsat 7.
(b) i)EVEi,()PMENI + AND I)EI,IVERY C()NSIDERATION.--ha negotiating a con-
tract under this st'ciioi_ tbl the dcvch+pment and delivery of I+andsai 7, the I+andsat
1)ro_r_llli Mali;ig('mcill shall-
(I) scck, as a thndaincnlal obicclivc, Io have Landsal 7 ()pcrati()nal t))' ihc cxpcci-
cd end of Itie design liti' of l,andsat 6;
(_)) y,cck II) CIISilrI' dala c()nlinuit)' by ilic dcvclot)nicnl dclivci+y of a saicllitc
wllich is, al a inhliliiUm, functionall)' eqtiiva|onl to lhc l,aiidsat 1)satclliic; alld
(_4) sock to iilcoit)oraic in l,at+ld+sat 7 ally pt'l'l'(iFtllit.il<<'C iltl|+r<ivcnlt'ilt,_ i+c(itiircd to
iliCCl United Slalcs (;ovcrniilenl needs thai would liOl jeopardize data continuity.
(c) N()TIFICATI()N ()F (;()ST AND SCIIEI)UI,E CitAN(iES.--Ttlc l,andsal
Pl'o_l'+illl Mailli_ciilClll .shall lir+)m|)tly liotil), the (]Ollgl'CS_; (if ally signiticanl dcviali<)ns
froni lhc cxt)cclcd cost, delivery dale, aiid laullch dale of l+aildsal 7, that arc sf)ecit]cd 1W
l|lc |+alidS_il |)i'()gi'ain Malia_cniciil ill)on award of the conlra('l tilidcr ihis sccihm.
(d) I;NI'I'I,;I) ,_TATES PRIVATF. SECTOR ENTITIES.--The Laildsai Progranl
+'V|allagCliiCili .shall, ti)r |)ilrl)oscs of itlis Act, detinc ttic lel+lll "United Slatcs privaic scclol +
cniilics," lakilig into accoulil the location of operations, assets, personnel, and olhcr Silch
[,l(lOl'S.
SEC. 103. DATA POLICY FOR LANDSAT 4 THROUGH 6. {citation ill margin: "15 [!S(;
",613"[
(a) (;()NTRACT NE(;OTIATIONS.--Within 30 days alier the datc of enactinent of
this Act, Ihe l+andsat Program Management shall enter into negotialions with the I+andsat
1) C()iIIi';ICIOI" IO tornializc arl arrangcnlcnt with respect to pricing, distribution, ac<luisi-
li()ll, _tl+chivillg, +litd availability of tlllt'ilh_tllecd data lot which ihe l,andsat 6 COlltl_iciof
tia_+rcst)<Sllsi|)ilily illldcr ils coiilracl. _iich arrailgcincnl shall provide for a l)li;ist'<l lransi-
lion I<) a data |)<)lie)' consislciil with lhc l,andsat 7 dam policy (developed l)ursnant to scc-
lion 11}3) I))' the datc of initial operation of Landsat 7, (]ondilions of the ptiascd
arrail_gi'iiicnl should l+Cqllirc ihat ttw l+alidsal 0 contiactor adopt I)i+ovisiolis so thai t)y lhc
t]na] lihasc <H the 1YanSilion period-
( I ) such tliicilhanccd dala shall hc provided, at a inilliinuin, 1o Ihc Uniwd ,_glalcs
(lOVCl+lllilClll +llld its atliliatcd liSCl'S at the cost of fillfilling IISCI + icqn('r+ls, Oll liic COil-
dillon Ihat _+tlch iiliCiliitlliCcd data are iiscd solt'lv ti)r llOliC<)lliiiiClcial plll'|)oscs;
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(2) instructional data sets, selected from the I,andsat dala archives, will be made
available to educational institutions exclusively tbv noncommercial, educali(mal
ptupost's ill the cost ,d fulfilling tl._Cl I'CqIIcsls;
(.'4) Landsat dala users aut" able to acquire uncnhanced data contained in tim col-
Icclivc archives of tbFeign ground slatiotls as easily arid attot-dably as pvaclicablc;
(4) adequalc data necessary to meel lhe needs of global mwironmmllal change
ICNe_IIC]ICI'S ;.tnd national security users are acquired;
(5) tilt" United Slates (;ovevnment allltl its affiliated USCl'S shall not bc prohilfited
from reproduction or dissemination of unenhanced dala 1o other agmwics of the
United Stales C, ovcrmnenl and olhm- aftiliaccd usvns, ou the condition lhat such
unt'zlhazwcd data ave uscd soh'ly toy imzl(ommt'zcia] puq)ost's;
(6) nonprofil, public inlevcst entities receive vouchers, dala granls, (_1 olher such
means of pv(widing thclll with tmenhanccd dala al Ihc tt)sl of fultilling user
I'CqllC'SI.";, Oil lilt' condition that such IMcn]lallct'd data aft* used solclv tbr I)()II-
('OIlIlllCI'CiEI] purposes;
(7) a viable role for lhc pvivalc sector in the promolion and dcvelol)mCnt of lilt'
commercial markcl tbr valuc-addt'tl and other scvvicvs t_sing uncnhanct-d dala
fiom tilt" l.andsal system is pvcsmvcd; and
(8) ummhanced data from lhv l.andsat s_tsl_']ll _]'{" provided Io the Nali_mal
Salellitc 1,and Remote Sensing l)ala Archive at no move lhan Iht" cosl of l ultillin R
I ls(q' FCqllCslS,
(b) FAII,URE TO REA(;H A{;REEMENT.--If negolia0(ms trader subsection (a) have
Ill)l, t)V SC[)ICIIIbCI" _'_(),lt.)(.)?*, I'C:';,II]It't] ill itll a_I'CCIIIClll 1])al lilt' I,/:llldX,:ll Pl-O_l._-llll
Managcnlent (term-mines generally achieves lilt! goals staled ill subsection (b) ( 1 ) lhl'otl.gh
(8), tilt: Athninistratov and tilt' Sccretary o| l)efensc shall, within 30 days aflv, lilt" dale ot
such detevnlination, jointly tel-tit}' and report such (Iclcvmination lo flit" (_(mgvcss. The
lepovt shall include a review of oplions and pmjeclcd costs [by achieving such goals, and
shall include recommendations tbv achievitlg such goals. The oplions rwview('d shall
include--lmarginal note: "Reports"}
( l } retaining tim existing or moditicd contract with the l,andsat (_ c(mtvactor;
(_2) the termination o[ existing Colltracts t()l the exclusive right to markct tlllCll-
hanccd l,andsal data; and
(3) lh(" establishnlenl of an ahmnalive pvival(" se('t()v mcthanism for the mavkcl-
illg and t'olTlrl_cvcb.ll tlislvil)tllioll of :,;l/t'}'l (tala.
SEC. 104. TRANSFER OF LANDSAT 6 PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES. [citation in
tamgin: "15 US(; 5614"l
The ,-csp(msibilities of thc Scctclavy with ,-cspecl m l.andsal 6 shall bt" uansfmvcd t(_
the l.antlsal Program Managt'mcnt, as agvct'd lo belwt'cn Iho Secvolarv and lhv l,antlsal
Program Managcment, |)ursuant to sc('lioll l Ol
SEC. 105. DATA POLICY FOR LANDSAT 7. [citation in margin: "15 (!St; 5615"]
(a) I,ANI)SXi' 7 I)ATA P()IMiY.--Thc I,andsat I'r()gtam Managemeul, in ((msttha-
lioll With other appropriale United Slates (;ovc_Jlmenl agencies, shall rh'vch)p a data pol-
it): |of l,antlsat 7 which should--
( l ) cnsut-c that imt,nhanccd data ave availat)lc I() all usms at tilt" cosl of tullilling
tlSCI" I'Cqt IC,gls_
(2) ellSttI'C tilllcly ;_tntl dcpendal)le (lelivcvy of IlnCilll;.tllCCd data to lilt' full spc(-
Ivmn of (ivilian, na0onal sccuvilv, ('ommev( ial, a_ld tOvt.ign us('vs at,d lh(' Nati<mal
Salellilc l.and R('mot(" Svnsing i)at.l AFchiv(.:
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(!_) cllstlr(! that the I.!nited Statcs rt'tains ownershi I) of all unenhanccd data gcn-
crated tly l,andsat 7;
(,t) support the dev('lopmcnt of the commercial market for remotc sensing data:
(5) ensure lhat lilt" ilrovision of conmlcrcial value-added serviccs I)ascd on l'CltIOlC
sensing data remains t'xclusivt'ly tile function of the l)vivatt • sector; and
(6) to the t'xtcnl l)ossible, ensure thai the data distribution systclll Jor l+andsat 7
is compatil)le with the E;trth ()t)scrving System Data and Inf_rmation System.
(b) In addition, the data policy t_r I+andsat 7 may provide tbr--
(1) [!tilled St;tics lnival( • s('('ItH- t'nlilics to operate ,_r<lund rtwciving stations in
the [!tilted States fiw l,andsal 7 data;
(2) other nlcans fin dala: access by private sector (ullith's It, unenhanccd data
Ir_ml I.an(lsat 7; and
(3) the [hilled Stalcs (;ovcrmnent to charge a t)cr imag(' I_.'c, license 1;.'c, <n-otllt.r
such tiw to entities operating ground receiving stations or (lislributing l+an(lsat 7
data.
(c) I,ANDSAT 7 I)ATA P()I,I(:Y PIAN.--Not later than July 15, 1994, the l,,mdsat
Program Management shall develop and submit to (;_mgrcss a report that contains a
I,andsat 7 Data. Policy Plan. This plan shall detine the roles and responsibilities of th(" var-
ious l_nblic and private scctor entities that would be involved in the acqtfisiti<ln, pr<wcss-
ing, tlistritlulit>n+ and arch;ring of l,andsat 7 data and ill Ol)erati<+ns of the I,andsat 7
spacecraft. [marginal n_tc: "Reports"]
(d) REP()RTS.--Not lalt'r than 12 months after sutmlission of the [,andsat 7 Data
Ihdicy Plan, required by stfl)section (c), and annually thereafter until the launch of
I,andsat 7, th(+ I,andsat th<_gram Matflagt, nlent, ill consultali_)n with reprt+st,ntalives of
appr<)l)riatc t !n ileal Slal('s ('-,()V(,llllncnt agencies, shall prepart' and sul)mit a report It) lhc
( ',()ngrt'ss wili(h--
(1) provides.justitication for the l,andsat 7 data policy in ttqtns ot I the civilian,
nati<,nal security, comnwrcial, and foreign policy nccds ot +the United St;lit's; all(I
(2) providcsjustitication fbr any elements o1 Ill(" I+andsat 7 data ptdicy which are
tl<_t <onsistcnl with the provisions of sut)scction (a).
TITI,E Ii--1,1( ;ENSIN(; OF PRIVATE REMOTE SENSIN(; SI'A(:E SYSTEMS
SEC. 201. GENERAL LICENSING AUTHORITY. [citation in nlargin: "15 US(; 5621 "1
(a) I ,I( :ENSIN( ; At )'!'I t( )RII'Y OF SECRETARY.--
( 1) In consultation with other appropriate United States (;ovcrnlncill agencies,
lilt" ,"qt'trt'tary is attthorized to license private sector parlies to o[)t_ratc private
rem<_te sensing space systems for such period an tilt: Secret;try nlay spccil_' and in
accordance with the provisions of this title.
(2) In the case of a private space system that is used fin remote sensing and other
ptuposes, the autlmrity of the Secretary under this title shall be limited only t<)
the remote sensing operations of such space system.
(h) (:()MPLIANCE WITH TttE lAW, REC,U1ATIONS, INTERN]VI'IONAI+ OBI+I(;A-
TI()NS, ANI) NATIONAl, SE('URITY.--No license shall be granlt!d by thc Sccrtqarv
tlnlcss lh(' Secrttlary dt+tcrlnines in writing that tile applicant will comply with the rt'qnir,_'-
tncnts of this Act, any rcgulations issued pursuant to this Act, ;111(1ally applicable interna-
tional _>llligali<nls and national SCflil+ily concerns of lhc United Statt,s.
(c) DEADIJNE FOR ACTION ON APPI,I(:ATION.--The Secretary shall review any
application and make a dt,tertnination thereon within 12(t days of the receipt <ff st(oh
allplicali<m. It linal acti<m has not occurred within such lillIc, the St'(+rtqal+y shall inforn+
tilt' applicant of any pending issncs atld of act;in'is rcqttircd to rcs<dvc them.
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(d) IMPR()PER BASIS FOR DENIAI+.--The Secretary shall not deny such license itl
order to protect any existing licensee from competition.
(e) REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE UNENIIANCEI) DATA.--
(1) The Secretary, in consultation witil other appropriale United States
(;overnment agencies and F,tnsttant to parag, raph (2), shall designate in a license
issued l)msuant to this title art;' unenhanccd data required to be prc)vided by the
licensee under section 2<)2(t+) (3).
(2) The Secretary shall make a designation under part,graph ( 1) after determin-
ing thai-
(A) such data are generaled by a system tot which all or a subs|antial part ot +
the development, t,tl>rication, launch, or operations Costs have been or will t)e
directly funded by the !.rnitcd Slatt,s (;-<)vel+nlllt+nt; or
(B) it is in the interest o[ the I!nited Sti_.t(!s H) reqttire such data to be pro-
vided by the licensee cotlsistent with section 20_2(b) (3), alter considering the
impact on the licensee and the importance o[ prom<>tii_g widespread access
to i+emole sensing data from [halted States and lbreign systems.
(3) A designation made by the Secretary t,nder paragraph (1) shall not t)e incon-
sislent with all)' COlltt-;tct oY ol]l('r arr;tllgelllent entt'red illtO between a [!nited
States (;overnment agency and the licensee.
SEC. 202. CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION. [citation in margin: "15 US(: 5622"]
(a) LI( ;ENSE REQUIRED FOR ()PERATI()N.--No person who is sul)ject to thejttris-
diction or c<>ntrol of the L+nited States may, directly or through any subsidiary or affiliate,
optuate any private remote sensing space system without a license pursuant to secti<>n 201.
(b) I.I(',ENSIN(; REQ[!IRI_MENTS.--Any license isstted pnrstuu]l to this title shall
sp¢,cit}' that the licensee shall comply with all ot the reqt,irements ot +this Act and shall--
( I ) operate the s+vstem in such lll::l.llllel" as t(> |)I'escFvt: the nalit)nal securitx of thc
United States and to ol)serve the intermltional obligalions of lhe United States in
accordance with section 506;
(2) make available to the g<>vernmt'nt o[a countrx (inc]ttding the United States)
unenhanced data collected bv the system concerning tht + territory under lht"
jurisdiction o[ such government as s<)<m as such data are available and on rea-
s<mable terms and conditions;
(3) make tmenhanced data designated b_ the Secretary ill the lic¢'nse l)ursttant
to section 2<)I (e) available in accordance with section 501;
(4) upon termination of operations trader the license, make disposition ()t an_
satellites in space in a manner satisl_t¢tm+y lo the President:
(5) [ttrnish lhe Secretary with c<>mF, h't<.' orbit and dala collecti<m characlcristics
of the syslt:nL and in[_rnl the Secretary immediately <ff any deviation; and
(6) notil}, the Secretary of any agret'ment the liccnsee intends l<>enter with a fi)r-
<,'igll natioll, entity, or cons<wtitml involxitlg fi)reign nations or elltities.
(c) AI)I)ITIONAI. I+I(:ENSIN(; REQUIRFMI,_NTS FOR IANDSAT 6 (:()NTILA.(;-
'FOR.--In addition to the requirements of paragraph (b), any license issued pt,rsuant to
this title to the [+andsat 6 contractor shall specit}' tllal the l.andsat 6 c<>nlra(t(w shall--
(I) notit\' the Secretary of any vahte-added activities (as defined I)y tilt" Se(Felal+y
by regulation) that will t)e condllcted 1)y the l+andsat 6 contractor or by a sub-
sidiarx or affiliate; and
(2) if such activities are to I)e conducted, provide the St'crelarv with a plan tot
compliance with section 501 of this Act.
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SEC. 203. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY. [citation ill margin:
"15 [!S(: 5623"']
(a) FUN( 71'I()NS.--In order it> cmry out tile resp(msibilities specitied ill this till{', tiw
S{'(Tutal'v l'l I ;i}e'--
(1) grant, condition, or transt('T licenses un(,ler this Act;
(2) se(,'k an order of i_!junction or similarju(,li(,ial determination from a United
Slates l)islri(,t (:ourt with [)ersonal jurisdiction over Ill(," license(., to terminate,
rood|l}', or suspend licens(,:s raider this title an(,l to lerlnillatt, licensed o]mrations
on an irnme(,liate has|s, if Ihe Secretary determines thai the licensee has stlhstitn-
(|ally taihed Io comply with any provisions of this Act, with any terms, condilions,
or restrictions of such licens(,', or with any international obligations or national
securily concerns ot Ill{" [;hired Stales.
(3) provMe [)enahi(,'s tor noncompliance with the re(,luiremenls of licenses or
regulations issued un(,h'r this title, including civil penahi(,'s not to ex(,(,'(,'d $1t),000
(each day of o[x'ration in violalion of su(,h li(,ens(,'s or r(,'gulations constituling a
Sel)arale violin ion ) ;
(4) cominomis(,', modit}', or remit any su('h civil penahy;
(5) issue sul)poenas lot any materials, (,|Oculnents, or records, or ti)r th(," allen-
(.lance an(,l l(,.slilnony o| wilness(,.s for the purpose of con(,lucling a hearing uiMer
Ihis seelion;
((i) seizv any object, rec()ld, O1" l'eporl [)tlrsllalll Io a Willlallt tF()III a lnagisllat(,'
hased on a showing of probahle cause to txqieve that su(,h obj(,'ct, record, or
rv[)ort was used, is h(,'ing used, or is likely to be use(,I ill violation of this Act or the
requirem(,mls of a license or regulation issued thereund(,'r; and
(7) make inv(,'sdgali_,us and inquiries and administer to m take liom any ()elSOil
an oath, aflh'mation, or aflMavit concerning any matter relating to thc t'llJ_W(c-
menlot this Act.
(h) RI;.VIF3A: ()F A(;ENCYA('TI()N. Any applicant or lic(,'ns(,'e who makes a timely
request tot ,cvicw of an adverse aclion pursuant to subsection (a) ( 1 ), (a) (3), (a) (5), or
(a) (6) shall t)e entitl(,'(,I to adjudication by the Secretary on tim record alier an opportu-
nity for any agency hearing with respect to suctl advers(,, action. Any final action by tim
S(,'crelary und(,'r this subsection shall t)e subject to judicial review under chapter 7 of title
5, Uniu'd Slales (]ode.
SEC. 204. REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY. [citation ill margin:
"15 [!S(; 5(i94"1
The Se(,Tetary may issue regulations to carry ottt this tithe. Such regulati<ms shall be
t)rmnulgated only after puhlic notice and comment in accordance with the provisions of
section 55:4 of litl(," B, Unite(,I Stales Code.
SEC. 205. AGENCY ACTIVITIES. [citation in margin: "15 US(: 5625"]
(a) 1J(;ENSE APPLICXI'ION AND ISSUANCE.--A private sector party may apply fi>r
a license m operate a priwm' remote sensing spa(,:e system which utilizes, on a space-avail-
ahh" basis, a civilian United States (;overnment satellite or vehicle as a platlorm tor such
syslem. The S(,'crelary, pt,rsuant to this title, may license such system i1 it meets all tonal|-
lions of this till(," iuld--
(1) Ihe system olx'ral(>r agrct.s I() reimhurs(,, Ihe (;overnm{,nt in a timely manner
t0r all r(,'lated costs ilwurred with r(,!spe(,'l to sllch utilization, including a reasonabh'
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and proportionate share of fixed, l)lalti)rn/, data transmission, and launch costs;
anti
(2) such utilizalion would not interttqe wilh or otherwise compromise inlended
civilian Government missions, as determined by the agency responsible tot such
civilian platform.
(b) ASSISTANCE._Fhe Secretary may oFlk_r assistance Io private sector paL'tics in
tinding appropriate opportunities for such utilization.
(c) A(;REEMENTS.--To the extent provided in advance by appropriation Acts, am
United States (;overnlnent agency inay enter into agreements for such utilization if such
agreements are consistent with such agency's mission and stalltlory attthority, anti if such
remote sensing space system is licensed by the Secretory befi)re commencing operalion.
(d) APPIJCABILITY.--This section does not apply to ac(ivilies carried ou! under
title Ill.
(e) EFFECT (IN FCC AUTItORITXL--Nothing in this lille shall affect lilt" authority
of the Federal Comnmnications (]ommission purstmnt lo the ConHntmications Act of
1934 (47 U,S.C. 151 et seq,).
TI'I'I_E Ill--RESEARCH, DE\_IL)PMENT, AND I)EM()NSTIL&TI()N
SEC. 301. CONTINUED FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. [citation in mar-
gin: 15 USC 56311
(a) R()I,ES OF NASA AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.--
(l) The Administrator and the Secretary of Dr'lense are directed to continue and
Io enhance programs of remote sensing research and developmenl.
(2) The Adnfinistrator is authorized and encouraged lo--
(A) con(lucl experimental space remole sensing i)rograms (including al)l)li-
cations demonstration programs an(t I)asic research at universities);
(B) develop remote sensing technologies and lechniques, including those
needed for monitoring the Earth and its environment; and
((') conducl such research and development in cooperation with olhtq
United States (;overmnenl agencies and with public and private research
entities (including private industry, universities, non-prnlit organizations,
St;re" and local goverllnlCLtlS, foreign governments, m_d international organi-
zations) and to enter into arrangements (inchtding.ioinl ventures) which will
tt)sler stLch cooperation.
(b) ROI,ES OF I)EI'ARTMENT OF A(;RICI!I/I'URE AND I)EPARTMENT (IF INTE-
Ri()R.--
(1) In order It) enhance the ability of the United States to manage and utilize its
rcnewable and nonrenewable resources, the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Secretary of the Interior are authorized and encouraged lo conduct programs ot
research att¢l development in the applications of rcmole sensing using timtls
apl)r<>priated fi)r such purposes.
(2) Such programs may inchtde basic rt, scarch al tmiversities, demonstrations of
applications, and cooperative activities invoMng other (;owwnmen! agencies, l)ri-
vale seclor parties, mid toreign and international organizations.
(c) ROI.E OF OTIIER FEDERAL A(;ENCIES.-- United Slates Governnwnt agencies
are authorized and encottraged to conduc! research and development on the use of
i'ell/Ole sensillg ill the fultilhnent of their authorized missions, using funds appropriated
fin such proposes.
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SEC. 302. AVAILABILITY OF FEDERALLY GATHERED UNENHANCED DATA. !cita-
tion in margin: "15 [!S(_ 5632"]
(a) GENERAl, RUI,E.--AII mwnhanced land remote sensing data gathered and
owned hy tilt, United Stales (;overnment, inchtding nnenhanced data gathered nnder tile
technolo_, D' demonstration program carried out purstlalll to SeClit)ll 303, shall he made
available 1¢_users in a timely fashion.
(b) PROTECTION FOR (:OMMERCIAI, DATA DISTRIBUT()R.--The President
shall seek to ensure that Imenlmnced data gathered under the techno]og_' demonstration
program carrie<l ou! pllrsttaIll to section 303 shall, to the ex!em practicable, be made
available on !t'rms that wouhl not adversely eft_c! [sic] the commercial market filr nnen-
hanced data gathered hy !he Landsa! (i spacecraft. {marginal hole: "President"]
SEC. 303. TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM. [ci!ation in margin:
"15 [rS(: 5633"]
(a) I'_S'IABIJSHMENT.--As a timdanlental component of a national land remote
sensing strategy', till" President shall establish, through appropriate United Stales
(;overmnent agencies, a technology demonstration program. The goals of such programs
shall hc to-- [marginal note: "President"]
(I) seek It) launch advanced land renlote sensing syslem componelHS within
5 years after !he date of the enactment of this Ac!;
(2) demons!rate within such 5-year period advmwed sensor capahilities suitabh'
[br use in tilt" anticipated land remote sensing program; and
(3) demonstrate within such 5-year period an advanced land remote sensing sys-
lem design lhal conhl be less expensive It) procure and operale lhan the l.andsal
system projected to he in operation through year 2000, and that therelbre holds
greater polentia] tier private sector investment and control.
(h) EXE(;I !TI()N ()F I'R()(;Po\M.--In executing the technolog,_+ delnonstration pro-
gram, the Presidcnt shall seek to apply technologies associated with United States
National Technical Means of intelligence gathering, to the extent that such technologies
are appropriate tbr tile teehnohJgy dentonstration and can be declassitied fiw such pro._
poses wilhollt causing adverse harm to United States national security interests. [ margin-
ill note: "President"]
(c) BR()AI) APPIJCATI()N.--To !he greatest extent practicahle, the technolo_,_'
ch'monslralion [)rogram established trader suhsection (a) shall be designed 1o be respon-
sive t_ the hroad civilian, national security, commercial, and fi_reign policy needs of the
[ rniwtlSlates.
(d) PRIVATE SE( 7I'OR FUNDIN(;.--The technoh%_' denlonslration program under
this setlion nlay be carried out in part with private sector fimding.
(e) I,ANI)SAT PRO(;IL,\M MANAGEMENT COORDINATI()N.--The l,andsal
Program .Management shall have a coordinating role in the technoh%_' demons!ration
program carried out trader this section.
(t) REPORT TO CON(;RESS.--The President shall assess the progress of the tech-
nolo t,,y dcmemstration program under this section and, within 2 yearn after the dale ot
enactmenl oF!his Act, st!bruit it reporl to the Congress on such progress. [marginal note:
"Preside n t" ]
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TITI.E IV--ASSESSIN(; OPTIONS FOR SU(:(:ESS()R lAND
REMOTE SENSING SYSTEM
SEC. 401. ASSESSING OPTIONS FOR SUCCESSOR LAND REMOTE SENSING SYS-
TEM. Icitati(m in margin: "15 US(: 5641"]
(a) ASSESSMENT.--Within 5 years alter tile (late of tile enactnlent of this Act, the
I,andsat Program Management, in consultation with representatives of approl)riale
United States (;overnment agencies, shall assess and report to the Congress on the
options for a slu cessor land remote sensing system to Landsat 7. The report shall inch,de
a full assessment of the advantages and disadwmtages o1_ [marginal note: "Reports"]
(1) private sector timding and management of a successor land remote sensing
system;
(2) establishing an international c<msortium t(w the funding and managenwnt of
a successor land relnote sensing system;
(3) thnding and nmnagement of a successor land relttllte sensing sysuqn by the
[!nile(I Slates (h)vernment; and
(4) a cooperative t.llort betwet'tt tile I_tnited States (;overnnwnt and the private
sector for tile thnding and management of a successor land remote sensing systenl.
(b) (;()ALS.--hl carrying out subsection (a), the l,andsat Program Managmnent
shall consider tit(" ability of each of the options to-
( 1 ) et).coura.ge the develolmmnt, launch, and operation of a land remote sensing
system thai adequately serves tilt: civilian, national security, commercial, anti tof
eign policy interests of the [Trilled States:
(2) encourage Ihe development, launch, and operalion of a hind remole sensing
system that tttailllaillS data continuity with lhe Landsat systent; and
(3) incorporate system enhancements, including any such enhancements devel-
oped under tht' technolog 7 demonstration program under section 303, which
may potentially yield a system that is less expensive to build and operate, and
more responsive to data users than is the l,andsat system projected to lie in oper-
ation through the year 2000.
(c) PREFERENCE F()R PRIVtgI'E SE(:TOR S3%TEM.--If a successor land remote
sensing system to Landsat 7 can be ftmded and managed by the private sector while still
achieving the goals stated in subsection (b) without jeopardizing tile domestic, national
se(urity, and foreign t)olicy interests of the United States, preliqence should be given to
the development t)f such a system by the private sector without competition from lit("
United States (,overmnent.
TIT1,E V--(,ENERAI, I)RO\:ISI()NS
SEC. 501. NONDISCRIMINATORY DATA AVAILABILITY. [citation in margin: "15 USC
5651"]
(a) (;ENERAI, RUl,E.--Except its provided in subsection (b) of this section, any unen-
hamed data generated I)y the l,andsat system or any other land remote sensing Sysletlt
funded and owned bv the United Stal(?s (;oveltltltenl shall be made availal)le to all users
with()ut preti:rence, bias, or any other special arrangement (except (m the basis of nation-
al security c()ncerns pursuant to section 506) regarding delivery, Ibrmal, pricirlg, or tech-
ttical collsideraliotts whi(lt WOltld l_tv()r Otle cl.tSlOllter ()r class ()l cttst()ttler over allolher.
(I)) EX(]l'_PTlONS.--Unenhmwcd dam generated t)y lhe I,andsat syslenl or any ()th('r
lalld rein(tie sensing systmn [itlt(led and ()Wlt(,'(l [)V th(! [mired Slates (;ovelllltteltl ltla'v t)e
made availabh' to the [ l ltited States (;oveltllttetlt alt(l its aftilial('d users at redu( ed prices,
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it+ accordance with thb+ Acl, _tl lilt+ condith)n that such utwtdianc_'d data arc used solcl,x
Jbr notlconnn('rcial ptJrl+<>s_'s.
SEC. 502. ARCHIVING OF DATA. [citation iu margirl: "15 US(: 565T']
(a) PUBLIC INTEREST.--h is it+ thc public interest fl)r tile United State (;overlmlcnt
to-
( l ) Itl;ailllain _tn _|l+tllixc oJ land re(note sensing data Ibr hist<irical, sci¢'tltific, and
technical lltirl)OS('S, includiug h)llg-tcrni global t'n'¢irontiicntal lllOllilol+illg;
(7) COll[I-<t] lilt +.cllnlt'lll aild nco])c of i]lc aiClliVt'; and
({_l) _iSSlil+( • lhc qtiality, itllt+griiy, and continuiiy of lhc archive.
(b) AR(:ItlVIN(', PIL,\(]TICES.--Thc SocrctaFy of" lhc [nlcl+ior, ill corisllltalion wiitl
lh_" [.alidSai Proglaili Malial._('lilClll+ shall |)rovid<." JOl ]onl_,-lCrlli SlOl-_ij_,t', niailitcnancc, and
liDgiiit+lilig of a basic, global, ]alid rclli<llc scnsing dala st'l (JlCl+Ciliali(!r r(!lt'lTt+d Io (is lilt"
"basic data sol") alld shall Iblhlw rcasorlab]o archival tiracliccs Io +iSSilI'<" [)FOD('I" storagc
and i)rcscrvali<)n of ihc basic daia sct and timely acc¢'ss I<)i pallics rt'qil<:Slillg daia.
(c) I)H'ERMINATI()N (iF (]ONTENT OF BASI(: I)ATA SI+]T.--In dt'lt'rlnining lhc
iililial conlcnl of, oi in IiFigHdilig, ih(" basic data set, lilt" Sl'cl('larv <if Inlcrioi shall--
(l) li_(' _ls,+t tlas('linc lh(+ data arctiivcd till lht" dai(" of i.n+tCllllClll of (his Aci;
(2) lakc into {iCCCIIIlII J'illtil'(' lcc[lniea| aild sciCllli[ic <-lcvi'lolllni!iits _ilid llccds,
paying f)articular ailctilioli t_l the antic(paled data r(!qtlir(!iiicnis of global cnvi-
l(inillCill:<ll cJl;lll_C ic_,C{liC|i;
(!+) c<>iisilh with +ili<l +('t'k lh(" advici + ot +iiSCl._ aiid ])roduc+<'i+ of iClliOlc st'((sing
d_ll;i +tlid d_ila lJrodlicls;
(4) consid(!t lilt liC(+d |Tit dlila which lll+ty bc duplicative _c_>gral)hical (ovciil_C
bill which ditt_'i + in ICrlii of si'ason, s|)ccll+a] b+ill<ls, l+c_+ohlli_)ll, of <lthcr rcl<..v;lill
lTtclol+s;
(5) hi¢ltldc, as tilt" St'crctary of the Ilitcrior considi'rs al)lir<ll)rialc, unt'nhanc¢'d
dala gCliClatcd ('hht'r by lilt" l.aiidsal sySlClli, I>iirnil;ilil It) ihlc [, or lly [ict'list'('+
Ilil(lt'l +title II;
((i) iilchldc, as ihc Sccl-Ct_il'y <)[" illc [ntcrioi +<.:<)il+i<lcrs ajipr<)l)ri;<iit', data coHcct¢'d
I)y fort'ign groiind +latiOllS <)r I)y t01eign r_'ln<)lt" St'lising si)acc svsll,lliS; and
(7) ciiStllC that thc (+()lll('llt oJ" the archive is dcvclol)('d hi iicC<)l-d:.4ll('c with st,e-
li<ill 5Oil.
(d) lilrBl,l(; l)()MAIN.--Aftci + the cx|)iiati<)ll oI any (+xclusivc right t_> moil, _)i afti'i +
i-tqii_<lUiShni¢,til of much right, Ill(+ data provided to the National Salcllitc l,and Ri-niol('
S(+lisili_ Data Archive shall b(" in lhc public domain and shall be liiadc available to r<:qtlcst-
iii_ [)artics tly the Sccr('l_lly <iF lhc hltcrior at the cost of fultilling llSCl + r_,qu_,sis.
SEC. 503. NONREPRODUCTION. Jcitation in margin: "15 US(; 5(i57,"1
[!ll('tlllallct'd data (lisiriblllccl by any licensee undcr litle II of this Acl may bc sold oii
Iht' condilioil I|ial such (lala will Ilol Ir:lc reDrodtiecd or flisscininali_d I)y l|l+: i)iii+chascl - I<ll-
(_ ililini'i-ci+il I)Url)oS_'s.
SEC. 504. REIMBURSEMENT FOR ASSISTANCE. [citation in lll+iit_iil: "15 US(: 5654"1
The Adilihli._tralor, tht" Sccl-(,lal-y (if Defense, +llll;t the heads of other United Si_tit's
(',oV('lillliCnl +igCliCiCS+ ill+i)' ]/r<lvide assistance to land lClllOlC s('nsill_ +vSIClll op('lalors
uild<.'r the l)r(tvisions of 01is Acl. Sillistalitia] assistance shall I)(" i('iiiil_iirsi'd by (hi" oi/t'i+a -
to( +,cxccf)t as <_tlicrwisc l)r_ividcd liv law.
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SEC. 505. ACQUISITION OF EQUIPMENT. Icitation ill margin: "15 USC 5655"I
The l,andsal lift)gram Managenlent may, by means of a competitive process, alh)w a
licensee under title I1 or any other party to buy, lease, or otherwise acquire die use oI
equil)mem from the l,andsat system, when such equipmenl is no longer needed for flw
operalion of su(h system or for the sale ()fdala Ii-()m such system. Oflkials of other Unit('d
Stales (h)vermnenl civilian agencies are authorized and encore-aged to cooperate with the
Secretary in carrying out this se(tion.
SEC. 506. RADIO FREQUENCY ALLOCATION. Icilati()n in margin: "15 USC 565(Y']
(at APPI,I(:JYI'I()N T() FEDERAl. (X)MMUNi(5\TIONS C()MMISSI()N.-_To the
extent required by tile Communi(alions Act oI 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 el seq.), an application
shall tie filed with the Federal (]ommunicalions Commission fi)r any vadi() facililies
inwllved with commercial remote sensing space systems li(:ensed raider title If.
(b) DEADLINE FOR FC(] A(TFION.--h is lhe intent of (;()ngress thai lhe Federal
Communications Comnlission complete tile radio licensing process under t11¢'
(:()mmunicalions Acl (if 1934 (47 U.S.C. 15l et seq.), upon the application of any I)rivate
se(l()r ]3arty ()Y consortitml ol)el'a[ol" of" ally c()llllnei(ial land lenlo[e sensing space system
subjecl to this Act, within 120 days of the re('eipl (if an application for such licensing. If
t]na] action has not occurred within 120 days of lilt" receipt of such an a])|)licalion, the
Federal (:()mmmlicati()ns (:()remission shall inli)rm Ihe al)l)li(anl (if any pending issues
and of actions required It) rest)lye lhem. [marginal note: "l.i('ensing']
((9 1)EVEI,()PMENT AND C()NSTRI!(:T1ON (IF UNITED S'I;,\'I'ES S_'S'I'EMS.--
Authority shall not be required tiom the Federal Communications (;ommission fi)r dw
deveh)pment and construction of any I.!nited States land remote sensing space syslenl (or
('()nl[)()Ilelll theteoi), ()tiler than radio lra]ls]llilliHg) la(ilities ()r (-()mp()nents, whih' any
licensing delermination is being made.
(d) (X)NSISTENCY WIT[! INTERNATIONAl, ()BIA(;ATI()NS AND l'l:l),I.l(;
INTEREST.--Fretluency allocalions made ])lllSllallt to this settilth l)y the Federal
(]ommmlicati()ns (;()remission shall I)e c()nsislenl with inlernalional ()l)ligali()ns and wilh
lh(" public interest.
SEC. 507. CONSULTATION. [ citation in margin: "15 [ rS(: 5657"]
(at (X)NSUI3"ATION WITH SECRE_I:_RY (IF I)EFENSE.--The Secrelary and the
Lan(Isat I)rogram Management shall consvh wilh the Secrelarv of l)efense on all matters
under this Acl afI_'cling national securily. The Secretary of I)eI('nse shall lie responsibh"
for detern|ining those ('()nditions, consistent with It)is Acl, necessary t() meet mutt)hal
seclliity COllCeFlls of the [ttlilcd Slalt.'s al)d It)l noliI_'ing prolnptly tile Secrelary and the
I.andsal Program Mamlgement I)r()ml)lly of such conditions.
(b) ( :( )NSUIXATI()N WITI l SE(:RI'71L_RY (IF STATE.--
( I ) The Secretary and the l.andsat l)rogram Management shall consuh with the
Secretary (if Stale <in all maners tin(let this Act aID.'(ting international obligations.
The Secretary of State shall be resp()nsil)le fi)r determining those conditions, con-
sistent with this Act, necessary t() meet inlernali()nal obligations and |.)()li(ies oI
the United Stales and fi)r holily, trig prompll_ the Secretary and the Landsat
l)rogram Management of such conditions.
(2) Apl)ropviate United States (h)vernmenl agencies are authorized and eric, tin-
aged to provide remote sensing data, let'hllolo_'+ anti training to developing
ilaliolls ;is ,I ('()lll])()llell{ (It" ])iOglalll',; (it illlelllali()tlal aid.
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(3)TheSecretaryof .";tale shall l_rOmlltly reporl to the Secretary and l+andsat
Pl-ogl_.tllll _;inittgt'inellt any instances outside the" tlnitcd States of disctiminatoFv
(limlrihutiott of l.andsat data. |marginal note: "Reports"]
(c) STATt!S RI'_P()RT.--The I.andsal Program Management shall, as often as neces-
sary, provide Io the (_ongress oomph're and ttpdate[dl infilrnmli<m ahotll the sl,|ltls <l["
ongoing operations of the I.andsat syslen+J, including tintely nolificati<n+t ofdecisions made
with respect Io the I.andsat system in order to meet national security concerns and inter-
national obligations and policies of the [!hired States (;overmnent.
(d) REIMB[!RSEMENT--ff as a resuh of technical mo(fificati<nls itnl)Ost'd ml a
lic¢,llSee under title ff on the hasis of national security concerns, the Secretary, in consul-
tat|on with tilt" Secretary of l)¢'fi+nse or with other Federal agencies, d<.lermin¢'s thai addi-
ti<mal costs +viii be incurred hy the licensee, or that past development costs (including the
cost el+capital) will not he. recovered hy the licensee, the Secretary inay require the agency
or agencies requesting such technical moditlcati<ms to reimburse the licensee flit such
additional or develol)Fnent costs, but IlOl for anticipated profits. Reiml)ursements may
(-¢_v('v costs associated with tt'quit+cd changes in system ll('rlbrmmwc, bttl n<_t costs ovdi-
muily associaled with doing hum|hess ahroad.
SEC. 508. ENFORCEMENT. Idtalion in margin: "t5 USC 5658"]
(a) IN (;ENERAI,.--fn order to ensure that unenhanced data from tile l,andsat sys-
It'Ill re<'¢'ivvd soh'l', lm noncommercial l)In'p()ses are not used fin" any commercial |)lit'-
post', tilt' St'¢rctary (ill c<)llal:,oration with private sector entities responsible lot lilt"
marketing and distribution <d unenhanoed data generated hy the l.andsat system) shall
develop and implemetn a system tiw entiwcing this prohihition, in the event that llllen-
hanced <t;tla fiom Ihe I,andsal system are made availahle for n<nwotnmercial proposes at
a ditf_,'rcnl price l]lall such data are ma(le availahle fin other ])Url)oses.
(b) AtFTIf()RITY ()F SE(:RETAR_: --Suhject to suhsection (d), tilt' Setlelltry inil+y
impose any ot tile enfilrcement nw¢'hanisms descrihed in suhsection (c) against a person
who--
(1) receives tmenhance(l data fi+om the Landsat system under this Act solely fl>r
n<mcommercial l)urposes (and at a difikwent price than tht" [;,ri(c at which such
data aFe made availahle fiw other purposes); and
(2) uses such data tilt other than noncommercial purposes.
(c) ENFORCEMENT ME(:HANISMS.--Entbrcement mechanisms referred to in sub-
sc(tion (b) may inchtde civil penahies of not more than $10,000 (pet day per violation),
denial o1 [in+lher unenhanced data i)urchasing privileges, and any other penahies or
restrictions the Secretaty considers necessary to ensure, to the greatest exlellt practicable,
that tmenhanced data provided for noncommercial purposes are not used to unt+airly
compctc in Ih¢' c<nmnercial Markel against private sector entities nol eligihh" for data at
the cost of lhlfilling user requests.
(d) PRO(:EI)URES AND REGUI+ATIONS.--The Secretary shall issne any regtdations
II(+<'('SS_tly Io CalTy ()tit Ihis section and shall estahlish standards and pr<)ce(ftut:s governing
the imp<_sition +)I enlk)tc<.,ment mecllanisms nnder subsection (h). The standards and pro-
ce<hues shall inchnle it pr<_ce¢lure t_+t potentially aggrieved parties to file formal protests
with tilt' Secretary alleging inslances where such unenhanced data has heen, or is heing,
used tilt + commercial pttrposes in violation of the terms of' receipt of such data. The
Secretary shall promptly act to investigate any such protest, and shall report annually to
tht +(;<regress ()n installces (d such violations. [marginal note: "Reports"l
?,(ibl ()BY;ERVIN(;TItl..EARI'11FR()M SI'A( :1-?
TITI,E VI--PR()ttIBITI()N ()F COMMER(HAI,IZATI()N ()F
WEATttER SATEI,I XI'ES
SEC. 601. PROHIBITION. [citation ill margin: "15 USC 5671"]
Neither the l)resi(lenl nor any other o[ti(ial of the (;overmnenl shall make any ettor!
1o lease, sell, or nansii'r 1o the privau" sector, or commercialize, any portion of the weath-
er satellite s)stcms ()perated by the l)el)artmen! of (]ommcrce or any suc('ess()r agency.
SEC. 602. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS. [ citation in margin: "15 US(: 5672"]
Regar(t]ess o1 any change in ('il'('tllllStall(('s stlb.',;e(lUCIll t() !111.! 1.'llaCllllellf (11 this Act,
even if su(h change makes il al)l)car l() l)c in the national inter('st 1() commercialize weath-
er satellites, neither the Presi(lent nor an.v ofli('ial shall take any action prohil)itcd 11_ s('(-
!ion 601 unless this title has li[s! ])(:en rcpcah!(t.
Approved ()ctober 28,1992.
IJ'2C;ISI,_'I'IVE I IlSTORY---tt.R. 6133:
(:()N(;RESSI()NAI, RE(X)R1), Vol. 138 ( 1992):
()ct. 5, considered and passed I louse.
Oct. 7, considered and passed Senate.
VCH".KI N (:OMPIIATION ()F PRESII)ENTIA1, DOCUM EN't'S, \_)1.28 ( 1992):
Oct. 28. Presidential sl:dlt'lll('lll.
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T/lew,._ pmr lette_ hi/fldigh! the poli,y a_d /unding dispute over the Departm,,nt o[ l)@,nw _ (DOD)
provision o/ the fligh Re.wdution Mulfispec/ral Stereo lmal4er (HRMSI) Jot Land_at 7, which 1)01)
had originally propmed]or the satellite bat then backed awcg']hnn when NASA rq/u_ed toJund a sub-
_tantial upg'rade /br /he gv'ound _)'_tem to col/eel the data. l_.,S. Represenlative Geor¢e Brown had
played a major role in drq//inff m_d _pop_wn'in/4 the Land Remote-Sensinl4 Polir)' Act _]- 1992 and
there/ore had a stake in w'ei_:4 the conlrove_:sy succe.s4_dly resoh,ed. 1)*: John Gibbons, President
Clinton _ _ciem'e advisor a_d the director q/the Office _[ Science and TecbnoloAg, Polity, helped trap
the (,'lit_ton admD_iL_lralioa ivpolir)' toward Land_al 7.
Document 11-41
August 9, 1993
*l'h(' Honorable John (;it)b()ns
mssiSlalll to lhe I:Tesidenl
()flice of Science and Technology Policy
()ld F.xccutiv(. ()fficc Btfilding
Washington, 1)(] 20500
l)carJack:
As you kl]ow, NASA and the Department of Detense are roughly sl)liuing lhe cos! of
lhc I_;-u_ds;4l program in accowtance with the I_and Ren]t)le Sensing Policy Act (P.I.
1(t2-555), which I]lC Vice Presidcnl played an important role in shaping. I lowever, only
I)()D has requcsled tundillg tbr the ttigh Resolution Muhispeclral Sleleo Imager
([tRMSI), a new s('ns()v tirol would t)roduc,u 5-meier resoltllion imagery; NASA's I)u(lgel
does nol include its pr()posed funding share for HRMSI, which would I)(' used Io build Ihc
data han(llil_g system.
While l t-e('ogniz(' the diflictflt choices thai lilt" Administration laced in ti)Hnulaling
NASA's tnldgel, I was greatly disal)l)t)inted that Ihis funding tbr 1tRMSI was not included.
tlRMSI is exactly what many users of remote sensing data have wanted for years. In addi-
lioll to global change vesearc:h, environmental applications lhal need tlRMSI-Iype dala
include t)iodiversity ecosystem mapping, forest and coaslal wetlands inventories, oil spill
lvacking, toxic waste sitting and monitoring, and land use planning.
The lack of NASA co-thnding fi)r HRMSI could lead to the cancellation of t IRMSI if
1)()I) is nol at)le Io oh/ain addilional timding. Without IIRMSI, DOD's interest in l,andsal
could diminish, possibly jeopardizing lhis valuable program that we have worked so hard
l() i)rt'serv( '. Even if I)OD is able to fund the entire (()st of tIRMSI, most civil users may 1)e
uuat)le lo obtain inlagely they need because DOD fimding would nol cover data acquisi-
lion arid pr(>cessing tot civil users.
I hope that you will turn yottr attention to the need to establish a ftmding fi-amework
for I IRMSI that tqlSttl'es fidl civil participation and use o1 the data. I stand ready Io assisl
VOlU in auy way possil)le.
Sincerely,
[hand-signed: "George"]
(;E()R(;E E. BR()WN, ]R.
Chairman
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Documenl 11-42
1)ecember 9, 1993
Honorable (;eorge E. Brown,Jr.
(;hairman
(kmuniltee on Science, Space and Technology
1.7.S. t louse <ff Representatives
Washinglon, D.C. 20515
l)ear Mr. (]hairm;m,
I promised to keep you in|ormed about L_\NI)SAT. Yesterday, Dan (;oldin and l met
Io talk al)ttl SOlile program decisions in preparation fin the FY_.)glbudgel. Basically, the
decision is for NASA to go its own way wilh a 30 meter resolution thematic mapper, and
DoD will consider if it will go forward with the 5 meter ttigh Resolution Multispectral
Inslrument (I IRMSI). Dol) and NASA could not afford to go torward with flw I+ANDSAq
7 and IANDSAT 8 program.
I am available to discttss this with you at ;mytime. Hope you had a I)rothwtive trip to
the Far East.
Best regards,
[ h an d-sign ed: "Joh n"]
John l)eutch
Document 11-43
[ 1] I)ecember 1O, 1993
[handwritten note: "(;eorge"]
Dear Mr: Chairman:
Thank yott for sharing your concerns on the h)ss of l+andsal 6. 1 also share wmr dis-
appoinlment with respecl 1o l]le loss of I,andsal 6 and your concern with flw polential
data gap that cotdd result fl+otn this loss. The Otfice of Science and Technolo_' Policy is
taking an active role in reviewing the options for responding IO this new situation, qk) this
end OSTP is working with the l)eparmwnt of Deft'rise, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to
develop options Ior reducing die likelihood of a gap in critical remote sensing data.
The Administration recognizes tllat l,andsat data is valuable to a broad user commu-
nity as represented I)y Federal, state, and local governments, as well as the business, intel-
ligeme, and acach'mic (-onmmnities. I,andsal is primarily valual)le t)ecmtse its 21)+ re;t|.
long data base allows trends in land-stu+|_tce (+haracleristi(s to be determined, its radio-
metric nleasul+enlent accuracy stupl)OltS delailcd characterization <)l lhe hmd-surl;wc, and
its (<)lnbill;.l.tion of wide area (:overage and 30 llteter resolution allows broad areas to be
assessed prior to initiating detailed sludies requiring higher spatial resolution.
(]onscqttenlly, as the Admilfistration develops a response lo the loss of l,;mdsat 6 we will
lake int<_ considerati<m Ihe requirements of the broad user community and the capabili-
ties requircd to meet their needs.
[']XI'I ,( )RIN( ; I! IE [ !N KN( )WN 371
Ahhough we are in tilt" early slag(Is of assessing options, initial indications tit)lll
E()SAT, the system's operator, are that l,andsat 5 could continue to operate tot several
more years even though it is aheady 9 years old and well pas! its design liti:. Consequently,
the likelihood of a significanl (tala gap may not he as greal as originally anlicipaled, assttm-
ing lhat l,andsat 7 is launched on schedttle, ttowevev, we do have serious concerns with
the coverage of the eavlh and the site revisit time of l,andsal 5. I_andsat 6 would have
addressed lhese concerns and added some additional capabilities that would have further
increased the competitiveness and utility of the Landsat system.
OSTP in conjtmction wilh the DOD, NOAA, and NASA is carefiflly considering
options to address both the loss of Landsat 6 and Ihe (()stand risk of the l,antlsat 7 pro-
gram. These two items are linked hecause lhe availabilily of l,andsat 7 directly afR'cts when
or if a replacement spacecrafl fiw l,andsat 6 should be latmcbed. As you are aware lht" cur-
rc'nl budgelary environmenl has made it necessary to examine options in terms of their
cost and risk; lherefbre, I wahl 1o assure yott lhal any alternalives to the currenl program
wilt undergo carefid interagency review in order to evaluale potenlial impacts relatiw, to
the I,andsal program's diverse requirements and users. [21 Further, I would like to assure
you that any proposal tot responding to the loss of 1,andsat 6 or for significantly modil_'-
ing the current I,andsat program will address data continuity; impacts on agency budgets;
schedule iml)acts; the acquisition, launch and operation of the necessary satellites and
instruments; and the needs of the user commtmities.
The necessary in/eragency review will be expedited to meet Ihe needs of FX:,,t5 bud-
getary decision timetables. 1iowevcr, it is important to make clear thai no decision on pro-
gram ahernatives has been or will he taken prior to the or)repletion of this review.
1 look torward It) working with you on this important issue and will provide a more
detailed (liscussiml of the alternatives being considered in the near t_.ttme.
Sincerely yours,
|hand-signed: '_Jack"t
John H. Gibbons
Director
The I hmorable George E. Brown,Jr.
(_hairman
(_ommittt:e oil Science, Space and Technologff
[ !.S. } [()tl_,e ()[ R('l)vesen(alives
Washinglon, 1)(', 2()510
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Document 11-44
l)ecenll)er 14, 1993
The thmorableJohn tt. (;it)boris
Assistant to lhe President
ell'ice of Science and Technolog T Policy
Old Executive ()ffice Building
Washinglon, D.C. 20500
lhandwrinen hole: 'ila('k"l
I)ear l)i: (;il)bons:
Thank you fi>r your letter COll('erlllng lhe [,andsat prograni, l apt)reciale yollr keep-
ing ine infoillle(I at)oul Ihe review of I,andsal issties, 1)ui the letter does ilol direclly
respond to lhe con(erns aboul I,andsal 7 oullined in my letter Io you of [haiidwrillen
underlining] Allgils[ (.). [handwritten llotc ill margin: "(attached)"] Specifically, the ]citer
made no nlention of what ! believe is the inosl critical isstle--resolving the dittbrences
I)etwel, n NASA and D()I) concernhlg tilnding tot the tligh Resolution Muilisl)eclra]
Stere() llnager (ttRMSI) on kandsal 7.
[ would like io reilerale iny strong support foi the l.andsat 7 prograni and iny belief that
t tRMS1 represents a valuable new capability for both national securhy and civilian users.
l would like to reqllest again thai you l)ersonaily iilleivene Io ])iovide a sohlliOn Ilia)
ensures ioliliiiilalion of lhe I.andsat 7 prograln. Any solulion should fultill lhe ri'qtlil-i!-
lnenls of lhe l.and Rt'iiiolt • Sensing I>olicy Acl (Public l,aW t07-555), hichiding an inle-
graled inanageinenl |)y NASA and lhe I)eparinienl of Defense, [)rocurclnt'iil of I,alidSal 7
as quickly as practical)le lhal is ill least as capable its l,aildsat (i would have I)ecn, all(|, whet'('
possible, iliCOil)<)ralion <l[ _tlly iinl)rovtqnenl needed Io llleel U.S. (;ovl'rlllll('ill iit'eds.
its akvitys, I Sialld ready i(:, assist you in ;:ill)' way possil)le.
Sincerely,
[hand-signed: "(,eorge']
(;EOR(;E E. BROWN,.]R.
(]hairlnan
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Document title: The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-3, "Landsat
Remote Sensing Strategy," May 5, 1994.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
After the l)epartme.t q/ lJefi'.se derided to _t@ dire<t(_' participati.g i. the l.and_at program, polity
maker_ within the ('linto. admi.i_tration .]aced the task of determi,ung how to proceed. After cm_-
sidemble discussion within the Clinto. administralio. 's National ,%ience and Technoh_g_, Coundl,
with i.put./}vm the National ._iecu_ity Council, Preside**t Clinto. sig,'ned Ihi_ dire(4ive, wkick _atse
,\:4 SA re._pon ._)bill O,/br prm'u ring l .a nd,_a t 7, NOA A the re_po. _ibility /or m a n ag-i.g .peratio. _, a. d
the l)epartme.t o/'the l.trrim' the re,spon,sibility.fin" distributing the data thnmgh the l '.,g. (;eoloL6cal
Survey _ EROS Data ('enter in Sim_x Falls, South Dakota.
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SI;BIE(:T: I.antlsat Remote Sensing Slrall't,_,
I. Introduction
This directive p,ovides for conlinuance of the l.andsal 7 program, assures ('onlitllfily
of l.amdsat-typc and quality of (lata, and reduces the risk of a (tala gap.
The l,andsal ])r(_gTam has provided over _20 years of calibrated dam to a broad us('r
(oxnnntnily in(luding the agricultural colnmunil% global change researchers, sl_tle itll(I
local gow'rnnwnts, commercial users, and the military. The Landsal (i satellile which tidied
t_ reach onbil in 1(.}9"{was inlended Io repla(e the existing l.andsal salelliles 4 and 5, which
were launched in 1982 and 1984. These satellites which are operating well beyOlM lheir
Ihrec year design lives, rel)resenl Ill(: only source of global calil)raled high spatial res()lu-
li()ll ill(';.iSlllelnelllS of [h(" E_lrlh's Slllt_l('(! thal (_tll I)e ClHl|l):lred Inn])reviollS data re(nrds.
In lhc Fall ,_t 1993 lhe .joinl i)el)arlmenl of Defense and Nali_mal Aeronaulics and
Sl)aC(. A(lminislralion l.an(lsal 7 program was being reevaluated due 1o severe budgelary
((restraints. This ti_(:1, couf)led wifll tll(: advan(ed age of l,an(Isat satelliles 4 and 5, resnll-
e(l in :,1 re-assesslnexl[ of the l,andsat program tJy rcpresentalives of The National Science
and Technoh_ D, Council. The ob.je(liw, s of the National Science and Technolog T Cour, ci]
were to minimize lhe 1)olenlial fi)r a gap in lhe I,andsat data record if l,an(lsal satelliles
.1 and 5 should cease Io operale, 1() reduce cost, and t() reduce develcq)uneiH risk. The
resllhs of this r(,-assesslnelll are identified below.
This (l{)(ument supersedes National Space Policy Direclive #5, dated February P,
199_2, and (lirecls iml)lemenlalion of the Landsal Program consislent with the intent of
P. I.. 1()2-555, lira I_and Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, and P. 1. 103-_221, Ihe
Emergency Sul)plen_enlal Appropriations Act. Tile Administralion will seek all legislative
(hanges ne(essary t() implemenl this PDD.
II. Policy Goals
A rmn()le sensing capal)ilily, such as is currently being provided I)y l.andsat salellilcs
I and 5, 1)enetils the civil, commercial, and national security interesls ()f Ihe United Stales
and makes (ontril)utions I(1 Ill(! priwlle scclor which are in the public interl'sl. For lhese
reasons, Ihe [lnile(l ,qlal('s (;()vernllwnl will seek Io maintain lhe (ontinuily ()f [.an(tsal-
lype data. Th(' [LS. (;overnmenl will:
(a) I'rovi(Ic unenhanccd dala which are sufth'iently consistenl in lerlns O1"acquisition
g('_ml('lry, (overag(' (haracl('rislics, and speclral characlerislics wilh l)r('vious I_andsal dala
I. allmv (lUanHitalive c-ml)arisons tor chauge dct('(ti(m and (haracterizalion:
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(b)Makegovernmcnt-_wncdI,andsaldataavailable to meet the needs of all users at
11o IllOlU IIKIII Ill(" COM Ill" fulfilling user requests consislcnl with data policy goals of P. 1,.
102-555; and
(c) Promote and not preclude private sector commercial Ol)porttmilics in l+andsal-
type rt'molc sensing.
III. Landsat Strategy
a. The l.andsaI sttatch0' is composed of the f<_llowing elcnwnts:
(I) l+'+nst,ring that I.andsat satellites 4 and 5 continue to provide data as long as
they are technically capable <ff doing so.
(2) Acquiring a I.andsat 7 satellite that nlaintains the conlintfity of [+andsal-typc
data, minimizes development risk, minimizes (osl, :111<| achic+++t+s the most
favoral)lc latmch schedule to mitigate the loss o| l+an(tsat 6.
(3) Maintaining an archive within Ihe Uniled ,+";l:ltt's for existing and tuttnc
Landsat-type data.
(4) Ensuring that tmcnhanced data from I+andsat 7 arc available to all users at no
more lhan the cost of fttllilling uscr rcqtt('sls.
(5) Providing data for use in global chang( + r<:scarch in it manner consistent with
the (;Iobal Change Research Policy Statements for Data Mmmgcnwnt.
(6) Considering alternatives for maintaining the continuity of data beyond I+andsat 7.
(7) Fostering the development of advanced remote sensing technologies, with
the goal of reducing tilt" cost and increasing the [:,t'rformanct_ o[ ftllurc
Landsat-typc satellites to tnct'l !!.S. (;ovt, rntnent needs, and potentially,
enabling st,1)stantially grcaler opp<)rttmitics for commcrcializati<)n.
b. These strate_ff elements will b¢+ imph'mentcd within the overall rcsotnct, and pol-
icy guidance provided by the I'residenl.
IV. Implementing Guidelines
Affected ;tg<:ncics will idcntit}' flmds necessary to implement the National Strat(%_/tm
Landsat Remote Sensing within llw overall r<.'S<nli('(+':tilt| policy guidance provided by tlw
President. {In order to cflFctttatc lilt+ sllittt%_' entmwratcd herein, the Sccrclary ot
Commerce and the Secretary of the Interior arc hcrcliy (tesignatcd ;is mcmt)ers of the
l+andsat Pr<)grant Management in accordance with section 101 (b) of the I,antlsat Rcm<)tc
Sensing Policy Act of 1992, 15 U.S.(:. 5602 (6) and 5611 (b).} Specific agency resl)onsibil-
ities are provided below.
a. Tit(+ Deparmlcnt of Conm+ercc/N()zkA.',++'ill:
( 1) In participation wilh otht'r approl)rialc government agencies arrange l_n the
confirmed operation of l.andsat satellites 4 and 5 and thc routi]le operation
o| +ft,tttrc l+andsat satellites after Iheir placemcnl in orbit.
(21) Seek 1)citer access to dala collected at t6rcign gromt<t stations t6r IT.S.
(;ovcrnment and privale soClOl +llst'rs of I,andsal data.
(!:I) In cooperation with NASA, manage the development of and provide a share
of lilt" fimding for lhc l,andsat 7 gtotmd system+
(4) ()peratc the Landsal ? spacecraft and grotmd system in cooperation with the
I)cpartmctlt o[ the lntcnior.
(5) Seek to ot+llset operations costs through use oIaccess fees tiom torcign ground
stations and/or the cost of [ul[illing ttscr reqttcsls.
(6) Aggregate tmurc Federal rcquiremt'nts for civil operational land l't'lllt)|U s('iis-
ing dala.
b. The National Acronatuics and Space Adminislrali<m will:
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(I) Ensure data continuily by the dcw_lopmcnt and launch ota l,an(tsat 7 satel-
IRe system which is at a mininnnn functionally equivalent to tim I,andsat 6
salellite in accor(-lanc(, with s('(ti()n 102, P. l+. 102-555.
(2) In coordination wilh I)()(: ;anti l)()l, deveh)p a l,andsat 7 ground system con)-
patihh, wilh tim I,andsal 7 spacccrati.
(3) In c<+<)rdinali<m with 1)()(:, DOI, and D()D, revise the cuvrenl Managcmenl
plan Io rt't]ecl the changes implemcnlcd lt+nough this direclivt', inclu<ting
programmatic, lechnical, schedule, and hudget infornmtion.
(4) h,nl)lt.m(.,nl the .joint NASA/DOI) Iransitit)n plan to transti'r the I)()D
l,andsat 7 rcspt)nsihiliti(,s to NASA.
(5) In c()ordinalion with olhcr appropriale agencies of th(' U.S. (;ovvrmnent dvvel-
()p a straleg_, tor maintaining continuity of l;mdsat-type data t_'yond l+andsal 7.
((}) (:(HI(hI('I ;t coordinated Iccllnologry demonstration program wilh otht.r
al)l)ropriate agcntivs I<_ imt:uove the Imrtormancc and reduce the cost fo,
ttHllrc tm(lassitivd earth renlole sensing syslcnls.
c. The I)epartmcnl of l)el_rnse will implement the j()int NASA/I)()I) transition plan
to nanslk,r lilt" D()I) I,andsat 7 resp(msihilities to NASA.
d. Th(' l)cpartrnenl of the lntmi(_r will conlinue I() mainlain a national archive of
cxisling and l+tiIttre l,an(lsat-lype remote sensing data within the tlnitcd Stales and ]nakc
such data available to 1!.S. (_,O'++'('l'llllltqll and other users.
v. Alti+clcd agencies will identit_, the funding, and fimding transt+rs tot I_ ' 1994,
r('(luircd lo itnplement this stratcb, _, thai are within their approved tiscal year 1!)94 hudgets
alltl Stll)SO,qtl(+lll hu(lb{tq l('(]tICMS.
V. Reporting Requirements
['.S. (h)vt,rmFl¢+nl agetlcics atl}.:cled by the strategy, guidelines are direcled Io reporl
no lattq lhal :+1')day'.; following the issuance of this directive, to the Nati<mal Science and
Techn(_h)gy (:ouncil on their iml)lcnmntation. The agencies will address Ill;UI;tg('IIIClll
and funding resp(msibiliti(,s, govt, rnnlenl and c(mtraclor operalitms, data management,
archiving, ;tlltl disscminalit)n, nett'ssmy changes to P. I+. 102-555 and (onnn<.rtial ((m-
sith'rafi(ms associated with the l,andsat program.
Document 11-46
Document title: Gregory W. Withee, Acting Assistant Administrator for Satellite and
Information Services, NOAA, to Walter S. Scott, President and Chief Executive Officer,
World View Imaging Corporation, January 4, 1993.
Document 11-47
Document title: Duane P. Andrews, Assistant Secretary of Defense, to Gregory W. Withee,
Acting Assistant Administrator for Satellite and Information Services, NOAA,
December 24, 1992.
Document 11-48
Document title: Ralph Braibanti, Deputy Director, Office of Advanced Technology,
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, to Michael Mignogno, Chief, Landsat Commercialization Division,
NOAA, October 19, 1992.
Source: All in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
376 ()B_,ERV1N(; TIlE EARlIt FR()M SI'A(T
77_e letter fiv, m NOAA _ (;regmy Withee represents the jir_t license to operate a commercial remote-se_-
ing satellite ,_),stem granted under Title I1 of the Lamt Remote-Sen_ing Poli 0' Act oJ1992. 77w license
was Kranted to WorMView lma_ing Corporation and _ubsequently tran,_Je'rred to EartM_htch, l,c.,
when WorMView and Ball Aerospace /ormed an alliance to buiM and operate wmote-se_sing salellite_
and to market data flora them.
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[ll JAN 4. 1'.)!)3
Mr. Walter S. Scolt
Presidenl and Chief Executive Officer
WorldView hnaging ('awl)oration
7015 Elverton Drive
()akland, (;alitiwnia 9461 I-1111
Dear Mr. Scoll:
'['his leltcr conslitules a license under Title II or the I_and Rcmole-Sensing Policy Acl
of 1992, EL. 102-555 (lhe Act), fi)r WorldView hnaging (;orporalion (l,i(ensec) Io opcr-
ale a privalc remole-sensing space system. The license is valid lot a pcwiod of l0 v¢'ars from
the above date.
A. Approval is based on operational spcciticmions scl [ollh ill paragraph (d)
auached to flw Icmq of application date(I July 15, 1992, and additional iniormation pro-
vided in the l,icensee's letter dated Augus! 20, 1992, in reSl)Onsc to qucslions 2-,t and 8.
B. This license is subject to lhe tolh)wing terms and condilions which apply to
WorldVimv and any affiliate or contractor as appropriate.
1. l.i(ensce will not change the operational characleristi_s descril)ed al)ow" in a
way that would resuh in materially dift;erellt capabilities than those described
in the application intbrmation, l,i(ensec will notit\" the National
Environmental Satellite, l)ala, and [ntormalion Service (NESI)IS) at I('asl
60 days in advance of schcdttled launch.
2. [.icenscc will opcrale the svslem in a ma,mcv that will pr¢,scrvt" Rm m_liomtl
SUCIII-iIy of 111(2 [ !niled Slates tllr()ugh posiliw" ('llll|l()l ot lh(2 spaCeCl-ati inchtd-
ing safeguards to assure lhc integrily of spacecrat'l operations. In lhc evenl ot
a national security crisis, as defined by lhe Secretary ot l)et__'nse, lhe Secretary
of(]ommcrc(: may, altt'r consullatit)n with the Sc(rt'tary or l)efensc, reqtfir("
the lAct, nsee to limit data collcction and/or distribution I)v thc system Io Ihc
exlcn! neccssitalcd by Ihe crisis. During such periods, the l,iccnst'e shall
(.'lld(.';.tv(,)l- to provide system dala vcquested I)y D()I) and other mtliona] secu-
rity ag-ellt'it's illldel" reasonable cost [el'IllS.
[2] 3. [Acensce will make available to the (,ovcrnmcn! ot any country (including
the Unilcd Stales) tmcnhanced data concerning Ih,e lClTilOl'y I.llldt'l- Ihejuris-
diction of such (;OVtqllIIl('ll[ tin 'S()Oll at.S SUCh data arc available and on ]ca-
sonat)lc Icrms and condilions.
4, I_iccnscc will make available uncnhanced data rcqut'slt'd by lhe Nalional
Satellite l,and Remotc-Sensing Data Archive (lhe Archive) in the I)eparlmenl
ot lht" hllerior _)ii reasonable cosl lerms as agreed by tile Licensee and the
Archive. After a reasonable period of lime as agreed will1 Ihe I_icensec, the
Archive may make these data availal)lc Io the pul)lic ;t! the cost o[ fulfilling
user rc(luesls.
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Betbre purging any data in its possession, the l+iceusec shall ot[_w them to Ihe
Archive at tin.' cost ()f repr(>ductiotl and lransnlissi(m. The Acchive may make
these data available immediately to the public at Ihe (oSl of tidlilling user
l'eqtlesls.
5. l,icensee will holily' NESDIS of any agreement perlainitlg Io operalions under
this li(('ns(' which |lw IA(_rlts(,(, intends to enter into with a tbreign nation,
entity, or (otts_)rliuln involving fi)reign natious or enlilit's, at leas! 30 days
beti)re concluding such agreement. Standard data purchase, distribution,
and processing agreements and agreements incidental to lh_" mainlen;nlc(, of
sales oftic('s in fi)rcqgn countries are not included in this condilion.
C. Enti_r(t,menl of tilt.' Act and this license will be carried oUl in accovdance with scc-
(loll 2(t3 of the Act. Any civil penalties authorized by secli(Ht 203(;I) (3) will I)c assessed in
a(+cordatlce wilh the ])r(_ce(Inres set tbrlh in Snbparts B and (: of 15 (:FR Parl 90,t. Y;nch
civil penalties may be assessed in amounts up to $10,000 for any violalion of the Act ()r any
('<)tldilit)n <d"this licensv with each d;ty of vi(tlation constilnling a Sel);n:n(' violation.
1). The t_dh:,viug te(luir(' au muen(hnent of the license;
I. Assignm('nl oF lilt! license;
2. Any chang(" it( ownership of Licensee lhat would resuh in toreign individuals,
entities, or cons<wti:_ having an aggregale inlerest in 15censee in excess of
15 p(',cent: and
[31 ?,. Any <q)t't+atiotl outside lhe range of orbits and alliltl(les, th(' tange of spalia[
r(.sohtlion ov the spectral hands approved al+ove, provided that in the case of
all elnergt!llCy posing ;t_t innnillent and snbslantial lhl+eal of h;tlnl Io httmatt
lilir, property, etwironment, or tile remote-sensing space system itselF,
I.icensee shall not I)e reqtfired to ()blain such amendment. If cir(ttmslances
permit, however, I ,iccnsee shall altempt to oblain oral al)prt:,'al from NESDIS
prior to hi)king any substantial change.
I wish yon well in your endeavors.
Sincerely,
Gregory W. Withee
Acting Assistant Adminislralor tot
Satellite and hfforrnation Service
Document 11-47
December 24, 1992
Mr. (;regory W. Withe('
Acling Assislmlt A(hniuislrator lot Satellite,
[):_ta, and lnlbrmation Services
N,ttional ()ceanic and Atmospheric Administration
l)('p;ulmeHI of (:on)merce
Washington, 1)(: 20233
l)ear Mr. Withee:
l hart' reviewed World View Imaging Corp(wation's answ,vrs to our <ltleslions prt)vi(l-
ed in yotn Sel)tt'ml)er 16, 1992, l('ller. [ am s;_lislied that the system and lit(" |ernls )lid (l)tl-
ditions in your in+(q)os('d apl)r()val letter ,,rill provide the necessary l)V(tt('cti()l) I<) meet
l)(.parttl,('ttl (>f [)el_'tls(" retlnit+emt'tlls, l rec_mnnend apl)rt:,'al of ll,eir request.
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There is currently considerable and growing inlernational activity in remote sensing.
Since this appears to he the first attempt to license a syslem under tile 1ANDSAT Act, we
are very interested and would like to track its progress. Please ask Mr. Scott to conlact
Cohmel Pete (;ill of my staff at (703) 697-9897 to arrange tot a hrieling Io I)ol) repre-
sentatives on how lhe system is developing.
Sincerely,
Duane R Andrews
Document 11-48
()ember 19, 1992
Mr. Michael Mignogno
Chief, l_andsat Commercializalion Division
NOAA/NESDIS, FB-4, room 3301E
U.S. Department of (;ommerce
Washington, D.C. 20233
Dear Mr. Mignogno:
We thank NO±kA's Thomas l_ke tot his September 16, 1992, lelter to Richard Smith
regarding the licensing of WorldView hnaging Corporation's proposed private remou'-
sensing satellite system.
Mr. Pyke's leller requested Department review of WorldView's Augus! 20, 1992,
response to earlier lISt; [U.S. (,overnmentl tbllow-ul_ questions on WorldView's initial
license application.
Based on the intiwmation provided, lhe WorldView license application appears to he
consisten! with U.S. inlernational <_hligations, and this ottice recommends approval of the
application.
We note in this conneclion that the "Nalional l,an<t Remote Scnsing Policy Act ot
1992" has codified the requiremenl h)r appropriate (;overnment oversight (with appro-
priate inleragency consultation) o1 private system activities afliwting inlernational ol)liga-
lions, ti)reign policy, and the national secmity of the United Slau,s. W(, look t}_rwar(l to
participation in this process.
Sincerely,
C(; NO,-LX/NESDIS - (,regory Withee
()ES- Richard Smith
Ralph Braibanti
I)eputy Director
Ottice of Advanced 'I'echnolog O,
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Document title: Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, "U.S. Policy on
Licensing and Operation of Private Remote Sensing Systems," March 10, 1994.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The]uric 1997 request o/£ochheed Co@oration _ Space Systems, Inc., Jbr a licen_e to operate a remote-
serrsing _)'_tem capable of receiving and marketing data of one-meter resolution caused the Clinton
administration to review its poll 0' toward the commercial (rperation of higdt-wsolution satdlites. After
a thorough interagen O, review, the White tfouse released this poli O, statement, which ree{[firm._ sup-
port /irr the international sale O[ _elatively high-resolution data and aUows the Seeretm 3' o/Commerce
the right to limit data collection or di_tritmtion "during periods when national wcu_4ly or interna-
tional ohbgations and/m'Joreig_t policies may be tvmpromised. " The poliQ is con._ide*ably restrictive
toward the sales o[ s)'stemg to ]breiLm entities, noting that each request wiU be _.,iewed on a case-Io'-
case basis and will tw made only "on the basis qf a government-to-government aLrreement."
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For Immediate Release March 10, 1994
U.S. Policy on Licensing and Operation of
Private Remote Sensing Systems
IAcense requests hy US tirms to operate private remote sensing space systems will he
reviewed on a case-by-case hasis in accordance with the l.and Remote Sensing Policy Act
of 1992 (lhe Act). There is a presumption that remote sensing space syswms whose t)er -
tormance capabilities and imagery quality characteristics are awtilahle or arc planned tor
availabilily m the worht marketplace (e.g., SPOq, l,andsat, elc.) will be tavorably consi<l-
ered, and thai the tollowing conditions will apply to any US entity that receives an oper-
ating license trader the Act.
1. The licensee will be required to maintain a record of all satellite tasking lot the
previous year and to allow lhe US(; access to this record.
2. The licensee will not change the operational characteristics of the satellite syslem
from flw application as submitted without tormal notification and approval of the
Deparmwnt of(;ommerce, which would coordinate with olher interested agencies.
3. The license heing granted does not relieve the licensee of the obligation to ohtain
export license(s) pursuan! to applicable statutes.
4. The license is valid only fi)r a finite period, and is neither transferable nor subject
Io foreign ownership, ahove a specified threshold, without the explicit permission of
the Secrelary of Commerce.
5. All encryption devices mnst be approved by the US (;overnment tot the pu,pose
of denying unauthorized access to others during periods when national security, inter-
national ohligations and/or fi)reign policies may be compromised as provided for in
the Act.
6. A licensee must use a data downlink format that allows the US (;overnmenl access
and use of l|le data dnring periods when national securily, international ohligalions
an(t/or toreign policies may he compromised as provided fi)r in the Acl.
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7. During pevit)(ls when national security or imernatio,lal ol)ligations and/or tor-
eign policies may be conq)romised, as delined t)y Ihe Secretary _)t+ l)el('nse or the
Secretary of State, respectively, the Secretar}' of Cornmerce may, after constfltati<m
with the appropriate agency(ies), require the licensee to limit data colleclion and/or
distvibllti<m by lilt, system to the eXIellt necessitated by the givetl situati<m. Decisions
to impose such limits otfly will be made by tile Setretary of (_OllltlleYce in constfltati<m
with the Sect+etary of 1)elk'rise or the Secrelary of St;lie, as appropriate, l)isagreenlents
between Calfinet Secretaries may be appealed to lilt"I+resident. The Secretaries ol
Slate,Defense and Commerce shalldevelop theirown internalmechanisms to enabh"
them to carry out lheir staIittory responsibilities.
8. Pm+smtnI t<) the Act, the (!S (lovernmerLt reqnires US C()ltlpanies l]lal have t)t+en
issm'd operating licenses tin(lee Ihe Act to notify the US (;overmnent t)t its intent to
etlter itltO sigtfificant or substantial agreements with new tbreign (tlstomers.
Interested agencies shall be given advance notice of such agreements to allow them
the opporttmity to review the proposed agreement in light ()I the nalional secturily,
international obligations and tbreign policy concerns of the US (;()vettltltelll. The
det]tfilion of a signiticanl <)r slt|)slanlial agreeltlenl, as well am the time Dames and
other details of this pr<_(ess, will be defined in 1;ttt'v (;otnmerce rt'gttlali<ms it| c<msul-
tati<)n with approl)riate agencies.
U.S. Policy on the Transfer of Advanced Remote Sensing Capabilities
Advanced Remote Sensing System Exports
The Untied States will consider requests to export advanced t-emote sensing systems
whose i)erlortnance (apabilities and imagery qttality characteristics at+e availabh" or are
l)lanm'd tor availability in the world man-ketplacc <m a case-l)y-case I)asis.
The delails of these potential sah, s should take into account the |ollowhlg:
• the I)rOl)osed foreigtl recipient's willingness and ability to accept conmfitnlents to
tilt" [!S (;overnnlent concerning sharing, pr<)tection, and denial of i)rodtwts and
data: and
• (()ttslrairfls <)n resoltttion, geographic coverage, limelitwss, spectral coverage,
data pv<,cessing and exploitatiotl techniqttes, tasking c_q)at)ililies, and ground
_trcllitectltres.
Apl)r<_val <)t reqttesls |<)r exports ()[ systems w<mh9 also requite cevtaitt dil>lotnati(
steps be lake,t, such as informing other close fvietlds in the region of the reqttesl, and the
conditions we would likely att;Ich to atty sale; and inl<)rmitlg the recipient of ore decisi<m
and tile conditions we would require as parl oi' the sale.
Any svstenl tnade available t<) a foreign govel'tltllellt OF other toreign entity |nay t)e
subject to :t f<+rmal govettltllent-lo-govel+lllltclll agreement.
Transfer of Sensitive Technology
Tht' Untied States will consider applications l() export remote sensing space capalfili-
ties on a restricted basis. Sensitive lechnoloh, Q, in this sit|tat|oil c<msists of items of lech-
n<)log,_' on the [!S Mtmitions It|st necessary to develop or tt) sltpport advanced remote
sensing space capabililies and which art" lmiquely availal)le h't tilt" [!nhed Stales. Such sen-
sitive technology shall be rmtde available Io foreigtl etltities only l)n II+nebasis of a goverrn-
mer_t-to-governmernt _tgFt'etltelt|+ This agreemenl ltlav be in the tOlllt ()f e_td-usc :tnd
relratlst(+r assurances which can 1)e tailored to ensure the prolection oft _S techn<dog_:.
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Government-to-Government Intelligence and Defense Partnerships
t'roposals fin intelligence or det_mse partnerships with foreign countries regarding
remole sensing that wotfld raise questions ab<>ttt US (;overnmen! competition with lhe pri-
vate sector or would change the US (h)vernment's use ofltnids generated pttrstmnt to a [+_
foreign government partnership arnmgement shall be snhlnilled for inleragelwy revit'w.
Document11-50
Document title: Robert S. Winokur, Assistant Administrator for Satellite and Information
Services, NOAA, to Albert E. Smith, Vice President, Advanced Government and
Commercial Systems, Lockheed Missile and Space Company, Inc., April 22, 1994.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
7'Di_ letter which "_onstitute_ a/itemise under Title H t_[the Land Remote .S'e._i.g Poll O, Act <?/ 1992, "
_[_ell_ out the wq.irements O[government polio, ira-the operation _( Lockheed _ one-meter ,_y_tem, _v.-
_i_te.t with the (2inton administration '._poliQ on remote sensing, liee._inA., and expmt_ (![ March
10, 199.t (see I)oeume.t 11-49).
I11
Albcrl I+'..Nmilll
Vice l'rcsident, A<Ivanc¢'d (;overiunenl
and (:<>mmercia] Syslelt|s
l,+wkh<'ed Missiles and Space Company, Inc.
I 1 I 1 Ixwkheed Way
StmrLvvale, (:alifornia 94089-35134
[rubl)er stamped: "APR 22, 199,t"1
l)¢'iir Mr Snlilh:
This letter constilntes a license under Title II of the l+and Renl<)te Sensing Policy Art
of 1992, Itl+. 107-555 (the Acl), lilt l,ockheed Missiles and Space (]olnpan,v, Inc.
(l ,iClqlSee) t(> (lliiq'lile a private relllOte-sensing space system. The license is valid tbr it pcri-
od of 10 years ti<)in the at)eve flail,.
A. Approval is based on the operational specifications set forth in your letter <+t+appli -
calion dated Jllne I0, 1993, as amended by your letter dated August 13, 1993, and addi-
tional infinniation provided in response to agency requests dated Septenlber 12, 1993.
g. This license is limited to the operations of a land remote-sensing space systcln and
snt)ject Io the t_flhiwing terms and conditions that apply to the I,icensee and any stib-
sidiary, affiliate, or contractor, as appropriate. The isstlance of this licetlse does nol relieve
the I+icensee of the obligation to obtain export or other licenses from appropriate U.S.
(;overninent agencies pursuant to applicable statutes.
1. l+icensce shall comply with the requirements of the Act, and any applicalfle
regulations isstied pnrsuant to the Act. The l.icensee shall operate the systeln
in a manner thai preserves the national security and observes the interna-
tional obligations and foreign polices of the United Stales. The l,iccnsee shall
at all lllnes inaililaiii positive control of the spacecrati inchiding sal'egnards Io
ensilre Itit" inll,grily of spacecrati operations. The I,icensee shall inainlain
and niakt" available to lhe U.S. (;overnnleni, amreqnesled, a record <flail satel-
lit<" tasking oper;ili(lllS, fill" the previous y,Par.
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2.
3.
4.
6.
During periods when national security <)r imernational obligations
and/or fi)reign policies may be compromiscd, its detined by Ihe Secretary of
Defense or the Secretary of State, respectively, the Secretary <if (:ommerce
may, after [2] consuhation with the appropriate agcncy(ies), require the
IAcenscc lo limit data collcction and/or distribution by the system to the
extent necessitated by the given situation. During those periods when, and
for those geographic areas lhai, the secretary o[ Commerce has re<lit|red lhe
l,icensee It) limit distribution, the Licensee shall, on requesL make the mwn-
hanced d_tla thns limited from Ihe system availat)le exchlsively, by means of
government tmnished rekeyable encryption on lhe downlink, to the U.S.
Government. The costs and terms associated with meeting this condition will
be negotialed directly belween the Licensee and DOD (for the U.S.
(;<)vernment) in accordance with Section 507(d) of the Act.
The IAcensce shall ensure that all encryption devices used arc approved
by the U.S. (;overnment tot the purpose of denying unauthorized access to
others dr|ring periods when national sectnity or inlernalional <d)ligali<nls
and or foreign policies may be compromised.
"Flit" l,icensee shall use a t`lata t`lownlink format that alh)ws the U.S.
(;overnmenl access and use (if the data during periods when nati<)nal securi-
ty ()r internalional obligations and/()r tbreign ])olicies may lie compromised.
The I,icensee shall provide sttfficien! documentation it) the U.S.
(;()vellllllell[ oil tilt," l,icensee's downlink data format to assme this access.
l+icensee will make available lo the (;overntncnt of any c()tlnttv (inchLding
the trnited States) tmenhanced data c.ncerning tilt, tcrrit_wy mlth'r IhejtLris-
dictioll tit such (_.ovel-lllllellt as SOOll its such data aI+e available alid oH rea-
sonat)le cost lerms and conditions.
I,icensee will make available unenhanced data reqnested by t|le National
Satellite l,md Remote Sensing Data Archive (lhe Archive) in the I)epartmen|
of the Inlt'rior on reasonable cost terms as agreed t)y the l,icensee and the
Archive. Atler a reasonabh" period of lime, as agreed willl file Licensee, the
Arthive may make these data available lo lhe public at a price equivalent to
Ihe cos! o1 [+ulfilling user requesls.
Betme l)urging any dala in its possessi(_n, the [,icensee shall ofli'r st|oh
data t<) the Archive at tilt" cost o| reproducti<Hl and transmission. The Alc]live
|nay 1hake these data available immediately to lhe I>ublic a! a price equivaletn
to the cost of [ulfilling user requests.
Ul;,on lermillation of operations under license, lhe l,icensee will dispose ¢)t
any satellite in space in a mamler satislaclory to the President. 1"o meet Ibis
condition and 1o deal with any circumstances involving [the] satellile's end ot
li|_,/lermination of mission, the l,icensee shall obtain priori U.S.
(;<Jvellllllelll approval of all plans and procedures to deal wilh the sat_ dis-
position of tile satellite (e.g., burn on reentry or cormoiled deorbil).
I,icensee shall not change lhe operational specifications of the satellik: system
from lilt" application as submitted, which ,+voilld resuh in materially diiD, went
capabilities than those described in the application, without filing an amend-
merit as specified in paragraph 1).3 o1 this license.
Licensee shall notit_' the National Envil'onmenlal Satellile, l)ata, and
[nil)treat|on Service (NESDIS) of any significant or substantial agreement lhe
l,icensee intends to enter with a |<weigh nil|on, entity, m cons<>rtium inxolx-
ing |oreign nations <)r entities at least 60 days betbre conchlding such agree-
men|. Signilicant or sulislanlial agreements include, but are not lira|led t_,
agreements which would provide |br tilt' tasking <ff the satellite and its st'ns<ws.
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provide for real-lime dirvc! access to unenhanced data, or involve high-volume
dam purchase agreements. NESI)I%, in consuhation wflh ill(" appropriate
agencies, shall review the proposed agrecmcn! lo ensure Iha! il is consislenl
will+ lhe !erms and conditions of this license. Specilically, lit(" agrcemenl shall
reqvire !hal Ihv toreign chilly will abide by !he conditions in !his license
addressing national security, and international obligations and foreign poll-
des. If NESDIS, in consultmion will+ appro])rial_" agencies, delermim's !hat the
[)ro]]os('d _+gt('('ltt{'++! will cOttlp+o+nise itatiot+al s(!ct++ily ([)tlc('tits ()t" i+llettla-
!itmal obligalions or torcign polic)q NESI)IS will so advise tit(' I,iccnsee.
(:. Entbrcvmen! of Illis license will Ix" carried ou! in accordance wilh scclion 203 of
!he Act. Any civil ix'hal!its au!horizvd 1Lvseclion 203(a) (3) will lx' assessed in a¢cofdancc
wilh !he' I)rocedures set torlh in %ul)parls B and (] of 15 C.F.R. Part 90/I. Such civil penal-
tics may Ix" assessed in atnoun!s up Io $10,000 !or any violation of !he Act or any condi-
lion of Ibis liccnsv wilh each day of violalion constiluling a separalv violation.
[4] l). Bdore lhe l,icensee may lake any of the lollowing aclions, NESDIS must grant an
amt'ndmcnl 1o the license. NESDIS will consuh will+ the a.ppro[)riale Federal agencies as
I('[[+li+'('d I)y l]+(" /\('1 tx,torc laking final aclion on !he amm_dmcn!. ]'h¢' I,iccnscc must
pronq_dy tih' all tel(wahl inlbrmalion wilh NESI)IS if the l,icenscc anlicip;m's th(" occur-
r('nc(' of any ot Ihe tollowing conditions:
1. Assignmcn! <)1-transfi!r of the license;
2. Any change in ownership of the 1,icenscc thai w<)uht r(,suh in fi)reign indi-
vi(hlals, ('nlili('s, ¢)r ((msorlia having an aggregate inl('rcs! in !he" l,i(cnsce in
('XCCSSof 2,_ [)('t'('Ctt|; al+ld
3. Any change in Ih(' or|)illt] (:llara(:tc+isli(s, ])('l'[_)t'l++ittt('(." sp('(iti('alions, or data
c()lh'clion and ('xl)h)ilalion capabililit's approved above. In lhe case ()[ an
cmt'rgcncy posing ;m immincnl and su|)slanlial lhreal of harm lo ht+nlan life,
prol)('rly, cnvironm(qH, t)r Ihc rcmolc-svnsing sl)a(-(' sysl(,m ilsel[, l,icens('e
shall no! I)(, required lo ()blain such an+en(hnenl. If (ircun)slan(es permit,
l,i(cntsc(' shall allempt lo ()|)lain oval appr()val flom NESI)IS prior I() making
any such sul>stantial change.
Sincerely,
Roberl S. Winokur
Assistant A(hninistralor tot
Sal(qlil(" and [n[brmalion Services

Chapter Three
Space as an Investment
in Economic Growth
by Henry R. Hertzfeld
Introduction
The resea,ch and developnmnl inveslnlents thai NASA has made have g,eatly allt'ct-
ed the economy of ill(: tin|ted States and the world. New in(tustries haw beet| created.
New technologies have heen advanced ti+om the laboratory to the marketplace more
quickly than if +there had heen no sl)ace l)rog|an|. No_ only have .jobs and income heen
created, but new ways ()t viewing the world now e×ist auld other inn()vations thai (.'all he
traced m NASA reqtdrements and inveslments have inlproved tile qualilv of litk'.
l)escrihing Ihese advances is relatively easy. Measuring them is difficult. This chapter
(l(:scribes various e(on<)mic methods that have been applied t<) the l)r<)hlem of the mea-
sut('n)etn of NASA illv('stlttelttS, as well it:-;th(+ restlhs of their rise. I! ,shows lhal e('ollotllisls
are nol in agreemenl in lh)ding a cl('ar and It(,'s_ appr<)ach (o measurement. I_ is also clear
that n() one measure is a ('omprehensive indi(alor of NASA iml)a('ts and l)enelits.
This Chal)ter also mt(ks two oflwr is,sues. The thst is the politi(al and social need lot
NASA t() measure its impact on the econ(mLv. From the beginning of the Apolh) program
until binding started to decrease it) file late 19(}()s, NASA had no l)ressing need t() justil_'
ils program from an economic l)ersl)e('tive. Falling NASA hudgets and very high tutti(real
visibility greatly increased tt)c need to explain t<) Congress and the public the us(.tilh)(.ss
of the space program. Also, with 01e growing hudget deti(:il and social programs ()f the
l()70s and 198,0s, NASA had lo c()mp(qe lit)" ils share of lh(. discrelionary budge! agains!
many (tiber national priorities, Finally, with the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the
spa('(" race wilh lt)e Soviet U.ion was over, and the pressure Io view NASA and space im,est-
meres tr()m the tterspe((ive o[ a rate of return to the nation from ils inveslmenls became
par_tll]Ollll|.
The second issue reflects an overall economic-related push within lhc Untied Stales
lo toilet| more and better dala on research and developmen! (R&D) and |o expand the
availahle methodological tools in economics lo analyze those dala. It is no coincidence
|baJ ibis |rend also parallels the overall growlb of R&D performed in large laboratories
and instilulion,s across die Untied S|aies f(tllowing World War II, including Ihe esiahlist'J-
m(')H ()f tit(" Nalional Science Foundation, NASA, and |be Del.)artlJ)e))l of Ene)f.,_' (which
inchlded Ihe Atomic Energry Commission), as well as the very sleady and rapid growth of
|he Nati(mal Institutes of Heahh. Prior to World War II, successful governmenl programs
in k'chn()h)g T development and lranster were limited to the Agricuhural Extension
Servi(e and NASA's prede(esson lhe National Advisory (]omntiltee for A('ronaulics, With
lhe great expansion of R&D programs in government, there was an emlthasis on do('u-
lll('rllillg illl(I llle_lStll'illg leSll]lS to develop public support, convince Congress lo ('Olllilllle
and exltmt(l funding, and heifer understand the role of R&D and technological innova-
lion ill st)('iely, l))y |he early 1990s, as descriht,d beh)w, |he mandal(" l() de\'t'l(tp lterlk)r -
man('(' measures for R&I) had changed fr()m a vohmla.ry and at(l ho( ell()rl I() ()he thai is
now tnandaled l)y c(mffr('ssitmal legislation.
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NASA Activities
The cumulative investnlent that the United States has nmde in civilian space activities
through NASA alone has been more than $200 billion over a period of nearly 40 years.'
?cs with any fi'deral expenditure, each year's budget outlays pump money into the _;cono-
nly, directly create jobs, and stimulate additional employment and income throughout the
nation. Ahhough the distribution anlong occupations and regions ltlav differ for NASA-
type expendittnx:s, fronl the exl)enditnres on new roads, honsillg, or well]ire lkaylnelllS,
the ow_rall nndtiplier effects are sintilar. Also, if any of the programs are eliminated, these
employntent and income etlects are eliminated.
What makes NASA and other R&I) investments different is that they also stimulate the
productive capacity of the cconomy through the development and introdu(tion of new
technology. New technology can lnake existing production melh()tls lnore efticient, and it
can also create new products and services that not only stimulate new markets, indust,'ies,
and opportunities, but can also improve the way people do things and the overall quality
of life. These benefits and impacts on the economy are not immediate--it ntav take years
or decades for an idea to be transfi)rnted into a marketable product or seivic,c _. Thus, the
benefits from R&D investments in space are more difficult to measure and retire unllre-
dictable than the short-term benefits that accrue from tile immediate.jobs and income
created by direct federal spending.
The nleasnrenlent difficuhies center around the unpredictable ways that technolo_,_,
iv transferred and the problents inherent in tracing tilt- progression o( ideas and experi-
lnellts into conslnller prodncts whose sales contribnte to the gross domestic product. This
process, even when tile route to the marketphtce is fast, may take vears. For solne funda-
ntcntal research, the process may take decades. The process of tt'clmology transfcr will
include false leads, dead ends, and even products that are technical successes, but frill in
the ntarketplace. However, it also may generate major commercial successes. Ira many
cases, the R&D stage represents only a sntall fracti<m of tile nmnctarv investment neces-
sary for bringing a product or service to the market. Also necessary fi_r economic success
are large-scale manufactnring technolog3, , marketing efforts, advertising, product support,
and st) forth. Many government-developed technologies that are highly usefol for their
design objective in fidfilling a government mission need a large amount ofadditional R&D
to nmke them optimal tor conmtercial nmrkets. Tracing over time tile many paths of tech-
nolog,_, development and transfer and placing a value on the returns to tile N_LSA R&I)
ctHnponent of these inllovati()llS C()lltilllle to be challenges to the eloil(lint( connntlnitv,
Certain "big" technologies for which NASA has been responsible and those that h;{ve
been greatly stimulated thvongh the space agency's programs have made their way into
product and service markets with virtually tit) active government technolo_, transfer" pro-
gram. Exantples of these technologies are cnnununications satellites, tilt" ntiniaturization
of electronic components, large management contputer software applications, and
advanced composite materials. Historically, indnstry has performed about two-thirds of
NASA R&I) under contract arrangements. Therefore, when a technolo_, is develol)ed
thai is basically a better or more elficient way of serving a proven and existing market,
industry is ah-eady actively inw)lved, knowledgeable, and often willing to con|rail Ihe nec-
essary funds to modif}' the government product or service for the commercial market. (if
course, as time elapses, new consumer dentands may emerge ;tn<l grow t1o111 the original
space-related technolo_,. The rapid growth of new satellite tcleconnnunications products
and services offers an excellent exantl)le.
I. Ifthis wcrc tlanslatcd to ccmstant 1tt97 dollars, Iht' ill',:(',;tnlt'lll would IIc molc than S450 billilm.
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I iowevcr, discerning tilt. economic impact of '*lilde" technologies is another mailer.
Since NASA has been commille<l t<> increasing its impact on the ccononly through an
aggressive leclmolo_' lransli'r program, flint program has primarily fiwuscd on funding
denlonslration pr_!jects thai alu'mp[ u> rake ideas generated wilhin NASA (or its connac-
l<)rs) and moving them Iowar<l usable end products. Although lhere have heen some suc-
cesses in [llis process, lhc [cclumlog_' transit,|" program has generau:d criticism over _he
years. NASA has heen keenly aware of the vulnerability oF lhe program as well as flw
importance oF measuring ils success fluough case studies and more aggregaled metrics.
Ill many ways, Ille agency has gained political support lhrough lhc anecdolal accounts of
i|seli|[ producls dewqoped [hrough tile technolo_' lransli,r process. These examples, par-
li<ularly in flw t>iomedical area, have provided a gromlding liar space technoh>_, thin is
un<lcrslan<lahle to Congress and the general populalion in ]nmmn uwms.
The ti><us of Ibis chapter is twolold. First, it traces the hislory of macToeconomic mca-
smes of NASA's impacl on ltle economy from both policy anti economic meflmdoh>gn,/per-
speclives. Second, il discusses lhe efli)rls Io develop me;tsures of specific u.chnoh>g_, trans[cr
acfivilies. IkNelhcr, these two [rends are related to overall political and social forces that
have inlh|enced NASA's budge! and the public's percepliun of space activities. This chap-
ter does no[ review tilt" shorl4erm impact analyses or the impacls of Ihe "big" technologies
Oil the eCOllOllly becallsC Ihesc iss(les are well documctlled ill other literati|re/
Measuring NASA's Impact on the Economy
Three distinc[ approaches have been use<l to quanliI_, the economic impacts of space
R&I):
4, An adaplad<m <d a macroec<momic produclion funcdou n|<_del estimates impacts of
lechnologi<al change aurilmled m R&D spending on Ihe "gross domeslic product" and
derivalive measures such as e|nploynlent and earnings. The results of using this type of
model call |)e expressed as a rate of retllrn to a giwn investnlent or as a total value.
• A microeconomic model evah|ales the returns to specilic lcchnologies through lilt'
use o[" bene[it-cosl ratios. Benefits derived from these studies are rarely additiw • [o
aggregate benefits across different technologies hecause of technical incompatibilities
ill dam collection and economic assumptions underlying the models.
_' An examination of data provides evidence of the direct transfer of technology from
federal space R&D programs m the private sector. Tile results of these analyses lend
to he reported in actual nmnbers measured (number of patents or inventions, value
of royahies, value of sah's, and so on). The}, arc rarely compared to associated gov-
e|nme|n expenditures because of the difficuhy of linking specitic fimding to specific
products or pale|us.
(!ntil lhc w'ry lale 1960s, NASA did not have to worry much about defending ils bud-
gel. I)ming lhe early years of the Apolh> era (which ran from 1961 to 1972) the United
Stoles was ill the mosl heated part of the Cold War and had made a commitnlenl to se! a
human on tile Moon heli_rc the Soviet Union. The expense was ahnost secondary, and
NASA was provided with a budget large enough 1o perform thejoh. At the same lime, tile
lTnite<l Slales had an overall budget surplus. This was before the impact of the expenses
2. The shorl-lcrm dirc_ I in)l);tcl _)f ti'dcral expenditures is :-1 Iopic Iha! ix lhoronghly disrnssed in any
clclnCnlaFv el'on,relic s tcxlb_ok. Rc[i'lCllCC will bc made ill this essay I_ studies lhill havi- t))Cllsed Ol1 lh(" special
dislribution ol NASA SI|OT'I-|I'I Ill Cllll)loyn]¢'lll illld illl?()lll(" c|[_'(:|s.
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of the Vicmam War were well understood and before the large social welthrc programs
passed by Congress (hIring, the adlltinistratiotl of Lyndon,]ohllSOlt allaine(l rapid growth.
This was also before/tie very high inllationary period of the 1970s and early 1980s, which
t)ropellcd tilt" federal government inlo a deticit and marie tIle interest payments <m the
national debt one of lhe largest single conq)onents of the l_,_dcral budgel, dwarting even
the dc|i_-nse t)ttdget.
Early sludies commissioned by NASA show fllal tile space agency was not tlnaw;ut" (}t
tit(" implications of its spending ()n Iltc econtnny. 1 lowever, Iltos(' impacts were secondary
tt) NASA's f)rimary mission (}f space cxph)ratit)n. A 1965 study by Jack Faucett Asst}ciates
found that NASA's st)cioet'<)n(nnic activities were "separate, tmt(}urdinated, and almost
inckh,ntal." The Fauc(ql study recommended that NASA create a headquarters stall dev<)t-
t'(I to c(}lh,cting cc(}nonfi( data and coor(lhmling varit)us ectmomic activities fllrt)ught)u!
lhc agency. These recmmnendati<}ns were !grit)red; to this day, the agency still addrcss('s
economic policy tm an ad hoc and uncoortlinated basis. [llI-l]
The goal <)t stimulating ettmomic growth throttgh NASA tcthnt}h_gff was very much a
side issue it) the space agency during the 1960s and 1970s. For example, a 1968 NASA pub-
lication listing goals anti objectives ti)r the next decades in space does nol mention two-
n()mi( growth at all, hut only rctkws ill passing u) the thcilitalion td commtmicati(ms and
n;tvigation as an aflertht}ught It) (h'veh>ping space capal)ilities tot managing the Ear01's
t'('S()t I I'('(+S.
During the 1960s, one of tim ilnportant goals t)t NASA was tt) slilnttlate st!eric(" and
engineering at the universities. NASA spt}nst)red s<)(ia] science and e(t)nomi(+ studies dm-
ing lllis era, whicll were orit'nle(| primarily It)ward defining and i(h'nlit_'iFlg tilt" itlq)acl <)t
NASA ('xt)en(lilures on parti(tflar regions. One study, l)ertormed al lhe [htiv('rsily t)[
Pennsylvania in its Regional Science l)cpartment, was an inl)Ul-t)utpul ('¢'ont}nfic analysis
t)t" the l)hila(lcll)hia (.ctmt)nty Illal (Icvch)pcd mcasur(.s t}f NASA exp('n(liltucs t}n the
l'hiladelphia region. _Thor(" is nt) evident(' that the resuhs t}f this sludv were ever us('d I)v
NASA 1(} publicize the local beneths, nor is there any evident(" that the resuhs dire(lh'
influenced NASA pt}licy. The primary purp(}se and benefit of ttlis study wt're It} SUpl)orl
tmivcrsity research activities and to advance knowledge in rcgi(mal ('ctmtmfic measure-
ment techniques. NASA also Sl)Ons<)rcd an<)ther inl)ut-output slu(ty by William Miernvk of
Wt,sl Virginia University during this era.' Orr andJtmes of Indiana University ix'rf(n:mc(l
an industrial I)reak(h}wn t}t' NASA eXlX'nditures It) measur(" national impacts." Again, these
w('rc l),imarily academic the(}ry-I)uilding sludies that were not spt)nst)red I)y l)olicy-nmk-
ing offices at NASA, nor were the results cxtcnsivcly used 1)y the space agcncy in supt)t)rl
of !Is [)rt)grams.
In 1974, Mary th}lman t)f (,eorgc Washington University l)ul)lishcd a coml)rt'ht'nsive
review t)t the ways in whi(h NASA had an lint)act on the ('('t}nonff, 1)ased on ]wr rt's(.arch
at the agency during tit(" late l(.)60s. 7Acct}r(ling It} lit!. i)r(!ia(e in Ihe 1),}ok, this rescar(h
was initialed I)y (+t}nccrns that NASA's associate a(lministralt)r |or lnaltllt'd spac(,llighl,
(;('t)rge Mut'lhq, ha(t about t)ossit)h, thture "seri<)us t)rt)l)h'ms and disI()rli(ms in s(.vcral
3. Sp;uu Task (houp, Th; Pint Apoll. '_pme Pr,_t.,vam: l)i,vcti.,i_ ft. the Imtu... Sqm'mber 1969. pul>lishcd
I)_wmnenl ti1+25 in .lohn M. I+t)gsth>n, gt+n. cd., v,'ilh i.inda I. l.car. ]mmclh' WarrumFindh'y, Ra..' A. Williams_)n,
and l)wavne A, Day, I:'xph_ring Ihe I )lktum,_l: 5;eletted l),.'uments i. th; tti_trn)" o!/he I '.S. Czvil ,_m_e Pr%,mm. lblu.., I,
()tga.izi.g/ot l(_])loratio. (Washington. 1)(:: NASA Spc(ial |'ublicali<m (SP)-4't07, 1995). 1:522-43.
4. S('I' Wilh('l I'sklld, t¢+_¢_tmal [_lJml ()lllJz;ll 511ud'_: Rerolh'Hi_ms, HeJb'cli._s. and ])ive_r N.les rm lh;
IJh_ladr'//d_ia l'2@o'ieme (( ;aml)ridg('. MA: 5.1[T I>FeSS, I !171 ).
5. William 11. Mictnyk. Impact o/ l/_e ,'_palr I'nq4_am .u a |oral lib,moray.' .In I.[ml Output .I.aO_i,
(Mo+ganlm_n. \_': '¢¢t'st Virginia ('nivtqsil., Ih+t'ss. 1':)67).
It. l,.I). ()tr and 1). Jont's+ "An Industrial I),rcakdown ol NASA Expenditures." Nm'('inl)et IgliU.
I)()( um('nl;uy I listory (;_)llc('tion, Spa((' P(di(?, hlsliltllt', (;('org<.' Wasltingt_m UnivcFsil)+, Wasifingl_m, I)(:.
7. M,A. } tohnan, The l',,lili¢al I+..om.'_ +_[the ,Spa+v I'r.t.wam (Pah) Aho, ('A: Patili< Books, lt.)7.t).
I_]XPI._IRIN(,TIEITNKN/IWN ;_l'l,c.)
sectors of the economy as a rcsull of a prol>abh • peak in spending fi_r the Manned Space
Fliglll Program ai that lime." This bo_k als_ im-hulc,s a compreheasivc bibliography of
sludies and books addressing die hnpact,s of space and other federal progranls during the
1960s and earlier.
The Sianfi_rd Research Insiitulc looked at economic iinpacls _ff the space program in
196_. Alfflo_zgh this repoFI r¢'cognizcd the de_x'loping litcr;mnc in lhc cc_;n,_mics of R&l)
and n¢'w techt3olo_o' dcvclopnlcnl, its cnl|)hasis was on lhe local and regis)hal impacls on
areas .surrounding NASA field (elllcrs. These impacts fell generally inlo lilt, calegoi'y of
sh()l'[-[(!l-lll dirt'(:! s|)4.m(lillg ('J'l(.'t'ls Oil per-capita inconl_.', ('oilstlIi(tiOll, _ili([ so Oli, no| ()ii
the la,slhig imtmcl,s _>f _hc lww lechll_Dogic,s created. [lll-2J
By 1970, lhe NASA budget had [hllcn by nearly one-third t]oln its U,tBS-1966 peak. A
ll('W Iq;l had ariivcd tilr NASA--one lhal meant a coilSlaill batll(" with (]()llgil'ss and tht'
Whilc I lot|st' for nioliCV, ])lO_t_liliS, aiid I1CW dircclions. Thus, ii is ilO cohlcidcncc lhai
NA,_gA colliliiis,sioill'd Ill_' ]]lSl coill[)l/'hcllsivl_ l_collolliic ali_li),si,s o|il,s illl[)acl oii till" cilliic
ii;iliOlial i!lOliOlny _tl Ih.il Iillit'. The _liidy was inc_tili Io |)(_ usl_d ;is a lobbying and pul)lic
rc'l;tliOllS t<_ol for thl' ;lgiql(v. NASA officials hoped that the ft'sults of Ih(' ,sllldy would show
vt'iy I()[)tlSl [llll);tcls Oll lhc t'c_lliomy, ])roving lhr I)cnclit.s fiom lh0 ili,.'t'sllil_.'lli in Sl)aCt'.
A .Midwcsl Rl's,t!;ifcil (]l'llll'l rt'porl ill 1971 accoltll)li.s|led its [)ill-/lost, ill lwo "w;ivs.
I II1-:_I_ I;irni, usinl4 all ;t_l('_;llc pro(hiclion |ill|Orion, it sliow(,d lal-gC Ioii_-Iiiii t,coiioiiii('
i'l'lttill8 Io R&I). SI'COlI(I, ii do('iillit!nli,d ;i nillili)t'f lit ('_st' slu(tics of slicccssflil t'x;iili])lcs
o[ N/liSA ll'(hllo[o_, 7' t)cilig lisc([ fOl colnnlereial purposes." It used a/:<lirly nt'w t.conoliiic
illl,lhl)doJo_y di.vt.ifJiJl,d by Rt)bi_rl _olo%' of MlT (who ]_ilt'l" rl'ceivrd _l Nobel Pri_r J()l" his
W(ilk (ill lilt<, ('coil()llli(_ ilxll);lcl.<s of ic(hnological C|l_lllg(') ;tilt| showed thai liil'l'(" w;ts ;i
_,t'_,t'll-I(t-()lil ' i_ili() oF IOli_-I(!flll ccollOlili(" t)¢¢n0l]Is to (_xllclidilurcs. v' Tills incih(Idology
and ils al)l)li(-ali<)li 1o NASA (a small _;ilt)stg of all R&I) (_xl)clidiluics) wtq(, shariily ('rili-
cizl'd Oil bolh l('(|iliical _il)lliid_s ;ill(l Ihe illicrpi('ialioii of tile, (l;il_i. Whiic lli(" c;il(lihtlioli
()[_i "b(HlOlii linl'" iililii|)(!i llr<_vi(lcd NASA wilh _,Oili(" t_Xll;i anlnlullili(>il flit its 1)udgci t)ai-
Ill's, ill Ih(' loll_ I('l-lil, how su(:ccssttil ltli,s line of ;tl-_lililClil W_l_ ill (]()li_l-(_ss i_ Vt'fv (lel)al-
_lii]o. _i_t_,"it ]I_tS ;liw_iyS t)('('ll |].lll(|l_t| t)t'callse of till2 inclil o| its niissions, l i(iwcvcl; lh('
riclil(inlic d;tla ad(Icd "willdow drl,ssillg" Io the pro|eel inission il.qllirt,lllt_lllS ;|lid Ill;tall'
tilt' |ulidill_ (it.cisioil._ [_lr th(! iit, w |)iOglitlll.¢, of tllt_ 1970s all(| li('yOlld easier lo .sell.
F'olhlwilig Ihe 1971 Midwest Rcsearch lnsiiluie study, NASA c<linini.ssionl_d several
addiliolial ili;tjof ltiacio('COll(/inic sludies of its R&D. The space ;igt!li(7)' ]iilcd (Jlll.se
["]t;OllOllit'llics ill 1976 to condllCt a nlacrocconomic simulation ;tll_llysis. 1III-43 Chase
[_]l_liiOlii('Iri(s i)l'lfofilicd ;i foi|oW-Oll study in 1080. [III-5] Tilt_ll in 1988, lht" Midwesi
Research Inslilulc, ulidci contract Io tile National Academy of Public Adiliiilistralion, i)cr -
/_ll-iil(-d ;ill iiil_tl)'.%is ill;it esseniially rci)licalcd its 1971 study with llpdaled daia ;t11(| t_('oll(b
ii1('11i( It'chlli<tu(!s. [Ill-61
Allhougli l'a¢'h of lhes¢' t0tll" siudics dill{'red in liinc, t(!chilique, and reliability, they had
lllll(|i iii (OllilliOli. [_'.z4(li w;i_ ;I rlidimt._nl;try ;tlt_illpt {o ine_lsilF(" l|lt_ overall I('lllrns io NASA
ill II'FIII_ of IlltliOli;t] i'('OtlOlllit" llleatllre,,i: gro.%_ ll_lliOlla] l)Fodll('l, t_iili)ioviil¢'lll, alid pfoduc-
livilv. ||;itll (wilh I]ll" i'xct'|)lion of the" ('.hasl_ fiillow-on) calculat('d r_ilt,s of Ft._tllfil l_l NASA
Ili_ll wcrc I)_'lwl'_'il 8('v_!ll-l(_ilc and ti)Ul't00n-l_lnt" (which lrallsial('d ilil¢l (liscoillll('d
i't'l_ilils oil ilivi,slillcill bl'lwt'(,ll 30 ;llid 43 pl'rccnl). Also, each aitcnlt)Icd Io look al iht" la,si-
iil_ ilil[)_icl oll liil' i!tOllOlll)' l]llOllg]l ll'clllio]ogica] til;lllgc_i thai ilicrt_';ist'd [)lOdiitliVilv.
1_. [li(.tl_,(. il(ill, ih;ll ihl, dO(llllllHil_ SllllliOl.lillg lhis I'S_,_i'¢ do nol ;t])|)('_lr ilt chr_nl_dlllz, ical (li(|l'l bill
i'_llhl'l in 1]11' llidl'l in wlii_ h lll_". Sllililllll Iht' t llllll)ll'x slll}il'll alldi'esscd in the i'ls{t%'.
!I, _[;lill <it ihl" _iis_" nfli<lil'n t_'l'ic lilk('li ilfOlll iht" ;il'rllll_llllil's r_:l) [Jio_litlil.
IlL Rol>lq [ M. %<dl_w, '<h.t hnical ('.it;|till' Hlld ihc A_I¢_HI( ' |lrlidll([iOll Plllli iioll." ]7#'_,7_7+,<_]I<_<fm+#llli¢_,
<_.d %t.t#sti_ ;'_ (<\liL_ll_11937); 312.
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These studies had their critit s. The mosi pOilltcd one was the report of lilt. (;el+eral
Accounting Office ((;AO), which exanlined the (',l+;-tse Ecoll<>nletrics Sltldv ot 1978.
LIII-7] The (,AO analysis was sympathetic t_l the idea that NASA had generated techno-
lo_i(al rt!lurlls, bttl it did not acccpl iJlC (3hast stu<l+_, nlctrics, nor did lhe (;A() i'('vicwt.rs
view the in('thodt)lt>g t' of the (:hast siu(t t' as valid. Th('v w('r(" l)r(il)at)ly (orr('ci I)(_('alls(' lh('
(]h_isc lilllow4)ll Sill(l)' tit l {)I',I0 Collld ilOt replic_lle lhc I('StlllS ll| ill(, 1976 Sill(It; ThI,F(, WCl("
a llttlllticl o|' technical eCOll()lllic lcasolls for lh¢" lack of COlltid(,nce in the (]hast t('stills.
Pi'rhaps the Intlst lolling rc;tson was Ill(, belief by (;hase lhal NASA lieedt'd to have "_ood"
l('stlhs lioin ihc Sill(If'. Thlls, (]base rail atlOlll sixl), (ti|feri'nl sil_lul;ilions of l|l(' (-colloills<
/llldt'r dift_.'rciil aSSUliipiillllS _ind chose ih(" I)esl r('s(llls Io prcseill in ihc r('porl. _l The
sttld b, did r('sull ill ,_o(l(I ptthlic rcl;liions anti i)i('ss rcl(';ts¢'s, I)ul ii was (lOt well received Jlv
lhi' pioft'ssional (,conoinics corllnltiiiitt'. Despite the or(lies' asst'ssiliciils, lhc rl'SllJlS
b('calll(' ti(-llChlll_trk |iglllt's lh;tl; ]l_tvc bccn qtlOl(!d lilnc _111¢t agaill ill Sl)eeches by NASA
otticials ;tlld in vali(ll(S l('slilllt)ny ;tlld pul)licalions.
1)urillg the llli¢l-l{)7()s, NA<_A also colllniissioiii'(t studies to allcilll)l to dcv('lop ill('a-
Stll-('s of lilt" _1<_'_I'('_;11¢" I)cll('tils t'FOI11 specitic sUCCCSS['tll t('c|llloJolies Ihal lh(" agenc t' tl;i(I
supporicd. These sludies wcre [tin(It'll b), ill(" NASA ht';ldquarlcrs ott]c(, responsit)le t0r
l('chlloh/_, 0, tllilizatioll ;tlld lrallsti'r, ;3.11(1 lht" 7 ;Ippli/'(t a tast_ Sltldy approach 1o ni(';tSlllill_
bt'nctits. B t' t_lCllSillt. _ on successful innovations, lilt' s('leclion of technologies was 11ol rali-
doill, nol-did it a(J('qtiatcJ), ll30;iSlllt _ overall I)('ll(_filS Io NASA.'-' 'Hies(" sludil's il;id the
adVallhitZ, c ill liSili_ lilor(" S/alidar(J econoiiiic IooJs and of id('nlit_'in<l 4 colicrt-lc casl's ralht'r
lh;lll _ll)silacl illC;i._l.lYl, s ill _lOSS tlolllcslic t)lodlicl. Tht'y were, hi shol'1, lllOr(" easily Illltll'r-
slood lh;tn lilt" iliacro('COllOillic ap|)lO_icht's ilSl'd J)), Iht • Mi(Iwt'sl P_('s(';irch Inslillilt_ alld
( ]hast l_]('OllOlllCll'i('s.
In 1977, lilt" 1)cnvt'r Rt's('_irch ]liSlillil(, sliidit,¢l NASA (ontril)llliOliS Io specitlc tiel(ls
of iechilolo_5. [Ill-l_l it t_lllil(l ill;It lh(" lll_tjor Sigllili(_lllC(' o1 NA,_A colliriilllliolls was ill
('aiisilig li'chiioJogv ;idv_inct's ill (hose Ileitis io occiir _ll iiii carli('r liilll" ilia() lilt" t, would
have wilholit NASA trill(ling 711id silpport, th;il illOl%" lhali oiic-half of lilt" IcclinoJogies
wcr(" ClilplO)'('d ill lilt" ;tCll)st)a('(" alld d(,l_t'iis(_ s('cl()lS, alld lh;il lh(" l('chlloJO,f_il's had ()illS,'
_l llltitlel'alt" c(Ollt)lllic llllp;l(l alld relativ('ly low scieniitic and s(>cial ilnpacis, Thert" was
wid(' v;iri;ttioli ill lht" qilailtil;itivc csliill;ilt's lrolli l(-CllliO]ok_' field it) tiel(t. Tht" Stild), w;is
t)ast'd i)li ini('rvit'ws Willl Ilic NASA cn_inct'is ail¢l scicillisls rt,spolisil)lo t_>r ihc ii]iiov;i-
iiOllS. AIIholl_h lilt > lll('lhodolokO, W_lS sull.jccliv(, _llld II_e Sallllil(' biased |)¢'c;ttlS(" 1}1(' dala
werc collected tl_<llll NASA (ltticials, die g('ll('l;ll p<tlicy 13<'stills ill'(' COllSist_.:lll wiih lat('l
sludi('s lh;il ust'(I lllOlC sophisiicaled lii('thodologics.
Ill 1_.)7{i, a stud)' pcrti>iillt_d tl), Malll(,lnalica allal)'zt'd IJlC colllril)lllioil of NA,SA lo
(>Ill t' JOtlr l('c|lnolog_,i(,s alld tOulld ll(.allv ._7 billion of t'clinonli¢ illlpaClS, li11-91 Ttlc
$7 billi(lll was lll(llt, lhTlli Iht" NASA ti/l(t<_el (it I {)7ti, alld lh(' r('stllls (1{ this sitidv were used
in (olin(!ciion whh ihc (;has(" ;t_ld Midwest Rcst'_iich hlsiilulc rcsiills Io Sil_('sl Ill(" I('v('r-
a<_(" lli;il NASA fllll(tS hlivt' o[1 l]lC (!C()llOllly. T]lis stud), fO(llSC(t ()11 _is Iiil+J)ill¢,s, (T)'(l_('n-
its, inll'_raicd circliiis, _ind NASTRAN (;i sollwart, f)ro_i_inl). The piiiiiar)_ NASA t)ciit'tits
lllt'ilStllcd WCFC lilt "spe(!duf)" of 131in<_illg tiles(, tcchl_ll(lt4ics illl(i lhc lll_tik('l|llact,, llOl
I I. This r_liirtilsioti w;is ix'l;llcd io ihr aliihllr in ;i illllXl-lx;llillll wi[h Mi_ lillcl |'LVall_,, picsidclli +it (;ll_i_l'
|'_(l/iii_llil'liil _;,_;l"c/'i ;il _C;il'_ _l|ll'r (hi' sllidv ',v;l_ t _lillpl_'lcd. h i_ I)a(kl'd lip |l) illc it'_,l'_til |i il'_,il}D, ill Ihl" l!l_t) Illl-
llll_-_lii _,llill), whith (oiiJfl liOl i('ll]iclitt' lh¢' l('.%lill_ |ill IWll lcti_Oll_,: ( J ) ihc ('aJ(iiJ_iliOll o| lhl" _it lil;il _lli_ill]t'_, w_i'>
i1()1 'wl'll dill illilt'illCd ill Iht' oii_iilal Silid), filial lhc %_ihl_'_ as_i_lil'll 1o _Olllt" ot IJi_' _triiilll_,_ <olild ilol I)t' _cri-
tied; tllld (7) Ihc _l_lli_lictll it'._l_ _h_lwl'd I|i_tl lhc it'llirll_ ((i _ %_,._ w_.'lt" li_ll _il4t_i|i_ iliill_, dittt'it-itl t_<liil/(,i'll. lhe
_,t'llllid i('a_ltil coulll _tlso lie cxplailicd t)_, llic vcr) Sill;ill lsl'i(('lil_l_l" (i)lilili_ fTl>lli Ihl' _.,_i,i_A t)udgt'i ot (hi" R&I)
_.'xllcndiliircs in lilt' ('(i)lll)lll_lD
17. hi |illl, Ill i)'¢l'r]llokiil_ iili_ii_ t csshiJ l('chiil_]o_it's, i}il' i<lsl side o| Ihl'_,t >hl'llcfii-( o_1 _ludil's ill(i% }i_i_,c
lice'i( si_iiililanlk tlildt'i_l;ilcd.
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the dt+vel<_ImlenI of the te<º'hnol<+gi(.s themselves, l+,<,waus(. this ,,+,'itsa study _d Ibur cases
i(tld tlsc(l tlIc ll|()l'C traditional ColiStltliCl surl)hts theory of Ini<,+lO<º'<,()llOllli('s, th(" I'CSIIIIS
+,v<,,r<,' liH)r_" readily a<,(el)led I:,5+ lit<+' cC<)llOt||+(s <,'Ollllnlittit_ t than l]l<," r(.stilts <)l the Ill_l('l+() -
(+((.+,tto||ti( sttt(li<,'s (t| theft era.
During the 1980s, NASA t'(on<)llli<º intpa(t and ])t'IR'III slit(lies to<>k _)n the additional
rid(: <>l creating the <º'lin+mte f_)r large, n<ºm+'NASA F,rograms, such its th(" space station, not
of siml+ly.justi[_in _ the (werall hudg<,'t. Th<," <,:(>ntlfination of the maturilv _+llife Sl)_t(:e activ-
itics and the national bu<ºIg<.'t <ºIclicil l)cgan to <,:l|a|Ig<,+ flit" way lh<º" nation vicwed th<,' space
program+ l+,<,+y(md th<,' spacc race with tlt<,+Soviet Union, it ]:,:cant<.' al:,par<,'ttl that [)ta<,+lic;tl
us('s of Sl>aC(' and l|tc role of the <,w<>n<>mic growth and l)<,+nel+ils lhat Sl+aC<º+c()uld provide
W('t+("logical r<,+asons t<>r lit(+ ,qovt+rnnt<,+nt it) invest it+ mimer" and i)rovide a(tcliti(mltl inti-a-
stttl(tttr<, • and in<,<,'ntiv<,'s lot fttlttl(" Imsin<,'s.s and ltlc <,()m|ner(i;d (tcv('hq)ment of space.
AIs<+, t)y th<,' lltl(, l<.)80s im(I Ih(! 1990+,,;,with l|t<," end of ttt<,: (told W;tr, ('(onc>ntic 1)<,'tit+tits
bc<,am<,' _)lt(" (_1+lhe the)r(, imlt<)rlant jll.,;titi<,ations for a ('()tltiIlil('(t ILS. i)r(,s<,,tt(<, ` in sl)a(+¢',
at ]easl liom tlt(" <,ivilian ])<,rrsp<ºwtive. lhtwever, the <,,vi<,l<,rn(co(<º'(ottonfi( l)cnelits am mca-
su|('d by the ('xisting slu(li(+s was still r('lativcly weak.
+I'o bltild [)olilical stq>l)_rl ti)r th<," Sl)aC<,"statiott, scv<º!ral sludi(+s w('r¢' [J<'rlbrmt'd I_) ana-
ly/(+ ils <,'xf)<,'ttdilur('s by industry and state. '+ Th<," NASA Ahunt|i lx',tgt,e spotls<+t<,'d a study
in 1983 that analyzed eXl)cndilltres by standalxl coot|omit induslrial (at<,+go+i<,,s and by
Mill,t'. This study also _ltt(rm[)l(rd to mcasur<," the indirect (or mtdlil)lit.r ) b<,'n<,q+ts 1)y indus-
tFV +lll(l M_-II{!.It did riot address the thor<," inl<,rr<,-stitlg and mot-(+ ch,dlcnging I_lsk of Ill<,'it-
suring l<,'chnological or prod(wtivily lx'n<:tits. [II1-10]
.M+tjor c()titi+icl()ts itly,o Slil)l)ort<,rd the splice station with <º'cot+<mfi( bcn<,'lils analyses.
R¢_ckw('ll ¢¢)nmtissioncd "l'lt<," WEFA (,roup (a merger t)<,'lwcctl 'O,rI'_.I+'Aand (;has<.+
l+_(onom('trics had <lccurt+cd) Io p<,'rti>|+m a t||a<,To<,'<,'(+|t¢)tt|ic sitnulali_n _)t spa<.<.' stati_tt
('xl)cnldiltnl('s. 1111-111 This was a mort sophislicalc<l atl('tnl>l al nit':tsuriltg |t|tdtiplier
('tli'cts thtoltgholul the nalional ec<+n<>nty, but it also di<,l sol I_tk(' the turther sl<,'its to ana-
Ivz<º' lit(' l)rodlt<º'livity or t<,'chnologic,tl changes lllltt might b¢" expected t_)occur with thc
sl:,it('(' st_ilic, ll R&I) F,r<_grltnl.
'l+h<,• m<_st rt'ct'nt Slil(ly <)1"t'<,'Olt<)mic l:,<,'n<,'lits that l()okcd _tl tcchn_d<+gy <.'hltl_gC ;+<,lld
nati_)nal growth ntilnulatcd b 5' NASA was l_<:rforntcd by tlt<," Midwcst R_'scarch htstiti,tc
(s<,'<,' l)()(|mt('nt [II-(i +tl)(>'+'<,+)through the National A,cad<,+nLv of F'uhlic A<,hninislrati<)n
lllldCr ((:,lltra(l it> NASA. This study r<,T,e:ated the nwth()doh)g 7 of the 1971 slt,dy and was
<,()n(ht(tcd I)5, th<e sam(" rcscarchers. It tlscd updated eCC,l+l()lll<,qri( • |n<,'thods and mort+ than
lill('e|i a(hliti<mal yca|s <)f data. The resuhs were remarkably similar I<) the carlicr study.
Th('v m<,'astH('d it |li|t('-to_)n<," rate of rt, tt|rn to NASA R&D l)tog|anxs. This lhtcling h<,'M up
t,n(h'r Midwest Res<,'ar(h h)stitute's sensitivity analysis. +Fit(+ institute also looked at casc
sttldi('s ()n a tn()r<,' (lualitativt" basis, lh)w<,w<,,r, NASA tle',:<,'l officially rc'l<,'as<,'<ºllilt" slt,dy,
l)('(atts(' th<,' nt('lllo(h)log_, us<,'d was still sub.ject to mar, y technical <,.con<)ttti<, qtmlifi<,+atilms. ''
13. hHc_nall',, NASA l_q_( ttrt'meltl t_llict' reports even gener;+_t<'d conttat ts and eXF, endittucs listed b,,
,._+ting <listt i_ t,, as a meth(_,'l <d infltwn,_ing (_+i_g_esstnen and scnatt)rs _+l"lh,r iml><_1+t;t_nt v _d" NASA _>n lhci_ _ _)H
Mitttt'llts. ] |{l_._.rcvIt'l. 1|{I npt't ilic <'_on<mlic nttlliilJlittrs or allalym's W{+l'C pCl't()l'lllcd int{'fnall'v t_ ;lll_lll('llt th<' IdW
1)1 It( Ill ¢'11){'111 II till| t)('I'S.
1+I. All ()( tob('r 5, 1!188. iHIcrnal NASA mcml+randtml t+r.m Jim P,ain t<_ NASA AP+_+ociat<. ,A.dminfistlat(_t
Willis Shaph.y, whi(h (_)mmenied OlZ the Midwest Research Instilute study, (h_(+tmwntcd th(' r.<.'s('r'+'ations <d iH-
tl_ttsc cc<_n<mfists as well as s_>tnt + mcmtx.rs _}f thc National Academy of Public Administr_tion's (NAPA) a(lx'is_-
F_+ /_;I/It'l c +Jr+_'<.r tl/tlg the resHh,+ +H th< + study. The m<'rtlo M_IhL'(I: "I"I+Ic NAPA A,_|vis_>r; Pav, t.l Icitt.l Ii) thc NASA
Adlllit|iMl_ll<)r {'11(1<)1_,('_. the (()lIChlSiOll o| i><+sitive R&I) ill|]l+|(D; Oll t]l(' ClOllOlll'+, |lilt ([(,('_; ll<lt IC[CICII(C
VH_fh>rs_'H_,t'HI I_| tht" sHld)'s t _n< Ittsi_+, on lht' magl_iltldt' it| lhis is|tat t. l)is_ u++si_+ns _ith indixidual tllt.Hd:._.n s
_d lh,_' A+lvis_ y P+H_t'I ha_,t ' it_dit alt'(l thai this was not au ._rt.c_ sighl, but Ihv di_ v_t _'st_lt <d tht' tmwilli_gHt".s <d
'tO)lilt" IIII.'III]R'F_+ Io ptthlic 13 <'ll<h_us_. ihl_sc iiiiiiiIR.l+i. ''
3(.)_ SPA(:t:.:\N AN INVI+'-;I'MI,:NI IN El:( )NI)MI(: (;R()WIll
A detail('d accounling of lit<+"(lifl]cuhies of measuring macroec(motnic I)eneths to NASA
R&I) is t)('vond 1t1¢"scope of this essay, r'
Briefly, howewm lhere were several major prol)lems with these studies. First, lhe use
<)1 the l)rOduclion timclion approach implied Ih_ll lechnolog, ical change is a ftmclion ot
R&D expetMitures. In the usual statistical method ()t regression ;lllaiysis, <rely an associa-
ti()ll t)(qwe(,ll t|+les(, p;_tl_lllll.'lels is llle_4stlYe([; (_ltlS_lli()n is 1lot proven. Second, the lll_t('l()-
economic studies (parlicularly the ones l)crt_)rmcd in the early to nfid-ll)70s) had only
about tifleen years of data with which to work. This skewed Ihe ,esuhs: the particular lime
span may have been measuring coincidental relurns, because il was a lira(' of expansion-
arv economic growth in the [!nited States that had little lo do with the space program.
The dramatic peak of NASA spending (luritlg the Apollo years was a one-time surge in the
long-run trend of NASA's space exl)endittu'es. It has never been repeated. Third, although
NASA R&D reached as much as one-third ot all ti:deral R&D in 1965 (one-timrlh of all
U.S. R&I)), R&D i,i total comprised only 1.9 percent ot lhe gross ilalional l)roducl. The
slatistical elli)l+S ("noise") in ma(roecoHot+lic llle_L%lll'es NI.I('|| ;tS Ihe gl-oSs ll_tlil)llltl I)I+()(|IIC|
WaS larger thatl NASA R&I). In other words, Ill(" sit|dies associate large impacls on gtf)ss
tmtional product from a relatively small component <d the product. This retati<mshi I) is
exlrelnely diflicuh Io validalc statistically, given the general acctu"ac+,' t)r<)blems with the
tlational inc_)tne data themselves. Finally, according to the accounting l)ractices ()t Ill(' gfw-
eminent dttring those years, there is no such thing as a government invesl,nellt. All gov-
ernment ('xpendittues are treated as oullav.s in lhc" year spent. There in no imputed rate
I)f It'llll'll lo Ihc gOVelnlllelll t, xf)(,lldilule,s alld no gl)Vellllllelll capila] _tCI'I)IIIlI. _;
Therefi)re, lhc process of calculating and equating a r+alc of return to NASA (or any
othel- govel+lllllent) expenditures with a I';tle ill I"CIi11"I] If) _tn eqtfivalenl privale illVe_.ll_lelll
in a venlure with high levels of risk is nol ;lcfurale. Ahhough there may well be robust
relurus Io NA.SA R&I), using lhe type of metho<hdokw all(l slatisli<.s available when these
Stltf|ies wele ])elt()lllled +,_,'ils IIlll('h lll()l'e of _111e:--+;.el/i,'.;eill doing lese_tlih _tlld ext)elillletll_t-
tifm <m ecoHomic nmth<,dolob, _ than it was in measuring the l)eneliLs If) NASA's l)rograms.
National Policy, Commercial Space, and Economic Impacts
E(_monfic growth and dcvch)pn|enl and itHer]lalional (Oml)etitiveness are gfmls f)l
nati<mal policy. This is rellect,t,<l in h,gislative and (,xt,(utive I:,ral_ch f)l)jccliv(,s as f)utlint+d
in various laws and policy directives. Th(' (lir('(t investment itx Sl)a(e R&D and t<+,(htloh)g_'
is fmc means to stimtflat(" the econ<)my of the (!nitcd States.
The National Aet_matttics and Space AtI _)f 1958: (alls for NASA to 11(' a lea(let iu
te(+hn<d<)gi(al deveh)pmt, nt. In add|lion to NASA's charter li)r spa(e and a('ronatltits atfly-
flit's, in the mid-1970s (:ongress added provisions chartering NASA t<) SUpl)(Wt R&I) ill
(iviliau grf)tmd I)t+<q)ulsi(m (itl(hMitlg a(Ivan(ed aut<ml()bil(') systems." Th(' NASA hl,dgul
15. ,\ g(_<)(ldcs(_il)licm _d tlw l<'_h]fi( al t._<m[)mi( mtqh<)doh_g_,and its ttsc ill ttwasming _I+(+l:+,..u<+liv.(_i
NASA R&I) tall lit' h)luld in "M<+anuli lg lilt' Et _m(mfit Rt'lUrlls l(_Spa_ (',+"iu]. (_ll'¢'ll]It'l_, aud It. llct_/Ivld, ('(It-
t,w+,,,_,)',',+.e li++m0++m+s (Washillgt<m, l)( :: AIAA lhogt,vss Nt'lit's #+t4, 1992)..\tH)lht+t l)CtSln'l li",t+(_llgo'_('l llllWlll stu(l-
its (_tR&I) Ir']wlil+, (;ill I)(' Ih.md in I'. K(_thati(v,v+.+k'+and tl. ]h')l/tcld, "()ttt+n ()xt'lh>(.k_'d Fa<l(_ln ill _.h'a,qH inl4
lilt' Ralc ot RcluFII t_ (;[),.t'l Ilmt'In R&t) I':xpt'ndilurt's,'" t'.li:; A.a0++_7 (St)_tug I!1_1): Iig27. Aln_,allystandard
h.xll)(.>k _l i)uhli( titian| c will itwhMt' a (Ictaih'd dt's(+_il)li<m_)f the pr()l)h'ms wilh t)c_vih-((:.l atlal)st's.
16. Tht'st" l>ra(ti(cs haxc ('hanged if(cHit'.,, Tht' ¢(_xcrntnt'ut tl<_whas 1)('gtm I[_ t+slimal<' a _apital
a(((_tult, aim Sl:+tJl i;ll alto|tit)Is at(+ l)('it+g n,a(l(+ to m[)tc atcIHalc],, Illt%iilll{"R&I) VXl)t'tl(lituH.'s i. the l_ali(ma]
ill| Olllt' ;_.l'l tlUlIIN+
17. Nail(real At'r(mautit sand Nim(T ,\_ _1 ]_.1_'_8.I'uhli_ l,aw _:':.--)tiP'i,'7_Nlat. 4Gli,
IS. Sul),.e(ti(m 102(c) was athh'd t):, thc l':h'ct_i( and ll,.l>rid \|'hi|It' Rvsca_(h, l)t',.vh,lmlt'_L and
l)t'm<.lstHti(mAt_()l1971i, lhfl)li_l+._wgt-ll:+,,h'ptt'mh<'r 17, 1976.u'cti(m 15 (90Yhal.127(l).Mn(_,Suh.x'tli(_H1tl2(t)
wasaddt'd 1),.fir" l)cpa_lincH| (,t EtHwt4-+.\[t (_1197_-( :i_iliau Allplit atMlls,l'ul)li_ I _l+_95-23S. l"(.t, ua__ 25. 1!178.
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during thcse ye+us was <omparalivel+v low, and this was one method to employ NASA engi-
neers ill ]heeling tilt+ nail<real Heed <)I developing re<we fuel-eMcit'tlt ('Iterhg j svstems +:Isa
resuh <>t tilt" ()PEr: oil crises. It ++,'as ills<> i)H example of one of lhe first direcl links of NASA
pl-(lgl'alllS 1<) civilian econ<mlic issttes.
()ther rel<._rences to natim:Ial econ<mfic growth policies hegan It> hccmnc apparent in
oHicial sp;we directives. It/ the Reagan administration's 1988 presidenlial direcliw" on
space policy, an entire section is devoted I<+ commercial space secl<n gt|idelines, which
<roll|Ned a number of gtlvernnlenl act|tins ;timed directly at slimtdaliHg private-sector
activity in space. 1111-121 This was tbll<_wcd I)y the Bush ad.ministrati<m's 1991 [!.S.
(_ommercial Space Policy (;16delincs, which explicitly recognized the last-growing corn-
inertial spat{" sccl(H alld cxpall(|c(I g()vellll11Cllt initiatives to Cl:iCOIll-agc I]le spacc seclol+'S
growth. I II1-1 :_ I
Finally, the tnosl c<>mprchctlsivc slatelllell! of national commercial space polic_ is
t_>tmd in Ihe (',liHt<m administralion's 11)96 presidential space directivt-, which propels
space ;wlivitit's directly int<_ tilt+ mainstream of t+ational economic polio', and internation-
al c<mq)etitiveness isstles. 1111-141 Two of the live goals listed in the itltlrodu,ction It+ this
policy Sl)ccilically mention both ec<m<m:iic competitiveness and the slin)ttlation <ff t+ton -
It+deral iHvestmt'nl ill space. The doctm_ent also incltldes a list of ,_tfidelines aimed at
enhancing c+>mmercial space. The significance of tiffs docttmeHt is Ihe extenl of coverage
_f cmnmercial issues surrounding space activities, it is indicative of tttc lllalUlilV ()_' I]1('
satellite conntmtfici+tli<ms industry coupled wilh the many intluslry pr<>posals It> develop
cmnmcrcial space svSlelIIS. Prior presidential directives on space issues have evolved t+rtml
barely addressing any c<mmlercial issues to those of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which
i,|iliait'd g<wernment studies at:itl actions aimed at st|initiating an enlergit:Ig potential Ibv
Ihe iH<htslrial use of sllace.
Econotnk" l_>recasts have long played a part in NASA plans for c<mmlercial space.
Somc of the earliest were the prqiecfions of the demand for c<mlnlttnications satHlites,
which w;_s I]_t' nmior driver of t]lc dem,md for expetldable lalmch vehicles (and Space
Sht[llle tlights t>et<_re lhc Challe,geraccident). NASA was the owner lind operat<)r of these
vt.hicl¢'s bel<_lc the push m transti'r expendahle lalmch vehicles m the private sector, and
the a_,ency necdt+d such |orecasls tbr planning and budgeting purp<)scs. In add|lion, the
Space Shtnlle was designed to launch commercial and industrial payloads as well as Io per-
fbrm NASA missions in space. Theret<>re, forecasts of potential users of lhe Space Shutth"
vchiclc provided inlbrmation to NASA matlagement that was imporlanll t_>t devel<+ping a
missi<m model+ manilk_st, and pricing algorithm.
An cxamph: t>l the use _d prt!jections was the 1983 forecast of a $60 hill|on commer-
cial space market fifteen years hence (2000) perRirmed hy the Center tbr Space Policy.
This pr++iecfion received a large amot)nt of publicity and helped set the stage tot the poll|-
|call and induslrial sttppor! of the International Space Station.'" However, am/project|o))
of ec<m<mfic markets many years in the futtlre is so prone to error that econolnisls alld
industry I>lanners discount any such projections an premature and wishft)l thinking, h)
|;_(t, lht" (',enter t<lr Space Policy torecast was revised in 1984 with more industrial and eco-
n_mfic delail, arid h was preset)ted as a range of possible markets in contrast to their con-
Iroversi,d prior t_>recasl. [lll-l.rS] Nevertheless, as with tile earlier tnacroecono))tic benefit
studies, these and other pr<_jeclio):Is of ,+,;)st new markets had significant political hnpact
and were influential it) both stimttlating ))ew government initiatives in industrial space
activities and in providing an underlying rationale for new big space programs sltch as Ihe
IiHt.rn_tli_nlltl Space Slalion.
19. x,'+,++_ )_M+ Tim+'s, Itmc 21+ 19_,, Settitre ?,, p. I.
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A 1977 study by the ttudson Institute that did not receive a lot of ptthlicity, but was
extremely interesting and well halanced, made 100-year projections of space activities.
The analysis provided a number of different scenarios ranging from space being domi-
nated by military activities to space being an instrument of a "green" society. In each of
the scenarios, the economic activities, costs, and benetits o1 space were major factors. The
pr¢_jecti<ms were hased on a comhination of economic growth and tecl'molo_, tiwecasting,
superimposed on different asstnnplions concerning overall tifltne societal and political
perspectives. This is one of the tirst studies sponsored by NASA that gave equal weight to
ecotmmic as well as technological trends and changes. The authors recognized that the
purpose of the study was to provide NASA with hoth qualitative projections of the tutnrc
fi)r planning and puhlic relations purposes and very hroad guidelines to answering critics'
questions ahout the value and l<mg-term use of space. [111-16]
In the early 1980s, NASA embarked on a numher of efforts to lind new and better
ways to commercialize space. NASA officials commissioned a task to review the agency's
options. The ()ttice of General (;ounsel prepared an in-depth legal and policy paper
detailing the options available to NASA tot stimulating commercial investments an<l
opportunities, till-17] The final series of reports of the task t0rce was instrumental in
establishing a headqtmrters <)ffice responsihle tot all commercial activities, ranging from
technolog 0, transler lhnctions to direct support of R&D and joint projects with industry
that had prospects of developing commercial space manufaclnring aclivities. This office,
as with most prior etlorts to stimulate commercial uses of space, had some near-lerm suc-
cess, but i! tailed to generate long-term changes in the operations or goals of the agency.
The otfice (t)ut not the commercialization fimctions) met with the t_ate of all prior NASA
economics_)riented program ottices; it was slowly dismantled in the early 1990s.
There were many reasons various internal NASA allcnlpts at estahlishing and making
economic analysis and economic stimulation programs were unsucccssfid. Priinarily,
NASA is an agency nmnaged and staffc<l hy engineers and scientists, t]istorically, NASA
ofticials and program managers have been recognized and rewarded hy <tevcloping suc-
cessful scicntitic or engineering programs. Cost management and economic stimulation
were seen as important, hut were not the yardsticks for promotion. Even though NASA's
top management recognized the need and the potential for NASA to be an important ele-
ment in economic policy tbt the United Slates, the mcssage was not adequately transmit-
ted to the program offices. The transition to a more business-like approach to space has
heen slow, but the trend, as evidenced in hoth legislative and presidential directives as well
as NASA's own planning docunlents, is unmistakably toward emphasizing economic
objectives as well as technological advances.-"'
In addition, during the 1983-1984 time perio<t, the Reagan administration took a
proactive stand on encouraging private-sector involvement in space. There had been a
nunlher of snccesstul Space Shuttle |lights, and experiments in materials processing in
microgravity were beginning to show the promise of l_.llnre business opportunities. In
August 1983, business leaders and top-level executive hranch olficials attended a meeting
on space commercialization and had hmch with President Reagan. [lll-lg] By April 1984,
a memorandum from Craig Fuller on commercial space initiatives had been prepared hv
industry representatives that began a dialogue on the various incentives and changes in gov-
ernment activities and regulations that might be necessary to encourage more industrial
participation in space. [IlI-19] :m interagency working group was estahlished under the
Cabinet Council on Comnmrce and Trade to hcgin work on these commercialization issues.
20. The morn>, 'Taslcr, thcapcr, bourn;'" which is the byline ot [);micl S. (;oldm's term as NASA
Admmislralor, is indicati',c ot this new cultmc bcmg inslillcd wilhin NASA.
EXl'l( )RI N( ; 111E UNKN( )WN _{9._
International econmnic competition itl space activitics has developed as foreign
nations have invested in space and uscd space and related technological R&D to slinnllate
their own industrial activities. Unlike the United States, one of the major reasons tot
European nations and many other nations of the world to inw'st in space has been an eco-
nomic motivation.:' Because of the difterent altitudes of the United Stales and the rest of
the world concerning govermnent subsidization of industrial developmenl, a number (/1
questions are frequently raise(l concerning the fair pricing of space pr(+ducts (+n the inter-
national market. The sttl_jecl of international econonlic trade and c()mpetition ill space
goods and services is too large and complex a topic t(+ address in (lelail in this essay.
NASA has made many attempts to encourage (ommercial uses ()t space. -'_ Beginning
ill Ihe late 1970s, and through the period of lhe develol3ment of tit(" Space Shuttle and
now the International Space Station, the governl+ll211| has commissioned space commer-
cialization studies, given free access to microgravity tacililies ill space for R&D projects
from universities, nonprofit instilutions, and for-profit companies, and made personnel
and te,+reslrial facilities awtilable for testing. NASA officials have always hoped that com-
mercial customers tor the Shuttle, Space Station, and other space plattorms will hoth pro-
vide the agency with revenue and the resources to encourage still more R&D and will also,
in the longer run, provide the nati<m with large economic and social benefits.
One examph' of this type of stimulation of manul_lcturing in space is the production
of new chenficals and drugs. Anticipating the operational phase o1 tile Shuttle, NASA
commissioned several studies of the feasibility of commercial space manufacturing. [111-
20, I11-21, 1II-22] These studies looked in detail at tile many possihle inarkets and ollpor-
|unities that could he present for R&I) in mioogravity and eventual commercial products.
Tile studies were comprehensive and included both a detailed technol<+g o' assessment and
a sample business phm wit]+ expected markets, development times, and potential rates of
re|urn. They assumed, o] course, thai space transportation and tat|lilies would be avail-
able on a scheduled basis and would be competitively pricedY' The study pert+ornmd hv
McDotmell-l)ouglas in 1978, under contract to NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, is
particularly interesting, h outlines in great detail the potential technologies that could
produce diflbrent types of new drugs in space, and it shows that a portfolio of such drugs
could serve many markcls and possibly be profitahle. [111-23]
21+ sve, tot ¢+xample, the Conv¢'nli,m t_Jr Ihc Eslablishmcnt ot at European Spate Agt+n¢}
((;Sl+L(:l)(73) 19. It-x. 7, Pints, May 30+ 1975). Artklt" VII (I) (b) slates: "The industrial policy which flu + Agmu)
iv to t+lat+<_rate and apply by virlut" <_f Arlhle I1 (d) shall be designed in particular lo: . . + b) improve lht' wc)rlt|-
wid< + conlpt,tiliveness of Europt'an induslry by maintaining and dewqoping space techlmlog T and by encourag-
ing lilt" rammalisali<m and dt+vt'lt_plnenl c,|'atl induslrial SII+IICIIII¢"approprialc Io lnark('l reqtlirements, inaking
us|' in tht" fil sl placc ot lhv existing industrial pt>tential t)l all M('ml)cr ,Nlat¢'s."
'2'2. ,,ks lllt'lltil_llt'd ill the illllodllt lit+ll, this essay does nol <h.st_il)v lilt' '+big" space o)mmercial Icth-
noll)git's, lht' ( C)lllltllllli(a(iotlS satellite inthlslry iv the itlt)Sl obvious and Itqt+sl xtlt cesshll of all spac<' x'enturt's to
datc. ()Iln'_ cxanll)l_+s |lit ludv th<"gh+hal l>Ositioning systmn (a tnilita_ y space systrm) that has icvoluli<mizt+d
land p+)siliollJllg syslt'lllS, t olnposilc nlatt'lia]s, and so|twale ttli+.llil.genlt+nl sysltqlls. Tilt'S(' It'| hll()logit's +tit' < h;|l-
atttmizt'd by being new ways ot pr+>viding ser+ices to existing markels. Only afler |hi + t'xisling markt*Is arc salis
fit'<l and It'Xt'IIIIt' sllt'alns al4t + large, {to Ill{+ firms then innovate wilh new types <ff services and |+n(><ltLtls lhat
t-t,qtm t. signifi(ant illarkel devdf._plnt'nl. Most tit Ill+.+ examples o| hoth ctnnmercial space lnaltlll_it'ltll'illg and
tc( hn_)logy tlaUlSlt+r <list tlSSt'd ill tht' b(_([} r otIhis essay ;|re new goods and services that have ]to currt'nllv <+]t+tillt'd
nlark{'l+ The risks ot a ncw product t<mph'd with the high risks <,t using spact" itsdf have not yet generatt'd grq*at
( ,+mlnt'l_ ial int<*rcst ill sl)a(e lnalnlla('Itlrillg. Th('l'el_ir<', lhe gOV(+I'IIIIIUIII has se('ll a lolt" lot itsell ht vnt<mtag-
/rig the +'illliltll industry .+ol sl+a_ e nlanul_ittllrin_,+
2'3. Mosl ol lhese anah's<'s also assumt'd that tht' Space Shutth" w<mld l>t* flying according lu t'arlv plans,
seven ofbill'|s+ twenty to thiit) |lights p(q y('al+ and st) forth. this type of rt'atl} a((t'ss did not malcria]izt' with
tht' _,hutlh" I)l ogram+ and access to spate lotla), is limited to t'Xl>t'ndal)le laun_ h vt'hi_ It+s l()r in<)st <<)mint.r| ial
payl(,ads.
_.)(_ SI'A(_E,kS+\N|NVES'IMI,.NI" IN I_]C()N()MI(; ( ;R( )_,V[ | l
McDonnell Douglas teamed with the pharnlaceutical firnl Johns<in and Johnson
(Ortht) Division) in tlle early 1980s It) build a space version of an electrophoresis instru-
l/ll.'tl[ It) cotldt|ct tilt" R&I) necessary to nlanutacture new drugs (the Eh_'clrophoresis
()pevations in Space (EOS) l'rogranl). NASA ptovidcd the Shuttle lbr tcsling [lie nlachine
witht)ut charge, and it proved to lie successftfl ill separating chelnicals and drugs ill micro-
glavity [h;H could not easily be separated on Earth. An early, and perhaps ovelly optimistic,
I_.'[ter |rt)m Johll E Yardley, president of McDotmell Douglas AstlOllalltics (]olllpany, to
NASA Adlninistrator.Jalnes M. Beggs testified tt) file success of tllese experintents and
p|edicted colnlnercial prodltction ill space by 1987. :' [111-24] A 1983 McDol|nell Douglas
Iiriefing details some of tilt" cotntnercial possil)ilities on which conlpanies hoped to capi-
talize. [I11-25]
Two |n_jt)|" [:actors led It)tile end <)t tile E()S Program. First, the ()hallengeraccident ill
1986 halted all tlights on the Space Sht|ttle, and this eventually led to a natiollal policy that
eliminated most conlmercial payloads t_'om [ht, Shuttle. It also dranlatically ilhlsttated that
space was a very risky place to tic) business. Access could be delayed or denied suddenly.
These risks were greater []la|l lllOs[ nornlal terrestrial bits[hess risks. Not only were ol|go-
ing conlnlercial progt-an|s l'lahed, but the accident also put a long-tt'rnl danlpel on com-
patlies ctmsideril|g new space business VCll[lll'es (pa|liculally those ilia[ del)ended till
bringing back nlaterial t_t)ln space).
The second t_lcto| is file unl)redictable nitlUlC o_ il|novatiol| and new technolog-
ical develol)tnenls. The drug industly in the United States was undergoing change [[sell.
(;enetic engineering and a Imrgeonillg biochenlical il|duslry were busy deveh)pi|lg new
drugs through new lerrestl+ial lnethods. Also, some of those I)reakthrtmghs were in drugs
that would directly compete with the ones wi[|l which McDonnell Douglas was working ill
space. Even though the space experitnellts in elec[rophoresis were exll-enlel,v successful,
othe|; tess risky terrestrial Inelhods to meet similar markets ended the private partlwrship
[o produce drugs ill space. A lit[h" rect)gnized spinotl benefit fionl this experinlcn[ was a
significant improvenlent in the electrol)holesis process tin Earth.
The (;enters tol (:ommercial l)evelopmellt of Space programs of the 1990s was ant)th-
eF at[Clllpt to s[illltl]a[e pl+ivate operations in space. [111-26] Througl| seed nlol|ey to uni-
vc|+silies, NASA hoped [o generate tmiversily-illdustry parmerships in space-related R&I)
leading to conlnlercial operations.
Sinlihtr ef[blts by NASA to find ct)nnne|cial uses of space we|e undellaketl fi)r the
Intevnatit)|lal Space Slat[on prt:,g|_tln :is well as tbl rclnote sensing and othe| applications
o[spact, |lavdware and tech|loh)gy. T<, date, [here are lnany proposals and ideas, but space
Inanuti.tc[u|-i|lg is still a tantalizing t'utule I)usiness activity fo| industry. Perhaps after the
lntelnati<)tlal Space Station is ope|-ating, and t|ansportalion It) and t1o111 space is cheaper
and nlorc i+elial)le, a numl)er t)t tilt" possible I)usiness ideas i_)rspace lna|lut_lCtl|ring will
tnaterialize.
The Stimulation of Technology Transfer
()m" of the [hOSt historically successful tt, chn<)h)g 5' [ransti_'r prog|a|ns of tilt' U.S. gov-
ellllllellt has I)een tile stilntllalioll all(I (leveh)pnlent of aeronautics. _' Fl't)lll 1915 [o 1951"I.
lilt' agency di|-ectly ,espt)|lsil)le for R&I) ill ;leronautics was the National Advisory
2t. ['his It+tlcv x+,;ts als_ a <lit +.'t t l><+sitiv( ' at+d ,('i,lli)I_ ing rcspot+s,t' to lh(' Atngust 7_. l t|_3. Itnlt hc_t+ at the
White I [t)ttse with il+dusttial h';t<l_'vs _md President Rcagan. Yardh+v had atlet+dcd the Itmche< m.
25. Tht' Stmllll_ttioil o+ ilt't'l)llittllit's HS HI1 ittli+_t_t iTl([tl'+ir'_ +ll the ('at'Iv p;trl ot this (('tltlll "+ iil'_<+l'+t'd I1<)1
ottlv lhc NA(:A, but also un:_nv other _overnmcnt a+.li'.,itics, van_ir+g h<_m wc;_th<'v fbtc( astint_ (aviali_t+ '+,aict'+ ) It+
thc pusta] sou,dec (tucatin_ a Itlitlk('t l<)r ;lit t algt) th)_)ugh In:d] dt+lixt'lx (1)llll;ttls)+
EXPI ,( )RIN( ;II II:. [_ !*KN( )V,'N _'](_)7
Commiuce tor Aeronautics (NA(]A), Fot,n&'d in l!tlS, il was the l)r('dcccssor ag(mcy m
NASA. Althou_,h s|)a(c activitics involve tn()te than 90 i)ercent of the NASA budget, aeto-
naulics R&I) is still a very illllJ()l'lilllt activity tor th(`" agency. The NACA was organized so
that industry arid g, ovi'rliln(!ltt l)('rsonncl involved with ai,craft workcd together, in holli
dh+ecling th(' R&I) program and making g,ovcrnnlel+lt the(lilies such its wind lllllllc'ls il'Vilil-
able 1o in<hislry.
NASA inh(.'ritrd this tradilion o|crcating lechnolog D' transfer oppoi-tunitics. I Iowcv¢'l,
it has dis(overed lhat transferring space lechnolog,':' to Ill( civilian scclor is difti'r(:nl and
m<)Fe tliffhuh than aer<mm,lhs li'clmolog_.'. Aeronautics began its an htfant induslry stir-
in R tim military and iT+tlrilial] g(IX'('I'IIIIICIII (pi)sl ofth'e) sectors. A civilian ('()tlSllltlCl- Ill(It'k('(
ibr pass(:ngcr attd cargo traltspt)lta.li(),ll grew rapidly. In comrasl, space applications have
vet to (lcvclop and (+al)lUrC a F()hllsl ((vii(an market (Olllsi(le of ('C,lllllllllti(:itliOIlS sal(,lliles)
(trill havc CV(llVC(I ()'¢cr liltlC an g)()VCI'IIIIICIII [+l+()_l+i+ltlS ('itlTiCd ()/It tly aCI'ON])IICC (otltrattors.
I rill(k(, a('l+onauti(s, Ihiding F('ady tnaik(!Is in tll)lia(,rosl)a((" applicati(ms [or the r<:suhs ()f
R&I) has bc(`'n difthuh.
The l(.V),i'tSpace Act r('rognizcs, in it g<:nel+al way, lit(." iml)orlan¢c of Ihc trniicd Slates
I)cing it leader in l('chnolog-+'.+"' This law also gives direction l() NASA to (lisseminatc int()l +-
milton to the widest possil)h, au(licilce. +: These sections ()Illl(, lax+,'d() It()l dir(`+clly chal+lcr
+l l('chnology transl(w activity. The thst section refers primal+ily to ttw (:ohl War l('chilolo-
gy rat(. with the Soviet Union. Th(.: st'cond was meartt for the civilian (.'[toFt to Inakc wid('-
ly avaihd)l(." the (htla ol)laim'<l ll()lll sl)acc l+c,Fs(ienlific and res('arch uses. lh)wcv¢'r, taken
iogtght'r, NASA has also tist'd this h'gislative tnatldatt" to create, InainlahL attl(I ('Xl);.utd its
activities in lnoving tcclln<)log-):' fr(m+ the NASA (and industry contractor) hll)<)ralol+ics to
hcnelh so(`ietv.
An inlernal NASA sit,dy in 19(')(.) re('()gnizcs tl+at in the posl-Al)()lh) (.wa, lh('rc was it))
imF, ortant r()h" Io) NASA to l)lay in translerring ils know-how and ('Xl)crtisc to n(mspa('(..
act(villi.s. Th(' r('l)Orl r(.comm('nd(_d the ('stahlishnmnl of a NASA <)l'lh(' I<) c()()rdinate
(+l'l_))ts t() transf(:r tcchnolob, D' from NASA to other civil systents. Th('r(' ,,+"itslitth' me,ni<)n
of industrial ()r commm-cial l:,(+n(.l]ts from tllese l)rOl)()si.(l lranslbr activitit's. The en)pha-
sis was insl('ad on supporting tlt(. social isstl(.s the nation lhc('(l, such its lit(" design of n('w
('()IIIII)Illl]I]i'S, Ihc (Icvclopll)(.tll ()1 EaFIh I'CSOIII-C(+S StII'VCy SySICIllS, thc' apl)lhation ()f tcch-
))()h)g-y Io highway satbl.v and In(f tic control, crime (ontrol, educational t(,h'visiot+ systems
and s()t()rth. {111-27]
The ('ailicst NASA lechnl)logD, utilization and transfcr ping'ranis did foctis oil the use
()[" NANA ltiatlag)Ctl+('nl skills an([ lcchnololgical know-how in ()liter g()vcrltlnCIll (both
national and still(- alld local) applications. With lhe exception ol+ the patent waive) + pr<)-
grain, th('re was a re-lucian((' to directly involv(+ industry it+ tit(.' progrants h(`'(at,se of tit( +
al)pCaFance (>f suhsidi(..s t() [)articular +th+tnsY _Tl-ierefore lhe majority of pi()grams aitd pro-
Lji'(:ts ()f lit(' l('chn<>l<)gn/' ll'alistb)" <)fth'(" loci(seal on two areas: the disscitii)tation of inlor-
niali()it and l)uhlicalioils des(:,ibing NASA advances iit technology an<-I the dii+ecl
inv()lv('mCllt in (:oiilinucd R&I) on I(_chnologies that (:ould be used Io help solve" sp(`'cit]c
social l)r()l)h.ms.
A I!)71 ('vahutli()n ()I tlt(" NASA technoh)bQ' transfer informal(on diss(mtinati(m l)r<) -
gl';lili (()lt(ht(h.(1 Ihat the t)r()14ratit had not t+een very successful.:" Specithally, tit(." study
<..)(_. N;Iti()ii;tl At'Iollauti(s and Spa((' A(t ot l(.)Bl4.
27. /bM,
2_, Eal< II ',car, N/IS:%. pal('ni('d I)('lw('('n I}30 alltt '20f} illv('nlh)llS, oriRilialinR t'l<)m 1)<)lh }it-hot(s(. R&.I')
and (()lilraci r('s('ar(ll. ITp()n al)l)li(ali()n and i<'vi(.w I)y NASA, _()lllC pal('nln" vmh('is I,,cic issued t() individuals
alill Io [hnls Ii) i)('i lliil lhciii Io d('v('h) 1) inv('iiii<)ils ilill) colntn('r('ial I)lodii(Is.
2!1. N.I. [)()( I(>I'S, 771_'+_,'.l?l'+l 77':hl+:)hJ£'_' 7)'a.)fi>*/')'0t.m.t, a, I"++,ahuH.>. <4 Ih*,D/_*¢l#l#_l<7lioll ,(Iy_l_.m (,'N'(.,,+.%_)ik:
I)]a('g('i ])ul)]ish(qs, 1{)71).
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t(_und that intbrmauon dissemination concerning new inventions and innovations was
not an ella:clive way to t'ncomage indt(stry t<) use the infb)-malio)l. More direc! methods,
such as interpt'rst)nal ct)nlacls, were Ibtmd it) be superior ways It) transfer lechn()It)_Q'. The
l'el'()llll)lelld;lliOllS Of the Stllfly c('nlered aroun(l having more ilileYaclive ex(llall_e,'s
between NASA and its regional development centers and giving the centers a longer tinlt'
fram(' and mr)re mt)ney It) deveh)p and locus the target techn()lo_i(,:s It) lheir civilian uses.
There have been a number tlf altenlpls t() measure lhe benefits t)f thv translk:r activi-
ties. ,:ks with the macrt)cct)t]t)nlic measures discussed earlier, lhe sltl(fies (fale fl()in If|(" mid-
f970s, ct)inciding with the overall decline (if NASA budget afh)cations. The mr)st visible set
t)l dotmnenls prt)duccd l)y flw ()Hice of tet'flnoft)g,_' transl(.'F has been |hi," ;llnlu;d ,(_t/H,'0] ]
ptll)li(ation.:" The reports (ff many difl('rem applications t)| le(hn()It)_Q, give lht" impres-
s|tin lhat the pay()|] froln space investnlents has been very farge. Indeed, it may have 1)('en.
f lowevt'r, most of the teptlctt+d tcchnolt)gical stlcccsses in Sfli;tq//are either demonsttation
projects (thal is, not fidly commerci,dized) <iv are pul)fic-scctt)r uses t)f space technt)fob,D'.
]))]blic-s('clt)r appli(ations may well have ];))ge social value, bul l]lal is nol quite the same
as a measure of prt)ducdvity increases from privately prt)duced and sold goods and st')--
vices." The benefits that accrue It) connnerciaf firms are afs<) more easily measured, and
ill theory, some of the costs of tilt" translk'r a(:tivities of the g()vermnent may be re(:t)uped
through royahies and through err-ritual lax payments lroln lilt! prolits t)f the tirlns.
Slndies of techn()lo_,_:' Irans|i:r aclivities in Ill(," mid-197(}s were ((inducted fi)r lhe same
teas|ins as tile macr()ect)n()nfi( analyses. NASA had a need to iuslit_ its budget t)y showing
thai lhere were more and longer lerm benetits than successful space missions. Agency offi-
cials w('rc trying t() answer the political questions raised t)y slatemenls such as: "It's fine I()
walk <in lhc Mot)n, but what have you done lhal improvt's the everyday lil_" ol the avenlgt'
American citizen?" The teclmolt)gy ll-anslk'l- studies were designed to pr()vid(' concvele
('as(!s thai iIhlsllated a(]val)t'es Sllf'h as ]leal'l pa(enlakers and ()I]qel- ]nedi(a] illSll'lllll('llta-
lion, new materials such as anli-|og glasses, and new construction and buildin R lechni(itles.
In 1(,)77, lwo studies were pertormed lha! atlempted measures of Ihese cases (if tech-
nt)lt)_,y transti.'r that C(luld be traced to the specific eftilrts t)f the agency. One was lhe
l)envcr Research Inslitul(" sltl(ly of the NASA Tech Brief pr()gram. This study analyzed tilt,
users (if tile intbrmation publicati()ns thai NASA produced that wcre made awlilable I()
intlustrs in the hope that technofogy dew'loped by NASA would be adapted and ('xlenff-
t'(I I)}' pvivale titres. The resuhs showed thai there were l('w new pr()ducts ()r commercial
sah's fr()m these technologies, but that the inlbrlnation was particularly helphd l() indus-
lry in improving the produclion process. (I11-981
Ahhough lhe thinking ill gt)vermnenl was that this "flcc" intbrmalit)n would be very
vahl;d)l(', |fie goveilllll(_)ll overlooked Ififu(' imporlanl J'_lclol's. Firsl, inch)sire f)ad It) inv('s!
flint' an(f pet)pfe It) seal'Cfl foY lh(' in[ollnalit)n, whi(h had a sign|litant (-fist. Se(()tld, Ihe
pnf)lished intormation was available Io anybody, and there were n() pr()pert!,' rights lha!
could It(" clainled by intfustrv in the inn(trait(in, lheretore making il risky It) inv('s! a(fdi-
lional (tevelt)lmlenl tml(ls in the l(:chn()h)gy. Third, very ()t'tcn g(ivernment techn(llogies
30. Evcr_ ,,c;u sin( c t!)71i, this l)ul)li( ;it|on h;ts t)('('n dist)il)utt'd I)', NASA. It is a Rl()ss_ i)al)('l ICl)oKt II);_t
dt'nt I il)t's su( t cssflll tt'chnoh)g _, al)l)licati()ns th;ll h;Ixe l)('cn li)sct'vcd by NASA lit ogi;ull olli,c ('s and,'ot |hi' ,)lli_ ('
n('sponsil)I(' fin It'( hn()h)g,, transli:r. Tht" dis(ussion is dcst ripliv(' in naluru, and ill some ways, lh(' l('l)otl h)(iks
like a c()rp()i ;tit" ;lllllll;ll I ('|)()1"1, 1)Vit]l()lll lilt" tln;tn(i;ll sl;IIUIII('IIIF).
31. tint' re;|son tha! the cml)hasis Ii_l_ I)t't!n ()11 puhli(-s('(l()l I)(!n('lils is thai, until r('(cnlb.. NASA was
uvhtt lantt I() lotus |Is tl anslk'J cfli)rts on p_ivatc compalfi('s I)c( attsc of Iht' i)<)ssil)iliQ ot lh(" alh'gation ot ;u) ;mlai)
t ()mpt'titivt' subsidy t() (m(' (tirol|any or industr',' twct ;mother. IH more tot t'nl years. NASA (and Ihc g_)xe_ nmenl
in gt'nc_al') has lit'on m()_c aggrt'ssivc in h('ll)ing ti_tns and in(h_strics directly. On(' wa_. Ihis has I><JVn a(c()tn
plishcd is tlnon%h (omp('litivc _nvards aim j,)inl "_('llllllt"_ wilh Ih ms.
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arc not ,sutlkicntly optimized F<)r Ih(' m;trk('l, _nld a lar_(.- financial commitm('nl lntlsl b('
made to tm-lhcr d(:vclop and nlark(.'l tht, technology. (:ombined, it is not sm-prisinI_ thai
studies show_,d a r(,lalivcly low economic return to the inl_)rnlation l)tLl)]i(:alions.
'l'h(" s('cond study rch,ased in 1!)77 was don(: by MathT(,'ch (a successor compmL_, t()
Malhematica). This slll(ly ]()okc(| _-tt _l IIIIlII|)CI+ O1" SUCCeSSIifl tvchnolo_i('s l]l_ll the NASA
lcchnoh)b,g / transt(_r otlicc h;_d cnc<mnag¢'d with addiliomd R&:I) Iimds and iwrsonncl.
[III-29] Technoloff, ics mwh as m_ improved f]retib[htcr's 1)rcathhlb_ aplmn+atns and zinc paint
('()alines w(_r(" analy/cd li+om an cc()nomic: l)cn('fils [)crsl)t'clivc. [+)(.'n('lit-(<)sl r_Iti(),'+were cal-
(tllat('d and in soun(, case,,+ wcrc qml(" high. The m_tjor prol)Icm with th()s(: ](_'>+tnll,_is not
thou `)her(., w(.,n¢: no si+..Tnili(_ml l)(.!ii('lllS (th(.'r¢" ".,V(,l(.!), bill Ill,it l]Ic cost ll_-Ul-(.'s w('r(' ;util_-
(!ally h)w l)(_(atlsc lhcy v+,('r(' prim:uily lh(.' costs of ti;Insl('uThl_, the t(.'('hn()l()_', not th(" ('()sls
involved with ini`)ially dcvclopin_ the tc(.lm()logy. The s(.'lecti()n of <)nly a few sttcc_'ssittl
(.';ts(.'s i_ll()r('s olh('I" |l';llI%l('l-++ lh;+.! v,+r(,'l'(." `)l()t _ucc('ssl'ul an(I, ;l_iliil, [(.,n(|s l<) ()VClP+,l_(.l( • Ill(." T)(:n-
('lil-(.onl rali<)s. Non(._th(_l('ss, ;m ;trgumertt cm_ be mad(.+ !hal withont the cflbrts ()1 the
a(lcl('(l '¢+lhl(+(:<)nlribtttt'd I)_; lh(." lechn<)log): t transl_'r l)roc:c,ss, eitlter th(.'r¢" would hay(" l)(.,('n
no) l)(,,ni('l_ts from lhen(" NASA inn<)valions or the |)enefils won](| hi|v(, (omc mn(h ]at('r.
Th(" (:hal)man sln(l,, <if I(,)N(,) is interesting be¢'at_sc it s+:]ccl(:(] 400 t(.'(hnoh)gics men-
tion('d in ,+pi,o]], and rt's('ar(.hcvs [)(.+rl_)rmed intervi(.'ws with !h(." (onH)ani(.'s to an(.'ml)! t()
m(.+amnr(' the (mnulativ(+ bcn('lit_+. Thcy |ou`)l(| that t]I(.' |)c')+¢_|]l.'+,|||:|_' h_IV(' b('l{']_ ;IS ]a`)'_(' _ts
+21 billion (spread ov¢'r tw(.'lIl+V yt'+trs). ] |owt'vcr, the rt, por! did no! attCml)t to c;iI(tflatc
the costs ass(>cialed with the (lcv(.'h)l)mt't)t and transfer <if lh()st" t(.,chn()l()gics, nor did it
determine when or if thos(" t(.,(.hn<)l()gics might have + l)(.'('n l_)lih(t)min_ |r<)m the [_l-mS
with()ut NASA inv<)Iv(._m('m. In _id(lilion, it did not attt'xn])t 1() s(![);-tl'at(.' lh(." NASA invt's(-
m('nl ()r stimulalion of `)hi" l)ro(hncts |tom prior _tn(l lttturc COml)+tny iIlv(.'s`)l'll('lll,'+, Ill
(.sst'n(t', lhis vept)rt is a (oml)r('hcnsivc Ul)(late <If the earlier st!relics !hal docmn('ntcd spc-
(ific c;tscs of techn<)h)_i('s m<)ving f+()m NASA to incluslry. [Ill-30|
An()tht'r :iSl)('tt of tcchn<)h)I-)D' trmtnf<:r wa.'+ the realization in lh¢" early l(,)70s thal the
th)il('d St;!los is m|itlu(." ;un()ng nali()n,,+ in thc world in ils ()l)¢'um(.'ss ¢()nccrning R&I)
r('snlts from civilian(tm('l;_ssil](.'<l) ,_()v(.+rntncnt-sp<)n,'+orcd work. l)t)rino th(.' ('aMy years <if
llw Nix<in _dmiv)istrath)n, :m ('fl_)rl xv_ts mad(.' to ])r<)vide [!.S. _<)v('i-mn('nt l(.'(]m()h)g_+' and
inl_,rmati<)n I<) tLS. lhm_, lh,+t, l,tcc()gnizing tl+mt un(h'r lh(.' thctl-(.tlrl-t'llt ()])('l_Itil'l,l._ pr,l('-
lic_'_,+tncl I_IV',r_'()l" the nati<)n, the Unit(.'d States c(>uld not (.'as!l)' r(.'stri(l iltJ'()l-ln+tli()`)l |+'<)Ill
l<)rt'i_,n mtli()ns and Iirm,_, _ l)r()grmn nan|cd FEI)I) (F()r Early I)()tncsti( l)istril)uli()n)w_ts
initi,tl(.'d. NASA l)arti(-il)att'd in this ])rogram and made an _lllcm])t t() g('l intfi)rmati()n t()
LC.S. in(luslry l)(.,Ii)r(' it was Ol)('n]y l)ul)lishcd, lh)v,'¢'v(:r, no formal ¢'vahuati()n was cvcr
m_|(l(.' (if lhc pr()gram, and ;t NASA white paper in 197_ c.,+s('ntially c()nch_(l(.'(l |hat il was
imp()s+,+ibl(.: t() cnl+orc(' lhim policy. [ III-31 ]
T|w NASA (('clm()l<)gy transli'r oftic(: also invested consideral)l(.' fire(Is in activiti('s
:timed _t ('<hl(_i`)]()ll ;Ill(| ill (.!n(.<)tlragin_ ll(?w IIS(_'I'SfOl" sp+I(.'c data and ]))()(ht(.'ts. T() snl)|)()lt
lhcs(" tral+sf('r l)r()grams, th(" ol'l_((." ;tlm() sponsored economic studi(:s that l'o(uscd tin s[)(.'-
cili( ])r()g_r:im l)en('l]ts. For examl:,]c, there were a number of analyses ])('rf()rmcd it') lit(.'
mid-1970s on the benelit,'+ that might I)(.+attril)ttled to having impr<)v¢'d information |'r<)m
th(' ]+_m(Is_it scri('s <if Ft'tn+)l('-sensin_ satcllites."-' Becaus(." whcat is traded on |h(.' lt_ttH(','+
mmk('t _md _F)_' pric(,s arc highly vohttilc dep(:ndin_ on the size: <)I th(' w()rh|wi(h: cro])s,
i+}2. S('< +. I_)) ('x_unl)h+, E( ;( IN, In(., l,.:',m)_m_ Be,e]_l_ o//m]m)ved h!/'r_mti+m o)_ IA_)ddT(_h'L+'(:)op l_)odI++l+,').,+,
R('I)())I 71_-5_43-I, Nov('mi)(') 15, 197(_.. A th('()_('ti+_fl r('port on which th(" E(:()N ',lit(!i<", _,<'(+_(" l)_>,('d wa'. l)td)li',h('(l
I>,, I). B,-adl_>)d +rod II, K(.h_ji+m. /7+. Ud+., o/ /,].)mati.++ [.) C)+,p /'+..'+:m_. K .,ith B:O':+#+. L_]_'_P+b_'_:': The+'.+' a'd
l-.+pi)+:+dl#:+.//+. 197,1, [)()( tll||('lll;ll "+ |list<in v ('.<)II('(ti())), Spat(" Poli('+ Inslilt_t(', (+(*I)I'_(' _VashhL_I()u+ t'nivt'n,,it',+
V_'asliiJlgl<)w, I)( i.
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having better intormation about future yields is having intornlation with a signiticant eco-
nonlic valuc. The cxtenl tllat remote-sensing satellites <:an help provide that informati<m
an(| tilt" sullse(]uent influence that the intitrnlation has on tile futures market can be mea-
suted in let+ms of reducing tilt" speculalive swings on the Inalket.
Rec<)gnizing that the NASA ettbrts to lrauslc'r techn<+log_' |lave had at vc,+y uneven and
often uncooldinated history, NASA estal)lished an inlernal task |or(x. ill lD92 to stu(lv Ill("
prol)lems and l+,.+Ct)lllnlelld changes. Tile final task tolce i-epovt had a series of recom-
tncndalions to inlptow' the system. These reconlntendations also included tile develop-
lllellt ()1" Illeastlles Io evaluate tim [)elfolnlance (if Ihe colnpOllents o1 the tFansfel + process.
1I11-321 It is intetesting to note that these findings and recolnntendalions are not very dit-
ti, rent ill thrust front those o1 lhe Doctors sludy ot1(.)71. '_ The process o1 technology' trans-
fer and inlormation dissemimttion still look too lnu(7]l lithe. Paperwork and olhel" tormal
eltk_tts renlained cutnbetsonle and slow. The money allocated to the program was insutti-
cienl. There was a lack of good data and t}._e(tl)ack on nlany of the programs t)elween
NASA and industry, ttniveisities, and nonprofit organizations that use the lechnoh)b,,7,+
Iiansl_:t-generated it|tin-mat|on and facilities, and NASA employees generally did nol get
iecognized for the|t ellorts in fostering techn<_log_' tlansl_-r
The technology, translVr programs at NASA are not unique in their tiustrations and
ploblenls in implentcnting more eff>ctive programs. Other agencies t_t(e similar issues.
There has heen a general recognition of these problenis, and (;ongress has passed a nunl-
hel <)| a(ls to help folce the agencies to addless the n+easurentent and nlanagenlent o[
tethnolot,_+. ()lie <)1 the IlltlSt important of these acts is Ill{" (;OVel'lllll('lll PeiTormance and
Results Act, whi(h rt'quives govet+nntent agencies to dew+lop new pertornlance nleasuves."
It is a clear signal fvonl (_t)ngress that measuring economic activities and inlpacts is an
important efli_t+t, not only to manage the progranis better, |)lit also to hell).justify contin-
ued g<tveYnment thutncial supl)ort of the progtanls. All R&D agencies are struggling with
tinding appr<q)riate measures, and NASA is no exception.
Summary
Eco,mlnics and commeldal/industrial activities have never been the top priority of.
NASA spac'e ptogvanls. NASA is an R&D agency, declicated Io advancing science and tech-
nolog,_'. That is its hisloYy and its culture. NASA's aetonattlics aclivilies have a velv ditter-
ent history and a diflbrent relationship to industl-y than spa('e activities, hut they wet-e
new'v able to I)ecolne models tbi the spare side of NASA. The documents included in this
chaplet +amply tet]e(l the push and pull of e('<)nontics. Tile push is to altenlpl to find uses
of" the innovative space lechnolog T in consume] appli{ations. The pull is that if a lObtlSt
set of market-dviveu uses fol- space can he deveh)ped, Ihe,e will be a continued dcnland
tor t+esources, both public and pIivate, to accelel+ale |utut+e spa(:e programs.
Valious economic sludies and forecasts have whetted lilt' appetites of the puhlic that
there may actually be Iobust connnercial uses of space that have I)een ptomised and that
space spinoftg ale vety bencti(ial today, lhtwever, without the development of tlul} ozlgo-
ing, [)r<)lilahle, and pul)licly visible conlmercial space ventul+es, the studies and projections
will t_tll shott (if being convincing.
As space tt'chnology Illattlles alld as innovative plOd|lcts and sevvices iue developed
using space lechn<_logy, conlmetxial and ,naIket (levelopnlents will materialize. ['heve ave
.'+,3. l)otto_s. ,V.L%I 7;,d+md0&,+x 7)++t+,+]+,+lJP0g,'Pam, llo+_t'vet+ bt't aus¢' lht" It'(:lmolcJg 2. tlanstm program has
chatiRt'd, the +,l_t+(ili¢ • tt't o]mnen(lations ave quitc (lifl_'tcnl.
_{-l. (,t)\t'llllnellt Ptql_+rlllallt<: and Rt'suhs A(I, Pul}lic law II13-G2, ,,Xll+_ttst 3, l.qg?,.
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still many htudl,t,s for the space industry to overt<sic, but the tide is m<)ving toward the
slinndatiot+ of new space tnarkcts. The lmrdrn +rill have to shift [rmn government-spon-
sored studies an(l analyses to bttsincss-sponsorcd proposals. In a(ldilion, these will have to
reach beyond serving goverllltlctIl itlarkgts and needs to serving lhc needs of the con-
In summary, the trends in ,ff,ov('ltm+mnt-le(l ecottotllic studies, te(hnoh>h_+ transl_'r
activities, and other stimuli toward business and market-driven space activhirs rrllected
the political needs of the timt,s and the develol)ing maturity of the space industry.
(i<wernment ;rill provide lit(" iltfraslrttclure and will ttsc space l<Jl-its own civilian ancl secu-
rhy needs. Thc p<>int is fast approaching when cmnmcrcial spacr activities will either br
ahlr to dtwelop and compete on a price basis or they will not materializr. The governmrnt
can provide hwcmiw's, as it has ill the past, hut performhlg sttldics an(I pumping funds
into marginal economic pr<_jccts ;,+'ill have diminishing results.
Document II1-1
Document title: Jack G. Faucett, President, Jack Faucett Associates, Inc., to Willis H.
Shapley, Associate Deputy Administrator, NASA, November 22, 1965, with attachment
omitted.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
77w report that was attached to this h, tter to NASA is one of the.first comprehensive a.alvses o]the
role eamomic,_ couhl play i. NA,%4 management decisions. It point._ out that mmt r_f_\,_L%_!s eco-
..mic anal_',se,s, policies, and deci.sions are done on an ad hoc basis, without top manaKeme)_t cm._
di.atio.. I_y 1%5, with the Apollo pm£.am in full szving and NAX4 .[i_.ding_ reachinL_ its all-time
hi_,'h, the _mporlance qf emnonm_ as well as leehnolo_, began to bemme m,ide.l to NASA manage-
me.t. The report conclude.s thai apt office Jot economics at NASA tleadquarterL_ be established to com_
di.ate N_L",'A coo.omit polity. (;eor W l_,)4ght was an assista.t to Willi,s Shaph 7.
Novemhrr 22. 1965
Mr. Willis II. Shaph,y
Associalc l)epttly A(huinistrat<_r
Nail<real Acrotlautics a+tt'l St)arc
A(hninistrati(m
Washington, D.(L 20546 Attention: Mr. (;eorgc W. Wright
l)ear Mr. Shaph'y:
Tim attached report, "A I'reliminary Survey of Socio-Ecotmmic Capabilities for
Meeting, NASA's Fttture Policy and Program Analysis Reqttirements," represents the com-
pletion of NASA Contract NASW 17,31, authorized by' y<)u on Septemher I I, 1965.
Am we scc it, the study's principal usefiflness m you is tt+ree-fold: ( 1 ) it identifies and
(lcscribcs the principal (tara collections, reports, and studies relevant to economic analy-
sis in the NASA Hcadqttartcrs; (2) it l)inpoints the chic[ mrans by which your central staff
cal)abilitics can he inq)rm, rd For purposes of socio--ecom)mic analysis; and (3) it recom-
men(is a general ('(mrsr of acti(m which, by pulling together the now largely unco(_r(li-
natrd activities, shotd(l serve t+) hring s(>ci(_'con(>mic analysis more ,pfti'ctiw+ly t<) I)ear on
NASA's policy planning an(t drcisi<)n processes.
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A word t_] elaboration on point (3) is in order, h is not surprising to lind that NASA's
socio-economic activities are at this stage separate, uncoordinated, and almost incidental
activities. Until now tile highest natiomd priority on NASA has been that of creating a
large technical organization and gelting on with the task of moving tile nation toward Ihe
position of pre-eminence in space. Most of NASA's socio-economic studies are now cal-
tied out on an ad hm basis by technical offices under tile :Lssociate Administrator. In each
of these specialized startS,, the perspective and outlook are constrained by' mission state-
ment, and the analyses are ahnost never carried out by trained economists, statisticians,
and other social scicnlisks skillet] in perceiving social implications. Moreover, the various
rcl)orting systems anti data elements are not adequately integrated and coordinated from
the point of view of economic analysis; the}, were developed ahnost without exception ]br
other specialized management purposes and only fortuit_lusly serve socitr-economic anal}'-
sis needs. To conlilnle this approach would deny your office the strong central stall and
perspective needed to analyze critical agency positions with respect l_>overall NASA pro-
grams and policies. A new prolk'ssionalism is needed if NASA is to maintain leadership in
lhe ne'er national envirmmwnt for goal selt'rtion and public policy formulation.
Our key recommendation is that your (;hie/ Economist's responsibilily of serving as a
fl_cal point tot agenc s_vide socio-economic analyses under the Associate Deputy
Aclministralor l)eclariliect, and his authority be spelled out in Inallagelnell[ instructions
and other suitable media. Our detailed recommendations tor achieving this are set torlh
in Chapter IV, especially section A, and the remainder of that chapter deals with other
improvements. The NASA Economist should become inwllved in major NASA decision
processes and selected interagency committees, and he should develop an information
base to serve ttlp agency needs just as the activities of the Management lnlbrmation
Systems Division now serve middle management attd project management needs.
I do not want to close without holing that in ourjtldgmenl successtid implementalion
of our rec_lmmendations will require a ntunher of additional p_)sitions wilh high enough
grades to attract oulstandiwg personnel, and also a period ot aboul six months to assimi-
late tile data collertions and cited reports, and to study anti begin tt) carry out the rec-
Olllnlentled illlpr(ivelllents.
_A_"wisl/to ex[)rt'ss ()Hr apprecialion for tile cooperation we rcceived tr<)m NASA p(+r-
S(llnle] alld Otll" gratilu(le tilt +the ()])[)(irttnfily to review lot you Ihe central so(iu-t'(<)noni-
ic staff role in NASA.
l, of course, will I)e happy 1o discuss any poinls in this rt,porl al yOtlr convenience.
_bm-s sincerely,
[hand-signed: "ilack (;. Faucett"]
Prcsidt'nl
Document 111-2
Document tide: Roger W. Hough, "Some Major Impacts of the National Space Program,"
Stanford Research Institute, Contract NASW-1722, June, 1968, pp. 1-2, 19-22, 36.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
l)u_4ng_ the 1960s, a,_ economi,_ts began to develop methodoloffie,_ desiffned to evaluate the impact _?[
research and deT_elopment (R&I)) on the economT, NASA contracted fi_r _tudies to document the .Ipar'e
agen O, _ specific impacts. These excelpt_ are.fiom one q' the ear& _tudie,_ that ./housed on the impact
o/,VAS,_,t .]ieM r'enter_ on their localities. The report did _mt addre._s national ecmmmic impact_.
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Some Major Impacts of
the National Space Program
[ 1 I SUMMARYAND CON(]IMSIONS
Recent studies have hegun to show conclusive evidence of a dramatic relationship
hetween advancing technolog T and economic growth. Although such a relationship seems
inluiliwqy ohvious, the proof has been, and still is, considerably elusive. No clear, detini-
tire, quantitative theory yet exists in the economic literature, although much attention has
lwen paid to the subject in the past 10 years.
Since NASA is exclusively a research and development agency of the government, it
is important thai the relationship between R&D and economic growth be understood.
This report discusses stlme aspects of the relation-ship and indicates some of the required
ingredients tor economic growth. These are, for example, a nlore l)roductive work torte,
gained largely through education; a cominuous building tip of the store of knowledge;
greater utilization of knowledge by entrepreneurs; and a high rate of utilization of human
cal)ital, tirsi by virtue <if low unemployment in all occupational categories and second by
a continual dewqopmeni and utilization of higher skills.
To lind out how NASA contributes to these various elements, thin study examined to
some extent the role of the Agency in extending the quality of environment at its centers
and prod(triton and test areas in the South. It was found that by contributing to impr(,ve-
tnents in local educational systems, NASA had effectively modified the direction of growth
taking place in a numher of Iocati<ms. It is clear that this is more noticeahle in small cities,
towns, or counties than in large metropolitan areas. On the other hand, in a particular
kind of environment, such ;is I hmston, growth in both quantity and quality is also appar-
ent if Ihc immediate vicinity of a center is examined separately. Furthermore, the same
('lt'ments that have been detected bel_we with regard to scientilic complexes in other
citit's, stwh an growth of graduate and higher education facilities, are noticeahle in con-
neclioi/with NASA ctwtters and other facilities in the South. In each of the areas--with the
ponnihlc exception of New Orleans, where it may not be ponsihle to detect such changes--
NASA has contributed to those elements that constitute the ingredients for economic
growth. It has vpgraded the skills of the labor force, upgraded the level of education avail-
ahlt' 1<_local inhahitants, decreased iuienlployment, and buih tip the store <if knowledge
liy virttle o[ its so;entitle mission.
hi sunnnary, we lind that:
1. NASA activities have had a positive and consequential inthience on the localities
in the South in which it has established research and development centers and
production, testing, and launch facilities.
[21 2. These inlhiences have gone heyond those associated nierely with the channeling
o[" governnient [lirlds into all area, primarily becanse (if tim research and devel-
opmelit nature of the work.
3. R&D is ditterent ti'om other transters of government funds because it requires
more highly paid, highly educated workers who demand more in the way (if qual-
ity of environment. This in turn affects the quality of education, tot example,
awlilahle to new residents of the community as well as to old ones, resuhing in
greater levels of achievement by all.
4. NASA and NASA-contractor personnel have contributed to this upgrading of the
environment ill each community in a varie D' of ways, from running for and being
elected to local political offices to providing pressure through neighhorhood and
coinnillliily organizations and vohinleer, charitable, and religious groups.
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Furlhcrnl()rc, it was fbttnd that, in many cases, a substantial portion of the leach-
ing staff in local grade and high schools was nlade il f) of wives of engineers and
sciendsls on NASA pr(_jects. These women ;_re generally well educated, oticn
liom a more cosmopolilan enviromncnt lhan l]l_l.l fottnd in many of Ilw NASA
locations in lh_,' Somh, and thus able to bring to school children a broader expe-
rience and a grcawr apprccialion ti)r cdttcation than they would have oth('rwise.
5. NASA's influence is also ti'll |)|realiSe of radical challgcs in per capila incmne lhal
il brings at)Olll. Recent scholarly sludi_'s h;we indicated thai the Solltll lllUsl
ttpgradt" the" productivity of its workers to achieve a posilion of economic (and
social) health and well-being <'<ttfiwdcnl lo that <)t" die r-<'s[ of the Unilcd Slaws.
Per capita incomt' is the most reliable measure available to judge such progress,
and lhis indicator has been affected greatly by NASA pvcst_nce.
6. In c_'rlain cases, NASA has been a catalyst in stimulaling other developments, par-
ticttlarly in New Orleans. In this case, lhe local economy was in a slmnp 1)tq_)rc the
advent of space activities in the area. Uniform _lgret'mertl was found among local
business leaders, Chamber ot'Commerce officials, and others that the NASA pres-
ence w_s ;t crilical inllucncc in (_nlighlening Iht" commmfiLv to new and pr()gr('s-
six'(" business opl)ortunilies.
7. The influence of NASA on educalion in the South is pertinent, above and beyond
that mentioned above. In insisting on good ¢'(lucalional t_wililics t_)r their sons
and datlghl('rs (alld for themselves thlotLgh collcge ('xt('nsi()n and gradtlal¢' l)rt)-
grams), NASA and NASA-contractor empll)yces have laid the grl)tmdwork tbr a
higher (lualily c(htcational environment ti)r all of lhc people in the communities
where they reside. The S()uth parti<tflarly needs such inllucnccs t<) enhance its
own dcvch)pmcrtt ....
1191 ll)ENTIFIABI,E NASA CONTRIB[JTI()NS
The impact on certain of the communities in which NASA operates in the South has
t)¢,(,n ('x/ensivc. In thre¢" of these areas, th(' (,conomic impact has heen dir(-(t alld stlb-
stantial; in the olher Iwo areas, local economies have been affected only slightly, but the
catalytic effect of the space program has stimulaled I)ttsincssmen and c()mmtmily leaders
to think in even br();l(lm terms ()f expansion an(t milizali()n of local res(}urces tllan they
had belbre.
Much (ff this clmngc might rcasonal)ly 1)c atlrit)uted l<) an influx of, and an enthusi-
asm for, ftmds []om tile fe(lcral government--whatever their specific sottr(e and whatcv-
t-r thtqr end use or purpose. On the other hand, il ;_pp('ared during this study tim| tht'rc
was something dislincl ab()ut the infllsion into a (ommunily of ft'(Icral funds t_)r ICS(_arch
and develot)menl, as ()t)posed to ti.'(leral funds tot other uses.
To investigaw /his hypotht'sis, tht" principal invt,sfigator m this stilt-t},, visited ca(h (ff
the NASA centers or bases o1 operations in Iht! Sotllh. This chaplt!r describes the rusnlls
of those visits and discussions, togcthcr wilh background material drawn t)om previous
studies along similar lines.
Huntsville, Alabama
In 1964, a Self'('! (;()mmiucc of tilt" [!.S. t louse of Represcnl_nivt's, 88th Congrt'ss, lWr -
ft)rmcd a sludy ('ntitlc,(l, "hnpacl (If Federal Research and D(w(qopment Programs." In this
investigation, impacls on commmlities, higher c(tucation, industry, and lilt, ecolloln)' and
th(' nation gt, nerally were examined. The sttttly r(,¢ealct'l, in part, /hat:
1. Federal rcsear(h and develol)ment programs make Iheir impact on a given area
in <)n(' ()r mort' of tin-c(" ways: Th(' t('(t¢'r;tlly ()wried <)r o])cratcd rt'st'a](h and
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develolmU,nt hlslallaiiom the research and developinenl contract . . .; and Ihe
expenditure of hasic research funds . . . in inslilulions of higher learning,.
2. Regardless of the channel, if siRniticanl numbers of Federal research and devel-
opnient activities, l)r_!jects or dollars are involw'd, the're is often a special impact
(m the locale, seemingly distinct from the spending of Federal dollars in other
types of aclivilies, which impact is especially noticeable in small cilies.
3. Asl)eCls of this impacl include, on the one hand, lhe l)hcnomenon of university
and especially of graduaw program expansion [_()] following upon the location
of a Federal lX'scarch and d¢'velolmmnt installation in a community; and, on the
other hand, in a particuhu climate, the occasional l)hen<mmnon of certain types
of resvarch and develolmlcnt related industries growing tlp around those univer-
sitivs which arc heavily endowed with Federal rcsearch and dt+velopment grants
and c()il li+a(ts.
4. ()ii(! al)partmlly c(insistelli characlerisliC (if Federal research and (levt'i<li)llienl
activily, anti eSl)l'cially any activity which involves signilicani iiIlinl)els of scit,nlisis
and ()l|lOr pr<lli,ssi(mal pt!rs<mnel, is (hal l)rilliary and secolldary school syslenis
arl: uf)gradt'(I, ()lien inark('dly. The seleel conuniilee Iound sliiking exanit)les o1
this in t lunlsvillt!+ Alat)ania, and Tullahonla, Tennesst!e, where in_ti<ir Federal
research and ttevel<ll)meill installations are localc(I; Slant_ir(I Research |lislilule
Iolin(I sinliiar evidence <if favorable ciianges in <llhcr c(inmninities.
These rt,silils <if si,!verai v(!ais ago wore substantialed hi lht" preseilt stti(ly+ For exalll-
lih ", discussi(ins with ill(,iii])ers (if |he E×eculive +laff al Marshall $1)ace Flight (:tlillt'r c<)ii-
thnl('(I each cif lilt! findings <if the selecl c<mlnlillee with regard to t lunlsville, cspccially
as I() illil)l(IVeliltinls in |he sth(io] sysielli, lhe aciive role played t)y Ihe center in Ill(" eslab-
Iistiilienl all(l c()lllintiily of the Research Instittlle, lhe t-slal)lishilienl of an iinl)rcssivc
rt,s(,aich ali(I in(hislrial park, an(t lilt, establishinenl alid I'xl)ansion of a I)rallch ()f Ihc
t [niversily (it Alat)aina al t |ilnlSVille.
,+';inc(" tiles(" fro+is ar(' ilnp()l-tant Io the presenl dist+liSSi<lti, it is atJpr(Ipriate to reilerale
lhein here+ Firs|, lhe selecl ((linmitte(! tound lhat educational t]lcililies in Hunlsville halt
})<.,i.'li inlpr(ived radicalk' (i+lilll 1950 Io 1964:
Total enr<)l'hntqit ill primary and secondary schools increased troni !/,1314 in
19_)0 to 77,537 in 1964, with a consequent burden tin local budgets. In 1956,
thmtsvilh" volers overwhelmingly approved an increase in ad "_'alormn taxes,
h.ooslin,g lhe lolal lax rate (including city, county, and _lale levies) lo $4,10 per
$100. Revenm's realixed from this additional lm, T were earmarked for scho(fl con-
sl I-IICli<lll I)r<lgr+illiS.
_ince 1955 school construction in the Huntsville area has increased at ilit_
rate elf appr<lxilnaielv olie new classrooni a week. The ntinlber of public schools
iiicrt'ased t]Olil I'{ in 1956 io 28 in 1964, represenlillg inert thall 140(l classl()oills.
Becalise of i|ic sleady growth of facilities the C(llnlllunily has not t)een t+orced Io
resorl 1o d<mhle sessions ai any lime.
Whereas in 1950 the figure for median school years completed by Huntsville
residents 25 and older was well below the national average (7.5 years as against
!t.3 years), by 1960 die Huntsville average was 0._ years abow' the then nadonal
avcl_age of '1(}.6 yt!ars. Results of lesling l)rograiils tot students in grades
121 I I ihrough 17, showed that [tuntsville students compared quite fav<irably with
lhos(" in <llher Stales using similar tests. A majority (if the scores are consistently
in lhe ul)per 7._ i)erceniile. (]oniparahle results show lip on lesls of lhe Americaii
(:ollege Testing l)rllgranl, lhe National Merh Scholarship plogram, and the col-
lege entrance examination program. Betwemi 75 and 8tl pcicent of all t hmlsvill<'
seCOlldary school _radllalt's II()W enter college.
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Some 350 spouses of Redstonc i)ersonncl or of the local dcf+.'nsc-rclatcd
industry serve as tc',|chcrs in the t hmtsvillc system. Substantial salary increases ill
recent years, coupled with an actual decrease in sludcnt-lcachcl ratios contril)utc
to the attractiveness of teaching opl)ortunitics. (If the more than 800 teachers in
the city school system, approxinlatcly one-fourth hoM nmstcr's degrees, a high
lwrccnlagc coniparcd with other Alabama cities.
Significant ilnprovcnwnls ill curricuhun COil|tilt have been ma<lc sincc lilt'
initial influx o|NASA and Missile Conmmn<l personnel. Such courscs as advanced
lfit)lo_, and calcll+ltts }laVe bccn ad<Icd to thc sc<ondary school l)r<_gratn.
The school system of Madison County (in which tlunlsvillc is situate<l) con-
sists of 30 schools with all cm+olhncnt of 12,860 studcnls, al)<)ut 1,500 of thcnl
"+t_+derally conncctc<I." Thrcc privalc acadcnlics anti two parochial schools serve
an additional 1,800 students. An cxlcnsion unit of the State vocational lc<hnical
school was rcccntly cstal>lishcd at [hmtsvillc, oflering high school sltldclltS tilt +
<_pportunity to complclc the l lth and 12th gradcs with training in ch'ctronics+
auto lllt+CIlallit+s, ;llld related technical fields. The ct]cct of Ihis new i)r<>granl has
bccn to up-grade substantially the labor f<>rcc ti>r Ihc entirc area, and many of tilt'
graduates olr+the technical school lind ready cnlploymcnt at the Rcdstonc +_,rscnal.
The lhLntsville Center of the l.!niversity of Alabama and the university's
Research Inslitutc tlcvch>pcd concurrently with lilt+ growth of the Rcdstonc coln-
plcx, largely sls a rcsttlt of con¢:crtcd comnntnity cflort. The univcl+sity center has
attracted an enrollment o| +m<)rc than 4,000 students. (If this mmlbcr, 1,515 arc
estimated by t|untsvillc's superintendent of public schools to bc dependents o1
Federal cmph)yccs at Rcdst<mc and of those of related induslrics. The (]cntcr's
drive toward expansion has bccn greatly accelerated since 1959 by the mush-
rooming demands placcd up<m it by scientific pcrsonncl in the area. Thc i,nivcr-
sity allocated $250,000, matched by similar appropviati<ms tionl both tile city anti
Madison (:ounty, fi>ra total of $750,000. In addition, tile city and county dol'mtcd
355 acres of land ti)r the campus, and tile county cotHribu/cd tile built'ling of all
ncccssary roa<ls.
The university center presently houses tile largest graduate engineering
school ill tilt+ Soulh. A fur+thor expansion of the center is ctlrrcntlv underway, and
anotiler $750,000 is being i+aiscd to thlance a new nndcrgradualc prograni, lit+st
hlslitutcd in Scpicnibcr 1964. Pr<}icctcd tigUlCS indicale that iliOl+C than 6,litl0 Mli-
denis will be eilrolled at lhc ilnivcrsily ccntcr I)v 1966 in I)olh graduate and
undcrgradllatC piograills. This cOillt)arcs with a tolal cni<)lhiiciil of 1,500 ill
dcgrce-_ranling inslilutions hi tilt- ttunlsvillc area prior it) 1t.t58.
Tile Resc+lich Institute, |oundcd hi l{)tl0, is adiaccnt tO lilt" university Ct>litcr,
and with Research Park, c<liisiitlllCS lilt" coinplcx _if icscal-<h tacilhics |)()rdcrilig
tilt" arsona]. Mally Of the institiitc's Slaff particil)aic as pl-Ot_,sS<)l-S hi the i+csidcnt
illaSlt'r'.+, dcgi+cc ])ro_ralli/lt+f_+lt'(I |)'¢ tilt" university ceillOl +,while the latter Sill)lilies
lhc institute with gradtlalt+ aild llndorgraduatc SllidCnls who wish to pariiciilatc in
particular rcsearcti projects. The institute is .%crvctt I)+%' IIIOI'C lilan 700 ttiil-lhnc
academic, researcli, and technical service i)crs<inncl.
Second, tilt" colnnlittcc discussed tile cstablishntcnt of an R&I) industry in Huntsville:
The ttunlsvillc Industrial Exi)_illsion (]Ollililitlcc, organized in tilt + early t_tl--
tit, s, had long realized tllc vast opi/ortunities which the Rcdslonc Arsenal "(Olll-
plcx, in close l)roxinlity Io tilt' hcal+l o| the city oil tilt- olie side and lai'gC, Ililii_;t'd
lracts of" land, on the other, prcscntcd, l+]fforts to attract induslrv and education-
al institutions into the I hnttsvillc al<.'a wcrp intcnsilicd in ihc ]art" 1950's alld Wt'lt,
cciitcred aroiliid the two ni+tior projects. The cxl)ansioll conilliillct! l/laycd all
ExPI ()RIN(; I'I IE [ _NKN()WN 4t17
imporl+nll roh' in raising funds For tilt" eslaldislHncnl of tht+ Rcs,t.arch lnstilute, a
l+ranch of tht" I Jnivcrsily <ffAlabanm created to provide res,t'arch in tlt<+" ,wrospace
physical scicnctrs. 1)1 +. yon Braun, shortly after being appointed Director of the
Marshall Space Flight (k,ntcr, helped by making an eloquetn apt+eal betore the
Alabania Stalc I,¢'gislalut+c fl>l + funds to cstalfli.,+h the institute', h was offici,illv
opened 3 months after Marshall Space Flight Center, on Oclobcr 1, 1960, on an
interim basis with pcrs<mncl loaned by nlain campus departnlents. A State bond
isstic provided $3 million for buildings and e(luipnR'nt, mid an additional
$ I00,000 was plcdgc<l by th<,' city <+f Iluntsvillc ;111(I Madison (]otlnl).
A concttrr+mH d,t.velopmt.nt was the creation of In(htstrial Rt-st'mch Park by a
nonprofit group known as Res¢'arch Sites Foundation, Inc., a land holding arm of
lhe industrial <'x|)ansion committee. This organizalion leases ;rod sells properties
_m a 2,000-;wre Ir;wt a(!jacctn to fl+e arsenal to private fhms mid research groups
;it attracliv+.' rates; il is l>letlged to donat,0 profits fr<nn these tr;insaclions to the
R<'s_'arch hintiluw....
1361 Bl'caiis_' o| thl! (It'niand Ibr additional courscs of hlslructi<)n, fIR' University of
l|OilSlOn now It!;ichl's 1_ grltdil;ll¢! cOiilS(ls ;il M_(] [Mall|it'd Si)a(.+l ' (]l'iill'r], inchldhig
lnana_t'nit!iil and political s(:i_illc', as well as t,nginet;rilig, nialheniatics, and physics. "Flit,
i_nivcrshv is now csial)lishing ii llt'W ,_litdll;tle school <)II it silt" adjliccnl lo MS(| on land
donalt'd by Ihl' I hinillll! ()il ( ]Oliip;+iny. Accordhig to rt,pr_,s(!nlalb,,t.s of Iht" ctqllC'l, Ibis now
facility rt_,pr¢,selllS ;ill invt,sllnt,nl ()[ iliorc lhan $3 niillion al lht" oulsel, and is t+x|)t_¢li'd Io
s,(wv/P it (:oininunity of 80,000 people t!ventuall 7 in ihc Nass;iil-(;lcar l+akc ait'a.
()ihc'r ¢'xmiiplcs t'xisl sucll an lilt" csiat)lishnient o| +lhe lAinm + _cicncc ]nslilute under
.j<_ini sl)<lllSorshi ]) of Rice, NASA, and Iht" Naliona] Scienct" FoundaliOli. All ol ihesc ele-
lilt,illS, +iit_, r(.prt,si.lil;lliV(, o| Ihe plllll'l-n t()ilnd hi Hunlsville. Ahhough it In_iy 11oi 1)(" p<)s-
sil)lc to crc'dil NASA with I]1_ cmlire si,iies <it dcvt_hipnlt!nts (in fact, il would t)t, hlcorl_,,cl
io do s<l), iht" in|hil'ii<i' of Iht' t'slablishinenl of ihc cenlel at ] Iouston g<R's lnlW|l I)¢,yond
lilt're IIIInibl'rs o1 people _llid ;I go'¢t'lnlnenl payroll,.iust ;is it dot's i']sl'wherc.
Fillaliy, inil)aCln Oil I [oUMOli and lht" (]ll'ar ],akl! AI(';I ;tl+e Sillnnlarizt'd iit ]'alih" 7.
Table ?
Summary of Impacts on Houston-Clear Lake Area
1)ir_'ct Econoniic hnpacls*
Populati()n
_(-h<)ol cnr<llhiienl
School b<inds (in nlillions)
B;ink deposits (in iilillions)
Rosidenli;il construction+
1960 1966
6,500 ,+3,ooo
1,900 6,700
$2.4 $ 7.4
$4.8 $30.9
-- 1,26O
( )th_'r hnp;icl+
Expmlsion of higher education facilities in general
Fshtl)lishlnlml <l|'cr<lss-(lisciplinary lnalcria|s so|tract" laboralory at Rice Uni',rt'rsily
Est,ililishnlent of [!niversiiy o|I louston (iraduate School
l_{sl;iblisllnit!nt o1+ I +unar _cii'ncc Inslilule
l)rain,tiic changl' ill charactt'r o1! Iouslon, exprt'ssl_d iii pride in |)¢'ing ;i St)act! (]t!nlcr
(;rt!al i,Xpalisi<)n in nilinl)t!r <if [h-ins lot;|ling in alt'a, primarily io servl" HA+A, tlul
cxl);anding to oth_'r niarkeis ;ts w<'ll
* As given in Rl'|t'i¢lllq' 7.
N<'I_ Silll t' 1961.
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Document title: "Economic Impact of Stimulated Technological Activity," Final Report,
Midwest Research Institute, Contract NASW-2030, October 15, 1971, pp. 1-11.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Tkis analysis was the first truly comprehensive national emmate o| the retun+_ /Pyre NA.S?i R_.CD
expenditures. It used a methodolo_ developed tO' Robert Solow based o_ an aggregate !rational pro-
duction fitnction to estimate overall returns from R&l) and then the subset o[NASA R&I) imparts.
The results o/a _even-to-one _Hurn on NASA expenditures and a projected _3-percent disgruntled rote
of return from 1958 through 1987 were used jm mmly years in press reh,ase_ and pubfic _tatement_
about the be_wficial q[]_'ets o/NA&4 R&I). TheJollowing is/'art I Of what wa_ a three-part report.
Economic Impact of Stimulated Technological Activity
[1] ECONOMICCONSEQUENCESOF STIMLTI_kTEDTECIINOI+O(;ICALA(:I'IVITY
"The nation's technological Cal)acity, which is conceptually analogous to t|lc" cal)acity
of its l)hysical planl, is unquestionat)ly a nation's most important economic resource. By
the same token, Ihe rate at which its technological capacity grows sets what is prol)al)ly tht'
me)st imporlant ceiling on its h)ng-le'rm raw of economic growth.
The rate of growth of a nation's Icchn(,h_gical capacity depends jointly up(>n lhe raw
a! which il pt+odu(es new le(:hnolog_' and llw fair! at which it diss<qninal<'s the old."
.Jacob Schmooklcr
Invention and Ecouomie (;nm,th
1966
()VERVIEW
The ([cgrce I<) which a nation can safisl)' ils c(flle(tivc and individual wants is depen-
dent tq)on the wcallh of tht" nalion and its citizens. The a(cumtflation of <:conomic where-
withal is obtained throtlgh comt)inations otlat)or, capital, and tcclmolog_'. All three inputs
arc essenlial but it is thr(mgh technological progress thai the prodtlclivity of labor and
capital arc increased t¢) ol)tain more otLtptlt l)<'l" unit of input and, COllsequently, greater
per Cal)ita wcahh. Th<_' United States leads the worM in the gcneralion and application ot
t<_,chtlolo,k,y. Our t('chzlologi(al progress post's certain dilemmas, but is also the source of
mtwh ot +the economic power we arc britlging to l)car <m so¢ictal deficicncics--dclhicn-
<it's !hal initn'+ [t'ss wealthy nations canllOl all+<)l-d to c¢)nsider, nluch ]<,ms tllC)lllll assaults
HI)oil.
Thin vohmw highlights flw findings of a research inquiry into the relationships
betwct'n technological [)rogrcss and cc<momic dcvelol)ment, with emphasis on the sever-
al ways in which NASA research attd development has aided in the acctmuilation and com-
mcr¢ial application of nt'++ ¢)r impr(>ved scientitic and tcchnoh)gical knowledge.
[2] Scope of Rest+arch
The research tmd¢'rtaken had three separalc, but rclated parts: Part I was an cxami-
tmlion of the importance of technological |)r<)gress in the generation t)t national eco-
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nomic growth. The lbcus was on a.t.¢t(reL,¥ttecononfic c|tk_c|s of u_clmological progressI
with technoh_gical progress being viewed ahshacl('_, as one of the principal growth-induc-
ing tbrces operating in the economic miliett. Parl I was concerned with el/eels: the
econ_nnic effi'ct of lethnoh)gical progress, the effect which R&D has on technological
progress, and Ihe effi'ct of NASA on the nation's R&I) spending. Specifically, this portion
of the study was hased on an econometric examination of the U.S. econon_v during lhe
last 20 years to identit_' and nleasurc the portion of growth which can he attribuled to
technological progress. Part 1 also examined Ihe relati<mship between R&D and techno-
I<_gical progress and, finally, made some tentative estimates <ff the relative eflk'cliveness of
NASA R&I) expenditures in generating economic growth via technoh)gical l)rogrcss.
Part 11 was a case study of the process whereby technology, is developed and coilnner-
cially applied. It was dcsigncd to undergird--/F example--the findings of Ihe etononmtric
study. It was also intended to illustrate the extreme complexity of the application
process--in particular, thai any large technological un<lcriaking produces both <lirect and
indirect commercial applications, that these come in a wide variety of [orms and types,
that counlless indivi<htal increnmnts of technological progrt'ss are torah|ned in any al)l)li-
(atil)n, thai there are inally participanls in lhe [)rotess--n() ()ne o[w]lOlll Call (latin sole
credil--and finally io cxanline the several roles thal a Inission-orienled research and
di'vt'iol)inl,nl agency Silcli as NASA plays in l|ie applicalion process.
The specilic case sttitly iillderlakt21i was of the R&D progralliS and applicalion cndcav-
ors which |lave cuhnhlall!(t ill comlllercial co|till|finical|on via salellite.
Parl lit of lile rep_lrl was an illustration of ways in which a NASA Ilnderiaking has con-
irilnllt'lt Io the nalion's scienli|ic and technical knowledge reservoir--th(! reservoir which
is drawl| iipoii alld extended hy aiiv move loward application. The iiill!lil was Io deilion-
sirale Ihai a large hody of kliowledge is acctimulated in the process of salis|ying inission-
orienll!d prograni requheinenis and thai this knowledge is retained |_)i rise hy others for
tither pllrpl)ses. The researcil procedure was again a case study. In tilis instance tilt" t_)ctis
was lin what we had to ]earl| Ill ket'p illall alive an(] protlucti@ in space--with elilpilasis
Oil lilose things which have reievalice in one |orin i)r anolher ltl carlhlv prllbieiliS.
I:_1Thus, in three sl'paiate I)iil inlerlocked studies, [Midwest Research hislitute] altvinpl-
i.d to louth upon Inaior eleinenls ill the prllgrression [i'tinl science Ihrough technolt)_,_' Io
viable application in the economic realm: Part I nleasures the economic vftYci (l| techno-
logical progress. Part 1I illuslrales Itle process whereby technology is developed and coin-
nlerciall 7 applied (covering the invention/innovaLion portion of tile spectrum). Part I11
shows lilai an inherenl aspect of mission-oriented RSd) is tile generation o| ilew or
ilnproved knowledge--in lnany fields: basic phenomena, applied science, engine/.ring,
design, Inaterials, processing, etc, And, lhat this knowledge is added io the nation's knowl-
edge bank fin withdrawal when demand and the state of industrial practice ew)lve io the
point wht!re lhe iechno[ol, 5, will be applied.
141 PART I
()VEtL_UJ. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TE(,HNOLO(;I(;AI,
PRO(;RESS_ITS MEASUREMENT
iX. BA(:K(;R()IrNI)
The central questions toward which this phase of the report was addressed are:
[. }4(hal is the role of technological progress ill national econolnic growth?
7. !!_rii_il [_t(l()i-s delerlliiile lhe Iate o1 ecoilolliic gl-(iwlh (hit' It) le(hnolllgical
[)t'CI£_i'('SS7
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3. Can ttle relationships between technological progress, its determinants, and sub-
sequent economic growth be measured---quantitatively?
4. And, how do the research and development activities of the space program tie
into the preceding questions?
BefiJre World War II, there was little need to ask such questions at the national level.
Most development was performed hy the individual inventor or by industrial lahoralories
supported by company thnds. Choices as to whether or not to allocate resources to devel-
opment and how to distribute resources among projects were made within individual com-
panies. Most of the nation's research effort was pertormed at universities as an adjunct to
graduate education. National priorities had little direct influence on the allocation m'
resources to R&D, and the scale of R&D was small enough that the formulation of precise
relationships between R&D and the economy lacked urgency.
R&D grew dramatically following World War II under the stimulus of the Cold War and
tlae race to comhine atonfic weapons with rocketry. Massive mission-oriented R&D pro-
glams were mounted, using as their model the Manhattan Project of%brld War If. All facets
of research--basic and applied--as well as development and sophisticated production plus
scientific and engineering education underwent huge federally funded expansions. A
strong scientific and technological capability became an essential instrmnent tot national
survival---_|ecisions to allocate resources to R&D were made on the basis of necessity.
[5] By' the late 1950's, when the nation's first large-scale civilian mission-oriented R&D
agency--NASA--was created, the economic effects of such undertakings were receiving
explicit, ff imprecise, recognition. At ah<mt the same time, the sh(nt-term and regiomd
economic impacts of expanded R&D began to receive widespread recognition.
Community after community strove to become another Route 128, or San Francisco Bay
Area, or Huntsville. The immediate benetits of a local R&D complex were clear. Less clear
were the processes whereby R&D led to new or improved processes, producLs, and ser-
vices. But more important to the purposes of the present portion of this report, the theo-
ry, methodologies and empirical data needed to measure quantitatively the cumulative
effiwt over time of the product and process advances were notably deficient.
During the 1960's a number of theorists and researchers undertook to improve our
ability to measure the economic impact of technological advances, tot it had become clear
that technology was a large and powerful fince in the accumulation of national weahh.
Pioneering work by Solow, Kendrick, and Den|son was amplified and extended I)y a num-
hel-ofolhers. Much progress has been made, I)ut the tac_ remains lllal we gol to the lnoon
in a decade, t)tlt are, as yet, unable to fully measure the present and [nttlre economic
impact of the science and technolob, Q, acctlnltllated on tile way to the lnOOll (or Ill(" aggre-
gate effect of technological progress in general). Our present capability 1o measure the
relationship hctween technological progress and R&D is even less precise.
$}.*t, national decisions widl respect to the allocation of resources to and within R&D
are hcing and will I)e made. These decisions canno[ t)e postponed t|nli] precise measure-
menls <)| their effects are possible. Thus, the intent <)t this part ot +the slttdy +,++'as tO t)l'O -
vide--from within the existing stale of lhe art--some measurements of technolob,,3?s
conlrilmtion Io this nation's wealth during recent ),cars and the role of R&I) in gt'nelal-
ing growth through technological progress.
B. RESEAR(2ti APPROACt]
The investigations were pertormed at the national economic level. We were exploring
the aggregate effects of technological progress rather than those stemming ti-om the indi-
vidual inventions or innowttions. Inadequacies in all existing macro-economic yardslicks
tbr('ed the sm(ly to tocus on the "cos! savings" eft(.cls, i.e., increases in Ou' prodtzctivity of
labor and capital achieved through technological progress. The many impr<wements in
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the quality of goods and sc'rvices due to research and development are not adequately
reflected in existing aggregate economic series and cannot be direclly measured.
I6] Given these rcstricti()ns on the scope of the study, six research tasks were performed:
Fhsl, we adopted a deiinition of technological progress that is consistent with how
pr<)gress occurs and how it is generally pcrceived to occur. The definition presumes that
all incrcases in OtLtpu! not aurihutahlc to added quantities of labor and capital are due to
technological progress; i.e., all quality improvements in lahor and capital are traceable to
lechnological progress.
Second, within lhe framework of Ihe definition of technological progress and neo-
classical economic growth theory, a suitable macr<_'conomic l)ro<hwtion function was
structured.
The adopled production funclion states that technological progress acts in a multi-
plicalive rather than an additive fashion in augmenting labor and capital in Ihe oulpttt-
generating process. The general fi)rm o| the production time!ion employed is:
Q_ = Af (I¢_,I,t)
where:
(_)= (),,tputin lime period t
K, = (:apiml utilized in lime l)eriod t
11 = l+al:)or expended in time period t
A, : l,evel of technology applied in lime period t.
Third, the te(+hn<)h)_,g' index _ implicit in the production function was used to assess
qttantitatively the impact of applied technoh)gy on economic growth and outpul.
F<)urth, having determined the level of technology and resulting otttptLt, we related
techn()h)gical progress generating activities such as research and development, econ()mi('s
<)Fscale, educ:alion, tic., in a malhematical model. Here, the determinants t)| techulologi-
cal pr()gress were linked to the effect of their stimulus in terms of incremental economic
OUtl)UL
17t With respect to growth in oulpul in the private, non-|,u+m sector of the economy trace-
able to R&I)--which was denoted (;(R&D)--we hypothesized the tollowing relationship:
G(R&D)t = f(Rt)
where:
R I = The weighted sum of past R&D expenditures for year.
Mathematically, the weights are expressed:
R t : w0rl_0 + wlru_ 1 + w2rt_2 +, . . + wirt_i +... wl_rt.18
where:
w i = Weigh! tor Ihe ith year lag, and
lt_ i = R&D expenditures in the year t-i.
I. Tht' in(h'x, A,, r('l)t('+.cnls lh(" 1('< hnology being al)[)li<'(l in the l+)Iodut lion p),)< ('ss lhrot,,ch lim('. II
is arriv<.d at lhll)llgh analysis ()factual Olllplll ilnd output possil)h" with lab<)l and ( ;q)ilal qualily--i,t'., cml)odi(+d
it'( hn<)h)gy--lixt'd at a has(' 'vt'ar.
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Thus, R t is a relict!ion <)f the current year's R&D activity plus the cf|_a('tivc vahtc ot each
of the past 18 years of R&D expenditures. (:oncel)tually, R l can I)c considered the ctf,t.c-
tire invesmwnt in R&D '+at work" in year t. The 18-ye'ar payout period and the payout pat-
tern within the period were derived from several comprehensive and respected stuvc',s ol
industry's pay-back expectations lot R&D spcnding and new product lifi'timcs.
Fifth, through the use of statistical analysis, we empirically delermivlcd quantitativc
rclati<)nships existing t)etwcen growth (h!,v t<) Icchnoh)gical l)r<)gress and determinants <)f
lcclmological pr<)grcss.
Finally, within the ptcceding analytical fi+ante_v<)rk, we examined the cc()nomic iml)a<!
associated with the tcchn()h)gical stinltdtts provided bv the spac(' program.
(:. FINDINGS AND CON(:LUSIONS
As have others before us, wc f<)ttnd tt,chtlol<)gical l)r()gr('ss has bccn a l)()we!Tul force
in cC<)ll()mic growth. Our study (onsidcrcd:
• That tcchtl()h)gy is one (11 thc Iacl()!s (if prodttcti<)n--al()ng with lal)()! ai_d (al)i-
tal--with whic]l tilt" <)tltl)tlt rt-q(lirclncllts t)l tlw flail(Ill aft" satisfic(l;
• That what wc t('I'lll tcchn()logical ])t()g!+t'ss is rCSl)onsibh' fin i]nl)r()v<.,tt+cnts it+)the
quality o! +l)rOductivity of labor and capital;
[8] • That tc¢hilological pr()grcss tcstths li()m the intr<)duction (if new or l)revi()ttsly
tll)tlSt'd kn<)wledgt" it)u) the pr()ducti()t) process;
• Tllat there arc ')tlatty mcchanistns I)y which kn(lwlcdgc is l)r()ducti',+'(+l),' apl)licd,
i')')cltMing: hnprov(_'d w()rkcr skills, iml)rovcd machil)(" dcsign, iml)r()vcd iil_tlla_t'-
flit'lit techniques, and s<) OIL
Measuring thc eflk'ct of technoh)gical pr<)gress--so deli')tcd--(Itu-ing the" 1949
through I(.)68 time ].)criod, wc li)tmd that:
• "l'lle technoh)g 9' added to the nat#m's pr, uh+ctio)_ recipe a/in 1949 acc+m)_ted]or 40 perce.t
_!/ the P_'al it!crease in private, _onJ?trm output during_ the period.
• Cumulatively, total output ]br the period wag about $8.2 trillion. ![ there had bee. no
ira')vase i. /he b'vel _?] technoh)g_, u_ed a/h'r 1949, the stock _!] labor attd capital applied
would have o.ly yielded a cumulative output _?[$6. 9 tHgio.. 7"hu_, the l_._lera,geo)t the other
lTt'o fit(lot?; (!] p_vduction I_' lech.olo,_fical p)'og,_-e.sspermitted almost 20 perce.t mow olll[.Jul
tha. ))fig'ht othe)+wi_e have bee, achieved with the same qua.ri O, o/htbor a,d capital.
• 77mm,t.4!out the period the tech.oh)©' ]hitot in the pmdt.lion./uncli.n inc_v'awd at a c.m-
pol+.d tale O[I. 7 penent per yem: By Ih+"e)ut ff/ the pe)iod--i)+ 1968_the co.@ou.di)_
,ffrou,th o]technob_&,3 _had reached a poi.t at whic)l tech.olot._ical impnn,eme)tt_ bev..d 1949
h'vels we)v accou.tin_]br 37 percent O] o'utput (Fig,_tre 1).
Allh()uglt it is llossil)Ic to dissCl)l on c('rtai!) grotnt(|s al)ottt thc exact ,un()t!!)t ()[ pro-
ductivity gains (h)c to tc(lln()h)g_,.,, thc t')t;_jor (<)nchtsiolt is clear. With()ut l]te in(+rcasc ()I
l<.,ch')')oh)hQ, and its i')it!-o(h!cti<)!) into t]')(." l)rodtt¢ti()tl !ccip(', this nati()n w()uld I)(" sub-
stantial]y less wealthy than it is. Milch ()[ the c(()nomi( + wh(,rcwitha] wc arc now at!oral)l-
ing It) a])[)]'+ toward lhc st)lull(ill (if prcssii')g (h)iltcsti( l)r<)bh't')Is is tlt(" [)i<)(|ttcl (if applied
tcchn<)h)gical l)I()gt+css. T() CXl)and It')is c(()t!<)mi¢ capacity li)r l)i+()l)h'm rcs()h!li()n, Ibis
Ilati()H lllILSI COlttilttl{" tO allocate icS()ltl'CCS to cnti'l+l)l-iscs which _(q](.'lal(" tec]m<)logi(,tl
l)!()grcss and cn(-()t!ragc its l)!-()(htclivc utilization.
This l)rings tlS to the sccot)d set of li!tdings--th()sc rclatcdt<, tlt(' s<)')u+ct's or dctcr!tfi-
nants of tcchnol<)gica] ])rt)grcss. The lhc()rctical and Cml)irical Ibtul(lati()n )or these
ass<,,sSmClllS is less definitive than fl)!+ the IJl+CC+.'dillg l]')l(]iltgS, ] [<)WcVcI, thcl'C is _,('llCl'a]
agrcclnCnl on a lisl of ti)')(:cs itnl)C)!lant in It')c gcncrati()n of t+_,clm<)h)gital t)t+<)grcss. Th('
li)!+c('s arc highly i!')lcractivc but, fi)r al)alvti(+d I+Cas()ns, wc!-c treated ind('l)CtMCt)tl:+. ()u!
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findings indicated that nlost of these t0rces were of insignificant effect during the rela-
tively short time period under study.
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[ 10] t Iowever, three factors_the sex mix of the workforce, education, and R&D--were
found to be important determinants of economic gains through technological progress
during the Post-World War II period. The first, sex mix, is the product of increasing par-
ticipation by females in the workforce and increasing productivity by distaff employees.
Improvements in this factor during the period accounted for 4 percent of the total gains
due to technolo_,9', hnproved worker productivity through higher educational levels con-
tributed approximately 36 percent. The balance of the technology-induced gain--60 per-
cent--was attributed to R&D after having ascertained that other possible determinants
had no measurable or identifiable impact.
The relationship between R&D- and technology-induced economic gains was
explored on a distributed-lag basis. Lag distributions between R&D expenditures and ini-
tial pay-back and final pay-out in the form of national economic gains were constructed
from industry estimates and experience, but when subjected to statistical tests the rela-
tionships exhit)ited reasonably good explanatory power. The findings were that:
On the average--each dollar spent on R&D returns slightly over seven dollars in technoh>t,_ical-
ly induced economic ¢ains over an 182_,ear period following the expenditure.
This finding leads to the strong conclusion that, on the average (including good, bad,
and indifferent pr<_jects), R&D expenditures have been an excellent national investment.
The final set of fin<lings relates to the economic impact--via technological progress--
<)f NASA's R&D programs. Assuming that NASA's R&D expendilHres had the snme pay-_fff
as the average, we tonnd that:
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7'he $25 billion, in 1958 dollars, spent on civilian spa(_ R&D during the 1959-1969 period
has rHurned $52 billion throufh 1970 and will eonli, ue to produce pay-qff through 1987, at which
time the total pay-qff will have been $181 bi#ion (7hbh" 1). The discm+.ted rote o[return /or thi.s
i,ve_t-nu, nt will have been 33 percent.
As noted, the preceding lin(ling was t)ascd on the assumption that NASA R&I) Sl)en(l-
ing has an avertage t)ay-off etlecl; there is slt'()tlg l)reliminary evidence thai lhe exa(ting
d('llli|lldS (l[" [lie spit('(' ptogl'_llll lllily I)l-()(hlc( , gl-(,;tlci- l]liltl ilvut-ilg(, u(()ll(>llli( ('f|_.!(ls (hit,
to itwrcased techxmh)gical leverage. This comes about ])ecmtsc NASA all<wales its R&D
dollar to the more teclmologicillly intensive segments of the industrial scctor of the econ-
omy. The weighted average technological index (AI) of Ihe industries which t)et-Ibrm
research [or NASA is 2.1, while thc muhiplicr tot all manul,tcturitlg is 1.4. Although there
lift" it lllllllb('l" ()J" (on(<'l)ltual and pl'()(+('(tlll'it] [illlilali()ns lo In(' ('()ll'-;ll-II('[i()tl <11 ill(]llMl'V-
level le(hnological tnultilJlicrs , the sprcad seems hlrgc ctlough to supp<,-t th(' view lll_ll
highly lcclmological tmdt'rtakings, such as Ih¢' space l)rogram, do t'Xt'l'l dislm>l)O,-tion,tte
wtqght Ioward incteascd n;lti<ma[ produclivity.
[111 Table 1
G(R&D) Generation Pattern Resulting From NASA R&D
\n,mal
NkS\
R&'I)
\,ln,lM \r,r,t,al
1959 1961_ 1961 1!162 IUfi3 I!11;I 196-, 191_1_ 1967 196_ 1969 (; (;
12_ ?;31 (il12 1,261 2, t t(i 3.315 3,_)_2 I,_3 3,11t 3,116 2rl_
(; JR&I)) ( ;l'tlvl;Ht'd
19.59 1
19611 1i 2
1961 21 16 t
191i2 1,_ 37 2N b_
I¶1113 N| 132 97 58 lli
IUI;I I IN 231 227 2111 113 _2
1911_3 138 ?.24 397 17++ 3t15 153 _(;
191;(; 13_ ?,7_ 556 _32 !122 536 INI 28
]!IG7 120 37N G-19 1,165 ],lilt 1,25!) l_tt 19_ 22
I !t(_N !l: _, _?;] 1i41t 1,359 Y,259 Y,187 I ,St)l 6!t2 15N 21
1969 Gt 251; 567 1,3-,9 2,(136 3.572 2,627 1,615 5"-,2 I tl 17 12.X9_ 35,167
1970 +tO 177 139 I,IX7 2,1i:',ti 3,572 3,678 2,g26 1.2N7 ?+lit 116 16, t62 rJ I ,t;29
1!171 22 1119 3t17, 919 2.303 3.572 t,291 '3.! V_t i 2,25:1 1,175 I<17 19.31 l 70,939
1972 I I 61 t88 I;31 1,782 3,t22 ,t,291 1.615 3,152'; 2.1156 %1!I 2I}.NI; l ¶11.8113
1973 5 31 11t5 ?,93 1,231 2,115 3,7511 -t.lil ". 3,679 2,87b, 1,661 211,761 I 12,51il;
197-I 2 14 53 219 763 I ,l:_t iN 2,9111 t,033 3,67!t 3.358 2,326 I9.111 t; I 3 t .582
1975 I 5 2t I IO ,t2(i 1,03,1 2,1NI3 3,121 3,2t5 3.358 2.717, 16,111tl 117,592
1976 2 9 511 21t 577 12-t2 2,155 2. t87 2.934 2,713 12.38 _, 159.975
1977 I 3 21) 96 291) 11!t3 1,336 1.718 2.270 2,371 8,797 168,773
1978 1 7 38 1311 348 7.t5 1,111i5 1,5ti8 1,835 5,737 17 t.51_t
1979 2 13 52 156 374 3!14 972 1,267 3, t311 ] 77,910
19811 | IN 62 l(;N 298 512 785 1.878 17!t,818
1981 I 5 21 67 17,4 272 .I?,_ 93!t 180.757
1!182 l 6 23 53 122 2211 |21; 18,1,183
1!t83 I 7 I N ,19 99 171 t X 1,358
1981 I 5 17 39 1;3 181,119
19N5 I 5 14 It+ INI,t3S
I!INIi I "I 5 IX1,443
19N 7 1 I I X 1,444
ItttAI. 91t 2,:-,IN; 4.298 9.1H12 17,462 23,1;65 2&t27 30.576 2t,2;7_ 22,247> 17,':1711 181,.t+I
Document 111-4
Document title: Michael K. Evans, "The Economic Impact of NASA R&D Spending,"
Executive Summary, Chase Econometric Associates, Inc., Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania,
Contract NASW-2741, April 1976, pp. i-iii, 1-18.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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This _tudy showed an ors'all w'i_e,-to-one return to NASA expenditures usin_ a macroeronomic pn_-
duetion [U,ctim_ approach. It di[[i,rs [rom the 1971 Midwest Research Institute stud_' (Document
111-31 in many technical was's, the most importa,! of which was that it assumed that ;sC,4.5;AR&D
was di[]erent +[nJmoverall I¢C2¢11.This sturl+iwas the last in a se_4e_ o]ma]or e[_rrts in the mid-1970s
to ju_t([} NAS;4 expenditures on the hasis t?]their economic impacts. Durinlz the post-Apollo period _?[
the mid-1970s, NASA R&D budl,ets were less than one-hall oJ those (?[the peak _,eaP:sof 1965-66;
NASA e_vnomie anal_'.ses were de_i.q_+,edto huttre_s ar_ments ]br increa.sed _pace +fmd_ets.
The Economic Impact of NASA R&D Spending
Ahstract
In this study Chase Econometrics, Inc., has undertaken an ewduation of the econom-
ic roll>aCt of NASA R&I) programs. The crux of the nwthodolog_, and hence the results
r('vok:(' m,nmd the" int('rrehlti<mshil>s existing between tile denland and St,l>ply ef'li'cus ()f
in<r('+ise(l R&I) sl)eti(lin _, it+ l>arlictdar, NASA R&D spending. The demand effi'(ts ;ire pri-
marily sh<wl-run in ilalure and have c<msequences similar Io thai of <)th<'r types .f g<)v-
+.'rillllt'tll spending. The st,pply eili:'cls, which reDrese+ll Ill<.+resulls of a higher rate of
technological growlh n|miiti'sted through a larger total pr<_ductivc capacity, are Iong-rt,i
in nature and have c<msequences very dissimilar to that of general types of g<)vernnlent
Sl>cnding.
The study is divided into two principal parts. In the firsl part, the INFORUM Intet-
Industry Fort'casting Model is used t<>measure the short-rim economic trot>act of alterna-
tive h'vels ¢>I NASA eXl>endittm.s fi>r 1975. The principal results of this part of the study arc
lhat a shill t<_war(l higher NASA sl)en(ling within tilt+ fi+antew(>rk ol+a constant level of total
Fe(lerM (,xl)(.ndilt,res would increase output and employment and w<)t]l(l l)rol)al)ly re(hi(e
lhc in[latiomtry ])ressures existing in the economy. Hence, (]hase concludes that NASA
spending is mor<.' stabilizing in a recovery p<.'riod than general government spending.
In the second part of llle sludy, an aggregate pr<lduction function approach is ttsed to
dcveh> I> the data series n<.'ccssary to tnc+lSllle tile impact of NASA R&D spending, and
other d<.'t<.+Nninatlls of technohNical progress, on the rate of growth in productivity of the
tLS. c¢<momy. The principal finding of this part of the study is that the historical rate <if
relin-n l}oln NASA R&I) spending is ,13 t)ercent.
l iil In the final iimt of lhe sludy, the incasiired relationship i)t'iween NASA R_I) spend-
ing and technological progress is siniulated in the Chase Macroeconometric Model io
ilieiiSllle Ihe ininiediai<.,, interniediale, and long-run +cononiic impact <l| increased N,&SA
R&I) Sl)<.'n<.ling over a snslained lieriod. Tile principal tindings of this part of the study art"
thai a sustained increase in NASA spending of $1 billion (1958 dollars) for tile 1975-i984
period w<mh[ haw' lhe thllowing effects:
I) (:onstant-d<>llar GNP would be $23 billion higher by 1984, a 2% increase over Ill<.'
"haseline," or no-additional-expenditure projections.
2) The talc of increas<., in the Consumer Price Index would I)e reduced to the extent thai
by 198't it would be a filll 2% lower than indicated in the baseline projection.
3) The tlneln]il<iylnellt rate would I)e rednced by 0.4% by 1984, and tilt" size of tilt' 1at)or
li_rce would t>e increascd through greater job opportunities so thai Ihe lolal nunlll<..r oi+
)dis would increase by an addilhmal 0.8 inillion.
,t) By 19b+,l fJr<Muclivity in the private n<ln-faFlil sector would he 7.0% higher lll_tii indi-
caled in lhe tlaselinc! proj<._cti<m.
()lher silnnhilions, <11$1()<) to $500 nlillion increases, ,show l>roportional results.
41(_ SPACE AS AN INVESTMEN'I IN EC()N()MI(: (;R()WIll
The large beneficial econonlic ettbcts ()f NASA R&I) progranls, particularly the
unique conlbination of increased real (;Ni' and a h)wer intlation rate, stem fr()m the
growth in general productivity resulting fvonl NASA programs. Growth in productivity
means that less labo, (and/or capital) is needed per unit <if output. This results in lower
unit lab<)r costs and hence lower prices. A tilt] slower rate of intlation leads in ltlt'n t() a
more rapid rise in real disp<)sable income, which provides consumers with the additional
l)urchasing power t() buy tile additional goods and services made possible by lhe expan-
si<)tl <If lilt" cc()n()niv's [)rodttction possibility fi(mtier. Finally, tilt' increase in real c()n-
SUIIIeF t'xpetlditurt" leads to i:lll increase in dt'lll_ln(| [C)l" the st.rvi<cs (if labor.
[ 1] Introduction
(Jlase t,_t()noinctri< Associates, Ill(. has tlxlderlakell ,an evalualh)n <if tilt" e<'Oll()llti<"
impact (If NASA R&D spending (m the U.S. econ()my. This study rcp()rts (in I)()lh lilt'
sh<)rl-run and hmg-run effects of changing levels <if spending. B(>lh tilt" Chasc
F+<'onoinelrics niaclO m<>del and input-ottllml ntode] are used to calculate tilt' impact of
diftk'renl spending levcls on the overall UtTonollly itlld Oil specific industries in thc sh()vt-
l'ttll part ot +the sllldy. The long-run part of the study inchtdes an estimate of tilt + r(+lalioll -
ship between NASA R&D spending and the rate of tcchn<)h+gi<al gl+owlh. This
relationship is ust'd It) <teterminc how much higher spending levels would raise aggregate
supply and increase tilt: total pr()ductive cal)at:ily of the econ(>my. The demand et]k'cts
stemming t]otn an increase in spending are tel sul)stantially <til]erent fi'onl traditi(mal
nntltiplier analysis aind are [)rimarily short-run in nature. Tht' supp]v elli+cts thl not begin
to have a significant cflk'cl on aggregate economic activity until five years later+ bt,t tilt' tLlti-
Inalc effects are much lmgct +and very dil'ti'rent than the effects of ln<)sl telIllS (>f g<)vettl-
,tent spending.
Short-Rttn hnpacts of NASA R&D Spending
l)escription of Apptoach
The first part of tilt" study deals with tilt' shorl-lernl ec_m<mlit impact of NASA expcn-
ditures and attempts to answer tilt' question of whether a higher level of NASA expendi-
ttues is more benet]cial to the [!.S. ecollonly lhan a lower level during tilt' v<'al +thai Ill<"
expenditures are made, holding tilt + level el + total [2] Federal spending constant. This
analysis is usefitl in cxatnining tilt" ett;ects of altering tilt' level of NASA expenditures as
part of an overall eCOllontic stabilization policy.
The economic Hilt)aCt WaS calcttlated ])y preparing two tbtecasts <if the U.S. ec<mo,ny
t<_t+ 197._ using alternative levels of NASA expenditttrcs, which we term NASAHI and
NASAl+(). The NASAl+() ti)ret;.tst assumed all expenditure by NASA of $1.35 billion in
1971 dollars tot goods and services (excluding NASA employce wages) during calendar
1¢.)75. The NASAt[I fonccast assumed an cxpcndittnc of $2.35 billion by NASA with other
Federal governmcnl spcnding reduced by $1 billion, hence leaving the total Icvel ot gov-
Cl+tinient spendin,g unchanged. Betattse of tills, the aggrc,gatt: t:cononiic Jinl)acl shownl for
this sllit+i is quhe stnall.
hi <)id<T Io IliCasui'c lhe diHi+rcniial indtlstry elli'ci of lilt > NASAtll and NASAI+O
expenditure levels, we utilized the INP()RUM lnter-lndustiw Fort+casiiiig Model. This
inodel, which was devcloped I)y Ihe |nlerindustry Forecasting Piqiect of Ihe {!niv<'rsilv <)|
Mal+ylatld, has bci'n t'Xl)anded ;llld modified by (]hatse F+(OllOllli-ll-iCs add h;ts ])Celt linked
to tilt' (]hase l_]C<)liOtll<'tlits _'l_t<'l'l:it't'l<illt;'lllit" P<)recastin,g Model to provide cotisistt'ill <,<ll-
ttt>niic i¢)lec'dsts till +the indtLsll+ies inchidt'd in the lnodel. TlllOtlg]l tlSUof this lll<)d<q, it is pos-
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sibh' to tor('(ast ttl(' impacts Cm nu!jor ('cononlic indicators such as intlation, employm('nl,
(.NIL and [)r,_)(ht(livily ot a '.;|rift in Ih(' F('deral bu(lg('l to a higlwr level of NASA sp('ndi,lg.
Short-Run Resuhs
The ¢.flbcts of Ihc lwo ahcrnativ(' fovecasts on the aggr('gat(' c(Ollomy, as ('Milllaled
Ihr(mgh use of INF()R[rM, are shown in Tal)les I and 9. While lhe ,-esulls are not dra-
Ilia|i(', they (h) ill(|i(alt" thai the direction <)f change in e('()n()mi( activity from an incv,.'ase
in tiw h.v(.] of NASA (.Xlxm(lhurt. is l)Osiliv¢" [3] [<)riginal plac,.mu'nt ot+Tablem ] and 2] [4]
and I)ent'ticial. Th,t' magnitudes art' 'qnall Ix'cause lhe total Federal expen(liture has not
bccn ahcrcd and th,.'s(' improvements i,esllh so|ely [l-onl ;.tshift within Iola] Federal expt'n-
dittLl(!s. Ncmcthelcss, th('s(' resuhs (h) indicate that NASA ('Xl)Cndittucs are less intlafion-
aIy than ()they Fc(tcral govcwnmcnl expc'nditurcs, and that a shif! toward higher NASA
H)t.,lding with it (()nsla.nt F('dcval ex[)enditt;uc is not intlationary in the present economy.
(:<mverse]> it w(:,tll(I tbllow that a drip away t}oln NASA to olheF F(+(l('ral programs could
t)(' r(.laliv,..ly inllati(mary in file ])ICS(?III ('('onolny. Fvrflwr, file ,.'mph)ymenl effi:(l of NASA
('xp('ll(lilm('s is Ix'neli(ial, ahil()ugh not large for Ibis small (hangc, atnd thus 1)olh goals
of higher ('nlpl()ynl¢'lH alld lower rat¢'s of inflation would tx, hindered I)y a h)wev l(w¢'l of
NASA cx[)('n(lil urt'.
Table 1
Macroeconomic Impact of NASAHI and NASALO Expenditures
NASAl .( ) NASAl II
1975 1975
(;ross Nalional Produ(!
(;r_ss Nalional I'rodu¢l ( 19585
(:onsumm l'ri((' Ind{'x (% change)
l)isposal:Jle Personal ln(om('
t:ed(wal (;()vernmenl l)eli¢it
1529.9 1530.1
820.7 820.7
10.5 10.5
1084.9 1085.0
17.0 16.9
All ligur('s arc in I:,illions ol dollars ('x('('pt where indicated oflmrwis(,.
NASAl [1 = NASA (_x[)(.tl(liltues during 1975 (:,f $2.35 billion in 1971 dollars.
NASAl.() = NASA CXFJcn(limr(.s during 1975 of $1.35 trillion in 197l dollars.
Table 2
Employment by Industries Affected by a NASA Spending Shift
Employment I)V Selc¢wd Industries
Industry
Numl)('r industr.,y SIC Code
HI I_O l)iff
(thousands)
5 Missiles aud Ordnance
59 Machine Sh(:,p l'roducts
67 (:ommunication Equip.
71 Aivcrat!
Tolal
19 154 142 +12
359 191 19(} + 1
366 404 402 + 2
501 488 + 13
+28
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22 l.oggingandIalmber 241,242 3(17 B08 - 1
25 Furnittne 25 543 544 - 1
27 PaperandProducts 26 501 502 - 1
30 Printing& Puhlishing 27 688 689 - 131 Industrial (',hem|ells 295 296 - 1
72 Shipbuilding 373 169 171 - 2
Total -7
Net gain in Manufacturing Enlployinent
(lhotlsands of.jobs)
+20
Thus in this section of the study we show that a shift to NASA exl)endhures from other
Federal government spending will siimulate the economy without raising prices. In par-
ticulal, we found the following effects of a shifi of$1 billion in 1971 dollars.
1) A higher level of NASA expend|lures would not haw, had an inflationary impact on the
I_J.S. economy during 1975 alld would probably have reduced tile inflation pressures in
the economy.
2) A shift of $1.0 billion in 1971 dollars, or $1.4 hill|on in 1975 estimated prices, tiom
other Federal non-(tett'nse expenditures to NASA expenditures would have reduced the
intlationary pressures in several key basic niaterials industries.
3) A shift to increase NASA expenditures would have increased elnploynien! hv 25,000 ill
the missile and ordnance and aircraft industries. While it would have reduced eniploy-
incnt in ten other industries, the net increase in ttle nlanuihcturing sector would, have
been 20,000 jobs.
1514) Output would have been stim(ilated in twt'lliy-one industries. The principal indiis-
tries whictl would have been atleveled had considerable excess capacity in 1975 and l<vt,re
producing at levels well below lhoir peak years aiid in tnosi cases below the average of lhe
past live years.
Tile general conchlsi(in reached in this section is that a shift toward hig;her NAS,71 .spend-
ing within theJramraoork qa constant level of total Federal expenditu#_'s creates johg without raising
the rate r( inflation, and hence is more stabilizing in a recove_]_, period than general gove_nment
spending.
The hnpact of NASA R&D i)il the
Rate of Change of Technological Progress
Description of Approach
Tile second part of this study is an examination of the historical relationship tieiween
NASA R&D spending and the rate of technological progress. This examination requires
two steps: (1) the construction (11a time series to nleasure the rate of change ,it tecilno-
logical progress; and (2) an empirical investigation througil regressilin analysis of lhe
determinants of technolt)gical progress suggested by econonlic theory.
(1) Time Series tilr _ (gamma). The time series representing the rate of change in
technological progress (T) is a somewhat ehlsive measure, inasmuch as it requires devel-
oping a series for potential (;ross National Product (GNP) as well as related series for
lahor and capital inputs. The series that was developed to measure T is based oil the
nletilodology used hy the Council of [6] Economic Advisers. In addition, ;ill alternative
series for ]' was (Icveh)ped, folh)wing the nletho(tohigy (if E. F. Denison, to test 11i¢: sensi-
tivity of the results to a ctlange in the formulation of the y series.
F, XPI .( )RI N( ; 11 I1( 1. TNKN( )WN 41 C)
()ur fiwnnllation oft is as fi>lh)ws:
AX AI_ AK
7- X -_ I, - (1-_) K
wllere X = full capacity or maxilnunl l)olenlial oulpul (national income or (;NI t) in
(()llStHnt prices
l, - maximum available lahor force
,%"
K-capilal stock, detined as K = '_ _.i/1_1 where )v is the rate of economic
i=0
depreciation and I is tixed nonresidenlial investltlent.
(x = share ()f potential Olllpnt
y = the rau" of technological progress (that is, lhe rate of increase in fill capaci-
ty real (;NP Ihat calls()( I)e accounted for by a change in either the size and composition
()t Ihe labor t_)r(e or th(' size an(l composition (if the capital slo(k).
(9) l)eterminants ot_. E(onomic theory and prior econometric studies suggest tit('
t()llowing possibl(' (h.t(,rnlinants tor 7: (a) R&D spending; (h) an industry mix variable;
(c) an index of caf)acily vlilizalion; (d) an index of labor qualily rellecting changes in age
mix, sex mix, health h'vels, and e(htcalional levels of the labor force; and (el all index of
ecol_omi('s of scale. After consi(lerahle experimentation, we Iblmd tit(' lalter two (let(w-
minanls Io I)e insigniticant for the lisle l)eriod examined. The exclusion of economies or
s(-a]e as an exl)hmat()ry variable tbr_' can be justified on lheoretical gronnds Sill('(" this vari-
abh' is generally relevanl to only []rm [7] or industry or un(lerd('velolm(I nation studies.
The stalisli(al insignilican(e of the labor qualily variat)le may be partly explained by the
[_nt (liar some of its characteristics are aheady retie(ted by the stunner in which we con-
slrll(te([ tile labor tore(' variable used i(7 generate ]t. Undoubtedly, tile insignificance of
_ll(' labor qualil._ variable is also partly due to our inabili D' m retlecl significant improve-
nlents (variahilily) in labor (.(lucalion and lraining over an observation period as short as
15 years.
Ih'n('e, base(l upon both theoretical consideralions and empirical investigation, we
oiler lhe fi_llowing ((inclusions regarding the deterndnants of y. First, R&D spending
should be included as a determinant and should be subdivided into two explanatory vari-
allies, namely, NASA R&D spending and other R&D spending. Secondly, we found thai
bolh R&D variablt:s could be closely approximaled by a distributed lag structure thai fol-
lows the general shape of an inverted |_t-distribution; that is, as a result of an increase in
R&I) spending in year 0, modest increase in the produclivity growth rate begin in year 2,
peak in .year 5, an(l terminate in year 8. The actual distributed lag weights, deterntined by
Ahn(m melhod anti used in Ihe study, are given in Table 3. Thirdly, an industry mix vari-
able should also be used in the equation that attempts to explain inovenmnts in g. This
sp(wifi(ation is necessary to capture lhe impact on ? of shifts (wer time in resource allo-
cation [roln high- to low-lechnolog 7 industries. Finally, the equation explaining y should
also include a capacity utilizalion wviable to account tot the fact that shortages and bot-
tlene(ks reduce pro(hlclivity growth as the econonly approaches titll capacity.
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[81 Table 3
Distributed Lag Weights for R&D Spending
Time l,ag (Yrs.) tq{}p{}rlional Weigh!
0 0.0
1 0.0
2 0.061
3 O. 16,t
4 0.220
5 0.232
{i 0.200
7 O. 123
8 al]{I ]alcr (}.0
The Measured Effi._c! of R&D Spending {m Pr{}{hutivity {;r{}wth
(1) The Regr{'ssion lqluaIion. The tinal r{'grcssi{}n
explain y in /Iris sludy is as follows:
7 7
(1-_Cp)
y = -1.81+0.426 _2 Ai(NPd))-i+0.074 __._Ai( OR1))i(i-cp)
i=0 i=0
{'qualion which was used I{}
(B.9) (9.0)
+0.031 ( IM _""
- IM)-O. 1.} J (CP-Cp)
(4.5) (3.1)
--9
R'= (}.883
1}W= 1.95
Sample Period I.{){i0-1974
whcl'C: NRI) = NASA R&D spending as a pr{}l)orli{m {}f (;NP
ORD - {}ther R&D spending as a pr{}l}orli{m {}1 (;NP
IM = induslry mix variable, fiattion
(:]} - index of (apa{'ity utilizali{m, pcrccn!
[9] The numbers in t}arcnthcscs beh}w the regression c{}{4]kicnts represent I-staustics. eX:s
{:;tit bc seen from the r{_gressi{m rcsuhs, all c{}efficicnts arc statistically signiticant and the
overall til of llte Ctltlalioll to the data, as iltCitSltlcd by the _2 value of 88.3 percent, is
impressively high, especially tor a tirst (titlkwcncc equation.
(2) The NASA {;ontrilmtion to g. Using the regression results above, we t{mn{l thal
lhc incrt'ascd levels of c{mstanl-dollar {;NP stemming [r{mt a $1 billion increase in c{m-
slant-dollar NASA R&I} spending in 1975 are as given in Tal}le 4. For Imrp{}scs {}f this cal-
culalion we hold Ihc I}asclinc level {}t {;NP constant and ignore all inwra{livc and
dynalni(; demand ;rod supI}ly muhipliers. _s will be explained ]atel. the a{lual changes in
(;NP will I}c ({}i]siderably larger once we {1o inchldc the {'fl{'tt of Ihesc muhiplicrs.
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Table 4
Increase in GNP per Unit Increase in NASA R&D
"Pure" Productivity Effects Only
Spending
Year (]unlulative (;hange in (;NI)
1975 0
1976 0
1(.)77 I)
1(.)78 0
1(.)7!) 0.26
1(.)80 0.96
I (.)81 1.(.)0
1982 2.88
] 983 3.7t
I (.)8,'t alid '1.2(i
su((('eding years
[10[ The ratr ()f rctt]rn on NASA Sl)(,zlding may I)e found by sut)s(ilt,ting lhe rest]Its of
Tahle .t into the conve]rtiona] ]'ate ()[' reltlrn h)rf][]llla, inc]ease i]] spending, the apl)rot)ri-
ale expression would be
0.255 0.952 1.888 2.882 3.736 r(l+r) 10]
--+--+--+--+--+4.26111 = 1.00
(I=,-) 5 (l=r) 6 (l=r) 7 (l=r) _ (l=r) 9 _----_]
where r is lhe rate ()f rettnr]]. Solving this cquatiotl yields r = ,13% I<) thr nearest peroe, nt.
4.26
II w(" rcs()lve the ('quation l)y std)stilutinlg _) for the last term, liras t]()l ass]truing av]
]Jill]lilt! lift', We tin(I lhr rate ()[ return dilninishes t() 38%.
Tht]s all increase of $1 billion in NASA R&D spending would increase pro(tuctivily
and total capacity of the U.S. economy by $4.26 billion in 1984 and each succeeding yea]-.
It should be stressed that this figure stems from a $1 billion increase in 1975 and then a
relurn to t)revious spending levels. If spending were to remain $1 billion higher indefi-
nitrly, (he tirst-order supply effects, i.e., disregarding interactive and dynamic effects, are
shown in Table 5. Am in(licated above, lhe actual resuhs are significantly larger because of
lhc d(,man(I anti multil)lier efti'cts calculated by simulating tile Chase macroeconomic
m()del.
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II1] Table 5
Cumulative Effect on GNP of a Sustained
Increase in NASA R&D Spending
"Pure" Productivity Effects Only
1(.)75
1976
1(`)77
1978
I (`t7(`1
1980
1(,)81
1982
1(.)83
1(`)84
0.26 = 0.26
0.9(i + 0.26 - 1.22
1.90 + 0.96 + 0.26 - 3.12
2.88 + 1.90 + 0.96 + 0.26 -. 6.00
3.74 + 2.88 + 1.90 + 0.96 + 0.2(; (.t.7,t
4.26 + 3.74 + 2.88 + 1.90 + 0.(.t6 + 0.26 - 14.00
Macroec()n(mfic Impacts of NASA
R&D-Induced Technological Progress
The third part of lhc study uses the rt'lali(mshi l} whi(h has bet'n dt.velopcd between
NASA R&D spending and the rate of technological progress t() ira,palate an increase in
spending into a higher ()vcrall h,vcl of productivity ti)r the U.S. cc<)nomy. This scc ti(m li-a -
tttrcs ;I illtt|lI)l't ot simulations wilh the (|hits(." Et()nolntqrics t[la(r() model which d(.+t(Tlnitl("
the t()lal ct]e(t <)f higher NASA R&II spending on the ec()n()my when inlcractiv(" and
dynamic cfli'cts arc taken into a((.otmt. These simulations c<)nsi(h'r tll(' supply side ()f flw
ccon(mLv as well as the demand side, and slrt'ss the tact that r('al (;NP (an t)e expanded by
increasing productivity and h)wcring prices as w('ll its I:,y incr('asing g()w'rnnmn! Sl)('n(ling.
[12] Approach to I)ctcrmining Macr()vcon()mic Ettiwls
Up I() this p()int w(' haw" considered ()nly the static supply or "]mrC' productivity
efli:('ts of NASA R&I) sp('nding. %_,k" n<)w emph)y |he (]hase l"xonom(+tri(s macro model t()
determine tlt(" (.ffecls of an increase of $I billion in c<mstant l)ri(es (I(.)58 dollars) in
N,.\SA R&D sp(:nding. We assume Ihat such spending is increased bv this am()unl at th("
bcgi,ming of 1(.)75 and remains in ti)r('(" lhrough<)ut the n('xt d('cade. There arc two lv[)(+s
of (.ltects ti-()m this increased spending.
The tirs! type of ettecl is th(" ordinary expenditure (demand) impa(t <)f increased gov-
ernmenl spending. Tim second typ(' <)f eflc(t--lhis ,Hli'ct b('ing what really dilli'r('ntiat('s
NAS/\ R&I) liom other types ()f govcrmncnt Sl)cn(ling--is tlt(' hmgcr run intpa(t ()f NASA
R&l)-indu(ed changes in the rat(" of t(,chn()logi(a] pr<)grcss. Th('s(' (hangcs h'ad t() an
cxpansi()n m the productive Cal)a(ity ()f the vcon()mv and uhimat('ly ]cad t() an in(r('as(+ in
society's slandard <)I living.
(I) The F.xpcndimrc (1)cmand) Impacl of NASA R&I). In a pcri<)d ()f ('c()n()mi(
slackness, an in(r('asc in govcrnm('nt spending leads t<) increased rt'al (;NI) and lower
uncnq)h)yment. These ¢!x|)t'll(litlllt' ('[l('(ts [_:)r NASA R&I) arc not mark('dlv (tittcr('nt
than th()sc CXl)e,ienccd f()r m()st increases in oth('r types ()f g()vcrnmcna spending or li)r
tlt(" r(.h,as(, ()f funds t<) thc private s(,(t()r li)r construction, h should be n()tcd, howm(w,
that NASA R&I) (.'xpcnditurc in(r(.'ases hay(" a largm- impact l)(.w dollar than similar spend-
iug (m wcllarc or h)w productivity tT,pc joh programs.
II 31 (2) The hnportan! l)rodu(tivilv Impa(ts of NASA R&I). Th(' pr<)duclivity impacts ()f
NASA R&I) generate s()cial l)cn(,lits in a s<mmwhat m()rc c<)mph'x man,m_: We have
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ahcatly shown al)ovc (]able 5) the magnilude t)f hlcrcasc which will occur it+ thc produc-
live capacity of tht" economy for all increase in NASA R&D spending, ttowcver, there is no
;+ttlt<llIl+lli(" iIwlCasc ill <lclll+tlld which will o('CIli" iliSl ])cc;illSC total supply is now highcr,
and t,ntil this tlewly crcalcd capacity is ulilizcd Ihrottgh higher demand no social b('tlclhs
are re;di/ed.
Tilcre is an economic meet|an+sin through which increased mq:,l)ly does create its own
demand. Greater R&-I) sl)ending Icads to an increase in l)r<)ductivity, primarily it+ lh(' man-
+ll_lclHring s_'clor. As a vcstth <if Ibis increase, It+mslab(Jr is nc<'ded per +Hilt of ot,tp+H. This
ill IIlrll IoWC+'S +It+it labor c<)sls, which leads to lower pric(,s. _;,+t this decrcasc is not iml+iC-
dialcly transl_'vred inl<) highcr oulpt+l and ernploytne+It. As prices are hm,cred (<iv grow at
a less rapid rate), real dispt)sablc incorllc of cotls+tmcis illCrt'ast's ilt a l,islcr l+al(+.
(:(ms+tmcrs call th<'li imrchase a larger market basket ofg<)o(Is and svrviccs, which in ltlrn
alc ilt)w a,.'ailahlc h('c_u+,;c tile p+-odltction possibility li'oilticr has m¢),.'cd (+utwm+d. _.+t these
dccisi.ns are _+ot illsllllil;+n('t)+ls and friction-lcss, as they w<luhl bc it+ at+ oversitlq>litied sta-
ll+ m_)dcl. W(" do ll<)l st't" sigllit]cant ctt_:cts of itlcreas(,d tcchn_)higy on ill2,gi'c/Z,;<llc (|+'lilt<ill(|
thrill 1980.
Rcsuhs (if Macr<)ec()+iomi( ,Niinulalions
()_lcc thc incrcasc i_+ I)rodtlctivt: (:apacily has worked ils('lt into i+ggregat(" demai+d
thrt)vgh the |ncchaldstns dis(:tlsst,d al)()ve, real grt)wlh is lhen f,tirly slt'a(ly its can be setm
li-oin Tablc 6. h+ parlicillar, w(" lind Ihat real (;NP rises l/car $5 billioil pcr +veal litstcr than
tvoiild t)(" lhv c;isc uiifh'r I1,tl Iorigillal place+lien+ ofTal)l(! tl ] llr) l the bast'lhlt" siinulatioll
which +hit, s liOl ilichid(" iliCTt'iiscd NA._IA R_D Sl)ciidinl4. Thtls C<)lislant-(Iollal (;NP is $6 bil-
li<itl higher iii 191"10,$10 billioli ill 1981, $14 billion ii] 1_.)_7, $1_'I billhln iii 19143, aiid $7_I
hilli<)ii hitcher it+ 19_.'t. If x_'e wcrc to cotllintIc this SililltLtli<)il ({ti-lht'r ilittl the (tiltir(', _++t,
woiild t]lld Ihal Ihc gii|) I)clxvct.ii (iNP hi lht" lwo shllulalions woiild ('l)illiiltlC Io ili(Tt'as(! al
i+t)|)rli+\ili/;tlt'l ), +_PlI)illi()ll ])or yt'iu--$71"l I)illit)+l in Ii)l_.+'),$:+,3 I)illi_)n ill 191_6, aitd st) oil.
ITat)h" G t)rigillall)' l)la('t'd ht'rc. }
As grt'itlt'l productivity is translated into higher denland, we lind that the t,(-onom),
('all produce lilOrC goods and services with the sanlc aili()lilH (if lal)oi; Tills has tw() I)enc-
ti(ial cftT<,(ts. First, ill+it lai)(ir Cosls (leeline, bent(, Iowerin_ prices. S('(()ii(|, low(!l' prices
ciiabh" (:<)iiSillli(.rs 1o purctiase iliore goods and services with ihcir ilt(()iilt', hen(e ]('itdhlg
It) tiirlh('r ili(T('its('s ill <)ill|Jill and ('niploylnenl.
tdl't, tili(l lhal thc COilSili+lcr pri(c index grows at a shiwer rate willl higher NASA R&I)
+l)t!lidili_ lhali with(it+l, ;+lid is a t11117% lower t)v 19144Iliali would othcrwisc tic Ih(" tii+('.
()tic+" tiVOli+i> this ('hltilt._t ' dot's tlol occur irl the early ycars of tilt' Siliitllatioil+ hilt I)e_ins it)
I)ccOliiC illil)orlant ill 19140+
()lit' ()t tilt" in;!i(ir cftt, cis (it +it+t, higher level of t+cal (;Ni' al_td a_lt'g_<itc (|oltlall(I i+ lilt'
i't+fltltli+)ll ill lht' IIlwmplti)'iilelil lale of Ir).4_;. b)' 19144. Siii(:c lhc laD<it t()ict" will t)("
;ipl)ro×ilnalcly l()O nlillioYl StiOlt_ b,V tidal date, illis illdicalcs, as a |il+l approximaliOl+l, all
illcit'ast' o[ <t00,()()0.jobs. I hiwever, it +we take into at:cl)llill the in¢i'east' in tile size <if l]le
I;tb()r tilrc(,, Ihc total will rise to 0.8 million new jobs. The increaso in the labor tT)rc(, will
()('('llr I<lr Ihr(!t" |)rill(ipal reasons. First, the derived dClllalld for labor will bc gr('al('r
Ix!catlsc lilt' marginal prodticlivity otlal)or has increased. Sect)rid, the 116] supply (fl+l:thor
will risc t)ccatls(" lh(" rt'itl wage has increased. Third, arid probably lnosl ill+[)ortanl, Ihe
iil(r(';tst' ill ;ig._l+('_;tlc dcilialid will i-Cdli('(" tilt' itinolinl of" liidd('ll tln('lnpl()),illVl+ll :ts iii<)rt"
('lilrliiilS toil+ Ill(' labor tOlXC.
li is als<) iiiilJ<lrhliil I() it(lit llial labor produciixii 7 list,s stll)Slalliiall'¢ _is _i +'('still <if ihc
iiit Ix,asvd N,,\_A R_+|) s|)('lidillt_. +I'll(' iildcx of litl)oi + i)l<)(luciix'il) ' t()l Ihc pri'+'ill(" ii<liil{irili
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Table 6
Change in Selected Variables With an Increase
1975 1976 1977
Gross National Product, Billions of 1958 Dollars
in NASA R&D Spending of $1 Billion
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
P, asc 788.1 ,_34.0 8fi91; 859.8 8685 922.4 977.7 1012.2 li159 fi 11_911.8
NASA 7<Jo.2 836.5 871.7 8ii2.1 871.7 928.6 988.0 1o350 IO77 t I 114,1
( ;hang( + 2.1 2.5 2.1 2.3 3.2 G.2 I 0,3 138 17.8 22/3
t,,_ ( ;hange .3 .3 .2 2 +, .4 .7 1. I I .t 1.7 2. I
Consumer Price Index, 1967 = 1O0.O
Base I{; I I 173.9 188.4 20t.9 219 1 2320 244.2 257.(I 271)9 28ti 5
NASA 161 A) 177,.8 188. t 211,I.7 219.0 231 o 2+12.2 25111 2[i{;._t 281L7
( :hmlg_, -0. I -0. l (LO -11.2 Ot 1.0 -2.<1 -30 -,1(1 ",8
% (]hang(' (I.11 (I.11 ILl) dl>l -I),2 I).5 -1),8 -II 15 211
Rate of Inflation, %
Bast" 9. I 7.9 8.3 8.7 7 l _'LN _')>2 5.2 _'_.+I !')+8
NASA 9. I 79 _4::; 8.1i 7.q 5.5 1.9 4.!t 5.11 53
(Thilngl. (I,O 11>0 11t1 (I ] -l/. J -O,3 d).?J 413 -Ill A).. +-)
Unemplo_lment Rate, %
lLt_sc 9.0 8.2 7.1 _6 9.!_ 9.2 811 7. I fi5 (i.*l
NASA 8._1 8.0 7.3 8.5 9.8 9.1 7.7 ft.8 6, I 36
( ]i;Ing(' -t} I 112 -II. 1 I). 1 -II. I -(I, 1 +11.)_ _It3 -I).4 -114
Employees on PayrolLs, Millions
P,a'+t' 71L9 79>(.t 82,8 N3,_] N32 N5.3 NS. l 90.5 !i2 _'_ !IL2_
N/L%\ 77.0 ,_0.o :g2,!l 83.,I 833 85.5 +48.,I 9{I,9 93. I 95.1
( :ll_tiigt' 1). 1 I1. I (I 1 O. I 0 1 I).2 (I.3 ILl (1.(; 11.8
_I (ill;tiler' (I. I (L I II. 1 1), I 11>[ 0.2 ()_;; 0.4 Ill; (I.8
Manufacturing Sector, 1967 = 100.0
1252; 122.4 I ?,26 145.3 151.6 I ti2.2 I fi8.6
12(i.3 1235 131.3 I.18. I 158.1 16C71 17.t.({
I .o I, I 1.7 2.8 3.5 t3 51
ll.8 tl.9 1.3 1.9 2.3 27 3.2
1125 115,2 120.1 123':t 1269 1299 132.<1
112.7 115.5 1211.8 125. I 128t; I '+12>11 1317
0.2 11.3 (I.7 12 1.7 2.1 2.7
11.2 (1.3 11,¢i 1.11 1.3 I,{i 2O
-o.7 2. t ,t.3 3.2 2.1 2.4 I.(i
O.(i 27 t>1; 31i 27 27 2.(I
(I I I1.1 I).1_ Ol 0.3 0/3 (I.t
Index of Industrial Production,
Base 11_). I 120.2 129.6
N&NA 109.9 121,2 13tl.5
( :hangs, O_ l(/ t)9
_ ( ili;lllgt" I),7 I).8 0.7
Index of Lab<)r Producti_4ty, 1967 = 100.0
Base I I(L2 I 12,1 13.?,
NASX I I<L3 112.2 13A
(_hangt' 11 1 t1 1 (I, i
+_ ( ]lLillgt' I). I i+. I <I. I
Change in Labor Productivit); <_
IList' -Ikl 1.7 I. I
NASA -0.3 1.7 I l
( ihilligt, 11+I 11.11 I1.0
|IllS(,
N.kSA
( ;}1_tllllt"
{'i ( ]lall_t"
h+ist.liiit, l>l,,jt+_ lioii with rui it,lit t+Milliatt,s t}t NASA R&]) slwndin_ 4 h*t lit'xl rio( a(h'.
_lli im it';Isc <11$1 billlon in 1958 Ihillals in NASA R_I) slit+lldili_+
NASA- B;ISt'
N_ISA llitsc _lilit t' lilt' tlllt'lllpIttMill'lll lllll' i _+_l]II'itd% _i_,l'ii ill pull l'lit;l_l' WilliS+
II_;tSC %_Cflit IIIIt (zti(tliate Ihis ill'm t111 illl('llli)hiVllll'lll
se(tor grows at a rate o| 2.75% during the 1980-1984 l)eri(td, (+otnt)arc(l to an average
_tlllltlal i'isc of 2.40% with I111increas(" ill 8pt+il(ling. By 1t)84 lhc hwel ()[]ab()r t)r(Muctivity
is 2.08 higher than the baseline pr()jcction.
Further details and coinparisons are given in Table 6 ti)r a $1 billion increase in NASA
R_D spciiding. 18't" also ca|culaled allernalivt' runs tor $0.._) and $(1.1 billion arid ti)lili(t
thai the rt'suhs werc al)i)roxinlately linear ti)r otht'r levels tit s[)(!nding (']l;tllg(+ Of Cqllal ()r
snlaller illagnitttdc. Sinlilarly a de(rease ill NASA R&I) spt_ilding ()1"$1 billion w<)ul(t tlaVt_
1('v(_1$c eJ]72cl,s <)t lhc 8HIIIU inagllitlide on econonlic aclivil)'.
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Signilicance and Reliability of Findings
Significance of Findings
()tie does not 1iced all e(<)llomelric inode] l() show thai ,111 in(Tease in govorntllenl
spending will raise (;NP and lower unelnp]oymenl. _¢x,'eh'arned many years ago that it is
easy it) spelld ()ill +Wav ()ill ()[ ;1 rec('ssioli if no other ('<)nstrailltS are involw'd. _k't having
just re(ently come from the realm of douhle--digit inflation and the first poslwar decline
if1 labor productivit); I 171 it is clear that alwrmttive policies tnu_t be examined riot otlly
trolil the point of view of their effec! on demand and elilI)l()ylllelll I)111oll lhe real growth
rate and the rate of inllali_m as well.
NASA R&I) spenlding increases lhe rale of technological change and reduces the rate
of inilation fi_r Iwo reasons. First, in the short rtm, il redislrit)ut('s demand in the direc-
lion of lhe hig]l-lechnolog_' indllslries, l]lllS improving aggregate prodtu.:livity in tile econ-
omy. As a rest,h, NASA R&D spending tends to be more stabilizing in a recovery period
than general government spending.
Second, in the long Hm, it expands the |)l-oduelioxl possibility t+rolllJer of the et:oll(>
my I)y increasing the rate ()f technological progress. This improves labor productivity fur-
Iher, which rcsuhs in lower unit labor costs and hence lower prices. A slower rate of
inflation leads in turn to a more rapid rise in real disp<)sahle income permiuing con-
sumers lo prochase Ihe additional goods and servires heing produced and generaling
gl-e_ll <+'r ellipI,DVIlle11 I.
In assessing Ihese reslllis, we once again stress i]1{: illlporlall,re o[" distinguishing
between demand aud supply e[/t'cts. A $1 billion increase in NASA spending will have an
immediate ettbcl on r_'al (;NP, raising il approximately $2.1 billi_m lhe tits! year and $2.,5
l)illi<m the second year. These (lemand multiplier ell+ects are not markedly (lil|_.'retn lhan
fl._se which would have occurred tot a sitnilar increase in <lther i)l,rchases of goods and
services by the g<vcermneilt sector or for release of funds to the private sector t_;,r con-
slruclion pr<_jects. They are, however, substanlially higher lh;-ux the eltects which would be
obtained from a $1 hillion increase in transfer payments t>i low-productivity .iot)s pro-
grams. In particular va" ha'+,u [<Jt|nd Ihal the demand nmltiplier in smallesl at+,(l the increase
in intlation in largest for a { 181 unit change in transfer payments. When we turn to the
siJpp]y sh'le+ Jiowevm; ibe nmhil)lier ell+eels of lowering prices and imreasJng real income
are more than twice as large. ()ther government spending programs which do not expand
the production possibility fronlier and improve productivity have no additional effect on
the ecmlonty after the inilial increase in demand.
Reliability of Findings
The resuhs found tor the equal|on estimating y are all in agreement with economic
theory, as the signs and magnitude of the coefficients are within the range expected from
a priori expectations. Sitnilarly, the statistical resuhs indicate a high degree of correlation
and 11+>bias in the regression coefticients, or the goodness-of-th statistics <)r the standard
errors of estimate. In addition, the results are in accord with the findings of other econo-
metric studies. Nevertheless, a number of criticisms have been raised about the tinal equa-
l|on [or y, suggesting thai lhe resuhs might be significantly dift_went if relatively minor
changes were made to the t+unction. These suggested changes fiicus on three areas; the
choice <)[_[c (the (]t']A series) inslead of_{D (the Dell|son series), Ihe inehision of the (]1)
tern| by itself and ill coiljunciion with OlD, and the exchision <)1"the indexes of ]a|)or
quality, parlicularly the level of educaliOli. To test the validhy of these suggestions, we cal-
culated si×ly regressi<m equations, inchlding a "least t_tvorable" (ase wiiich incorl)oraied
all of the above clialiges. The sanlple period |]is are SOlile-whal worse+ indicating thai i'l)
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contains a larger random component than ?(:, but the coelticient ()f the term tor NASA
R&D spending is similar for these regressions. Even the "least [avorabh'" case does not
change the general conchlsions of the study corrcerlring either the rate of relllrrl or the
economic impact of changes in NASA R&D spending.
Document 111-5
Document title: Robert D. Shriner, Director of Washington Operations, Chase
Econometrics, to Henry Hertzfeld, NASA, April 15, 1980.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
In 1980, NASA commis,_ioned Chase Emnomet_4e,_ to redo its 1976 stud_' (l)mTtmem 111-4), this time
taking into account changes in the overaU Ires|hess o'cle and possibb, statistical erro_ that might have
acmut_ted Jbr the results Of the earlier study. In the 1980 anal_,sis, Cha.w,fimnd that the percentage
O]overall R_'D.]or which ,_4SA accounted was so _maU that the quantitative results that showed the
&onefits from NASA R&D were _tatistically insiKn!ficant. The study did not mnclude that benefit_
did not oa_r, only that this (_,pe _?]economic tool was not capable of prerise measurement, given the
quail O, of the data available. This is the letter that accompanied the 1980 report, "The Emnomie
Impact o] NASA R&D Spe_Ming, an Update, " try Chase'_ l)avid M. Cross under Contract No.
NASW-3745, dated March 1980.
April 15, 1980
l)r. tlenry Hertzfi, ld
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Room 6133, F()B#6
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 2(1546
Dear Henry:
Chase Econometrics is pleased to transmit herewith 10 copies of the final report of
our ell'orts under ('.ontract NASW-3345 to ilpdale the 1976 study of tire economic impact
of NASA R&D spending.
,ALS Vt)ll al'e a'svare, ilrajor technical problems were ellC()rlnt('red in the course of the
study which ultimately led t() the decision to al)andon an attempt t() prepare a lO=year
macro simulali()n because the estimates ()t several variables deveh)l)e(t in preliminary
work were judged unstable and unreliable. The problems encountered in trying to repli-
(ale the prior study with an expanded time series calls into serious question tire soundness
of resuhs obtainable li-om this sort (rf "macro" level approach to the estimation of returns
to NASA R&D expenditures. While it is possible that some ()f these difficuhies could be
overcome if more time and effort were devoted to the task, there are conceptual simplifi-
cations implicil in the aggregate approach that will n()! disappear with m()re work. We
have noted these in our report.
Our experience and Omt of olher invesligalors in this general area suggests lhal lhr-
ther attention shouM lie focused in the limu-e on the examination of effects at a more
micro level. Industry case studies (ti)r which much data aheady exists) and interindustry
studies would be mutually complementary and should provide significant new insights.
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I)avid Cross and I will be glad 1o discuss derails of our analysis and ccmclusions with
you at any time.
Cordially,
[ h an d-sig n ed "B( _1)" I
Robert D. Shriner, Ph.l).
Director of Washington ()perations
Document 111-6
Document title: "Economic Impact and Technological Progress of NASA Research and
Development Expenditures," Executive Summary, Midwest Research Institute, Kansas
City, Missouri, for the National Academy of Public Administration, September 20, 1988,
pp. 1-4.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
"l'hi._ Midwest Re_earch Institute _tndy o/NASA eeo_mmie impaets replicated the methodolo_ O" _*f the
1971 a,rely,sis and calculated a nine-to-row return. Modifications O/the e_vmomic methodololo, that
had been _teveloped _ubwquent to 1971 were onpb(_;ed, and the resuB._ were _ublected to sensitivity
analv_i_. This ._tudy was mainly a postscript to earlier studies--it did not add anything siffn(ficant-
Iv n/qv lo the pn'viou,_ results, and it met with similar technical _ritieism_ as had the prior macroeco-
;tomic analyses per/ormed I_ ('base in 1976 (l)ocument 111-4), a_M the Midwest Re,search Institute
m 1971 (1)ocument ILL3). Whatfidhm*_ is the Exe_zttive Summary.fiom Volume I, Fxecntive Report.
Economic Impact and Technological Progress of
NASA Research and Development Expenditures
Ill EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
"l'hirtv years ago, there was no satellite communications industry. "today that industry
generates g(oss annual revenues from sales of services and equipment exceeding $B billion,
provides an indispensable servicc to people, businesses, and governments throtzghout the
world--and is responsible for returning more each year in tax revenues than the entire 30-
year N/\NA investment cost to U.S. taxpayers.
"tN.,haps even more signilicant, although not as ol_viotts, is NASA's role in driving
Icchnologies which I)enetit the U.S. economy and lhe nation's security across the board.
Requirements posed by NASA programs like Apollo, planetary exploration, and the
Shuttle have l_ro(lu(e<l miniaturized electronics, power systems and ('()rot>orients, auto-
matic checkout equipmenl, computers and software, high-volume data processing and
c(mnnunication, guidance and control systems, high-strength materials--the list is virtu-
ally endless. These technologies have transformed American business, spawned hundreds
of:new products and services, and made innumerable contrihutions to national delkmsc."'
1. "[hc Civil Sl)a(v Program: An Investment in America," Rcl)Otl, ..\mcvi(an ]nslilutc cd Act<)nauti(s
alld /\sir oll;tllt i<'s _v%'(_lksh(q)..\it lic I II)IISC, Virginia. Nqr)V('lllb('t 17- I _;, 19_q7.
4_ _ID\(;E AS AN INVESTMENT IN E(;()N()MI(: (;R()Wltl
In 1971 the National Aeronautic._ and Space Administration commissioned Midwcsl
Re,search In.,+titulc (MRI) to conduct a nmcr<_economic analysis to measure the extcm of
the be|writs of NASA R&+I) exp<:tldittwc.,+ on growth in llw [ _.S. t!c<motny. This research was
attgtncnted with two casc mitt(lies, syn(hronot_s cotllnltlnicatioll sattqlites and space crew
suppot't .,+ystcnls. The case stt|(lics detailed thc sul)slantivt+ contfil)t|tions an(I lwnclits of
these NASA-related technologies t<) NASA programs, the I_|ivate sect<it, and the American
pttblic in general. Tim study was well rt'ccivcd and wa.,+ used cxlcnsixcly bv NASA in thc
1970s to depict its role in U.S. economic growth and technoh)go +Iran.,+li'r.
In the fall of 191"17, NASA coinnfissiont.d the National Acadctnv <ff Put+lic
Administrati<m (NAE,\), wilh MRI as a subcontractor, to condttcl flirther research and to
evahlatc NASA coiitrit)ulions in tht r lt.I4N-19blli time li-mnc. The objcctivcs of lifts latest
stltdy are to:
• Measure the impacl of technological change on tim coon<mile + growth <if the
nation and characterize NASA's contribtttion to the growth process.
• hlcntil)+ link,tgcs between the tc(hn<_h_g_' gc||cratcd by sele(tcd NASA missions
and the broa(Icr t+conomic llenelits.
• ldentif), and characterize futttre benctits of selected NASA progranis.
[2] " ldcniit), arid characlerizt' lilt" t'conoiiiit impact of conliliu(,d invt'stment in NASA
R g,,zi) i)rogi;<illis.
This Executive Report presents MRI's findings and conclusions.
A primary objeetivt" of lhe earlier sttldy by MR| was to measure the impacl of R&D
expenditures on the national economy. Whih. R&D expenditure._ do hay<_' a nearly imnle-
diate t, cononiic inlpact thl+ough clnployniellt and payroll, the priniarv ec(moniic citt+cts of
R,.l_l) art" teh over lillit'. Thc 1971 y,ludy |iildings indicated lhal the average dollar speiil
(ill R_cD returns aboiil ,_7 in technology-induced econolnic gain o'¢t'r an 18-yt'ar period
following the cxpenllilurc.
The ;<ip[)roach MRI took in the 1971 study was based 1)11 tnelhod<llogies dcvclopcd by
Dr. Robert Solow." Dr. Solow wlts honored in 1987 with a Nobel Prize tier Economics till +
his pioneering work in nicasuring total factor productivity. The approach MRI used,
though relatively new at the tinle, has stood tip under critical review in tile 17-year period
ti_llowing the tclcasc of the lel+lort+
MRI's CIIITPIiI study has I)eell designed to bc similar ili appr<mch and colltt+nt to Ihl"
1971 Stiltt)'+ The 1988 study primarily iises Dr. Roberl <_ol<lv,,'_; al)l:ll-oach in liit'asuiJng the
impart of technology on t+conolnic growth, I)lll it incorporates retlllt'inenl+ devt'lopcd by
other economisls in recent years.' The 1971 study esiimaled econoniic impaci during itl¢"
period of 1948 to 1968; the 1988 siudy covers nol only the original period but cxtends tile
esliniates through 1986. The findings of the 1988 study, which incorporale essenliallv the
same quali|}'iiig assunll)lions ;<is in 1971, ;<tlt':
• R_Icl) t,Xl)t.ndiltlres ]iavt" 1)et'n all ex(elh'lit llalioiial inv('Sllllenl.
• On the average, each dollar silt!ill on R_t_cl) relul+ns aboul +9 in it'thnol<l/2,),-
induced t'COllOllliC <gain over +ill 18-year period (i:dlowing lilt! expcndilure.
2. Robert M. ,S_fl<_w,"li'chnical (:hallgt' and Ilic Aggrcgatc PliMiiction Pnnctioil," The [7_'v7_'1+,J]
F,mom/c_ and Stati_tit:*. AtlgUSt 19F)7.
3. Edward F. l)l'liison, lI/0' (;I.wlh Igate_Ihiie_. t',J_lu,a_lg.x_Jer.,mein A'im' ltT_l+Tn Colum'w_ (_%'asllillglotl,
II.C.: tl+l'llllkillgS Instiltilion, 19t;7); Ac+.un//n_fi. lt.h'+ 17co.ore/+ (;.m,th. ]?29-[?hO(I, Vashingtiln, [).(;.: ll_to_>kinl4_,
Inslituti_+n, 1'974); A+couulin g ft.._l.we_ lCm.Jmit (;+olvtD: The I r#lited Nlal+:+ iu the' 177"/+ (Washington. D.(L:
lhookings Institutitln. 197tt); and 7)_'nd_ it_ Ame_i+,<,',,+t'.'..l_)mi_ (;_m,th. 1929-1_)$2 (V'(ashingl<m, I).(L: Bl_okillgs
hlstilutil)n. 1{t85). Also. Icxicws mid lllllillit'iID4 1ix lhs. Z. (hilit hcs, I. Kcndiick, E+ l)cni_on, and N. '[i+l'h't k) i.
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I "l'he discounted rate ()f return ranges liom 19 t() 35 l)crccn! annually (depending
on the assumpti()ns made rcgar<ling the time-lag rclationships between an R&D
exl)en<liture and its c<)ntribtnion to prodttclivity growth).
[3] • The $148 billi()n, in lt.)_2 dollars, spent on NASA R&D <h,ring the 1961) tt) 1986
period has returned to the U.S. economy at least $950 hillion through 1986 and
will contintu, to produce payoff through ',)004, at which time lhc total payoff will
be an estimated $1,33_ I)illion.
MRI used the l)ayha(k c()clIici('nt of $9 to $I 1o meastne the ('¢()nomic impact ()f
NASA R&D. Tht' $9 1<) $I l)ayl)ack is slightly higher than the estimate ()f $7 fotmd in lhc
earlier study, l)i[[k'rcnccs in these results are attributahle, for the mr)st part, to m('lh()d-
!)legit:a] rel]nelnettls deveh)ped in the 1971 to 1988 lime period.
Any economic estimati<)n requires an approach based on c('rtain mtderlying assump-
lions. (',rifles of the l)roduction fimclion approach as it is apl)lied l() NASA R&D in this
sludy may have concerns thal ( I ) the gains ascribed to lhe stock ()| technical knowh'dge
measured hy R&I) cxp(m(liltlres are overstated and (9) there is n() empirical evidence fi)r
the ;issmnption lhat NASA R&I) is representative of the average ()f all R&D.
To atldrcss the first issue, MRI conducled a sensitivity analysis whi(h showed that a
l0 I() 30 pcr(enl <)vercstint;tlion of lhe economic gains attril)tttaJ)h' l() R&I) would rcduce
lh(' R&I) l)ayha(k from $9 l<)a )ange of $8.50 lo $6.50. If, in fact, lit(' MRI l)ayhack figure
is ()verestimaled evelt ])V lh(" wet'st (:as(' o|' 30 percenl and the (:()clficicnl is more in tlt("
)_my,e ()f 6.5 t() I, tlt(" $i.I_ billion spent ()n NASA R&D (lurit)g th(+ I!)60 lo 19_,6 period
would reltnn an eslimalv(l $!)(i(} billion rather than !he $I,3!+_N l)illi<)n eslirnaled rellt)-n
lr<)m a !)-lo-I payl)ack. In either case, the payback from NASA R&D would be suhstanlial.
The second prin(ilml assmnplion in the MR! study is thal NASA R&D expendilurcs
ha_(' the same e(()n()nfi( pay()ff as the average of all R&I). In ()!her _()rds, NASA R&I) is
asmmwd l<) ('onlril)tnc as much 1o productivity growth as the av('r_,ge <11all R&I). To illus-
It;.ll(! alld Sltpp()I'l this asstmq)li()n, MRI selected two case sltuli('s to) tra(c how technology
d('vvh)l)ed l)y sp('cili< NASA missi<)ns has l)een applied c()mmer(iallv:
• l)igila[ ('()mmtmi(ali()ns--inchtding lh(" ttse ()| ('rror-c<)rr('(ling codes and (latlt
c()ml)r('ssi()n in pr()(('ssing digital signals f<)r m()dern-da', digilal c<)mnnmica|ion
and (l;H;t slot;tgt'.
• (',ivil a(w()nattlics t)ertormance and efllciency--('enleting ()tt a series of advances
in aerodynamic drag rt+duction, advances in propulsion, and advances in night
c()ntrol tech noh)hD'.
MR[ ch()se thest" lw<) ti+<)m a lisl ()f over 250 major NASA te('hn()logies. Our results fi()m
these two case studies, as well as the knowledge we have gained in reviewing the
250 i)rin(:il)al NASA I('(hn()h)gies, indicate a very high payhack tiom Ihc NASA R&D invest-
m('nl. In narr<)wing !he p()ssil)ilities to two, MRI visited all <)f the major NASA R&D centers
and rc'view('d NASA's research and technoh)gy operating plans (RTOPS), NASA's Tech
I+)ri('tS ;rod Spin<)ffs, and kt'y NASA patents. During the course ()f the pr<)ie(:t, MR! staff inter-
viewed over 200 NASA personnel tamiliar with past and cun-ent technological achieventents.
[4} The MRI sltldy temn chose the case studies to he representalive of the breadth and diver-
sity (11 NASA progrants. The temn re)ugh! to include tx)th sides ot +N;_SA--aerormuli(s and
spa(e--and 1() select two vastly different technologies---incremental vs. leaptiogging
advan(('_---y('l with (:()mm<)n t:haracterislics from the point ()fview oftheir beneficial ofl++pring.
I! in (lear ll'tal with,)ttt N:_SA's mission objective of commtmicating in deep space, digi-
lal (ommtmitati,)ns would not t)e as advanced as it is today. "NASA l)usht'd this le(hn<)lo+.,D,
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lttrlh,pr than any other entity. "+ The work of the MRI research Ieatll documents that
NASA's support and extensive R&D I+unding made possible many coniprehensive an(t
ground-l)reaking advancements in coding theory. For many years coding was considered
to be an esoteric and impractical approach to communications, yet it provided NASA an
excellent ahernative to adding weight, I>ower. and complexity to spacecrat]. The case
study of digital communicati<m/errol_correcting codes ilhtstralcs how a technoh_gy
advanct'd by NASA to meet the mission requirements f<)r deep space <omnmnications has
spawned a family of high performance and productivity-enhancing eleclr<mic devices wilh
annual sales expected to reach over $17 billion by 1990.
likewise, NASA's Jole in civil aelonatlliCS is a good example of why the United States
has at decided edge in the world's commercial aircraft market. Improvements in civil aero-
nautics perti>rmancc and etticiency haw_ spanned some 70 years since the early days of the
National Advisory (;ommittee [ti)r] Aer<mautics (NA(;A). This repair! summarizes a series
oladvances aimed at enhancing the performance and efticiency of civil aircraft. The cast,s
cited are intended to illustrate the comph'x palhs by which new knowledge applicable to
the design, conslrtlClion, and operation of modern aircrafi comes into being; the inter-
actions between the aerospace indttstry and government centers of research and technol-
og,'y: the ntunertnts evohilionary changes and improvements lhal are contributed from
many sources; and the often prolonged period of time required to validate, demonstrate,
and retinc technological advances I)ctore they become accepted comm¢,rcially and wide-
lv used.
As a. resull of NASA's continuing R&D in aeronatttics, man can tlv farther, fa.ster, high-
cn and mort' efficiently and safely than thought possible 2(1 years ago.
This Executive Report SUlnmarizes the economic impact of NASA's research. Part l
explains the nwlhodolo_', tindings, and projections of economic benetits resulting t]-Olll
NASA R&I). Part II presents Ihe technolob, _' adwmces and resulling benefits from digital
communications, civil aeronautics pcrfiwmance and elticiency, and seven future lechnol-
I I_,)' al-t'as ....
Document 111-7
Document title: "NASA Report May Overstate the Economic Benefits of Research and
Development Spending," Report of the Comptroller General of the United States,
PAD-78-18, October 18, 1977, pp. i-iii.
Source: General Accounting Office Library, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.
Democratic Senator William 15oxmire _![Wisconsin commissioned the Government Accountin£_ Office
((;el()) to review the 1976 Chase qudy (l)ocu merit 111-4). l{g((llt._ie (!/" the .stur(V'._som_ohat unusual
approach to maovervnomic Jm.ecasting, the (#tO was critical r_it.Lfinding_ and comhtded that ca_e
studie_ _![ innovation and benefits were mol_" telling O/NASA impacts thaa overall trudger economy
calculations. During this era, there was a gem*ral belie[that R&I) was an ecom, mic investment with
a good payo[]to society,, but economic models, aml particularly mactoecmmmic mode& were mJt ¢vn
_idered dffinitive evidence o/Ion,-term pro/ected be,re/its. The li, llowing are the opem_ paKe, r4 the
(;,'+tO report.
4. lntcrxicw with h,.ing Reed at his ollicc ;it lh<' t'iii,.crsip, of Southern (:alih+rnia. ,\plil 2S, 1988.
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lil
NASA Report May Overstate the Economic Benefits
of Research and 1F'_ 1
 evmopment apenmng...
t-_ 1-
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conlracted with Chase
Economelrics Associates, Inc., Io evahlate how (;ovelnlnen[ research an(| developln{_ii|
sport(ling, particularly NASA's, aft(,cls lhe U.S. economy.
(;h.:tsc's :vl)orl "The E(ol:loll)i( impact o] NASA R&I) Spcndii)g" conchJdcd lhal Ibis
spending produced many benefits ])etwcell 1960 and ]97,t. '['he SIl.l([v did not try to eval-
ualc how clfi.'ctively NASA carried out its primary ohjeclives, such as spac.e exph)ralitm
and satellite communication. NASA cited the Chase stIIdy ill |IS 1976 apl)ropriations hear-
rags as evidence of ccrtaill beneficial el/_:cts of research anti development.
['he (;hase sludy does not ])rove convincingly lhal the |)chef|is are its large as stated.
Tilt" Slll(ly is usetill its exploratory research, t)lll other types olsludies are necessary to pro-
rid(" it comph'le evahmtion of NASA research and dcvelopnlenl.
The mosl signiticanl corlclusion of lhe (;hase sludy in that "... a $1 billion suslained
increase in NASA R&I) spending will raise real (,NP $23 billion by 1984 .... "' ()1 this esli-
nlailt'd increase, $21 tiilli(m would resnlt from improved teclmology and l)ro(hulivity, and
the rest wottld resuh tiom increased (,overnment spending, which stimulates sl)ending in
difti'rcnl paris of Ill(' cC()n,[)lllV.
Since similar increases wouhl resuh from (;overnmcn! spending (m ()lher ])r_!jecls,
su('h as welthrc programs, Ill(" "muhiplier effects" ahmc do nt)t.jttsiit)_ more NASA research
and dcveh)l)menl s1)cn(ling. For this reason, GA() focused on pr(_jc{lcd technoh)gical
inlpr()v(=lllelt[.
{iiJ The (;hase c(mclusi(ms are questionable from three p()inls ()1 view:
-- The Ix'stills, ("V('ll it accepted as accuralc, do nol F.rovidc the type of infornmti(m
needed 1o determine whether NASA's spending sh(luhl in('reasc or dec,easc. The
estimates arc of average, ralher than incremental, etlccls. Therefore lhcy (1o not
sho",V v_,h(.thci iil()re Sl/cn(ihlg for research and (levelopmenl would rcsuh in as
in,-lily I){'n('l]ls :Is I)el_)re. Wilhill NASA's |)ll(|gCI, Ihe rot)st ])r(){ln(livc (w nnl)ro-
{|uclive pr(wcts ()r Lvpes of spending have not been sl)elled Olll.
-- Even if the Chase approach is accepted, the techniques used had certain short-
comings. Plausihle and seemingly minor changes in the study's assumptions lead
!o major changes in the resuhs. Under some of Ihese ahernatives, NASA research
an(l dev{'hlpnwnl seenm<l lo have no grca! elti'ct on produclivily. Such sensilivily
It) small (hangcs in m('thodoh)g_' indicates considerahle uncerlainty in Chasc's
restlhs.
-- Basically, Ill(" rcsnhs det)cnd upon statistical correlation ])eIweell NASA research
and (hwclo]inlcnt spending and changes in a measure of gr<iss productivity in Ill{'
U.S. cc<m<mD: No infiwmation on specific NASA projects or (m Ill(" adoption o[
new techni(lues hy private business is use(l in the sn,{ly. Because (if prohlems in
meastning total l)roduclivily ill the economy and |)ecause other possible causes of
lcchnoh/gical progress wcrc ignored, the correlations may no! indicale a lrll(,
cause-and-efli:ct relationship.
Ahhough Ihc methodohigy I)| a particular study may he quest|one{l, the importance
(if evaluating NASA's programs is undiminished. NASA. has clearly been an important
s()ur(e of technical pr<)gress in reccm years.
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[iii] RE(:()MMENI)NI'ION T() "fl tE AI)MINISTI,bX.TOR OF NASA
Future evaluation studies should look at specitic innovations, their effect on specitic
industries, and the process by which NASA expenditures for research and development
improve pr<)dttclivily in the et:olt,Oltly. In other words, S,{HIII2 of the more important inno-
w_tions, rather than the total budget, cottM be examined, and individual technological
improvemenls in individual indttstries, r+l.1]tel than gross national product tigmes, couM
be stttdicd. (;A() believes that such studies would giw" the Congress a more ;.lCctlr;.tle pic-
ture of what taxpayers are gelling for their money.
MA_VI'ER FOR CONSI1)ERATION BYTHE CONGRESS
Technical stttdies are tieqttently presenled to Ihe Congress it+ supl:u)rt of agency bud-
gets and am evidence tor or against proposed h'gislation. "¢+]len important questions are at
stake, sucla studies should be subjected lo independent examination attd appraisal.
A(,EN(;Y (:OMMENTS
ht general, NASA as well as Chase Econometrics, Inc., agreed wilh our assessment of
the (;hase rep<wt ....
Document 111-8
Document title: Martin D. Robbins, John A. Kelley, and Linda Elliott, "Mission-Oriented
R&D and the Advancement of Technology: The Impact of NASA Contributions," Final
Report, Industrial Economics Division, Denver Research Institute, University of Denver,
Contract NSR 06-004-063, May 1972, pp. ill-iv, 25-39, 59.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
l)uri,g the &re 1960._ and ear& 1970s, the Denver tIeseanh Institute supported ,VA&4 i_ teehnolo:,7
tran.}]er prot,n+am. 77+is stllel_' reported the re_u#s o/interviews with .\(4SA personnel on the O,pe and
/ield 0[ techn°lgo' on which their work had an int/)a(l. The (_oPg(llt.$iotl.gthat impact_ w:_v indirect
and were _![ien due to the .speed-up _¢ tnTnffin/_ a new technolog O, to the ma@et pre_ented a di/lere, t
pel:speetive to the mine a_egated national benefit_ measured by the 1971 Midwe_t Research l,_titute
._tudv. The.]bllowing are excerpt._ Of the report.
Mission-Oriented R&D and the Advancement of
Technology: The Impact of NASA Contributions
[iii] M,_I()R FINI)IN(,S
Primary objective of this study was to identity,, and characterize the nature of NASA
c<mtributions to |]re advancement of major developments in several selected tields of leth-
n(dob,_,. M_tjor (teveh)pmetfls were identilied through interviews with recognize(t leaders
in each (+1 the selected tields whih' NASA c()ntribttlions were i(lentitied through interviews
with NASA scientists, engineers and administralors and an extensive search <d the NASA
and non-NASA literatu, e
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The m_ior findhlgs of du" study f<fllow:
I. NASA contrihuti<ms to tilt+ advanc('ntent of major devclopntents in the selecled
fields of technolog T appear to be hr<mder, illOre complex +Ill(| Inorc indirect than has been
realized to dale. The nunlber of NASA contribntions lhat lind direct nonaerospace appli-
cations represent only a small fiaction of the large nttntber of c<mlrihuti<ms that advance
the state of technoh_h_ / in a field.
2. Ten dominant types of NASA contril)utions to tlt,,, advancement of maj()r devel-
opnRmls were identified, htdividual contributions identified it+ this study enlbodied fronl
one to all ten types. The types hlclude: developing new knowledge; dt'veloping new tech-
noloh_'; demonstrating the application of new technolog)+ Ikn the first time; at|gram|ling
existing lechnolog_,; applying existing technology' in a new context; stimulating indttstry
lo acquire or devch>p tit+++,' techn<+log_'; identit_'ing pr<>blen/ areas requiring further
research; and creating new markets+ Certain D'pes of NASA contrilnHions appeared Io he
more (hmfinant in some th'lds of techn()h)gy than in olhers.
3. The "signilicance '+of mosl of the NASA contri|)ttliolls was I<) have cattsed the te(h-
n()]()gi(a] a(Ivancentellt I(_ o(Clll- al an earlier tinle thai| it Wotlld have ()CCtlrre(I ()therwise.
Significance of NASA contributions varied between fields of te(hnoh)b,D; with those fields
mosl closely idenlilied with NASA missions, sltch as cryoge,fics and telemetry, having the
largesl proporli<)n of (ontrihulions leading to advancements thai probahly would not
have <_c(urred wilhout Ill(:' NASA c(mtribution.
4. The NASA contributions represented all levels of technolog3,, inchtding major
slep-changes in technoh>g2,+', increntental advances in technology,, and consolidations of
tectmtflogD'. (:ontrihutions that represented hlcremental or systematic advauces in tech-
nologn,+, were the most [reqtlelll type of cor|trihtttion, followed by (ontril)utions that rep-
r(,sel/te(l a consolidation of knowledge. (:olltri|)utions |hal rt-presented ntajor
step-changes wcre relatively infrequent. Wide differences in these difterent classes of con-
tt+ibution 1o (liflerent fields of technology' were found, depending ttp<)n the existing stale
o1 techttolog,_' in the field and NASA's ntission requirements.
[iv] 5. NASA contributions were f<)und in all stages of developmental activity studied,
with ntore than one-half finding ntilitary or aerospace applications and ahnost one_luar-
to, +finding commercial altl)lications.
6. When intpact was assessed on a linear scale of high, nloderate (tr low, the tech-
nological impact of the NASA contributions was estimated to be moderate-to-high, the
t+cononfic impact to be moderate, the scientific impact to he moderate+to-low, attd the
direcl social impact to he low, with impact varying widely between different fields ....
1251 Ill. MEASURIN(; TIlE IMPACT OF NASA CONTRIBUTI()NS
Measuring innovative activity is itselfa formidahle problem which has not been solved
to anyone's salistaction. Moving fr<ml a measure of this activity to a measure of econotnic
impact greatly increases the prohlem. Focusing the task on measurement of the econont-
ic imllact of NASA's technological efforts reduces few problems and adds many. One
r('(enl altentpt to measure the overall economic impact of technological progress appears
10 hav(' lne[ with solne StlCCeSs. I
I. I:'u,mmm Impmt ./ 3,timu&ted 7;,+hnoh,g.ital A_?ivi(_. Pat| k (?q,erall licom,mi¢ lmpmt o/ 7}'_hn.bJg_ual
P_._rw_---Its Aleasulemem. Kamsas (;i%. Miss_mri: Midwest Resem th luslimtc. Final Report 7, April 1970-15 April
1971 (NASA (',onmu t NAS_V21)'g(I).
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A. Quantitative :Xssessment
Tile measurenlent process associated with quantil}'ing tile econonfic benefits <)f the
NASA contributkms in this study would require the three following steps: ( I ) identification
of technological advances and NASA contrilnltions; (9) estimation of economic benefits
auributable to the advances: and (3) isolation of the links between the NASA contributions
and the advances from among diverse other contributions. The first step has already heen
acconlplished [be a sizeable [sic] saniple of technoh)gies. Measuring tile benefits of new
technological advances--the second step--requires beneih/cost analysis, it is on the third
step that the most difficuh challenges arise. The knowledge and techniques needed to
assess the relative economic contribution of one agency ill a multi-agency development and
diffusion process appears to be beyond the present state o1 file art.
1. Measm-ing the BenefiLs
l)uring the past two decades considerable progress has heen made on the theory and
practice of henelit/cost analysis.-' One pioneering example of tile research and develop-
IHCIH area was Grilichcs' study of the economic l)enefils from hybrid corn rcscarch, in
which he |trend the return on research investment to be approximately 700 percent. _Most
o1 the NASA contributions that were identified in this study, however, present more dilfi-
cuh eslimalion problems. Perhaps most important, corn is a simple, nearly homogeneous
product, while inally o1 the NASA contrillutions have multiple nonaerospace applications.
[261 In this respect a better prototype is A. W. Brown's study <ffeconotnic benefits attrib-
utable 1o the development ()| atomic absorption spectroscopy hy tile Attslralian
(;ommonweahh Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO).' Brown identi-
fied more thatl a dozen applications for a new and more efficient spectrollleter and, to
estimate the benefits f)?oln these diverse applications, he interviewed some 37 different
riser organizations. An equally extensive interview schedule would undoulltedly he neces-
sary to assess with tolerable precision tile benefits froth a typical NASA contribution. Even
then, many NASA cases would pose special difficulties because they involve know-how and
techniques not directly embodied in hardware, whereas Brown was ahle lo devote his
analysis to a single well-defined instrunlenl.
2. Assessing NASA's Share of the Benefits
More fundamental conceptual problems must be solved in estimating how much of
Ihc benefits of an advance one can altrillute to a NASA contrillulion. The crux of the mat-
ter is 1hal ik'w technological advances of any importance originate through the eflklrls ()f
only a single person, group, or organization. Rather, ntnllertlllS groups are likely tn be al
work on various aspects of the lectmolo_D, in a complex interacting way. This process can
he illustrawd with a well-known example in the tield of nuclear physics. The haste exper-
iment through which Otto Halm and Fritz Strassmann discovered nuclear fission in lale
1938 had heen pertorlned previously by Enrico Fermi in Rome during 1934, tly Irene
.loliot4:ttrie and associates in Paris during 1937 and 1938, and was being prepared hy
l'hilip Abelson at Berkeley when the nuclear age dawned. Knowledge flowed fieely among
1lie several researctl teams, infhLencing hyl)otheses and experimental design. In this mul-
til/le-paths environment, it seems [_tir to say timt it ltahn and Strassmann had not achieved
_. Fen ;t gcncral survcv, see Roland N. McKc;u+. l'S[[iti?m+v i_+ (;ore+time+it Thtough L%,Stem+,,l_+al+_i_ (Ne+_
'fi_rk: Wik'+_ 19581, ( :haps. 8-12.
3. Zxi (;lilichcs, "Rcscmch (_t_sls ;tlld Social Rettu-n: It_brid (_orn and Rt'laled llllllp+:|lilnls. +"]o+ttrtal o/
I',,liti,al l'hommO', October 195P4, pp. 41_3-'131.
4. A.W. Brown, "The E(onmnic Bcnefilx t<+ Australia from Atomi( Absorpti<)n S[)eclH_s('opx," The
l,.'+ot+omic Herotd, lunc 19(i9+ pp. 15P,-IS0.
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their momentous insight when they did, soincone else surely would have done so later,
and in all probability not ntttch later) Similar parallelism occurred in the experimental
proof that chain reactions were possible and in the conception of isotopic separation
mettn)ds. For instance, the gaseous diffusi<m process nsing uranium hexaflnoride was out-
lined ahnost simuhaneously and independently by George Kistiakowski in the Untied
States and Franz Simon in England.
[27] Examination of ill,i" NASA contrihutions snggests that, like ltahn and Strassmann,
NASA has typically not been working ahme in the new fields of technolog T where it has
made contributions. Instead, there was usually parallel and prior work sponsored by other
[_'deral governnlenl agencies, private firnts, tmiversities, and/or research institutes. For
purposes of the present study, the key methodological question was, how should tim cred-
it be divided up among the several contributors?
This problem would require the use of marginal analysis, supplemented by network
lh¢'_ry. The sintplesl theoretical ilhtstration is the case of multiple research groups work-
ing in parallel, but independently, on a problem, with each group having, say, one chance
in twenty of solving the problem during any given year's activity. (;iven these assumptions,
tile contribution of an additional equally competent and lucky research group can be eval-
uated through straightforward probability analysis. Thus, it can be shown that if hmr
hypothelically identical groups are working in parallel and if a fifth path is added to the
nelwork, the average expected linte from start to successful solution is rc(Inced fiont
5.39 years Io 4.42 years. In this case, the economic benefits from the 0.97 year speedup are
correctly attributable to thai fifth group, even thongh some other group ttnns out after
the t_tct to have "won" the race, since ex ante a resource-alh)cating decision-maker could
not have Ioretold which group wouhl have hcen lucky enough to find the solution first.
To be sure, this illustration grossly oversimplifies reality. The typical real-world case
characteristically involves an extremely complex network. If the network for some partic-
ular contribution process could be specified at least approximately, it would be possible to
simulate the nelw<)rk on a coml)utel, adding and withdrawing paths, modifying demand
levels aitd hence resource allocations, etc., to determine how tire presence or absence of
a contrihutor likc NASA affects Ihc rate or character of tcchnological progress. There is
no reason why such all undertaking would not be feasible. Indeed, a group of British
economists did sonic modest exploratory research in this <lirection. `_Still the voids in our
knowledge of the nodal thncii<ms and tire interaction effects are so great that a niajor
research el[k)ll would be required merely to estimate the network relationships fo, a sin-
gh', relatiw'ly simple, technological advance. Even then, a high degree of quantitative pre-
cision could not he expected front such a pioneering venture. Sttch a venture was
obvi<msly beyond the scope c>l the study.
[281 B+ St,bjective Assessment
(;iw'n these difficuhies in quantitatively assessing the intpacts ofvarious contributions
on the advancement of a development, two subjective approaches were developed. The
tirst was a simple subjective assessment of the actual and potential intpact of each contri-
bnlion on a linear scale of high, moderate and low. The second was a case stndy approach,
describing the economic impact of several major technological advances on a particular
develotmmnt and tracing NASA's role in helping to bring about those advances. The
scalar approach is described below, while the case studies are contained in section IV of
this rep+)rl.
5. Sec K 3,1. S_ hvrvr, "'Was the Nuch'ar Arms Race Inevitable?" Co I_xislmP+e,.lanuary 1966, pp+ 59-(:,%
li. 1. (',. R. B_att and A. V. ( ;ohen, An Attem H to Quant{/y/he E.momi_ Be._:/_t_ o/&i,'_+tific Ib'_eanh. l ,<rod,m:
l:tiitcd Kiu_,<h,m I)cpallm<+nt o[ l+_dtwatilm and Scimwes, 1!169.
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The impact of a NASA contribution on tile advanccinent era inajor development was
defined as tilt, eflT.'ct the (ontrihtttion halt on the (levelt)])mcnt itself or on the environ-
ment in which the (tevelopnlen! exists. That is, did the coillrihtiti()ll bring abottt a positive
change? Four types of iuipacts were assessed:
• Technological inlpact. The [c]ffcct a contribution has in changing the matrix ot
produ(+ts, pio¢esses, te¢hniqucs, methods and materials that make tip the devel-
opnlent.
• Scientific impact. The [elllc¢t a contrihution has in (hanging what we know or
how well we till(lerstatl(I the bask phenolileila related to a te¢hliologi¢al (level-
oplnent.
• Economic inipact. The tel(feet a contribution has in (hanging the econonlies of
the developllielli el" the e((iliOlliiCs of the s+','Slelll in which the developnwnl is
applied, including the availability and cost of the te(hn<doEG, ' that makes up the
devclopnlent.
• Social impact. The [cltl¢_¢t a contrihution has in changing the innncdiate social
environnwnt in whi<h the development exists. (For tilt' purposes of this study
ollly tirst-order or ptilllary social impacts were in¢hided.}
In interviews, NASA scientists, eilgineers and adniinislrators were asked to subjective-
ly assess the inipaet of their ()x*+'ilcontrihtlliotls and thc NASA contributions with which
liiey were most t]unilial; Using a linear s¢ale of 1 for high, 2 lee moderate and :_ tk)r low,
all assesslnellt was made for each contribution in each of Ihc ahove tTitlr ¢ategorics (tech-
nological, scientific, e¢ononli¢ and social} tk)r hoth actual (present) and potential inlpa¢t.
Each NASA assesslnelil WaS reviewed by two lllelllbeFs el" the proje¢t teaill, hi those eases
where a NASA assesslnelll of tile impact of a ¢ontrihution [29] conld llOt he obtained, tilt'
assessinell[ was made hy the analyst on the projcct (Gall] responsihh" lee thai particular
field of technolol.>_'. These judgements [si¢l were, ill till'n, reviewed by ailother lnenlhel (it
the team.
Weighted averages t()l actual and potential impa¢t ','+'ere (aleulaled f(>l each field, in
each (if tilt' f<)tlr categories. A¢tual inlpact represents impact thai has already I)een real-
ized to date fronl the NASA ¢ontrihutions while potential impact rcpresents thc total
inlpact of the contributions 1o be realized. Using potential impa¢t as a nieasurc of total
impact [o be realized does not mean to inlply thai the estimated total impart will definitely
O¢¢tl1", since these are estinlales el +potential fhat might neveY he realized. Nevertheless, the
assesslnelli (if ilnpa¢i aheady realized (actual) versllS total inlpaet (potential) is an inlpor-
lanl con¢ept sin¢e it reveals nnlch abotlt the time lags experienced in applying NASA teeh-
ilOlogy to llOllaelospace flee(Is.
hnpacts of the NASA conlrihutions, average<t for Jill twelve fiehts by ¢ategory of
iinpa(l, ai-e shown in Pigure 1. Tile icchnoh)gi¢al inipa¢l el NASA conlrihutions is gi-eal-
esi, t()l]owcd t)y e(onoliii¢ inipaci, scicnlitic impact and social impart.
]'eehnoh)giral iI+npatt <)1 NASA ¢oiitribtitions, hy fields of te(hiiology, is shown in
Figure 2. The ieehnohigi¢al impact does [lOt appear to Yarv too greatly hetwccn fields,
with assessments ranging from nloderate to moderate to high. NASA contributions had
the highest technological itlipact upon the field of telelli('try and the lowest on integral=
ed circuits.
The s¢iemific impact of NASA contributions, shown in Figurc :_, appears to vary much
more by field of technology, wilh NASA having a very low inlpa¢l on some fields such a
nia¢hincry andjoiniilg, and a nioderate inlt)act on others such as nlicrc, wave syslelns an<l
internal gas <lynamics.
E¢ononii¢ impa(t assessnients, showil in Figure .t, ranged fl-onl tclclnetry wilh Ihc
hil4hest potential economic inlpact o[ those studied, to cnerg 7 ¢<mversioil with the lowest
potential hnpaet.
l,_xPL()riN(_ ]nu, LINKN()'_N 437
The (lire(t s_>(:ial iml)_t<l of NASA (ontril)utions varies g,rcatly I)('tw('('tl ticl(ts studied,
_ls shown in Figure 5. For most fi('lcls, NASA's (ontritmti(ms h_tve low soc'i_d impact. For
some otht'r ficl(Is, h<m_even such _tsgas dymmfics, simuhuion, ;m(I I(,h'Hl('lrv, the imp_t(t of
NASA's c()znributicms ;_ppro;_ch m()clc'r;tlc.
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[351 Impact of tire NASA contributions also varies with tile level of technological change
brought about by the contribution. +ks expected, class I c<mtrihutions have a greater
impact than class II contrihutions, and class I1 contributi<ms have a grealcr impact than
class Ill contributions. This was true tot each of the individual tields as well as tot the
twelve tields combined, as shown in Figure 6.
Taking the assessments of actual and potential impact tor each tield, the cxtt.'nl o[
impact already realized was determined by calculating the ratio of iml)act tell to date
(actual) to the total impact to I)e realized (potential). For all twelve fields, almost all of the
total scientific impact of the NASA c<mtvibutions has already bect_ tealiz_'d (911 p_-rcer_t_
as has the technological impact (70 percent). This is understandable in light of how these
types of impact are la]l'fected. That is, tire scientific and technological impact of a contri-
hution starts to be telt w'hen the contribution is still in its early stages of development.
Economic impact on tile other hand, is much more dependent on the application of the
contributions. The t_tct that Olfly 30 percent of the total economic impact of the NASA
contributions to the 12 lields has been realized to date indicates a lower level of applica-
tion. In the same way only 30 percent of the potential social impact of tile NASA contri-
butt<ms has bct'n realized to date.
The relationship between thc economic impact and rate of application was examined
tot each of the fields, and is shown in Figures 7 and 8.
Data on economic impact already realized tot each field was calculated as described
above. Figures on aerospace amt commercial applications were calculated from data col-
lected on each NASA contribution.
l.Tsing least squares regression analysis, there appears to be a valid correlation bclwc('n
economic impact and rate of application. This is as expected, and indicates that even
when a sizcabh" [sic] proportion of NASA contril)utions are tinding aerospace applica-
tions, the peFcentagc of economic impact realized is relatively low. With almost 55 percent
of the NASA contributions being applied in aerospace, only 30 l)crcent ot the economic
impact has been realized (Fig. 7). Economic impact realized rises more sharply as NASA
contributions find commercial applications (Fig. 8). However, with less than 25 percent of
thc contribtttions being applied commercially, it is not surprising thai the alllOttnl ot cto-
nomic ilnpact t_.'lt to date is only a stnall proportion of its total potential.
[36] [Figure 6 originally i)laced here.]
J37] J Figure 7 originally placed here.]
[38] [Figure 8 originally placed here.]
[39] A similar analysis determined that a correlation did not ,exist belwct,n techn<dogical
impact and applications rate. This indicates, as stated earlier; that the technological imf.vact
of contritmti<m rnight start It) I)e fc-lt much earlier in tire life cycle <)f the contribution, dur-
ing research or advanced development, and a good part of its lotal impact is probably
already realized by the time the contrilmtion starts to find widespread application ....
159] V. (;()N(JJ.;SIONS
The gencral conclusions of this study concerning NASA contrit)utions to the advance-
llle/ll ¢)|" Ina, iof (l,:'velol)rtlcilts ill selected tields of tcchnolo_' itwludc the t0llowing:
(l) the NASA contributions are indirect and varied; (2) the NASA contributions become
"embodied" in the advanced technologD' of a field; (3) the major c[tkwt of the NASA con-
tributions was tt) cause technological advancement to occur earlier than it would have oil>
erwisc; (4) the NASA contributions represented all levels of technology', including
step-changcs, incremental advances and consolidations; (5) the NASA 'tonlril)ulitms wcrc
in all stagt's o1" d¢'velopmental activity; and (6) the impact of ltl,t' NASA contributions
ranged t)-om low it) moderate-to-high.
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From these c<]nchtsi<)ns it becomes apparent that, it+ effect, NASA's role in adwtncing
t,'chnol,,g_, has heen to create a demand Jot the technolok,_ / to fill. Fttrlher, hy el+eating this
demand, NASA ;q_patently aided indltstry, in+ several cases, it] carrying OUt their own
devt!h4)metH effiwts to l+tlrther advance the technology' ill ;t |+(-It'|, restflting in new prot,l-
nils atld processes.
The impact <)f NASA contributions appears to be related to those |he]ors which are
inherent it] the contribution as well as those factors which deal with the uses to which the
contri|)utions are put. If the NASA contribution can be thought of as a stimulus ant,i the
impact as a response, there does not appear to be too great a time lag hetween the slim-
ulus provided by NASA's technohogical efforts which resuhed in the contributions and the
response in the Ihrm of technological anti scientific impact brought about by' these con-
lribtlti(ms. That is, most of the techn(flogical and scientific impact a contribution is going
t(> have is ti'lt within a reas<)nahh' time after the contribution occurs. For the it,h'nlified
contrihtllions, 70 percent of the technoh)gical impacl ant,l 90 pt,'.rcent of the scientific
impact has aheady hecn realized.
()n the other hand, the rate at which the economic impact of NASA's contributions
is ti'h, appears It) he related to the rate at which the contributions find nonaerospace
applicati<m. In tnany of the areas of NASA contribtttions, itldustry is reat,ly to take innne-
diate advantage of the lechn<)h)gical and scientific stimulus provided, with a resuhing eco-
nomic impact. In many other areas, however, a gap apparently exists between the NASA
sfinmlus and the ahility of industry to respond. In these cases, only a small proportion of
the potential e(onolnic impact inherent in the NASA contribution can occur.
The net resuh is that with only one-quarter of the identiliet,l NASA contribttlions
being applied c<)mmercially, the am<tun] of economic impact teh to ],late is hess than olle-
third of |Is potential tolal impact. With a greater rate of con]n]crcialization, the e¢on<+t]]-
ic hnp;tct of NASA contribnlions could he expected to rise sharply.
444 _I'ACI,I ,ks AN INk'F.SrMI,'.Nr IN [_,C()N()MIC (;R()V,,+['t[
<.=
_,.L2
:'Z '="
_..'-,
E_
+<
Fz
100
75 -
50 -
25 _
@ Cryogcni( s
• Simul_
hm'gr:. _t (:inuit_/
S MacldHing
• Me_ '['t'h'mvtr_
/_'" . ....... 0 *l"itlit'g
/ O(_cramit s • NDT
•"/" __' '1"''i .... I
25 5O 75
]_'t'tct't}tagt + _d NASA (:<)z;tril)uti<ms ;,+.'itl'_
Mililar'¢ or AerOSl>a((. Al)l)li('ati,:ms
100
Iggv+re 7. l?elatmn+hip lJetwee, l'.'++momi< l,npm+l ,tl,'e+,';('v 16.Miz,.d /+,.. NAS, A Co.tnhut.m_ a.d l'_.p,. /.m q/C, mt_zbuti+m+
I'+.dn+ K Military m , lYr+J+ptlft' , tpphrat.,.+
]_2X I'I ,{ }RIN{ ; I1 IE I. I NKN{ )WN 445
,.._-
_Z
I ()(}
75
50
25
O { ,
D Simulali°n
• Int{_'{l (]Ircuits
OMa( hitting/
./
Z .... O.l"iuiug
/ NI}T O M i( H }',*,'ax c_,
O (2{'t,4mi{ ',
F:n"'rg2" ( :{)_" {'I si°nl I I
2.'} ,1"}0 75 Ill0
Pt!r{t'lltabB + {if NASA {]ontrit}titii}i]s with
{ ]Olilin{'l'{ i_l] At)plic+ttions
t+'ig.u.. <_}'+IPehtti.,dUp Belwee, t..'r.mm+i+ hnpm/ Already IPealized From NA.%I ('xmtrilmtirms a,d t'mp+.rtiml O[ ('ontrih, t,ms
Findi,g Commerrml Applicati+m+
Document 111-9
Document title: "Quantifying the Benefits to the National Economy from Secondary
Applications of NASA Technology--Executive Summary," NASA CR-2674, Mathematica,
Inc., March 1976.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
7'hi,s _tudy examined fimr ea+w._of major technologies (cryogenics, gas turbines, integ_ated cilrait._,
and the NASTIL4N _wmputer proLwam) that NASA had advanced duTJng the 1960,_ and L_hOTl'eCI,
bawd o. eco.omie studie_ and intervieTi_, that their benefit.s couhl be as high as $6. 9 billion over te.
;eaE_. Mathematiea, Inc., wlied on miclveeonomie consumer ,_u_plus theme% which i,_ a mme tradi-
tio.al approach to mea,_uring benefit.s and more easily understood than production fu.ctio.
approache_. Most O] the Denq[it,_ resulted.[ram the earlier introduetion of the specific technolokB' rather
tha. the deveh,pment +}/the teehnoh_gB"' itw!f.
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Quantifying the Benefits to the National Economy
from Secondary Applications of NASA Technology--
Executive Summary
[ 1] A. INTR()I)U(71"ION
In the 1958 law establishing Ill(" Natioual Acronaulics and Space Administration,
(]ongrcss charged NASA with conducting its research activities "so as Io contvil)utc.., to
the expansion of human knowlcdgc of phcnomena in the alm<)spht, rt, _lllft Sp_l('t'."
Recognizing II'l_ll .%tlt'h knowledge, like much of tile knowledge generated by research,
could also have potcntial applicability in non-acrospa(c S('CD:)IS of the ('conomi', (;ongrcss
further dircclcd NASA to "provide for lhc wich'st praclicabh" and appropriate dissemina-
tion of iuli_rmation co]werning its activities and tilt" I-eslLhs tllt'rt'of."
NASA's success in accomplishing its aerospace ol)jectivcs is unquestioned. Thc
achicvemt'nls of the satellite programs, maimed sl)acc flights, and cxphwalion of tilt'
nIO()ll ill'C draln;+.lic and well-known, lx'ss clear, however, is the CXl('ill I() which the knowl-
¢'dgc developed in the NASA programs has t)ecn us('ftd outside its ovigimtlly inlctlch'd
aeronautical and space al)plitalions. Whih" literally hur]dreds of instances of noll-
at'vOSl)acc al)plitalions, ranging fv<)m lilt" (a,diac 1)att, maker It> gas tttrl)incs, have t)ccul
calah)gctl, hatdly an vlhing is kllowtl of the (lu;tnlilativc ccollomic significaJwt. ()f NASA's
col_lribulit)lls.
The ptn'l)OSc of lhis study was to develop preliminary cslimates of the cc<_n<_mic t)cn-
t't]ts t() the 1 !.S. t'ct)nonly t]om secondary al)pli(-ations of "NASA tcclmology." If It'thllol-
ogy is dcfincd as the body of knowledge let concerning how socictv's res(>ut-(es can I)c
c<md)incd It) yield economic goods mid services, then NASA Ict_hllt>h)gy I'C])l('S(qll,";,
NASA's (ontril)ution to this body ()f Icchnical knowtcdgt'. Secondary applicationls rcti:r to
uses (>1 NASA gt'llt'rat('d knowledge fi)r 1)tlr])t)st's other than Ihost' l)rinlavy mission-
<)ri,t'llt<.,d OliOS for which the original R&I) was douc. Tlwsc applicatious occur whclwvt,r
a non-NASA cntily, with ov without t'llCOllli_.ff, t'lllCllt tl't)lll NASA, list'S this knowledge in
SI)lIIt' t't'OlIOmic activily.
B. MEASUREMENT AI_PR()A(:tt
The developnlctlt of procedures to quantil}' the economic I)enclhs of s¢'condmv appli-
cations involvcd lilt" adoption of conccpts and tools that art' theoretically s()ttnltl ;lll(I Vet
practically ustqtd ill dealing with a wide varit'ly of applitalions o[ NASA Ic(hnoh)gy. Tht+.rc
art" two key 10undational clcnwnts of Ih(' apl)r(Jach: one, an understanding (>t how t('ch-
noh>gi(al change g('llCl'_tt(2,'4 t'conollli(' t)('nt'fils; and two, a dt'termitlali(>n o1 the v_l(' Itl;,ll
NASA ('m] play in tilt" process of tcchnoh)gical change.
1. The Ec,,n<mfic Beneths ofTt'chn,)logical (_hangc
Ill t)l'(>a(l t('llllS, tilt' ('t'OlIOllli(" [)I'O('('S,',+; illv<)i',t's tht' ('()llX'('l's, iOll <)f socit'Iv's stock ()1'
rt'sourccs into goods and services and the salc or cxchangc of thcsc goods and stqvi(cs ill
the marketplace. This ;ttlivity g('n('ralt's +-'('OllOmic I)t'll('Iils I)v allowing people to c<mstunc
dcsirt, d c<)inl)it]ations of goods and scrvices. Advancing t('cl_l]olo_,Q: itwrcast+s tilt.st +bctlc-
lits I)y alh)wiHg society Io g('l IlIOl't_ flonl tht" S;llll<," slo('k of IUSI)LUI+('(.'S.
I31 The spc('ific ul('thods for quantit_'ing t'cc)nomic bcncths hay(" t)ccn the sut>jctt ot
much disclnssion in thc cconomi('s literalurc. The inosl widely accepted pvilwipl(, tot eval-
uating ('c<_notni( I)cNcfils is Ik_tmdt+d on illtlividuals' "willillgllcSS to pay" to nlov¢' I'r<>m a
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"less" to a "more" preferred stale. What this 1)rincit)le translates into fi}r tile purposes here
is that tile benefits of lechnological change can be measured as tilt" cost savings generat-
ed by new or improved production processes plus the extra value lha! consumers attach
u} new or improved tinal products. Theretm'e, by deternfining how cost and demand [br
various products are affixled by specific technological advances, one can estimate the
benefils of these advances.
2. The Benefits l)uc Io NASA
The rest,arch process by which technological advances are generated typically involves
a complex interaction of various groups and individuals. Ill solving tilt" l)articular prob-
h.nls associated with all} advance, the individual research "actors" build on or combine
their results with those generated by others. As a resuh, all), "credit" for tilt" benefits cre-
aled by a particular advance shotfld, in a real sense, be shared by the various contributors.
The goal here, of course, is Io assign a particular share It) NASA in some specitic cases.
The melh{_d lot assigning fills share is based on the prenfise that NASA R&D led t{) an ear-
lier rcalizalion [4] of tilt" particular technological advances being considered. In other
words, had NASA not done ils R&I)--and had its faihne to do so not led It) changes in
R&I) t}y others--these lechntdogical advances would indeed have <wct,rred, I)ut at a later
date.
If mw accepts this view o[ technological advance--and it has been proposed and
<hqimde<l by a number of authors--then the measurement of benelits attributable to
NASA becomes, at leasl theoretically, a rather straightl+orward task. These bt'nelhs tan be
IIwasnled as d+e difference between tile present vahle o| t'_vo benefits streams: one, the
stream resulting fiom the advance as it has occurred, and two, the stream that would have
rcsuhed had NASA not been involved.
In each of tilt + specific cases technical experts outside the NASA establishment were
questioned about the speed-up resuhing fronl NASA's role. ()f course, there was st)me
variation in theirjudgnwnt. In order to allow for the inherent uncertainty ill this aspect
_}t+ the Sillily, calculations were made based on ahernalive assumptions concerning the
extmn to which NASA acceh+rated the time stream of bcneths. More specitically, benelits
wel'e calclllate{[ based (ill a Illillill}llll}, a lllaxinltlln, all(| a conservative "prol)able" speed-
tl l} due to NASA.
(L RESUI£1'S {)F{;ASE STUI)IES
Bel0re describing the resuhs of the analysis, three points are worthy of mentitm. First,
lhe case studies are by no means 151 a random selection from the possible cases which
might have heen examined. (;ases were deliberately selected where data were awdlable,
where NASA's role was widely acknowledged, and where I)enefils were anticipated to be
relalivelv large. (]<msequently, until additional experience with more cast+ studies is
acquired, it is not possible to draw infi.+rences regarding the total secondary benelits of
NASA's R&I). Second, because the case selection was not random and because of the inno-
vative natme of the work, all effort was made to be conscrwltive ira tilt" calculations. Third,
the brief discnssion of tile cases which follows is not sulticient tbr a fitll understanding of
the qlmlilicati<ms and limitatitms of tilt+ analyses. To acquire a more complete coml}re-
h<'nsion of these, a careful reading of tile technical report is required.
I. (:ryt}genic Muhilaver Insulalion Materials
NASA's role in cvy{}_,t'nic tecluufl{}gy is an {mtgr{}wth of the etlort Io nfinimize tilt"
wcight, v{}hmw, and evaporative loss otgases used in launch and [light ilrt>lltdsi{m s+vslmns,
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lit_: support systems, and power generation on board spacecraft. An integral part of this
general con¢elll WaS lhc design of improved insulation systems. The development of cryo-
gen|(" instdali(wt /ethnology' has ('t_,ntribllled substantially to the rapid growth of the cry<_
genies industry.
In this case study, benefits are calculated as the cost savings generated |ly the use of
nmhilayer insulalion inswad of file next best [61 instdalion material (perlite) in file trans-
port of liquid hydrogen, liquid helimn, and liquid nitrogen, it should be emphasized that
other savings arise from file use o[" muhilayer insulation with liquid hydrogen, helium, and
nitv()gen, insofar as it is used t() insulate storage tanks, i)il)ing and other eqttipnlent used
ill the production of these liquid gases.
The two principal sources of measured cost savings due to muhilayer insulation are:
reduced t)oil-of[ h)ss during the time the cryogen is transported, and reduced transporta-
tion costs due to the lighwv weight of muir|layer insulated tanks. Benefits were estimawd
using an engineering approach it) specit_, tile relevant technical relationships between
evaporation h)ss, weight, and insulation characteristics. The "best guess" or "probable"
estimate of beneiils is $1,054 million.
2. hHegraled Circuits
Prior to 1960, conventional eh'ctronic (ircuitr_' was based on tilt' assembh, of individ-
ually encapsulaled circuit components such as transislors, resistors, capacitors, and
diodes. Integrated circuit lechnoh)gT--the combination of these circuit functions on an
inseparable, continuous base--provides significant advantages over conventional circuit
technohlg3', particularly in smaller size, h)wer power consmnpti()n, increased speed ()f
operation, improved reliability, and redtlced cosl per electronic function. These fealures
make integrated circuits especially attractive tk)r space applicatit)ns.
The intrt)ducfion of integrated circuit technologD' produced significant chang('s in all
ele(lroni( products, including cttnsunler electronic products, and the estimates of the
I()tal benefits to advancing integrated circuit technoh)gy reflect its very widespread applic-
ability. [7] Based on a simuhaneous equation estimation of the demand tor integraled (-iI:
cults, estimates of benefits were derived. The "probable" estimate is $5,080 million.
3. (;as Turbines in Electric Power (;eneration
Since the early 1940's NASA (then NAt:At has been intimately involved in gas llnlfine
lechnt)logy, primarily as it relates 1() improvement of jet engines for military and com-
mercial aircraft. This basic research has also produced benetits in Ihe production of ('lec-
tric power, as gas turbines have beet)me rot)re widely used as sources o|' peaking pt)wer and
standby capacity.
The use t)f gas turbines ill electric power generation tmdoub_edly con/ers may social
benelils; e.g., gas turbines are relatively "clean" |rt)nl an environmental point ()f view and
also enhance the reliabiliQ, ()f power produ(tion. Nevertheless, the estimates ()f benefits
are based only on the |uel cost savings in power product|oil produced by mq)rovenlcnls
in gas lurl)ille perfortnance, hnprovenlents in gas lurbine performance are assumed It)
resuh |rt)m advances in turbine lechnoh)g3'; gas turbine vintage was used as a prox.v for
le('hnt)h)gy level ill these calculati()ns. Using standard regression analysis, the relationshi 1)
belween gas mrbit)e vinlage and lit(" average cos! of fuel col)sulned in tilt: |)rodu(lion o1
i)t)+_er was eslitnated; based on tiffs relationship, a "l)robable" estimate t)t tht' tt)tal fuel
c()st savings of$l l 1 million was dett'vmined.
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[81 'I. NASTRAN
NASTRAN (NASA Strut:lural Analysis) is a general purpose finite element computer
soflware pa(kage for static and dynamic analysis of the behavior of elaslic slructures.
Industrial users are generally product engineers in mechanical or civil engineering appli-
cations such as aircraft and autonlohile production, bridge construction, or power plant
modeling.
N,.\SA's (;ochlard Space Flighl (k'nler developed NASTRAN, lhrough a combination
of in-house and conlracted research, over the period 1965 Io 1(.171). It represented sub-
stantial improvcnwnt over similar exlalll programs, and was released to public users in
Nowmber of 1970.
Because fivw published data cxisl regarding the extent of use of NASTIL.MN, estimates
of cost savings from the use of NASTRAN were obtained fronl telel)h<nle interviews with
a sample ol users. From tilt" sample responses the "probable" benelits accruing to the pop-
ulatiotl <)| NASTRAN users werc estimated at $701 million.
1). S[!MMARYAND (:()N(:IMSIONS
A summary of tile "lnohabh:' estimates [or each case study is presented in Tabh" 1. ii
indicates that total hcnelits due to NASA ti)r the [bill cases studied arc prot)ably on Ill("
order of $7,001) million.
[9 ] Table 1
Results of Benefits Estimation
Estimated Prohahle I)rohahlc Benetits
lnlerwll of NASA Acceleralion Aurihtttablc lo NASA
Tcchn<dogy Benefits Estimation (Years) (Millions)
(;as Tinhines 1969-1972 1.0 $ 111
( ;ry()gcn its 1(`)60-1963 5.0 $ 1,054
Integrated ( :ircnits 1963-1982 2.0 $5,080
NASTRAN I !)7 I-1 (`)84 4.0 $ 701
Total -- -- $6,946
[ 10l In interpreting the resuhs of this study ()tic should recognize that it in one of the first
ol its kind ever attempted. The results, while arrived at through careful and rigorous tech-
niques, are sensitive to data uncertainties and analytical sinlplifications. Though one must
necessarily view such rcsuhs with caution, it seems that the folh)wing general observations
could he safi:ly made:
• Opcralional inethods can be developed for estimating the secondary benefits ()t'
lnissiol| oriented R&D.
• Secondary beneths attributable Io NASA's R&D programs nlay be impressively
large. For examl)le, the $7,1)00 nlillion total for the fi)ur cases studied is more
than twit:e NASA's present yearly t)udget.
• Because secondary benefits im W indeed be significant, public decisions contcrn-
ing the alh)calion of resottrces to research and dcw'lopment programs should,
where possi/)le, consider such l)(,nefits.
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Document II1-10
Document tide: "Economic Effects of a Space Station: Preliminary Results," NASA, June
16, 1983, pp. 1-2, 20-21.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This study, sponsored l_, the NASA Alumni Leagme, reports on only the direct and indirect empire'-
merit and income that were generated b), NASA spending. It came as ,%'tSA was weking White ltonse
approval to initiate a space station program. Although the impacts are pre._ented t_, indust17 and
state, the benefits only represe_,t the multiplier efJects of the spending patterns 01 NASA. These Jind-
inks and similar studies were important in rvnvincing legqslators how imp_rrtant ,%_$SA 's fmdKet had
be_vme to their reffions. The following text is the introduction and conclusion,s from the fir:_t draft o]
the report.
The Economic Effects of a Space Station"
Preliminary Results
[I] 1.0 INTRODUCTION
This report disctLsSCS the economic effects of a manned Space Station. Since the
major reasons fin building a Space Station are nol economic, this report will also discuss
some of the non-economic benefits to be gained. Some of these t)enefits include:
• The Space Station will enhance the defense posture of the United Slates by
demonstrating an ahilily I¢)control lhe high ground of space.
• The Space Station will build respect tor the industrial strength of flw nation by
proving the ahility to initiate and maintain large-scale, high tec]molog 7 programs.
• The Space Station program will increase the nation's pride and contidencejusl as
the Shttule and other space programs have done.
Since few of these benefits can be quantitatively assessed, it is not ti:asihle at this tinle
to jttsti|_ a Space Station on economic grounds alone.
To look at the Space Station program from an economic perspeclive, the program is
divided into two major phases: a develol)menl F,hase and an operational phase. During
the development phase, cash flows will consist primarily of government expenditures (to
plan, design, construct, lest, and deplo,v the Space Station hardware) and the resuhing
direct and muhiplier effects of those expenditures on the economy, l)tH-ing the opera-
Iional phase, the direct economic eftkwls will diversil_' as a variety of government and pri-
vale Ctlstomers begin to use the Space Slillion.
An imporlanI point thai needs to he staled is the level at which a Space Station will
inlhtence the economy. During the development phase, the expenditures will be Ioo small
io notice at a macroeconomic level (e.g., abotH .25% of the (,ross National Product).
However, the development expendilufes will have signiticant effects for sF,ecific industries
and locations. The (_l)erational phase should have a major iniluence on the overall econ-
omy as [2] the technolog 5' spreads throughout all sectors. A Space Station could open the
door to the creation of a whole new industry based on space operations and may provide
the stimulus fi)r new and improved consumer products. The projected revenues [or (ore-
inertial space activities are highly tmcertain due to the length of time (10-20 years) being
a(Idrcssed. The most likely near-term effi'ct an operational Space Slalioll will have is Ihe
reduced cost of l)erft)rming cerlain missions in space.
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The following sections will discuss tile cost of Imilding and operating a Space Station,
the efl_wt of Space Station expenditures on the economy, the potential savings on planned
missions, the new or improw'd capabilities that will be provided by a Space Station, tile
inlluence of new lechnolog3, Oil the economy, and the opportunities fi:w new space indus-
tries ....
[20] 8.0 CONCI,USI()NS
The acquisiti(m of a Space Station will sut)slanlially enhance the ahility of NASA to
more effectiw_ly pertorm the planned space missions of the 1990's and will eslahlish an
exciting capahility [or the posl 2000's that could foster the growth of a broad range of
thmncially altrac'tive space endeavors. The Space Station is a project that is consistent with
existing NASA hu<lget levels and does not conflict with the nation's economic policies of
a balanced 1)n(lgel and rcdu<e<l Federal deficils. In facl, the capabilities ollcrcd hy the
Spa<-c Station result in cost savings through the 1990's that arc approximately equal to lilt'
cost of lhe Project.' l,argcr cc,momic benefits are expecled beyond the year 2000.
The existence of a Space Slation will also stimulate evolving commercial Ol)portmfi-
tics ill space, h will provide a permanently manned and easily accessible research and
<tevelol)ment facility toy new space ventures and ensme the lmtion's leadership in the
industrial t}onliers of space.
The real value ola Space Station, however, extends beyond economic benetils.
The Space Station will also c<mtinue the unbrokcn chain of Uniwd Slates advances in
space technology that has existed lot 25 years. It will once again demonstrate the in<Ins-
trial i)rowess and military strength that has made the United Stales a great nation, h will
also enhan<e lhc contidence and pride the people of this country have for their nation.
[2ll REFERENCES . . .
4. "Space Station Nee<Is, Auribntes and Architectural Options Study: Final Report,"
(]Olltract NASW-3680 (eight reporls by various authors), 1983.
Document II1-11
Document title: "The Economic Impact of the Space Program: A Macro and Industrial
Perspective," prepared for Rockwell International by The WEFA Group, Bala Cynwyd,
Pennsylvania, May 1994, pp. 1-4 (reprinted with permission).
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
?'o support the _pa<'e station [_ogram, Rockwell International commis._ioned IV'rYA (which had
merged with Chase) to conduct an analysis of the industrial and economic impacts of the space sta-
tion prog'ram expenditures. It did not calculate impacts of new technology, but instead focused on the
total multiplier impact on jobs and income from NASA. This study was used to develop political sup-
port [br the space station I_ illustrating that investments in high-tech industrie_ were beneficial. It did
not analyze impacts if the money, had been ._pent elsewhere or if there had been a tax cut of equal pro-
portiom. 7"he /bllowinL_ &just the report's executive summary.
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The Economic Impact of the Space Program:
A Macro and Industrial Perspective
[ 1] Executive Summary
In this stu(,ly, the nlacr()cc()n()niic and indltstry impacts d lhe National Aeronauti((s
and Spa(.-(.' Administration l)rogranl <)n Ihe I/.S. c(,ononlv at+(,` t'valuate(I. !1i) p(,,rti)vnling
this study, Th(,! WEFA (;roup's llla.CiOe((7OllOllli(,: model ot +tile U.S. eCOllOtll.v an(,I its
hl(,tusirial Analysis Se,vice inodd were tttilized. These simulations were generated t)y
removing NASA expen(,litures ti()m th(,' curr(,qll baseline prt!jections of economic activity.
The NASA program provides the following economic impacts:
Bv 1997, an estinlaled 380,O00jol)s ill tilt' [I.S. (,,conomv are generated by NASA relat-
ed aclivity. Summary Figure 1 (,tepicts how many jobs would be lost ill the U.S. ectmo-
nly if the NASA Iludgel were diminaled begiuning iu tiscal year 199`5. Aerospa(,e,
COlillllltnicati(',llS cquipnlciit, transpt)rlaliOll (,'qlli])lilelll, industrial mac]linery, ilwtals,
tes(,'afch all(,l consulting servi(,(,'s, and (,'()llSlruclioll jobs are highly dependcul upon
NASA. These ('lllploylIwl)l cslil]lales t]ow ffc)lll dirl'cl sources (govefllllR'lll ('olllfac-
|ors), indirc(,l sources (the contracl(,)rs' supplier n(,'twork), and expenditure related
(leedlhrough o1 cnlploylnenl and incomc) s()tlfCCs. The direct and indirect enll_loy-
incur totals 217,000, with atlother 163,000 due to tilt" mttltiplier impact oH the Ivsl of
the economy. One important tacct t)f this analysis is Ihal lllally of I]le industries |den-
lifted as likdy beneficiaries of NASA programs are the in(,histries that are ilnporlani
it) tile (()untry's ac|lievem(,'lll of critic:tl i(,'chnol()gi(,'s, as id(,'nlil]ed l)y the l)ep;lilnl('lll
of( :()nlmer(,e, lhe Of lice of tit(" Vi(,<<'Pr(,'si(,lent, and the Council on (_ompelitivcness.
These Icchnd()gi(,'s in(,lttd(," Appli(,,(,l M()h,cular Biolog,3', Distribtlted (]omptlting and
Tchccommttnicalions, Fhexil)le Manut_l(luring Ele(,trical Supply and Distribution,
Mater|adS Synthesis and Processing, Mi(roelectr()tfi(,s an(,I ()ploeleclroni(,s, and
Soflwar(,'. While no one _v()ldd Inak(,' an a)guin(,'ilt that certain ilidustries are sa(r(,'d, it
is true that Ill(" l.vtl(,'s ()f ac/iviti(,'s that NASA ftlnds c()rrelal(," highly wilh nlam' lech-
u<)lt)gi(,,s thai have I)(,,(,'n id(,'nlitied as kvy t() the l.!S. cc()n()my'x fulur(' (()nlpetitiv('ness.
lFigtu<<" 1 originally placed hcre.]
12] • Au estimated $23.49 billion ()t r('al (;l)P It;ross l)()mestic I),oduct] (('c<)n<)nlic
oulput) ill tilt' U.S. e(.OllOlily is lie(,I to activities at NASA b v I{)(.17. Between 191.).r) and
L>O00, lh(,' space pr()granl will (,()nit|but(' :i (-immlative additi()n (11 $130 billion t() r(cal
(;DI). This (,'Stillldte d()es ilOl in(hld<<' lilt," liltl-ease l() (;1111 thai llli,_hl r(,'suil fl-()lll I(,,(h-
nological innovation. Summary Figure 2 displays tile loss of real ccollolllic ()lllpul thai
woul(,I o(,(,ur if lilt: NASA bu(,Igel were eliininated beginning ill tiscal year 11.195. The
p()sitiv(,, impact on the econ(,)nly is t,u- greater than just federal outlays on NASA. Due
1o NASA's purchases ()t goods all(I servi((,'s, firlllS increase their ()ulptll au(,I enlpl()y-
inent, prolll(itilig personal illcoinc gr(lwth, tlighcr pels(mal into|n(,' growth catlses
COliSUlliers Io raise lheir pllichases. (]apilal iilveslillcill is slinlulaled du(,' Io its high
._c_l.sllJlil)' to olllplll growlb. | |i_ber lill'(,'sliilt!/ll ]t'a(.t5 II,_a _icaluf acclllTilllalJoll ill I]R"
t ;tpilal stock, pronioling l)rOdilClivily _lowlh ;tlld If.S. hliernalional (,olni)elilivencss.
[Figure 7 ()rigin<llly plac(,,d here,1
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1t the NASA budget were eliminated, there is a loss of economic output, lower employ-
ment, and decreased corporate profits which reduce federal tax receipts. Payinents
ft. unemployment insurance and other related transfer payments rise, increasing gov-
ern ment expenditures on lhese programs. The combination of lower tax receipts and
higher transtkr [)aylnenls offlsets much of the impacl of tile elimination of the NASA
budget on tilt' t_,deral surphls. By 1997, the tiederal budget improves by only $1.6(I bil-
lion relative to what it would be if NASA spending of $16.14 billion were not cut.
Summary Figure 3 highlights the exlenl of the improvement in the fi'cleral t)udg_'l if
the NASA budget were eliminated beginning in fiscal year 19{.)5.
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Additionally, potential technology spinoft_ ti-om NASA-derived research would be lost
if NASA programs were eliminated (such as artificial intelligence, advanced rob()lics,
optical communication, and advanced computers). Because of their cuuing-edge
nature, NASA programs are highly conducive to promoting technolog)' advance-
ments. This store of technology is an important national resource t)ecause it can I)e
adapted to develop new products and processes.
NASA's human space flight program provides the following economic impacts:
• By 1997, an estimated 179,000 jobs in the U.S. economy arc created t)y the human
space flight program. The composition of the job gains are similar to those of tim total
NASA hudget. Man)' industries identified as likely beneti(iaries of the htnnan space
flight program are those that have been determine(I as important to the country's
achievemetlt of critical technologies. Mt,ch of the research and developmetlt ('florts
taking place at NASA's human sl)ace tlight program are (lev<_ted t(> high-technoh)g 3'
s¢'(tors and stimulate employl]lenl ill these vital sectors ()f the ('('()hOlily,
• An estimated $8.37 billi(m of real GI)P in the U.S. co<moray is fled t() Ih(" human sl)ace
tlight program by 1(.)(.17.Between 1(.t(.15and 2000, the human sl)ace tligh! program will
conlril)utc a cumulative addition of $44.4 billion to real (,l)P. This estimate does sol
include the increase to (;I)P that might resuh ti+()m technological innovation. Though
the transmission mechanism of l('deral expenditures on the hun]an space tlight l)r() -
gram throughout the economy is similar to the tirst simulation, the impact is lowm
(tue to the smaller expenditures. ()ne of the most critical ben('tits tot the U.S. ec(m()-
my tiom NASA's hunlan space tlight program is the stilnuh,s it provides to cal)ital
investment. We estimate that by 1997, capita] investment is aided t)v S1.12 bi]li(m.
Investment in equipment benetits the most and lends to foster productivity growth.
[41 • If the human space tlight pr(>gram were eliminated, the t('deral deticit w(ml(I not
improve as much as the ('xpenditure cuts. The comhination of I()w('r tax receipts and
higher transfer l)ayments oll_et much of the iml)acl of th(' ('liminati(m oi le(leral
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expenditures on lilt: Imman space Iligh! program. By' 1997, the ti'deral budget
improves by only $0.80 billion relalive to wha! it would be if"NASA spending on !he
hmnan space tligh! program were not cut.
Polential technology spinofl_ would t)e lost if lhe human space [light program were
eliminated. Much of the research in the human space tlight program is taking place
in artiticial intelligence, advanced robotics, optical comnu,nication, and advanced
computers. These arc all areas !hat would have clear commercial applications.
NASA's space station program provides the following economic impacts:
• By 1997, an vslimated 55,000.jobs in the U.S. economy are created by the space sta-
lion program. Many arc in high-technology sectors (such as high-tech capital goods,
electronics, telecommunicatioTlS, and software development). Employment a! aero-
space, (ommunicati()ns equipment, transportation equipmenl, and induslrial
machinery manuli_cmrers are dependent upon tim continuation of sp:,lce station t)ro-
gram. ()ver tit(, nex! couple of years, spending on the space station program will cen-
ter on the final R&I) and on manufacturing. While tit(' eslimaled employment
impacts arc smaller than !he other two simulalions, lit(" industries most impact('d
again show a high correlation with those sectors !argeted as critical tor national com-
petitiveness.
• An estimated $2.60 hillion of real (;DP in the U.S. economy is lied to the space sta-
lion program by 1997. Belween 1995 and 20(10, Ill(! sl)acc station program will con-
Iribule a cmnulalive addition of $13.8 billion to real (;DP. This estimale does not
include flu" increase lo (;DI' lhal might resul! from !ethnological innovalion. The
Iransmission mechanism throughout the economy of li'dcral expenditures on the
space slation program are similar to the first two simulations, but the estimated
impact is lower due m smaller expenditures. An important implication of the eco-
nomic activity associated with the space station program is !hal i! promotes propor-
tionally more lowar(Is investment in equipment than either the total NASA bu(lget or
Ill(" ]lun|arl sl)a(e flight program. Therefore, the pro(luctivity enhan(ing properties of
th('s(' t}..deral expenditures are high.
• If lh(" space station program were eliminated, the li:deral deficit would nol improve
as nnIch as lhe expenditure (:tits. The combination of lower tax receipts and higher
!ransli:r payments offset much of the impac! of the elimination of these federal
expendi!ures. By 1997, the federal budget improves by only $0.26 billion relative to
wha! it would be if spending on the space station program were not cut.
• Potential technolob,n, .' spinofls would be Iosl if !he space station program were elimi-
nated. Similar to the human space flight program, much of the research is taking place
in arlificial int(qligen(e, adwmced robotics, optical communicalion, and adwmced
computers. All of these areas promise a high degree of commercial applications ....
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t_'_,1988, p_4vate seetm activities in space wew beg6,ninj( to g,+row rapidly, particularly in the com-
muaications satellite and laumh vehicle _ector_. The Rea!za, administration i,gsued thi* presidential
directive, which, .[or tke first time, made the creation o] commercial opportunitie,_ i, Ltmee a major
compone,t 0[ national space polio,. It prohibited NASA/_vm operating an expe_dahle lau nck veki-
tie prol,_am and e, courag_ed the L_over, ment to purchase +vmmercial lau,ch _ervice._. Also, it ealh'd
/or open prorate opportunitie.s i, ,space in microLnavity, remote ,sensinL_, and other space ventures
where thme was the potential [br commercial apemtions.
Ino I)agc numl)cr]
For hnmediate Rclcase February tl, 1!188
The President's Space Policy and Commercial Space
Initiative to Begin the Next Century
FA(:T SIIEET
The President today remounted a cOn|l)rehensive "Space Policy and Commercial
Space Initiative to Begin the Next (]enlury" intended to assure [!niled States space lead-
ership.
The President's program has t|nee lnajon ('OlllpOllelllS:
• Establishing a long-vallge goal to expand hlllllall plesellce alld activity |)eyond
Earth orbit into the Solar System;
• Creating opportunities tk>r [!.S. commerce in space; and
• (kmtinuing our national commitment to a permanently manned Space Station.
The new policy and pr()glalllS are contained in a National Security Decision l)ire(tive
(NSDD) signed I)y the President on.January 5, 1988, the 1_' 1989 Budget Ihe President will
sul)mit shortly to Congress, and a tifteen lp(fint Commercial Space Initiative.
I. EXI'ANDING HUMAN PRESENCE BEYONI) EARTtt ORI'IIT
In the recent NSDD, the President committed to a goal of expanding human pres-
t!ll('e alld activity in the Solar S'VSIUIII. "Ib lay the fOtllldatioll ['of this goal, the President will
be requesting $100 million in his FY 1989 Budget fi_r a major new technolo_' develop-
nlent program "Project Pathth|der" that will enable a broad range of malmed or
unmanned missions beyond the Earth's oft)it.
Project Pathfinder will I)e organized around fi)ur major lotuses:
-- Exploration technoh)g_,;
-- ()pevati<ms technolo+.,_:;
-- lhmlans-in-space technoh)g_'; and
-- Transfer vehicle techtlolob,_,.
This research effi)rt will give the United Slates know-how in critical areas, such as
humans in the space erivirotnnent, closed loop lift: support, aero braking, orbital translkw
and 111anetlverillg, Cly<)gt!tlic storage atld handling, alld lal+g¢ + s('ale spa((, operations, alld
provide a t)ase fk>r wise decisions on long term goals and missions.
Additional highlights of the NSDD are outlined in Section IV of this []tct sheet.
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['21 II. (;REAT1N(; ()PPORT[_NITIES FOR U.S. C()MMER(:E IN SPA(:E
Th(' l'resident is remounting a tiftcen point c()mnlercial space initiative to seize the
opportunilies t0r a vigorous [!.S. c<mmwrcial presence in Eatth orbit and beyond--in
research and lll;_lllltl_l('llll'illg. This initiative has lhlee goals:
• lq+onl,t)ling a slrong U.S. commercial presence in space;
• Assuring a highway |o space; and
• Building a solM teclm()logy and la]et)t h,asc.
])r<)m()ting a Str()n,g U.S. (;()nnmet+cial Presence in St)act"
PliVat(' S,t'clof Space Facilily: '['h(" President is ann()uncing an inl,t'nl Ibr lh(+' Fcderal
(,()vernlnCnt I() ],t'as(" space as an "anch(tr tenant" in an (trl)iting space |acilhy suitat)lc
lot r('s('arch and ,t()nmmrcial nlanufat'tttling that is thmmcd, ('()llstYll,t'ted, and op(.'r-
ate(I I)x th,t' Illiv;l,|' s,t'(.l()l, Tim Athninisllalion will s()li,tit l)rOp(tsals from lh(." l.r.s, l)t.i-
val,t' s(',tl()t" It)l stl(']l a tacilily. Space in this facility will l),t" used and/<tv stdtl¢'as(*d I)v
V;-ll'i+>llSF(',tleral ag,t'nti,t's with illl,t'l'eSl in mitt,|)gravity research.
Thc Administrati()n's inl,t'nl is It) award a conlract during inid-sunmlcr ot Ibis veal, tc)]
su(h Slta(c and nt'l;tlt'(l St't'%ri('(_S I() [)e availal)h" t() the (')()Vt'llllllelll If() later lh_ln lh,t'
cnd ()i FY I(.)!)3.
Sl)a(ehal): The Athninislration is c(mmlitting to make b(.'st effonts t() launch within the
Shut(h' payl()ad liar, in lit(' eatly I(.)(.)0s, the commercially devehtp('d, owm,(l, and man-
ag('d Shutth + mithh'(k moduh': Sl)acehal). Matfitt'sling t-cqui]em('nts will dcl)t'nd (m
('LLS(()III('I d,t'lllalld,
Sl),w(,hal) is a I)r('ssut-izcd metal (ylinder that fits in the Shullle ])ayl<tad bay and con-
n(+.tls I<) the (T('W c()nll)altlllcnl thr()ugh the orbiter airlock. Spacehab takes up approx-
imalely <)ne-qtJ;u-tt'r ()1 Ill(' ttayh)ad bay and increases lilt" I)rCSSttriz('tl living and working
sJ:*a¢c ()I an ()rl)ilt,Y Ity appr()xitn;tlt'ly 1,000 cul)i(" l(!('l ()r ,i00 l)erc(.'zll in useable research
v()lum(,. Th(" lacilily is int('ndt'd it) l)e ready for commvrcial us(" in mM-l(.)(.)l.
Micr<)gravity Research Board: The President will establish, through Execulive ()rder,
a Nail(trial Microgravily Research Board t(t ttSSlllt' tlnd c()()rdinal(" a l)r(:,ader range ()f
(tpp<trtunitics l_)t research in microgrm,'ity conditiotls.
NASA will oh;tit lhis board, which will include senior-level representatives trom Ihe
l)clmrlmcnls of (:onun('rce, Transportation, Ener_', and Defmlse, Nltt, and NSF; and
will ((tnstdl will) Ihc univcrsily and commercial seclors. The 1)oard will h;tve lilt" f<)l-
h)wing resp()nsil)ililies:
• T() stixnulal(' research in microgravity envirotmtrnts and ils ;ill)lie;lions t() c()m-
m(.r(+ial uses I)y advising Federal agencies, including NASA, on micr<)gravity l)ri -
()ritics, and c()nsuhing with private industry and acattenfia on micr()gravity
research ()pportunities,
• T<) develop policy recomntendalions to the Federal (;overnmenl on matters relat-
ing to microgravity research, including types of research, governnwnl/indus-
try/academic cooperation, and access to space, including at l)otential launch
VOIH'h('I" pF()glallllS;
• 131 To c()()rdinale the ntitrogravity pr<)grams of Federal ;tgencics by:
-- rcvicwhlg ag('n(-y I)lans t_)r microgravity research and vet<thin|ending i)riorilics
1()1 lilt., us(' ()t F(.dcvally-<)wncd or h'ased spa(e on mict()gravit?, tacilities: and
458 SI'ACF. ,ks AN INVESTMENT IN ECON()MIC (;R()WIH
-- ensuring thai agencies establish merit review processes for evaluating micro-
gravity research proposals; and
l't) promote Iransfk*r of fcderally funded mioogravily research u) the comnwrcial
sector in furtherance of Executive ()rder 12591.
NASA will continue to be responsible for making judgments on the satlety of experiments
and tot making maniti'sfing decisions for manned space [light systems.
4. External Tanks: The Administration is making availahle lot five years tim expended
external tanks of the Shuttle tlccl al no cost to all feasible U.S. commercial and non-
l)roth endeavors, for uses such as research, slorage, or manul_cturing in space.
NASA will provide any necessary technical or other assistance to these endeavors on
a direct cost basis. If private sector demand exceeds supply, NASA may auclion the
external tanks.
l)rivatizing Space Station: NASA, in coordination with the Office of Management and
Budget, will revise its guidelines on commercialization of the U.S. Space Station t()
clarii_' and strengthen the Federal commitment I<) private sector investment in this
program.
6. Future Privatization: NASA will seek to rely t<) the great-est extent t_.'asil)le on private
sector design, financing, construction, and operation of tuture Space Station require-
ments, including those currendy under study.
7. Remote Sensing: The Administration is encouraging the deveh)pmen! <)f commercial
remote sensing systems. As part of this effort, lhe Depar!ment of(;ommerce, in con-
suhation with other agencies, is examining potential opportunities fin tnlnre Federal
procurement of remnlc sensing <lata from the U.S. commercial sector.
Assuring a ttighway to Space
Reliance on Private Launch Services: Federal agencies will procure existing and
future required expendable launch services directly from the private sector t() the
tulles! extent feasible.
9. Insurance Relief fin l,annch Providers: The Adminism_tion will lake administrative
steps to address the insurance concerns of the U.S. commercial launch industry,
which currently uses Federal launch ranges. These steps include:
[4] °
Limits on Third Party IJability: (;()nsislent with the A(hninistration's tort policy,
the Administration will propose to (;()ngress a $200,000 cap on noneconomic
damage awards to individual third parties resuhing ticom commercial launch acci-
dents;
IAmits on Pr()pcrty Damage IJability: The liability of commercial launch opera-
tors for damage to (;ovcrnmcnt proper!,/ resuhing from a commercial launch
accident will be administratively limited to the level of insurance required hy !he
Depm'tment of Transportation. If losses to the (,overnment exceed this h'vel, !he
C,overnment will waive its right u) recover [i)r damages. If losses are less than this
level, the Government will waive its right to recover for those danmges caused by
(;overnmen! willful misconduct or reckless disregard.
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I O. Private I,aunch Ranges: Tile Administration will consuh with the private sector on the
potential conslrncti()n of commercial launch range facilities separate from Federal
Pacilities and the use of such t_tcilities by the Federal (;ovcrnrnent.
1 I. Vouchers lot Research Payloads: NASA and the Department of Transportalion will
explore providing 1<) research payload owners mani[ested on the Shultle a one time
launch vou(hev lhaI ('an he used to purchase an ahcrnalive U.S. commercial latmch
servi(e.
Bttil(ling a Solid Technoh)t.,'y an<l Talent Base
12. Space "fe(:hnology Spin-Oil;s: The President is directing that the new Pathlinder pro-
gram, the Civil Space Technolog O' Initiative, and olher technolog O' programs be con-
ducted in accordance with the tolh)wing policies:
,, Federally tunded conlraclors, universities, and Federal laboratories will retain the
righls to any palenls and technical data, including copyrights, that result tiom
these programs. The Federal (;overnment will have the authorily to use Ihis intel-
lectual property royalty [fee;
* Pr<)poscd lechn(>logics and palents available for licensing will he housed in a
Pathtindcr/(:STI lit)rary within NASA; and
• When contracling for commercial development of Pathtin(l(q, CSTi and other
te(tmolog_' work products, NASA will specilT its requirements in a manner thai
provides conlra(lors with maximum flexibility to ptusuc itmovative and creative
apl)roaches.
13. Fc(tcral Expertise on Ix)an to American Schools: The President is encouraging
Federal scientists, engineers, and technicians in aerospace and space related careers
to lake a sabbatical year to teach in any level of education in the United States.
14. Education Opportunities: The President is requesting in his FN 1989 Budget cxpand-
ing tive-lold opportunities for U.S. teachers to visit NASA tield centers and relak'd
aerospace and vniversity facilities.
In addition, NASA, NSE and DOD will contribute materials and classroom experi-
ments through the Department of Education to U.S. schools developing "tech shop"
programs. NASA will encourage corporate participation in this program.
15. Protecting U.S. Critical Technologies: The Administration is reqoesting thal Congress
cxlcnd 1o NASA the authority it has given the Department of Defense to protect from
wht)lcsale release under the F,eedom of Informalion Act those critical national tech-
m)h)gies and systems that art: prohibited from export.
[5] III. (;()NTINUIN(; THE NATIONAl, COMMITMENT TO THE SPACE STATI()N
In 1984, the President directed NASA to develop a permanently manned Space
Station. The President remains committed to achieving this end and is requesting $1 bil-
lion in his t'N 1989 Budget tot continued development and a three year appropriation
commilment tiom Congress for $6.1 billion. The Space Station, planned for development
in c()ol)eration with U.S. [iiends and allies, is intended to he a multi-purpose I_tcility to,
the Nalion's s(ience and applications programs. It will permil such things in space as:
research, observation of the solar system, assembly <)f vehicles or facilities, storage, servic-
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ingofsatellites,and basing for future space missions and cmnnlercial and entrepreneur-
ial endeavors in space.
'Ik_ help ensure a Space Station thai is cos[ effective, the President is proposing as part
ot his (',ommer(ial Space Iniliative actions to encourage private sector inveslmvnt in Ow
Space Station, including (lirecting NASA to rely to tilt" greatest extent ti:asiblc on prixale
sector design, limmcir% construction, and operation of liHure SF,ace Station require-
lnenls.
IV. AI)I)ITI()NAI+ ItI(;tII.I(;HTS ()F TIlE.IANUARYS, 19,m,8 NSI)I)
• Space l+eadershiF,: I+eadership is reiterated as a fund.lmental national objective in
areas of space activity critical to achieving U.S. national security, scientitic, ecollOlllic
and toreign policy goals.
• Detining Federal Roles and Responsibilities: (;overnment activities are specitied in
three separate and dislinct sectors: civil, national security, and n<mgovernmental.
Agency roles and responsitfilities are codified and specific goals are established lot the
civil space seclor; those tin +other sectors are updated.
• Encouraging a (:ommercial Sector: m sepalate, nongovernnlenlal <)r commercial
space sector is recognized and ellCOttl+;tged bv the Federal (;oveFnlllelll actions shall
not preclude <w deter the continuing deveh)pnlent of this sector. New guidelines are
established to limit tlllne('essary (',<)vertllllelll competition with the private sect()l-all(t
ensure that Federal agencies are reliat)le customers tot conlnlet+ciat space go<_ds and
services.
• The President's launch policy prohil:,iting NASA from maintaining an expendal;,le
launch vehicle adjunct to tlt<_"Shuule, as well as limiting commercial and li)reign pay-
loads on the Shuttle to those that ;:tle Shuttle-unique or serve national security or lot--
eign policy puri+_,oses, is reaflhmed. In addition, policies endorsing the l)ttrchase of
conlmercial launch services by' Federal agencies are further strengthened.
• National Security Space Sector: An assured capability ti)r nalional security nlissi<)ns is
clearly enunciated, and the survivability and endurance of critical national security
space tunctions is stressed.
• Assuring Access to Space: Assured access to space is recognized ;is a key element of
national spacc policy. U.S. space transportation systems that provide sulli(ient
resiliency to allow continued operation, despite Ii:tilut+es ill arty single system, are
emphasized. The mix of space transp<)rtati(m vehicles will be define(I t<J SUl)p(ut mis-
sion needs in tile IllOS[ cos[ eft_,+ctive lllHllllel-.
• Renlote Sensin W Policies fin Federal +'rem<_te sensing" or observation of the Earth ave
established to eltc<)tll;lge the (leveh>pment of U.S. connnercial s_,'SteltlS competitive
wilh ov superior to foreign-operated civil m ¢mnmercial systems+
Document 111-13
Document title: National Space Policy Directive 3, "U.S. Commercial Space Policy
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These Bush admini._tration ffuideline._ expanded on the earlier Reagan administration presidential
directive (l)oeume_Pt 111-12). Tlu 3"explicitly recoLmized the use q/._paee /br commercial pu_])oses a_ an
importa_t eleme_d in developing the i_+ter_mtional competitivem,._s O] the [ "hired .SYate+. The3, detail
many ,¢over_ment i*_itiative_ that ran ge/iom a requirement to pu_vha_e eommeleially availal_le _paee
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products and L_ervices to the avoidance of govervlment ret..ulation_ that couhl preclude or deter com-
mePrial _pace activitie.L In addition, thQ' direct the ,goz,ervtmen! to enter into trade ne£mtiations that
encourage market-oriented compelitiot_ on an it_ter_mliot+al hasi_.
[no page number]
Nalional Space Policy Directive 3
February 12, 1991
U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines
A l+t,ndamenlal <)l_jective guiding Uniled States space aclivities has been space h'ader-
shill which reqttires lweeminence in key areas <)I space activity. In an increasingly com-
petitive illtel'll;lli(Tlla] ellvil'()lllll(!lll, the I.:.S. (;()Vellllllelll encourages the COllllllel-cia] IIse
and exl)loilation of space techtlologies and systems for national economic benefit. These
<,fi+brls to en(ourage commercial activities It+lUSt be consistent with national security and
fi)reign policy illlel+ests; international and domestic legal obligations, including t!.S. com-
nlillnents to stem missile prolitt'rati+m; and agency mission requirements.
[lnited States s])ace activities are conducted ])y three separate and distincl sectors: two
[7.._. (;ovel'lllllelll seClOl+s--the civil and llali(>na] security--and at Ii<)llg()verntnenta.| COlll-
mercia] space secl<)r. The c<)nllnelcial space secl()r illC]tldes a broad cross seclioll <)f poten-
tial pr<Mdet+s and users, including both established and new nlarket participanls. There
also has been a Iecell[ elllel-gell('e ()[" ,qtate govelnlllelll inilialiv('s related to ellC()lll'agillg
commercial Sl),t(<: activiti,us. The (<re+inertial space sector is comprised of at h:ast live tllal--
ket areas, each encompassing both F'.arth- and space-based activities, with varying degrees
()1 market inatttrity or potential:
Satellite (;omnmnicatiotls--the l)riwtte development, manufacttwe, and _q)eration 771
commtHlifalions satellites and Inarketillg ()f satellite te]ecollllnHtlicalions services,
inchtditLg position location and navigation;
l+atmch and Vehich! Services--the private development, manul_t¢turc, and operation
of hum('h and reentry vehich% and lhe marketing of spa(( + tratlsp<wtati+m services;
Rtqllole Nel+sinlg--lhc l)rivale devclopnlellt, lnanl1[aclllre, and <)pel+ati<)ll o[ lClll()te
st'tlSitlg satellites and the processing and marketing <)[ renlole sellsillg dala;
Malerials l'rocessing--lhe experimentation with, and production of, organic and
inorganic materials atnd l)roducvs utilizing the space environn]enl; and
(;ommercial lnli+astrtwture--lhc private development and provision of space-rclaled
support lacililies, capabilities, and services.
In addilion, olher market-driven commercial space sector opportunities arc emerging.
The tI.S. (,overnment encourages private investment in, and broader responsit-fility
li+l; space-related aclivities lhat can resuh in pr(Tducts and services Ihal nleet the nee(ts o1+
(;overlltnent and olher cttstonlers ill a competitive nlat+kel. As a matter o1 policy, the U.S.
(;()V('l'lllllelll plll+SlleS its commercial space objectives without the use of direct Federal sub-
sidies. A rol)usl cotnmercial space sector has the potential to generat(? new lech]lol<>gies,
l)r<Mucts, markets, .jobs, and other economic l)enefits for the Nation, as well as indirect
l)enefits for nathmal sectLrity.
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(;ommercial space sector activities are characlerized by tile provision of products and
services such that:
[1II-20]-- private capital is at risk;
-- there are existing, or potential, nongovcrtmwnlal customers lot th(' a('[iVil+V;
-- the commcr(i;tl mmket uhimalcly determines the viability of the a(tivhy; and
-- primary responsibility and managemt'nt initiative |or the a(livity rcsi(|cs with the
|)rival(" st't't()r.
hnl)lcmcnting (;uidelint's
The tolh)wing ilnplcmcnting guidelines shall serve to provide lhc U.S. priva+lc st'ttor
with a level of slabilitv and predictability in ils dealings with agencies of lhe tT.,',;.
(;overnmenl. The agvncies will work separately but cooperatiw_ly, as appropriate, lo devel-
op specific measures to imph,menl this slrateg),. U.S. (_OVel+nlllenl agencies shall, ¢onsis-
tent with national security and foreign policy interests, iiltcvnational and domestic legal
obligations, and agency mission requirements, encourage the growth of the U.S. com-
mercial space see+lot in actordanct, with the following guidelines:
• U.S. (;overrmlent agencies shall utilize commercially available space |)toducts and set-
vices to lhv fullest extent tk'asible. This policy of encouraging t.'.S. (;ovcrnnlenl agen-
cies to pttrclmsc, and tim private sector to sell, comnu'rcial space products and
services has i)otentially large economic I)cncfils.
-- A space prodtlct or service is "commercially available" if it is t:urr<.'ntly o|]i'r,pd
commercially, or if it (<mid be supplied commercially in ]csponse to a
(;ov('lllll](,lll pl()(lll-(Hll('llt i(,(|l.l(,sl.
i "Feasible" I]l(';.tllS thai.| proclucts and scqvices meet mission l'eqtlil('lll(qlts hi a cosl-
C ['f('<.'l iV(! I11_.111 [ l (!l'.
-- "(:ost-efl_'cliw"" gem,rally lllC;lllS thai the commercial i)r<_ducl or smvice costs uo
Ill()l'(' [h;tll gllv('llllllCIl[_ll dCV(!IOpIIICIll oi" dil't'cled [)l'()('lll'('lll('lll I+vh('l+(" Sll('h
(;ovc,+nmcnt costs include applicable (;ovcrntncnt labor and overhead costs, as
well ;+iscontractor chalges and operations costs.
-- ] lowever, the acqttisiti<m of commcrcial space products and set+vices shall _{'ll('l-
ally t)e c<msidcvcd {<>st cff_'ctivc if they ;11<,+ i)t-ocured competitively llSitlg i)crtor -
matlce-bascd contracting techniques. Such contractin R tcchniqt,cs Rive
COIIII';.I('IOI'S the I+rcedom and financial imcnliw' t<) achieve e<'<momies <)t scale by
combiuing lhcir (;overnment and c<mmwrcial work, as well as hwrcased produc-
tivity through innovati<m.
IIII-21]
U.S. (;ow'tnmcnt agencies shall acliwqy c<msid¢'t, at dm carlicsl appv<>priatc timv,
the ti:asibilily of Iheir using commercially available products and smvices in
agency programs and activilies.
-- U.S. (;ovevnmcnt agencies shall (ontinuc to lake al)l)t+<q)lial{ . in<:aSUl+t,s 1<) in-olt'ct
fiom disch>stuc any proprietary data whic]l is shared with the U.S. (;ovetnmcnt
in tim acqttisilion of c_mmwrcial space products and smviccs.
(;ovcrmncnl agencies shall promote the llallslt,l o[ U.S. (;<w¢'tnmcnt-dcvcloped tech-
nolohQ to the [)rivalc sect<)t:
-- U.S. (;ovcrnment-dcvelol)cd tmclassificd space Ivchnoh)b,_+ will I)e Ir;ulstk'tr,pd to
the IC.S. commt.rcial space st'clor in as limcly a manner ;as p<_ssit)h" and in ways
thai t)rott+,{l its commel-(:ia] v;lluc.
-- U.S. (;(:,vt.rnnlt.nl agencies may undcrlake c<)Ol)m+ative research and development
aclivitics with the private sector, as well as Stale and local govcrtmwnts, consistent
with policies and ftmding, in order to fulfill mission requirements in a tnanncr
which +.'ncouragcs the creation of commercial Ol)pOrtunilics.
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-- With respecl u, technologies generaled in the ])ertormance ot(;ovt'rmnenl contracts,
U.S. (;overnmenl agencies shall obtain only flmse rights necessary Io meel
(;overnmenl needs and mission requirenlenls, as direcled by Executive ()rder 12591.
• IT.S. (;()vcrlllnen[ agencies lllay make tlllllst'(t capacily of space assets, services, all([
infrastructure awdlable tor commercial space sector use.
-- Privale SC('IoF list' of [.!.N. (_ovel'lllllell[ agell(y space assets, seFvices, all(t ill|]-a-
Sll'llClln'c shall be made availal)le on a reimlmrsable basis consistent wil]l ()MB
(;ircular A-25 or approl_riale legislation.
• (;ovcrnmenl agem ies may make available Io lhe i)riwtle sector those assets which hay{'
t)eell (lclelnlilled lo ])c excess lo tile iCtltlilelnt!lllS of the [!.S. (;OVel-nlnell[ ill ac(Ol--
dance wilh [LS. law and applicable internalional II'c:lly obligations. Due regard sh,tll
|)¢" givell l(I ||IC ecollolnic impact Sllch transfer IllaV have oi1 Ihe COllllllClCia] space sec-
lol, promoting compclilion, and lhe lonDterm imblic inleresl.
• The [!.S. (;overnment shall avoid regulating domeslic space activities in a manner
lhal precludes or (lelers commercial space se(lor activities, excep| to tile cxlcil{ iit'(-
essary to meet inlernalional and thmlestic legal ol)ligalions, including lhose of lhc
Missih, Technology ( ',entre] Regime.
Documen1111-14
Document title: "Fact Sheet, National Space Policy," The White House, National Science
and Technology Council, September 19, 1996.
Source: Documentary History Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington
University, Washington, D.C.
i_l'7,ile |hA a&lwsw.s a fidl range O/ _pace poll 0, issues, it is also the.firsl p_z'_ide_tial space pofiry dire_.
tire lhal directly, a_M ,_pecifically details the p_ocess tO' which the Lrover_me.l ('at_ stimulate ecmmmic and
burliness activity fiom ._pace pro t,wams. It reflects flu, end 0[ I]le ( )dd ll'hr, the shrinking fi, deral disc_v-
timmr_' budgwt, the matu ri(_' o/._ome parl._ Of the spray [notg'am, and itlternational _vmpetitive prev_ u te_.
[ l J For hmm'dia|e Reh'ase Septembe,- 19, 1996
in|rodtlclion
Fact Sheet
National Space Policy
( 1) For over th,ee decades, the United States has led ihe world in the exploralion and use
of other space. Our achievements in space have inspired a genera|tim of Americans
and people throughout the world. We will maintain this leadership role by SUl)porl-
ing a sir(rag, stable and I)alanced natit)nal space program that serves our goals in
nail(real securit},, foreign policy, economic growth, environmental slewardship and
scientitic and technical excellence. Access to and use of space is cenlral tot preserv-
ing peace an(I prolec|ing U.S. nalional security as well as civil and commercial inter-
esls. The lJnilc<l S|ales will pursue grealer levels of i)arlnership and coopcratiolt in
national and inletnational space activities alld WOlk with oIBcI" nations m ellSllle tile
continued exploration and use' of ou|er space tot peaceful purl)oses.
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(9) The goals of the U.S. space program arc t{}:
(a) Enhan{e knowledge of lhe Earl}l, the solar system all{} the univ{.rs{" i[n{}tlgh
human and r{}boli{ CXl}I{>ration;
(1}) Strt+.llglhell ;.tlld mailllain Ih{- llali<}nal s{_:{'ulily {}| tile |.Jniled Stales;
(c) Enhance Ih{" ccon{}mi{: Cmnl}etitiveness, and scienlii]{ and technical capabilitit's
of tile Ullitcd Slalt's;
((|) Eil{{}ula_{_ SlalP, h}cal and private s{'{tor invcs[lll{_nI ill _lll{| lISt,_{}f spa{{' [{'{tl-
noh}gies;
(e) Promole international {-<}<}p{'ration t{} further U.S. domestic, nati{}nal s{'{'urily,
an{I ti}reign p{}licies.
(3) The United States is {+{}mmitle{I t{} the exploration and use of {ml{'r sl}ao." I]'_ r all
nations lk}r pea{cful purp{}ses and li}r the benetit of all humanity. "Pea{eful 1)url}{}s-
es" alh}w defense and inlcllig{nlc{'-related activities in l}ursuit {}t+nati<}nal se{-urily alld
{}filer goals. Tilt" Ullil{'{t States rtjects any claims to sovereignly I}V ally nali{m over
Oilier space <}r {+eleslial 12] t}{}{lies, or any porti{m thereof and rcj{'{ls any limilalions
t}n the fun{larncntal right of s{}vcr{'ign nations I{} acquire {tala |i+om sl/ace. Tile Unit{'{t
Stales considers lilt? sl}a{+e S'VSlE{'IllS(}f ;Ill}' nation l{} Ilc national l}r{}t)crty with the right
{}f ]}assage through and operations ill space wilh{}ul interti:r{'n{e. PurI}{}scful inter-
ti,ren{+{" with space systems shall I}c viewed as ;tII il/fl-illg¢'lnenI {}II s{}vt'r{'igll rights.
(4) The U.S. {;{}v{,rnm{'nl will maintain and {oordinate separal{' nail{real security and
{ivil spa{{" systems wh{'r{' {lifti,ring nc{'{ls {ti{ta_[c. All a{li{ms ml{Icrtaken by ag{:ncies
and del)artnlents ill iml)lcnwnting the national spa{{" policy shall be {{msisu'nt witll
[r.S. law, regulati{ms, nati{mal s{'{urity rcquircnwnts, ti}reign policy, international
ol}ligati{}ns and nonprt}liferali{n] [}olicy.
(5) The Nail{real Sci{'n{'{' and Tcchnolog, T' (;<mn{il (NST(;) is ill{' prin{il)al ti}rum ti}r
rcs<}b,'ing issues rclat{'d I<} nafi{}nal si}ac{" policy. As appr<}priat{', th{' NST(; and NS{:
will co-{hair policy l}r<}{ess{+s.
This i}olicy will be implcm{'nt{'d within the overall res{mr{e and policy gui{lanc{' llrovi{l -
{'{I I}y the Presi{leni.
{ ;ivil Space {;ui{lelines
(1) The National A{.r<mauti{'s and Spa{e A{hninisnalion is Ill{' lead agency ti}r res{'arch
and {tev{'l{}I}nl{'nl ill civil spa{{' activilics.
(2) NASA, in {{}ordination with other d{'l)arlmcnts and ag{'n{ies as apl)r{}priatc, will locus
}Is rest'arch ;rod devel{}l}nlt, nl efforts in: spac{" science lo enhanc{" kn{}wle{lge of the
solar system, the universe, and fmldamental natural and physital s{iell{'t's; Earth
ol}st,rvatil}n Io b{tll'r understan{I gl{}bal change and lh{" etIi_{'! {}|' nalllra] ;Jn{I hlllll;lll
i|/}hu'n{'es {m lilt' cnvir<}mnenl; hmnan sl)a{et}ighl to c{mduct s{ientitic, r{mnner{ial,
cxpIorati{}n a{tivilies; and space tc¢hn<}h}gies and applicalions to d{w{'l<}t} new tcch-
n{}l{}gi{'s in stipp<}II {}f [T.S. {;{B/{Wlllll{'ll| tle{'{ls and {)llr {!({}n{}llliC {oml}ctilivl_ness.
(3) To enable these a{+tivitics, NASA will:
(a) }){,velo[} and {}peralc the intcrnati{}nal Spa{e Station t{} sUI}l}ort activities rc{luir-
ing the unique attri|}ul{'s {}| hillllallS in st};l{{" ;lll{I {.shtblish a [}crman{'nt |llllll;:lll
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presence in Earth orbit. Thc International Space Slation will support future deci-
sic,ns on the t{'asil)iIily and desirability of conducling further human exploration
activities.
(b) %_,_}I'k with Ill+`' private st'clot to {hweh@ flight demonstrators thai will support a
decision l:,ylh{' end of tilt'+`lecadc on development oI a nexl-_cneration reusabh"
launch sys{(,lii.
(],[}ll[i1111e _l Ml"Oll_ {Ollllllillll{'lll to spact! s+`it+ll+`t, anti E;tII]I scienoe l)r+`)gl-a111s.
NASA will undertake:
(i) a sustain+`'d program to Sill}port a robotic presence on the surlhcc of Mars by
year 2000 lot flu' purl}oSCS of scienlilic res{!Hl'ch, cxphwation and tcchnolog,T
developlncnl;
(ii) a hmg-wrm program, using innovative new technologies, to obtain in-sire mca-
sure'lllenls and samplc r{'turns from the celestial bodies in the solar syslem;
(iii) a hmwternl program Io identit), and characterize planctary bodies in orbit
al'Olllld {)[ht'r MalS;
(is,) a l)rogran] of hmK-term obserwuion, research, and analssis of the Earth's
land, oceans, atn_osl}here and their interactions, including continual m{'a-
surenlt_nls from the Earth Observing SVslem l}y 1998.
(d) In carrying {}ut lhesc aclivilies, NASA will develop new and innovative space`" Icch-
II+`}[(}_itPS aIl([ slnal]+`!l till}I{" capable spacecraft to ilnp1ov{, I[1{" pt'rt<w111;lllCU ;Ill+`[
Iow{,r lht' cost of futurc space missions.
(4) Itl lilt! conduct of these research and development progranls, NASA will:
(a) ]+'.nstH+`, sal_+.ly on all space flight missions involving Ill+.' ,_piic{' Shtlll]{' alld Ill+` +
InlernatioIlal S[}ac{' Stalion.
(18 l+hnphasize flight programs that rt:duce mission costs and development litn{:s l)v
imph'tnenling innovative pr<)curenlen! practices, validating new lechn()h)git,s anc'l
promoting parlncrshil}s between government, industry, and academia.
09 Atquire spacecraft tron+ 1he private sector ttnlcss, as delcrmincd by the NASA
Athninistrator, devcl<}pmcnl requires the ttnique technical capabilities o[a NASA
(t'n It'r.
(d) Make use of relevant private sector remote sensing capal)ililies, data, and inf<w-
marion products and establish a demonstration program Io purchase data prod-
ucts [ronl the U.S. privatc sector.
[+st+ c<m+lpetition and peer review to select scientific investigators.
Seek to privatize or commercialize its space communications operations no later
than 20(15.
Examine with l}oD, NC):L& and other appropriate federal agencies, the ft'asil)ilily
of consolidating ground tacilities anti data communications systems lhal cannot
mherwise I}e prt)vided by the private sector.
Co)
(t)
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(5) The 1){'partmenl t}FC{munerce (DoC), through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), has the lead responsibility for managing Federal sl}ace-based
cMl {}pcrational Earth observations necessary to meet civil reqtlilt'ltle111s. 111 this role,
the l}oC, in coordination with other appropriate agencies, will:
(a) acquire data, conduct research and analyses, and make required t}re{licli{ms
at)+`}ut tilt" Earth's environment;
(t}) {,ms<}lidatc operational [!.S. (;overnment civil reqnirements tor data pr{}dncls,
and define an(I operate Earth observation systems in supp{}rl {}f operational tnon-
itoring nccds; and
(c) in acct}rtlance wilh {urrcnl policy and Public l,aw 102-555 provide fi)r the rcgu-
lati{m and li<<'nsing of tilt' <}l}cralion of private sector remote sensing systems.
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(6) The Department of the Interior, through the U.S. Geological Survey (US(;S), will
maintain a national archive of land remote sensing data and other surface data as
appropriate, making such data available to U.S. (;owwnment and other users.
(7) The Department of Energy will maintain the necessary capability to supp<wt civil
space missions, including research on space enerb, _, technologies and space radiation
effects and satt'ty.
National Security Space (;nidelines
(1) The United Stales will conduct those space activities necessary for national security.
These activities will be overseen by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) consistent with their respective responsibilities as set tbilh
in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, other applicable law, and Executive
Order 12333. ()ther departments and agencies will assist as appropriate.
(2) Improving our ability to stipport military operations worldwide, inonitor and respond
to strategic niilitary threats, and monitor arms control and non-proliferation agree-
ments and activities are key priorities for national security space activities. The
Secretary of I)efense and 1)CI shall ensure thai defense and intelligence space aclivi-
ties are closely coordinated; that space architectures are integrated to the maximum
extent [easit)le; and will continue to modernize and improve Iheir respective activities
io collect against, alld respond to, changing threats, environments anti adversaries.
[51 (g)
(a)
National security space activities shall contribute Io U.S. national security hy:
providing suppori for the United States' inherent righ! of selF-defense and our
defense commitments to allies and friends;
(b) deterring, warning, and if necessary, defending against enemy attack;
(c) assuring that hostile tortes cannot prevent Ollr own rise of space;
(d) countering, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile purposes;
(e) enhancing <Jperations of U.S. and allied tortes;
(f) ensuring otu +ahility to conduct military and intelligence space-related activities;
(g) satist}'ing military and intelligence requirements during peace and crisis as well as
through all levels of contlict:
(h) supporting the activities of national policy makers, the intelligence community,
the National Command Authorities, combatant commanders and the military ser-
vices, other ti_deral otticials, and contintfity of government operations.
(4) Critical capabilities necessary for executing space missions must be assured. This
l-eqnirement will t)e considered and imt)lcmented al all stages of architecture an(I sys-
tem planning, developmenh a(quisilion, operation, and SUl_porl.
(5) The l)eparmmnt of Energy, in coordination with DoD, ACDA [the Arms (;(mtrol and
Disarmament Agency] and the I)CI will carry out research on and developmenl ot
technoh_gies needed to ett;vctively verily' international agreements to control sl)ecial
nuclear materials and nuclear weapons.
(6) Defense Space Sector (;uidelines:
(a) DoD shall maintain the capability 1o execute the mission areas of space support,
force enhan(entent, space control and force applicatitm.
(b) In accordance with Executive Orders and applicable directives, I)ol) shall protect
critical space-related technologies and mission aspects.
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(c) DoD,aslatmchagentforboththedefimscandintelligencesectors, will maintain
the capability to evolve and support those space transportation systems, infra-
structure, and support activities necessary to meet national securi_ requirements.
DoD will be the lead agency for improvement and evolmion of the current
expendahle launch vehicle fleet, including appropriate technology development.
(d) DoD will pursue integrated satellite control and continue to enhance the robust-
hess of its satellite control capability. DoD will coordinate with other departments
and agencies, as appropriate, to foster the integralion and interoperability of
satellite control tbr all governmental space activities.
(e) The Secretary of Del_nse will establish DnD's specific requirements for military
and national-level intelligence infi)rmation.
(f) The Secretary of I)eti:nse, in concert with the DCI, and tot the purpose of sup-
porting operational military forces, may propose modifications or attgmentafions
1¢) intelligence space systems as necessary. The DoD may develop and operate
space s_sle/ns to support military operations in the event that intelligence space
systems cannot provide the necessary intelligence support to the DoD.
(g) Consisten! with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and
maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if
directed, deny such tieedom of action to adversaries, These capabilities may also
be enhanced by diplomatic, legal or military measures to preclude an adversary's
hostile use of space systems and services. The U.S. will maintain and modernize
space surveillance and associated battle management command, control, com-
munications, computers, and intelligence to effectively detect, track, categorize,
monitor, and characterize threats to U.S. and friendly space systems and con-
tribute to the protection t)f U.S. military activilies.
(h) The United Stales will pursue a ballistic missile defense program to provide for:
enhanced theater missile defense capability later this decade; a national missile
defense deploymenl readiness program as a hedge against the emergence of a
long-range ballistic missile threat to the United Stales; and an advanced technol-
o_ program to provide options fiw improvements to planned and deployed
delenses.
(7) Intelligence Space Sector (;tfidelines:
(a) The D(3 shall ensure that the intelligence space sector provides timely intorma-
lion and data Io support foreign, defense and economic policies; military opera-
tions; diplomatic activities; indications and warning; crisis management; and
treaty veritication, and that the sector performs research and development relat-
ed to these functions.
(b) The D(:i shall continue to develop and apply advanced technologies that respond
to changes in the threat environment and support national intelligence priorities.
(c) The 1)(;1 shall work closely with the Secretary of Defense to improve the intelli-
gence space sector's ability to support military operations worldwide.
171 (d) The nature, the attrihntable collected information and the operational details of
intelligence space activities will be classified. The DCI shall establish and imple-
ment policies to provide appropriate protection for such data, including provi-
st<ms for the dedassification and rel.ease of such information when the DCI
deems that protection is no longer required.
(e) Collected intormation thal cannot be attributed to space systems will be classified
according to its c(mtent.
(t) These guidelines do not apply to imagery product, the proteclion of which is gov-
erned hy Executive Order 12951.
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(g) Strict security procedures will be maintained to ensure that public discussion ot
satellite reconnaissance by Executive Branch persomwl and contractors is consis-
tent with I)(3 guidance. Executive Branch personnel and contractors should
refiain fronl acknowledging or releasing intbrmation regarding sawllile recon-
llaissancc until a security review has been made.
(h) Thc tollowing tacts arc UNCLASSIFIED:
(i) That the United States conducts satellite pht>toreconuaissante ft>r |)e_weful
purposes, ilwluding intelligence collection and monitoring arms ('Ontl_l
agreements,
(ii) That satellite photoreconnaissance includes a near real-time capabi]ily and is
used to provide defense-related inlbrmatitm tot indications and warning, and
the plamnng and conduct of military operations.
(ill)That satellite photorecommissance is used in the collection of mapping,
charting, and geodetic data and such data is provided to authorized fi'deral
agencies.
(iv) That satellite photorcconnaissancc is used to collect mapping, charting and
geodetic data to develop global geo(tetic and <'arlographic mawrials it) sup-
port dei_.mse and other mapping-related activities.
(v) That satellite photoreconnaissance can t)e used to collect scientilic and envi-
rOlllllelllal dam alld data Oll ilattlra] of iTlall-illade disasters, and Sll(']l data
can be dissemimtted It) at[thor[zeal [k_deral agencies.
(vi) That phomreconnaissance assets can be used [o image the Uniled Stales itll(I
its territories and possessions.
(vii) That tile U.S. conducts overhead signals imelligencc collection.
(viii) Thai lhc I_!.S. conducts overhead measurement and signature intelligence
collection.
(ix) The existence of the National Recommissance Office (NRO) and tilt' idemi-
flea[ion and official titles of its senior oMcials.
All <)tiler details, [:acts and products of intelligence space activities are suhiect
to appropriate classification and security controls as determined by the I)(3.
(i) Changes to Ihe space intelligence security policy set forth in the national space
policy can 1)e authorized only t>y the l'resitlem.
Commercial Space (;uidelines
(1) Tile fun{lamental goal of U.S. commercial space policy is to support and enhan{c U.S.
economic c{)mpetitivcness in space activities while protecting U.S. national security
and foreign policy ill|eFests. Expanding U.S. commercial space activities will generate
eCOllt!,mic I)enel]Is t(_l Ill<:' Nation and provide Ill<! U.S. (;()veinlllell[ with an increas-
ing rauge of space goods and services.
(2) U.S. (;overmnent agencies shall purchase commercially available space goods and ser-
vices to the fifth.s! extent tk'asible and shall not conduct activities with commercial
applications that preclude or <Icier commercial space activities except [or reasons of
national securily ()r pul)lic safety. A space goo(1 t)r service is "commercially available"
if il is curremly of[bred commercially, or it it could be supplied commercially in
response [oa gl)V<'llllllell[ service pl'o(;lll'elllellt reqHest. "Feasi'ble" means [}lal sHch
goods or services meet mission requirements in a cosl-efl__'clive manner.
(3) The United States will pursue its commercial space objectives without tile use of<lirecl
Federal subsidies. Commercial Sector space activities shall he supervised or regulated
only to the exWnl required by law, national securily, imernalitmal obligalions and
put)lic safi,/y.
EXPI.()RIN(; IItE [!NKN()WN 4(_9
(4) "l_ stimulate priv_lk' sector illvcslmenl, ,,wnershiP, mid operation of space ;lssels, tilt"
t!.S. (_,ovt'rlllllClll will |'aci]italt* sl_i])]e all([ pr,+dicl+tblt' U.S. comm,'rcial sector access
Io apl)roi)riatc [ ].S. (;,,vernmt'nt st)a¢e-rc'l_ued i_ardware, ta<iliti¢+s mid d_Jt:_. Tiw U.S.
(;,,vernm,.'n! rt_st'ivcs tile rib_ht 1o rise snch hmxlwarc, t.wililies mid data on a priority
basis I¢, mccet national secm+ily mid crilical civil so.clot requirements. (;ovt'rnm¢'nl
SP;w¢! Seclors sh_dl:
(a) l+]nler into approprim," [ooi)l+tliltivc ii_rcctnenls to encourage lind advanct' private
st'¢'lol" basic rc_,t'+ill']i, develolinlenl, and opt+re|lions willie" protecting tile + COill-
mercia] value o| the illlelll,'ctil_t] property dt'vt'hil/Cd.
I<.,I (b) idc'nlit_' lind ])roi)o,_t • iii)i)roprialt + anll!ndnients to <)1+ the elinlinalion el +iil)])lica-
illc i)orlions el+! !nitcd _l+llcS ]+lws and l+e_ul+ilion,s lhat tillnecessaril)' ilni)ede (+Olli-
lllCrli_t] siJ+i('e s(+('l<)l +il('tivitit'.s.
((') (:<lllsislcill witil il+ilioll+l] sl'('ilrilv, l)r<ividc t()l lhc liliit']), ll_illSli_i- i)[ _ov(,rniiii,nl-
(l(.v(,]ol)t'd st)lie(' lcclinol</h+' l() lilt, private scctor in sticil _t ill_il/nct its to pl+<)tc(l
iln C<)lilllicrci_il v+titic, includin_ retention of leihnical (i_it+i ri<_hls ])v lilt" |)rive|it •
_(,( Iill.
(d) 1'o lii¢' exicnl tbasiblc, l)tirsne innov:ilivt" ineiilods t_)r ])rocurl'nit+nl <,lsl)+l<l' [Irod-
tl(IS and .s_'rvic<'s.
(5) Frt't" and l{ih +trade in conlnler<ial st)lice Imlnch services is ii/4,11il <it tile {'nhed <Stat(,s.
In sii])[)ort of tills ._o+t], lilt" {!tilled Stales will iin[)lenicnl, _il file exi)ir+ition oi+ ctirrenl
sl)+ice ]+itlncii 14_ri,l, lliCnls, _l slr_ill'hry for tr+insilioiliil_ tiolli iie_<ili_iled tl_tde ill I+illn(h
si+ivi<cs loW+it|is +i Ire|d( + ciivironinelH rh+iiaclcrizcd b, lilt" fr<,,c 4nd ol)t!n inler4clion
of iiiarkel (,COllOlilil.s. Tile U.,S. Tr+ide Repri.+cnlalivc, ili cooi([ii/_tlhln with the ()t]ic/"
o1 ,Science lind "I_!chnolohw Policy _lld tile Natioil+i] l_]cliFlOnlic (]OllliCi[, will develo i) a
sli'+llc_,r) , Io _liidc iilis ilnplcilit'iit_ilion.
(6) (;onsist_.nt wiill Execnlive Order i2046 and apl)licable st+lttttes, I_T.,S. (;<)vCilllnl'lll
+i_CtlCiCs +ill(i dci)lillmt'illS will enSlilO thai U.,S. (iOVclnliiCnl IcIt'coillilliinic_lll<lll+
i)<llicil's st|ill)err a <<linileliiivc ilil<,'rn+ilioil+t] i'iiviroliliit'lll I(ir Sl)_ice-ti_lsed leleconl-
lllllniC_lliOllS.
[lllersi'ctor (hiideline+
Tilt! 17diowinl4 liaiitt4rlIpil+ idcnlit)' tlriorit7 intersector gitidmlce 1o supp<irt ni+t, jor thlit_'d
_l+lll,,s si)_i(-i, p, dicy oi}iectives.
( 1 ) Ilitt'riiali<lli4l (;,,oi)erati,ln
Tht' United <States will I)ursue and conduct international cooper+ltive Sl)acc-rclaled
aclivilics lti+il acliieve scientitic, ti)iei_n l)olic) ', econonlic, o1 n_itioii_li seClil+ily bencth.s
t_li- Ihl' ll_llion. [illern+ilion_tl a_rccmenls related to space aetivilies silail be subject Io
ill)i-|lilt] illll'rlt_enry cooldin+ilion ])rocedill+CS, consislent witii +l|)plicabh' lliws +iiid
rc_tli_tlioils+ [_nilcd $l_tlcs cooi)cralion ill inlei+naliolial civil space activities will:
(_t) [lioln<Hc C¢]llil_lt)lt! cosl-sharin_ and yield benel]i,s io the United _l_tlt's bv iilci-i'_is-
iii_ ii('(ess Io |+<lrei+n scicnlilk and technological data and exileriise lind [<lit'i_n
rt'st*+ilch and dl'velopincnl facilities;
(1)) i']nll_ulce relations with U.<S. allies and Russia whik" supportin_ inilialives witil
<lltier st+tll_s <)t lilt' f<llliiCi- _oviei Union _+iild t_liil'i'l_iil _ si)aceflii+ill_ n_ili<)llS_
(c) <SUl)l)Orl U+,S. It'chi+lolol_y lr_tnsfer :and n<)nproliferalion oi+j<'ciivcs+
It01 (d) (;IC+IIC liCW _li)[)_lrlnnilies tTir U.S. eonlmercia] sl)iice _tciivitit's; _lit+l
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(el Protect tile commercial value of intellectual property dew, loped with Federal sup-
port and ensure that technologw transfers resulting fi-om cooperation do not
undermine U.S. competitiveness and national security.
(1) In support of these objectives:
(i) NASA arrd the Department of State will negotiate changes in the existing
legal tiamework tot International Si)ace Station cooperation to include
Russia in the prograln along with the United States, Emope, Japan, and
Canada; and
(it) NASA, in coordination with concerned U.S. (;ow'rnment agencies, will
explore with foreign space agencies and international organizations the pos-
sible adoption of international standards for the interoperability of civil
research spacecraft communication and control facilities.
(2) Space Transportation
(a) Assuring reliable and attordable access to space through [r.S. space transf)orta-
lion capabilities is fundamental to achieving national space policy goals.
Theretiwe, the United States will:
(i) Balance etfi)rts to modernize exisling space transportation capahilities with
the need to invest in lilt' develol)menl of improved [lltuFe cal)abilitics;
(it) Maintain a strong transportation capability and lechllology base to meet
national needs tor space transport of personnel and payloads;
(iii) Promote reduction in the cos! of current space transportation systems whih"
improving their reliabilit}; operahility, responsiveness, and sati:ly;
(iv) Foster technology, development and demonstration to support a future deci-
siolr Oll tire development of rrext generation retrsable space transportation
systems that greatly rethwc the cost of access to sl)ace;
(v) Encourage, to tile titlles! extent [easihle, tilt" cosl-etliwtive use of commer-
cially provided U.S. products atr(I services that meet mission requirements;
alrd
(vi) Foster the international competitiveness ot the U.S. commercial space trails-
p<_rtation industry, actively considering commercial needs and [ l 1 ] tacit)ring
them into decisions on improvements to launch facilities and vehicles.
(b) The I)epartment of Transportration (l)oT) is the lead agency within Ihe Federal
government lot regulatory guidance pertaining to commercial sl)ace transporla-
lion activities, as set torth in 49 [ !.S.(:. § 7111, et seq., and Executive Order 12465.
The U.S. (;owwnment encorrrages and will [acilitate [r.S. private sector and state
all(| h)cal gOVCllrlrrelrt space lalllrch alrd lCcovery activities.
(c) All activities related to sl)ace Iransportati(m mltlerlaken by [!.S. agencies and
departments will he consislent with PI)I)/NSTC-4
(3) Space-hased Earth Ohservation
(a) The United States requires a continuing capahility fin space-based Earth ol)ser-
wrtion to provide infi)rmation uselul lot protecting puhlic heahh, sati'ty, and
national security. Such a capability contributes to economic growth an<t stimu-
lales educational, scientific and teclmoh)gical advancement. The U.S.
Government will:
(i) Continue Io develop and operate space-based Earth observing syslems, includ-
irrg satellites, instrmnents, data management and dissemination activities;
(it) (;ontinue research and (Icvelopmcnt of advanced sf)ace-1)ased Earth observation
technologies to iml)r()ve the quality and reduce the costs of Earth ol)servati()ns;
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(b)
(iii) Supporl the development of U.S. commercial Earth ohservation capabilities
by:
- l)ursuing techrmlog 3' developnmnt programs, including partnerships
with industry;
- licensing the operalion and, am appropriale, the eXl)Orl of private Earth
obserw_tion syslems and technologies, consislen! with existing policy;
- providing U.S. (;overnmenl civil data to commercial firms on a non-dis-
criminatory basis t_+ foster the growth of the "value-added" data el:hance-
ment industry; and
- making use, amappropriate, of relevant private seclor capabilities, data,
and infi)rmation products in implementing this policy.
(iv) Produce and archive long-term environmental data sets.
The [LS. Govcrnnienl will contintte to use Earth observation systems to collect
elivirol+llll(*llla] dal_t alld provi(|e all U.S. (_overl|mel|t civil etlvir<)lllllelltal dala
and data products consistent with OMB Circuhw A-130, al)plicable statute and
gtfidelincs contained in this directive.
(c) The U. S. Gowwnment will meek mutually beneficial cool)erali<)n with U.S. com-
mercial and olh++w national and internalional Earth observation system develop-
ers altd operators, to:
(i) detine an integraled global observing strategy fi)r civil applications;
(ii) develop I !.S. (;overnmenl civil Earth observing systems in c<)ordination wilh
other national an(l international systems to ensure the eflicicn! colleclion
and disseminalion of Ihe widest possible set of envir<mmenlal rne+tsttr++!n+++'llts;
(iii) obtain Earth ot)servation data [+torn non-[!.S, sottrces, and seek to make such
data av;filal)le to users consistetH wilt) OMB Circular A-130, n_+.tionitl secHrity
reqtfirements, and commercial sector gtfidance contained in the nati(mal
sl)ace policy; and
(iv) sttpport, as approl)riale, the pul)]ic, non-discriminalorv direct read-out of
data from I:ederal civil systems.
(d) "l'h(" 1!.S. (;overnmenl space sectors will coordinate, and where teasible, seek Io
consolidale Earth <)bservation activities Io reduce overlaps in development, mea-
surements, infmmati<m processing, and archiving whet+++ cost-eflective and con-
sistenl with [P.S. spa++++"goals.
(i) In accordance with PI)I)/NSTC-2, DoC/N()AA, DoD, and NASA shall estal)-
lish a single, c<mverged, National Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS) to satist_' civil and national security requirements.
(ii) NA,S;A, I)o(:/N()AA, l)oI), the Intelligence Commtmity, and l)oE shall work
together to identify, develop, demonstrate, and transilion advanced tech-
nologies to U.S. Earth observation satellite systems.
(iii) In acc_n'dance with PI)D/NSTC-3, NASA, DoC/NOAA, and Dol/USGS shall
develop and operate an ongoing program to measme lhe Earth's land sm-
lace fi()m space and ensure the continuity of the I,andsat-type data set.
(ix,) (k)nsistenl with national security, the U.S. (;overnmenl sl)ace sectors shall
c(mlinue to identity, national security products and services that can con-
tribule to global change research and civil environmental monitoring, and
seek lo make technology, products and services available to civil agencies for
such uses. Both unclassitied and, as appropriate, classitied data tiom nalion-
al se(tnitx f)r<)grams will t)e provided Ihrottgh estat)lished mechanisvns.
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('1) N<mpr()liti.ralion, Exl)ort C()ntr()ls, and Technoh)g T Transfi.+r
(a) The MT(;R [Missile Tech n<)h)g T (;ontrol Regime] (;ui(lelines are nol designed to
imt)e(le naliomd spa(e programs or international co()peration in such t)rograms
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as l<mg as such progranls could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of
mass destruction. Consistent wilh U.S. mml)rolifevation policy, t]_c Uniled Slates
will continue to oppose missile programs of proliieration concern, and will exer-
cise particular restrainl in missile-relalcd coopcrati<m. The United Slates will con-
tinue lo retain a strong presumption of denial against exports of coml)lele space
launch vehicles of other MTCR Category I components.
(b) The United States will maintain its general policy of not supporting the dewlop-
merit or acquisition of space launch vehicle systems in non-MT(;R stales.
(c) For MTCR countries we will not encourage new space launch vehicle programs
which raise questions from a prolit_wation and economic standpoint. Tilt' United
Slates will, however, consider exporls of MTCR-controlled items to MT(;R coun-
tries. Additional satk'guard measures could also be considered tot such exports,
where appropriate. Any exports would remain subject to the llOll-ll'alls[].'l- l)lOVi -
sions of the INF [International Nuclear Forces] and START treaties.
(d) The United Slates wilt work to stem the tlow of advanced space lechnologT,, tO
tmautltorized destinalions. Executive departments and agencies will I)e fully
responsible tot protecting against adverse technology' transfer in tile conduct of
their programs.
(e) In elllering into space-,-elated lecllllolog,_' develol)ment and translk'r agreements
with other countries, Executive l)epartments and Agencies will take into consid-
eration whether such countries practice and encourage tiee and t_dr trade in
commercial space activities,
(,5) Arnls (;ontrol
The United States will consider and, as appropriate, tOvmulate policy positions on
anms control and related measures governing activities in space, and will conchlde
agreements on such measures only if they are equitable, eft_'ctively veritiable, and
enhance the security [ 14] of the United States and our allies. The Arms (]onlrol and
Disarmament Agency (ACI)A) is the principal agency vdthin the Federal governnlent
tin arms control mattets. ACDA, in coordination with tile DoD, I)CI, State, DoE, and
other appropriate Federal agencies, will identi|}_ arms c<mtrol issues and opportunfi-
lies relaled to sl)ace activities and t'xallline concepts lov nleasures I]lat stlpport ilati<>n-
al security objectives.
(6) Space Nuclear Power
The Department of Energy will maintain the necessary capal)ility to support space
missions which may require the use of space nuclear power systems. U.S. (;(_rt'_']_'_('l_l
agency proposals tot international cooperation involving space nuclear power systems
are subject to normal intevagency review procedures. Space TltLclear reactors will lIOl
be used in Earth orbit whhout specitic approval by the President or his designee. Such
nequests liar approval will take into account public sat_'ty, economic considerations,
international treaty ot)ligations, and U.S. nati(mal security an(I foreign policy inter-
ests. The Otfice of Science and _li'chnc)h)g T Policy, in c<)or{linati(m with the NS(] staff,
will examine the existing appr()val process, including measures It) address possible
COllllllercial LISt" of space nile|ear systems
(7) Space l)ebris
(a) The United States will seek to minimize the creation of space debris. NASA, the
Intelligence (;ommunity, and the l)oD, in cooperation with the private st-clot, will
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(b)
develop design guidelines tbr Fulme governmcm procurenlenl of spacccrafl,
launch w'hich's, and services. The design and operation of space l(!sls, experi-
ments and syslems, will minimize or reduc(r ac(umtflalion of space debris consis-
IUlll wilh llliSSiOll r(!qlfir{'in(!nls and cosl effectiveness.
h is in lhc hlleleSl o1 Ihe W.S. (lol/'rllmenl I;o ensule that space debris nlinhniza-
li(lll praclices itl'e applied b_ oilier sl)acel_iiing nalions and iillCrllalional or<l.{ani-
zatiolls. The [!.S. (;o,,criinicnl will lake a leadership role hi hllernalional |'ora Io
adopl polich's aiid praclices ainil'd al det)ris llliniilli/alion alld will coopi'ral('
inlt, rnalionally in lilt" exchaii<_e of intormation on debris rcs('aich and the iden-
Iilicalion oF debris iniligalion oplions,
(M) (;ovl'riiilll:lll Pricing
The price chai_ed t_>i + the use of F.S. (;ovel'nment facilities+ equipnlcnt, and service,
will b<' based on ihe t_/Ihlwing principles:
(a) Prices chal+_ed Io [r.S. ])l-iVali, seclor, slale and local goverlillil,lll space aclivilit,s
lot the iise <)f [!.S. (;_>vernm_nl tacilities, eqllipmt!lil, alid St'l+Vi(es will tit" based
oil cosls con,_isll!lil whtl Federal guidelines, applicable slalllles and the (oinlllel-
cial t.{uidelines COlilailled within the policy. The [l.S. (;<)vt!rnlntqil will nol seek l<l
[151 re(ovel dcsil4n alld developnl/,nl costs or invt!5,1111enls associated wiih lilly
existing [{tcililies or new |Tlcilities required to llleel U.S. (;ovelnillenl necds and
1o which the U.S. (;overnmenl relains title,
(t)) (]onsislenl wilh mission requhelnenls, NASA and l)oD will seek Io Ilse consislent
pricing pra(lices Ior t]lci[ilies, equipnlenl, and services.
(c) Tooling, equiisinenl, and residual hardware oil hand al tile coniplelion of [!.S.
(iovernnielll pro<_rains will Im priced and disposed of on a basis lhal is ill lile 1leSt
overall illleresl of lhe gniled Slales while nol precilidiilg or delerring lhe coi1-
Iiilliiilg dl'velopnlenl of Ihc {!.S. commercial space seclor.
Document 111-15
Document title: "Commercial Space Industry in the Year 2000: A Market Forecast," The
Center for Space Policy (CSP), Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 1985 (reprinted with
permission).
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h, 1984, the ('enter]i. Space I'olic_:, a gmall analytic gro,,p, projected a private ,_pace market t?[$60
hillio. &, 2000. Thi,_ proieetio, was influential in promoting the potential _?fspace as a commercial
enterprise and in &_,el_rping_ _upport fi_r the .space station program. This document is a revision r_the
1084 p_vWctio., widely c_iticized.fin" it.s optimi._m. The 1985 revisions are more detailed and reflect
the broader ran tre o/space commercial markets rather than point estimates.
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Commercial Space Industry in the Year 2000
A Market Forecast
[l] I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. INTRODUCTION
One of tile most remarkable facts of our industrial society is the accelerating rate ot
progress. Our scientific knowledge and understanding of the universc doubles now in less
than a generation, and we have had more progress in the past fifty years than in the pre-
ceding millennium ill terms of practical impact. It is interesting to note that economists
predict that a substantial percentage of the jobs that will exist in the year 2010 (i.e.
25 years fi'om now) do not exist now; rather, they will be created by the dynamism of new
industries made possible by technologies which are only I)eginning to emerge from lal)o-
ratories today.
Our nation's brief history in space is an unparalleled exanlple of this trend. While the
United States had been investigating space and began to develop rudimentary space tech-
nologies after the close of World War II, our civilian space programs did not begin in
earnest until the creation of NASA in 1958. In a little more than a quarter of a century,
we have come to understand tile requirements of living and working in space.
hnportantly, the way we look at tile heavens is changing. For the ticst two deca<les,
NASA's space programs had three primary objectives: tile advancement of so|entitle
knowledge about our universe; the development of an engineering capability which
enabled us to conduct manned and umnanned operations ill space; and the pursuit of
heroic feats of exploration renliniscent of those of the maritime explorers of centuries
ago. Now, we are beginning to look at space as a place of enterprise. The Admiifistiation
and NASA have both come out strongly in support of commercial investment in space,
and have expended considerable amounts of talent in order to understand what the
Government can do to encourage the private sector to invest in a new industrial [rontier.
This report focuses on the year 2000, and projects the commercial revenues fi)r six
space industries: satellite communications, materials processing m space (MPS), remote
sensing, on.)rbit services, space transportation, and ground-based support. Revenues are
for I.!.S. industry only, and are stated in 1985 dollars. Tile pmiections tit} not take into
accollllt revenues accruing to tile private sector through the R&D expenditures of tile gov-
ernment (e.g. the NASA space station program is not included), ltowever, government
purchases of commercially developed space hardware and products are inclnded (lor
example, govcrnlnent purchases of ct)mmcrcial upper stages), tligh and low scenarios
have t>een generated tot each industry. Under the low scenario, extremely conservative
assumptions have been used in dclining [2] the product or service and its market. Under
the high scenarios, more optimistic assumptions have been used.
The satellite commnnications, MPS and remote sensing tnarkets can be considered
"Applications Markets" in that some aspect of space is critical to lilt" provision ¢)1 service.
Satellite communications and remote sensing protit fi-om the vantage point all_rdc<l by
space; MPS utilizes other physical attributes of space (most notably microgravity) to pro-
duce materials which cannot be made on Earth. Space transportation, on-_rbit services,
and ground support, on the other hand, can be considered "lnti-astructure Markets." They
are not end products in thenlselves, but are necessary tot the l)r¢>vision of other l)rodtwts.
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B. SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
Satellite communications is tile oldest and most mature commercial space industry.
The lbrt,e basic types of satellile services that have commercial applications are known as
"fixed satellite service" (FSS), "broadcast satellite service" (BSS) and "mobile satellite ser-
vice" (MSS). Total rew'nues projected tot this industry are $8.8 billion under CSP's low
market scenario, and $15.3 billion under the high scenario.
FSS provides a common carrier link tor point-to-point and point-to-muhipoint trans-
mission. The primary FSS markets are the transmission of voice, video and data. The last
two markets, addressing corporate needs tbr the development of private networks, are
especially expected to grow to a $5.0-6.8 billion level by the tmn of the century.
Direct broadcast satellite (DBS) service has had a spotty record in the U.S.
Neverlheless, long term market prospects look tremendons for the industry (large up-
front capital requirements, and Ihe inability of DBS firms to secure aflordable program-
ruing have been the malor obslacles to date). By the 1990s, I)BS services should he
available; by the year 2000, annual revenues could be $2.6-6.6 billion.
Mobile satellite commmfications services will take advantage of the large footprint of
a satellite 1o make thin-route mot)ile communications economically ie;isible. The market
consists of two major segments: limited alphanmneric message services and tidl voice and
data transmission. Ann0al revenues are pr_iected Io rise lo $.8-1.5 billion by the year
20O0.
CSP anticipates a domestic demand fi)r approximately live new spacecraft per year hy
2000. FSS salellites will comprise the largest component of markel demand for spacecrafl.
131 C. MATERIALS PROCESSING IN SPACE
(:ommercial materials processing in space (MPS) will allow U.S. companies to take
advantage of the properties of the space environment. There will be two general types of
MPS activity: basic materials research, and the development and production of new prod-
IIClS or processes thai are possible only in space. This study includes only those revenues
accruing from the second activity.
Basic economics limits severely the number of candidates fi)r space processing to
0lose which can justify high production costs, which inchtde an estimated transportation
cosl of$10,000 per potmd. In the next fifteen years, only three kinds of materials are like-
ly to meet this threshold value while also generating sufficient demand to justity prodnc-
lion. These materials include t)harmaceuticals, semiconductor crystals, and halide optical
fibers.
There will be significant research in numerous other materials fields, notably organ-
ic crystals, ceramics, and alloys. The knowledge gained from space research will be applied
to terrestrial production techniques, or demand for products in these fields will be so lim-
ited that individual markets will be small (under $50 million). It must be noted that the
development of a strong knowledge base is essential for the continued growth of com-
mercial MPS revenues in the long term; current projections based on what is now known
will likely prow' conservative as the rate and quality of space-based materials research
imt)row's.
A key driver in the development of MPS markets will be the availability of appropriate
research facilities on orbit. Present Shuttle facilities in the mid-deck and the payload bay
are inadeqnate, especially for tasks requiring a high level of human interaction. The space
station will alleviate this situation, but will be unavailable to researchers before 1995.
MPS is expected to generate revenues of $2.6 billion to $17.9 billion in the year 2000,
based on 6 to 30 products. Most of these revenues will come tiom pharmaceutical i)rod -
nets ($2.0 billion to $14. 9 billion); much of the rest will come from gallium arsenide
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crystal pr<_duction ($500 million to $1 billion). Thcsc crystals will bc cmph)ycd primarily
ill <tcfcnsc applications. The balance of MPS products will come lv<)m othcr semiconduc-
tors ($1 billion in the high scenario) and halide optical tiber ($100 million to $1 billi<m).
]4] D. REMOTE SENSING
Remote sensing sat('llilcs provide data from space concerning ll)e earth's surface and
atmosphere. To date, satellites have been opcrated by the gow, rnmcnt as public goods.
The government is still the largest user and supplier of l+anclsal data and services. The
imminent latmch of the first SpOT satellite, a torcign private system, and lhc current
attCml)t to shift thc Amcri<an l+andsat to the private sector will ahcr this situaliotl dra-
matically.
The success or [_dlnrc of the Landsat lraFJs|+cr will I)c the greatest single t:actor in the
d<'vclo])mcnl ()| the Am<'rical) remote-sensing industry tbF ltl._=I(!Sl ()f this ccnlm'X. Delays
in the process have ah-cadv cnstu+cd that an interruption in service lasting at least lwo
years will t_dlow the expected 1987 tailurc of the (nrrcFt[ Ol)craling salcllilc, l+andsal 5.
This data gap could allow the SPOT system to prccmpl oppor/tmilics [or a tutttrc
American syst c|n.
The <lcvclopmcnt of a "valtte-a(ldcd" iHdustry to process satellite dala depends heavi-
ly on lhe existence otatl American system on orbit. Willqoul access to aftordablc dala dnr-
ing thcsc tbrmativc years, Ill<.' valuc-addcd industry <`,tllIl<_l get on ils tk'cl. The
ol)portunitics tor privak" s,ttcllilc raw data companics wouhl then bc limited severely: the
d<`,Illand f_:)l raw data will not support a private remote sensing salclli/c vclHtnc.
Total r<`'v<`'ntR+s [<Jr satellite remote sensing in the Unitc<l Sl,tlcs :ll+c expected to bc
I)ctwcctl $.50(t milliotl and $2.5 I)illion in the year 2000. In our low S('<`'ll_ll+i(),the only appli-
(atiotls likely Io I)c (()nlilluc(I arc those which require global covcv,tgc (sltch ,is the ghd>-
al crop assessment service). All U.S. revenues would bc obtaitwd tiom valuc-ad<h'd
services: $380 million is forecast tor expcndiltncs by the pctr(dcum indttstry, while the
rt'mainder will derive flora a numt)cr <)1 smaller users, in<hlding paper and Imnbcr ('<)m-
panics, grain traders, commodity brokers, and some very large agrictfltural associalions.
Federal, state and local g<wcrntncnts will c<mtinttc to usc l+an<lsal (I;tla, processed 1)y pri-
V,I((" ('otltl'a('lol's, t<)l" those Slll'VC_,'illg l;,llrl)os(+s w]lcr(' c()st.-c||('(+livc allt+vt]ativcs art' t]<)!
available.
in our high scctmvio, a private remote sensing satcllhc is in operation, as well as pri-
vate scll.sors on lhc space st,tliot(s polar platform. The American vahtc-addcd market also
t]ll(ts sufficient suf)p<wt for continttcd dcvch)pmcnt. Comptltcr and inti)rmation technol-
ogy' improvements, in(rcasing prices tot notl-rcncwal)lc rcsoln-ccs, and increasing compc-
lition in agri(tdtural and torcst-rclatcd in<htstrics supp<,+t this development. ()f the $2.5
billion generated in this scenario, $500 million accrues t]om raw data sales, while thc
remaining $2.(, + billion arc derived from wduc-added [5] services. ()f the tolal r<+vcriucs,
$1 billion derives tr_ml non-rcncwat)lc vcsotn-cc industries, $1.35 t>illion from renewal>It
vcs<)ur<'c indttstrics, a)a<l $150 million from other sources.
E. ON-ORBIT SERVICES
A large market <)pp<wtuldty will nmtcrializc in HIc comiug years toy cotnpanics pro-
viding on_wbit workspace and servicing. Several compatfics (tlrrcHtly <dt:,_'t+tbrcrtnmcrs oF
the on-oft)it hardware that can l:,c cxpcctcd to serve the MI:'S induslry at the turn <)f the
ccnltlry, and NASA is dcvcloping servicing conccpls and hardware Itl;-ii shcmhl bc applic-
able t<>commercial use. Total yearly indt,stvy vcvcnucs m-c prt!icctcd at $.(_2._ billion.
Commercial workspacc will bc the location for all <ommcv<ial pt+<_<tuction a<fivilics
(R&D is asstiMcd to lake place aboard the NASA space stalion). Frcc tlycvs and Mall-
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"l>nded Facilities (MTFs) each offer specific technical advantages, depending upon the
complexity of the process. Using tim MPS market scenarios, requirements for on-orbit
workspace were derived. Under the low scenario, live fiee flying platforms and two MTFs
sat|st), commercial demand; under the high scenario, these numbers climb to nineteen
free flyers an<l twelve MTFs. The annual revenues earned by these facilities should be
$.6-f2.5 billion per year.
Satellite servicing revenues are comprised of commercial ()MV [()rbital Maneuvering
Vehicle] servicings ofiiee flyers (MTFs nlllSt be serviced by the S]'ltlttie; these revenues arc
included trader tilt' section on space transportation). Under the low scenario, no comnmr-
cial ()MV operations are pr('dicted; hence there are II() commercial revenues. Under lhe
high scenario, seventy annual servicing missions generate revenues of almost $.3 billion.
E SPACE TRANSPORTATION
Space transportation svstt`'ms (STS) are required lo support all space activities:
launching payloads into their operational orbits, relricving payh>ads and returning thent
to Earth, and performance of experiments and manufactnring activities on orbit. For IF]("
remainder ofthe cellttlry, tilt.! majority of space transporlalion reqniretnents will locus on
three orbital destinations: I.ow Earth Orbit (l_EO--Shuttle "parking orbit"), geostationary
orbit ((;E()), and I,EO polar orbits.
"l'hc space tlansportation systems available in the Western world to reach these orhils
are the U.S. Space Shuttle, Expendable Launch VeFlicles (El,Vs--which include l_;urope's
Ariane launch vehicle) and upper stages for use in col!jun(li(m with the Shuttle and ElYs.
[61 In the h)w scenario, (:SI' aSSllnles that the STS relnains a govermnent-owned and man-
aged syst('lil, alld Fl(!llC(' it() rcvenlleS il.ccrtle to ('Ollllll('l'('ia] elllilies. "|'()tall delnand ()f
12.;"; STS equivalent lat,nches in the year 2000 provides no "overflow" demand for the EI,V
industry and IFnls there is no inclusion of commercial EI3/revenlles. Upl)er stages are the
only som(e of commercial revemu's in the low scenario. Tola] revelllles are expected to
top $.2 billion.
The high scenario aSSllnles a t]eet of live S]nlttlc orbiters (each operating at six
flights annually), with two operated hy commercial cntitics to service man-tended fat|li-
lies in I.E(). The cost of an orbiter to the operator is a straight-line depreciation of the
$1.7B purchase cost (in $1982) over I00 flights. An average of capital costs over remain-
ing flights plus a gross margin o130 percent brings the launch price to $76.2M. The strong
denmn<l for I,E() transportation services generated by the MPS industry (espcciaFly for
MTFs) is expelted to use all of the available STS capacity; a strong market exists lot EI,Vs
to take lip the overload. Under the high scenario, colnmercial orbiter revenues and EIX _
revennes reacF1 <wet $1 billion each, and commercial upper stage revenues are projected
at alines( SBO0 million.
G. GROUND BASED SUPPORT SERVICES
Space operations require support services that are located on earth. Tim major ser-
vices inchlde: payload processing, earth station equipment manufacture, and space insur-
ance. Each of these couFd become a significant market in its own right by the year 2000.
Payload processing mnst be performed on aIF commercial payFoads prior to launch.
Payloads include communications satellites, MPS free-flyers and resuppFy modules, and
commercial OMVs and MTFs. By the year 2000, it is assumed that all commercial payloads
will be processed lw a commercial firm (s). Tim market for these services was calcula'led by
evahlaling lhe processing reqllirelnents for payloads generated in (]haplers IFF-Vi of lh('
report. Under Ihe low scenario, these revennes total $.03 billion; in our high scenario, the
revenuvs rise to $. I F hill|on.
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"file earth station market includes transmilting and receiving antennas tor satellite
services, tracking and control facilities, and other ground eqttipment used with satellites.
CSP expects that the principal sources of revenues will be sales of tixed and broadcast ser-
vice eartit station equipment. Revenues for this market are dominated by FSS services,
although DBS and MSS equipment are expected to generate large revenues as well.
Revenue totals are $3.7 billion in the low scenario, and $8.6 billion in the high scenario.
[7] The insurance industry is a key element in the development of commercial space
activity. Major tbrms of insurance to be offered include launch, operational liter]me, and
liability. New types of insurance will need to be developed to support I,E() operations for
MPS and servicing. Industry revenues will depend directly on the level of dewqopment of
other commercial space activities. Total insurance revenues are tbrecast at $.33 billion in
the low scenario, and $1.64 billion in the high scenario.
Total revenues lot the ground t)ased Sul)por! services are $4.1 billion in the low sce-
nario and $10.4 billion in the high scenario.
H. SUMMARY
Table 1-1 summarizes the revenue projections torecast it] this report. Under tile con-
serwttive assumptions used to generate the low scenarios, rewmues in the year 2000
should be $16.8 billion; using the move optimistic conditions of the high scenario, rev-
enues rise to $51.3 billion. As noted elsewhere in this report, the key determinants altiwl-
ing the actual outcome are the continued commitment t<> developing the commercial
space infrastructure, and the development of an MPS R&D base which will allow broad-
scale industrial activity.
Table I-1
Commercial Space Revenues in the Year 2000
Activity
Low High
Scenario Scenario
Communications $8.8B $15.3B
MPS 2.6B 17.9B
Remote Sensing 5B 2.5B
()n-()rbil Services liB 2.8B
Space Transportation 2B 2.4B
(;round Based Services 4.1B 10.4B
"limd Rew'nues $1.6.8B $51.3B ...
19 ] B. COMPARISON WITH EARLIER STUDIES
The market projections presented in tiffs study are a revision of an earlier internal
study conducted I)y CSP in January, 1984. The current figures (see beh)w) at(" apprt)xi-
tnately [ 10] twenty I)ercent lower than those presented a year ago. Two factors are respon-
sible tot the change. First, the earlier study assumed that the space station would be on
orbit and functional in 1992, as predicated in NASA's original timeline, ttowever, title to
a slowdown in funding in the FY 1985 and FY 1986 budgets, the target dale tbr space sta-
tion has slipped until 1993. Reviewing historical evidence with the Shuttle program, it is
not unreasonable It) expect that the station will be delayed a year hmger (i.e. 1994). This
delay has a negatiw' impact be(allSe i1[ the crilical role the space station will have on the
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anlounl of R&D activity which (an be l)erlornle(I, and tilt, e(ononfics of working (m orbit.
Much of the growth which had been l)roiected for the late 1990s will still occur, but not
until after the turn of the century.
The second f:actor has heen a stronger methodological approach. As any statistician
will note, it is (lifficnlt, if not impossihle, to predict markets in the year 20()0 for products
and services which do not currently exist. Without an historical database, trend analysis is
nleaningless, an(t concepts such as focus grotll)S are of limite(l value when talking of
entirely new concepts that may not t)e on the market for a decade.
As a resnh, pr()jecli(m of commercial space markets must rely more upon developing
a cohesive set of (:onunon sense assumptions about the basic economics of supply and
deman(l. Earlier projections have t)een predicated on assnmplions which len(I to foCUS on
the "SUl)ply side" of the market e(tuation, hat is, many have made Ill(" assumption thai
once a I)rt)(lucl or service t)e(:onws possible, it will t)ecome prolilal)h'. This is a "technol-
oh,,3, [lush" al)proach to market pr(!jection which has often led to error.
Ill] In ad(lition to lhe supply side, the current analysis also addresses file issue of
(lemand. It looks not only at what can be prodnced in si)ace, bill what advantage Ill(. space
product has Io the huyer as compared with other alterll.alives. [p. addition to looking al
the relative advanlages of space products, we have exanfined analog<)us situations (the
inlro(tuction of technt>h_gi(ally sophisticated, relatively high cost [)ro(lucls into new mat-
kels) lo determine wha! has hal)pened in the past, and often have nse(t these as nlo(lels.
It sh(mld be no!ed thal these i)rojections are only as valid as their underlying assuml)-
It(ms. (:SP has endeavored to use conservative assumptions in delinillg its scenarios, and
has sought corr(fl)oration of these assumptions through lengthy interviews of experts in
ihe aerosf)acc industry. In short, (;SP has used what might be terme(l a "modified-Delphi"
apllr(_ach.'
Aclual revenues might I)e substantially lower than expected, due to an mfforeseeahle
an(l ftlll(talnenlal chang('. For example, if new medical evidence l)rovr(l that In(_n cannot
w()rk ill sI)aCe with(rot serif)us h('ahh drawbacks, the scope of fi'asiblc endeavors would be
sevrrely cir(umscril)e(l. On !he other han(l, it shonld be noted that the revenue t)rt)jec-
lions (:(mid be sut)stantially lower than reality. Man), of the activities contemplated in this
study involve new materials lhal wonl(l be used in "high-end" applicali(ms. Thus, the situ-
a!ion might be analogous to pro.jetting the flmlre for the manufacture of silicon crystals
in Ill(' early 1950s (i.e. 112] I)etorc ihe development of the lransistor and lhe takeoff of
the (-ompuler industry). Revolutionary products may create a substantial demand for
sl)acc I)ro(lucts that are no! inclu(led in this study. Therefore, as with all long term pro-
.jec!ions, this sm(ty sh(nll(l be use(l ;Is an indicator of potential, and not a prognosticator
of fmt.
C. GENERAL APPROACH
This report Iocuses on the year 9000, and projects the commercial revetmes for six
sl)ace industries: sa!ellite c(mmnmications, materials processing in space IMPS), remote
sensing, (m-orhit services, space transportation, and ground-based snl)l)ort. Revenues are
tier [!.S. in(tuslry only, an(I are slated in 1985 dollars. The projections (to not take into
acc()lllll I('V('llnes accruing to !he private sector through tile R&D expen(lilures of the gov-
crnnnen! (l'.g. Ihe NASA space station program is not inclu(ted), l towever, government pur-
I. lhr l)elphi incfl,)d uses a g_oup ot c×pcrts in a field, who fl_cn (h'xrlop their individual st rnarios
(_t lhr [ululr. The rxpmls cht'n t rilitlur rach olhcr in order lo develop a s('l of agrt'cd-upon assuuq)licms Ihal
s(qvr its Ihc basis tor analysis o| tulurc re.ntis. I lislori( ally. this melluM has ptOVCll Io I)c Ihc hcs! mt'ans ol [)H'-
(1i¢lillg, the ( hangr in siltlati(ms wht'r(" tht'r(" :It(" rumwrous "¢aria!)l('s arid Wll('r<"data arc s( ar_ c'.
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ch_Lses of conunercially developed space hardware and products arc' included (fi_r example,
government pulchascs of+commercial upper stages such as the PAM-I)an<l thc TOS). High
and low scenarios have been gcnermcd tbr each iuldustry. Under lhc low scenario, exlrcmc-
ly conservative assttmpliolls have been ttscd in defining the produc! or service and ils mar-
ket. Under the high scenarios, more oplimistic assumptions have been used.
The satellite commtmications, MPS and rem<)te sensillg markets can be col_sitlered
"Applications Mackels," in lhat some aspect ol+ space is critical Io the provision of service.
Satellite comtntmications and remote sensing profit fiom the vantage point all_rded by
space; MPS utilizes other physical attrihutes o1' space (most ut+tably micr_+gravity) t_ pro-
duce materials which cannot be made on Earth. Space transportation, on_)rl)it services.
and ground support, on the [ 13] other hand, can be considered "Infrastructure Markets."
Thcy are not end producls in themselvcs, but are necessary tier the provision of o0wr
products.
It immediately becomes clear that the markets are inextricably linked. The demand
for the applications markets is generated "externally" by indMduals, companies, govern-
merits, and other organizations here on Earth. This demand is clearly influenced by the
ftmctional ahernatives that can be produced on Earth. For example, the demand ti)r satel-
lite commtmicalions is dependenl upon the economics and capabilities of terreslrial com-
mtmicalions media. The demand for space int]aslructure is a timction of this applications
demand.
V_k)rking in the opposite direction, the supply (and cost) of space infiastructure prod-
ucls and services is the ch)miuant t_l.ctor in determiuing which applications prodtwts anti
services can be produced economically (i.e. at a cost that the market will stlpporl, and
which will earn the tirm a ininimum level of prolit). In order to develop overall consis-
ten(y within lhis rel)orl, the high and low scenarios fi)r I]le applications markels are used
in the baselines tor determining the infrastru(:ture markets.
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This stud_' was ver_, unusual]m NAS,)L It dtnpel@ed several sce_tarios detailing possible hmg-term
trend_ i_ _pa_e Rg_2D, technolog),, deJ_,n.se, and environmental aJ_rl er'o_tomi_ rtevelopment. 77/ese sce-
nm4os irefurled pessimistic and optimistic t,,_vwth and opportunities in space. Space is seen as a
re._ource aml n place.fin ecmmmic entetln'ise. The stud_' did not detail ectmomic benefits, but did make
ervrwmic issues central to lml,ff-term .space financing; exploratio_i, and de_Jelopment, l"mv other stud-
ies of the mid-1970s werv as J?tr reaching a._ this ot_e m visio_.
Long-Term Prospects for Developments in Space
(A Scenario Approach)
By
William M. Brown and tlerman Kahn ...
[257] ( :hapler VII
REVIEW AND ASSESSMENI'
A. hnages of the Fulure
I,el us Ihst review briet]y what has been attempted in the Ih+st six chapters. The thst
chapter otfi'rs a typ<)logg' of various space scenarios arid of vatlOltS l]]ellleS l(_t cotlstru<.:l-
mR scenarios. The point is made that such scenarios have many uses, add thal t;rOtll
NASA's vie_poinl an important, if somewhat neglected, one is tlt¢" sysl+.'matic fornmlathm
and diss<.'mitlation o[ appropriate images of tile future. Hopetully these images would be
realistically developed and become valuat)h+ to policyntakers.
We believe thai NASA should Iry, in a low-keyed manner, Io tbrmvlale and promtfl-
gill+,' a COllce])l of ftlltll'e space development as part ot the manil_.'sl destiny of humanily,
and its an obvious next phase in an historical process which slarted in the 151h century
wifll Ihe age of exph)ra.lion and which has led to today's modern world.
In Ihe 19th Cetlttlry tllatly Atlteric_t.llS overtly beliew:d in tllatlit(.!sl desliny, a COllcept
which _.ncomaged lhe opening up of the V+k_st and eXlellded |his ('()lllllt',V to the Pacific.
Through ore scenarios we did lind thal space, to a ralher remarkable degree, was likely lo
play roles similar Io lhose which lhe fronlier played in America's past. According Io some
historians, such its Frederick.]. Turtler, much of the chara<+:ler ()[ American life--the egal-
itarianisln, lhe ti,elings of in(l('pell(lellce and competence, the Sellse ot opellttess alld
unlimite<l vistas, tile upward mol)ility, and a deep belief in democracyl--lseem to haw
been depen(lenl on, or strongly inl]uenced by, the exislence of a frontier. We I)clieve lhat
Ibis characteristic of oltr past [258] may well be conlinued--possibly in a moditied or
weaker tk_rm--lhrough Ihe exploration, development and exploitation of space.
Wheflwr the analogy ix valid or not, an accepted image of the thture can give rise to
expeclalions thai could materialize into real space projects. We also argued that tor such
images to have the greatest near-term impact in the U.S. they should emphasize the prac-
li(al uses otspace--i.e., ils scientific and economic values--and should treat its important
psychological, polilical, so<.ial, and (uhural consequences as by-products.
_,_,'_.belt,we lhal t)asic images of the fulure such as we have presented in this rt, p<_rl are
generally tmavaihtl)lc in America, or elsewhere, h is clear there is a large and active group
<ffscience ficlicm rims and it ix clear thal publicists have been very inslrtmmnlal in spread-
in g parlicular concepls (such as Fhol_:ssor O'Neill, for space col<rotes). But nluch lnore
can I)c done. Many potential st)ace activities, even if they are unduly optimistic <)r exag-
,_cra.led (lot example, an some crilics believe Professor O'Neill's estimates to be), are sli}l
ttsetul as part of a social process. If supporled by NASA they should be properly formu-
laled and labeled. NASA should also fttrnish hmg-range estimates and images of Ihe
ttlltll(' which are m<)re or less consonant with its official positions; these can be quite excil-
ing and still I)v l)lausil)le, or even conservative, within NASA.
The ;tttlhors believe lhat a basis exists tot a popular but serious book thai will rel]e(+l
illlt(]l ot the material ill this I('])O1I. _¥e believe our activity has I>een a very uselul ()tie, evell
lhough lhatl in clearly a sell:serving t+emark, t h)wever, we would not have entered this pr<!ject
tmless we tbh thai it "+,+titsts('ful trotn a broad national perspective. Enough ix now happen-
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ing ill space to guarantee a moderate level of timue activity. [259] This means that whalev-
er unexpected treasures are yet to be tbund have some reasonable probability of being dis-
covered even in a pessimistic context. We should add that the spirit and need of scientitic
inquiry, and the spirit and need for exploration, will remain as permanent fi)rces which cre-
ate varying pressures lor some kind of activity' ahnost ever)_here--and in most of our sce-
narios these needs and pressures increase--if not in the United States lhen elsewhere.
B. Earth-Centered Perspective
In Chapter il we try to visualize the coming economic role of space devel<_pmeu/s in
an earth-centered perspective. Our view lies between that of ll'le nlore exlrclne space
enthusiasts who tecl Ihat society's problems on earth are basically intractable and should
not be allowed to hinder the future of space, and thosc who conceive of the space poten-
tial as very limited, and often as an activity to enthrall the young or the tech,mstructure--
and thus often a place for expensive, sterile, dangerous or toolish exploits.
We first offi.'r evidence that the basic physical problems relating to the world's fim_re
needs can, in principle, be solved without recourse to outer space, Ihat the earth has more
than enough resources to supply an adequate standard of living for all. On the other hand
it seems quite clear thai cis-hmar space and possibly the rest of the solar system could lurn
on! !o he exlraordinarily important in an ec()nomic and technological sense. This out-
come appears t(, follow from just the current reasonably projected pntential in space--
that is, without having to conjure up unforeseeable grea! breakthroughs. Of course i! also
seems to be reasonal)le [26¢)] to expect that fuune space developmenl will yield some
equivalents of Middle East oil ()r Klon(like gold--that is, vast treasures which have not yet
been dreamed of. Thus, it is almost certain Iha! space exploration will lead It) great hen-
efi/s, and possihly I() an extraordinary economic and technological impact.
In our basic Surprise-Free Earth-Centered Scenario we c(mcluded that good long-
term prospects existed for technological solutions to current concerns at)out lhe adequa-
cy of the world's physical resources--although social and political problems could--and
probably will--create many difficulties in applying such solutions. When potential space
developments are added It) the al)ove scenario the ou!look for the require(! solutions is
fu,ther brightened. That is, over time space technology and spinoffs from it will certainly
contribute to these solutions--perhaps enormously. With our necessarily pn()r vision into
!he future we can still list a tew general ways in which space activities are likely to con-
tribute. In each category below we include spinoffs and serendipities, since lhey are often
the most productive, although intrinsically obscure, avenues:
Energy:
1) Space-based electric power stations
2) IANDSAT information for oil and gas exploration
3) Spinoffs and serendipities
Materials:
I)
2)
_)
4)
Food &
l)
2)
s)
St,perior materials from unique processing capabilities in space industries
Lunar and asteroidal sources of minerals
[ANDSAT assistance in mineral exploration on earth
Spinoffs and serendipities
Water:
Improving weather forecasts for days, weeks, months, and possibly over
longer intervals
1ANDSAT information on crops, disease, insects, water, etc.
Spinoffs and serendipities
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l ) Monitoring pollntants i)+vsatellites
2) I+ANI)SAT inti)Fntation <in ('nvir<)nment and land use
3) Pr()(:essing in space (('.g., suelear l)()w('r or ()th('r radioactive pr<)cesses)
4) Spin()fls anti s(,rendipiti('s
Tit(' economic and t('clmoh)gical potential of space leads us "parad()xical]y" to con-
C]llde that tit(.' iteal-t('rln "st)it," or so(-io-psych<)i<igical, (,if elIS may egual ()r ()tHwt!igh the
"+lard" retlUns. ,,ks an anah)g()us ('xamphe, it might s('('m wise lot tlt(," United Ntates to
devote', say, I pert+t'n+ of h:,+(;NP it) l>nildh)g "p),)+imid+" ,-+i)d "catbtPdl++Js" Jl) (>rdcr ++)
impr<)ve publi( ntorale and national fruity, llowever, a dire(t attempt towatxi this eml
woul(,i alto<+st (:(,'rtainly |)(_ d()()me(,l t<i i'aiilu-e. In ()nr (uhnre it is als(i vhal fl)r most
"gran(h,tn-(reath)g" pr<!iect_+t<) be (_c()m)mi(:ally s(+nsil)l('--()th(+rwis(+ the average' citi_,'.e|/
++'ill r(!ject then+. N<) _leat national inlerest exists in "climliin_ m()nnlains because tlt(+'+' are
tiler('." Most Americans have t() +<.'el tilat a pra(ti( al, schentific, military, ('('()nonii( <Jr ()th('r
l)urpc)s(+ is served in "(limi)in_ niountains" before riley ,,,+'illslq:)i)ort and take pri(ie in such
at(iv+tit's. Isolat('d events may be ('xciting--anccl ('reate telilpOl+ai-_/heloes--lltlt a deep last-
in+..+pride and a s<)lJ(l sense' c,f acliievei)t(,'nt uslnally )+(`+quire practical p)t)jecls.
St) ntanv tan_ibl(' e(<)nomic and scientific opp()rttu+ities (hi exist in <lurer space tilat
tile c()nntry can aft+(ted t<) plies(+(,+ th('m with intensit),--and ;+Is() rea l) tile intportant ps>-
c h()hlg, i(al, p<)liti(al, social anti (uhural i)cncfits as "by-l)r(iducts" <)[' the main effort. In a
cost-bent'lit analysis tilt: spat(" pr(_iects cann()t bc given explicit ere+die for such "bv-
pr()dil(ts," i)nt it (-an note the, p(>tentia] whicit exists, h shouhl I)(" n+ade clear that these'
"i)!,'-pr()d+Icts" couhl lit' as '¢ahmi)h" as tile there tangible el)it'clive's, in('luding any windlalls.
That would be our,i+Higment, al least for the balance" <if this ('entur>'.
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(_hal)ter iii exph)r('s s<)me oi tile technol()_' expectc(l to I)(' ass(to+ate(,+ widl space ill
the ill'at, iil(!dium and I<)ng term. Some readers may find this chapter exciting because tit(`"
t(,ctin()h)<_ica] p()ssihiliti('s ])ortray{'(,I are _l'eater lhan ilia+iv relatively kn()wh, dt4eai)i(,"
_r()lil)s ciirr('iitly setgii I() illlderstand. This cllapler hldicat('s titat a hasic (:han_(" in tit(.
char_iclei ot ()ill" pra('ti(:al actk,iiies in space is likely io ()('(,'ill" by lilt" late 'l'_Osor early '(.)(ts.
As kn(iwie(,lgeat)h: NASA pers(,)nnel and other space-ori(,,nted proti:ssionais know, lip until
+lOW sl)ace systelllS have atletnpted to keep the large, conlple×, expensive eqtiiptlteltt on
lilt" grotin(,I, wher(' l)<)ssitile, and tilace the snlailer or (heal)er equiptnent into space. (Tile
[)rest+ill sittlati(in illaV t)¢" (<)lllpar(Pd to the use of river Irerries whieit are severely liinited in
die teat,is tilt') Call tl'allSl)(irt. ) lit tell or ill'teen years, we expect to lind lllany new systems
which deph))' the tara(" conlplex equipment in space anti kee l) the sniali inexpensive, but
ilun+erous, parts oi tiic syslenl on tile ground. (To continue the atiahigy Ihis change woul(,t
be similar to tile replacenlent of most river ferries with modern bridges. That change was
l)asic and eftT.'ctive.)
Although Chapt('r llI focuses strongly on technology, it also attempts to indicate that
future deveh)pments ill space, especially in terms of manned activities, are pr(lbahly (,tepen-
de/it more on a nulni)er of imponderables other than successtiil techn()logy. For exainphe,
Ill(! personal heahh and satt_ty of a space traveler---or tourist--is potentially crucial tel
many activities. Ahhough safety is more or less a direct colisequence of technoi()gy, Âiiture
health ill space is still a mystery which may involve risks that are sub]ect it) straighu'orwar(,I
te('ilnological soluti()n--or at least not for quite a h)ng [263] time. At the moment there
al)liears it) he seine uset]tl information from prior life s(ience stndies, bnt those arc r('ii-
al)h" inaitily it)i relaliv('ly shorl-terni exposures Io tile lpace ('nvironlt+(,l+l.
,(';)pact."/0urT_m, which appears ht every scenario its a niaior new growth in(,hlsiry, shonld
iiol be taken as quile Ilia+ cel+laill. Thai is, even asstlliiiil_ l]lal problelns ot +heal+h, safety
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and cost do not h<:conw h_trinsic dclc,rrt,nls, il is p_ssit)lc at l('asl Io col+((,iv(, of ()lh_'r
developnwtHs lhal might haml)er that polenlial i,llduslry. For e×amph:, lilt" exHteme_l
might vm6sh alit'v tlt+" first IZ+wy<:ars. After all, +++illherc he en<)ugh importaiH c×peH(+n¢-(,s
which an expensive tour carl bring thai tilt + advanced electronic sysll'l+lS atTlit+ipatt.d fi,t
tit(" 21st ((.ntltt+y could hi)t? Many of the vis,lml experiences in spa((- might h¢" helle+ I)('r -
ceivcd through ('l¢'ctrotlics, and prol)al)l) a 1o! re<w(" comt_)rtably. Slill tll¢+ eXl)eHence <)t
weightlessn(,ss, <)+-the knowl<:dge of the new rt'alilies, s+,ich as being suspt't+ded in st)acc,,
l)('rhal)S 25,01)0 miles above the' earth, or a chant( + to walk <)n lhc+ tn<)on, tnighl t)r<:,,t" I<_
ht- l)ric(,l(,ss. (:ertainly c'lect+onics h;+s not heen a sttlt]ci(,nl Stll)stiltltt" l() dat('. These t,l_wt'r-
tail+ties might possibly be rt'solved liflly dutitlg this ct'nttt++v.
Another consid(,rati<)n might bc that ()I lit(+ [)¢>ssil)le liagilitv of lit+." Ul)p('r allt+<)s-
])he,l_'. If it is fitund that this i)votective env¢,lol)e would be seri_;ttslv degraded t)e,,,ond
some calculated ntHnbc'r ot a,nnual latmches, lh(m lhe tult,lre tourisi industr\' couM be
gve+,ttly hamt)ered since it would prol)ahly have a relatively low priority. This mid,hi not rule
l(),llriSl+l o+`it h+il co,uld limit il scv<:tt,ly (>l +(+strict it to only• a very, l_+w high l)rio,lity nt+t_ds.
()n the other hand, the tilt|tel- atmOSl)h(,rt+ might not pr<w(" to he ftagi](, at al] l_tr l)rop-
t'Hy d('sign<_'d I)Vopulsive systems.
12641 These l)(>tential issu¢.s are raised t_w halanct, in this disct,lssion. Space tourism has
an exciting I<+n,g-l{'l',itl potential I),itl it tirst needs to 1)c developed and shown to vi¢'ld ++,i1:
ticit'nt hentdil+. During the nt'xl fi'w decades tmt_)rese+,ll i)r<tblem+ will +lndot,lhl(:dlv arise
and will need to I)¢+solved +atislitctorily. Until lh_,,l linl(, Sl)aCc to|its aye likely to r(q,l_ai,l! i,l,l
tit(' limbo <if hopes or dreams.
It +the heahh problems associated with pmtmcted iotuneys into space should h('c<mw
relalivt,lv sever(,, various sohutions Italy emerge <we+ time lhal will pe,ltnil space develot)-
m¢'NI to colllinut', h_dee(I, lh¢' maj<w colnp(,lil(ws Io lh¢, h+H+,l;tn l)r<.sctlce in spa((" hav(,
het'n and +mdot,t:,t('dlv will bt' lh(: vari,l)us _tllll)lll_tlt'(] dt'vices--+'ot)ols, in ()n(" ti>rm <w
an_)tht'r. (]t,ll'I/t'lltl+V, acc(wding to (:;+rl Saga|l, "As a rid(' of th+m+h, a mannt,d mis_i()n (()sls
50 Io l()(i times more" than a c(mll)aral)le tlt,lnlanned mission. TM ()vet ti+n_+, automatkm ha_+
h('c<)t,l,<: i,lw,leasingly compact and efl+:ctive. Thai is, tit(" r<)t)ots t<:nd to shlrink in siz(, and
inert+as( th(" range ot +the'Jr a(tivili(,s, ttumans can h'art+ to do Ihe latt_:r, hul Ihey will hay("
ditfi(t,lltv ill shrinkil+g.
X('vertht'less. a humat+ prt'senct" in Sl)a((' will bt" needed and is lik<:l_,, to gr<m:. 'Ill(' eco-
II()]t,li('s ()t the (Oml)etitiotl with th(' rohots generally will (l(+tCl+mil+( + tile I¢'lalivc I)alanc( +
only wh('n the same lasks can he done hx h(ith. As spa('(+ dc+veh)pm('tH pt(w('('ds, th(' hal-
:uwe maY shift either way. Howev<w, ,+s space indttstriali/.alion grows it+ compl('xily the
nt+t'd fiw ht,llnan sp¢wialists may grow in I)rOl)ortion. The tirst Spa((, Shtttlle decade, tht'
"8<)_+,should give us some ca,fly (it+es ahoul lhl(" (>tltcotn(+ of this loITg-t(wn,l compt'tilion.
126:] J D. The Scenarios
()ptimistic Set'nail<): Sore(. of tht" })ott'ntial t(,chn_)l<tg 9: (lis¢t,lsst'd in Chapl(,r llI is used
in Ill(" ()t)limislic S¢(',l+alio of(:haptt, r IV. This scenario simply exercises tilt +possil)le tt'ch-
t+o]ogica] and ('t'<)l]()lllic IIHIN(']CS lit show w]i_tl could l-C;J+Slill_lhIV ()('(+llF ill Sill ('llVil'()nlll('l'll
<)l+s,l,lstained li,ln(ling, high moral(,, dedication, c<)(tperation, g(;od managem(.t,l,, and rea-
sortable luck. It is intt'nded Io opc,,l+ tq) some vistas, Io make it cl(+ar that ¢+xlra()v(liHary t)os-
sihililic, s t'xisl lhal ar(' not necessarily l.!lopian. AhhotLgh the ('v('nls porlrav¢-d at('
generally not t'×l)(,c-tc, d to hal)pe,ll as s<t(,l,n as in(licatt+(l, we helic'vc lhal lilt+ s('qtwt+ce is ,n<tt
inlYinsicallv tiwt)idd('n, h may only r(,(tt_ir(. ;t cha_lgt, it+ put)lie allit,l,ld('m+ which is C('llai,lt-
I. The A'e_+, }?.k 77me_ :lla_,_t=im _,.]ulv III, 1977.
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ly po,_sihle. The scenario nut only is intended to _ive a sense of some ultitnate po,ssihilitie,_
hut +tlm<)of an ,,_;enlu,,';/outc<)me. Almost all of tilt, teclmol<)gical deveh)pnlenls that "hap-
pen" in tlt+." li,-st I00 years it)'(.' likely to <)tour s<)<)l|Cl oi hllt.+r--t'Vt+ll it] a pessimistic sce-
wari<), ahhough l)r()hahly mttch later and ()n a rt'cluccd scale. As is (liscussed hel<)w, the
economic and techn<)l()gical progv(,.+s associal('d with the ()ptimistic Scenario is amazing
it) ils long-term outcome, hut is relatively modest in any partictt]ar y<'ar or d('(:ade.
Pessimistic Scenario: (]hal)let V portrays lhe two New lnltwnational ()rder Sc(mari<)s.
Parl I carries ()ut a theme which today is widely accepted in the world, ahh()tngh not ])y the
atnhors. This is a perspective which suggests that the devt'h)pcd nalions g('nerally are rel-
atively "dt'cadent" and that the de++'eh)l)inR nations have lhe enerho' and dynalnis'm |() })ush
lhvm aside and hec()me the fl)ct,s of the futtue. The sec<)nd (Part If) version of 15_6(+1the
s('t'tl;+trio a_%ttllle'_ that l'iCllt+l + C()tUltlit+,+s will+, in part tht'()u_h the tl-aD.,_l(.'r o[ re,_()ttl+.'(_'s,
gr('all) a<c(qt'rate lhe dcvelopm('vn <)f the poorer cotmlries and that these, as they attain
(<)reparable wcallh and techn<)logical advancen+ent, will ad<)pt lhe +<)(ial attitttdes and
idc()h)g O, oi their former hi'tit!factors. Both of these sc('narios strike its as heing relatively
imlJr()hahh'--htlt lhey d() raise imp<)rlant issues.
()n lhe oth('r hand, we do find that many lm'merly poor nati<)ns ;.If(' llOW midttlc-
income ones and progressing very rapidly. Sccllal'iO I gives special roles to (]+iml and
Brazil in detcrmining the world's fttture, each for different reasons. Scenario II gives a
much wt'akt'twd and m<)dified lbrm of this New h11ernafional ()rder in which h()th lhc
mi(|dlt'-in(()me nations and the poor nations e'ventttally l)('c()mv post-industrial, after
whi(h lttrtht.r ('c()nomic pr()_rt'ss is very slow.
In hoth scenario.% it is tlt+., nil(Idle-income natioi'_s that appear likely t() "chaLlenge" the
lead <)I the I+.T.S.and the S()viet Union in space activities hy the end <)f the (cnttn+y or so<)r,
aft('r_,vards. In Jact, in these scenarios the U.S. lead--as meastned hy buclgt, ts--is los! t<)
holh the Russians and tlt(+' (:hinese hefore the year 2000, and t<)the Brazilians soon afler-
wards. We believe that in thi,_ rcspt'ct the two scenarios depicwd are not implausible; it
may well tmn ()ut thal them(' newcomers in advanced lechnoh)g),' an{l growing afl]tlCl'l('("
will h('come lechnologically dominant, inchtding space development. Pc+rhaps n<)thing
sttcc('eds like m,c+cess in a space "race." Moreover, the stwc(.sses of I)3(" l()rmer mid(tlc-
in(om(' (<)tmtries in spat(' could greatly increase their ability t() hecome weahhier than
tlt(' present deveh)ped nations. In these steltarlos it occurs, lll)t only because of
['i)671 <lir('ct ('conomic an<l lechn()logical achievements, but hecattsc their success creates
a high tn<)rale and a sense oi c()tnpetence from the attainment of communal goals--alti-
ttldes that gr<)wing space activities might als() en++ender in the [Organizati<)n fi)r
E(()nomic (3o<)[)eration and Development] nations under appropriate circttnistatl(es.
B<'cause visihle signs <)f stlcc('ss art" so important, many of the Third World ('otmtries
()flen a.lt(_!nll.+t l() "tb.k('" them. That is, they are attracted t<) f()ulqane highways and jet air-
liners in ()rder I() achieve tilt' appearance of success before they have properly attended
t() th('ir pr<)blem.s in rural r(tads, agricuhure, employment, and educatit)n. The diversion
<)l rcs(mrccs tl) shox+ T prt),jects can be tragic even if the sho_ T projects are successful; usu-
ally t})cy are not. Thus it may b(" undesirable tor a Third World cotmtry to.jump into space
dcvch>llmenl rapidly, t!nlcss both Iheir economies and techn(>l()gi(al re.sources art' suH-
stanlial it can represent a serious and impractical diversi<)n (1t scarce res()urces. I |owt'ver,
the all|)rt)priat(" economic conditions and technological development can appear wilh
astonishing rapidity. In |hct, even S. Korea and Taiwan may he ready f(ir certain special-
ized sl)ac(" v(,llltlles in th(" foreseeahh" future because of the rapidity with which Ihey ]l_ve
he('n progr(.ssing, l)otential economic and technological gianls such as China and Brazil
may also dev('l<)p a spa((" capability much more quickly Ihan generally expe(l('d, it Iheir
F('('('III ])r<)gress i()lltillll('P+.
In ore most Pessimistic Scenario progr('ss in ecl)n(tmics and tel+hn<ll</g_ ' he(<)mes very
low afl('r a (()ttntry l)¢.c()tn(.s l)<)sl-hldtnslrial. Sli}l, a sin+prising ()ulc<)me (()ne which Slltuck
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holh aulhors tbrcibly) was tltal evenlually, despite a 14eneral 13essinfism aboul space pro-
jects and off_er technolot4ical devclopnlenls, space aclivides siill I)lx'onle surprisin/4 b
exlensive. {268] ((,onsider, as an amdogy, lhal even if (_ueen Isabella had not fimmced
(;olumbtls, or if he had |;tiled mi his voyage, the 'Western ftemisl_here would slill be there,
wailing to be found; since the lime was ripe t_lr worldwide expIoralion and exploilalion
olher Eurol)eatls would have reached il Ix'tbre many more years had t)asned.)
The presstnes |or exploring and ext)loiling outer space basically derive from incre_ts-
ing weahh and advancing technologies. ()vet lime tile projects become easier l{) fund and,
wilh ;l(kr;lllCeS in iec|lno|o_', less dit}icu]l Io do. AI SOllle at)pro|lriale lhne, t)arrin_ ;in
_tltito,_l teli_iOllS _tvetsil)lt io ttew l{'{]tllt)ll)<L_,) ', it _llt]TCiClll desire for sp;tce dev_:hJi)ll)l'ltl will
arise--even if IOllg inlerv;ils octtel- wheel Stll)])Oll i_, hard Io tiild.
AiiOliler ail;ilo_' lilighi be illadc wiih )he dt'velopilienl el lhe [!.S. railroads mid lhe
k'esi. The raiho_t(ls were ,_linlltlaled l)v 14ilis of tree" land 1)), lhe _ovellilllenl and lhe bcliet
lhai, a._ )he i'ailro_lds were buih, lhe Ira|tic would t;)llow--lhai a _iea[ deal o| indu_ii'i;tl
titiilill_ iili(t a_liclti[lital d('vt'lo|)lll(>lll, inchtdill_ t_li('sll_,4 iVOllld o¢cilr quhe r_lpidly _illfl
.iUSlit_' lh('ir iiivesttlletil. The liliie was ril)l- ;ttid il did.
A ,_inlihu" experience could oC¢ill wiih ihe Space _huiile _v_lelll. In space )here lllaV lie
tie eqilivaletll lo )he tiee lti0-acie hoilicsle;ld,_ which were ()il(e av;til_ible lo Ihe _lvel_t_e
AtneliC;tii, |)tit _te;tl Ol)l)oriunilies _lrt! likely io exisl |_;ir V_iliOll,_ "railroad" COlliiJ_lnies who
"slake Otll clahils" in Olllet- space..&l Ihe tllOtlletil lhe Sl)_tce tiotilier and iis av_iilatlle
re._Olil(e_, .%Ceil1 relalively unlinliicd. Rehllivel)' |i'w crilical lel_ioils _tl)t)ear Io exisi lhai nlilhi
evellltl;411)' I)e¢olne lilt" ({lille of Ill,lie| ¢onl]icls all(I hinder ¢onlnlerci_il develoi)nlenl.
l_691 [_lOdCl';llo _Cell{trio: (]h;ii)ler V] develops {tilt" [_|odel'ille _C['llllrio whicii ix inlellded
Io lie tllOre pi_utsit)le ill;ill lhe olhers. II lla._ _111 inil)li_'d convielion l|iai liie l)i-o_less rel)-
i'esenled i,_ worlh slrivinl_ |_lr--_llld e;ili lie achieved whhoul illldile i-e_ichin_, li r_t)ie_ei]l,_
our "tliedi;ill" illicit(, o| re)lure develol)lllenl,_ in space, il ¢onlilins SOll)e |]cliolial elmnenl_
whicll ar(" illlellded Io lit" |)roloi,vl)es of _iclil_i] |tislotica] cvclll_i, ilichldill_ iildividll_ii,s wtt_>
;Ire "iilOVi,is" and ",_haker,_" and who |)lay C('lllr;il roles in |i)rciilg ;4 tllore rapid Sl)aCe devcl-
O|Jliletll.
The Moderate _ceil_lrio (,lll])hasi/es two llew colnlllerci_tl oi)])orltlliilie_: ,S_)i_/('/_ 7IIUilI,S -
lri:di_..tm. :rod l#lxri,s.t, both o|" which al)l)C;U Io |i_lve t'xlrenlel), lart4e l)olet)lial itl all the
_ct'tl;iiio,_. Tile l(>rlli, "s|J;l¢(" lolirisill," _tloli(" lil;tV IlOl ¢Ollvev lilt- hiiended liil'_lilill_. Ifwe
_i_itlllie ih;tl Sl);tce lrave] ix the lnovint4 exf)erience )hal ii has l)(,(-li It) Ill;ill), ;tSll-Itil_lill_, ;tl
SOllle I]lllll'e lime v{iriolls or/_,aliiz_lliollS or sociciies Ill{ly wish to provide lhis experience io
selecled l)eople, ii In,iv l)(, _t reward Ior dedicaled service or M)ecial conlril)iilion,%, or _l rh-
u;ll as,_ocillled whh special reli<_ious _l{)lll)S. ()l il could be iUlan_ed throu/_h _ltl ellen (tr
Iintiled access lollery.
,_horil)' alit'r lhe t)cl_innhi _ otSl)_ice lourisin, assuinin/_ ii ix success[ul, we lind Ihe l)OS-
sit)ilil)' oF _leal iillt'i_'._l in esl;iblishhl_ [)erili_lllelll orl)ilin_ cohtnies--i)ossil)l)' whh ilia)i) _
ot Ille S;lllle lllolivaliotis. We hale tlol dweh ul)<lli lhe desire litr UlOl)ias or choices |_lt
olie's preferred Iit_, slvle. [towevei, i! Iliav well lltrn oul )hal olle o1 )he itl;!ior ttloliv:tiions
t_tr col(roles in sl)aee is sin)liar lo )hal which drove Ihe Pil/_ritii,_ io _l-w l_]llt41aild: Ihe desire
Io (hoo,_e)heir way of lift" wiih tliitlilital iillerlT:reticl" t[otn )he he)lie coUtllr,v. This el)l-
COil(C, otf'Olll'._t> WOlil(t depend very tlltlC|l on [27() I Ihe ¢o,_i arid vi_ll)ililv otsllcil ¢oMllies.
|lul evell relalivelv small secls, _iven it ,_rowin/4 |].llllre al]lilence, could eVelllll_tlk, |]llance
;i ct)loilv it lhe)' were sulticienlly' itloliv_lled--i)mliclilml )' if )lie)' had abilhv to liihe, like
Ill<" _,lOliiions or Black Musliln_.-'
2. I;ol i'xalnph', il 1,000,01)0 t;linilit's i,;ll li i lillllihull,d _2,_')111)a vl'_il IOi 41) ll.,;ll_, wiliillul iitt_'ll'_i Ihis
b_ouldl ll('COlitt > _11tll llillion, t'ilOli_h Io csllll)lish ;i ntlllsialllilll ('l)hlll)ill ihc (';il I_ Ill iilid-91si i 1'111111_, ;l(l+ll d-
iii_ Io lliil ill ,ic_ lie)in. I'lil' _oiili iblllillii i llllld al)])l'tu Ill ii D_'D:I;_./;is ;I tax-c_;cilipl inv_'slincili ill )hi'/iilili i' iatli_'i
Ihail ;is _i Rite.
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Ill many religions the wealth of lhe cht,rch is thought of as a cotnn+ml resource (or its
ntentl)ers t<_ help those ht difficulties and S<Httetillles, eV('t] whet] S;<)111{"members at(' sti(-
cessful, to l)e used t<t facilitate additional sit(tess. +I'o the extent that space colonies, iu
addition to lheir religious connotation, |night ht+tk like profital)le ventures then lhe
investments would eventually increase the wealth of the church. Furthermore, through
lllCIil criteria (>r h)tleries, every lnetilbeF would have a chalice to l)cC<iltle a colonist, or a
tourist. The chttrch might deent Ihe high costs well worth lit{? increased faith attd activity
of its ntembers--partictilarly if these "tourists" returned with atn inspired atnd zealous (ore-
(nit(nest to th(' (htu+ch.
E. Potential fi)r Growth
()ur vtwy rottgh estimate of current world space pr<!ject expend|titres is al:,<ntt $9 bil-
lion per year on ntm-ntililarx d(weh+l)merlts and perhaps hall that much on military Sl)a<:e
l:,r<igrants. Thal is, total exp('nditttres on space projects art' about .2 Itercent of the (;WP
(al)+ntt . 13 percent non-military, att|d .07 percenl military).
In a pessitnistic spat(e scenario thai small (.13 percent) tiaction generally remains sta-
ble <w decreases, desl)ile the ta('I that tit<.? cost o1" lransl)(trtati()n lo spa(+e lntlsl almost <er-
(airily titll by more Ihan a [Tt(tor [271 ] of 10 during the next cent(try. Still the (;We during
the next 100 years is expe(led--in <mr earth-centered surl)rise-ii-ee l)r(!jections--lo rise by
about a la(-l<>r of 20 .... If space expenditures merely keel+ pa(e witll (;WP tlt(+++' would bc
altpro×intately $200-$300 l)illi<m l)y then and would ahnost double again in the Ioll<+win,g
100-year imrio(t. The "truly" pessimistic space scenari<_ wet,It(, (m averaRe, maintain a slow-
er growth in space invcstltlt'lltS than the (;WP. On averr++_emeans thal "lernp<irary'" l]tt(tu-
atti_)ns may ,,:ill'), that pr<!ie(li,,,t sotnewhat over periods of a fi'w decades or less.
,,\ moderate scenati_i, in our view, we(rid, on average, l)ttt lnOlmbl)` with erralic flu(-
ttuations, show at g;rowth r,tle m spa(e which exceeds that on earth--l_erhaps by about a
IT(tier oi2 or 3. Thtts, lit(' world's space bridget would have a mean brr<:,vl]+ rat(" (ff 3-I/2
F,ercent t<) 5 l)ercenl, which w(mld h'ad t,:t space btv_Igets between $200 atnd $1,200 bill|is
at the Tri<enlennial. We arrived at $700 l)illi<m (or our l)articuhtr Moderate Scenario
(( :hapter VI).
! Iowever, we notice that the 2076 I)udgel (or annual investment) estimate is cxtrelllC-
ly sensitive to the assmned average growth rate. Over a hundred years a 2-per+*'l+tchange
in this average aflbcts the budget by aboul a factor of 7--and, over 200 years, by at factor
el 50. Yet it appears to tts that the inherent uncertainly in the average |tit(ire growth rate
is intrinsically greater than 2 per(+elll and ilia),' be as high as 5 percent--the latter leads to
at l]tct<)r of more than 100 over a centtlry and more than an astonishing I0,000 over two
(:('ntttriest
1272l ()n tim positive side--that is, from a space enthttsiast's point of view--the high
growth rates h'ad to an optimistic scenario. In lhc ()prim|site Scenatlit) el +(]ha[)t('r IX+'lhe
avelag<' Rrowth rate in worldwide space investments tosc during tlt(.' last qtiarter of tlt,.'
2(lth <cnturx at al+mtt l(l |}cr<elll per anllllnl (about tlt(" average Ik+l a "glatnotu +" <it high
techn<ilog,): +industry ctn'rently). During the first 100 years after a brief rise to a 12-1:,ercenl
Rrowth rate, lhe (;ross Space Product ((;SP) then declined steadily to about an 8,-fiercest
Rrowth rate, and during tlt(" second I00 years Io 5 percent .... We if(tie that tire growth
rate in space, per capita, ends at about 2-1/2 percent--actually, less than the pro<ht(tivity
increase of the average Ameri(an worker in recent decades. Thus, the Opt|re|slit Scenario
i>ortrayt.tl would not be I)erc('ived as having an astonishing growth dtning arty year t_t its
hist<wy--e×cept perhalrS during 19bI0-2(100, when a general change ilt societal ',tttittt(ics
toward space is asstuned l_l o<'Cill-. Alier tile lurn of the ((!nlury it is just lhe assumed loil_-
lerlli steadiness of the slowly (le(lining growth rate thai 1)rin<gs ai)_)til _i "iiliraciiloiis" lraliS-
[i>rinalion--first to a $30 trillion (i_P and then, during the nnich slower l_rowlii o| the
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second 100 years, to an awrsonw $12,000 trillion .... Slated onb,, in this last way the num-
bers tend to I)c hard t() acccl)t _ts havin_, any rca]ily; the avera,_e annual (;WP/ca[)ita,
including the (;SPn aflrr 200 ),cars, reaches almost $1 mi]]ion--al)out 600 times greatrr
than th<+'avrrag<+' today!
The 200-year progression of mo(lcratr succrsscs in the OPtimistic S(cnario not ()ill _,
h'adm to [_++ntastic dcveh)|)mcnts it] spa(:+', it also demands an CXtlcmclv rich socirty (m
<+'arth--onc ill. which essentially cvcryoll<.' (cxccp! those who v<)hmlari]y opt oul) is an
active participant. 1"o tlt<+"127:+] average citizrn, today, this mIlM rrl)rcscnt an unbrlirvabh'
()tltCt)IIW--cvc11 though the path to it is rrlativrlv straightlorward. For example, to _<_
I_-<)m thr ctwrcnt (;x.Vp of r<)ughly $6.6 trillion to <me <)] $6,700 trillion ov<+'r 200 yealS (on
earth . . .), rcqifircs "only" an average growth rate of ?,.5 perccnt--/e.++ lhan that which the
world as a wholr has eXl)(,ricncrd (hu+ing thr last l_.'w (lrcadrs+ What is so astonishin_
about that? The itltswer appears It) 1)c tlolJlill_'to +ill optimist, eveo, thi++,_to a ]),ussimisl.
In lh<++a])<)vc sense of economic and Icchnological pnogrcss, wr have pOz-lraycd ])cs-
sire|st|c, modrratr, and optimistic scenarios. In the pessimistic <)lip thr intrinsically high-
trchnol<+g_' Clltcrl)rincs +it'+,+treated as l+ascinalit+g but dangerous idols to |)e kept tllt(Icn
vrry tight control. Society respon(Is to s(icnl(c all(I tcchn(dogy as if it wrrc a "t<)reign" <ul-
lure beyond its real understanding, and potentially t]aught with great new risks.
The Mo(leralc Scenario is It|OFt of" +I+Iong-trrn+ l)usiness-as-uslml 1)ct-spcctixr. Whcrr
s])ac,v projects arc 1)rofital+lc the co(tit(till|( +rewards ten(l, oxcr timr, to (lonlinate the s()cio-
political restraints and, acconlpanicd I)7+ ntunerotLS |)rol)h!ms, dilficuhies and intcrru[)-
tions, spacr development erratically but slowly clilnl)s the la(hl(+r of progrrss. BUl cvcn
such erratic slow f)rogrcss over a "mere" 100 veaP:g I)l+ings about changes which in to(lav's
world (otnld onllv sccm amazing--li)r cxam])lr, a $600-billion annual investmunt in spa(r
"when transl)Orl (()sis arc about 1/25 of tln<+' i)rescnt ()tlcs, coupled with trrnwndous
adwutccs (to take a few cxami)les) in atttonmti()n, instrumcnls, materials, and new (|<:sights
(for vchMes, in(luslrics, commurJicali<)tl systems, and 1)rocess<++s in spa(e). Thus, rvcn
[27++,] lhr slow, rrratic Moderate Scenario reveals a potrnlially ast(_unding transfornlation,
one that may l)e almost iml)ossil)lc to c()ml)rchrnd lhlly or foresee accturatcly. Tha! is, tilt'
])r0jcctions wc havr nta(Ic are likely to al)[)(,ar l)rintitivc 100 yrars from now--just as (i<)
thr [7.S. 1)rojcctions fi-om 100 years ago that (<mid not scri<)usly imagine Ihc grncral use
(>f aut(nnol)iles, let ah)nc airliners, Sl)aCC tlight, electronic computers, tclcvisi(m, ()r
nudear emwgT--t() name jusl a lk+'wof the cv()lvcd '+ntiracles'--and all this with all aver-
age growth in per capita (;NP of h'ss than 2 l)rrcrnt.
llow lhcn, when lhc I)ttsill.ess-as-usttal l)rqjccti(>n l)ecomrs shocking or in(<)ml)rchcn-
sil)h,, can wr CXl)CCt anything l)ut imrc(hdous reactions lit| + any Ol)litnistic scenario? Our
()ptimistic Sccnat+io requirrs, fi)r the worM as a wholr, merely that htunan l)cings Ol)l for
growth and srt about to obtain it with r<>ughly the same, bul +ugtained, vigor that on avrr-
agr w(" lind rxists to(lay. That is +ill.
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As part O[ a hu]_er review o[commercial LIIJJ+([(+_ activities, this report revi+.w.+the variou.s poli+4e+ A_.1.%4.
had developed ot,er the yeat:s co_tcervli_+,qrindusU_al and commevvial i.voh,ement in space. 5;uch doc-
ume.tatio, re_,eals a .ew way (_[thinkin[.( at N4SA; the age.Q was beg,innin,_ to to.sider theJuture
user:, t?/"space rather tha_t ./us! demon.slrating .at|toTal technological competence and e,xJdoratiom
This u,a,_ partly' i. pre]mratim_ Jor the qm_v' statio., part(_, [or co.ti.ued pres_u_v t. ]i.d _ommercial
R&l) veulltre_ Jor the Shuttle, a.d partly' to bo[ster NAA'A support lhruuLdmut the eco.om_,.
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NASA Policy to Enhance Commercial
Investment in Space
h is national policy to efl:ectively apply the resources of the nation to preserve the role
of the United States as a leade, in space science and technoh>h_+ and their applicatious.
With lhe maturing of the Space 'l'rat+sp<)rtation System (STS) to a reliable and operati<mal
status antl in lig, IH el +re(+t:ul initiatives in space indtlstrializati<m, il is evident that tlm dawn
of the era oFwide-spread c<mmmrcial activities in space is at hand. Maitllenan(+e of nation-
al h'adership in space requires the support atld t:xpansion of commercial space activilivs.
rl'he President's National Space l'olicy of.July 4, 1.982, directs NASA to expand United
Stalt.s pFivate sector i,P,'esttnent anti involvement it+ civil space and space-related activities+
In light of this directive and since st,I)stantia] portions of the [!nitcd Slales tcclmoh)gical
base and tnolivali<m reside in the [ !hired St_+ttCsprivate sector, NASA will invigorale its
<.'flOltS to lake lle('<,+ss_lt'y _lttCI I)t+oi)er acli(ms It) promote a clinlatt, conthtcive t() t'x])anded
private secl(:,l invcstmen+l and iuvolventet_t ix+ sl)ace by United States domestic ¢()tlcellts.
NASA views il+ role in tim commercialization of space iu light of the National
At'r+matttics and Space Act oI" 195_, as amended (Space Act), whi,:h eslablishes NASA as
the agency rt'sponsil)le Ibr the direction o| civil "space . . . activities" of the United States.
The h+gislaliVe history of the Act states that "the tertn 'activities' slt<mld be constl-ued
broadly enough to enal)le the Administration . . . to, carry <m a wide sl)ectrttnt of activities
which relate to the succcsst+ul use of <tier space. These _tctivitics would include scientilh-
dis(overv and research not tlireclly related to travel in c, uter space t)ul utilizing outer
spa<x:, and Ihe deveh)pnmnt of res<)ttr{es which may be discovered in outer space."
The Space Acl also establishes thai space activities will l)e (ondu(le(I Io make the
"'most eHi'(tive utilization <)f the scientilic and engineering res<)urces of the Unite(l Slates
• . . iu ()r(l(+r t() avoid ttnnetessaFy (h,l)licati(m of eftort, tacilities, and e(tuipment." NASA
has lttade large scale list! <)I privale in(htstry as c()ntra(tors ill carrying Otll its a(:livilies. It
has provided space launch services 10r commercial purposes since 1962. Beginning in
1979 it has entered inl<_ "l)arln,:.rship" arrangements with private se(l_)r firms to _'nhan(c
lhe ('<mmler('ial utilization <>[ space res<mrces. These and other activilics carry out and
('XlJand lhv tradition <d NASA's (•()()])erati()n with indt,stry and <)the, private sect<)r insti-
tuli<)llS which dates ba(k to NASA's predecess<)r agency, tlt(_: National Advis()rv (',otnntittee
i lbrl :\er<mat_tics.
In light of the Presidential ptdicy ()f.]uly 4, 1989, NASA will continue and expatld its
eflorl to fa('ilitale priwtte sector investment it] outer space and will en(:c)urage comnlercial
space activities ({lllSislenl with that policy.
In order to more (+ftbctively encourage and tacilitate private secl<)r inv<dvemcnl anti
invesllnent in civil space and space-related activities, A,Y1SA will redirect a portion O/its ,space
Fesearch and developnmnt activities to assure that its R&D program supports the research.
develol>ment and demonstration of space technologies with commercial application.
I() [ttrther support this objective, NASA will directly invob:e the privale sector in ini-
tiatives which aFe consistent wit]l NASA program objectives atnd which supl)<)rt COllllllel'-
('ial space activily.
These initiatives may inchtde. I)ul are no! limite(t to: (I) ere.gaging in.joint arrange-
tents with I._nite(l Stales (l()mestic concerns t() operate on a commercial basis tacilities of
services which relieve NASA of an operational responsibility; (2) engaging in .lOinl
arrangements wiHI t:.S. donteslic concerns Io develop facilities or hardwaFe Io be ,s<'d in
c+mjunclio,l with the S'I+S or other aspects _d the U.S. spao: program; and (!+,) t)y entering
inlo Iransa(tions with ['nite+l Slates (<scorns designed t<) encourage the commercial
exph>ilati(m ot space.
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Principle NASA incentives availahle in.joint arvangcmenls may inchMe in ad(titi(m It)
making availat)le Ihe resuhs ()f NASA research: (1) pr()vi(ling Ilight time ()n the space
lr;l]lsi)()rtalion syslt, tn ()n al)lm)priatc unms and c<)ndili()ns as (Iclermined by the
A(hilillistrator; (2) provi(lillb_ technical advice, ('onstt]talioll, data, eqnipnlt.tH al[d t_tcilities
Io })allicij)aling orgallizalions; atl(I (?)) elltelillg into .joint r(-sealt}l ;,lilt], (h'ltlonstflt|i,{_ll
pFo_rkt.lIlS whel'(2 each t)ar|v funds its own parlicipati()n. Ill making the necessary d('lel-nli-
nation It) pr(}cee(I under this poll( 7, the Adnlhlistralor will consider lilt- ilee(l [+or NASA
fnnded support (Jr ()thor NASA action to commercial endeavt)rs and the relatb,,e i)ellt, llls
to be obtained t+r_)n+ snch en(leavors. The j)riniary emphasis <)f these joint aITall_enlenls
will be to provide support to ventures which fesnlt in <)r t_uilitate industrial activity in
space when snch activity w()uld ()therwise I)e nnlikely to occur due 10 high techn()lt)gical
<)r tinancial risk. Other venltlres inv<)lvhq4 new conlmcrcial activities in space will also be
Sul)p<)rled, In either case, t)rivate capital nltlSt t)e kit risk.
As m_j_)r areas Ior NASA enhancement of uJtal United States capability, including tilt'
private secl()r, may bcct)nle aplm/ent h+()m tinle to time, the i+actors It) be c(msidere(i t)v
NASA pri()r 1o pr()viding incentives may inchl(le, but not be limited 1o, sonic ()r all ()f the
lblh)wing cons|tit:rations: (I) the eftk'ct of the private sect()r activity tm NASA t)rograms;
(2) the enhanced exph)ilation <)f NASA capabilities such ;is the Space Transportation
Syslem; (3) the contrilmtion to the mainlenance of United Stales technological supcri()r-
it)'; (4) the amount of l)rof)riemry data t)r l)ackgrotmd inlbrmafion io be Jurnished I)v tilt'
concern; (5) the rights in dale to be grantc(I lhe c<)ncern in (()nsideration ()t+its c()ntri-
I)utitln; (6) lilt" impact ()1+NASA sp<)nsorshi 1) on a given hldnstry; (7) provision f()r a t<)rm
()fexclusivity in special cast's when needed {o promote innowttion; (8) rec()upmt'n[ of_he
(ontribnti()ii tlll(ter approl)riate cil(_nlllStallces; (.(.1) snl)l)()Ft of sl)ci<)-econ()mic ot)jc(:lives
_)[ Ill(! _()vernnlellt; ktlt(]. (]0) the willingness and ability 1)1 lilt + i)r()t)oser to market any
resulting products and services.
]'his p<)licy supersedes the NASA (;uideline.s l_,_arding Early U_age o+[,_'pace./or lndu._trial
/+urjt_o.+es.It does not att+ect existing tin)grams (such as Materials Processing in Space) and
rclationshil)s which are consistent with or <)ntside tile scopc <)f the l)olicy. This policy is nol
to be construt+tl as authorizing or requiring NASA to pert+<)rn_ a regulatory review ot +a pro-
posed c<)mmercial use of space where tit) cooperative agreement or other appr(q)riatt +
arrangenlent I)etween NASA and the commercial enlity is contemplated ....
ll.B. Description and Discussitm of Aclions and Transactions
In or(let to nn(lerstarld NASA's view of its role in the commercializali(m ()f space, it
should be hi)ted that the National Aeronautics end Space Act of 1958, as anlended (Space
Act), establishes NASA as the agency rcsp(msible li)t the directi()n of civil "space . . . at|iv|-
tit's" of the United States. The legislative history slales that "tile term 'activities' shonld be
construed I)roadly enough to enable the A(hninistration to cmry <)n a wide spectrmn of
activities which relate t() the successthl use (ff outer space. These activities would include
scientitic discovery and research not directly related to travel in outer space but ntilizing
outer space, and tile developntent of resources which may be discovered in outer space. '+
The Space Act also establishes that space activities will be conducted to make the
"most eftk'clive utilization of the scicntitic and engineering resottrccs ()f the Untied States
• . . in order to avoid unnecessary (htplication ()f t't'ti)rt, facilities, and equipment." NASA
has made large scale use of priv;_te industry as coz+traclors in carrying out its activities. It
has f)rovided space launch services for commercial purposes since 1962. Begimdng in
1979 it has entered into "parmership" arrangentents with private sector firms to enhanced
the conmlercial utilization of space resonrces.
ht light of the Presidential policy of July 4, 1982, NASA will c<)ntinue and expand its
eff()rt to titcilitate private sector investment in space and will enc(mrage conlmefcial space
activities (:onsistent wilh that policy.
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The Ibllowillg is il description of the meclmnisnls NASA ttst'.,+ m enter into COOl)era-
ti<)ll with Ill(' ])ri',,_ilt( • se(l()l. l'hese various il('li()IIs i111d |i'illlP+ii('li<)ii_. i11-e <+I" In,Iv |]e 11sed fix r
NASA ill vm-+ving d('gr('e.'+ t<>_SStL](" II1(' apl>li('_ui<m <)["n<+n-ptd)li( res_>ur(es to the ex|)l<_il_l-
ti<m <)t Sl:,a(e t<+r c<)tnniercild l)tHl)<)s('s.
I. l:'rOcllrel])elils. NASA carries <)ul most <:,[ its research iul(l development (R&I))
a<'tivili('s as well as space hu,n(h <+l:_etali<+ns Ihroug]) (ht" use <if i)rocuremenl c(inll-_l(ls
ralher than dlr(-)ugh its(' <ff ils <_,,,¢lll:,ers(mne] and the|lilies. The [!hired Stales (',ode t>re-
.,+cril:,es Iha[ 11.i_,r<)ctlremt'llt C()l'lll'it('l shall be tuned when:
"(1) lht! l)rin(iph • ptLrp(+se <)f the irlslrlmlellt is 1o _lc(tuire (by l_ur(hase, lease, <_l-
barter) llr()perly (>i services |(it the direct benel]t <)r use <11the United St_l.teP.;govelll-
ment; ()r (2) the agen('y decides in a specific irlslan(e lhal lhe tlse of a l)roctllettle]It
c(mlra('t is appropriate. +`31 U.S.(:, § 6?,03.
NASA's Pr()cttl+ellient Reg-uhlli<+ns are |+OtLnd it) (:hal)ler l_, ]'ith" 41, (:<+tit+<)f Fe(ler_d
Regltlations. L!nlike in<+Pit civilian agtmcies NASA's pr<)ctlrenlen! auth<+rity is based <+it the
Armed Services l)rocllrenlenl Act, 10 U.S.(:. § 2301, et seq. The F('der+d Pn<+l)erty anld
Administr+tlive Services Act, 40 tt.S.(::. § 471 et +eq., as it relates t<) (lisp<+sal of pr<)l/erl+v, is
als<) iq)l)licill)le.
NASA iml)lemen Is lhe l)rinciples o|( )MB Circul_tr A-76 "Perlbrn);_tw(" <>l(:<mlmer(+i_d
Activities" as il re]ak',+ t<) c<>ulmercia] activities in su]_p<>rt <+I R&I) even thottgh in m<_sl
inslluw('s A-76 is n<+t directly applicablc to NASA funcli<>ns. NASA's <ttrrem al)pr<mch t<_
Sl)+i<'e c<_Himercializ_tli(in is much l)r<mder than the A-76 (<m<ept.
2. (:<)<+perative /\_leeln(.'l'tl (Chiles Act). NASA selcl<ml <,tll('rs into c<)oper_ltivc
,lgveements its (hqin(:d in the ('.hile.s Act (as distinguished tr<ml v+ui<ms Space Act co<+per-
|1tire _ll'l'itlIgelnell|S), Such it (<_(+l:,eralive agreelllent is llsed wllell:
"'( I ) the prin(+ip;d 1)turll(+se <+t the relati<mshil) is t<_ trmlsl('r a lhing of value t<+ the
St|lie, local g<+,+,ermtw_m, <>r <)lheu recipient I<) t:arny out a l_ttblic l)ttrl)<>se <)f SUl>l+<_tx
<)r .,slittiitlali<m ill_lh<>rize(l b+v 1t law <)f the United States instead <)1 acquiring (1iv pttr-
(hilse leilst', O1" l+;ll'tel') pr<)pt'rty (+r services for the dire<l l>enelit <_t use of file trniled
Stifles (;()vel+nlllellI._ and
(2) subslantial illv<)lveltlelll is e×pectt+d I)etween the exe(tltive 11gencv :tnd the Sl_lte,
Ioc,d governmet+l <_l- (+lller recipient when carrying ot_t Ihe +wtivity c<mlemplated ill
the agrt'elnent." 31 1.I.S.(:. § 6?)05.
NASA is prep:tred Io t,xplore the possibility of expanding its use (_t+such agrt:elll,_q+t.s
1() Slll+)l+)orI C<Hlllllelciltli;':itti<)il,
3. (,ram Agreentellt. NASA hlts made use of grants princilmlly I<> tired universitv-
sp<)llS<)led le._e_lr(h 111](I (leveh)l:,]]lent. (;,l'alltS are used W|lell:
"'( I ) the l+rincip+tl purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of vahie to the
State or local govertHnent or other recipient Io carry out a public purpose of support
<)_ sliunul+tti_n attlh<>u+izcd t-Jy _t I+tw of the United States instead of acquiring (by i>un--
('hilse, leitse, ()r I)_tl+tel ") property or services for the direct benelit <)r use of the []tilled
Sl;+ttes (;ovelnltlenl; il.nd
(2) substanlial im,'(+lvemenl is not expected between the execulive agency and Ihe
Stale, local g<wernment, ()r other recipient when carrying ()ut the activity contem-
l)hLled in the agreem(mt." 31 U.S.C. § 6.'+04.
NASA illlet](ls l() (lil'e(:t a portion of its grant-|traded research toward areas with polext-
tial viability fi>r (:omnlercial space ventures. NASA regulati<m.s (<wering research (,rants
mid (:_)<)per+ttive Agreements are tbund in Part 1260, Title 14, (:<+tie ot + Federal
Reguhtli(>ns.
4. S111ice A(+I Arralil._emenls. [rtdepextdenl <)1 its +tuth<irily l<) enter in|<) co11|I+11(I.'-,[()I
])r<)(iLl-ellleI11, c<)<)[)er;+tlive iigl-('elllt'llts Ol gl+i',.l+llS |is del]ned above, the N_11i<+nlll
A<,l+()n:,ttLti(+san(I Space Acl <+t 1(.).')8, 1ts alllendetl, authorizes NASA t<) enter it+t<+ a variety
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of tlcxiblc arrangements with public and private instilutions. Seclions 203(c) (5) and (6)
O|" [hc Act providc:
"(5) without regard to section 3648 of the Revised Nlaltllt's, its amended (31 U.S.(L
•_2_))+ 1() 4?IIICI" illto +:|lid [)Cl+tiH'll| StlCh ('olltliicts, leases, cooperative agtccments or
oIhcF tl'allSiI.CliOIlS aS [llil}: |if IICCCSSaI'y ill the ('()lldtlC[ o|" its work and Oil Sll('h [C['lllS
as it may (teen+ approl)riate , with any agency <)r instrltm<:ntality ()I+the United Sllli('s,
or with any State, Tcrritory, <)r l)OSsession, <it+with any political slibdivisi<m therc<d, <)r
with any pers<m, lh+tn, associati<m, corl:_<irati_+)n, or educati<)nal instituti<m. "I+() the
maxinntnl extent practicaMe and consistent with the accomplishln<mt of thc ptnpos-
cs of this Act, sttch contracts, h-ases, agrccnwnts and other transactions shall bc allo-
(atc(l l)y th(' A(hliiiiistral()r ill a IIl+llilllq which will enal)]c small-busint+ss (oti(crlls Io
l)articil)atc <.'qttital)l)' an(l proF, ortionately in lhe con(htct o[ the work of lhc
Administration;
(6) to use, with their consent, the" services, equipn+ent, l)el's(>nnel alld tacilitics o1
Federal and other agencies with or without l+eilllt)urst.liicnt, lind Oil a sitnilar basis to
<:ool)c'ratc with othcl + public and private agencies and instrmnentalities in Ihe use of
services, <.(luipmcnt, and lh(ilities. Each del)arlnicnt and agcncy of the Federal
(;overmncnl shall c<)opcrate fully with the Administrati<)n in liiakillg its servic(.s,
eqtfipmcnt, i_ersonnel, and t:acilities availabh: to tim Administration, and any su(h
department or agency is authorized, notwithstanding any other ]_rovisi()n _lt law, to
transti, r to or t_) receive ti+om the Administralion, without rcimbtlrsemcnt, aeronauti-
cal and space vchi¢h..s, attd supplies and cquilmi<..nt other than administrative supl:dics
or ('(]tii[)ni(:n t."
The Iblh:,ving m-c ¢'xaml)h.'s of arrangements mid transaclions supporting space (om-
mercialization which NASA has entered into ttndct+ its Space Act aulhority.
a. Early lnitialiw.s in C<)n)mercial Space Activity.
(I) (:ommttnications Satellites. (in,July 10, 1962, a NASA Deha launch vchi<l('
launched the first privately-owned satellite which was also tile world's tirst a(tivt" commtt-
nications satellite. +[iqsmr [ was a product <if private industry, American Telephon(, 8,:
Telegraph (:ompany, launched titr AT&T It), NASA on a rcimbt,rsabh, basis. This satt'llitc
('naliled a whoh" (()tllillCllt to "scc" i|(l(tss ()ccitllS. ']'('l<:vision ])]'()gl'lllllS [+FOIII ;till[ to
l':urot_c, |in-inslan('c, I)rought new, real-time sights and sounds into the h<)mcs of millions.
l+_vcn thotlgh "li'lstar's "+mttttlal visibility"--the lime (hning which signals could lie sent and
received--was rclatiw.ly short (appr(iximalely 15 t() 20 minim.s), th<: portents of this m'w
c()mmunicati</ns mc(litml was immediate. With an cllil)tica] <)rbit that crc)ssed the Van
Allen belts+ Telstar I taught engineers a gl+eal <h'al about radialion damage t<_ commttni-
cations eguipnwnt. Telstar I's technoh)gy did not pr()ve comtnercialk, li'asiblc, h()w('vcr.
A h'gislative (h:bale soon ensued on Capitol ttill as to h<lw this new conmnulicati()ns
SVSI<.'lll W_IS 1() bC used <)F,erationally--by private industry, by a publi( ulilitv, or Its' a
(;ovcrnmcnlal agt'ncy. (in Augusl !+It, 1962, Prcsidctn .John E Kennedy signed ih("
"(:<nnmttnicalions Satcllitt, Act of 19(i2." This law cl+catc(l a "<.olnnltlnicatiotls salcllitc cor-
poration 10t + i)r<_lil which will nol be an ag<.'n<.)' or ('stablishmenl of the k!nite(l Stalt's
(;()VCI'IIIIIt'III, but which would have' goV('llllnCll[ rcF, rcscnlation on ils Board of |)irc<:l<_r++
and have many ()I its activities regulated l)v (;()vcrnment." A spa(+c-age develo]:,mt'nt
I)C(IIIIIC i! IICW busil)(+'ss 011t('r[)rist" and tilaFkcd +| llCW flitill <it (;ox(+iilmCll[-I)tlSillCSS ccd-
]al:,()ration.
Rapid strMcs v,,(.r(., mad<: I)y NASA in the area <if iml))-<)v(,d (<)mmtmi,uation tech-
nhlues. Te<:hnoh)gical advan(::(_s l>rodtw(.d l_y AT&T's Te]stat: NASA's l':cho, Re]a:,. and
Syncon) systems soon f<)tmd further apl)licati()ns. In 1965 the c<)ntrol of Svnconl II and
N}'II('<)Ill !II was IraliStcl+rc<l ii) lhe I)cl)al+lnlcnt of 1)cfensc t()r <)l)crati()nai COmliltlliita-
li<liis aild t(>i- sludv iil dt'sigli <)1 inililary conilnllili<aliolls s}'sl(,nis, l_]_lil,+, P,ird. lhc world's
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C+:_mllICl'['i+ll ('()lllIl11111iC;lli<IIls s;_lellht', was built l)v II+1c _xn(t_li+ <.<)Ittl+;l(-l<>l -, [{tt_llcs
Aircr_dt (:o., l_>r thc (:<mununhations Salellht. (:_)rp<irati<m al]d w_is ch_st,ly ]+>allcrned <in
the earlier Sync<m+.
"|'hi' c(:,lliltltmi(+ili()ns satcllite in ,qe<>-synchron<_tlm orbit has |)ecc)nie the basis fi+)r sub-
s<.'(lltCllt _I)V,I'IIIlIICIII _lll<l Comlnt,rci_t] commtntications satelliles. In less th+m D,VClllV v¢'itl+
a mulli-billi<)n dollm- il|tltlslry It+is ,ql-<:,wtl up in international and domestic space' tt'ie('<)lll-
tnuni(ali<>ns. Applications haw resulted ill the rapid (.Xl)ansi<m of lht" c_tl)h' t('h'visimt
industry +rod new +ll)pli(-_itions ol+direct l)r<)ad(;isl iecl'moh+g T art+ ill tilt' <d]]ng,.
()he ol NASA's most recenl a<|v+mces in torero<re|cations s_ttt'llhc, the Tracking and
l)at+t Relay Satellite S+x'sl<.'In (TI)RSS), w_Is orib_imtll+v pr<_posed as a cotntn¢'rciM v('ntme bttt
litter re<)r+qanized as +t ItlC,lc lradhi<)nal l)roctn'ement.
(_) [.atulch Vehicle t;pgr;tde mid tTppcr Statc l)cvclolJn+ents. In I!)72 lhe t!nited
Sl+it<.'s c<_mlnilted ilsi'lf to tlt(' d<+'velol)tnt+nt of th<: reusabh' Space Slmtth, m_d _l decision
was made not l<J spcrld addition_d l)ul)li<: |unds to iml)rOvt, t.Xl)end_tl)h- humch vchich..s
such _ts the I)cha. M<l)<mncll l)_>uglas, the l)clt_1's manttfacltut.r, tm+lert_H>k in 1!173, _i
I)crt<_rmat+ce Ul)grade of Ihe I)ell+l <ailed the 3914, which incl+l'ascd file Delta payh)ad
cap_d)ility Io 200<) lbs. int+_ the _qeosynchronous lralistet + orbit. The emerginb_ donlestic
c+lmmunicati<+ns sate]]il,t, hldustr.v x,,,_+.sw'ry intt,resled in the cost ctfeclivt.nt,ss of the addi-
tiomll l)_'lla launch capability and this met tile stage tot McDonnell I)mlqlas' first com-
m<:rci_d Sl)aC(+ VCIIIIII<'. R(_A I)<.'('+II11(! lllc [l]'Sl ('tlS{OliICl + _ll]d +l_iCCltlCllt_ W('l-C Sll'tICltll'Cd
between R(;A, Mcl)otmell Douglas mid NASA to operate Ihe I)r+!jecls am tbllows:
• .Mcl)mmell l)oughts agreed to design and develop the u[)ratcd vehicle _lt their own
risk _)n <ommerci_fl ftmds but with profit limitations.
• J\hl)<mncll l)<>ughts agreed Io rec+)ver its investment thr<mgh a speciticd "nol tl_
<.'X< ('<'<+l '' ('tlSl_r)lllCl cllal'b_<' l_r el|ell ('<)InlllCl'Ci;l] ];lilll(']l; h()x4]('v('|', [hCl'C would bt" n<>
"investment char<q<." l_t U.S. (_ovt+rmnent use of the vehicle.
• N,'\_A a_rt'ud l+) (ontracl |<)i production and launch servi('es of lht' iml)r+:,'cd vehicle
;is an integral part oi the on-ffoin+q Delta Pt+o,_ranl and w<>ttht provide, technical mon-
il<>ring,.
• R(:A _tgr_'t'd Io conlr_tct with NASA tin lhlee vehich,s and hu,nch services and wilh
M<'l)_mnell l)ouff, hls l_t" three useF devt,h)l)inent _tnlortization [)a)+'tnenls.
The t]rsl hu,nch w+lsstwccssiul in 1975 and as of mid-191"t3 there have l)cen 2_+_lalmch-
es <)Fwhich scvt'n have been U.S. _overilmCltl missions with lhc remainder I)einq com-
mercial and t_rcign customt'rs+
Mcl)muu,ll I)<nlghls' sv<<_nd c<lmmcrcial venlurc ill this rich w+ts lilt' Payhmd Assist
M<Muh' (PAM-I)) Imd+:rlakt'n in 1976. PAM-D is an upper st_lge vehich' tbr 1)elt_l cl_lss
satellil<.s d<'si_,nt'd to assist I+umch vehicle customers in planning launches in Ihc era of
iransilion between cxpendaMc launch vchicles and the Space Shuttle. The I'AM is l)asi-
c_dlv <t l);Ut oF the payhmd c_lr_o cIt+ilicnl and as such it Ill+ly l)e used cilher +isa lhird Sl_l_'e
+lii Ill<' l)ch+t or as +ill ill)per sla_c Oll _hilille to carry the satellite hilo the _CO++VlIchlollOli_
lranster orl)il. This [)rovidt+s llie Cilstonier with the tlexil)ility Io |)]_in a launch <)ll l)cha or
_]iulih' and +i rclaliv<-I), cas)' Inc++ii-ls Io shiti I)eP+vecn lhc lwo if coilt-litiOliS should so w+ir-
I+iiill. A_+lili, Mcl)onnel] [)ouglas b+.-_an ibis de+:elopmolli after l+<.'iichhl_ |ill ;i<_l'CClllcnt
whh NASA +:ill how l|lC [)roll+till would b(' perfiirtned. The priln_tl.V |(,:altli+(,s <)f tills a_TCt'-
lllClll WCI+I + _IS lidh)ws:
• Pvlcl)<lllli<'ll [)<lii_las ;t_l'el'd io devel<lp lilt" s)'stelil coin|)lcIcI 7 on coinliit'rci_i] fiinds oil
ii s<'il¢'(Iti]¢! conilialit)ll" wilh lhc Slluttle operaliona] ieqilii+cint!nls.
• Mcl)lnln¢'ll [)<)il_]ils it,_tet!d Ill sell PAM ('<)llllllcri'ial])' +it il SlJCCilied "il<)l-io-('x('l'cd"
cl'ilin_ price _t]+)ill_ will| il tixcd _'sc+tlalion [_>i-inl]ali<>nar), I{icl<lrs in _tddilion lo t)rt)l:
h ]ilnil_liions.
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• NASA agreed not to fund or tovmally solicit the devclopnlcnl ot coutpctilivc or alter-
nate systClll.
• NASA agt'ccd Io provide stfitat)lc building facilities at I Ketmedy Space (;cnlcr] tot
PAM pt+occssing activities with reitnbursenlcnt as a part of tilt! Shlittic launch service
c,mltt-att with each customer using PAM.
• NASA agreed to providc inlCl+t_lc,,: data and technically monitor tilt" l)l+,c!ject.
The titst commercial lb\M c<mtract was signed between l lughcs and Mcl)<mncll
Douglas in 1¢.t78. The [hst tlight was StlCCcssltil t_)l- Satellite Business Systems Oll l)clta in
Novctnl)cr 1980. The lilSl tWO tlights on Shultle wcrc succt+ssfully completed in Novt, lnl)ct-
i Gt82. To mid-It)83, McDonncll Douglas had contracled '2_.) PAM-1) nlissions and success-
tully tloWll 1<) out of l0 schcduled+
In 1¢.)77 McDonnell Douglas signed a similar agreement to dcvchlp a larger PAM lilt
Shuttle launch only (alled "PAM-A." This vcrsicm has c<mlparat)lc payload capability to the
Alias ('.clll.illll" EIN. A.licr a t'onll)ctilion with :`lllt)lhcl" aClOSp_l(e tirnl, NASA awarded
Mcl)olmcll Douglas a Firm Fixcd Pricc (',onlract I_.)r (i PAM-A. launches whicil has subsc-
qt,ently been increased to 8. There are, llowevcr, no ctlrlontly assigned missions l_v PAM-
A and no commercial sales have bccn achieved.
Ill 1(.)8 t) CtlSltIIIIeFS began I'CqllCS|illg addilional pcrtormancc trom the PAM-I) svstctn,
bul short of the more expensive I'AM-A capability. As a rcslfll McDonnell 1)ouglas decid-
ed to cotnmcrciallv undertake a growth version called "PAM-I)II," which includes a new
motor and raises file payload capability m appt-oxinlately 4100 Ills. illlo tilt" gcosynchro-
nots /r;lnslk'r orbit. An initial comnlcrcial conlracl resulted |lom a 1983 order I)v (;TE
Satellite (:Orl)Oration. NASA has agreed to provide technical monitoring.
In cark' 1983 NASA cnlercd into a cooperative a grccnlenl with Orl)ilal Svstctns
('a)ri)oralion,:`m cnlirclv ncw conlpany, Io l)rovidc toy Iht! producli<nl of anolhcr slntIlh'-
conll)atit)lc Ul)pcr stage, tilt' Transt}.w ()rbit Stag\" (T()S). NASA has no CiiFrcnll IiCt'd t_:,l
such an upper stage tk)r its in-house 1)rogranls but is cooperaling with ()rbital Svslcms l<_
ot)lhnizc Shutll(" capabilitics filr cointncrci:d custonlcrs who may wish to lmrchasc such :.Ill
tipper stage. The T()S is privately tUndcd but has NASA technical nloniloring, and NASA's
;Igl'Ct'lllCllt lltll It) build a competing/upper stage.
b. ,loi,lt Endeavor Agreemeuts. Tile.Joint Endcavor Agtccnlcm (lEA) was <wiginally
developed to t_lcililalc NASA's inlercsl in involving Ihc privalc sector in tnawrials pro-
ct'sshlg in spat\" (MPS) but its basic provisions arc apl)licat)lc to oltlt'r aFt'as of st)ace indus-
Irializalioli.
Tiic.lF+A is ii cooperative allan_clliclil in which pl-ilalc parlicipanls and NASA sharc
COl)linoii ]lro_l-alll ob.jcclivcs, pro_,lalli rcspoi)sil)i]ilics, alid linal)cial risk. The obiectivc <_1
aJEA is io ciico/Iralz, c carly space vl-iilili-Cs aild dCillOnSllalc Ihe uscfuhless <if si)acl! icch-
iiolo_y to Illt'cl Illal'kctt)l:`icc IlCCds. A .]F.A is ;I lctgal agI-Ct'lllClll t)elwt'Cll Cqllal pal'lllt'lS,
;tlld is llOi :`l I)I'OCIII'CIIICI/I a('liOll; lit) ttllldS :`It'\" cxchitlll_Cd t)clwccll NASA alld lilt' indlls-
trial i)ailllCi -. A pli,,';iic [)arlicipani seit'cls :`ill CXl)erililenl and/or it!chno]o_y dClllOliSlra-
ti<ln lot a .ioini t'lldCaVOl which coinl)lics wilh MPS pro glalii objectives, coilthlclS the
ll('(('SS_lly <_l't)(lll(l illVCsli<_aliOil, and dcvelops Ilighi hardware al I't)lllt)illl }, CXpCIIS('. As
iiiccnlivt' tor Ihis in'vt-slnicnl, NASA agrees 1o providt' tit't" Shullic tlighis t_)i- tmWcts
which ilit't'l ct,rlaiil basic ci-ilcria, such :`is technical incril, coniribulion Io inn<)valion, aild
acccplablc I)usiness alTall_t!llICnls. As furlhcr inceniivc, il)c parlicipanl is allowcd Io
rcl;iin ccilain proprietary rilgiits io lilt: i-\,suits, i)arliclllariv lht" lioiipalcnlal)ll" inlorliiali_>n
that yields a COlli])cIitivt" t'tigc hi lllal-kcling products based <ill MI'S rCslllts. II_>wcvcr,
NASA it.ccivt,s sufticicnt data to i:vallialt" lht" si<gliiticanct' <if Iht' rt,sulis and rcquirt's lhal
ally t)roniisin<_ Icciulol%_ies t)c al)l>licd t<)iliillt'i-ci;il]y Oil ii lilnt'lv basis, or published.
EXl'l .{)RIN{; I11E U NKN{)WN 4!).r}
'I'll{" t]rs!.[EA sign{'d in 1.{}8{}inv_}lv{,{I Mcl}{}nn{'ll Douglas and ()rlh{}Plmrmac{'uti{;ds
in a i}r{}j{'{! litlc{l {{}ntinu{}ns tI{}w {'h_{lr{}ph{}F{,sis whi{h l>r{}misc's high{'r {tUanlili{.s and
qnalily {}t {{'rE;fin 1}harmac{,micals [}r{}{lu{{'d in Sl}_tc{'. Su{c{'ssful {'Xl}{'rim{'nts have 1){,cn
c{}n{hl{led {}n s{'veral Shullh, flights. A.IEA l{}t lh{' t}mp{)se of i}roducing (;;dimn [sic]
Ars{'ni{b: {ryslals in s]};I{'{! was .signed |){'[wC{'ll NASA ;rod Mi{ro {;rarity R{_sear{h
,,\ss{}{:iat{._ in 198B. ()01¢'n MI'S ]t_2.Vn ;u{" un(l{'r consi{h'rati{}n.
An {'xamplc {}f lEA {'xt{'n{ting onlsi{l{! lhc MI'S area is Ih{" r{'{{'nl NASA-Fairchild.lEA
{{}ll{{'rning Ih{' d{'v{'h}i}ml'n! {}l ;_1s]};I{'{? ]}laltorm t'{)r lease. {)lh{w [}r{}t}{}sed .[EA's {loll
wiOl {l{'vel¢}pnl{'n! {}t ShllIl]c i)ayh}ad {';wri{,rs.
{. Tt'{hni{;d Ex{hang{' Agr{'{'m{'nls. For companies int{'r{'st{'{t in applying micro-
,_,raviB: l{'{hnoh}g3', l}tH n{)l r{'_l{ly t{} commit to a Sl}ccitic spa{{' Ilighl {'xl}{'rim{,nl {}F v{'n-
Ira{', NASA has {t{'v{_h)p{'d th{" T{'{hni{al Exchange Agr{'{nn{'nl (TEA}. l.rn{l{.r a TEA,
NASA ;rod a c{}mj}any agr{'{' I{} {'x{l]ang{" lcchnical inf{}rmali{}n aH{I {<}{}l){'l_tl{ • ill lh{" {'{}ll-
(ln{'l and ;malynis {}f grmm{l-1};_s{'{I r{'st'ar{h programs. In this a_r{'{'m{'nl, a Illill {';Ill
l}{'{4}m{' t;mfili;w with mi{T{}gr_B'ily tc{hn{}h}_' an{t ils al}]}licat}ility to lh{" c{}mi};my i}r{}{l-
u{l lin{' ;n minim;d {'xl}cns{'. [ hi{let TEA, the privalc {{}mi};iny fm]{ls its own parli{ii}ali{)n,
+tnd {l{.l iv,{._;<lift'{! it{{{'ss I<}+ut<l nt'stdts fr{)m NASA t;wilitics and r{'st'ar{h, with NASA gain-
ing th<' stq}l}<}rt ;m{l {'×l}{'rlis{ • {}f Ill{" j}rivat{' {'{)lnl)_lll_."s in{hlsl]ial lcsc;u {h {al}al}ilily.
S{'v{'ral MPS TEA_, hart" I}{'{'n signed and oth{.rs ;ll{, l}r{}l}{}s{,{l. NASA Ires i}r{wi{h'{l
micr{}gr_B'ity (h{}p lid){' list" and air{r;dl flights, among {}Ih{'r th{iliH{.s, l_} sUi)l){}r! lh{'s{"
{.flbrls.
d. ln{ltlslrial (;nest hP¢{'sti_gators. In an hl{lustrial (;u{'st Inv{'stigal{)r (1(;I)
Agr{'{'m{'nl NASA ;u]{l in{[nslrv shar{, snl'li{ienI mulmd scienlit]{ inlcr{'st thai a {{}ml}an )
,_rrang{!s 16r {}n{' {d its s{ i{'lllisls I_} {'{}llal}{}r_n{" (al {{}mpany {'Xl}{-ns{') wilh a NASA-sp{}n-
s{}_{'{l I}rin{ipal in_{'slig;_l{}r {}n a Sl}a{{" llighl MPS {'Xl}{-rim{'nl. ()n<c Ih{' l}arli{'s ;tgr{'{' t{}
Ih{' {{}ntril}uli{}n t{} I}{, m_l{l{r I{} Ih{' {}bj{'{:livcs offlw cxt}{wimcnI, Ih{' I(;1 t){,{{}mt,s ;t mcm-
1}{'r {}l Ih{' inv{'sligali{}n I{'am, Ihns adding in{h_strial cxl}{'rtis{" _l_l(I insigh! I{} Ill{' {'Xl}{wi-
m{'nl. A mmd}{'r {}1 I(;I _tgl{'(!lll{'l]|S h;B'{t b{!{'ll Illl(|{'l'[_tk{'ll.
{'. (:{}mm{'r{'i,d 1,;mn{h V{'hi{l{'s.
(I) (_{}inmcrcializati{}n {}f NASA ELV Systems. B{'{ans{' {}1 Ih{' llali{}tl's {{}!lira!l-
!Ill'tit I,} Ih{' rt'nsal}l{" Sl}a{'{" Shttll]{! both NASA an{t the l}cl}artm_'n! {}f l){g_:nsc plan !{}
!{'rlninal{" _s{" {}t {'xp{'n{labl{r l:um{h v{-hiclcs. In May 1983 _l_e, Pr{'si{Icnt {l{'ci{t{'{I lh;lI Ill{'
i}riv;n{' s{'{l{}r sh{}ul{I 1}{"_iv{'n Ill{ ] {}l}l}{}rlunily l{} {}pera!_" !hi,so syst{'ms {}n a c{}mmcr{i;d
t};_sis. NASA is in Ih{' i}r{}{{'ss {}1{'xph}ring ways I{} trans|i.r Ill{" pr{}{ht{li{}n and {}p{'rati{}n
{}1!Is H.V s_,,'s!{.ms I{} !h{' i}riv;u{" s{_{t{}r. By [FaIISfc'FFiFIg t]'ICS{' syslcIIlS il is h{)]}cd Ih;l! !lit"
{'xisling i}r{}du{ti{}n an{I I;mn{h th{ilili{'s will remain ;_:tvaluabl{" nalionat rt, s{}mc{, ralh{'r
!h;M t}{"r{'{lu{_M !{} s{rap I}ut thai govclqlnl{'llt will be r{rlicv{'{I {}f Ill{" {{}st {}t maintaining
a rc{hmd;u_t latm{:h system. Transf{'r will FcqIIiFC termination ofvari{}us i}l{}{:llr{'ln{'lll {;Oll-
!r_t(ls ;t11{1 {'×{'culi{}n {}f mnlli-tacct{'d facility use agrccmcnls.
(2} Priv;l!{'lv I}{'v{q{}f}{'d I_aunch Vehicles. NASA personn{'l i)r{}vi{h'd a(lvi{'{" and
gni{l;m{{' I{} Spa{{_ S{,rvi{{,s, Inc. (SSI} in !Is allf'nlt}Is ill, d{'vch) I} a sp;t{t" r{}ckt'!, hi I{.}8_
SSI su{{{.sstnlly latm{h{'d ;_ snl}-{}rl}ilal F{){:k{!l t{) d{Iln{}ns|l';tt{" lh{" abililv of a I}rivatc {{}m-
i}_tny in this ticI{I. F'tnsttanl t{} a {{}{)l}{'ralivc agrc{'mt:nt, NASA provided th{" rI}ckct m<}t{)r
ti}r SSI's {l{'m{}nslrati{}n t|igh!. It is believed lhat this {temonstralion gcncral{:{t ,gr{'at inlcr-
csl in !h{' i}riva!{ • {}[}{_rali{}ns {)f space lannch v{,hiclcs and stq}I.}{)r! sysl{mL SSI is {{}nlinu-
in_, Io d{'v{'l{q} ;_ hBv {{)s! {}rt}ital lam_{h vehicle which will h:n:{' slighlly grt'at{'r {;q};tbilil)
than NASA's S{{}u! vchi{l{'. SSI has r{'{ii_{_sl{'{l NASA to agr{'c n{}! I{} i-{'s!_ll-I S{{}lll l}r_}{It_{-
lion {)r {}!h{'rvvis{" cOral}tit? in thl? h}w w{qghl, I{BV {';ll!h-f)ll}il {'{}tIlln{'l'{'i;t] mm-k{'l.
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NASA has also provided limited advice and technical assistance to ARC Technologies
in its attempt to develop a launch vehicle. The proposed ARC vehicle is based on propul-
sion k.chnology originally dcvclope<l by the government ])tit later abandoned. It success-
ful, AR(; ma)add to America's technological resources. In addition to NASA's advice AR(:
has requested tracking and data services tiom another govermncnt agency.
f. Other Transacti<ms. NASA's currenl and pr<_jecied l)rograms and policies can
[boil|tare commercial space ventures itl a variety of ways.
( 1) Patents. NASA views its patent program its an integral portion of its mission
resl)onsibilily to encotnage new te<hnolog T and t<)stel the ulilization and comniercializa-
fion of NASA SUl)ported technologies. The st|tit,tory basis fi;r the agcncy's l)atcnt policy is
Section 305 of the Aeronautics and Space Aft o[ 1958. Accordingly, NASA acquires title Io
all invent|ells under _.'ollll'acl unless lhe Administrator decides thai waiver of title to the
contractor would bc in the public interest (see. 305(f)). Thus, the agency was granted
broad waiww authority, but is required to retain a broad royalty-free license to all inven-
t|oils Ult(|el+ ('()lltl_l('l SO that the wai'veY of title tit a(ltlality itltlOtlllt_, 1() it wai'_'et of (()til-
mercial rights <>nlv. NASA patent regulations are found at Title 14 (;ode of Federal
Regulations, Part 12't5.
(i) Patent _%'dvers.
There me two tyl)es ()t"domestic v,'aivers granted t>y NASA: ( I ) adwmce waiw'vs whi<h
are al)l)licable to inventions made under a contract; and (2) waivers fi_r inventions subse-
quently reported under a contract. lhe granting of waivers is authorized by the
.,\dnlitdsirator upon the recommendation of the Inventions and (;ontribulions Board set
tl|) tllldet" section !>tl}5([') of' the 1958 Act. Fh_wever, all waivers are sub|cot l<> the retention
ol NASA <>[ a l)roa<l, irrevocable royally-li-ee license and <if "march-in rights.'" Mar<h-in
rights l)erinit the agency to intervene i1 it believes tlmt invent|otis iil-e t)eing Sttl)pressed,
liial there i+ it danger It) the public heahh _llld s_i|l,'ly, <)r thai a c(iml)anv is not liieeling
(_o'¢erlliiieill i'e_tl]itii(iliS. The itgeli(+v also i'el_liil,s the alllhoi'ily Io void waivei's if a litin
t{lils Io i'e|)ol'l eli its iOllilliercializalion activities.
Seventy-live ])ercelll of lhe l+eqtlt'Sl+ t0f waiver have been _l'itllled. l{owevel; to dale
this ret)it'_,eill+ <lilb,' _t Slll_tl] niilltiiel +otwai'¢er_, I)et-ail_;e Iheie have t)celi tt'w IeqileSl+.
(ii) Patent l+icenses.
NASA I)ateill liceilSilig I+egillalioll+ weie i)iOlittllgaled to tl+e the l)_llelil sySlClii to fifo-
mole the utilization of inventions arisitig t}Olli NASA sul)l)ol'led Ie+e+ti-(h illld deveiol)-
lneltl. ,,\ll alit)licanl i,s required t(i SUl)i)ly NASA with it saiist{iciory plan fol develot)liiClll
or itl+ilkelilt<l._ (it the licensed inventions, el llolh, alld with int_)l+lii,iliOli _i|)(litl Ihe al)t)li-
c+llil's capability io fultil] the plan+
(iii) l>i-oletling hllelieclual Pi'ol)eii 7 Ril_hl,s ill (;on|inertial Space Activities.
ht I+e(ogltiliott o| tilt" stlt)Staltlia] iil,¢eslineiil iiecessaly Io develol) tile electroi)tioresis
exl)erilltelit ill]d ethel-activities c<)llducted as,i,lint elideavol's, NASA iteg<)tiated special
<'lltttses dealing with iilveilti(ins alld technical data. Typical <llittse,s ]lrovicle I|lal its lollg its
Ihe |)arly eiigltged ill tile joint eltdeavor with NASA COllliniied to ptirsile lhc extierinielil,
thai tiarly We|lid l+elaill all Iil_hls to iilvelilions ailc| prot)i+ielai+,v lechiii(a] <tallt. NASA
would It(it ULke ,I goVei'liliiClil license <lr iiil_,' "lilltl(]i-ill" rights Io re<luire Ii<+ensill_ of oth-
ers. The Ollly excel)lion is if" lilt +NASA Adtninistralor, in tesl)Olise tO it llitliOllHl elliei-_el]()',
delerlllines Ihlii |tit iliVelllillli made in the I)erlitiliial_(e of the joint endeitvof is llrgeltlly
lteeded t_)l t)ublic he;tlth ieas(iltS. NASA |tilt'lidS to COlitilitle Io use its flexibility to alCOl-d
full rights to iilvelllioil,-; _ilid i)rol)rielary technical ill|<)l'ili_ili()li Io ]lrivaic i)arties willin<_ to
invesl subslailiial st|ills in .ioini eildeltw)l- il_leellleills.
(7) |_rivlili/ali(lil and (;oinilicicili]izltliOli <ll _l)_i(t" hifril-slru(l/ire. '['he llail,S[t'l" of
(;OVellilileill |,_|,V s'¢slC'lilS I)_tsed eli ii Piesideiililt] decision was deslril)ed above _ill(| It|eli-
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lion "+,,+asm;t<`le oi priv;tt(+ly financed u[)per-stages. These art" [:,rot<_lYl)eS [or transl<.'rrin_
existing, in[t;-t-strt1((tttre and crealin_ n<`'v¢ infra-slritctttr<,' through private irlvestm<,'ttl.
NASA beli<,,v(('s [Is policy of acquirin_ and Ol)eraling [Is [_tcilities, e((ltdpnwnt, and lec[i-
nical services tlltou_h industrial c()ntracl<)rs has l)uih ;i c(>mp<,'l('nc<`' l_)r supp<)rlin_ new
iniliali'¢t's an<,l exploiting sFmce t<`+chnoh+h_ in lhc private s(('ctc, r. [;or example, sevt'ral F,ro-
posals to NASA involve private financin_ of s<Hne of lilt+! shuttle iltlr;islru((lure. Th<,'se ;ire
<)[)p<_rtuniti((+s tt) facilitate the conmwrcializalion [)roc(('ss and r<`'duc<," NASA lunding
requirt,nwnts wilh<)ul posin_ a thr<,'al it) NASA's [)riltcipal mission--resear<,h atld devel-
<_[)mc'nl. Tlwrel6r¢', in cerlain instances after identif_,,ing a sl)ecific r(('quirenwnt fi>r it pr()d-
il('I Of sel+vi<,'e an<`[ dCIeillliilill_, thai lhel+c is 11<) conq)elliug n<`_Ct| It) llleel the i't_tltlil(('lIR'ill
through a traditi(mal NASA-<,;ontrollcd d<,+velopm<,'nI program, NA.SA +,+'ill adverlis<`' tlt<,'
ne(('d wilhin the private sector +ts ;t c<)illmercia[ Opl)<)rlunitv c<)ncltrrenl]+V ailnl)till(illg that
it +.,'ill nol initiate a <,onlpetitiv<,' (heveh)pnlent. Difli<,+uhies ('nc()utH('t+ed in the tracking mt<,l
data <+('lay s,tt('llilc program in _ic<,onuttt)dating g,¢)vernm,.+ntltl and c<)mmercial fire<lion in
a sing, le spac<,+crafI [lave ma<,[e NASA keen]y aware ot +tile im[)orl;tncc of a thorough exam-
ination <_t Ihe ,_overllllletll'!,; iillClest I)efol+e nlaking ;t [)rival<` + sec:lor c<)mmiIiltcttl.
(3) The Aeronatttics Model. EverHs over th((' I);tsl Iwt'ntv years have (('slablish(('<,la
tw<_-I_>ld R&I) role t_)r NASA in space applicalit>ns--nam((qv, to <,'xplore new opportuniti(('s
tot th<," a[)plicalion of space tcchnoh)gy and to imF, rove demt)nstral('d lechnt)lt)gies t()
achier<,' the ((!xlerlsiv<`' ol)eralional t:afmt)ilities available today. NASA I)<,'li<,'v<,'sthese activi-
ties supp<)rl crili<,al tutti<told ileetls; Ih<,,refore, this NASA r<)l<,' sh<)ttld l+)e continued and
(.xt)atidcd. An ('h,'nwnt of this role is perhaps 1test illuslrated t)y Ihe tlt'ed tt) at,Ivan<,+<,' c(>m-
mtlnicltli()ns techtlolob,_ ,' in<,ludiug work in the 30-90 (;tlz [reqt_encv range. Since its
(hemonstrali(>n in th<,' early [9(+()'s, the private se<,'lor has transl tied sytlchron<)tls c<)mtntt-
nicati<ms salellile te<,:hnol<)b,g.,' into a highly succ<,'ssful growth induslry. The c()rnmunica-
li(>ns satellil<,! indttstry is lhe principal current (('xamphe <)[ comm(('rcialization of s])ace
lechnoh>+.,_', yet n<,'wt<,'chnoh_gical l_r<,+aklhroughs are now required to maintain U.S. le;l<,[-
crshi l) and I<>reldizc conlinued ec<)nonfic l)enefils. Th((' <,,slimatcd cost oI lhis ad+"mwt'd
I('¢ ht+olt>gv dexel<_pmcut excecds the l]narlcial cap;d) I ty el ++t11)r single l]rtn in lit<,' indus-
|r+_ r. N]\S]\ inleil(ls I_> I)tUsU( ' this R&I) requirentent ;till[ any similar cases in space appli-
cations through deulonstrati<)n <)[ the applicable le<,hnoh)g'+,/. In so doing, NASA +'++,ill
exl)h)rt' the t_.'asil)ililv o[ adapting the mutually l)enefi<,ial experience at<riling [rom Ih(("
g<)vernment/induslrv working relalionships in conducting its aeronautical res<,'ar<,h pro-
g,ralns, wherein NASA conducts R&D and in certain cases industry performs hardware f;d)-
ricati()n an((l tlight lestinK of nt+w t<,,chnologi<,_s under c<)st-sharing arrangc'ments.
(.t) SItlall Business hmt)vation Research. NASA has im[)lem<,'nled the firsl stage (if
its SBIR program pursuant Io the Small Business h)n<)vation Developnlent Acl. The pur-
pose ()| Ihe statule is to sel asi<,le a portion of each agency's exlritmural R&D bu<,[g((_l to
assist in a substantial way small business in bringing to market advanced RScD products
;rod servi((+es. The SlUR pr()gram th()ugh not specifically related It,) "in sp;wt" <,'omlner-
('ializ;tti()n (hits ill[<'hilt[ I() dev<,+h)p space technoh)b, _' and [Is applications to the p<)inl of
c<_inmercial viability.
The Small I+usiness Innovati()n i)evelt_pmenl A((:I requires an escalale<,l <,'Xl)enditltre el+
im agency's RScl) fimds ;iccor(ling to a set [ormula where the extramural R&I) [)udgel is over
S IO0,O00,O0<): in tilt" firml year 0.9 percent; O.B it+ the s(('cond; [.0 in tit<`"thir<,l tiscal year; and,
11<)1 h'ss Ihltn ]._) l)cr<,t'nl ill all siLl)sequent fiscal years. For NASA, this means $_ milli_m in
1!)83 and $1 _ million in 1984, with a subsequent re(htcti()n in dollar aInounts in lalt'r _'t'ars
as all ShtLltle a(+tivilies :u<e trealed its ol)erati<mal and llt)l R&D tbr budget I)urpos<,'s.
The ._;B/R prog, r:ttn is reqtfired to be conducted in l]llCC ph;_s('s, only two ot+which will
I)(' ['ttnd('d l)y [hi' (+;()VCllllll('l'l|. ]II |]Ic [l]+Sl |)has(,, (-()llllkt(I()lS ;tr(+ It) ])l-OX:e [hi' [k+ilsil)ililv
()I' their l)rOl)OSed scictllific and tcch_lical id<,'as. Up to S."+O,O00will be awardc<l [br sel¢'ct-
('(I Phi_sc I l_I+_l)<_s,i]s which will I)<,' <,Olldl_cted, _lor_n;_+]Ix, wilhin six m(_nlhs. Price
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comp_-lili(m is If<)! a tactov ill sclccti<m, but villl|c to the (;ovevnmcnl is. In Phase II.
ctnl)odying the principal research eftoft, aw_rds will be made to Phase I conlractors whosc
work shows promise of prodtwing something otwdttc tot the agctlcy in It+l-tns of technical
merit and ti'asibilitv. Special considcratiotl will be given to proposals which demonstralc
tunding commitments to dcvelopm('nI of commercial application of Ihe idea. l_has( • II
awards arc cxpcctcd to l)e in an+()ttt+ts (d up tt> S500,000 for a period of pcrformallcc, gen-
erally, not to exceed 24 n+<mths, hl both Phasc I and II contracts, a profit or l_.'c Ill;ty bc
included, l'hasc Ill. hopclully, will itlvolvc private market funding supporl of contractor
cfforts with ullimalt' commcrcializalion of Iht" pv<)duct ()rservice.
In order to I)c eligible to prol)OSC, a conll:Wl<w nlust be a small business. And, the pro-
poser mtlSt be thc primary source of employmcttt of the principal investigal<w. I-t<:,vevcr,
some stfl)contracting is F,ermilled in both phases and.j()int ventures arc pcrlHilted and
even cncotH;tgcd, pt<widing small I)usincss eligibility slatldards t()r lhc prol)oscrs arc
maintained.
One of the most signlif]callt aspects of the SBIR collll'_tcls yt't t<) bc rcsolvcd is the cx:tcl
natttrc of thc data rights issue: neither the statute nor the SBA ISmall Busincss
Administrati<m] h:lvc given clear gtlidancc on tiffs issttc which must 1)e resolved in ;t tmi-
l_)rm tn;m])er ll+u+otlghout thc SBIR progratn.
An SBIR program was cstal)lished at NASA I leadqtmrters in the ()tfic'e of Acr(mautics
and Spacc Tcwlm<)h)g T to co(wditmte and lmFldlc the deveh)pmcnt of t<)pics, and t<_cot+Jduct
the sclt'cti<)n process. +l_)l)ics were proposed by the NASA tield eel+tens, evahualcd and cullcd
;tt ttcadqtuutcrs tot hwhtsion in a topic list sent out with the solicitation. Evaltmli<)tl ;rod
selcclion of winning prop<_sals are accomplishcd through pantqs of NASA scientific and
technical t, Xl)t.rts. Awards of contracts will I)c llmdc t)y the SBIR office wilh the ach-nfinistra-
lion :at the fiehl cenlcr fi+<)m which the topic originated. Initial tirst phase contr;wt awards
have t)ectl made. It this program l)r<_vcs sttcccssfttl, NASA may extend the c_mcept bey(rod
the original st_tttttt)ry requirements ;_s ;m a_!jutwt o1 ils commercialization i)r_+gram.
Document 111-18
Document title: "Space Commercialization Meeting," memo with agenda, participants,
and outline of policy issues, The White House, August 3, 1983.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
I, 1983. the ICeaL.a, admi,istration decided to e,couraL_e the p_ivate sector to inve._t it+ ,'+pa,"t' _'g).Sl'(It't'h
_t,d commercializalio, and wanted to u,de_:_ta,d what :_overnme, t policies wouM provide the best
climate/or private i,ve_tme, t i, space. A meetinff was held at the White ttou.w with bu_ine__ and
.ffovePPtme, t leaders to discuss measures thai would stimulate p_Jvate-sector i,rht.stP4al activity in
_pace. 77+is meeti, L, wrt_ one r:/ the fi_t very hi/._h-h'vel a,d vi_ibh. _i+..'nal_/rom the L_over, ment to im_i-
,e_.s to phi,/i}r a m'w era i, +pace q/ profit-mahinL_ .p/mrtunitie_. ma,t{/ar'tu_4ng, a,d other aclivi-
ties. It was also a direct .+iLr,al to btlsilH.Lg+that the plat+m'd space .statio, would be availabh. /i,
_vmmercial o[)portu,ities attd that to advance the pla,_ [or the .statio,. the Iobt_+'inl._a,d support O[
the bu_ine_.s _ectm woubt be importa,t.
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Augusl !_, 1983
Space Commercialization Meeting
A,_emla
I. Inlr_Muclion (:raig [. Fuller
2. \_,i.lconic Edwin Meese III
,lanws M. B<'ggs
3. Rcvi,'w,,f Issue ()uilinc (:raig i. Fuller
t. Discussion ,,t (:o,nmmcial .Space Issues All l:'arlicipanls
5. [.,inch wilh lhe Prcsi(lenl All Parti,Hpanls
6. Summar,, All Parficipanls
I, u n cheo** With the 15"eside*tt
()ld Family Dining Ri.ml
:\ugusE 3, 1983
[2 noon
l_arlicipant_
Mr. John E Yardley
I'r,psideni, Mcl)_mnvll Douglas Aslronaulics
Sl. l,ouis, Miss_ltll'i
Mr. M'aximv A. FaRcl
lhx.sidmm Space Induslrics, Inc.
t [Otlslon, Texas
Mr. Rol)crt A. I lanson
( :hairman and (:hi<'f Executive ()t]icer
l)ecrc & (:ompany
Molinc, Illinois
MI. Frederick W. Smilh
(:hairman and (:hief Execulive Otticer
Fcdm-al Exprvss (:orporation
Mcm ph is, Ten,wssec
Mr. ( ;corRc ]ct]s
Presidl'nl of Norlh Anierican Space ()peralions
Rockwell lnlernaliona]
H Neguiido, (:ali|_Jrliia
Mr. (k'oigc Skurla
(:hairllian and PleSidenl
(;illllllll_lll Alq'ospa((! (:orporation
|_l('lllllagl', Nt'w _ll'k
,'_()0 _I'A( ;E \".; AN I NVENTM ENT IN E( x )N( )M I( ; ( ;R( )_,VI l I
Mr. David Thoml_SOn
President, ()rbital Systt'ms ( ;_wporation
Vienna, Virginia
Mr. I)axid t lannah
President, Sl)acc Servitcs hworporatcd
t hmsmn, l'exas
Mr. ()liw'r (;. Boil,c.au
Pr,vsitlent, (;choral Dynamics (]o]])oralion
St. l,ouis, Missotni
l)r. Klaus P. tteiss
Ncw _in-k, New 'fi)rk
Mr. John l.atshaw
Executive Vice President and Managing l)ircctor
E.E tlutton & Company, Inc.
Kansas (:it}', Missom-i
Dr. John W. Townsend,Jr.
President
Fairchild Space (:Olllpilny
(;ermantown, Maryland
])cpm-tntcnls
The 1 Ionorat)lcJames M. P,eggs
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C.
The f hmoral)lc (:larenceJ. Brown
Deputy Sc('t'ct ar y-dcsigll at(.
l).t'p_ll-llllCll[ of" (]OIIIIIICI'('C
*_'V_lshillgl()ll, D.( :.
Mr. I,Icwcllvn Evans
Assistmll to tilt' ,.\ssociale l)epttly Administrator
National Acrommtics and Space Administration
Washington, I).(:.
White Ihmsc Smlt
Edwin Moose III
Richard (;. I)arman
(:raig 1_ Fuller
(;eorg,v A. Kcyworth, II
(;ill)('r! 1). Rye
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Outli_te O/Commercial Space Poli 0' l_sue_+
1. I low does tim Adminislrati<m insure a consistent Federal space policy?
2. Whal constimws a lair and lawwablc pricing policy?
3. What economic incentives should be considered Io promolc commvrcial space aclivity?
• protil
• lax cicdils
* dcprecialion
" low cosl capital
• fix'c R&I) llighl lilnc
• risk sharing/risk reduclion
• illSlll'_lll('C ])o()]_;
1. What Federal t'unding/progr<un coilllniillll'lllS arc illll)ol'ialii?
* shuffle availal)ilily
• space ,4IaliOll: illalillCd and lllllllallllCd
• basic l('sl'Hl'('h
5. llow will properiy righls bc [)I'()I('cI('(]?
* palcnl htw
• l)rol)ril,lary I)rOlccliOllS
6. liViial lcchniqucs ,should ])c used 1o expand the Inarkcl flit coninicrcial st)ace aciiviiics?
• Sl;,cchil go'¢l'l-llln,cnl i)l'(IClll'l!ilicill policies
. period ot cxclu,dviiv lor high risk, high-cosl, high-bcncl]l VClllllit's
• fhcililalc piivaic sC(lOl iit'(-l'ss Io gOVellllllClil dala
• provide illHlkcl gllalalilccs fi_r space producis
* hcighlcn aWillt'llCSS ;ll)Olll (Ollllill'r('iai space V(,lllllrCs
7. !t,V}llil is I]11' il])pl()])li3l(" role filr NASA?
i _'I'S ol)cr._iliOilS
• I'US(',lll'h
• rcglllillOr
S. lv4(llal rcgllialory ])arricrs exisi lhal could rolard coiillllCl(ia] space dcvch>pnicnl?
i overlal)l)in g.iurisdictions
i llll I{iviclra])]¢' Ix.'gIl lali,cills
9. !vVllal naliolia[ si!Clll'ilv isstlCS at'_l;'cl COllliner(ial space VCllltll-eS ?
• ilCCd Io r,l_t'×alilill(! classiticali,0n policies and piot'edilrcs
• rcasscss intcrllali(illa] space iSSllCS (lechnology transient, tT)lcigll coopcralivt' t)ro-
.jccls, ('it'.) giv(!n Ioreign colnpi'lilic, n
Documen1111-19
Document title: Craig L. Fuller, The White House, Memorandum for the Cabinet Council
on Commerce and Trade, "Commercial Space Initiatives," April 10, 1984, with attached:
"Private Enterprise in Space--An Industry View," pp. iv-v.
Source: Documentary History Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington
University, Washington, D.C.
7hi._ memo and the attached document (below is onl+f the introduction) summarized a .w'rie_ <!]issue
paper_ prepared f*y business a_M government interests. 77te White tlouse was a strm_Lr _upporter q/
space commercializations, aml this memo detailed the iniliative,_ thai i_Mu_tr3, /bll woaM he necessary'
Ira tile gm,er_me#ll lo tu't+6_opeJU_lg .space to bu._ines._ opportu_itie_. {:raig l"ulh,r wa_ a While I louse
.qa// member./or the Cahim,I (:ou_lcil m+ ()m+merce and 77ride who had a particular i_lt,_,_t in ._pace
commercialization.
April 10, 1984
Memorandum for the Cabinet Council
on Commerce and Trade
FR()M: (;ra N 1,. Fuller [hand-inilialed: "(:I,F"]
SUBlEt;T: Conunercial Space Initiatives
Thc President and (;ongress h,tvc expressed siFong suppoFt of expanding pl-ivaic sec-
tor involvenu'nt in space. The success of recruit shuttle tlights has stinmlaled intercsl in
l;,ossibililit's o1 prot]lablc ticc-cntcrprisv businesses in space. The attached set _>t issiu,
papers were developed by a diverse group of business leaders who met with the President
last summer. The issue papers deal with initiatives that the Nation might lake to help stim-
llla|t' (()iliiliClt'ia| sllil('t" ¢'ildcavol,'4,. \¥iih the (;(iVt_l'l|int'il[ as a palllll.q, privalt' SC¢'I_H
enterprise can help turn space into an arcmt of immense benelils for our Nation.
In light of lilt: Presidcnfs desire Io encourage such I)rivale iilvcStillCIl[ ill sl)acc, l
would appreciate your having your staff review the attached issue papers. Pleasc appoint
a re|)icscillalivc to st!ive <ill a (;abinet Council for (',omnlcrcc and Trade Working (;roup
that will be responsitlh' tilr assuring appropriate coverage o1 critical agency concerns,
NASA will chair the woFking group m discuss agency commenis.
Please provide initial comments by c.o.b., April 16lh.
co: Mcmllcrs of Sl(;/Spacc
I lhis page and the tilllowing pages art' rul)hcr stamped "I)I,L\FI'"]
Private Enterprise in Space--An Industry View
The tidlowing analyses of potential connncrcial initiatives were drawn by a
15-menll)er Commercial .S'pace (;nmp made up of representatives from diverse pri-
vale sector [irills. They cxaniined opportunitics in and inipc'dhnt'nts to the coin-
inertial list" of sl)acc....
l iv] INTR()I)U(:TION
ttistorians tilay look at the 1980's its the beginning of an industrial revolution in space.
Tilt',,' Illay pinpoint ltiese yeal,'_ as lhe pcriod in which U,S. business and (;overillnClil
joined ill parlilci-ship Ii) set lip shop ill orbit. "Flit, indlislrial ill(iVC spat't'ward illaV pr('sagt'
a liew t'conoiliiC alld social ext)allSiOll as well as a rccinphasis o| l|ii' I_Jniicd ,qlaies" icch-
nohlgical leadership.
Privalc underiaking,_ in space I)roinisc the Sallit" rewards tor tlUF nalional weltarc
which Ii-ec cnierprisc has historically bcslowcd (>11o/it l)COl/Ic--;jol)s, higher li'_ing Slali-
dards, new oullels |ilr innovation aild iinaginalion, addilional slinnilalion of technical
e(|llcalioll aiid new possibilhics Jill illVt'sliiicii[s alld profils, II also call I)e expt'clcd Io
cnhanci" Olll- |)alailct" of i)ayiilt'nl,s and Olii national securily aild i)r¢',sligt ".
Nille speclaclllarl}' Sll(C#.',',;s;tli] tlighls by NASA's Iwo SIIlilIIos havl" Ylliowil llial Olli
nalion is lln the verge of a space iiansporlalion syslenl sullicienlly depeiidabh' to sul)i)orl
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spat]" it]chnstrit.s. Facilitit.s br pt.rmatlt.n]l ]nail]It'd c>pcrati(ms ivl onl+il att" becomi]+g l_.'a-
sibl( +. For lh(+ l]rst time il co]tld bec<m+e l)_+ssil)h" to ass]ivt+ in]dllstty of rolllill(" atTt.ss It)
orbil and :t stnitablt, plat]" Io work <mcc then-e.
Though the tcclmoh>t.,q' is ripe, inallnlad(+ l:,arriers l)h+ck or slow private seclun
t'lllrall('t! t(i sp;tct +'. I+aws and rcgtnlatitms t+nacted l<mg bt'f<)nc plk,alc itp+/cstmevvts iv] spacc
wt,rt + t.nnvisi<mt+d still govt'nn r<mnmcncial spact' ol)evatitms. ()re'rolls lax and tariff laws and
regular]tins avid mnldatcd on-imtppr(>priatt" adminfislrative mechanisms arc" disc:(mt-a'qinvg
('vcn S<)lllt" <)t" the stallll(ht+st atlvt>catt+s _)t ills+'CStltlenl ill (_olnlnt'Ft;ia] spac('t, ndt,avors.
T<_ lht'st' ar-titicial h;mdicat)s must I)c added lilt' natural high risks and r<_sts inht'rcv|t
inl spacc opcralbns. Exptmditlm's br tmilding and latmchhig rt+seardl and matml.tttttr -
itlg ,+gtnipvvienit br tvst+ ivv spact_ ran V't'qltil'e in]]+stint'tits l]onvl IO to more IF]at] I00 times
as langt+ as br cmtvlmvat)h' t_tcilities or+ the Earth. The danger t>l"lores is vnally titan's g]catt'n
in] spacc. I'ht +possibilities dqtnick pn<>til are low.
Yt+t, tht' vtltimatc s<>rial, i'cmmmit and tectmological I)cncfits for otnr hint]oil avid iv]di-
vidnml cilizcns jnvslit_, +tht+ risks. Privatt'ly owtled and operated, highly pr<lfital_h, commtnvvi-
c,nti<ms s,nlcllitt+s arc ,tlrcad): dcnmmslratitlg that t+rc'¢• cv]terprist" in Sl)aCt" works wall.
l'n<_l<mgt'd tvcar-wd+_hlh'ssnl('ss and otht'r Liniqtlt! attril)vm's <_I spatt" nna+v tmlkc pssi-
lilc lilt' IllallllJ_tc'lul+t" _ll tmF, ncc_'dt'wted protltvcts: t]ledical l>rcllanationvs br l]ghtinvg s<mnt.
<_I otnr m<_sl ,.vi(h'sl)nt'atl (lis('ast's; all<_ys strm]gcr yt't lighter thavl an]+] l)rt'st'nl].'+ t kln<)wnv: ('l('(-
tt(mi( +(()lllpOlVt_lllS J<ll" I_ist('r avid srllallt, n conlplllt"rs and l)t'ltt'r dt'('tl+()ltic machint's than
arc" nit)w availal)hr, atvd svslcnns |<)r almost tmivcrsal iv]f(]rm;libn] availability to intrt'ase tilt"
dilhnsi<m ()t kvwm'h'tlg('.
Iv] I)_)m<'sli( anv(I mtcntnalimval manktqs tbr spa(t.-I)ast,d pn<dttcls ,rod scnvit+cs anc csti-
lllal('d It) lit" ilVnllt'llSC anvd thtg' IllaV grow gt'ovvlt'tritally. {_vldcv+stanldabl) '. compt, titms
<vllr_mtl arc t'x])t'linnlt'tnlJll_, ill ,nil of these lit:iris. F<_rt'ign stnbsidics anc" of]ell large avid
t'xl<'vvd l',t'yonld rl'scanc+h aml clt'vcl<)pmtml into prodnction anld mat+kt'linvg.
lh" arrompanying 20 isstnt+ papt'rs, ill mix categories, disctnss t'ach _>t tilt" m;+:j<+r prt+b-
](']VlS (<_llllt'( tt'tl wilh Ill(! (<)lllm('r('i,_.Ji/ati<)n ()t space:
Nalbiial (:Olililicrria] Spare I_t)licy. Bccausc t'OtlVi]vt'rcia] dt'vt'l<il)mCtlls in sl)act' otit'li
rt'¢lnirc lVl:<illy ,%'t'+il'SI<) rt'ach the lirodltclion |)iiasc, tqill'i'i)rt'nt'urs nccd assnralltt,s ()|
cOilsislciil (l()Vt'lnlllt'lll acli<)i]s avid polic'ics (felT I<)FI_ l)t'niods.
l(r<)li<)lnic hlct,i]lix, t,s. l+aws anti regulations whidi cliscrinvinatc against coinnicrcial
spacc Vt+lllllrt!s iiccd l<l 1)t" t+ii_iilgt'(I <)r t'liininate(I.
Expanded (;()'¢t'riiliit'lil Rcscarch. In partnership with industry and acach'tilia, NASA
iict'ds Ill ('xi)alid l);isic avid applit+d i't_spaic(+]l and iinprovc disscinilvalion o1 rt,st, arrh
rcsulls which ina.v Jiavt" hnplicalions br inveslors aiming It) dt'vch_p iilarkelal)Jt" pr<M-
lifts alid s¢,rvict,s.
Roll' of Pt'dcral Agcvicic's. Rt'spol]sibilities of I_!.S. (;<)vt'innitml Agt'vlc-ics rclaliilg it)
roilmlv'rria] sl]att' aclk, iiit's viced It) t)t" firmly assigned and clearly del]ned.
l,g.fal aivcl Rt,gulat<iry llat+rit'rs. [ ,aws and regulalions prt'daii_lg space opcraiicms ill'i'd
to I)<' ul)dalt'd to acc+mimloltalt • space comn](-rdalizali<m.
Naii_m<ll Sortlrity iSSllCS. (;aining access to (;ovt'rilil]t'nt-owlied tt'chnical inlorl]lalimi
alld ;iSsilriiv_ lair inlt+riialiOllal ¢(lll]F)(,lili()t] ai+t" ainoli_ nlai<lr coil(t'rils i)t pr<lspeciivt'
invt'sl<)rs iv/ spat(' ('lldt'av()lS.
._)1)4 _1',\(:EANAN]NVb:5,TMI.LNTIN1_:(:()N()MI(:(;-R()%VI'It
Tim entrance of liev enterprise into space for conmiercial activities conlornls with
national traditions. Priwtte inilialive has been tilt" toundation otoiir nalioll's development
and progress from ils I)cginning. Even dttring the earliest exploralioils of the North
American continent, explorers and pioneers were tbllowed by traders and cratislnen who
(alll(" Io Si'lVe liew st'lilt'lilt'ills. Now, induslrial ('lllleplt'nelllS ale lolhlwing Olll aSllOlla/ils
iiilo lilt" new reahns,
(:onilneicia] experlise will i)crliatls do I_)i spat:c wtlal tile cariiesl Ainerican sellh'rs did
tot out- {Olilili0nl. Tiiey llllll('d forbidding i-egions inlo prosperous alld hosililatih' inhal)-
ited aFt'as.
(:olnniercializalion will atso perhaps do 10r space Wllal Cliarlcs ].indl)cigtl did [_ll avi-
alioii, h will sliow lhal space is a vhal arena t7)1 COllilliercial and iiidliSll-ia] aclivhies, Outer
space is pcHlaps tilt" 2[st-ct'nttlry t'quivalt'nl o|a new conlin(-nl wahing io share its weallti.
Tile parlncrsllip required for these ililderlakin_s t)y the (;overlliileill, indilslry, a(ad('iiiia
and other scclors in ollr sociely ('all only sll'l'll_lhen Otli" llalion. Space ('Oililiil'r(i_liizalion
is pelhal)s as llill(ll Ollr llaliOll'S illanil{'sl (h'siiny as was lhe lalllill_> ill lands Calli{q hi Olil
hislorv....
Document 111-20
Document title: "Feasibility Study of Commercial Space Manufacturing, Phase II Final
Report," Volume I: Executive Summary, MDC E1625, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics
Company, East St. Louis, Missouri, January 15, 1977, pp. 1-2, 8-20.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This i.s <me o]a series q[ _tudies that were d<me lbr the Marshall .S'pa_*, /'Tight Center in the late 1970_.
I, itial N./.SA [TIndi,g o/'indu_t U to look at ma, u/uetuHnl_ gmut._ i, _pace h.d to/urther I¢&l) I{_'
compa,ie_ a*ut to e.x'periment_ on the ,S'[mee .Shuttle.
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Feasibility Study of
Commercial Space Manufacturing
Phase II
Final Report
Volullie I
Exe('lilive Stlllililai'y
Ill SIVA( :E MANUI:A(:TURIN(;
l.O INI'ROIit;CTI()N
[originally set in Iwo ncwspaper-slyh! cohnnnsi Space processing experinienls con-
dueled during tilt" Skylal) and ASTP [Allollo-Soyuz TeM I',ojecl] niissions have shown lhal
lt/e space l'llVirOllllllqll tias SOilll" iiiiiqlit' t,tl_,cis iiii illal('l-iais processing, |I is l)oil'nlially
possit)lc Io Irallsiatt" ltlcse eftc'cls inlo langiblc bcncq]Is siich as coinnit'rcia[ ilrodilClS pi_>-
duct'd in space. To fully dlwclop Iliis polenliai, liowovcr, i-equircs industry tlarlicif)alion Io
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guid<', direct and imldenwnt st)ace manulhcturing OF,,rrations. The F,Url)ose oF this study
was m examine the fi.'asibility of estaldishing commercial space tnanulb.cturing <:,F,erations,
and thus assess ttw potential participati<m of commercial industry. This study analysis was
dMded into two phases. Phase I assessed the technical fi'asibilily along with a preliminary
economic evaluation; Phase II assessed the commercial and Imsim'ss aspects of imF, le-
menling commercial space manuthcluring.
Tile Hppl-()H('h takell was t() Its(" H Illo(le] prodllct 1o assess the lechni(a_] and ('COll()lllic
fi.asibililv <d c()mmt+r(+ia] spa+((. Ittalill['i|('ltllill_. The principal daUt l<_aid the selecti<m of a_
model f.'odt,ct were the experimenud resuhs of space processing experinwnts (m Skylab.
Some of the most promising experimental resuhs were in Ihe ar('a ()t (rysla] growlh, such
as unitiwm distritmtion ot dopatlt elements(l) and crystal tacels which were tlat within a
tcv,, httndrcd Angstroms(2)+ B_'cause of these potential itnprovemetHs, crystal processing
was sch'cted Ibr fuu+lhcr inw,sligalion. Since the most widely used c-rvstal malerial is semi-
conductor silicon, and technical and economic data were awulat)le as a basis tiw Sill(l), it
was selected as our candidate lnalerial. One economic consideralion Ilia| led to silicon
selcclion as a m<_del pro(hntt was thal new products have a |)t'llel +(']tat|('(' ()f Stlccess if they
are entering existing, growing nmrkels(3) and silicon was tq:)l|nd to I>e in a gr(v+,ving, tllal-kel.
With the selection of a tn<_del product for analysis, the fi)llowing stel)s were totmd to
t)¢' ne(essary in ti)rmulalinR an implementalion l)lan for a space-mantutacltnred pto<hwt:
• Mat'ket analysis Ibr system sizing
• Technical evaluation and plant design
• PFOdtlCt Valtle assessment relative to ealth l)fOdttct
• Financial analysis for commercial opefations
• Risk assessment
• Adjust financial t-elut'ns for+ risk
• ()rganizati<mal ('vahntti_m
Phasv 1
Phase I
Phase l
Phase I1
Phase II
Phase II
F'hase II
A nominal market analysis was completed dut+ing the I'hase I study and is updated for
this Phase II analysis. Evaluation ol + the first three steps were reported in detail in the
Phase i final feporl and will only bc stu+nmafized here for background iutt+<)rnllalion.
[_1 2.0 MARKET ANAI+_'SIS
In order to determine how Ihe value and market for space pro(hLce<l silicon could
Ix'st be developed, an analysis of the semiconductor market was undertaken to both
understand and identiti,, market characteristics. These characteristics included type and
exlelll of market segmentation, trends, product life cych+, and compctiti<m.
The tnal-kcl analysis results are illustrated by the projected world market for senti-
c<,n<luclor (h'vi('t's as shown in Figure I. This market is composed of discrete devices and
integrated circuils, is cttft-ently al)<)ul $5B, and is growing at an annual rate ()1 11%. Single
crystal silicon for use in integt+ated circuits requires extremely high quality material in
terms ()t purily and structttre. The damaging effect of deh_cts increases with circuit size
and is gl'e_tlest |+Of large scale integrated circuits (LSI). These I,SI would be a candidate
applicat ion Ion space processed silicon if the promising experimental resuhs could t)e real-
ized in a developed process.
Crystal manuthcturers estimate silicon material sales to be about 8% of device sales;
the,vfi.e, materials sales [original place+ment of Figure 1] fi)t I,SI, the fastest growing
lllaFket seglnenl, iS pl't!jecte(I Io l)e al)_ ml $0.64B alllltLa]ly 1)y 1<..)85. Ten percent of the I,SI
segment of lit(' 1985 market was sel as a goal. Since there are approximately I0 cOtnF, anies
cttrrenlly pr<)ducing sittgh' cnvstal silicon, and the market is growing at an I 1++ rate, this
109_ market capture wits feh io be a n-easonable, conservative objective. This 10+,7+,market
set our initial l)roducti<m tale which was used to size the overall producti<m system ....
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5.0 FINAN(:IAI. ANAI?I_IS
The ten plant ¢'<:onomic analysis bas<:linc was selected on thc basis of +_atisl)'ing 10%
of thc 1985 l+Sl silicon substrate market. Thc estimated 1985 Earth mat+mlhctur<+'d silicon
sah,s for I.SI of $0.64B shown in Figure I wouht correspond to an annual l)l+odu(lhnl of
0.47M kg oi wali'rs at $1360 per kg, cquivahmt it+ kg to tlw <mlpttt of 200 space manulh¢-
turing plants. Bccattse (>l increased processing yield, however, only 110 phu+ts wouhl lw
t-cquirt'd lot the same number of integral('d circtths with each plant satisl)_ing about I !_+_,
of the ] 985 I,SI nmt¢'rial market.
"1'()illustt+atc the pott'ntial e(<m<)mic l_,asibility of tlw sl)acc nlanttlaclurc ()f silicon ril)-
bt)t), the allowal)h, cost of $7560/kg is compared wilh the matmfactttring (()st of
$2930/kg. This ¢<wnparis<m resuhs ill a positive economic bcnel]t of $4630/kg. It+ Figure
I [ all the costs and sales fi_r the Hlrce years of d,esign, dcvch>pmt.nt, test, cngin('ering, and
thl)ricati,_m, lhe []vc yt+'ars o[ l)r<)dut'tion, and one year of run out are included over the
[]vt. Vt'_il+pr(>du('tion F,eriod lot a ten plant operation.
l'Tgvu_+. I I. 15elax +',',++,+,gs ( I# ph;,l+. 5 ye,'+h
Figurv II illustrale++ the (lislribution of all tlw cal-
culatt+d cost ('h'menls fin + spa(x, manulhctttring and
the resultant earnings. Thv prctax earnings arc 51'G+
of sah's. The cosls itwlude launch (Shutth," user
charge $21.M/launch), depreciation, selling and
administrative cost at 1594, of sales, the sharcd-lamwh
revisit charge of $8't0/kg, and raw material cost of
$70/kg. If production continues alier the fifth v('_li
wlien all Illl<" ialincli and dcprccialion costs ar('
oxl)ens<.'d, I|ic ];,re-llix Cal-IliligS for subs<.'quenl v('als
wouhl t)c 71% of sales.
Whih' it is inip(irtanl lliai Ill(' pot('ntial valu(' of
silicon ribbon lilalltll.icttnl.d ill space is ai)oiil tWO
aiid one half (2-1/2) litnes llit" space nialiU[_iCllu+in<_
cost t()i it tell plant o])eialiOli, space [original plac¢'-
llleill of Figure [ l ] inaililt_i(lUling intist also |)t' t+val-
tlaled in l<'rins of lhe capila] iilvt!sllnent and risks
involved. (:.ipital iilvesliiicnl decisions ilitist laki' inlo
acc()ilnl Ihc linic valu(' ot + liiOiley; lhal is, a dollar
spcnl on pJanl lo<la'+ i_ w<n+lh iilore lhan lhl' pr<nnis('
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of a dollar of profit fiom fimue operalions. Thi_ is accompli.',,lled hy disccmnting Hw
fultue exlwnditures and receipts (cash tlows) at a constant anntml rate. If tIle stun of all
Ihe (lin(TomHed cash flows for a pr(!jecl equals zero, then lifts rale is deliwed as the rate ot
relllln ()n ]llvesllllenl (R()I) or Internal Rale <)f R('tuMi (IRR)+ This rale iS analogous to
allallntlaJafler-laxiIIIereslrate ()nthe (hfllarsa! risk.The cash flowsl()ra I0 plant ()per-
afion are shown in Figure 12. The shaded areas repres('ilIthe ])resentvalues of Hw cash
flows (lis('<)ttnte(l at 191 [<.+iginal l)l;wement of Figure 121 the rate ol rettlrn ()n invest-
merit. The negative cash fl<m+s duriHg the first three years tel)resent the inveslnwxlt fi)r
plant (<_nnli+twthm, As showi+, the R()I is 29.5%, which lot an eflbctive c<wp<wate lax rate
<d ,IXg_,, is anah_gotls to a l)retax vettun <)f 57%.
I ,+,(j
(lash I:h_w, Re( cipts Positive
I Pl<'s(.nll \'_tttl+,' ;it 29.5% Rclllrll oll ln,,cstmcnt (R()I)
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In it sensilivily analysis of rate of return on investment the number of plants, plant first
unit e<>sl, and integrated circuit pr<wessing yield (ribbon value) were fi-)lmd to he the
major cost drivers, while Shuttle transportation cost was tound to have a more m<)derale
et|bct. The variati<m of rettLrn on investment with tile total nunlber of plants deployed is
shown in Figure 13. Return on investment for one plant is relatively low, because Ihe
clesign, ch'velopment, lesl and engineering (DDT&E) costs are approximately equal to the
plant cost or $16M. As the number of plants increases, the DDT&E costs are spaced over
more plants and the plant unit cost is decreased by a 91% learning curve, thtLs increasing
return on investment. The return on investment for the selected 10 plant baseline (5% of
1985 market) is calculated as 29.5%. The number of plants also has an effec! on the pay-
back period or time required toe the manufacturer to get his investment [original place-
menl of Figtlre 13] back as shown in Figure 14. This figure shows cumulative cash flows,
with the h,w poinls retlecting the maximum cash investment, the crossover points, the [)ay -
back periods, and the end points tile tolal after tax earnings. For the baselined 10 plants,
the maximum investment is $120M, the payback period is 5.3 years, and the total net earn-
ings are $248M.
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PI;mt first unit cosl was dctcn-mincd to be a major cost driver _md its ct]++'ct on the
tt'llnZn ()n invt.SllnCt_t tbra ten i)htnt oF,_'l_ttioll is shown in Figmc 15. This tin-st ttlfil _<)sl
cl'|'cct is in+cotllr_tst to I)I)T&I_ cost, which Ires _ lcsscr cl]k'ct l)t'qltlsc it is sprc+_d ox'cr the
tolal mttnbcr of l)l+tnts. The sensitivity o| rctttrn out iw+cstmcnl to plant liFst trait cost i]lus-
iv+item the iml)O_tatwc of dcsignin_ _t silicon ribl)<m processor and plant fl>r cl+licicnt st'ft-
a] |)rodttction.
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The sensitivity of ralc of rctmn on investment t() inl('gratt'd circuil processing yiHd
improvcmwnt is shown in Figure 16. As noted ('arlier, the integrated circtfit processing cost
s;wings d(q(wmin(' ils alh)wal)h, cost premium oww ground t)roc('ssc'd matt'rial. Th(" impof
lance oJ this l)aram('t('r prOinl)ted an in(lcpendcnt assessment of vivid iml)rOv(,mcnl [i-om
the hlt('gral('d Cir<uil Engineering Corporation (I(:E), a consulting firm to the" indusu+y.
For _t comlx)sil(! markc!t, with _t ratio of MOS device sales Io I)ipohu device salc,s of 3 to 1,
it1(" processing yi¢'ld tot .38 cmx .38 cm baselin(" chips using space processed mat('rial is
cx[)('(tcd to irncrvasc! [](m'l 14% fi)r ground material to 25% fi)r space rnantd_tcttured rib-
bon. h should Ix' noted that a yield increase of only 5% woul(I resuh in a tale of return
on investment comparat)]c to current indusuy operations.
IFigure 16 originally 1)laced tH're]
[ 11 I [h(' s('nsitivity of return on investment to Shutllc user ('hargc is shown in Figure 17.
'I'h<' vslimaled Shiftily tts('r charge of $21M per launch amounts to a cosl of about
$840 per kg. This cost is a significant portion of the silicon ribbon matutfhctttring c<+sl per
kg, so rtqurn on inw'slmcnt decreases rapkUy with increased Shuttle user charge.
[Figurt' 17 origimdly placed here]
1121 6.0 RISK ASSESSMENT
+I'<)(<m4)are lh_ +29,._% raft+ oJrt4ttrn on itlvestment for t¢'n planls with a typical indus-
try r('tliltl Oil iZlXt'SlIII('Ill Of" l 0<_, requires that it be adjttslcd for risk. In industry this is llStl-
ally (hint" l)y reqtdring a higher CXl)e(t<_'d rate ()I r(-lurn <m illv('stm(qll f()l ll('w l)r(_jects
th_ttl thal r('stdlint_ from (tlrr('iH ()])t,rati()ns. hi ()ill surv+t'v ()f fi)ur (rvslal 111_tl+Itl[itCtlll'('ts
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the desired aver+tge expecled return on investnlent was 2<).8"_,, ota risk premiunl of about
11% over ('UITC'II| ¢)peratitms. The 2(t.5% pr<)jt'cled l+eturn on investment t7)1+ silicon ril)-
t)on manufacturing ¢'xceeds this triter|tin by a substantial ttlargin.
Another more comprehensive niediod of risk analysis is t¢) t-v;tlll;tlc risk _ls a function
of |inlc and allen risk-adjust the cash tlows for use in calculating a risk adjus|ed fa|e ¢)1
return. To th) rhis, firs| I]'le le<hnical, legal, and market risks associated with the ctmliner-
cial space manufacturing of silicon ribbon are evahlaled.
Evahlation t)f lechni¢al risk required definilit)n of the research and developmen|
aclivities for the silicon ribbtm process and process apDaralus. The researt'h and devehtp-
lilt'Ill requirt-d was divided |lilt) lhree phases, ground and sounding fockel researth :|lid
development, Shllttlc sortie deveh)pmen|, and pilol plan| detnoltstr;tlit)n. A proposed
lhnt'lat)h, t_)] th<'se activities is sh+iwn in Figure 18. The ;ipproxhnate ('O.M t)|" these activi-
lies is S3(iM, ii_li illcludillg l:lllllch t'O.<,;Is. For file purpose of risk _in:ilysis , lhree objectives
wl're idelllilied as t)eing liect,SSill): 1() lhe technical iinp]enienl;itiOll of sl)_tce in_lllllfaClllr-
itlg; ])ilsi( process dcvelliplnClll, lll_<tllll|'ilCttll+ill_ plilnl dt'Vel<)[)lll('lll, and IlliSSil)ll tip('l'il-
li<lliS. Tlies(" ot}ieciives were divided into lllirty-six leCiiliica] risk eleiliClilS ill threc ]('vels
of delai] sililil;ir Io a work bre;tkdown strtlCllIFO. These eleltlelllS wefc lhen class|tied as
(I) ])l'()Vell sl)ilfe leihllolOkr}' , (7) existing knowledge ietlilil+ing developtllenl till _.l);t((,
;I])l)]i(:tti<)li, ltll([ (_'_) li('W It'(']lll()[Ol_' rt,quiring tesear('h. Tile ilpplical)le I'allgC of pfoi)a-
llilhy <dSllfless tiir these (itle_()iies is: (1) _le_iler liiaii 0.gtl, (7) more lh;in 0.95 ])tit less
liIHn 0._.){t, and (_-1) less lhall ().(iF), respectively. A sul)ieciivc eVititlilli()ll WilS Illilde of w]lelc
||it' risk t_li i.'ill]l elenl_,ill ti'll wilhin Ihe applicable lallg('. Tile rest|its of Ibis _ili;llysis ;ile
sh()YVll in Figtlrc 19. The pr(ibill)ilily of lechllic;t] Silc('ess ill(l-eiises with lilnc from 0.77
Iod_|y, Io l).4_ _ll lhe coiilplc!li<m c>f groilild and SOlltldill<_ rockcI resel.irl]i ;|lid develop-
lilelil iii 1'.t141, Io l).1i9 ;il ill|" i Olnl)lelioli ofShlitile sorlie ])lO(+es_; delitOllslr_ilion, and |]lia]-
I)' Io 0.{E> :ll ltle conlpll'lioli ot _i pih)l plan| deilion.slr_tlion ill 1{)_,_.
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Thrcc areas of (onccrn were addressed ill cwdttating legal risk: patents, trade secrets
and liabilities. These c(mcerns were evltlualt'd with respect to U.S. and intt'rtmtional law
;ts illustrated by Figure 20. The rccommcndatiol)s indicate [13] [original placcmcnt of
Figure It.l] [original t)laccmcnt of Figure 20] [14] l}l_tl {hcrc ill-(" no insurmountabl(" l('_a]
prol)lcms. Based on this cvahmti<m, a subjective estimak' was ma(l{" of tile pr_fl)al)ility of
c()mplcti<)n of the nlanuihcturing program lhrottgh 1990 'wilhi)ul l<:,ss,t's el<used |)y legal
prol)lcms (today). This protmbility of success was cslimated as three chances in t_>ur. The
amount oi+ risk is a function of time[;] lhtts it decreases to zero as the It)90 completion
date is appr<)ach<'d. Earl) c<)nc(mtrali()n on ])r(4)lcm areas is cxpcclctl to sul_stantially
rctlucc the risk to abottl 10% lty the start of sotlie missions.
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Three areas <)|(ottct+rn wcte <'vith]itl<'(l it) (Ictt'rntinc ntarkct risk. Tit<' first was that sil-
icon might b(' replaced by another malcrial, lh¢" second was that ("<on if the l)r<_jt'cl<'d mar-
k<'t [_>r high quality silicon <'xisl<'(t, it c<)tnl)Clitiv¢ + grotmd bitsed pr<)(t'ss might I)c
(Icxclt)pt'd, and the third ',,.,,itsthat tit<" space material might n<)l cotntniutd it l>rcmium
price mid thus not b(' l:,rice (Otnl)Clitiv('.
Analysis o[+c<mtpctitive materials lhilcd _o i(h'ntil_' it material which would SUpl_lant sil-
icon as lh<' l)its<' stfl)stt+at(_ • tnaterial l<)r alt I+SI l<'chnologics, lh>wcver, th<' risk was it(!jttst-
cd to account Ibr l)Ol(mtial (oinpelitivc impact of silictm-on-Sal31)hirc (St)S) tm the
mel:tl-oxidc-stmfic<mdttclor (MOS) I,SI market scg, lttCllt. In ICrltlS o[ comp(:litive l)roc<'ss-
cs, sorer" iil)bon ])ro¢t,sst+s itlc l)cing (h'vch)pt'd its i)iut of Ill(" gi)vCrlll]l('lll sp<_llSt)l-Cd s(>lltr
cell rcsclirch l)rogrlttn. Thes¢, l)r<)(css<'s itrc tlirc<lcd towm(ls the (l<'vclt>l)ntcnt <_[ It)w-cost
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l(ur('slrial solar c('lls I_)r whi(:h the qualily requirements are nol as high its f()r int('grale(l
('il('llilS.._,hh()llgh Ill(" pr,!ie(l(.,(I ]llaleriill ch;lra(teris[ics of s()lilr ((']l sili(()ll ;iF(" tt()! _ic('c])l-
al)h' tb] inle_rHle(I (il('ltits, pr()(`ess iuiprovellle'l]|S _lI](I new deveh)t)menls lll_+l_/ ()C('lJr HI
unv time. Thus, a signit](`ant it(!illSllllclll ill lnal+k(!l risk was IllHfle If) ac(l)Ulll t()l Ill(. + illlpitc:t
()f gr()lmd l)r()cesst,s (()nlpelhtg for lht, sallle market se_m(.,lll.
t_sselllial to Ill+. + tlZl;tl+('iil] stic('('ss ()t" Ihc space m:+u/ul+a(;tlnit_ VeiMtn-( + is Ill(. + nl)ilily I<)
ctutr_(' it pri(( • which l)r<)vi(h.s Mltll(-it+lH rt'v('ntle t()l an H.(leflllillt" r(!ttlrll on illVCStlltelil.
F()r st)a(('-l)rodltc(.d silicon Itlis inv(}lv(.,s the eslat)li_l(.iHcut of+t t)li(_: hight]- than its inale-
ri_tl ('t)sI and al n level e(lUivillen! to Ih(" vahle oF processing yield hlll)r()v('nicltl t)e]l(.d]ls.
An aS_,;(.'SSltlUlll ()t Ih(.' ('osl Iren¢ls ()f 1._[ devices i¢lenlilled lhill _ts (l(..vi((, :.,;ile ifl(l-(_its -
('s, ('()sis increase sul)slanlially. This is evidenced by the sharply higher cost for r('t'cnt]_
markeled devices Sll(,tl ;is a nlicroprocessor as compared to Ihe ('()st o[ a rehllively silnp](,
]);l_,('lin(' ._-_l'_(ltl X .]8 ('Ill ('al(llhllor chil). Of greater si_llifi(:iul('e' is the in(Teasiu_ del)cn-
(h'nce upon i)roeessing yields to make ever larger LSI devices econorlli(`allv compel]live.
For ffllure l)roducls st]oh as gompltlers-on-a-sil_gle (`hip and 64K R_ll(.doll] J_t.c(ess
._'|(!mories (t,Lr\MS), hl('r('ifsed yields are critically imporlalll.
h is highly prot)ahh. Ihal, as compared to value of the yield i]lll)rovenle]ll t)enel]ls of
Ill(.' relaliv(.lv small I)i(.selinr: calcuhttor chip, a milch higher value will I)e asso(i:ale(l with
lh(" US(' ()1' spa_(C-l)ro(lu(t,(I sili(`()n tor lhese larger sized t'uttne i)r()duels. Thus, a prclllitnll
l)ric( • can l)rol)id)ly I)e (harg('d t(_ differt,nlialc • the space-produced silicon from gr()un(t-
made material whi(h (amu)l pr()duce similar yield improvement values.
l_,;ts('(l _m these c()nsiderali()ns, Ioday's probability of unarket success was subiceliv(,lv
(l('t('rnlincd to t)e t_)ur chances in ten. This market risk is expressed as today's probal)ilili'
Ihal Sl)a(t'-prt)(hwed sili(()n ribbon will capture 10% of the projected 198,'% l,Sl matcrii{l
mmket. It is (h'lermined by muhiplying the probabilities f()r each market risk faclor
IoRtqher al each ()t lhe t_)nr maj()r milestones prior to project completion. This is depi(l-
ed in Figln(' 21 where the early [15] 1977 risk evalualion is established at 0.:-_8, and
incrt'ases I() l.(} in 1990 ;it i)ro_yam co]it)let]on when all nl;irkel t)meli()ns are (`()lllplele
illl¢l known.
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[161 7.0 RISK AI).JUSTED FINANCLM, RETURN
The combined probability of successthl implementation of the space manul_tcture of
silicon ribbon is the product of tile technical, legal, and market success probabilities given
in Figme 21. The cash flows were adiusled tor risk by considering each year as a tork of a
decision tree. The value associated with continuing the project tbr a year is the cash flow
fin that year and the value associated with failure is zero. Risk adjusted cash flows are the
product of tile year's cash flow and the series probability of continuing the project
through that year. Using these cash tlows, risk adjttsted returns on investment were calcu-
lated for tile years of the comnlercial design, plant fabrication, and production,
1982-199(1. The resuhing risk adjusted rate of return on investment versus tilne is shown
in Figure 22. While tile expected rate of relllrn atier tile five years of production in 1990
is 29.5%, the risk ac!justed rate of return when tile private sector would tirst comnlit to
development in 1982 is 14%. This is greater than tile rate of return for continuing ground
based operations and could .justit_' initiation of commercial development at that time. h
should be realized that this tavorable risk adjusted return on invesmwnt assunled gov-
ernment sponsored research and development through the pilot plant demonstration in
1984. If industry assutned these risks and cost, the risk adjusted rate of return today would
be 4%, and because the 4% is less than tile 1(1% typical return on investment tot earth
based operations, industry would probably not invest. This means that tile government
will nlOSt likely have to [original placement of Figure 22] sponsor the process research
and development tbr space nlanutacmring to become a reality.
For the government to participate in any activity it is necessary that it be in the pub-
lic interest. In general, advancing technolog T is considered to fall in this category because
of the impetus it provides tot continued economic growth. An example of government
sponsorship of commercially applicable technolog T is NASA's work in satellite communi-
cation. Although Telstar in 1962 was advertised as a $50M investment by a commercial
tirm, AT&T, the governtnent had already spent approximately ten times that amount to
develop and demonstrate the potential of space communications. This lechnolog_' was
later applied by tile Congressionally chmtered Communications Satellite Corporation
(COMSAT) in iml_lementing improved international communications.
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[171 8.0 ()R(;ANIZATIONAL EVAIA!ATI()N
A (;OMSAT type congressionally chartered corporal+on was considered its a possible
organizational arrangement liar iml_lementing commercial space manuf:acmring, and
compared to a joint venture and existing separate company(s). While the financing of a
(;ongressi<mally clrartered corporation is aided by its special charter; arid it or a joint ven-
ture would tend to spread the risk, existing separate companies were chosen, because of
the tax adwmtage of he+rig able to exl.Rrtlse the cost of the reqttired research and dcvclop-
lnet+l against profits ]iom operations as it is incurred. In the chosen arrangement, an aero-
space company would design and labricate plants fin sale to eJeclronics companies ti)r the
manuthctttre of silicon ribl)on, hnplementing space manut:acturing throttgh existing sep-
arate companies has the additional advantage that Congressional interest and oversight is
no! required as in the ease of COMSAT, and possible antitrust aclion is avoided that could
resuh liom the lormation of a joint venture including major industry producers.
!).0(:()N( :l ,USI()NS AND RE( ;()MMENI)NI'I()NS
The following concllJsions ¢an he drawn ahout the inq)h'mentalion of space mantt-
lacturing:
• A melhod of" assessing the lc-asibility of space man+fracturing has been lo+mulated to
evaluate the associated technical, economic and risk ['aclot+s.
• Product manufacturing in space appears to be feasible, but other product analyses
and supporting research are necessary to vet+f), assumptions.
• The cost of space material it+ comparison with earth material is not necessarily a valid
c<miparison. The value-added from material improvenients must be computed and
assessed to evaluate econol++i(" ff'asibility.
• Rihhon manulhcturing in space appears to he technically and economically ti,asit_h',
but private initiative may be blocked by the hmg term, high risk development pro-
glattt required.
• The gow+rmnent shottht sponsor space processing research and [original placemenl
o1 Figme 231 dexelopmenl in+ Ihe interest o1 promoting titttn+e economic hem,Ills to
the |J.S.
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Rc,(-omnwnd+tlions--Th( + rcc()mmc'ndati()ns, in th(' t_)rm <)[ an implctncntation plan
l<)r tlt<.' (ontn_crc+a] Sl)a(c mat]u[a(tttrir_g of silicon ribbon, r(,cogtdz_ • th(" n+'c([ l()r NASA
._l)Om+orship al<)n_4 with tht' nvt'd to Kct c()mmcrcia] indt_str 7 inv()ht'd. \'fifl](>ut cav
invoh'_'mvnt, induslt+y will not ha'++v a data base for the std+s(+t]t_('nt comnt¢'r(ial Ol)('rali()ns
ilw('stnt('nt dccisi<m. Sl)ccific r(,c<)nltnt+n(lations, st4)p<)rtvd l>y the' r('sult._ <;,] a c,-vstal nmn-
ttfa(Itn'+zr's sutvcy cot_dt_ct('(l as part o1 the NASA study :_tl+C gix+'(+ll ill Figtlr(" 2.++.The" mt's-
sa w is that the govt'rnmcnt should sponsor spacv processing activities throt44h pilot plant
dt, monslrations, to declt,a._c the itnl)lcm<mtation ri,_k to a lcvvl colnln,tPrlStll;+ltt" with privatv
v01+lltir( • (+tpital cotntnitmcnl. The" _O_,'('t'tHl]('I]It it+ s¢']¢'clin<_ pr()c('s_+c_+ I()r d<'vclolm_Vnt ran
I),_:,11+slimttla.tc econ()nd( _rowth and lind _,()hlti()n:,+ t() F,r<:,h,h.'ms ()1"national ('Oll('crtl Stl('}l
;is tl],t" p,_)ssible appli(ation of silicon ribbon in tnantd_tctttrin_ solar (,_'lls fi:,r ;.t solar l),:)w.er
stati<)n. %'itlt,_:,ut [191 this sp<)n_,,mshi]) it is l)()ssil:,h. • thal th.u p,m('ntial ec()non+_ic l)t'n.ulh:,,
of sp;.t(c m_untl_+tctttriri_ tn;.ty not ])e [tdlx' realiz<:'d.
The ndlt'st(:,nu s,rh(.dtd(, showt_ in Fi+z,ttr<_'24 idcntili(_'s the n+_;:tj()ra,rtix'iti(+: ,, nv(P+ssar,, ' t()
the iml)Ic'rn('nt;tti(m (:,l+sl)a<.'(' nmnttfacturir,._ ol +_,ili,ron ribbon, h_clutd¢.d is ;,..r(.'c<)mm('n-
d;iti<)l_ [_:_,r_+F,(ms()rship <)r th(. +.¢tv t_,.and id,t'nti[i(ation o[ lhu _r()tt|) or ()r_anizati()i] that
should take th<" initialix'u [i)r any action, hnmcdiat(" ;tcli(m toward tvcht]ica| dcvvlol)n+cnt
iN Ilt'(+('hS;ll'y i[" Sl);t,{'(' manulitcttu-ing is to t)(,(()nlt, ;i r¢'alitv t)7 the 19N3 target,
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Document title: "Space Industrialization: Final Report," Volume 1. Executive Summary,
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By the lute 1970s, with the.first launch t?] the Space Shuttle approaching, and with plans beg4nning
to /r_rm [m building a Vmce .station and m larger platforms in space, NASA took partirular intere._t
i, having indust_ 7 Wur/y the possible uses r(.space for profit-making activitie.s. This repre.wtzted the
/irW steps in thinking about the commercialization of space activities in areas other than .satellite
teler ommu ,ication s. Thew "madmaps" for the industrialization of space included economic analyses.
Unlike the earher benefit-cost prr_lection._, these futun'stic looks emphasized more truditional busi,ess
tools, ineludi,ld ratr_s of return to investment and the relative demand Jbr goods and service._ coupled
with p_ir'es a,d co_ts, floweve_; the true value of this and other studies of the era was the ident![iea-
tiu, o[ spaee terh,ol%,'ies with nonspar'e market demands that could be met th_vugh the use r?/.space.
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Space Industrialization
Final Report
Volunm 1. Executive Smmnary
April 14,1978
[ 11 INTRODUCTION
Space Industrialization can be defined as a new technolo_' in which the special envi-
ronmental properties of outer space are used tor the social anti economic henefil of the
pe_ple (m earth. These special properties include zero-g, hard vacuum, low vibration,
wide-angle view, and a complete isolation from earth's biosphere. Design engineers have
always been willing to go to great lengths to ()blain those specitic environmental condi-
lions that ftdfill their particular needs. For example, the ttale Observatory was construct-
ed at the top of Mount Palomar so that it would be above a small portion of the earth's
atmosphere. Eight million pounds of steel and cement were hauled up the side of a
rugged mountain to achieve air density reductions of less than g0 percent. When indus-
trial processes are transferred into space, the envir(mmental conditions are typically mod-
ified to a far greater degree. In fact, in-sl)ace pressure levels of one-trillionth of an
atmosphere are relatively easy to ol)tain.
Because so tew experiments have been conducted in space, it is extremely difficuh to
envision all the I)enefits that might resuh t+r<)m extremely low pressure levels there. But if
the past is a reliable guide, pt+essures 12 orders of magnitude lower than those encoun-
tered al sea level should lead to previously tmsuspected I)enefits. As Figure 1 shows, vacu-
tim levels ranging from 10'-' to 10'" atmosphercs have ahcady been used in a lltnnber of
practical ways. These include tood processing and prescvvalion (includirtg freeze-drying
and refiigeration), metal distillation, x-ray devices, 'I%r picture tubes, thin film depositi(m,
at_d the maDufacture of vacuum diodes and solid slate electronic devices. Moreover, many
orbiting satellites have already capitalized on the natural w_cuum of outer spa(('. For
example, when the semi-rigidized E(h() halloon was tested on the gronn(l, more than
80,000 l)ounds of intlating gases were reqttire(t to inflate it. When it was loDed into the
vactlunl of ottter space, only 30 pounds of gases were needed.
The grlevels and the viewing areas achievable in space are also shown in Figure 1. In
comparison with terrestrial conditions, these parameters are improved approximately six
orders of magnitude. I)recise g-level control is iml)ortant in medical and chemical cen-
trifllges, in crystal growth, eleclrophoretic Sel)aration, soliditication and purification
processes, and in the construction of extremely lightweight orbiting structures such as
large-scale solar arrays and multibeam antennas. A wide-angle earth-oriented view can be
extremely beneficial to meteorology, cartography, reconnaissan(e, c(mnnunicati(ms, earth
sensing, and wide-area navigation--all of these have aheady brought important benefits
to the people on earth.
Thus, it is not hard to see why the aerosl)ace engineer is so keenly interested in the
beneficial environnmntal properties of outer space. But these properties ('an form the
basis of a meaningful Space Industrialization program only if they can he exploited in
practical ways. Businessmen are keenly interested in environmental properties, but they
are mt,ch more concerned with protit-making opportunities to fill real hmnan needs. The
first task in our 18-month Space Industrialization study was thus quite clear. To match the
nee(Is of humanity with the opportunities tot tilling these needs through modern space
technol()gy.
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As Ihey look to the turn of the cetllury and beyond, many people see increasingly
bleak prospects fbr the thlure. The pressures of population growth c<mtinne, particularly
in the less-developed countries. The people in these underdeveloped regions are surpris-
ingly young with an average age of about 15, and (hopefidly) they will live to see several
generations of offspring. By contrast, in the develol)ed countries like onr own, the aver-
age age is about 29 and steadily increasing. The developed world has nearly reached that
magic time when each couple replaces itself [2] [original placement of Figure 1] [3] with
only two offspring. Worldwide, however, that is not the case, and it is not likely to be in the
near fittnre. As Figure 2 shows, the overwhelming majority of the world's population is in
the tmderdeveh)ped cottntries; and within 100 years, their fractional share of worhl pop-
ulation will nearly double. Of course, their populations will also increase in absohlte
terms. The birth rates in many areas have recently undergone encouraging declines, bill
so nlany of the people in the world are below the critical childbearing ages that the earth
is committed to supporting at least dout)le, more likely triple, its present poptdalion. Most
experts are convinced that the best way to cut p()pnlalion growth rates is to (leveh)p a
heahhy w(_rl(twi(le economy, l+'.nlerging afthlence Ilas always been atx:ompanied by rednc-
ti<)ns in population gl'owlh rates.
I'it,7+re 1. F,,vironmental Propertie.+ in .Space
One key to a heahhy worldwide economy is expanded trade--especially trade that
restths in a reasonable balance between imports and exports. The Uniled States and other
industrialized countries sell large quantities of goods to the developing countries, but
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today only a discouraging trickle of trade flows in the opposite direction. This negative
t)alance o1 trade endangers the ec(inomit's of the undcrd(welol)ed counlries; it also
deprives tlS of a l/];.tFkcl that COll]d bc provided by lhe 2 billion pcoph" living in the tllldcl-
dcvclol_cd regions. If United States investmcnts (put>lie and private) in l]]c productive t,se
Of" space cotlld COll|l'i])lllc to |]lu econolllic gl(lWt]l alid plllrh_iSillg pOWCl of |hcsc p()VCl-
ty-slrickcn areas, this could have an important l)Osilivc elf_'('l on the economy of our own
country and on the rest of the world. Specifically, if we couh:l develop two-way markets ot
only $17 [br each worm citizen, 2.7 million new American jobs would be created--enough
[O rC(tlICC ()Ill" unemployment level to 4 percent of our work force. This wo,ld not be a dit_
ficult level of trade to attain if underdeveloped regions could be edged toward slightly
higher socioeconomic conditions. In fact, as Figure 3 shows, it is only 20 percent of I}lC
pet capita trade wc arc already achieving with \_'st (;crmany and the United Kingdom.
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[4] [original placenicnl ot Figure 3]
th'althv worldwide trade would also help assure iis o[ unintcrrilpi{'d supplies of nec(l-
cd la'w lilalerials. As indicait-d ill the bar charts of Piguic 4, we arc spendillg iliOFC tIiali
.$46 billion each year for illiporlt!d pclioletlm producis, alid wc ciiirelllly iinpoFt liiOi't' thali
._4) percenl of 14 illipoilailt iiihlerals, ilichldilig platinuln, lilngSl('il, aild nia_ncsitllll,
%Vilhotit ad_.-quale _'xi)oiIs h) pay for i|lesc crucial substances, our country would quickly slip
ilitO a d('clinin<_ ccolloinic position, Over lhc long FIIII, OIIF trade balance has |)CCll quilt
favoral)lc; howcVi,F, in lhree of th{" ]asl live VcaFs, OUF balance of ])ayliienls has I)l'('ii ll('_a-
tire, alid in 1977 aloliC, we ahlioSl exceeded the deficits of all previOtlS years coin|lined.
]_t'CatlSt' of otii high labor ialcs, hig, h-lcchnology il011is aft: essentially the Ollly thhig
',vc, as a COlllllry, can exporl al conlpclitive prices. Malitlt_lctiirt'd goo{ls COllStitiile abOtll
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(il I)er('c']ll o[" our CXl)Orls, and ;lgri(tdlural l)r(_(hwls make u t) anolher 19 perce]U.*
l Tid_wlunalel}', other (omltrics of the world have recently been making unusually hea'_3*
invesllnents i_l rese_u(h s(_ Ih_ll iil_lnv high-lechil<)log_ ilems that were ,race solid American
ex|)¢wts are n¢_w I)e(¢nning common imporls. "li.levisi()n nets, steel ingots, precision oplics,
:rod :mlomol)iles are a ti'w ol_vious examples. Thus, the only way we can maintain a p_si-
live I),d_uwe (_t trade in to in(r(,_sc worker producfivily or to slav in the forefronl _t
,_(lvan(cd l('(hnolog, y. As will be sh(v, vt_ in the rem_fit_der of this report, space induslrial-
iz_fion o[t2qs us many possibilities for exercising both of these |roper(ant options.
In 1973, whel_ the OPEC oil carlel successfully raised lhe price of petroleum, il was
widely tk':ued thltt oth_'r {iwls _n(I minerals might also experience substantial pri(:c hikes.
So fa_; however, this has tlol (wcurred. Prices have remained reasonably stable because of
Ihe wi(lesl)rea(I distribution of most minerals, the tacit threat of sut)stilt_tions, and the
('((H_(nnies of large-scale mining operations, in many cases, howew, r, the quality of ore has
signilicanlly declined. In particular, the copper ores now being mined are not nearly as
rich _s Ihey once were. ,.ks Phillip Morrison pointed [5] [original placement of Figure 41
()ll| ill it r('f'(*lll Sriettce ,.Dne_'ican article, "I'he ancient miners I¢_oked _br sho_ T min(wals
with a copper co_)le])l of 15 percent. The grade has steadily declined; it wan 8 per(-e])t it_
Eur(q)e I)y Ilw lime of the Renaissance, and today m_st copper is won from low-grade ores,
the [ !.S. :werage grade bei_g a|)otlt [).65 percent."**
* Agri(ullural I)l',_dn_ Is arc. in _qlt'_ t. hiRh to( hnology items: ,ml fat in(']s use Ihc highcsl 1('_ hnoh_43
l:il nllili_ ili('li_()(ls i]) Ill(" '._I_l Id.
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The recent book The l.imil.s to (;rou,th provides an ahernate evaluati{m of the status {}f
the worhl's fitture mineral supplies. Figure 5, taken fiom this p{}pularizcd book, indicates
that at least eight crucial minerals will be exhausted within the next fifty years at the i}re -
sent rates of increased usage. The assumptions made in this study {m available reserves and
recovery technoh)gy have been seriously challenged, and the pr<}jecti<}ns are now widely
regarded 1)y most experls as needlessly pessimistic. For lhis reason and {}thers, the Rockwell
analysis learn does not believe that these minerals will actually be exhausted in the indicat-
ed time t}-ames. _rhen supplies begin I(} run sh{}r[, mankind will expend whatever energy
an(l exploration ellorls ale required to locate and {}l}tai,_ needed supplies. Substitutions will
also occur. Nevertheless, Figme 5 highlighlas a crucial problem: Ore kn{}wn mineral reserves
are not intinite; large new supplies will be needed 1}y timlre generations.
F{}rtunately, as is sht}wn {m the right-hand c{+htmn <}t Ihe chart, many tcdmi<lues arc
available ti}i+expanding our recoverable supplies. These include intensitied exph}itati{}n,
the extraction ot minerals li'{}m sea water, and the exph}itatitm of ocean-th}{)r reserves.
These lechniques could expand our mineral supplies t{} an essentially unlimited extent:
however, a careful study of the list will reveal Ihal each available lechnique requires larg-
er inputs of {'nerg_' than we are now expending. Thus, adequate energy' supplies are again
a key to a prosper{ms future ti)r/he Untied States mtd, indeed, ti}r all mankind. As we shall
see, space l{,chnoh)g)' can help ensure lha! the needed ener_' will be available through
{{}nservati{m and thr{}tlgh the prodtwti{}n <}f almndanl new supplies.
[61 Ioriginal t}lacement of Figure 51
In addition to their physi{al nee{Is, tlllIllall beings als{} have psych{}h}gical nee{Is.
These are t}asically similar fin pe{}ph" everywh{'re. We need to 1}e 1}r{}du{tive and ti'el use-
lift (i.e., t{} have aj{}b). We need an acceptabl{' standard {}f living IhaI illlprov{'s eacll year
and a quality of litt" compatil}h: with {mr individual heritage. We think the United Statics
InUSl I}lay the role of leader in this worl{Iwide enterprise. The key direction {}t Ibis lead-
ership should n{}t mcrely I}e g{}{}{l stewardship {}t what we ha',,e, 1}ut the c{}ntinued ere-
alton {}i wcahh ti}r ourselves and for the pt'ople Ihr{}ughotfl lhe rest {}f the world. In Ihe
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face of [:,<)F_uhtlion growth, a more.just and equitable dislril:,ution of scarcity is not enough.
For prolonged scarcity makes the future look bleak and disappointing tL, r the average
w<_tld cilizen. _%rllal in necessary, therelore, is new ways to create weahh--wt'ahh that will
make the wot-H a hvahhier, m(+rt, stable place to live.
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During tilt" cot]xse of this study, we attempted to look 50 years into the fimlre and col
rclale real human needs with space opportunities. Our work proceeded down lwo pmallel
l)aths. Along one palh, we looked into tile tiLture for meaningfitl trends in human needs;
and ah)ng the olher, we searched liwpractical and economically viable space opportuni-
ties. I, general, these opporttmities Call be broken down into lilt! following categories:
I. Services 3. Energy
• hi fOllllati()ll i IallSlllissioll • (]onselvalion
• l)ala acquisition * New energy sources
'2. Products 4. Human activities
• Organic • Space careers
• Inorganic • Frontier for mankind
,'ks we proceeded into the study, we fi)und thai is [nit] was easier (and more tim) to
Ihink up new space i)rqleClS thaH it was Io redtnce tilt" list down to a more mamtgeable
numl>er. We used tilt' ideas that have been advanced by NA.SA (Outlo<_k I_w Space), Ivan
Bekey at the Aerospace (;(_rl)oratioTI, and many many _thens. We also added many new
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i(h'as of our own. The overall lists :11¢' i)rcscntcd in Tat)h,s 1, _, :tnd ?;. h is not l)t)ssit)lc t<_
discuss each one individu_tlly ill any rt'asonal)lv sized report, but it is rcassllring It) <)bscrvc
their tilt" known tq)l)orttudties are quite iltllll('lOtlS. It is also cntt)uraghl<_ th;it flit'st Opl)or-
tun:ties rt'slltmd to l]lu ll_'t'fts of sank:lid to a nta.jor dcgrcc. This Sll_g('sls /hat Ill+_' Sl)_t(('
i)rograln should bc ct>nsith'red ;is ;i In_lillStl(';llll kl<.'liVit_' l',ttht'r th;lll ,t Ill,tilt'l" of lllillor
inlcrest, t)encfiting only a few peol_lc.
In the II('xl f[PW pm-agraphs, wc sh;lll 1)rit,llv discuss onc or two opportuldlics frotn
t'ach ot the fl)tlr majt>r catcg, tll+iCS: (1) st'trices, (_) products, (3) encrh_.', and (.t) hllnlall
activilies. ()nee this has t>ecn done, an inlcgr;itccl plan will l)c rt'vealcd, sllt_wing what wc
bclicvc to t>t" the proper evollltit>n Ik_r a relatively ambitious t)lll cnltircl_,' realistic i>rogr:un
<d Space ]ndustri,dizatit)n.
SERVICES
In ;t v('ry real sons(,, tilt" scrvices iuca of space industrialization is already a rt':ditv, t:t_r
st'vcral v(':.tl-S+space plattbrms havc bccn providing valuable ctmmlunic:ttion, navig_tli_)n,
<d)scrvatit>n, and wcat|lcr scrvices [or pcoplc wtwldwid(,. Some of thcse scrvices have bct'n
t'arnillg tt)nlfort;lt)l(, pr<)fils for ct)rl)orat(" sllart,htddt, rs. Toda.v colnnlunicatioll s,ltt-llitcs
art' ()wnt.(t ,In(| ol)('ral('(] I)v 111o1(" t]l_tll ,t doz('ll c(Itllltrics, ,111(1Illtll't" I]litll 10{1 havr." l]lt'ir
()wll[lltt'lsilt t_l'()llll(| t('llllill;I]S. "|'hi'st" It'l'll/ill:,lls II';tllSlllit lllt'SSilgt's ;tll(| (13.t,I I():tlld [)()Ill
such unlikelyplaces as Nigt'r,Bmlgladcsh, (;mllCrOtln,and French (;uian:l|sic|.
The utilization of satellite tcchnt)h)gv in thcsc prinfilivc h)catit)ns is t)as(,d <)tl silnl)h'
t'conondcs. The cost of the hardwar(' n('tt'SSal} _ to handh' ,t salt,lilt(, "¢<)icc tiJctlil (st'('
Figure G) has been d('clinillg hv a thct<lr t)f 100 cver.v 1_2+,'cars In 19(itL an Early Bird voicc
circuit cost Inort' lhiul S2(),00(J per year. 'l'o(l_lv Wt'Stal- provi(h's cqnixalcnl voict" circuits
for a tilth' t)vt'r $200. Mort,tlvt,r, largc-scah +Atllt'lln,l Farnls launched I)'+ tht' St)act' Shllttlc
lllitv SOt)If l)rill_ _I|)()tlt flll+th('F illlpOl'l;ltll cost r('dll('li()ns. I [,ll'(hV;ll(" illVt'StllIt']It ('t)sls ,ts
low ;IS $14 per circuit-year scenl ¢'ntir(']'+ within the realm t)| p<)ssil)ility. With costs at this
level, wc will begin It| see nunlcr_)us ucw applications ill +advanced conuntmic;ttitms.
181 (]onu)h'xily invcrsi<m . . . is <luit'tlv l_istcring ull<)thcr rcvtlhttion in our approach I<_
sp;ict, c<)inlnllnicatit)l+s. (h)nlph,xitx inxcrsion lcli,'lS to the conccpt of puttill_ ]ar_c ;ttl(l
c<mlplicatcd h;udwarc in space Stl t]litl tilt' units on the ground can llc sln;lll and sinlplc.
This l)hih)s<q>hy ('Olltl',tsts sh,uply with tilt" ,tl)proach th,tt was ad<)ptcd ill lilt' carlv days t)f
tilt' space i)rt)gl+am when t'vcr.v cffi)lt was Inadc Ill kct'p the Sl)aC<. scgnlcnt of tll_' svstcln
small and light. Ill order to dtl this, the Ct>lrcspt)nding ground s(:glll('nts had t<) bc Imts-
sivt' and colnl_h'x. For cxanlph', the +l'('lst:u + c_muntltdcalitm satcllitc weighed only 150
pot(ntis. This ctmlpact dr'sign hchl down I_ulll<h Costs and sinlplilh,d thc s_tlcllitc, l)tll as a
rcsuh, it could t'(.'l,lx high-qualit+v sig, ll;tls only bctwccn such nlassivc .gr_mnd installations as
th¢' 8.5-fi)<)t (;()It|sit)lit. ;intt'nna, which wt'ighs (it)0,<)00 pt)un<ts. Nunlt'r<_us olhtu t'x,tnll:,lt,s
C,Ul l)t' l_Itll(l in l)olh civilian and lllilitary l:,r<_gr,llns ill _:hich hug(" gr<)und antcnnas ,tlltl
lu,!i_)r c_>lnl)utct + installatit)ns l)ainstakin<R]_< pr_,ccsscd i,tw t[:ll,l tt_ t'xtr,l(+t uscl'ul inl_)rln,i-
lit>ll t]<_ln wcak ,tll(l dillusc signals ]-adi,ucd by slnall, colnp;lCt satellites.
|_('(-,ttlS(. ()f i-t'tt'llt atlvanccs ill spa(t, tcclmoh>gy and impl+t)vcd Ii;+lllSp()l+t,lli()ll (';lll;i-
I)ilitics, it is now l)t)ssil)h' to cltlar'gt, the orl)iliNg salcllitt,s and, ill IIlrll, shrink th(' glt)t,lltl
tlS('l st'is, hl particular, lll()(l('l'll t'It'clr<)ilic dcvict's ,llld Itltlhil)t'alll illlt('llllits illlt)v', r tilt'
sp;tc(' scgntcltl t_) bc vast b mort, c;tpahh' ,Ind t+omph'x, but still st:t_ withitl rcas<m,tl)h,
launch c<)st ]intitalit)ns--cspecially considt,ring tilt' launch ccononfics <d thc Space
Shutth'.
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Table I. Attractive Opportunities in the Services Area
Communications
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|_.l,_< till ( i" M('IiMII I'lllt'll D,
• { }il/nihl{'lal h)( ali{}ll
• I)lillili_ / Itihlill_ <>peration_ Ill{+Tlil<}l
{ ',t'l>tO al)hi{ Mal}pinl_
t ti I)ciii _lihili h_in ih'li_iB
Rv{ i(';lii<}n _ih' |}]_iiiliiii_
• 1 li_4h-il'_ohiih}n l'aith In,t})|)iii _ i;t{l_ii
• _%rihllall{I _+<,_{'llilit_l/ niapllhu4
• ( )11_lil,i¢" _,11 ill lliil" in_q}phll4
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Weather Data
• Atlnosp|lt'rit I_'lllpt'I;llult' pii_l]h' s_tlll(|_'l
• R;lill Inonil<)l
Ocean Data
• ()({,jill i'l)%Olll_ CN _lll(l d_Ilkkllli( S S_N{('It|
• M;IriIl{" t'llvil'tHInl('Ill ]ll()llilol
• ( Ill spill
• Shoit+iillt ' ill t%lll (Ill l_'llt lll<_llill_l
• Air,It" l)lOOtll lllt'+'IP_llll'llll'lll
• Salillc intl ttsil.t
Global Environment
• (;lat icr tnovt'HH'Ht
• ( )/<_ll(" la+r<q I('p]C+ll+*+hlllt"llt/pll)l('( tit)ll
• Ili_hx_;,'_ +l(+.+dx+ax t'itxii<)iHu_'llt impa_t
• Ra(|iatiC_tl htld_'l ol)_tq "¢ali()llS
Atm_sphcl i_ t ,Jtnp, Jsili,.i
l+_llt.l,%_p iiiiiilit()l. +,()lill I('ltt'stri;|] (+l)S<'l_+ill4)ll.
• l't't t,lllil l)l_llt" I_bM'txaliI_tl
Table 2. Attractive Opportunities
in the Products Area
()Ig;,tli_
• ] +( )/,+ lllt,++
• (h'nt'ti( cngi,]cc,i,+_ _>I h)b, id pla,,ts
• t'H_kilmsc
• ]nstllill
• Nt",'+ a;ltihi_tiI s _+ia +apid nxlltaliOll
lt_I_i g;ufit
• I+a,_t. <,..stals
• _tlpt'l [ill_t'+S(ill( ` illlt'_lilli'd ( il( flits
• ['lAIISp_|lt'llt t+xidc IIl_tlt'l'i;tls
• SIll lil( t' ;tl I lllSlJ( W;I_+t+ (h'; it t+s
• Nt+w glassc+. (i,I, hiding fit_'t .1>1, s)
• ['tlllgStt'II X-I;i'+ Kllgt'l Ill;llt'li;tl
• Ih+llo++ hall hca, ings
• ]ligh-tt'i+il)t'latUl_' llti|)iIw bl:l(h+s
• .'_'palalloll _)l l;ltli_)is,,t+_pt++
• Itigh strength [)t'r lit;lilt'lit II+.t_llt'ts
• Ma_tlcti¢ bubbh, ,nc,,t_,, + <_,,sial lihn
• lhi,, lih,l clc( ll()lli( ([t+'¢i( t+S
• I:il;tmt'nts l_+i hi_h-iIHcnsit', lamp,_
• ;_]lllllilllllIl lt'_tI| hl|)lit:lltJ¢l ;III<_'+P,
• ( _Ultii+g tools
• '_lit i<)sl)h<.i <.s
Table 3. Attractive Opportunities
in the Energy Area
] Alllt*l t_t
• Ni_,]II illtt+)lin;tti_>il I_,, ,,,ha,+ a,eas
• Night illttt]+in;Iti(>i_ I0] ;t_li( tllltllt" al+,] indtl_trial
l l])t+l ali<_llS
• Night illt+min;ttion I<+_ disamtt', ,<'llei +>p_',;,ti+ms
Solt+ll+l
• Nigh! host dama'd,t' [)]()lli(tl()ll
• 1,,_( al l]illlatt' lilaliiplIlati+)il
• RI'|]('( tt+d ]i_]It It_l }_l,ltlllI| t'lt', Iti, il_+ + llli'_Ul'sillli
• ()_t'_llltt'llw_llllill_l,_l(liltlAlll'(l,l_tl'(>l
• _*lillllllltlillll ,l| ])hi,ll)_yzltl]('_i_ I)IO( <'_ +`
( )lh('l
• Satcllilc p<_._'l ++'+++If'ill (s<)lill)
• l+'t_sil_n lit space
• Ntltlc;tt ++asl<" disp<+sal
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]lB'{'htllll'Hl ( ',()St P{'F
Salcllilc %_fi{c (:h{ 1Ill
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Document title: "Space Industrialization: An Overview," Final Report, Volume 1,
SAI-79di62-HU, Science Applications, Inc., April 15, 1978, pp. 1-5, 10-12, 15-17.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
?'hi,_ .study wa,_ similar to the RockweU study o[the same era (Document 111-21). It examined detailed
industrial sectm:s and the potential demand and revenues from sample ,space ventures. It also urged
the aero._pace industry to look at the possiln'lities of space industrialization. What Jbllows are excelpts
]ram sections 1, 3, and 4 and a fig'ure ]rom section 5,
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Space Industrialization
An Overview
15 April 1978
Final Report
Volume 1
I 1 } 1. SUMMARY
S1)ace Inttuslrializali(m (St) is tile mediunl I)y which services, energy and i)roducts are
relllrlle(t t'l'Olll sl)ace it) Earth to provide economic and ()lht`'r l)ragmatic bclleths to
Illallkilld. Alihough Ihis sllldy foct`lses Oil lilt." [)lliled _%lal('s as Ill(' llle('llalliSlll t(ll" bellel]l
generation and II';,lllSt_.:T (with an appropriate i)ayl)ack to its indusiry alld citizenry i0r
invesling res()ur(es and labor), it is tiw w()rhi lhat beneths, lndee(i, the undefdeveh)ped
and deveh)ping countries are now, and will continue I_) I)e, prinw i)eneliciaries from Space
in(iuslrialization. It is possible to ('OllStYIl('i credil)le steilalios which slc l) these nations into
lilt,' tWelltiel]l ccnltlry equivalent of ill(" U.S. ill less Ill,Ill 100 years, WilllOlll signil]calll h)cal
or gh)l)al ec()nomic t)r envirtmmental damage. The greal powef t()r wha! is considered
"good" ill tim western world (heahh, safety, knowledge, creative growth, elc.) aflorde(l hv
Spa(e Intiustfialization has i)een comprehended 1)y a very few, i)ui there is evidence that
realization is spreading, il is Ii()l)ed thai tilts (ioculnenl and lilis report, in ('()l}jun{'ii()ll wilh
tim companion report by Ro(kweli International, will assist in this realization, anti help
i)r()m()te early cxpansi()n of tile beneficial l't`'ttll'llS ()n tnunanity's investtnent in space.
The S:\l study (<)ntenlrated on the U.S. and wllal we may gain from lhe investing <)f
our res()urces, both public and private, in SI. Tile future was examined 1<) characterize
res()tuce pressures, requirenlents and supply (populalion, energy', materials, tood): als<),
tilt`" I)ackdt()p of prol)aille events, at|ill,des and trends againsl wtli(h Si will ev()lve were p()s-
tulated. 'I'tw ill)pOt|Ira|lies for space indt,slry tilat wouht bring |)t`'nt'tits to Earttl were cora-
l)ileal anti scrt'ene(l against ierreslrial alierllalives. }l()sl su,-vived, and a I)opulalion of Ihe
survivors were [sicl examined to determine if SI w()uld ever I)e "wt)riil lilt" inveslnlenl." A
ctuS()ly market survey was conducted ik)r the seh.cted services and [)rodu(ts provided I/_, r
Ihese initiatives and Ihe resuhs were astounding. Space [ndustrializalion is a billion d()llal-
a year |)Us|hess now; in ti/iriy years il could grow t)y tO0 limes tilai amolmt---_)] Illt)l'e!
121 But, Sl)aCe is exl)ensive. Might not Ihe ilrtesllllenl ouIwt'igl) tile gain? I)rogralllS of Sl
evt)luti<m c<)rresl)()nding to the postulaled future scenari<)s were deveh)ped, and tilt'
il)'cestlnetlts ('Ollll)aled t<) Ill(" re'cellllCS all(| tileir ass<)cialed helle[lls. Tile l/rogralll analy-
sis results Illought two ()l)servati<)ns: SI investments will t)e good investments and tile soon-
el itle iIFVeSIIllelII, Ill{" l)etlt`q +tot all c<)n(et+ned (in terms ()i tim pllle Inatiletnati(+s). il was
re(()gnized, h()wever, lhal (erlai]l ()lher t_wiors may (on|rill Ill{" practical rate ()f i)rogress.
These "other I_t('t{)rs" were exantined t<) lilt`" extent i)racti(al ill tilts study: a great deal
renllains I() I)c dolle. The Ibll<m_ing <)l)serxali()nls ale ill order, h()wevct; I)ased oil this
assessmeni.
( 1 ) Foreign compel|litre is I)ec()ming very slr()llg ill St. It ix no longer "()ur" (i(mlain and
these pressures will increase. Tilts may limit or spur [;.S. increased im;()lvemenl.
(2) The (h'veh)l)ing and underdeveh)l)ed ilalions of lile w()rld ma,; consider tilt" U.S.
and S[ a l]lrea! ()] a powerful lo()l t0r progress depending (mllow we l)](ml()le il.
(3) ih-()specis lot econ()mic returll lo lilt`' govefnnlent (]mblic settot) are excellent, st)
[Oll g lel'lll invesllllelllS sht)uld t)e.juslifiabh' A fi'w I)illion dollars im'ested in Ihe
eigillies will resuh ill hundreds ()f 1)ill|tins ill lax ]evellltes, millions of.j()bs created,
slI()I/_ e('()llOlllit" gl'l,)wIh ;lll(l _l.)od I)aiallce ()l trade illlpacls ill tWelll,V veals ()1 less.
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(4) Allhough .some U.S. industry will resist SI, a sir<rag .SUpF,ort ba_;e can be' Imih
amot_b_ U.S. privale enlerprise.
(5) In both domestic and intcrtmlional law there arc no legal entanglements which will
seriously inhibil SI devHopmenl, ifwe develop proper policies and sli¢k to lhcm!
(6) Although many P+ocial and political inslilulions will t)c atl'ecled I)y Sl, the sos1 si_-
nifi(mll ale Ihos(, im, lilulioas governing induslry :rod gov+.'rmnent relation.s and
those relating the IJ.S. to the rest of lhe world. Nolhing t)recludc_+ tnuluallv ben-
efi(ial _irl++in_t,l+it,llts ii] both of these arenas. I [istorically, such arrang,rm(.t)ts hay("
t_tk+.'ll sc'vcr_d vt',ll_ l(+ t,v{>Ivt,.
131 (7) +flw most iln]i_>rl_ttll _] iliiti+tti',,,t's would al_pea, to hax(' rather high itfiti.d ili',.'._.sl-
n>et+ts, +!rid payb_wk F,et+i<>d,+longcr than normal l<+r l)rivatc investlncnt. A mech-
anisln t_lt-reducin_ initi_tl risk and sh<ii+let'Jin_ thcst, i)aYtmck lin'lcs is t)ossil)l¢' and
will _ittl+l(t substantial industry mq)por! upon initiation.
Ttms, in stun, this study has concluded It+mr Space lndtlstriali].a!ion exists and is :.:,ul_-
sl_tnlial atld st|slaincd growlh is hiKhly desirable. From ,:x_tminatiotl of lh,r SI l)rogratns
_li+tt lhcir ch_Iractt'ristics thc l<>llowing tt'<:otnni<:tldations were dr.lv:n+
( I ) ,'_If<+)II_ iilduslf+v ilIv,+_+l'v{'Itl+'.'lll ill all area+ <st SI fiom plannin_ Io tlllilll_iI+' ol)+t'l_i-
tions is nec,t'sm,try Io l-(qtll-ll ti1_:iximuwi l)¢+l]t+(_l.+,;.
(2) A centl-al groul>, F,erhaps under the Adtnini_+,trator of NASA. ¢'_,pccially mskt'd to
plan, intcgr+tte and advocate SI ;++city!ties is needed badly Sitcll +i group, located
within the g ovt'rnt]i,.'llt, in_ly indeed be {,ss.<:tili+il if l>tiv+tl,.' c|itt.rl:,rime cart llt;,1111¢'('1
tiw challcn_e on its own.
(t+,) SF,aCe Im:lustries will need 25 to 75 KW of r_tw |)owcr in the t'arlv It> mid-ei_hti,:s,
l()() to 500 KW in lhc l+itltq- eighties and I-I0 MW in the early to nfid-nincties. A
Solar l+osvt'r Sat,rllitc [:,roi<>tyl3C dcvc]opnwllt [;,rog-r;im it) prove teclntical/<_+co-
no]ni_ l_',isil>ililv ;u>d envii+_>ntncnt_d acce|)labilily w<lithl [!arc sittli];u tlli]t'+.,l,!+li,.'s
.llltl char;i<Icristics. Space power need,,+ l_>r l)rodiwls h;ivc a similar l)r_igression,
wilh the l>t>ssil)ili!_ of a three to five year l_i_ it+ de,stud rHalive to other reqtmt'-
nwnts. A Sl)aCc l)(>w(w pr()gratn designed t() il+ttc'gt+at¢` ,uld synt'L+.+,i].e these require-
mt+nts should l){" initiated, begirnfing with d('vch)l>m('nl <)l th<: 25 KW Power
Module tqlt'l+t'litly p,-ol+Os<:d. The rc'<ltlil'i+lllt!tlts lof +i ¢'<)t'l+.'lll'l',t'lll large _,tl+ti,_'tiltt':,;
])rtD_t'_tn] im implicit it> the power progranl.
[4] (4) l'hc cost <)f SlmCC iransportatiot+_ to low Earth orbit tnust come+ down bclow shut-
tic [],r,_!icclions |)y z,i !;rotor of 10 to 10{) to really open the pr<iducts market ill the
!lit>olios. :I'll!+ Shuttle is the key, hut the lotlger ttq-m S[ reqitirenlents are ah+t'adx
+tl)l)+Uenl. [ll{'l'C+tSt+s in tlcxibility and decreas¢'s in cost are needed by high orl)il
<>lit'rail<ms in the kilter eigh!ics for both services m_d e,iergy initkllives.
I'r<_fmlsi<,n mid vehicle program.s !o nm,ul !hese needs should l:,e inlegrated inlo
flilill'l' ll'_ill,SiJoll_ilioil f)hinning.
(5) The I r..%. (l)r,)l>iil)l\ , through tht! NASA) silould Clllt)iti'k i>n till inli'llSivl" d_ll_l ,_ill]l-
<!rill 7 illltl |)Ltiliiili<_ i'f|ilrt during FY79, 80 iill{l _1 in l>_uallcl to initiation o[l'itlk:
l)r<!jccts _li(h >is 75 Kli_t ' [IOWCF Modul('. This (q]i>i-I w(itild culniilillll! in ii cllrt'ltillv
cooldili_llt'd, t'vOlillion_ily <_paec lndu_lri_llii_llion Plain witll d_liii_'_lic _iiid ililt.i-
li_tliOli;i] _is wl'll _ts _ovt'rlitiicnl _tild industiy scgililqits.
The _illovl' rt't+Ollilii_.'nd_ilions inlply only modest I)tid_t't COililniliil_nl_, ()v{?i thi, ilt'_l
lhr_'c vc_ii_ (It's_ lh_tn live niillion p_._r )'¢'_ii in studies _lild l)l_tilnin_ and less th_lii tifiy in>i-
lion l)l'r y{'ltl- ill liaidw_lr0 (Olnliiilnlcnts). Th_ budl_i rcquir/'nl_nis t_ll d_vcioptil_'lil _iil(i
ililillclil_,iii_lliOll of iliili;iliv__'s wilh _'iiily cliiect rctilriil (inid to Ltl_! eighties) plus Ioii_ le_td
i_'ctiilol<l_y dt,vt,l<ll)niciil I_>i Ihl' i/illl'tics lill_ _l |'ulldin_ peak of It's_; ill,lit fo/ir tlillion dof
l_ii_ _iliilii_il. '|'ti_il {osl Col>ill hi, sii_il'_,d ill v_ifioii_ w_iy,_ bl'lwt'_'ii NA,_/_, ol|i¢'f 14-ovt'filiil_'lll
;l_l'llCit's, |)riv_lle indil_try _iiid iillt'fn_tlioil_il (or t_lr0i<_il) Ol'_iilizltli_lll_,. "flit" Sl);/ce iech-
llol_l<_y ])_'culi_lr Iliildill_ rcqilii<!llll'iils _li-_.. Ii's_ ih_iil two I)illion ill lhl' t<lur I)illioll totlil.
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A great deal of work remains betore Space Industrialization enters tile main stream of
governnmnt and industry planning, and a proper public understanding is achieved. ¢x,
solid intormation base, a dedicated advocacy group and very hard work are t|le essential
ingredients to accomplishing these ol)jectives. The rewards will be wotth the elIort, and
attaining these goals will turn Space Industrialization inlo the mechanisnl tot achieving
the next plateau of hunlan development.
[5] The remainder <)f this docullt(_nl provides discussion in greater depth in the tasks of
tile study as outlined in the Sumnlary. Voltmms 2, 3 and 4 of this report contain Ihe in-
depth discussion and data ....
ll01 3. INI)USTRIAI, OPP()RTUNITIES IN SPA(;E
The eslablishment of future markets and a space industrialization program tot each
[uture scenario required a compilation of potential opportunities. These were estahlished
to a level of detail and breadth <)f application stdticient t() alh)w gross market stn+vey att¢l
l)reliminary progranl tormulalion.
The t)urpose of this compilatiotl was not It) create an exhaustive shopping list <)t
()l)povttmilies but rather to key in certain indicative possil)ilities within each industrial
activity i(lentified (Inti)rmation'Services, Enerk,_,, i)roducts, People). The goal was of st,t]i-
citrnt breadth to insure represensalive [sic] program tornndation and appropriate market
survey. The resuh of this is a conq)ilation of over 200 potential applications tor space relat-
ed goods alld services.
.+%sprtMously noted, the opportunities and their identitied repre_'ntative usage were c()ttt-
piled un(tev tour industry activity categories: hdi )vmatiotl Services, Energ W, Pro(htcts and l'e()plc
(in sl)ace ). Each of these categories was further st,1)divi(le(l into suh(alcgories ;is tollows.
lntormation Services
( :ommunications
()bservations
Navigation
l.ocation
Sensor Polling
Etlet_g._
Solar Power Satellite
Redirected Isolation
Nuclear Waste Disposal
Nuclear Power/Brt+eder Satellite
Power Relay
Products
Biologicals
Electronics
Electrical
SIlUCttn+al
Ptocess
Opticals
Tourism
Medical
Etnertainnmnt,/Art
Recreatioll
E(htcalion
Support
Illl 't. THE TERRESTRIAl+ AI3"ERNATIVI+'S
Thirty-two candidates tiw space utilization were compared to polential Earth based
ahevnatives. Comparisons were based on examining tilt" initial cost of installation on a litst
order basis atnd at cursory review of qttalitatiw, t,tctors such as ease of use, relialfilitv, tech-
noh_g3, requirenlents, etc. If costs and capability obtained appeared contparable b+:tween
the ahernatives, they were retaitmd for ftnlher study, hi certain instances the identified
space uses exhibited nntch lower cost lot + similar capability or the reverse. These were
identified as ch'arly viable candidates. Where cost and/or capal)ility were clea,lv superior
tin tilt" Earth ahevnative, the candidate was dropped tiom turther ((msideratioil.
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For live ot +tile thirty-two the terrestrial alternative was deemed clearly superior, seven
apF.eared m<)t+e lavoral)Ic acconq)lished lrotn space and lwcnty <-lel)ended too much on
specific (h'tails (too clone to call).
The gcticri( l{'ss<_ns ctflt+ninatc with the (oticltlsi<)n thai alternatives (|o exist, or can
be visualized for most space initiatives. "tiniqtt('t+ess" of Ihe space candidates detailed was
not deemed strong enottgh to warrant special consi(h'rati<)n in a competitive envir<m-
ment. Significant t(+chn<)h)gical "lead" for space Ol)ti()ns was t_mnd only in the area of
earth resources. And, in the case of c()mmtuiicati(ms, implementation may be tipped
already toward terrestrial <)pti<)ns. ltl concert with these argttmt't+ts it is c<mclttded lh+il
lli+li'kt't s<)ftiless, ill Icfilis ()fs)+stl'liiS requirt'lllelil_L I+CIIIOVC the (()nsll+3till| lhal terrestrial
ailCrilalive systeilis lliliSl dul)lic+tll' exacilv space l)rodiicIs and services.
The iln[)li(aliOliS <if lhc _l|)(ivc st_tlClllelltS _k,t's rise 1o ttlc f(flh)whlg ol)servltli<)ns Oll
lhe viatfility of ll'frCSll+lal +ih(trntiliVcs.
(1) (]Oliipiexily tlOlii di'lailcd ass(!ssni('nl of iilili-CO_+l i,m_;lies stit)staniially rcduct's lhc
Ol)l)<)rluiiily Io develop a 'kvhilihlg" mix <JSl)aCe (,Ileitis I)a,_!fl {)11 geiieralizt'd 1x, iletils,
(7) Ill licit of a llllinfllitc, Sl)aCi! viability llltlM |)C aggl't'ssivt_ly a(Iv()t:att'd/siudi/'d
agaiiisl coiill)(!iit<trs in ill(" mid 1980's.
1121 (3)The ctifrelil invl)ivi!incni (ltliii cxistiiig ill(|uslry will lypMill)' indicate which ahcr-
llHtiv(' w_iilld I)t, [{tV<)lCCt |)y it unless forced I)y (()lllpCIililin Ill challgc (lifccth)ns.
Ni'w i'illlil's ill aii iiidtlstlX will sciecl +i palh I);isl'd on invcsliilcnl and risk COli-
si<teratlons, Most Sl)aCl" iliilialivcs colisi(lt'r<_!d in ihis Sltldy will apt)car highly t{tv(ir-
al)le ovt'r lerrt'slt+ial aht'riiativt-s only aftcr sl('l)S toward risk rl'dticiion _tfc
iml)ll,llli'lill'd ....
115i
Projected Annual and Cumulative Revenue Potential for
Selected Information Services Initiatives
(1977 Dollars)
Potl'tHi+il Revell tleP+
(in Millions of Dollars)
Annilal (]umulative
(Peak) ( 1985-7010)
Information Services
P<}ck{!t Teleph< inl!
"l'(!ll!con I('re nci ng
National ltl|<irlll+llil)n Services
Electroilic Mail
1)isaslcr (]oiniiitinicati<ins _ei
Advancc(I TV Br(ia(h+asi
V(,hicle Inspection
(;hlt)al S(!lir('|l and Rcsctlc
Nilclc+ir Puel [+()c+t+I()rs
( )c(!+til Res(illlCe,_
"fransi)()rlatioil Services (l+]quipnlciH _al('s)
Rail Allii-(i()llision +yst('in
Pcrsonal Navig_llion _cls (F+quil)nii'nl <_ales)
\"(_]licl('/Pa(kag(" [ ,(ic:;tl(ll
V(liinglP(illhig Wrisl Sol
20,000 i 00,00(l
9,000 {.t0,000
6,0()0 40,000
9,001) 90,000
30 500
2,000 8,000
300 4,000
50 30O
3 40
2 5O
7O 400
,1(} 6OO
1(}(} ,t00
300 5,000
4O 2OO
-$47B/Year -$340 Billion
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Projected Annual and Cumulative Revenue Potential for
Selected Energy Initiatives
(1977 Dollars)
P{>lenlia] Revenu{'s
(in Millions of Dollars)
Annual { Mmulative
(Peak) (1985-2010)
Energy
Solar l'owcr Satellite (First SAT in 1996)
49 5(;W at 27 MII_S/KWtl 50,00{i
60 10(;W al 11.5 MII,S/KWtt >7.1 MII,S/KWtl B0,000
60 10(;W at 27 MII.S/KWH 100,000
Url}an Nighl Illuminatltr 20(1
Nuclear Waste Disposal 1,00(t
1i61
-30-$100B
Projected Annual and Cumulative Revenue Potential for
Selected Products
( 1977 Dollars)
300,0(}0
20(L000
(_(I(LO00
2,0{10
3,0(}0
-$200-$600B
Products
l}ritgs and l'harnlatcuticals
Eh'ctronics
Scnlicon{hlclill-S
Eh'ctrical
M;ignt'l_,
Stlpel'{Olld/ICI/}I" (gCllCl';tlillg <}11])_)
()piMtl
Pil){,r (}plies
Special Metals
Pcrishai)h" (2ullin_ Tools
l/{';irings iiiid Bu._llin_s
Jewelry
Polcnti;l] Rcvcllltcs
(ill Millions ofl)ollarsl
Anllil;tl (]iiliiUialivc
(l'cak) (1985-701 O)
600 73)00
2,000 20,000
300 4,0(}0
_,{)(}0 9(},(}()0
80 800
80() 8,0()(i
900 2,00(i
I(}() 2,(}0{}
-$6B/Year -$64 Billion
F2XPI,{)RIN(; IIIF ([NKN{BAN ,_33
People
Si}ace Tourism
Space th>I{'l
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Projected Annual and Cumulative Revenue Potential for
Selected People Initiatives
(1977 Dollars)
I'{}tcndal R{'v{:iI II{_s
{ill Millions {}t"Dollars)
Annual ( _unmlalive
(Peak) ( 1985-2010)
5{}' 900
50 600
-$100M/Year -$1.5 Billion
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Document 111-23
Document title: "Feasibility of Commercial Space Manufacturing: Production of
Pharmaceuticals," Final Report, Volume 1, Executive Summary, MDC E2104, McDonnell
Douglas Astronautics Company, St. Louis Division, Contract NAS8-31353, November 9,
1978, pp. 1-3, 26-30.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Thi._ is another one of the series restudies conducted in the late 1970.sfl_r the MarshaU Space Flight
Cent_ In the 1980s, MeDonnell-l)ouglas teamed with.Johnson and.Johnson to experiment wi_h an
improved electrophoresis instrument that could make new druL_ in microKravi(v aboard the Space
Shuttle. Although the program was publicized as a privately fixnded e+ffort, the g_e._is _" the projec!
can be traced bach to the early support that NASA gave the company m looking at all a.q_ect.s (teeh-
nol%6cal, economiG and so on) _space industrialization.
9 November 1978
Feasibility of Commercial Space Manufacturing
Production of Pharmaceuticals
Final Report
Volume 1
Executive Summary
Ill 1.0 INTR()I)U(;TI()N
The environment of space holds great promise ti)r new manut_tcturing processes
which take adwmtage of the al)sencc of such carlhl)ound phenomena as natural convcc-
lion and sedimentation. Using these processes, space tnanuthcttu-ers can not only produce
products superior to those produced on the ground, they can prodtlcc entirely new class-
es of products. Though characteristics of space--including high vacuum and radiation--
can be duplicated on earth, the most imt)ortant characteristic, weightlessness, can be
achieved only for an extremely brief period. In the microgravity of space, molten materi-
als can be suspended without conlainers----eliminating a major somcc of contaminanls.
More importantly, in space we can escape gravity-induced convection. (;onvection cur-
rents--which are caused by the thermal gradients in thfids--can lead 1o undesirable slrm-
tural diftiwences in the solid materials produced. I taving escaped the woblcms posed by
these erarents, space manufacturers will be able to grow crystals of great purity with high-
ly controllable characteristics; they will find it much easier to mix and homogenize liquids,
to cast metals, and to separate and ptuiI}' the elements of mixtures.
The question immediately arises, why is not industry actively purszLing opportunities
to develop materials and processes in space? The tirst reason is that industry is not gen-
erally familiar with the potentials of space. NASA and key aerospace organizations are
working <ontintmlly to rcctif}' that sittmtion. The second, and by Ira- the dominant, reason
is thal observation of basic phenomena wilh potential application is truly the slarl t>t the
industrial process. A major body of data on applied research into processes and nmtcrials
chmacteristics, material applications potenlial, potential markets and their pr<)bable
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growth, and the characteristics of production systems and logistics must be developed as
a vital decision base. Before private industry will invest the money required to begin such
nntried processes, it must I)e reasonably conli(lent 111;tl the product will have a high value,
that the benelits of pr(_ccssing in space will t)e substantially greater than processing on the
ground (i.e., capable of producing less expensive, more useful pr()ducts, or producing
products that cannot be made ¢)n carth). The invest(>r must also be reasonably toni]dent:
that the space process can he deveh)pcd in a given lime all art affordable cost; that a mar-
ket exists at a price which assures a reas<)nable return on investment; an(! that this market
will [2] not disappear because a new product appears and captures the market, or hccausc
a breakthrongh in the technolo_' occurs that pcrnlits competitive ground production.
Because these risks are so diflicnh to assess, and because the required initial invest-
mcnt is so large, mosl industries a<lopt a "wait and set'" attitude. Until more data are avail-
ahlc, industries find it extremely <lifficuh to assess tile potential of new processes and
products.
To address this prol)lem, we approached NASA with a proposal tO study the feasibility
<>tcommercial manutacmring of pharmaceuticals. The goal of this undertaking was to
induce pharmaceutical firms to participate actively, <m a continuing basis, in exploring the
possibilities of using the unique environment of space to produce new pr<)ducts. The
MI)A(;-St. l.<)uis' approach was, first, to secure the initial c()mmitment of thcsc firms by pro-
vi<ting key managenlent and lechnical executives with preliminary data and forecasts of the
business and technical potential of space processing. The second asl)ect of the approach
wits to tbstcr the initial connnitnlents by establishing continuing technical and management
cx<hanges with the interested pharmaceutical companies to ore mntual benefit.
()ur cnthusiasm t_>r space processing focused on the pronlise shown by otu company
timded eltorts with electrophoresis. In order to accomplish Ihe facets of this goal we had
to expand lhe dala base we had deveh)ped--including significant lal)oratory work and an
awareness of the state-ot:the-art--and we had to target c()mpanies potentially interested ill
the bcnelits of the process.
In our early company tlmded work with electrophmesis, we learned how to separate
relatively large qtlanlities of test materials. We also experienced the adverse effects of grav-
ity on flw process--causing the vertically flowing stream to collapse on ilself (if |he Sillll-
ph' were denscr than the carrier tluid) or to ball up and tloat to the top of the chamber
(if the samph' is less dense than Ihe carrier fluid). On the basis of these experiences we
t)egan developing, with MI)AC-St. Louis fimds, our own mathematical models of these
ell_.cts so that we could predict effects of design changes and operating conditions, and
tdtimately [i)re(ast the benctits of operating in space. We also ran company ftmded pre-
liminary mass balance calculations; these activities assured us that we could define [?;] and
denl¢mstrate the types of requirements needed to characterize conceptual space and
ground pr<)duction systems, with their requisite logistics capabilities, in presentations to
NASA and industry.
tinder Ihc c(mtract, we addressed the problem of targeting pharnlaceutital compa-
nies. ()m tirst step was to engage the services of Price Waterhouse and Coral)any to pro-
vide important drug industry data. The overall drug industry analysis provided by Price
Waterhouse included: detailed assessments of the top twenty companies in the industry,
t_)cusing on their apparent cmnmitment to innovation, their research and production
emphasis on products having high potential for space production, and the prominence of
their executives. Price Waterhouse ais0 helped us prepare the presentation to be made to
these companies, recommending a "businessman to businessman" approach.
l,etterswere written to the selected companies. These letters gave an overview of the
li'asibitity study, listed some of the potential benclits to pharmaceutical manuthctnring I)y
processing in space, and requested an ()ppc_rttmity to make a presentation. Ten of four-
teen companies requested the presentation.
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Although tile pllarmaceutical tompany personnel were generally skeptical at first,
once they understood tile benefits of microgravity, the inlplications of the preliminary
resuhs of continuous flow electrophoretic separation, and lilt, polenlial of an integrated
space pharmaceutical production system manufacturing producls of greal value, they
became inc,easingly intrigued. :ks a result of these initial contacts, six companies respond-
ed positively to our invitation for assistance and cooperation in this sludy. Two companies
agreed to participale actiwly in lhe form of laboratory testing a prt)du(! of specific inler-
esl to themselves. Four addith)nal companies agreed to participate in a more passive mode
by suggesting products, providing mm-keting inti)rmation and reviewing lilt! analysis of
resuhs. One of lhe condilions tot their participalion, howevm, was that the companies not
be linked with any potential product or pr<)cess dala because of the highly competilive
nature of the industry. V(ith NASA ('otlcurt+en(( ', theretore, and participating company
approval, we have deleted the munes of any company associated with this stttdy and,
instead, emphasized tilt" important product and process ilflormation obtained from them.
This report describes our melhod of obtaining pharnmcettlical company involve-
ment, the development of protocols with two of these companies, laboratory resuhs of Ihe
separation otserunl proteins by tile continuotls flow electrol)horcsis process, tile selection
and study of candidate prodtlClS, and their producti<m requirements. Front lilt, twelvt"
candidate products discussed wilh, or suggested by, the visited ])harmaceutical companies,
six were selected tbr fl.trthct evaluation: antihcmophilic t,u'lot, bela cells, erythrol)<fietin,
epidermal growth factor, alpha-l-anlitryl.+sin and intcrferon. Production mass I)ahmces [or
an!ihemophilic |:actor, bela cells, an<t erythropoiclin were compared tot space versus
ground operation. Selection of the best mode of operation tor these Ihrec rcpresenlativc
products permitted a conceptual description of a muhiproduc! processing system tbr
space operation. Production requirements for epidermal gl'owlh |kl(lor, alpha-l-
anlilrypsin and interferon were tk)und to be satislied by tile system concept.
In the technical interchanges that occurred with these pharmaceutical c<,ml)anit,s,
significant data were generated and many valuitble lessons were learned. These data and
less<ms, detailed in this repor!, are intended to serve others interested in exploring the
possibilities of space processing ....
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l)uring this study a nmnt)er of lessons have been h'arned abou! oblaining and toster-
ing connnercial producer participation in studies of space processing. These should be
givcn due consideration in [ormula!ing plans fin future studies oF this nature. They are
|)resenled here in brief, and MDAC-St. l,ouis rccomnlends tllat they be adopted as eh'-
merits in the NASA model tier cxph_ring other market sectors considered tin lhc com-
mercialization of space.
The key to involving industry in Sl)aCe l/rOccssing is to establish a tully I)usiness-likc
tooling tot their participati<m. In most cases, the producer industry is relalively tmlamil-
Jar with the space environmt.mt, operations in space and the rt+qttilenlt'nls and techniques
of designing and integrating systems hardwm+e lo tm flown in space missions, l)ealing
directly with NASA would involve them in a new form of governmenlal intert_tce to which
they are tlOl accustomed.
By establishing a bttffer leant between itself and the industry wilh which it desires Io
ImiM participalory agreelncnts, NASA can establish fiR+ bttsinessman-t<>-business,nan rela-
tionship st) essential to nurturing c<)mmercial enterl)rise in space. The aerospacc compa-
ny chosen tor the butti,r team should have established a COml)Ctcnce in dealing wiflt the
particuhu process NASA wishes to advance its a candidate tiw production operations in
space. Moreover; the COmlmny shottld have nlade a significant (olnntittllenl c, it its own, in
tt'rms of fltn(Is an(t manl)ower, to lilt' deveh)pnlent of that ])ro(ess I)elore N,.\SA chooses
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lh;ll |]rm to scr+,,c <_I] lit+.' l>uFlbr to+tail. Tlit+ bttll_'r tt+_un _+It_ittl+l also hlcltuJt + all ind¢'l>¢'H-
dr+Hi l>ttsili,.,ss analysis firm spccializirlg ill the |:,+uticular illduslry to bc _q>l>r<m_l|_'d. Tht,
right l)tisiti¢+ns +malyP+is firm not oi+ly kn<:,vP+ the it|dttstries of interest, bttl is l+_tmili+tr with
Ih¢' l)at+lictilar ('l/+`'ilOllllll'lll ill which the l]i<)diiccrs ol)¢'r+itc. II has acct',_s to t>ltsines,_ doc-
tllllclil+tliOll lt,._<)tll(+('_, I)(,yond tht' ;tcl+<l,_l>;tc( • ]lorizolt; arid, nlo+t ilill)<ll-l;inlI.V, ,_tl(h it 1i1-1il
will kll<)W kl_V lll+ln+l_(_lll('lll alld ll'ClilliCa] |)Cl'_Olltlt'l lit lilt',_;t " COllipalliC,_ l)]tl+ lilt" COITC('I
I)il+ilit+',_+ I)+t+iS on which Io _il>i>roacii lhctn.
'[tit! catididatl" [)l<lthlci'r iirlnP+ idlqllillt'd t))' lh_" |)iiff¢'r It!am _+]lotlld l>t' mlbjc+ctcd to it
]lctit.lralili_ I)llSilil,+s ;lll;ilx'si_+ by lht! bil,_hlt'+_; (on_lillalll liit.lnb(.r o| the It'alii. Ttiis +lll+ll)-
sis ntloiild itlchldt! _ilih t{lllol_ +t_i: Ill<' t}iiii's illiiiila] sa]¢'s alld _i+o+::th; [<_7] lht' size! of tht"
('_llill>;ili)'_ lilt + lit!+,+,' pi+o(itlCl,'+ it has iii+irk.ctcd; lht" I¢'iiili(" <)i tht" tiriil'+ _,tqlior of liter<s; lilt"
siirl>lils ftllldn ;tv+iilal)lc t_ll ili+`'l'_+lliit'nl; lilt" +izt! of lht! Iilili'_, R_|) I)lid/.f,/'l; +ili(l lilt" idt!llli-
tiat>h, COll_;Ir;lilils till lilt" Ili'lll'_, _i'owlh. In addiliOll, lilcrc will t>¢' t]lclor,_ i-C(liiirili _ cvahla-
li<lli +`+`llich +lil' l>t'tuliar to lht! ,_t)_'citl_ (:]a++ of ilidu+lr)' I)t!ill_ ai)l)r</aclit!d+
[tliVill_ iliad<<' ('Olll+l('l witll lilt" (l)lil|XtlliC+ bV itlll+odltctorv ]clli!t +, t_ll]ow-II t) lt'lt'iilloiit"
ialls sh<>illd ;ll-l-al/_(" I<ti + a I_)riiial ])rcscnialioli al lhc ]>rodiict'i"+ <lxvn tTicililV+ Alit'i/'stal)-
Iistiill_ a (ltl_rt.t! of r+ii>t>ort wilh iht'ir I)tisint'._s oi it'chlliCal illalia_Plllt'ill, ll'it" I>rt'st'lllhib_>
(<ltill)_lllV shotlld l+li]<)i- I!a(:h [)l('+t'lll_ition to t]lP inlt'l+tl._,t_+; of I|lt' kt'v t)t'ot)lc in t'a(h I)ro-
(lli(l'i c<liiil)all)'+ i,t'+, Ill(" (oil)oral<! (Icci._;ion inakt!i+ _in(| s¢,nior 10chilic+ll ])('r+oiin('l.
]_!l+_Oliil(.] lilakitil_ lilt. I>rt,,_t.nlali<)n <_liOtll(l t)t, liioroil_til), [{ilililiari/t'd wilh lilt' s('_-
lilt'ill ol iil(histi.v ihcv will I)_' x, iSilinl4-; at ]t'aP+l (lilt, ilit!lill)_.'l + stiotlid ]tart' crt.dilih, c×[)¢'ii-
t!ii(l' ill Ih_il l)l<)dti(t!i in(hi_;Ir+v. All int'lnbt'r, _, _;hotiid I)l! l)rt'i)alt'(t Io +l>¢,ak lilt" v(l(_ll)tilai)'
distilicl it> that iil<l_i,stiilil []cld llt+(-n(it!aV<)l +, The ])rcscnlor,_ l,+ic] ,_)iotiid bt" a +v,_lclli+ It'alii
that is (ai>at)lc <if" ad(li'l',_+iil_ all antil'(:i,_ of ,_l)aCt! ])io(:t_ssh_ to lll_+ +iu(lii'iic/:s salisl_iclion.
Not <_illv lilti+l I|l_')' tit! kiio,,vtc(l_cat)lc in the alt'a of l)l+o(hicl,_ +ili(l t)ioct_._st'+, 1)ui +ll_<l []liliil-
iai with si>a((' Ili_hl sV_;lt'ilis ;in(l how dav-to-da), aclivitit',_ ill si)_lct" at-(" carlit'(l <till. "]]lcv
iililP+l I)l! ihoroul4hly t>rc|>_trc(t, a,_ well, to tli,_cu+._ rt'_,otiicc It!(ltlilt'illOlllS, ((>P+l+ and niall-
i)ow_'r, alld +chl'dilh's. lilcllisi+ln of a Iitt+ ,_ci_+llct+,_ ._pccialist ill lht" Itlalil is hit4h] ) (tcsiral)lt"
+_ Ihal (lllt'+liOll+ on ill;iil'_+ C<tlllril)liliOll+ and iCCltlil+t'llll'lll,'+ ill +])a(t" can l)(" an+w('il'(I.
lht+ ])rl',_t'tltalioil ai)l)l<lach shotiid rt'tlccl lht' lill+iiit's+iiiatl-lo-titi+_hit'+siilan i+t'laliOli -
shi 1> (h'+_irl'(I 1)l,lwt,l!ll lht + liiitt{'i ll'alil lind lh_" lllaliUl]t(lUlili_ ]irlii. li iililSl i-olh'(l th_tl
iii/hl+liX' in l)iolii oi-it'iil_'d rlitht'r Ihaii ki+owlt+tt_" oiit.nt(,tl; it+st,alth liitlSt ulliiti+il(!l), lt'ad
I<l iliCl-i'a_/'(I (<lll)<>ral_' l)r<)til. It)' ._t'h'clili_ i)rochlcl,_ of [)arlictll+tr ililt,rcsl to that COlii])ail.v
ali(l i)rcst!liliii_ rt'lt'v+tnl ili+tikt+l and IlilSill#S+ |'Olt'e_ist+, a l>iotlt [)ol¢'iilial (+ill I)<" dt'ili(ill-
+Iratl'(l iti +i way Io t'll_a_c both tht" l+(hnic_l] _ind ill+in,tilt+lilt+ill alleillion o| +lilt" _tu(li_'llCl',
Usitil4 a cons(qvalivt, al)|)roacll in lh( + prt+st,ntalion, especially wilh l('ctinical and |)tisiill,+,_
v;thlt'n tTiilii]i+ir Io thc ati(lil'iic(!, wilt t4ive hldividual,+ an _×ccll_'nt challCl' Ii) conlritlllll+ to
lhc discll_siotl,_ aild l<l rl'aliz_ thai thigh c×p_ri¢-nc_ ailed llaiticil)ation wotlld _,rl_ail)'
i!iiliallll' ih_! I)rol_l+alli.
I_l In ilii_ _ilualion, iht' l)rt',_¢ntation appro_lch _holild refl_'ct thai _l .ioinl Woi+kitl_
arl_ili__'liil!iil I)l,l,+_'l,l,ii ihl_ vi_hcd COill])any and lille a_il)_p;tcl_ indu,_lr)' would t)/" illiltil_il-
Iv bcilvti<iltl, ii_ili_ Ihl' _lr_'i+l_,lh,_ <ll <!ach parint'r io achieve" n_w _oal,_. It liiiiSl COllX'<:v thc
alliliidl': "_i+t'_• al(" d_'t'f>lv involvt'd alid would like you to ioin il_" r_llh('i" ihaii ++_)li t_'ll tl_
whal wt' caii do |ilr .VOtl ill ,_[)_itl'." It the pi0_0iltalioi+l ft+altiic._ workin_ llal+dx+,_il+t ', llialht'-
iilalilal ;iil_ll+x, P+t,,_ ;tnd HIodt'ls, _i,_ well _i,_ |)relillliil_ii+)' i>roducl (l_it_l with Ihl'ir rolai_d lliarkt'l
;iilfl iisk _lii;il,x'_l'_+, Ihl' atidit'ii(t" will tt_cl that the ]91t'_;t'lltt_i_ ]lavt! _i $1i()ll_ (tlit>oralt_ iiivt,_l-
lilt'ill iii ltl_' I:oilccl)l, bot]l thl_ln¢iall)' and in t_rin_ o| +nl_nliour_ o| ct]ilrt.
I)itrin_ lhl- f>i+l',_cnl_ition, iht" gul-._iion i,_ inv+lriabl)" _i<_ked of the l)rt'st'iil_)r bicl, "qiVh)'
shotild wc lll;tlltlt{it'ltlrt'l_; t)t" inlt'rcst_d ill _pac+<" ]:lroc_s_ingT" Pl;tcint4 ;I 14<lod rt+a,%Oll [tll-
l]l_'ir ililt'rt'$1 t'arl+x' ill lhc l>rl'_;t'ili_ttioi] C_lll t<lr_._i_l]l Ih_" iil(]tiirv. 'lilt" il'_t_<)ll i;-ili t,asily t>t"
d_'vt'hll>_'d I)+v idl'illit_:ili_ fill" vi,_itt'd cl)lli[>_ili)' with _l t'_liidid;ill" ])l'_>diicl i]lai ]las Ihl! I)<)ll'i+l -
lia] ot lll'ilil_ ]>i'd)dill'i'd ill _[>_ic_' ;llid thai ab;o COllll)]l'lilt'lils l|ll'ir alr<'adv I'xi_;iili_ ])r_lducl
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lille. We |lave tolmd it is also essential to indicate very early in our presentations that the
products discussed are of the vcry low vohmle-very high valuc typc. Many of the propri-
etary pharnlaceutical companies think in terms of large volume-low cost products which
are not applicahle ill tile space operations we visualize.
Results of the presentations will develop relatively slowly. The companies visited wilt
take time to digest what is presented and investigate the claims made. Experience in this
study has shown that this phase will lake ahout three months. If results of tile initial inves-
tigation are favorable, the company will present the concept to their corporate manage-
meat. This second phase usually will take two more months. The tornlal development of
participating doctunentation (e.g., protocols, agreements, etc.) and approval of hudgets
will ordinarily consume an additional six to twelve nlonths. All during this time, routine
contact hetween the two conlpanies shottld he maintained with pertinent management
and technological data exchange by hoth sides as required.
l)uring this period, it is extremely important not to exploit die manufacturing
conlpany ilailleS or the products they have lmder consideration. If Sllch intormation
[29] becanle generally known without the consent of the candidate participant, coopera-
tion would prohably be terminated. The privacy of a manufacturing company considering
participation mllst be respected until the lirnl decides to announce puhlicly, |or itself, its
illtellt to participate in the exploration of space applications.
A data hase concerning a potentially prolitahle candidate product nlust be developed
upon which a lechnolog), interchange can he estahlished hetween the interliacing colnpa-
ny and tile candidate prodttcing company. Cooperative laboratory activities are essential
tools in building the required data base. hi this way MI)AC-St. l,ouis established a tech-
nolo_, interchange with tile participating pharnlaceutical conlpanies. This, ill turn, we
believe, has enhanced tile level of interest ()f these conlpanies in Ill(" potential offered b)
processing pharnlaceuticals in space.
Many potential products can he proposed t_w space processing hy reviewing tilt' liter-
ature atnd discussing the subject with prolk'ssionals ill tilt: field of interest. Many of the sti R-
gestions may be of interest scientifically for their own sake hut will have little chance of
he|rig ral)idly adopted by the workers ill that tield if they offer no suhstantial inlprovelnenl
over existing nlaterials. If tile conlpanies do not see a significant return on their invest-
lnel/t ill research and developnlent of a product they will igllore that product.
l)evelopment of nlarket data on products important to candidate participating firnls
is a key to securing their interest. A search of tile literature, supplemented hv COllslllta-
lions with clinical authorities will provide tilt" inf+ormation necessary to develop a picture
of the ctlrrellt nlarket open lot tile model products. Reasonahle ass|iltlptioils, hased on
the guidance of clinical research teanls, will yield use market projections for advanced
clinical uses. Finall B appropriate husiness risk analysis should be employed to assess the
nlarket risks tiw processes and products ,ts they lnove tiom initial R&I) conltnilnRml
through ground and flight experinlentalion to achieve stucesstul flight production
demonstrations. By o|tk+ring these preliminary analyses to prospective participators, nluch
useful data can he obtained during tile presentation itself. Most inlt)ortanl, the potential
participating firms will he assured that tile presentor [sic] has a business understanding
and an investnlent attitude appropriate for cooperative endeav<ws tor their nlutual henetit.
[3{)1 A hardware system that is capahle of producing a variety of products with ()ill}' minor
operational changes, e.g., instrlmlent settings and chemical substrates, wottld ofti'r sign|t-
it+ant operational logistics and cost advantages to a producer. Using conservative assUllll)-
tions based on data flom the litcrature, teml)ered by laboratory experience, tilt'
requirements for such a systenl can be developed and its significant operating character-
|sties can he defined. This was the approach used hy MDAC-St. lxmis to detine a system
|ilr processing pharnlaceuticals ill space. All of the" twelve biological products reviewed in
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thisstudycouldexercisethesystemill parl, or ill its entirety, thus supporting the concept
of a true mulliprodtwt system.
While this study was done to assess the commercial feasil)ility of mantffacturing phar-
lllacellli(al products ill space, it SOlyes as a nlodc] for those who wish Io consider other
processes or l)ro(lllclS ill the Sit.lllC elIvirt)nmellt. The rise of the mass balance analytical
concept tortes a delineation of what must be accomplished in the process fi)r each prod-
uct in a stel)wisc thshion. The calculated quantities t)t malcrials at each step will quickly
delermint_ if lhe proct,ss is feasible with currenl lechnolog)/, where tilt- areas of informa-
lion must 1)e ol)lailled It) rill ill Ihe gaps, and anticipated recurring transportation costs it)
hatfl Ihe material Io and fiom space. %rhile it does not detine lhe l()la] COSt Of the system,
il riot's give lilt" prospeclive mamd_wlurcr and NASA a general idea of the size, power and
weight t)fthe processing equipnlent as well as the exlenl and type of storage requirements.
The lenglh ot lhe missions will be defined Io fie!elmille ecollOlllic ti_asibility. This will
have to be i_llerwovetl with lhe NASA program and schedules to tie!ermine if, and when,
a vehi('h' Cal)at)ilily will 1)e availal)le to support such a manu|:acluring far'lilly, l.egal anti
regulalory consi(tcrations will also have to be (letine(I.
Retommelltlali(_ns fi)r fiHurc work arc presented .... It is reeomnlended that drug
lirm itlvolvemcnl be continued and encouraged I)olh ill grt)ulld research and product
evaluation. Because el companies' sensitivity about governnwnt interference and disch)-
sllle of trade st'ere!s, each company should be dealt with on an individual basis with st)me
t)lher privale firm serving as a I)uffer or interthce I)elwee]l Ihe individual companies and
the governmenl, t leavier involvemcnl through evolulionary processes will prot)ably lead
tt) direc! i)arlieil)ation ill space aclivifies. Such parlicipation will logically require a user
dcvelol)menl laboratory tbr these companies' product dcvelopnwnts.
Document 111-24
Document title: James Beggs, Administrator, NASA, to William Clark, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, August 26, 1983, with attached: John 17. Yardley,
President, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, to James Beggs, Administrator,
NASA, August 23, 1983.
Source: Ronald W. Reagan Library, Sima, California.
Alter a_t AugTtst _, 1983, meeting with President Ronald Reagan, .John Yardl_, the president oJ
McDonnell Douglas A _tronautics Company, offered to be the first commercial user era NASA space
station. In the inte_4m, be[bre the station became operational, Yardley propowd manufacturing t_
u_ing./ieeT[(ving ._pacecra[l. 77re tmsiness plan revoh_ed around the successful re._ults of expe_iment_
in drug, production aboard the Space Shuttle.
August 26, 1983
Honorable William (]lark
Assistant It) the President fill
National Security Affairs
The While tlouse
Washington, I).C. 20506
l)ear Bill:
I .iusl received the Ihandwritten underlining] enclosed letter from John Yardley of
Mcl)onrwll Douglas. ["This is our" crossed out by hand and rtq)l;wed by h:,tndwrilten "re:
.'_40 SPA(;F, AS AN INVESTMENT IN E(:< )N( )MI( ; ( ;R( )Wll I
l|l('"] [handwriiirn underlining] tirst t_)rnial induswial conlnlilnlcnt to use Space Station
commercially. 1 am confident lllrrr will 1)r many more (ommilill('nls of this kind as wr
move inlo l)]anning and iml)lemcnling a Space Slation.
With best l)¢'rsonal regards.
Sincerely,
I}mnd-si_nrd: 'i_im"J
.James M. Beggs
A(llllillisl t'_llof
Ihan(Iwrittrn note: "Mcl)onnell will go furlhrr than this it asked. They also would makr
this public if we dcsirr R." hand-inilialrd: "B"]
CC:
(;ommrr(c - Mr. Baldridgc
CIA - Mr. Cas('y
23 August 1983
Mr. Jam(,s M. Bcggs
A(hninistralor
NASA
4th and Maryla.n(t Avrnncs, S.W.
Washington, 1).(;. 20546
l)earJim:
Aftcr participating in the recent White l l()usr rattling on ((_mm('rcial space a(livity.
I lh()ughl it al)prol)ri_llc to rrvirw th(' Mcl)()mwll 1)()uglas Elc(lrophorcsis ()l)crali(_ns in
St)ace (E()S) lh+ogram rrlativr to Ihe potential (trvch_pmenl of a man-hal)ited Isi('l Sl)aCC
stalion try NASA.
,.ks v(m know, M(l)onncll Douglas and.lohnso,I & lohns(m are a(tivrly f)msuing the
(Icvelol)mrnt of an rlrctrol)horesis |)rocrss that will use the gr_r¢ily-tiec envir()nmcn! ot
sl)acc to pr()(htcr ])harma(eutical l)ro(hwts thai cannot be c(onomicall_ l)r()ducc(I on
Earlh. _,_,2' ;rtrc now (lrw'lo])ing ore I]lSl ])l(>ICill ])rodtl(l, a llallna.l horm()ll(." CI.|ITCFLIIv
tmavailal)lr. Sin(c 1976, w(' havr Sl)('nl many millions of dollars on this ('tfiwl. W(, Imv('
I)c,.'n succcssltd in pr, wing Ihc validity otour concrpt in our first thrrr Slmlllc tlighls with
otlr conlim+ous tlow rh'clrophorc.,,is rcsca.rch rquil)mrnl. Wr mr n+_w drsigning ;I pn_-
duclion version ol ran svstrm which will tly in the pakload bay of Ihc Shutth. in 19X5 ;rod
1986 and thcrctbrc, our cxl)cnclitmc ra.lc has grcally "ac(cleratc(l.
Wc I)cli('vr thai the l)Otrntial tot manul_tcluring new and improved l)h;trma('culi(';tln
in Sl)aCc is rral and attainablr. Whilr shutllr-l)asr(l research has 1)ecn stl((csslul, thi,,
mrtho(l is sl()w and l;d)mious. [han(twriurn ml(lc,lining] With the opl)orlunilv ti)r
rrsear('h and (lcvrh)l)mrnt of new l)r(_(htcls dlat a spa(c station would provide, we (ould
(htring thr 199()s brin K five limes lhr tmmbrr (ff new I)rcakthrotlgh t)harmacrtili(;ds to
ill_ll_k('[. Also, tht' ('()sis ()t ([('v('l()])lll('lll HII(| ])ro(hl('li()n o1" thcnc nov, ])lo(hl('ls (HII 1)c
grr:uly rc(hlc('d.
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()ur recetlt w()rk with live (ell material such as the islets (beta cells) being studied in
cooperation wilh Washington University School of Medicine its a potential cure fi)r dia-
tl(!les, leads us 1o believe that it will bc inlp()ssit)h" to anlomatc a facilily lha! could suc-
cessfully separate live cells by electrophoresis. Unlike tIvolein materials, tim sensitivity of
12] living organisnls, i.e., t)(q;.i cells, 1o operaling conditions within Ihe systenls dictates a
man inlert_wc (hn-ing processing to ensure their slnvix'al. If Ill(' CIll'Fen| lrealnlenl illldel
investigation proves successful, it follows thai withoul a spac(" statioll lhe probability of
achieving a populalion-widc cttrc tor diabetes is low.
As you know, we arc striving to begin commercial production of<mr tirst prolein prod-
u('t ill early 1987 or bclbve, l))('cause a space station w()uld not lie available until the earl_
1990s, we are planning Io use dedicated nnnlanncd fi-ee [lying spacecraft tor increased
l)r()ducti<)n. Serious nc'gotiali()ns are presently under way with tluec' companies willing to
illvt,sl l)rivalc [rinds I() build lifts Sl)a(ecraft. We look ill this initial c()nunercial step its
I)(,ing only interim.
We hay(' been ('nc()uraged tly lhe progress NASA has t)(:en making in defining such a
sllac(" slali()n progranl. []lanclwrillcll underlining] (]onsidcr this i:t fi)rnlal request lot the
Mcl)()nnell Douglas E()S Program Io be inchtded as the" firs! c:onlnlercial user of a NASA
S]la(c" slat]oil.
aSSllllling nl.ii CC,lllillll('d Sll('('(!sS ill lhis aclivity, you ilia} ('onsider this a tormal com-
milm('nl I() use the space slation as the major base of operations for carrying oul and
expanding lhis new induslry.
Sinccw(_l.v yores,
.I,)hn V. Yardh'y
I)rcsidcnl
M(J)()NNH J. DOt Y(;l AS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY
Documen1111-25
Document title: L. Smith, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, "Electrophoresis Operations
in Space," briefing charts, September 1983, pp. 6-7, 30.
Source: Documentary History Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington
University, Washington, D.C.
Thi_ Mdhm nell l)ougla.s viewAwaph su remark, of the EOS program illustrates that the company had
preprtred detailed busines_ plan_ and ,_aw potential profits in drug productiml in .space using its elec-
Irophore_i_ instrument. It empha_ize,_ lhe potential market growth and demand, a,_ well as the relative
eJfir'ienr), o/mir'rogravity production compared to similar terrestrial productim_ of these d)uff_.
/(;I WHY SPA(]E?
(;ravily l,itnils the Full l)olcnlial of the (;onlinuous Fh)w SystCln as a (;()nnnercial
Pl'( )('('SS
(;l+avity IAmits Sample (;oncentration, Flow Vohlnle, and Ptnity ill (]ontinu<)us Fh)w
Electrophoresis
-- 100 to 800 Tinlt,s M()re Thr()ughput ill Spac(' for Saln(' l)egre(' (if Purity (Varies
|or l)iHmvn! l)r()duct Mamrials)
-- Five Times hnpr()venwn) ill l)urilication Potential in Sl)ace
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Electrophoresis Operations ill Space Necessary to Satisfy Patient Population
-- Ground Scale-up (]osts Prohibitive to Achieve Meaningfid Plant Output
-- Price of Ground Derived Product Would Be Substantially Higher
-- Purity Levels That Are Achievahle Only in Space May Be Required
[71 INITIAl+ BUSINESS STRATE(,Y
Objectives
Find Pharmaceutical Contpany as
Active Partner
Accomplishments
Ortho Pharmaceutical Became Aclive Partner
in July 1978
Obtain Free Flights li{mt NASA to
Verify Concepts and Equipment
Optimize the Electrophoresis Process
fi>r (;round Research
Ensure Proprietary Nature of Process
and ttardware
l(tentify at l,east One Product tor
I)ewrh)pment and Marketing
Assess Feasibility of E()S Program
lnchtding Economic Viabilily of
(]ommercial Phase
MI)AC/NASAJoinl Endeavor Agreement
Signed Jannary 1980
Five Years Development of Electrophoresis
Technology' 1977 Thru 1981
Five Invention Disclosures Written,
Two Patents Issued, One Pending
t'roduct l(lentitied and l)etail Market Research
of ()rtl't(_ (]<mt]rmed I+arge Market
Economic Feasibility Established and Presented
in Business Plan in,|une 1981
[no page number] PAIL&METERS OF THE STUI)Y
Number <)f Products
• 1 Product Industry
• 6 Product Industry
• 12 Prodnct Industry
Market Capture
• 25% Domestic
• Pharntacentical Products Only
Modes of Operation
• Shuttle Sortie
• Shuttle + Unmanned Platform
• Shuttle + Space Station
Time Frame
• Until the _k'at 2000
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[no page numberl
5.0
,Io
3.0
0_
<
1.0
Annual Market Potential for Electrophoresis
25% Market Capture USA Onl}
/ t_llion (5A2%)
Wotld 4585 Million
• Gross Natitmal I'roduct ((;NP)
USA $2.626 Trillion
Etu<q)c/Japan $4.530 Trilli<m
i_ I I I I I
0 2 4 6 8 IO
Nmnb('r o! Products FOS [nduswy
[ 30] (;ON(;LUSIONS
• Potential for Manufacturing New and Improved Products in Space Is Real
• Without Long Duration Capal)ility Market Penetration for Any One Product Is
I_imited
• Unmanned Free Flight Support Will Allow Market Development for One or More
Products Within the Limitations of the Space Transportation System
* Manned I,ong I)uration Facility Can Provide the Basis for Industry Growth With
hnproved Economics
Document 111-26
Document title: U.S. General Accounting Office, "Commercial Use of Space: Many
Grantees Making Progress, but NASA Oversight Could be Improved," Executive
Summary, GAO/NSIAD-91-142, May 1991, pp. 2-5.
Source: Documentary History Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington
University, Washington, D.C.
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In 1986, N_ISA initiated a program e_tablishmff ( ;et;ters]Or the ('ommereial I)evelopme_tt +?[Space at
a namber O[univtq:sities. It was aimed at e_;couraffing unive_:sities and bu._iness to|otto partner_hip.s
to pet]brm R&D o_t space-wlated ropier. NASA wouM initially Juml the program with the expecta-
tim; that the busines_ seetor woahl (q,entuall 3' take over theJhnding respon.sibilities. NASA would be_t-
_JTt/iom having customers who woubl wa_tt to pev]brm experiments in _paee, and the u niveP:sitie_ amt
private _eetor woald beT;qit ]?om the kmm,ledKe--and profit pote_tial--o] ._paee activities. A._ this
General ,_+eoanting Offhe ((;.+10) report SU_WLSLS,this teehnol%real developme_d p_wgwam had wine
suece.ss, bat it dM m, t fiflfill all _[ its imtial goals.
12 ] Executive Summary
Purpose
The National Aclotlaulics and S[)a(t' Administration (NASA) has long recognized
thal to [lt'l t) thc United Stair's maintain a technological edge thl()ughout the world, it
ill|lSI [hid wHyy, to (_ll(-i+)ttl_l_,¢.'_.tllC[ Sll[)pol+l Iht" (]uveloplllcIll of H dOllWSliC colnll|Clcia]
space industry. In 1<.)85, NASA began to pr(>vidc grants an<l other types of stlpF, ol-t 1o th('
('enters for tiw (;ommcrcial Development of Space to en('ourag(' the melding ot the
lt'sOl.ll(t's a.n(| ialelltS of gOVt!l'lllllCllt, indusll'y, i|ll(| a(adcniic institutions [_)1 I(+stqt|(hillg
and developing spate-related tec]uloh)g-ies thal have polentia.I c(:,llllI|el-cia] a|q3licalions.
After a limited period of grant Sl. ll)])Ol'l O[+5 to 7 years, NASA t'xpccted the (cnt('rs to
])CCOII|C seliLsufticicnt.
The (]hair, Sul)(ommiltee on \5\ [Veterans Aftairs], tiUI) [llousing and Urt)an
l)cvelopment], and hl(lcpcndent Agencies, Senate (]omnliltt'c on Appropriatiotls. asked
(',At) to lt,'vit+w th(" ('xl¢._lll of private setfor involvement in the centres" programs, the cvn-
tots" prog,css toward anti prospects for sell=sufficiency, and NASA's lll_tllH_cIIIt'lll o[" Ill(!
i)l'Ogl'alll.
Background
Through 1990, NASA has provided about $81 Inillion in grants to 16 centers, most of
which art" located at slaW alld private univt, rsities. The CUll|t'l'S work in OIlC Ill"M?V(ql /tl+('_tS
o[ specialization: materials processing, lif_" sciences, rtmlott • sensing, automation att(t
robotics, space stru(tmes and materials, space propulsion, and spacc power. The ccnters,
which have opt'rated from 3 lo 5 years, reported that by the begimfing of 1990 they had
establisht'd about 300 aMliations with other organizations and companies, and they had
com|)ltq('d over 750 flight tC'MS ;alld olher experiments, including I_ conducted in spacc.
At that time, they were also planning over 300 more flight It+sis,
Results in Brief
Since the itwcptitm of the program, NASA has had some success in estal31ishing (cn-
tct+s (apablc of attracling and sustaining industry intmest and sttpport. It is too soon to
gauge the extent to which the program may uhimately achieve its goals, although it is clear
that the centers will not become scll:sufli(ienl in 5 to 7 years. However, such a tix('(l peri-
od of support applicable to all centers fails to recognize difft.renccs among the centers.
Recognizing such differcnccs wouhl require NASA to establish grant supp<)rt goals for thc
individual ct'ntt't's 1)ascd primarily on the 3 to 5 years' operating experit'ncc each center
has had.
NASA also has opportunities to make im[)rovements elsewhere it+ the program. With
tilt' t'Xl)eclalion for significant growth in the numl)cr of [3] future expcrimet_ts requiring
acccss to Sl)aCv, the pro(css lot evaluating the (enters' payload rc(ttwsts sh(mld be exam-
ined to cnsttre that it cfficiently provides the desired mix of CXl)erlise to adcquately rcvit'w
rc(itu,sts. Also, NASA n('c(ls Io examine the adt'<tl.la('y Of lilt" internal (oi_trols it ¢+mphws
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to (msu)-v that its accounting system contains lim(qy, complete, and accurate il)f()imali()ll
rcl)()rted l)y grant('es (in their uses (if fi.'dcral funds.
Principal Findings
Growth of Industry Involvement and Support
Sini:e the inception (if)tic pri)gram, the (enters have l)cml incr('asing lh(' numl)cr (if
()rRanizali(ms and c()ml)anies with which they have l)ec(mm alfiliat(:d. More imp()rlandv,
the numl)er (if such affiliates lhat represent industry has also been increasing, from
63 r('p()rlcd by 6 (miters fbr I(,)86 to) an estimated 199 rcpi)rt(,'d l)y 16 ceillCl'S fol I(,)90.
Tilt" level of cash SUl)l)orl the r,'cnl(.rs have receiv¢'d Ifore their industry afliliatt's has
also l)('¢,r) incr(,,tsi,g. In 1986, induslry alliliales provided less that| $I million, l),y I!)90,
th(' am(it|hi ()I (ash stll)])()l'l l'l'()m industry was estimated at ,$4. I nlil]i()n [br the 13 (.elll(,lS
thal r('( ('iv('d such supp()rt. The industry afl]]iales that were w()rking with a center in 198(,)
had l)('('n d()ing s() R)r an avmagc (if _.?) years, ali(l alin()st all (if then) had l)r()vi(le(l cash
()r ()ih('r t,,<']lt's (if support t() Iht'ir center.
Centers Will Not Be Self-Sufficient Soon
The pr()l)()rti(m (if centers" supp()rt prl)vidcd by NASA grants has liccn increasing, not
dc(r('asiitg. For ('xampl(', NASA f)rovided 28 percent of d_e c¢'nte)s' to|al support itt 198f},
but l)y 19(,)0 NASA's share was estimated at 47 percent. The ccnters' h('avy relian('¢' (m
NASA grants will (olltiilllt! fi)r llic foreseeable future. The main reason li)r this pattern of
[tlCl'CaSilt_ slll)l)ort is that NASA's OVCl+al[ stant support tit help the C('IIICI'S ]"tlll(t the cost
(if' at('i'ss t() sl)a((_ ;-ui(| lh(' cost of i|tliqlle hal'(|wal'c and facilities has ili(,r('ast_d.
N()tte (if th(! (cnl(,l dil-cct()rs belier(' that their centers will lie able t() (.ortlintl(' at their
l)rcsellt levels of' aclivity if _i'ant SUl)ll()rt is withdrawn l)efor(' 19!)5. Thc mosl ()ptinlislic
directors l)clieve dwir (enters can achieve self sufficiency somewhere between 1995 and
2000. At ih(' ()])[)()sit(, ('nd of tilt' scale, five directors do not ever lorcsee a time when their
centers will lie al)Ic t() (to without NASA grant assislance.
[,t I Structure of the Payload Review Process Should Be Reviewed
For al)()ut ? y('ars NASA has used a Payload Selection Board i(i assist in r(,vicwing tim
('(,ntcrs')('qu('sts R)r flying their llayloads on the St)ace Shuttle. However, little sp¢.cili("
guidance has liecn pr(ivided to Board nlembers al)oul the levicw process and what they
were t'xl)t'(t('(l t() c()ntvil)ute to it. Some Board members expressed uncertainty and con-
c(,rn about the pr()(t'ss and their rl)]c in it, In addition, the Board's membership, whicll
was initially planned to inclttd(" thre(" menlbers rel)resenting industry, has n()t had nit)re
than OIIC.
Availability of Good Fiscal Information Should Be Ensured
Tinmly, c(mtl)h'tc, and accuralt' fiscal information on grantees is n()t routinely avail-
al)]c fr()ln NASA's atc()illiliilg systclll because I'epoFtiilg I'cqtiiI'ClllClits ()tl tile iisc of tk'(l-
('ra] fitlids al'(' not ('flectively enfi)rced. Even alier Ihe reports at-(" receive(I, the
ilil()tlliali()ii is liOl IOiltincly entered into the agencywide at:(:ounling rccoids hi a liiIlelV
tiishi()ll.
NASA a((Ollllliilg l)ersonnei havc t)ceil at)It' 1o gel tilt" centclS I() volulllalily ('()iTe('l
vat-iott_ t-ClS<)vtiri _ I;)loblctil_, iilcltl<ti/ig a Illtl'll_('f ()t" itl,_l_tli('('s of ,£'t'l',_)lIc,:iltt4 ari<l iticotil-
[)]('1(' rci)()rling, tt()wcvt'r, ]at(' rel)oriill _ has provcn lo tie illuch nl()ie (litticuh 1() d('al
whh. NA,_.._I llCCOltnlillg piTslilinel ('_ihnai(" lhal a inai(iriiy (if the required quarterly
rei)()l'lS al(' ial(,.
[n[i)rniali()ll fr()ill _ranli'('s' [inancia] i('p(irls is iis('d to u|)(lale Ihe a<_('ncywi(lc
a((()lliilili_ ii'c()ids, I I()w('/cr, S()ln(,tiliies sii('li li[)dal('s _tl(" it(it d()ne liiilil Iwi) o1 lil()l'l'
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quarterly reports are on tile. NASA accounting personnel frequently receive complaints
ahont the lack of current financial information on grantees in the agenc_,_'ide data base.
Recommendations
(;AO recommends that the A(hninistralor, NASA,
• estahlish, in consnltation with each center, a grant support goal with interim tar-
gets h_r tracking progress toward sell'sufficiency and for determining the need
tor, and to help measure the resnhs of, corrective actions;
• review the flight request and approval process to ensure that the expertise need-
ed ]or such reviews is availahle in the mr)st efticient manner possible and that
those who are asked to assess tlighl re(luesls fully ttnderstand the intended scope
of their participation; and
• assess anti, as necessary, strengthen file internal controls tbr ensuring thai timely,
complete, and accurate fiscal infi)rmalion on granlees is available in NASA's
acconnting sysleln.
Agency Comments and GAO's Evaluation
ht commenting on a draft of (;A()'s report, NASA said that it provides a useful cont-
ntentary on one of NASA's newesl and t_stest growing commercial space programs. NASA
noted that C,AO's recommendations were reasonable and cotdd be implemenled.
However, while recognizing the slower-than-anticipated pace of the program, NASA said
that delerntining how and when to establish grant support time limits would he consid-
ered in the tiHttre. (;AO believes that a grant program I]lat is essentially intended In t>e
sell'liquidating must include a constantly visihle grant support goal It) tocns and encour-
age each grantee's ettbrts to develop alternatiw, revenue sources. (;AO recognizes that
support goals may change as circttmstances warrant, but each such change should be a
highly visible ntanagentent action subject to review and to a determination that the
change in the goal, rather than grant termination, isjustitied.
NASA also offered other specitic suggestions, which (;AO incorp(n-ated inlo the
report where appropriate ....
Document 111-27
Document tide: Leo S. Packer, Special Assistant to Associate Administrator, Office of
Advanced Research and Technology, NASA, "Proposal for Enhancing NASA Technology
Transfer to Civil Systems," September 26, 1969, pp. 1-9.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This Apollo-era document ._peeificaUy relates to technolo_, trans[_. Fconomie benefit._ are deempha-
sized in favor of public and social benefits. The objective rJ the technology, tran.s[+,r prog_am was pri-
marily to u.w NASA technolo_ to help _oh,e proldem_ in "public fieMs. "Although teehnolog6cal help
[or business is discussed, it is generally, dismissed a._ not beit_ appro[nqate or us@tL
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Proposal for Enhancing NASA Technology
Transfer to Civil Systems
Sepwml)er 26, 1969...
I I I (;ttAPTER I11
()t_jectives
Since the assigmnenl tor this study was phrased in very general terms, it was helpful
inilially to t)reak down lilt" st,t)ject lnalter into manageable categories. The f<)llowing lisl
indici|les the scope of Ihe Sttldy, with lhe understanding thai il represents a selection ol
the most iml)ortant elements, without which one cannot obtain a valid picture. The obiec-
lives tlow quite naturally from Ihe list.
1) Examine the current slalus o1 Federal public policy tot R&I), with emphasis on con-
gressional and pnl)lic attitudes and the guidance of It/(" While lhmse advisory
organizations.
2) Understand Ill<" hislory and nature ot +NASA as a national R&D rcsource.
3) ()htain some ti'eling lot the diversified and scattered NASA activities in non-
aerospace and non-aeronautical R&D. How did these l)ro.jecls arise, how are they.jus-
lilied and timded, and why are lhcy t+elatively inconspicuous within NASA's program
S| I'llCl llle_
4) What is the curretH ])esl understanding of the nature of technoh>h,+y transli'r illllOllg
goverlunent, it+duslry, universities, and institutes? Wha! is NASA's i+erceived role and
efli'ctiveness?
5) Assemble a list of national, civil, social problem areas that have some obvious tech-
Ilolog_; (()nlp(lllell I s,
6) Develop generalized criteria Ior evahtation of the above in order to reduce the list to
a lewer nnml)er sttiml)le fin NASA interest and investigalion.
7) Recommend a small nttlnher of problems for serious consideration as NASA chal-
lenges, with apl)ropriate suggestive pros and cons tbr each.
8) Propose policy, organizational adaptation, and actions that NASA might consider to
enhalwe ils resl)otlsiveness and contributions to the public wella.rc, in addition t<) ils
im_jor resp(msilfilily fi)r assigned missions.
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Observations and Recommendations
I - ()bservations
I. NASA possesses certain unique talents and experience that are relevant to technolo-
g3' needs of public problems, either directly or with minor modification. These are
generally in the calcgori_+s of specific technology, systems engineering, and organiza-
lion it.n(t lllallagelnetll.
2. NASA is laced with an opportunity Io take new organizational and program initiatives
to apply a small portion <)[its resources, say two percent, on a continuing basis lo tech-
nology' applications in ptthlic tields.
3. There are many indicalions that the public and government environment is now gen-
erally favorable to such inilialiw:s if they are convincingly explained and vigor<msly
a(lvocaled. Although some political and jurisdictional I)roblems will Im encottntered,
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an al)l)ropriate and timely action by NASA is expc(tcd to bc wchomcd and SUl)port-
cd. I believe it would also strengthen NASA's "mainstream" plans and programs.
4. Thor( is a rcscrsoir of polendal support among NASA pcoph', I)ascd on response to
challcngc and social scnsflivitv and ahruism. An overt organizational step toward
social application of technology, HO IIIHII(!F h()W rcstri('tt'd and <;UltiOltS, WOll](l ,ff('ll('l-
at( cmlsidclabh, enl]msiasm. Thenc wmfld also Ix' Opl)<_sition based on resistance u_
chang(, administrative obstach's, and dislike of mflhmiliar, dil]ictflt and trttstvating
probh'm s.
5. I lind no difl_cuhyin exWnding NASA's technology charter t_ inch,¢h"directpaFtici-
pat|on in civil prol)lems of nalional scope. NASA (h>cs study, penetrate and cxph>it
IIIICOllV<.'lltioll;tl ;111(I hostile ('llVil'onlll('lltS t()l" tllHtl, stt('h _ts /t'l+O gravity, tmdcrs('as,
radiation, aetotlautical Ilight conditions, closed life cycle, cxtr(,me temperatures, vac-
tnnn, etc. Since hoslilc environn+cnts can t)e natural or social, wc can also includc
crowding, malnourishment, air and water p<dlution, noise pollution, violence and
inse(m-ilv, l_,+ar, cc()n()mic disl()cati()n, l-('Sotlrcc depletion, carthqttak('s, deslrtt(liv(,
Sit)FillS, H11(t ()11(" ('_tll gO Oil _tS t+ll" ;iS (Hit" wishes to illC]tt<|{ + IIl<)sl <)[ Ill(" social ills <)f ()Ill"
thllc.
6. There should b<.'no dot,hi that NASA's i)rimaryjob isspace cxph_rafion and spat('
olwralions as well as aer<mauti(al R&+D. I believe that the Apolh+ achievcmctlt pr(>-
vid<.'san appropriate time to prop<_se that tt'cimology transl_'rto scrv(• public and
social ptuposes is now a ma.jor c<+n<_crn of the Agency, that it will bc pinsued with the
S;llll(" nlission-oriented conct'l|tr;l+ti<)n that characterized ||le s]J_l(t- program. This ncw
policy does not prt'cltv:+h' a c+,trt'ful al)])r_ach to tmlamiliar a])l)li(alion environmcnts+
+v'%'("have to try It) strtlctttrc +Is l_tvorablc an eHvironn+ertt ;is possibh, in OFdcr that (_ttr
te(hnol<)k, _, conlribtttions hay( a max|inure impact.
131 7. NASA nt'('ds a slr<mg and visil)h, Ikwus fin l)('Ol)Ic and aclivitics involved in m'w
arrangements, new lechnolog T, and ll¢'+_r applications to civil and social pr<d>h'ms.
Rccommt'ndaliorns
l rccomm¢'nd the lbrmation of a new Program Ollh(" (()flic(' of (;ivil Syslcms
Tcclmoh>u,T) to asstmR" rcsponsihility lot all of NASA's tcchnolok,O+ aclivities Ior pttblic
programs, with the t'x(!<.'ption of th<+sc directly tied to aer<mantics, space cxph>rati<m
and Sl)aC(' Olx'rations. The basic (;ompon(+nts of tit(" ]'rogram ()llh(' ave:
itl) All A(lvisol'v (_otnl¢'il tbr poll() r guidance, cornF, osed of pc<q)h" fiom indtlslt+v,
From olh(,r NASA Pro_Tam ()[rices, th(' Administrator's offic(', ()fthx' <d !)()1) and
Intcv,lg,('ncy Aftairs, ()tfi(e <ff I%li(+v, [National Scien¢(, Fotmdati<_n, lht'sidt'nt's
Scion(t+ Advis<>ry (_onlntiltec, ()|tic( (>I Sci('ncc and "Ik'chnoloho ], I+llr('atl of the
Btudg('t, and possibly other agencies.
b) T('('hnolo<u,T I.+tilization. ] Ix'li(.vc that this activil+v w_+uld Iw mor(' ¢'Ft('clivc in a line
tt'chnical <w<_anizalion diicttlx r('htt('d to ils fttnctioth rather than in an adminis-
trativ¢" staff organiza|ion.
c) Markcl Rcs(,arch and Reqtfirem(,nls Analysis Division to inovidc initial k'chnical
and I_.'asil)ilib r analysis of l)roposed prol)lcms, evahmtion <)t NASA capabilitit's,
I)rOicction <ff evolving technical ncccls in pt,I)lic prol)lcm areas, inlcracli<)n wilh
NAI'], [National ,\(a(l,.'myof Scienccsl and ()lh('r;lgt'll('ics and induslrv, st;tl(,-()t L
th('-;tll sttldies, and exph)ralory tcchnoh>h_ sin(lies t<) F,r()xid(' a basis ibr NASA
decisions.
(I) A program managcmt+nt organizati<m |ha! will (oordin;ttl(! pr<!jects in lying, ini-
li;.ll(' ll('W eflbrls, channel inlormali(m fr<)m prqje(Is Io lll;llHtg('Itl('llt 3111dother
;l_('ll('i('s, _tlld ;t('l ;Is "CIISI()IIICI" l't'pl'C'S('lll+ttivt's" ()l ";ICC()IlIII PX(X+IltiV('S ', t01" (Hit-
side ;tgcncics concerned with NASA work trader the Program ()tfi(c.
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e) A Slwcial Mission l)v+,:clolmWnt Division that '+++'illC_>llCctn itscllwilh inll>Icnlcnl-
in_ slandar(l and innovativt+ instiluti<mal arrang-etncnts +,,:ill+other agencies and
intc|csls, such as special-pm-p<+sc instittttcs+ seminars, training a_,rc¢+ments, +hwel-
<>l)mt, nl of R&I) ca<h_'s IOr other a_cncit's, NA;SA-induslry cooperation l_+t spt.cilu
it [)lll+])i)s{+s, assist+lnt't' to Iml)lic affairs ol_jcctivt's, and other administrative and
managcnwnt supl+<>rt Ibr tlt<.' lhogram ()llicc.
I t+mF, hasi.'.¢' that n<_ s(i('nlil_( and tc_chnoh)gical work, other than the Mmkct
Resva|-ch and Mission Require'merits Analysis, is to be pc'rformcd in the Progratn ()llict'.
Thc rvsvrvoir _>I+ lvclm_d<_Kv lCsourc<.!s ++,+illbt! in the (;cmtvrs, induslr.V, tmiversitics and
inslilulcs. The l:'roqram ()flicc acts as the integrative mcclutnism l<n l)oliq, t, dccisit)n mak-
in,4, l_];itu+itl_. +tllotati<u+ _d lt+sl:,tll(('s, l)lO_l_tm control, c<nntnttnicatiotl and l)ro_rt'ss
I+vl)<_rtin,_.
1412. Altvr dccidin_ <Jn ils dcsirt'd cottrsc, NASA lllatl_t_t'l]l_('l+It sh<_uld c<+ndttcl a discreet
F,r<L_ratn of lWrntmsi<m HIIH)II_ luadt+rs oI (]on_rt'ss, |hu-cau oI the Budget, ()fl]cc of
Scit.ll,C_ , _llld Teclm<,l<,_y. offmr _ovcrl..tnt'nt a_,t'llci<:s, l)rivatt • industry, and othcls to
,qail| lJii<>r ac('t+l)lallCC <d" Ih(P policy.
3. NASA mamt_vmt'nl sh_n|ld idvnlil_' at Ih'adqtutrlt'r_+ and in lhe (:c,ntc'rs t,xislin<_ ;uld
l>Olcnlial Cal)al)ililit,s applicaldv to those l+ro_rams and Ol)l>orltmilics dccmcd wotfll+
_+f NAS:\ t>arlicit>alion. ()ttmrlicular interest are pcoph' "wh<_w<mld wish to apply Iheh
skills and cxfwrivncv in new v.'vd ellvironnlt'lllS.
4. NASA should, allcr applicati+)n of pr<>pcr critc+ria and ad('qualt + l_rOl:,h'nl dcl]nilion
stltdics, sch:¢t a limited nmnb¢'r of promising challcn_t',, nv_qoliatc tht' r_'quircd
a_Tt't'lllt'ttls, dvvvh>p _bj[+cliv<:s, assign l'_'sotll+ct's alld lllOVt' aht'a[| undt'r a l]+:w nl_!jor
l'r_Lqram ()Ificc as it m_rmally does wh<+'n assumin_ nev,, nfissiot|s. NASA idcntil]c.-
lion, in tht' s('it'ntil]c and tcchnica] ('Olnllltlllities itlld ill lilt' l)nl:,lit (')+',t+,+,','ill+a limit<:d
tmmtwr of m;!j<_r t>roi4r;tms of perceived ur+cncy +,+'ill Iblh)+,+' mttm;tllv.
5. Tht" ncw activity sh<nthl rt:tcb,'c se]mralc fundin_ as ;t lint, itt'm tith'd, "non-;tt'r<,+l_t¢¢'
tt,clm<doq 7 tr;tnst_'r ;tnd apl)lications" to maintain its identity and permit adequate
('< lll_l'('Ssi< Hl;ll ('X I)C+_+,I ll'('.
II - ( )l:,servali<_n
Althol_gh +tl:.-<md mana_cnwnt <:onmmlSUS and policy arc lacking, NASA cttrr¢'ntly has
its imF, rt'ssivv numbt'r <)f [)r_!jccls, sotnc of thvm quite F,romising, relatin_ directly to [:,ub-
lic prol)h+m arcas. Many of thcnl do not show up ill tile li+rnla] nlanagcnlenl control sy+
It's. _onlc <)l them aft! dis_ttis<_'d, some ave bootlegged, whereas some are shown ,vxplicitly
in tilt" I_nnml system, h would I)v a tormidable task to assemble them tm- consideration as
a sin_lc ._roup, but it would bc <_,xtrcm.ely usetul to (Io so, it only to provide inte_ralive
mamL_emcnt and sourer inl_nmation lot a splendidly co_cnt answt'r to tilt" (ttt¢'sli(m <ff
whal NASA is now doin_ F.r lilt' conunon man.
I_ecOlll llltqlflat iOll
NASA should mganize a temn cltbrt to visit all the (;enters, dig int<_ and underneath
lht' tt-)llllal doCtllllt'lltali<m, interview key people, and _lsSt'lnl)]c a CIIITCIII calalog_ of t,fl_)rts
al)l)li(;ll)le to i)tt|)lit problem fields, ill accordance with clearly undc'rslood trilel+ia. This
inti_tm;ition should be kcl)t cturt!nl and be made avail;lblc to NASA i)ul)lic affidrs, con-
grcssiomtl rclalions and top It.vtq NASA staff, ;is well as to other g<)vernlnt'nt agcncies,
It)l lice of _ci_'nc_" and T_'chn<_lo_y, Bnreau of tilt" Bttd_vt I. etc. It is iml>orlant to make
lifts larRcl+v invisil>h' ;.tivily rcsF.'Cl;tllh' and subject to t'+,;lluati<m, |31annin_, and tnana_,c-
lIICIll ilW;ll-('lll'SS,
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[5l III - Observati<)n
I1 is a filet thai NASA is held up as a m<)de`l of Sl)CClacuhu achie`ve`menl in diflicuh
problent areas, h does nol millte`l" to tlt<.+public thal there` is a wide` dill<:re`n¢c l)e`twe`e`n
NASA's technology acconlplishnlents and desired accomplishments in social are`as and
Ihitl <.OlYll);trisolt of tilt" lwo is illogical and uninforme`d. The reality of l]lc situation is lh_tt
NASA is pe`rceived by tile" pul)lic (and tilt +Congress) as a ray <ff hope and a somce` oF
potential leadership and help with problems that are` dee`ply and e`m<+tionallv felt. Arguing
thltt space proble`ins and social problems are` vastly tlill_qe`nl and that tilt! ];Hie`l- ill'(" milch
morc diflicuh will havc little e`ffi:cl on the l)ul)lic other Ihan causing bille`rne`ss toward
NASA and the space` program.
Re`('OlltlncndaliOll
NASA shollld makc a cle`ar (|)tlt tlol deli'nsivc) stalenle`nt Io include:
a) An ttne`tltfivocal de`te`rmimtlion to (<>ntinue primary work ill space e`xl)h)ration
alld it<: I'O llltl t I i ('_';.
h) A persuasive summavv of NASA's impact on scie`nce`, technolog), lhe` nali<>n's
economy, and lhe` quaiity of litt" in this cot,ntry.
c) What NASA is doing lo(lav to he`lp solve` social and civil prol)lcms ot national
importance`. This is actually quite` impre`ssive` whe`n properly pre`se`nte`d.
d) An iDlenlion 1o de`re`lop ne`w areas for NASA participalion in solving civil svste`ms
proble`ms, wilh art outline of orgatfizatiomtl and policy sleps lake`D or to be`+lake`n.
IX,' - ()bse`rvation
NASA does a l)(_or.job of bringing ils scientific and general tt-clm<)logff; activitie`s to
l)tthlic alle`ntion.
Re`cOlllllle`llditlilHI
A spe`cial pttl)lic ve`lations clli)vt sh_mld be` mounle`d in comwction with NASA's work
tbr l)ttblic wt'll,ue and social progress. Enough material li)r su(ce`sstifl exl)loitati<m exists
at pve`se`nt and more` shotdd 1)e` availablt, latt'r. Rt'(enl spe`eche`s by NASA ofticials have`
be`e`n le`ss than inspiraliotlal <_n Ihc subje`ct of NASA and ils re`lalionship to the` ne`cds ot
tilt' lt:tlioll. ,_r(, must appre`ciatc and COllllle`F tilt" t_lcl Ill;it tilt' space` pr<_gram, alth<+tlgh
e`xciting and challe`llging to the` imagination, is llllt_)rlllllale`lv re`lnole` fi-om tilt' daily c<m-
('e`l-lIS()]"lilt, C()lllllloll lllilll.
161 V- ()t)se`rvati<m
As lar as lhe` pttl)lic is conce`rncd, NASA has cxpe`vtly de`monstrate`d the "what" and tilt'
"h()w" of Sl)aCe` e`xph)r;ition, bttl has Dot l)e`e`n as ;trlicnlnle` ()]- su(ce`ssfullv ('()lllllltllli('_tlive`
with the "why" of space e`xl)loration. SimilaHy, there` is inade`qtmte` tmdt:rstanding of the`
impact that NASA has had and is causing in le`chnoh+gR,,, lilt, e`c<)nomy, and the quality of
lift:, alth<+ttgh st)me` perce`plive` ot)st'rve`rs have` re`Ce`llllv be`gttn to tmde`rsland this question
in ils truly dramatic sense`.
Re`cOllt file t`l(]aliolt
A compve`he`nsive` study of tilt' national iml)aCt of space` e`xplolati<m and tt'chn<dogy,
l;:u+ l)ro;ide`r than ;mylhing ye`t alte`mplcd, w<_ttld l)e` e`xlre`me`Iv valtlal)le`. In (:hapte`v IX,
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"NASA So(:ial hill)act," ! hay(, snggeslcd soul(' ()1 Ill(" uni(lUe alld impressive (ontribuli()ns
alllil)nnlal)h, to NA,(",;A. This lisl could scrv(' as a l(qnlaliv(, Onlllhn(" It)l- snt(h a stndy.
VI - ()|)s(.'rvalion
(In(' Ir(,(itw]llly heaFs ;Mid s(.'es ill l)riul lhc slal('in('l]l, "if w(' (all put a )nan on th("
m()(m, w(' sh()ttld l)(' abh' It) (hi s()-;ili(i-s()," ",%o-all(l-s()" llslially is a (()mpl('x social prol)l(,m.
Rec()mnn('nldali()ll
Th('
l]nlnl:
a)
)))
f)l()l)('r r('sl)()ns(' I() IInis In()sli](' ()r uninlt()nm('d staleun(,nnl sln()llld t)( _' 1() i)()int out
'I'll(' Al)()]h) [)r()granln had a oh'at and unami)igu()us ()l)j(.(tiv(., a r('alisli(- lhn(' lit'ri-
ll(I, ill] tlnlrt'sll'i('lt'(l I()n_-r_lll_e alloc;J.[ionl of r(!s()nLn((!:.,;, (OliSislx'n[ supp()rl _lll(I _l
C()lllillnlili_ ('()lnlllill|](![]l._ iil[] available sn)ur((' ()r lie(,ill(,, le{hlrl()l()_,Q' and hnil(ling
Ill(,(ks ()tn)rgani/alion, high Ilionall' and ((imlnille(i lit'nil)It, all(I a ((mllal a|llh(lr-
ily Io rllll Ill(" p]'o_n'_tnl], h ills() h;.i.d ]lo ()pp()_inl_ v(,si(,d inlel(,sls.
The typical S(l(ial i)rol)l('m has 110 clear and unaml)igu()us ()I)j('('tiv¢'s, n() ]()nl(_-
rang(' alh)cali()n of rc's()urc('s, sp(lUV and (ontr()vcrsial support, inach,ciuale mlm-
1)(')s (if skill('d F)('()l)h ", iuadequate lechn()h)gv and lack of at)pli(ali()m,
('N.[)c']'i('nl('(', In() nl}('_lsllr('s o| l)rogress, hla(le(lual(, ()r n()n-exist(,nl Ol'_Hnlizil[i()l|S l()
]('_tl] ()nl_ _llld g('nel'ally no ('(wllnal aulhorily Io organi/(." and I'Ull lilt" pl()_._l_.lni. ,,'_
])ow(.rful spa((" I('('hno]ogy (.amlot solv(_ all thes(" l)r()i)lcms. I1 (inn ()nl_,' In(']]) wh(:n
Ih(' s()(i;ll pr()blcm (,niVil()nnnllCl'll is ready l(i a(:((:pt anld [l_(" Ih(' t('chnol(igy.
171%:11 - ( )hs('rvalion
]u) social [)re)lilt, ms, IIH'r(.' art." manly hazards _n([ o])sla(l(,s 1o Ill(' slnc'c'('SShL1 ap[)li(ali()u
(if I('( hn()l()gv.
R('(()lnl m('nl(llnl it)in s
1. lu s('l('(ling l('('hll()l()gy ;.In'('as to work onn, primary emphasis sholLld lie [)laccd (in thos(.'
lhal d('riv(' f]orll spa((" capabililies in a Father direct manner. Then we sholn]d (()nsid-
(.'r linosc llnal n(!(luir(' lalellls and te(:hnol()_,_' uniql.l(" It) NASA. Then we should (()ll-
sid(tn - mils(in-mo(litic_Hiolls and ("()nY_eIsiol|s of NA,%A l('('hnolo_n:,. Foll(lwing lhat, w("
w()uld (()nsi(h,r major lnO(|i|]c_lli()ns of NASA technology mM si_nil]caIit irrv(,slln(,llls
ill al)l)lyill _ NA,%A technolo_.,_' It) new needs. ]qnall._; we ll|i_;hl (orlsid(,n the _enelilli()ll
(if un('w I('(hn()logy Ih_tl does not ('×isl, |hill 1|(_) ont, iS w()rking oi1, and where w(" have
r(';isn)n 1() (!×p(!cl a ]li,_,h pn(ll)abilily of sn(((!ss. I use lh(" t('rm "techrn(i]o_Q'" to in('h.l(l('
])()[h Inar-(b:van-(. and software _.s well as organizational, nlanH_{.!ll|('lll, pn()C'llrenll('nlt,
h'ga], i)('rs(mn('l, and leadershi I) skills residing wilhin NASA. (Spe('ifi( ('rileni;i t()r ('val-
uati(m of t)r()l)Os('d opl)ortnnities are (lisclLssed in (]hapler Xi, _-nl([sonl(' of lilt" pit-
l_lll_; ill _,()(:iill fields arc lll(Pll[.i()ll(!d in Chapter VII.)
9. (](wl;ain s;,tl_('gnlards al|d cautions mttst be applied to prev(:'nt prenlallnr(% inad('qllal(." (it
l('('hlli('aily IIllSOuI|d approaches to problems. (.]eri_ain kinds of prol)lenns, pal'li(nlallv
wh('l'(." t('(hll()l()gv is I'lO! I.h(" dominant deficiency, should not |)e tOtL(hed until Ihc
('nvir())nm('nl is more [avorat)le |()r a('hiev(2ment. (]el'litin prol)lems aft' lind will b("
if|If'||('|ill)l(" ¢)1" llllil{lr;.l('liV(' |fir SOllle years. These factors arc (|iscllssed fnrlh(.'l ih
(',ha])l('n X! o[ lhis r('ll()rl.
!_;. in general, i t_'('l lhal NASA should av(lid basic research, haMware dev('h)|)m(!nl tirol
can t)(. (hint" hv in(luslry, so('ia], psychological, I)(qlaviora] or so(:iol()gi('al sill(lit',',;,
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Ol)crational functions, minor or trivial l)r_!jects, anythhLK in which industry or gov-
mnmcn! ahcady has a heavy invcstmcnl and on-going work, anything lacking a direcl
link 1<_ N,\SA skills and ,t'xlmri,.'nct', utl.(t,.,rtakings la(king (lt't]nable wmls and ',vil]l il
very I<mg-ritngt" ])avl:,l't, iut(I ])v_!je('ts with()tll it reassuring f)r,clSl)t'ct ()f su('(('ss fi)r Ilw
ov,eritll (no1 ,::,nlv lh,.' Ivchn,.:,loRica.I) ,::,l)jcclivcs.
VIll - ()bscrvation
NASA has a very crcdital)l,.' record ot inlcvagency cuop,.,rati_m and coordination.
Sonw innovative and imaginative initial|yes have bccn takt'n ])y t l,u',tdquart,urs and ltv Ihc
(]cntcls but hilvc riot cxhattsled tilt" p<lssibililh's tor fullller dm'eh)pntcnt ot t{+<hn<d<_gy
l Iillt sit'i itll+_til_('lllCI l Is.
[_] Re<:<munendations
NAS,'\ should c,iticallv cxamine its currcnt work t(w other governn|eltt agencit,s with
a view t(_ t,hnming it (lowt+ to signilicant, challcrLghtg, and promising ettOl+ts tor whi,:]l
NASA has a uniqttc capability. We" should ttot 1)c at generalized R&l).jol:_ sh<lp tor <lth('r
agCil('it's, il<)i + shottld xvc do ill-[IC, tlSC work thai can ])e lmrchascd <m ((llltl'itcl tlqr)tl'l
industry oF uldvcrsitics.
N,,XSA should tiroad<ql its policy of iiilcrag('llcy cooperation to itccoiltittodat(' a Sl)t'(-
llilln of niodes Io salis[_' diftT.'rcnl needs aitd coildilioiis. ] would itl('hldc:
a) On-ihcTiob ii-aining of [)orsonne] |iotti oilier a_('ilci('s oit NASA activities--an
cxcelicttl start has I)c, cii lilade with lhc Arniy.
b) l)cdication of specialized [)('i'soitill'l Io Sl)VCific lasks for ollicr iigt'ili'il's.
t') Trluistt'r of I{tcilili('s it|i([ o])cialili_ slaff tlndt'r ccililiti coiidilions Io _lliicr ago'n-
tics.
d) l_]xchiui<_t , ])crsoiiii('[ wilh olhcr ag(,nt+it, s liv sat)l)ali(als and lrainin_ assi<_ninclllS,
c) .Johtt cil'iilion wilh ollit'i" a<_('iicit's lif s])ecial-l)tiiliOS(' it'si'aixh iiisiitulcs. (For
t'xaiill)h', l)Ossil)ililics Itii_hl ])(" ailTia[l Mruclill'CS, uri)ali svslctils cii_iitl'('iill_,
ciiinc iccltnology, liuildin<_ s)'slcins icSCalclt, ]li_]lway satbiy, svnlht'iic t0od
|('scat-oh, alid ;tit liafllc coitlrol,)
f) (]i't'aliOll within NASA of Cadlt! R&I) Olgittii/ali()ns Io work (HI It'('hlll)lo_y prob-
h'ili_4 of olhtq li<_t'lii'i_'s with a ((llliitiillit('iil Io li+ailS[i'r a I)roduciivc, litliliii-t" alid
vial)it activity Io lhe <llht, i a t_t'it(y allcr a iitllit])Cl o[yCalS. AIIhougll iiianv adiiiill-
islraliVc [)rol)l('ins will I)t, Cll(()tltllClcd. ] I)clit,vc they (till I)t+ s<d_,cd if llic basic
lmlicy enjoys sti'oilg iiiiinal_t'nit'iil Sli|)poil.
IX - ()l)si*i+vatiOliS
One hc<us ;t ti('(lucnt criliiisnl Ihal spinoft ti_lln lit(' Sl)a(e I)ro,_rlun has done litth' ot +
nolhin_ [<)r ])tisiiit'ss. I lak(! a dim vil!w of t)lOSl)t'cls _lf (h-alnalic SilCCess lit Ihis aicii. In
g#.'llt'iii], siliiiil 1)ilSiti(,ss is ilol itlll'rcslc(| ill kli_)wicd<_-t, per se, ii tttl.'rciv WalilS a SlJt'cific
lii<l(hlcl ill ])i<l(hi(li(in It*(ilililitit" prol)leln to It(! solved. ()tit ITccltn(ilog T {rtili/ation]
plo<_iaili, which dis|tenses knowlt'dg(', ili[<)i'litliliOll aiid i+cpoils thids all iilitesi)OllSiVc
rccipi('nt in sinai[ l)usincss, lit Sl)itc of its iliaiiy initoValiVc allciiti)ls Io identity, packaR('
and ])usli its |)lOducl. _ilicl" wt' (aniiol s(*il([ 191_()_,t'inincnl or (onlra(+l t,n_iiicl,is I_l
sinai] 1)tiSiilt,Ss to solve lht'ir specitic ])rol)]citis, wc will c()iilillue Io lit'at lhl'it (()ni-
t)laints tor illaily ,'_tqii+s. Until sina]l btlSillCSs realizes tlial ii lililsl (h'vc[o]) th(' rccipii'nt
CalJa]>i]il) cillter by individual or glou]) h/ilialiVCS (induslry or trade associalions), it
will look [Ollgiit_ly and grud<l._higly al goxt,iiiliiCiil R_I) eXl)endiluri's. Nl'vl'i'lliel('ss,
,_ovciilttiClll itlllSl c()iililiilc Io liv lit develop, ]iV t'VeI'V tt*asil)h" ili('ailS, its flow o[ Ic('h-
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noh)gy infiwnlalion to) small business. Big I)usiness can lake care of iiself since it is fre-
qucnll_ Ihe d_'posilor,_ Ihr lcchnolol_ ff or il knows how Io oblain and use h.
NA,SA's Tcwhn_dogy l!iilizalion iJrogrllm has been ih(" subject of conl_-nlious discus-
SiOII t)V¢<'I lhe yei|l'_i, llYhill Illillly l_Col)h ' tail to realize is Ihill lechnolot_ / [litll_if(!l is il
social i_'l)llllllllllicilliOll ])roct*ss (hill isjusl II()W I)l.'_illllJll_ tO ht, illl(lels(oo(l. "[ht, capit-
bilily at lilt" S()lll((! 1(1 dil'l'cl lind l)llsh a]lt)licalion o[ le(llll(ll(lgy iS ,sevelelv linliled.
The t'llll'¢'l)lellellliill (']('lllelll i_i (11_1('11 lacking illld 1110 l¢'cel)l¢)l ('llVilOlllllelll is ()flell
unr_'sl)_msive. NeJlher can be conlrolled by 1he sollrce of Ibe lechn_)h)gy.
l)oclnnenlalion, screening, idcnlilicalion and dissenlinalion arc absohllek, necessary
hill ill'(" llr)l Sllf[icil'lll I0 [UlllSIIre the use of (Ill.' liv('hllOll)_ry, 'l'tl('_(' aclivilies _ll'e
kllll()ll_ Ih(' leasl I)o1('11I t_t(tOlS hi Millltllillil'l_ 1hi' ill()Velll(,nl illl([ ilse o| le(hn(fl()g,9'.
Ri'i'C)llllll('llditliOll
NA,%,%sh<_llld re-;ift'lrnl Jls connnilnl_,nl Io lechnoh)g)' lr;nlsti'r ill hs I)roadesl _'llsl', I_l
ihc privllll' _ell()l (tt the i'lqlll()llly lind Io oilier _OVCllllll(qll enliiies. There shonld t)e lt'ss
i,ilillliltsis on devices, lcchniques, illali'rillls and coili])onellls since we know lhal rel)ealc'd
eiiiinil'r;iliOli of lhese ileiliS, whih' iintlrl'ssive to t'ilgineer_, is less Ihlin t)t,isnasivc" 1o ilw
l)llt)lic. The re;tier enii)hllsis should be Oll direct leChllOi{t_' <%lll)l)ol'l Ill il Sllllill Illllllt)el-(1t'
In;!jor t31o_rillllS illld nlissions of _oVel'lllllelll lind illdnslry, especially in innovaliw'
illTiln_l'lllCIIl_ Ih_ll hel t) olht'r ()l'_llliliition_ Io ilpply l_xiSlili<_ lechnolol_ _" lllorc" etti'clively.
T|il" co_ll)erltiiv<" 1"t}7_iIs of lll,ollle slioilld |)c slrcssed r_lliicr l|iiiil i|le di_;_('liiililtlJoii of
lechiiil ill do(illlleilllilion ;nld lhe llalurat, long-lernl, diflll_iOil of _;l)ace lechnolokrx'. NASA
ileC'ds Io aclel)l lhe l)rhwi])lc thai lhere is III1 eil_y _h(ll'lClll lllelhod of'le<'hnoh)gg' IFilllF, Ii'F
((]|lal)ll'r V1). The lllO_il efti'clive methods involve ihe _ellerOll_i giVillg of OllF ie,%OlllCeF,
wilh lie ol|il'r COllSidl'rlilioii Ihlili I_eing of service. This idea rllns COllnlt'F Io i'OliV0nliOll-
ill JnflollrJnalh_n, I)lil ii prodiices llllw c|lallen_l" and file kind of dvlilillii_;ili in Jill Rlt_;l)
_lr_iniilalion Ihai NASA iiet'ds io fosler ill Ihis l)oinl in histoiv ....
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In the mid-1970_, while NASA k tmdlzet was deelining from its peak spendinL_ period, a ,_eries of eco-
ueanic ¢'z,aluctlicm _tudie_ wa_ ce_mmi._ioned. 7"he main purpose ¢_/ these ttt_di¢<_ wa._ to holster the
at_kmmet_t_ ]m i_¢'rea_t,d [.undint_ ba.sed oll the premise that the cumulative hentJit_ /kom NASA R&D
were #tt{_e emmgh [or the nation to continue to invest in space. Because NAS,'4 had atl active tech-
nolok,y /rangier prog'ram in place, the monitorittg o/this program for economic impacts and case
anal_,_e_ wa_ important it!formation to document the spino[ ] benefit,s. The [_niver_ity e[ l)e_n,er
Iee_eareh Institute had the ongoing cont_vict for collecting this inJmmation. This study wa_ per]armed
to e_timat,, ag.k_re_ate bemfitg iiom the iniormation-di_semination-ba_ed technoh_k_' tran,_,ikr prok_ram.
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NASA Tech Brief Program:
A Cost Benefit Evaluation
May 1977
Ill EXE(:UTIVE SUMMARY
A cost benefit study of !lie NASA Tech Brief Program was c<mducted by tile Denver
Research Illstill.llt? under (Olllra([ lo [hc Technology Utilization ()ttice. Net benefils to
public and private seclor organizations due to Technical Support Package (TSP) requests
between 1971 and mid-1976 were statistically estimated tiom random sample data.
Progrmn operating costs tot lhe same time period were based on a trail cost analysis con-
ducted by the [Technology Ulilizalion ()fticc] Program Evaluation and (2mlrol l)ivision.
Fhc study objectives, melhodolog T and resulls are sumn_arized below.
()bjcctivcs
The Tech Brict/TSP Program is one of several operational mechanisms in tilt" NASA
Technol_g_' Utilization ]TU] Program designed to transfer aerospace technology' to both
public and private sectors of tilt, economy, h is, howeveI; the oldesl of these mechanisms,
dating back Io 1963, and has been one of the principal mainstays of NASA's technolog3
transfer eftorts over the years. Tech Brielis and other new wchnology itllllOllll(.'elllClllS ptlb-
lished by the TU Program have generaled an annual a'_erage of over 26,000 inquiri¢-s since
1964. In addition, NASA has maintained, under contract, a data bank on requests and
applicalions for new technology' announced by 7>ch Briet?s since 1968. This data bank
contains over 121),1)00 entries and provides one of lilt' most t:<mlplele records ol any tech-
nolog T Iransl_.+r program operated by the Federal (;overnment. Based on the availability
of data and lht- request by Congress in the FY 1977 NASA Authorization Bill to conduct
"a cosl benefi! tollow-up analysis," the Agency elected to study its Tech Brict/TSP
Program. The second ot_jcctivc tin- Ibis study was to develop an evaluation nlelhod which
sat|sties lhe (If|ice of _litllilgCIllCnl and Budget guidelines tot cvahtation managements.
Melhodology
Belwccn 1971 and mid-1976, 72,50(} TSP rcqucsls due to "l'ech BriefS, were recorded in
tile data bank and 15,500 questionnaires had been returned fronl the ongoillg six month
mail questionnaire stuve}; A Iwo-ticred ialldOlll Saml)le of questionnaires was selected to
assure a 95 percenl confidence level lot extrapolating the samph" dala to the cnlirc ])opu-
lalion of TSP requests. Slruclured lelephone interviews were conducled for the second licr
random sample ct'lls delined by requesl year and questionnaire responses.
|ill The interview data included responses to the tollowing qucsti_ms:
a) D,]la! specilic use was made of the TSP (e.g., inlormation source on solar energy
or developed new compuler conlrol soliwme tot chemical processing) ?
b) What costs and gross benefits arc direclly auributed to the particular TSP, how
were these quaiHities estimated, and when did they occur (e.g., number of hours
saved in 1972 times the hourly talc including overhead)?
Only data which salisfied Federal guidelines on costs and bcnefi!s wcrc acceplcd lot
analysis. Standard slatislical mclhods were used 1o eslimate three prolr, dfilily dislribulions
lor the samph" data, and an expcclcd net I)cnelil wduc per TSP I'('(]IICSI WilY, calcula!cd
li'om lhcsc dislribulions. The t'xpeclt, d ncl bencfil pcr requesl was muhiplicd I>y file !ol;al
reqttcsls Io oblain Ihe csIilmllcd lotal benelils tiom requests made bclween 1971 and mid-
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1976. This tigur+`_ includes net benctits which arc expected to occur after 1976, with s<mw
net I)cncfit sttt!ams continuing into the 1980's.
NASA costs were (al(tdal<._d for each ()l)eratil)g year by multil)lyin _ lhc tolal trails
((..g., Tt.ch Briclk pul:,lishcd and mailed, T,";l)'s r<.'l)r<)duccd ) timcs the cost pet +tmiu. ttnit
(()sls Wele estimated by experienced TU personnel for all direcl and indirccl cost lactors.
l+<mtl net lwnclits to users wcrv divided by NASA c<>slS to calculate a h,¢mclil-t<_-cosl
ratio for the Program.
Resuhs
Th+`' t:,+`'netii-to-cost ratio t_lr th+`" "l'+`xh Brief/TSP Pfogi+am is t)etwcen 10:1 and about
I 1:1. The total NASA +`osis, discotmted io 1976, were $6A million fi>r lhe [ix'+.' and onc-half
ycar pe,iod. T<_tal nct bent, Ills, discounied to 1976, wcre 1)elween $63.8 tnilli<m and
,$77+.'1 million t7>1 requi.,sis iliad(' ill lhe same linic l)eriod, Federal lax ix,vt,nu+`'s duc io COl--
l)Ol+at+`" iax+`'s only t<lr these li+`'l I)cii<.'tits were estimai+`'d Io t)(" tiOlii Olil., and one-half to
lhr+`'c iilii+`'s the Pro_,ralli ((isis, which indicates that these cosls aix' iiloix" thai( rccovcicd
wilhoui cllarl4iii _ I<li Ihc (hie(ill(elliS.
Appiicali<m,,+ flit TSP's wcrc characlerized in li)ur al)l:ilication inodl.,s, each haviill4 all
exp+`'cied not bl'n+`'fii itild prot)ability (if" OCClil-f(qlC(':
Mod(' 0 - i/l) applicali<ln, $0 II+`'i benei]t; 34% ch{inc(!.
[iii1Pvlode 1 - inlilrlnalion acquishion, $100 (let 1)t!il+`'tii, .r14% ctlance.
Mode 2 - iinpr<)vcd liioccss, l)fOduct or service, $5,01)l) net t)ent'lit, 11% chance.
Mode 3 - li+`'w proc+`,ss, l)r<lduci <>i SOlViCe, $22,60tl to .$31,100 il+`'l t)enclil, 1% cllail<.t'.
Th+`' +`'Xl)CCtcd li+`'l I)cilclit i)cr TSP ieqll+`.sl is al)Olii ,$_R7,:), l)lil lilt-+`'+`' +lilt +if +tl_,'t' lt'(liit'sls
l:,rodu<c lie( lll:.n+`.lits less Ihaii $100.
The tmnctit-io-cosi ralio is quitc good for ally iypc of gov+`+i-nliit'lii lli+ogi+alil, alid il
colnpar+`+s v/'i+y tavorably with ttie rest(its fro(it oilier lechnical illl_lrltlaliol+l dissemination
tii-o_i-aili'.;, Tht' <)vcrall assi's_,lli+`'l+ll [ilf file Tech Brit!IITSI _ llro_l-aln, based Oll qualilaliVe
data holn ill(' ilil('rvi+`'w Sallipl+`', i,'.+also good. A high l)olcillia] tor iini)rovin,g lht' Plo_ralil
was indicalcd I)y (til+ltl+`'i slalislical ailaly.<,+l's of lhe dala and Ot)l)Orlunilies lot doin_ so al++`"
I++`.COliiiil+`,lid i,d.
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As a fidlowap to the March 1976 Mathematica study, MathT'ech, the "_+_('t'_JSL_Orcompm U _!/"
Malfwmatica, a.alyzed the &nffit.s and costs o.f ._m,eral succe,s.*.fid lechnolog 9' t_rtnsfi'r o[[ire project._.
The _tudv added t. the _.cces_ion oJtu" O, positive henefit-cost ralio,_ thal _\_'t,g,,t wa_ /£eneratinLr du_.
i.g thM em in it_ budget support activities and, in particular; .ft. the _upport o/the technolo_o' tran_-
[m Imd,wt. 7'he economic methodology, was straight/brward and wall documented, llowm,e_; the
narrow [Ocu_. which included only the costs as.,odated with technololo' tran._fi'r activities, tended to
oper_tale the ratim and results.
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A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Selected
Technology Utilization Office Programs
N<wcnlbcr 7, 1977
Ill EXE( :t :TIVE St rMMARY
Since its cstahlishnlcnt ill 1,¢t58, lilt' Nati<mal At+ronautit+s and S]:,acc ,Mhninistration
(NASA) has playcd a nmjor rolc in tt'cht]ology llailsl_:q thr<mgh activities which encour-
age lilt" adoptitm, by other scctovs of the econonly, of tt'chnologics or tcchniqucs dcvtq-
oped tot tilt" space program. '1'o pr<widc a tbrnml program to supptwt and monitor
techn<_logy t,anstim NASA, ill 1962, eslablishcd its hlduslrial Aiq)licali<ms ()lticc, tilt" prc-
dt't:cssor of today's Technology Utilization ()lficc (TU()).
This sununary bvictly icpol+tS the rt+sulls o1 a study applying standard mt'lhods ol+ cosl-
t)ent.th analysis to selected program activities nlanagt'd by TUO. ()ur prinlary <_bjcctivt + ill
lilt" sludv is to amtlyzc lilt' costs illld t>cncfils of selected TU() activifit's, I)ast'd upon avail-
able data.
In order to n/cot this <>l_jcctiw, wc have sclcctt'd a suhsct ol Tt:()'s i)miects or activi-
ties tor analysis. The main criltwion for selection was tilt" availability of dala. To east" lilt'
burden of data galhcring, wc have Iurlht:r linlilcd lilt' aclivilics ¢'xamint'd to fllost+ con-
ducted during the period 1970 to 1976. Ncvcrlhclcss, lilt" avaihtl)Ic (lala Ibr lilt + l)r_!jc(ts
wc havc st'lcclt'd art" somtqimes i]lCOtlllJlclc, or arc sul_jtrct t<>consi(hrrablc Utlccrlaitltv.
The individual activities thilt wt" havt" analyzcd art' grot,pt'd into two gt,nt.ral calc-
g<wics: inlbtnlafion activities and applicalions i)rc!jccts, lntor,nation activities arc dircctt'd
toward lhc produclion and disst'minalion of docunlcnls descrilfing, NASA tcch,lology as
wt'll as computer programs and docunttmtati<m. Al)plication pr<_iccts arc dcsigncd to sup-
port tilt" Iransfer of a specilic techn<_log T or tt'clnliqut" by participalin R with olhtqs ill lilt'
I_1 dcvelol)nmnt of a new prodttcl or l)r<)ccss.
We have estimated two tlilt_'rt'nt intti(al<lrs <>fv.tluc tbr each activily/l)r<!icct wt" exam-
inc. For both intornlalion aclivilies and al)plications t,,0it',ts, ,,,t. t'slimatc tilt" I)t'nt't]ts
which arc dircclly associated wilh Tt:()'s costs. For convcnicmt +wc will call thcsc "Tilt)
Bt,nclils." The "cost-I)t, nctil i('sl" which wt' nlakc ill each of our amtlvscs ol Tt +() acli'+ilics
consists ot+ COmlmring TU() 1)cnctils wilh lhc TtT() cl+sts of thc ;tclivily gctwr:lling Ihtqn.
lfTt:() 1)c,tcfits exceed TU() costs, tilt" activity passcs lilt' cosl-I)cnt'tit lt'st, This is an indi-
cation that society gained lllOl-t' l]l:.llt "l't;O's ,tclixitics (in lilt+ Ibrnl of new inIortnati<m,
new prot:csscs, or new l)rodtt(ls) than it lost ill the ta-,:cs, IlSt'l" ('osls, illld tiNCt" t+hargcs
which wcrc incttrrcd in the pr<wisiml of list' (:,t tilt'st' activities.
Whih' tilt' pritnary i-t.slllls ol this SllldV t,stilll_ltt +tilt' cosls a,.I hcnctils ot T[r()'s tt'ch-
,lohlgy Iranstbr aclixilies, wt! also prcst!nl two olher special indicators of tht" ¢'cononlic
impact of thcst' activilies to pr<widt, sonl¢+ pcrspcclivc. Thcst" indicators ditt:vr tot inlof
tnati<>|l aclivilics and applications i,0jt'cts.
For inl_wmation activities, wc cstimatt+ lilt' sum of TU() l+cnclits, ttscv ¢hargcs, and
user costs. ]'his nunlber provides an indicati<m of the value society places on tilt' into,--
lll;'llit>ll ('(>ltlltitlt't| ill tilt + transliq tncdia. For c<mvenit'ncc, wc rt'fi'r It> this lllt'aSltl+t • its
+activity scale." Tltc nlcasurc ol+ attixitv sca]c fi>r infornlati<m activities is intt'ndcd to indi-
calf tilt+ |-t'sl)uvccs others arc willing to spend to cxlracl tilt' inlormalion contained ill lilt'
wu'ious n/c'dia. As stt¢h, it provides onc (albcit inll)crti.'ct) cstimatc 13] ol lilt' valuc of lilt'
tcchnolo'gy c<ml,lint'd in lilt" int_wnlation. Igor applications pr<+jecls, wc t'stilnatt' lilt' Stllll
ofTl_:() t:,cnclils and th<Jsc lx, ncl]ts thitl atl't' attributable to other i:,arlicipants. V+,'crctbr t_
this lllt';lStllU Hs "al)plicalions bt,nclits." Apl)lic,tti_ms l)cncl]ts arc inttqldcd to l+'Slilll;itt' thc
valuc to socit'IV of lht' llt'%v i)t+Oie<l or ll,+<wcss h> which TU() is a tonlrilmt_m
II i_, iml)ort_mt t_) rc<oglti/c that only Ill(" TUO I)t't1(,lils tltc_tsurc can I)c its('(| t_+ })a_.,s
()it lh(' tti('l-ils ()I rtI(ys a('livilit+s. It+ it(+dill<m, it('tivity s('idc iu1(l apl)licali()ns l)('tt(,fits (h)
l|()t m(,_tstlr(' ¢+)mlmr_dfl(+ v_tlut.s, ht (lilt (.siimitl(, oF al)l)N(alR)its })<'li('l]ts, w(, it1('+isttvt' [}I('
1,:+thlc (>f the l)r<)du(:t <)r I)l()('('Ns whi('h hi('lu(I('_+ l)olh Ih(' It+('hlt()l().gy Irallst('t+r('d thr()ttg|+
TU() +ll+(I th(' tc(lm()h)_y ('(mt|il)tltcd by oil+or lt+ulicil):ml_+. The (+retire+tic ()t +activity s(;tl( +
i_+m+ c_+fim:ll(, <_t Iht • v+duv _t I('('lm<_h)_' (om_fiJl('(I iJ+ I1)(" trmtstlvr m('(h+ufi.,+m ah)m'+
A _+umm;(ry of our liltdiltgs i,, ])r('s('m('d in Tabl(' 1. l(mphtyiltg standard mcth<)(l_+ ot
(()st-ltct|clh atmlv_,is, w(' tilld lh,u the T!!() I)('ttt'tit_+ <)1 th<)s(' a(tiviti('++ w(" have (,xamitl('(l
arc gr('al('r Ih_m [h(' T(:() ((>sis hl(twr('(l.
ht Tal)l(' l, (',+lira:ill',+ ()f both lYl)(',+ ()t +all mc:lmu(',+ +u(' Cxtlr('_+s('d ill I)rCst'nl valtl('_+ in
197+i (fl th(" ++lr('am (tl tl(+n('ths ()v(,| the roll:rant l)t'riod, m('a_+,ur('(l ill 197li CO|lStant dof
]:its+ F<)r (.+t(h ()1 th(" itt(tivi(lu,d a(livitics, TiIO I)(,l_('til icsuh_+ ;ut" l)r¢'_.,cnl('d in both (h)llar
It.tins _+n(l a_+ r;tli()s t,) tit(' ('<)]T¢'Sl)<_|l(lilig a(:tivilv ('()'+1 h()rlv.' (lir('¢tly tly TI!().
l:.a(h <)1 tit(' c_timalc_+ i('l)<)tl(,(t in ('oltmms 2-<t of T,d)h' I ha_+ t)c('tl a(!iust(.d hv it
rt'ali/;ttion ])r()lmt)iliiy ta(l_l] whi(h is r(,i)()rlc(1 in (<)hu|m 1. Tiff+,+ rc;tliz;ttion Ihci<+F
rcll('(|_ <mr ¢,++tim;ttc ol th(. likt'liho()(! that ])o_dtivc [4] Iorigilt:d t)l;t(cm('nl of "Ett)h' I I
151 1)('lit'fits haw ()l" will dcriv(' tl+(li'li It)(" +tclivili(!s w(' h;Iv(' (';',,;;.tlllilt('(l. For t|i(! itltiiltit_ilioii
_i(ti,,iti('s, iht' r('_lliz,ilioii f)r()l)at)ilitic_ ill'(" I.tL I)l'l'_lu_.t" CXl)C('I('(I h('tt('til_ of ih(" aciivili('n
lll;lv I)(' iiil),'rr('(l (lh-{'(ll) li()llt actti_il lii_lrk('i (lala itn i1_,1"1(tl'lll_lil(I tor lht" a(livilit's. ()ln-
l'sliiilal('_ ()t r(,:.iliz_ili()li llr(il)_lliiliti(,,_ f()r _il)|)li(_lli()lt_ t)r(!jcct_ illt! _t+li(,r_ill), l(,ss lh_lit iitl(,.
This is t)c(aus(" lll<)si (it lit(" ]Jr(!j(,(t l(!(hnol()gi(,_ Ii;.iv(" v('l to l(,it(}l lit(' tllitl'k('ll)l_wl', ,utd
a('('()r(litigly lh(u(' is tlll('i't'l_tiltt_; _tl)[)ltt wtl('lh('l" llw,v will. The tlit'iho(l liy which th('s(" rcal-
iz_ili()n llr_llilil)iiili('s W('l(' ('stililal('(I f()r Ihc al)l)li(iliioiis I)rojc(t,_ is (lis(us<,,;(!(t in (]h_lt)It'i-
V. Tit(' rail() sh()wtt iH (+()hllitti ,I i_, lh(' iatio of TUO Ill, ill'Ills, i. ('., I)cil(,t]l,_ aitrit)ulalil(" i()
ll!(), l<) '1'[!() a(iivhy (osl_, This i+_tii(i sil()ws wh(.ih('r or liol )hi" TIl() t)cn('lils ot_t giveil
Ttr() _i(.liVily 7it(, ,gl'('_lll'l" Ih;tlt it,_ ('()st. If ihi_ ralio is .gt'('_il('l" lh_ui (lilt', lhoil tht" ('()_,l-
lit'Ill'Ill I(',_1 is l)itsst'(I.
Table 1
Summary of Estimated Benefits and Benefit-Cost Ratios
of Selected Activities Initiated 1970-1976 _
(All Benefits in Millions of 1976 Dollars Discounted to 1976)
a. Information Activities
1 2 3 4
Rc_tli/_tlion TU() ll_t'iiCtils T[!() t_,<'m'tits TU() llcn('|ils-
Pr[ibat)ility Plus User (;<)sis "IIT() ('_t I,)_ttJti
and ('hargcs
"]'('chliit,i] ,Sill)l)+)rt ll_i('k::tgt's ].f) $ 87.0 $ 2.0 l+2
( ;( )SMI( ; 1.tl 3(i7.0 6. I <t.1
l. ]:l>l Iltt()liil;tli(_il I'i(i,41;Uli_. the c,,tiililllc_, ;ir(' I(_l till' t)cliod 1970-1!i71i. I:lir lh(' AI)lflicali()ils
I'i(!i_', i_. lhc (",till)all", ;ill' liii It'll V('_li_ :itll'i I'_'-;ll('(i('(I (Ill _l('lll_il) i'l)liitncl(i_lli/_ltiOli.
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b. Applications Projects
1 y ,'_ <I
R('alizatioli TI.!() I_cll_=tiis "1"1.!() Bt'Nclils "I'U() I_cll_'til-
t)robabilitv Plus ()thor "I'U() (_lst i_tlio
Ilioiil('dic;ll:
( :_llili'_l('l TI)(>l 0.5 3 I.I) (i.4 41 ,()
]lurns i)i+it_ll(tsis I.l._ 7.7 1.1"I _.7
M('al Sv_I('III_, O. 10 10.F) .8 F>,I_
I)iiCt'llllik('r 1.00 7Y,O .7 1. l
I Itiinilll "Fissuc
Slinilll_tlor I),:t(t ._ 1(7.0 7,(/ ._t.(i
1':i i<_i i i ('t,li i i_:
Nickei-ZillC II_ltlt'ry O.TlO !17_,(l l 5.(l (ii-I.()
Ziilc-Ri(h ( :O_llilil_i (I._10 iil'l.t) 1 ,I.17 :_,t0.()
Tr_i('k-'l'r_lili l)vll_tllli('_;7 0.70 {ttq.(t ,07 7.(J
Phx!ti_ill('i"s Br(,alhilil4
_)'_1('111 _ l.()O ti. 1 !t.14 .<l.ti
'I'll(" lolal TUO l)('neiils iiolll tile applic_tlions |)ro.jccls _tllal),zed _tlc (!siilll_tlt'(t to b('
$44.9 tlliilion with a ])(!ni'til-(-ost r_llio of 27. ] lowi!vt, l-, ])t_c_illS(_ lilt" applicati<)ns ])r(!jt'(ls
ev;t]li_llt'd d() nol conslilillC _t r_tiidoin _tlll])l(., i]ic rt'sil]lS ic])()llc(l in T;tl)]t, l c_tnnol ])(,
u,_t'd I() in|ill|It. ])('llcfilS I() lht" ()vcr_i]l _t])])lic;ilions illtilers|in. 'l'lw coriespoiidinl_ Iol_i] _tit([
r_tlio [or lilt" iil|()iill;ilion _iciivilics wc cx;lillillCt| {ti(" r('sl)cclively $I_.1 Illilli()ll iilltl 7.5.
Rt'illt-ilii)t, rin l._ ill,it tht" illl(llin_llion aclivity e._iilii_tlt',_ _irt! I)_i,_(!(l ill)lilt ([_tl_i (in II_lliS_tclioiis
Ihill at:lustily took place ([uiin_ lht" I)t_riod 1970-1_.)7(L while llw ;_l])])[ic;tliolls pr0iccl ('sli-
Iliillt'_ _il'(" _('ner;lliy [7)i- pr(_jccls Ilia| will hi" colll])](,l(,d _l|lcr 1_.)7(i, _tll _t])proxiiileii(, ovt'r_l]
('slhn_ilt, ()[ th(" TIT() I)('llciiis of tile _t(iivilit_s _iil_liyz(,(i (_tli t)(, di'iiv_,tl |l()lli ihc st|ill ()t lit('
])('il('til,s shown ill lit(" l_ibl(,. %{'h('ll lhi,s i,_ do|it, w(" o])l_tili ('Slilll_ilt-(l T[ r() ])('n('til,_ till lilt'St'
I lil scicclt'd activili/'s of $."t:_ niillion _111([ _1 I)t'il(,tii-_osl i_tlio (fill) lilt Tt!O's a(iivilv.
[i is iliit)orl_lnl to liildcisl_iiid l]lat out /'slinmtt.s of I)cil('|it._ _lii(I ])cnt'lil4()sl r_llios
sii()ll[([ I)c l;tk(!il _t_ ;tVt'l-_l_('s iibOlll whict_ SOlll£- un(:(!llilillli(_!.; cxi,_l. Th('ii" _il(" l|li('(, ilia|ill
s(itll(i,s ()t Ihis uilc('rl;tinty: possibit_illt'7t._,tlli-lll0nt ('l-|()l- ill lhc data; possihll, ('ll()l'_ ill o111"
iliod(,iin_- of i(']_lli()nshi])_ usin<_ Ilic ([_tt_t; _ill([ i_rrors in I<li('C_lSlill_ llic |lilur('. ll('calis(, lll('
[;i,_l <)f lilt'S(" iyl)cs of UllC('i-l_tiilly (hit's ilol |)()s(l _i i)rol)i_,in t()i ()111 csihllTtlt, s ()t lilt ])('nt'lils
;ls,_o(i;ll(,d wiltl lilt" in[(lllli;lti(lll aclivilics, lhost" bcnctils l)r<_bably ]l;tv(' ]('ss llnct'rl_linlv _lss()-
ci_tlc(l willl lhl'ln. ! [owt'v(,i; lilt' ll_lllll(! ()| the d_ll_i S(illlt'(,s ;tlld Ill(" (()ilil)()iiildin_> O(lll_iii,+,
i_tll([()in t'v¢'ills t)rt'vcni._l _tlly qil_tiilii;tiive t_,_lilll;il('s of llit'._t- (;rror ])<ltlildS t}<)lli ])('illg ilia|dr:.
lllt_cd on 1|1(' illflWIilillili]l ill l]i])]e ], il ('till |)(" COll(:hidc(t l]llil for lko_e pr<Jk_<#m._ <_,d
pl'l]]_Y'/.S lhfll tl#t' hrzt,e _.<d)'zed, ill(" contributioii ()1" '1!.!() ill lit(" f(_l'lll ot })('il('flls g;liil('(l
Ihr()li_h ils l('(']lnolol_y ll'_illslt'i ])r(i_r_iillS is <_l-(';llcr ill,ill Ill(" (()sis il iliCiilTt,d ill ill('
])1"( )('('ss ....
'J. ]+:siilii;ill'(I IJ;ii;liii('iii(';li[)...,
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>lime 1976, ,%:'tSA ha_ annually published the book 3;pinq]]_ which report_ on _u,'cesfful case,_ of tech-
no/oLg: tran_fi, t: "l'kis _lucl_' examined tke vaPJou.s terknolo_es tkat have been fi,atured i_ spinqff2 The
Cbapma_ Itmean:h (;roup comluded that the benefit.s fizmt more than 400 ca_es may have bem_ as
Kreat a.s $21 billion in _ales. These JiLvure_ do not include any cost_, nor an_' un._acce.s_]id tech_wlo-
Lries. The p_qmar_, purpose oJ /hi+ _tudy was to update and expand on the earlier studies _" the tech-
mdo_ U tran_fi'r pr%,_am that w_.re u._ed to _appmt both the ,\_.L%'_ bu@t am/the tecbnolog), tran,}fi'r
]mdgzq, which hi._to_4ca/(_" kat a/wto_._ /u'rp_ under se_utbo,.
An Exploration of Benefits
From NASA "Spinoff"
.Jmw 1989
[ I [ The Ii)(us ofthis study has l)cen to explore those applications of NASA lechn<+h)g,n/(<)r
NASA-assiste(l techn()log?.' tr_tnsli'r) |ha! have l)eerl reported in the annttal rel)ort, ,gpiaoffl
The l)rinlary ])url)osc has l)t'en t() identify what benelits resulted [i()m th()se ai)l)lit-ations,
anti. ['tlrth('l, It) (]llantil _, l)t'l+it!l]ts (w|l(.re p<)ssil)le) l<)ward which tilt' appli(+ati()ns made a
(()ntril)tlti()n.
l)arl 1 o1' this r('l)()rt, "SliMy Approach and (]onducl," sttttmlariz('s the m('th()d<)loh_ .,
used and the chaIIeng('s lilce(l by the study team .... lh)wever+ tile reader sh()uM l)e aware
<)f several iml)()rtant, general conditions which afli'ct the scope and inclusiveness ()l this
stttdy ill ternls o[ how/ulls, it ca]++tul+es the benelits of NASA-furnished |echlloll)gv.
First, the Spinq[]magazine d()es not inclnde even all of the "got)d" examples known.
S+)me examlJh's have not heel) published simply because they are difficult to illustrate in
a meaningful way to the general put)lit. Such is the case with the inanv nses of
NASTbUX.N--a comptlter pr,:)graln initially deveh)ped by NASA [0r struclural analysis of
large ro(:kels, and c()nsiderably m()dilied li)r literally thonsands of non-NASA applicatitms.
Second, in working "backwards" from known al)plicati<ms, one misses th()se applica-
lions where NASA |echn()lok) _ is "embedded" into whatever was applied. That is, the orig-
inal NASA-turnished |echnoh)g 3, may have been tile basis ti)r a series ()f m()diticati<)ns
(luvi_,g which lilt, original lechnMog_; now embedded in the changes, has been "lost" as
It) its origins.
[21 Third, these benefits resulted fr<)m the contributions of only 259 applications of
NASA-sl)Onsored or [hrnished technt)h)gy. II excludes a number of impor|ant benelils
which should I)e obvious |<) even the casual observer: (1) direct NASA or Departnumt 0]
DeJenw use: such as NASA commercialization programs, mission--directt+d apl)lications
(su(h as weather satellites, c(,nmunication satellites and the like); and, (2) social benefits:
such as lives saved, Icnglhened or impr<)ved; labor days saved from illness, accident or
death; improvements in the envirollitl,t'tll ()r the quality of lift,; l)roduclivity improventenls
and tilt. like.
As revealed in this study, the techn<)h)g D, transli'r pro(:ess inchldes not only the hard-
ware end of techn()h)g,D', l)ut managerial and ec<)nomic aspects as well. h in(hld('s
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SUl:,plicrs and i,s,.'rs, inF, Uts and outputs, products and F,roccsscs. Working back, ill an his-
torical scns¢', also providcs chalh'ngcs of int0rmation galls whcrc pcoph' move or fbrgct,
organizations which have changed or disappeared, and where there may l)e a le]tlCl_tllC('
to fully acknowledge a particular I)entqh or its origins. In many rcspt:cts this stttdy rel)re-
s0nts at stq-ioilS I)robc into lilt' comph,xity (,rod difl]cuhy) of capturing "spinolF" applica-
lions, h ccrtaittlv dclllOllSlI-Htt,s tile iltq.:d t0r ear/_,, itll(I .+_+slematic aitt'ntioil to mt>,tns I_>r
identit)ing and It+ackhtg potential sphmff applicaiions--it only to mort fully tmdcrstand
this phcnomcn¢m arid its contlih, utions to lht" Nati<m.
131 PART I. STUDY APPROACH AND CONDUCT
An examination of tilt' bencths of spinofls of NASA technology presents a particular
challenge in the delineation of stttdy paratnctcrs because the scope is vast and the docti-
in(qllalioll is sparse. Since £[,im_[larticles provide the <mlv ('olltillttOtlS st)ill'Ce of t,pchnol-
ogy lvalisliq intorntation, this rescmch has as its principal source the articles which
al)l)ear¢'d in the aiilltial A_#mmffreporl betwccn 1978 and 1986.
Defining and Locating htformation Sources
rl'hl, basic hlftn-lnation tot the study was colnpost'd o| l)ersoils, conll)anit's alld insti-
lutioliS <if a_('ll[it's thai had 1)COil liit'llliOllt'd ill any ,_JJit/0[/alti(']t ` ill- on all at(Olllpally-
iltg list frout the ._'l,im+_lfilcs. Inl_ninati<ltl availalilc ti-otu these filcs was cross-checked with
t_l'llll'i + I)t'nvcl" Rt'st';ill']l Illsliltlll' (I)RI) cast' flies and whh availabh' dircclorh's slwh its
/ll00d_,,. i_, Th0ma, s /.¢,,,,,.r/_-l_; Dun _ BradMreel, lind tilt (,'ollmtrae 7"echnol%_.+ l)ireHor_' 1987, to
obtain the most rl.,(eiit toipOl-atc" Ol- business address, (lEt), lelcphonl' nlllllb¢'l', and all/
oilier rclt'vailt iilf_lrmalioli.
Development of an Interview Guide
All ilttcrvimv guide was developed COlwilrrl'lltly whh tile basic study COllia(l list. A
study of the .Spim_.ll"articles ;lil(I old case Ill fih's ill I'oll.iunctioll with the sttidy's siatenll't)i
ill woik and discussions with various NASA "Ii'chitolog_.' Utilization ()|'lice and IndllStria]
Applicatiou (]t'lllt'r pel-SOilllt!l conlrilnited t_l dctining whitl data was tlt't'/tt'(I and what
data niighl lie possible io obiaill. Earlier studics about the t)cnellts of NASA {and other)
l('st,_-iI(h _llld dl'vt'lO[)lll(,lll werc reviewed tbr COlll('lll {tlid COlll[)h'l('lll,ss. Frt)lll this
process guideline qlll'stiollS wci'e drafied, (tis( ilSSCd aild revised. 'l'tw illtt'lvi,.'w guido was
a(colnpanied I)v a _lil¢" page ilistriicliOli sht'ct l_li" inlerview0rs.
Data Collection Through Telephone Interviews
Eight inonttls of tclcphone intl,rvicws vielded soine till0 usctill interviews invok'illg
400 tOllll>_lllies. Al)l)l-tixilit_t/t!ly 2500 OlligOillg ;tllit 500 i-t'llli-Ii calls wcre ii1;<tdt" during tilt"
I'Olll-Sl" of the sludv. I1 took all aVel-agt- Ill tivc (olila(ls Io obtain a coniplctcd interview arid
the a'l't,r;.i.gt, inlcrview lenglh (hlcluding all (lllltatls) was allproxhnait!ly 15 lllillUteS.
There W('lt' ahiiost liO refusals Io c()opt'lalc, but ii was a clialleitgc to persisl unlil
SOlllt'OllO with _iil al)proprialc COl-l)Oral/, illt, lliory could tie (olllacll'd. ();_lilal'is Wl'l'/'
ahiiosl tliiiversalk' rt, sl)onsive to a iequcsl t_>1 help in a Silldy for N)tSA.
Standardization of htterview Data
A spreadsheet syslcili of record keeping, which placed the tcchnohlgy al)plicalhm into
cal(,_oiit,s dell'rlliilit'd I)v "Clid ilSe," I,_1was dcveloped by t'xli'apoialill_, frolll all alrav of
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carlirv bt,nlefits smdit's. Mom,larv, dal_t ,.v_',sstan(lardizrd by using currrnl t'stim_tlt's and
cottvt, rling labor-saving infiwm,lfion into do]hus vvht.nt.vt.r I)ossil)lt ,. Rc]cvmH inl()rmalion_
was highliglHrd using kt,y words or Phrases ....
1231 PART llI. BENEFITS: CONTRIBUTION TO SALES OR SAVINGS
Thr primary fi>+`:us of lhr slt.dy has bern tilt" namrr and rxlcnt of bcnlrtits from lhr
aPPlicalion of NASA drvrloPrd or NASA Providrd tcchnology. This has hrrn expressrd,
whrrr it was l)<_sxiF)lr to m_lkr ('Slilllillt's; ()f(lu;tnliti+`",tliozl, in trrms (ffcithcr salrs or in sav-
iwgs--slalcd ill (Iolhtrs t>r as a l)rrcrntage of businrss. Whrrr (h)lhu" savings +`()trill not br
rlicitrd ]rom Ill+`' rcsl)<m(h'nlts, cnq)hasis was l)lacrd upon man Ill<)l/ths ()l" Ill:lli yt',tl's, _lll+`I
also savizlg, s ih_tl mig]H l)t' t'Stilll;llt'd resu]ling from matcria]s, ulilitics, cquipnlcnl, main-
[('IIHII('(';lilt[('vt'llavt>itlcdrrsrar+`hmltl([("_.'(']+`)[)lll(!lllCo,s s.A_;ll()lt'dilllilt"scclion on l]Ic
st utly al)l)r, m(h, I( :hal>re.u( Rrs+`..u-+`h (;r+`>ul) ] rcs¢'ar('ht'rs havr attrnq)tr([ t<, "st_m+`tardizr"
Ihcsc s,drs ,rod savings Ilcm'lits ('whrrc they wcrc I)rtv¢i(tc(I) so that Ill+`' rrsulli.tg tigurrs
I>rrsrnl+`'(1 in /his sltt+`ly rrprrsrnl Iotal dollars in sales or savings, rv('n I}l()llgh Ill<.' inilial
_lllN%%'t'l'Sll _IV}l_IX.'+`'l>('+`'ll,_i'_Cll()llilyCitl'lyl)asi._,+`)ll_I])('l('('ll[_l_+`'()['SHI('N,()I"illlll_InVt'_l|-N
(>f effi>rl.
r['ll+`' It'l'lll _';lh'"; in+`lu(lrs, such itt'ms _ls nt,w ]lro(htcls, a+`l(liti_mal s_drs I)r('_usc o[ ;m
ivnpvovc+`l pro(blot, or iH+`rcascd sah's ])c+`mtsc o[ NASA use. No ;ttlcHq)t w;ts made to iso-
l_itr lit+`"sl>rcil]+` c(()ll(>lllic t+(intril>uti(>ns of thr l)artictflar tcclIIl()l<)<_y ()I" as:++,islmt+`'+`` to tilt"
full rawg+`' (>t' salts. I towcvrr, this rCl)_rl t,xth]drs gross salt's/s;r¢ings I]gt|n-+`.s thai l)rol)ably
iul('hu+`h'([ <Jthrr l)rotlt_(ts <w l>r<wcssrs .... Tht' coml)It!tt" assttrancc <d 1241 rxch,(ling all
l)ut +`tirrctly "l)r<>vabl+`'" l)rnrfits (an +`>nly ])t! +`hmc thr+`>ugh (hqaih'd +`asr sttn+`lirs and cxmn-
in;tli(>n ()I a+`+`+`)uultin<_inl()rnlati(>Ix fi+<>m thr particular firvns inx()Iv('(l+ Sin+`r +dl of thrsr
intrrvirws itlv(dvr<l Irlrphonr inlclviews, lilt.' rcscar(hcis rrlird itl><m tilt' ('slilll31(':.; +`)ttilt'
_rsF, onclrwts and <dirn accct)tr+`[ tolal sales figtHrs of a p_utictflm" ])rodu('l whrrr lilt" lrt+h -
i.d()g_ w+ls usrd. This ,leans that lilt' N.,\S:\ trchnlology m.h+ibuted to lilt' salcs, I)ul that
(owtril>uti<m can vary subslatlliallv From ;l rclalivrlv small F,Cl-CCm.tgr of Ihr lotal salcs ot +
savil+g t]gtH-c t() onr whrrr a n('v,' i)r_tlt,tt or l)rot'rss was +`<mq)lrlrly +`lrl)rn+`lrnl Ul>(m Ihc
NASA l<'+`hnoh>gy.
Savings ivwhu+`h' such (()ntert_s as ir,('rease(I efficiency, labor Salt(I. re(hwti<m in matr-
rials, n_ait_l('t+an(r, ulililirs and ])roccssing +`:+`:,sisand rcscm+`h and drvelof)mctH av+`:,i(lc([.
Th(" vari(ms al)l>li(ali<ms weft" calcg+`>riztPd a(+`+`>r(ling l+`l rn(I usr as (h's+`+ril)e+`l in ill+`"
,%'pi,ol/',u+ti('lr. This rrsullrt[ in nine categories: ctmununication/(lata pro(cssing, rm'rgy,
i,_duslrial (mavltd_t(luring and processes), medical, ('onsun+cr ])r(>(itltis, 1)ul)lic sati'ly,
lrat|sll<wlali+`>n, cnvir()nmetWa], and +`>ther. l,eaving aside _hc "(>ther" category, thc ]argrst
covmibuti(ms wrrr ma(lr to int(lustrial use, foll(>wr(l l)y tt-anSl)(>rlati(m, nlr(lical, anti (+`>n-
smwrr pr<_(lu+`'ls. St'+,, Tabh' I, "P,cnefits Realized from NASA-furnished Tr(hnoh>gy, (:a.+.;r
Appli(ali(ms t+'om ,";/,i.+:,//Rt+l><>rts, l+.y(:aleg<>rics (:.f En([ Use, Sale.,+ (>r ,gaving.s." fi)l-a I)rcak-
(l()wl_ I>v rll<l usr dcs(ril>ti(m, sh<>wing lltlrllt)('l o1 (3.ses, S_l]cs _tll(1 ,";iIvillgs.
,r)()2 _l'.\i :E AS AN INVESTMEN 1 IN 12A ;( )N(IMI( Z ( ',R( )VCI I [
[25 ] Table I
Benefits Realized from NASA-Furnished Technology
Case Applications from SpinoffReports
By Categories of End Use, Sales or Savings, $ (000)*
End Use Number Ntunbcr of cases Bcnclhs Realized $(000)
Descripti<m oFCases wid_ sales or savings Salts Savings Total
(]Ollililiilli-
cation/l)ata
Processing
Eiicl-_-
51 32 171 J)07 51 :)64 222:._71
3t) 13 203,500 15,613 219,113
hlthlstrial
(mtg 8c
process)
Medical
17t) 107 5,767,649 67,837 5,835,486
61 31 2,003,036 30,613 2,033,649
( ]<)l ISlllilCl"
Pi'otlucts 2't l8 1.278,2.q4 524 1,27S,81
I'ul}lit: Sak'ty 27 16 347,888 555 348,443
Transportatioln 40 18 9.887,865 116,623 I(},(}0,I,48_
Envilonnwnlal 16 11 16,962 21,788 38,750
( )tht'r 22 13 1,()54,989 10,232 1,6(i5,221
"Ik)tal 441 259 $21,331.190 $315,749 $21,616,939
* Esmnalcs welt' (_l)tained |item _(mq);my (_[tit i;tls, or (t('l ixt'd ttom connpan,, ('ntim_lt'n _1 Imtnp(_ct t)l
other t',lWS ol saxings .... ['he 141 ( as<'s _('rc tt'l)_lrlcd in Spin(_ll magazine, 1978-Sfi; _f th(.s(' 'J;(,_ had atkn(,_l-
c(Igu(I salts in sasing, s, bul IO9 taxes ((mid n()l I)t' cslimalt'd ;is t(i cXIClll.
[261 A tk'w c()mmcnls arc al)pr<)pfiatc rcgar(ling tilt' (lislvil)uti(ln 1)y cnd it,st. It is not
tmusual, given the nattu(' ()l NASA's high tcchn()ll)gy, that the largest shme would t)("
(tircct<'d t()war<[ nmtmlhtturing and pr<)ccssing where the l)rincipal user (in a (lir('c!
s('ns(') _)t the NASA Icchn()lt)gy is a stq)l)lit'r _)1 manlflactuv('v. Thc uhinmtc user may I)c a
(onsulnt'l ;.tl [hc ('n(l ()[;i parlicular chain. I {<lwc'v<'r, th(' ('rid use cl('sclil)lit)n here is ([('t('r-
inining lhc Ii;ttlll(' ()l lh(' tP,;c plit)r Io [h_ll t)l'()<'('SS t)<'ing <oml)l<'lcd ('lsc'wh('rc or 1t1<' pl-()Cl-
tl('l lil<)Vilig ()li ]()l it fUl'lh('l" lC[]llClli('ll[ ()I ()lht'r|lh('. F()l t'y.;l]ll])IC, the "('()ll_,tllli('l"
pr()ducl" cn([ us(" dcscl-ipli()n was [isc([ ()lll v ill those instan<-t's wht'rt' th(' company mak-
ing the al)plicati<)ll actually i)rl)ducc'd (onsumc'r g()()(Is.
()lit' flight also anti<'ilml(" lhat tr:ansp()rl;ltil)n '_vq)ul(t l:ulk high (s(,<<lnd) ill tt/u use of
tt't'hn()h)g T siticc NASA is ()lit' _f the primary if m,t the pvin<-il)al l)r<)duccr ()f Ic<hnoh)t,_'
f(lr at, F<)nauti<s ant| at're)spa(('. Aviation uses ()f t('thnoh)g 5' (h'arlv w<'rt' the most 1)vt'-
<l<mfilmnt within this <+atcgc)ry ()f t1+ansl)()vtati<)n.
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Finally, ,he medical end use category also rates high (here, third) and nm unexpect-
edly so, because of Ihe virtual explosion in medical use of such computer lechnolo_,_ as
digital-imaging lechniques and the like. The niicrominiaturizalion of electronic C'il'Ctlils as
well as mechanical features, are especially adaptable to medical needs. The development
of the lhogrammable Iml_lanlablc Medication Syslem (PIMS) avid its slubslantial pc)ten-
lial, along wilh digital ivnaging used tbr I)¢11tl brain and whole body scans and sut)sequcnt
diagnostic procedures are only parlial evidence of the [27] explosive growth of this type
of lechnology in lhe ['LIilll'e.
()f 441 sel)arale instances of Ihe applicalion of NASA-spcmsorcd or provided technol-
ogQ,', the stucly team was able to identity' 368 cases where the respondents acknowledged
that there were c:onlribulions toward savings or sales--this amounted to 83 percent o1 lhc
total cases identil]ecl. ()f lhe cascs in which sales or savings we,-e acknowledged, 109
(25 pe,cent) involved cin-cumslances in which [he respondent either could not estimate
sah's or savings or was unwilling to because of the proprietary nalme of lhe information.
()f flu' 25!) cases in which the respondents were able to identify' sales or savings, it was
possible to identify conlril)utions Ioward sales o[ $21.3 billion ($21,331,190,0001.
(:onmibuli<ms toward savings were $315.7 million ($315,749,0001. "Iolal contril)utions
Iowarcl sales and savings were $22 I>illion. This figure exclude_ nearly $12 billion in sales
thal included NASA-i],rnished technolog), but which were given as total sales figures tot
a c()ml)any, in(hurling all products ....
Discussions with (()rporate officials rev('aled 67 instances in whi(h a pro(lu.cl, process,
Of e',,'('il ;.ill enlire ('()llip_tlly W()ll]fl 110l h_lvc COllie into existence had it not I)een fi)r the
NASA-furnished technology. These represented 18 pcrcent of :ill cases inw_lving sales/sin,:
ings and amounted to $5.1 billion in sales/savings ....
[281 Other Benefits of Economic Value
()lice ()lie has all eslilllate of additional I-CVClllleS, it is l)ossil)le to l)OSlll]iile tile lev-
e,mes or.jobs (creale<[ or save<l) associaw<l with that revenue. Using stan(la.rd e(()ll<)llli(
])v-_!jecli_m ])rocedures, it in eslimated the Federal (;overnmenc rc<eived corl)orale income
mx receipts o[ nearly $356 million as a rcsuh of these spiuoft;s and Ihat over 352,000j<_lls
were created _,t saved. And flwscjobs were in relalively high skilled categories ....
Document 111-31
Document title: H. R. Hertzfeld, "Technology Transfer White Paper," internal NASA doc-
ument, June 23, 1978.
Source: Documentary History Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington
University, Washington, D.C.
Thi_ internal paper was intended to assess a program called FI"d)D (l"or Early Domestic
l)is._emination) that ,\',4,%4 initiated in the 1970s during the early years of the _'_7"xonadmini._tration.
7"he integer wa_ to make I'.S. _pace technology available to American firms fir_t. ?'he U.S. balance tJ
h'ade wa._ laminar m%rali_w du74ng the period, and such prokrrams represented an effi,t to stem the
/hm, <!/Ameman technolo£9' ab_vad. The Hq)l) progr<tm was ineffective, and thi., memo addressed
the i_ue_ invoh_ed.
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Technology Transfer White Paper
INTRODt!CTION ,-\NIt I)EHNITIONS
• Tcchn<_lo_}'
TcclmoloN9' is a term loosely aF, plit.d to know-how, cnd l)roducts mid +.'x+.'tl lhc bcnc-
fits of technology, l)icti<mavics and the _tcvospacc industry d,.'fitlc il cffi_,ctivcly ,is know-
how appli¢'d to practical proposts.
Technology is gcncially distin_uishc(l t}om basic (scicnlit]() knowledge mid fl<)nt end
products and thch- uses, |)tit I]lt'Ic ;,tl<_' ilitl)t)il_tllt cxt(!plionn.
I'hc l_ttty i+cpoit ' defined It!cltilo]()_y as kiiow-h<lw tt)i + design, dtwclt)putcitt, Inltilti-
I_lcltuing, quality (OlillOl aild testing, pcrlbrnmn(c analysis, lll;tiitlt'ii;lit((, aitd i-cpairs;, (+It+
Closely _tssOChll,:!d with such know-ltow ilKt}' lit" iil_+,;titiitlt'ittitlit)it Hild basic kn<iwh'dgc nec-
essary to its use. I Iowcvcr, basic knowledge is generally widely _c+'ailablc and not restricted.
It Ihcrcforc I)c(orncs of concern lot the control or disscndmltion of tcchnoh)gy <rely in
rare casts where fundauicntal knowh'dgc is critical to it:+.;Upl)licati<m and is new in chm-
:.l(lt'l +or it()l ,,'t'l <t_('itcI_ill} _ kitown.
Thus, technolo_4y _ts used ] ] ¢• ]1¢_ rcfers prhmu-ily to know-how, SuF, plcnwntcd as ncccs-
s,uv l)v tlt<.' cquil)ment and scientific knowledge required lot its implcmcnlation--and all
_tt rchttiv('ly SoF, histicated levels.
[2] " Tc¢'huology transfer
Tcchnoh>'4y li+itilslk'l + i_, ;i tcrtn rclk'rring t<) all t+vpcs of ('x.c]l;Iilgt's involvin_ tcchilolo-
Eft, includin_ hoth those that the nation lakes pains to control or limit, and those which
lhc nation wishes to lll;tkc (domcslic:dly attd internationally). Thus, wc have export liccns-
ing rcguhttions It) [)rcvcnt or ctlndili<)ll the coilllilcr('i;tl liHnsl't+l" o1 t'ci't;liil ntm-militarv,
unchlssiticd tc¢hnoh>gics ;_tIl([ produ¢'ts abroad. We also have p<ilicics designed I<> cntour-
ilgc tiimslS..vs in the intc]cst of !JS induslry ;tnd g<)vcrnmcnt cntiti¢.s or in the inl('rcsts iuld
SUl)porl ol +developing cotum+ics lind militmy allies. For the sake of clarit}, thc control <d
tritnslbr will l)(" (lisctlsscd st,])iUalcly lront llw cnt(mr;ig,tuncnt of tritnsli.,r.
• N/kS+_\'s ohmtot
NASA's chmlcr (iilld,t'r Net. 102 (c) ol thc Sl);i(+c Act) directs the ;tgclwy "111 (liii-
tribulc tn;ucriallv to • • . the following ol+jc(tivcs: . . .
(2) Thc iml)ro'+'cmcnt of tlt<++ usclulncss, licrfi>rlnancc, spccd, s;d+.+ly, and clIi<:icncv oI
;tcr<maulical und spa¢c vchiclcs; . . .
(.I) +lhc ('st_d)lishlnCnt <d l<mg--rangc studies oI the l)olcnli:d benefits to I),_' }_ailtt'd
from, Ihc ()])l)()Ytunitics I})1, and thc F,rol)lcuts involved in tit+." ulilizmion ot acro-
nautical :Ind sp;tcc itclixitics l_>r pcac'cful and scicntilR purposes
(5) The l)rcscrvatiott (>f the role ,)I the Ihdtcd St;tic.+.; its it lca(lcr in wt'ron;uilJtitl and
spiltt" scit'l/('(.' mid tcchnohlgy and in Ihc iipl)licalion thcrcot +to the c(inlhi(l ol
poreof u[ ;t¢livitics within and otitsidc lhc alui<l_p|icrc'. ''
Thus. NASA is hi cfl_.'(t dircctcd lit <_t'ilt'i_ilc lcchnc)iobry, sol lh;il lilt 1TS will I)c a leader
hi world ii(.'i()s[)_l((+ Ic(hnohlg)'. mid to conlrilmlc Io lhc ulilizali_m mid al)l)licalicm of th_tl
ll'(liiiolo_y,
[3] _cliion 7l){I (_i) sl;tlcs Ih_tl "The ,'\dniinislritliOil, in orch'r Io carry oul the purpo_;c o|
tllisAcl, sh;tll--,,,
I. ,.lPP.ltlo/++7+ <+]I:x,/_rJHC(,#mM oi I '};. 7+,rhHoh_¢), LI /.lOll I+¢'_+]SertiV+',:X Rcp,.t _,! the [)t'lt+liSC S( it'n( c
l_,_ald "l]isk lq)iic (m l_]xp_)rt ,)1 I',_,, To< I,,,<_h>14v,I. t;icd IIliC).Llr.. (;ll;iil In;ill, ];1'1)1il;ll _ I. 1976.
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(3) provide t¢)r lhc wi(h'st i)ra<lical_lc and af_pr<q)rialc dissemination of inlormalion
c_mcerning its activilics and the rcsuhs lhcreof."
N<_tc lhal lit(' provisi<m does not Sl_ll(', ;ASS<+lllelimes sugg, cslt'{l, that NASA must pr,>-
vi(h' lh,t. widcs! disse]ninathm (_I+infolInation l:,ltt only that which is praclicaMe and appr_>-
pri;tt,t'. "lhactical_le" incstnmd)ly lllt'ltllm within the limits of bttdg, ets, personntq, and
colnnnulicali<ms and disscnlination systems. "Appropriate" would me;ul within tilt+ limits
oI security chtssification, audience and user characterislics, connnercial considerations
;lll+l nathmal sellZinlcrest.
NASA's statttt<Iry obligations I<) develop and lead in acron,tutics and space technolo-
gy aim to diss('ntit+al(' rt.stflts widely may sometimes cordlicl. NASA may properly devchq)
more Icchnolog,O+ than it need report, reporting only that which is practicable and apl)ro-
pIiatc. (()l+vi<msly, NASA cann<_t "F,rcserve" [IS technological h'adershi F, ifit publishes tiw
full dctails of its t('(+hn<_l<igi( _d activities and expertise" it+ all (irctnnstances.)
(;ENERATION ANI) TRANSFER OF TECI tN()I+()(;Y
• (;entq-ation of techn<>hlg)+.'
The gcncI+ali<m of l¢',c]+moh_gy (in NASA) derives li<im in-house and contraclcd work
ill space l)l-ogrants told l)mjccts, ael<mantical programs and In<!jccts, encl'g) r ])roglalllS
,rod ptRjects and the develolmwntal aspects of the technology' utilization l)rogram.
Sttl_llOl-ting research and tcchn<)log_' ,rod the NASA capabilitit's ill qualit} assurance and
lll;tll;t_l.+In('lll _I]S<I signilicantly {+l)llll'il)llle to the technolog)' base.
111 " "I+ransfcrof I<'( hn(+h>gy
Th<" transfer ol l<+'chnol+LL,_ occurs l)olh delil)eralelv and inadvertently, and lransli.'rs
may I)(' wime obiectivt,s or entirely incMental to other activities. F+xamples of tilt+ variety
ot Iransti'r mechanisms which <>peratc are the following:
"l'ranst;+'r Mc¢ltan isms Inv_lving Pcrsollal ( ;ontact
Advisory C<)l+lH+nil I<.'t's
NASA s¢.nfimus atnd workshol)S
Ihoti.'ssi_mal act ivity
Pcrs<mnel ,nobility
()ngoing technical exchanges
Personal discussions
'l'ransl+,w Mechanisms Inv,)lving Agreements Contracls and I:'atcnls
(]ot>l)eralive NASA programs:
with governnwntal agencies
wilh t!S industry
with torcign nations
Industry use <it NASA Ihcilities
NASA RH"s and work statements (US and foreign)
(_<>nlract and Subc<mlract implementation
P;|lents, licenses, waivers, etc.
Transli'r Mechanisms Involving Technical Literature
Ihtblicatitms:
"li'ch Briefs, STAR, [Industrial Applications (:enter] searches,
l'echnolog 3, tbr Avialion and Space
l)ocumentalion provi<lcd with licenses
l+iteramrc intbrmally provided upon reques!
"li'sl reports and analyses
( :( )SMI( '.
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[5] Other Transfer Mechanisms
Exhibits
Technology Utilization program pr<)jects
Theft, leaks, espionage
• Effk+cliveness of different |l;lnsf¢,Y mechanisms
Tile effectiveness of diftiwent transfer mechanisms was rated according to Ihe fi_llow-
ing table (see page 6) reprodttced from the Buoy Report (which tbcused primarily on the
l)vM/lem of the exporl control of DOD lechnology, but has I)roadev implications).
CU RRENT NASA POI J(;IES/I'tL4.(;TI( :ES
t'R()MOTIN(; TE(;H N()LO(;Y TRANSFER
• Domestic policies
In aeronautir'_, NASA carries on the tradition of NA(_A in w<wking closely with the
l)et;.qlse agencies and with US industry to contribute an advancing lecht|ology base tl])<_ll
which both can draw. Recent examples relating t<) l)efense are the dual |liter-active flight
simulation at I+aRC [[.angley Research Center], the helicopter pr,_gvam at ARC [Ames
Research (]enter], tilt" Hi-Mat project ;It DFR(; [Dryden Flight Research (]enler], etc.
More broadly relating to tilt" aelonautical industry are the ener_,_'flicient engine and
composite primary aircraft structures programs. These programs are most <)t)en shaped,
organized and funded in NASA, then carried out Ihrough c<)tHracl<)v work ()r a c()ml)ina-
ti()n of in-house and contfactof work. Where the tlet_.qlse agencies are involved, there is
genet-allyjoint funding; even in non-_lefense w<)vk, industry may contribute in s()me pay!
to the ftmding requirements.
Also in aeronautics, NASA actively supports devel<_pmental or opevatitmal research of
interest to the l)epavtmellt <)[+]'vansl)ovtation , generally managing the pr_!jects and f),+_-
riding ov sharing the funding.
[6] [Effi'ctiveness of Techt_<)log O' 'l'rans[ka Acc<_vding to Industry and lranslkq- Mcchauism
originally placed here]
[7] In applications, NASA carries <)tit a variety of programs designed to transfi'f technolo-
_,_ to the ])fftate arid pttblic seclors. (]ongress, as well as stales an(| local g<_vernments,
exeft pressures on NASA to develop aflhmative and aggressive pr<_gfams of technoh,gy
transfer. NASA's ettorts to transfer techtlolog,_' parallel those of other government agem
cies such ;is the Department ofAgriculture and the Departinent of Commerce.
Space applications in the lield of communications and meteorology,, |br examph',
were developed in NASA, ¢lemonslrated successfully and then taken up in the first case by
both pul)]ic agencies altd private COrl)orations and in the second case by the l)el)attment
_[( :omHterce fiJr operational use. (:uvretltly, NASA is developing satellile remote sensing
and assisting pattie!flatly the l)ublic sector Io assimilate and apply the analytical tech-
niques required It) use the satellite data product.
The NASA apl)lications program stretches over a broad range of activities. New tech-
nology, is developed, particularly in the civil systems area. There arc R&I) pr_!jects which
apply NASA know-how to non-aerospace civil sector problems. Projects such as the acti-
vated carl>tin water treatment system leplesellt p<+tential c(mtributions to the soluti<lil of
significant scientific, social and econ<mtic problems. Others such ;Is the system fi>r tmdev-
water sttlvey antl exph)vation represent tilt+ unique contribution ()f NASA let hnolog 7 and
expertise to tit(" sohttiott ()f llon-aelt)spa('e prolllents.
Application Systenl Vevificati<m and Test (ASVT) programs ave ct+operative ])rtpiects
with Fedet+al and tit)n-Federal pttl)lic se_+lof agetwies. Potential ASVT projects ale identi-
fied at the field centers, with final selection at the I leadquat-tevs <_tfice t>| NASA. The field
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Effectiveness of Technology Transfer According to
Industry and Transfer Mechanism*
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* +l'akt'n tl<.n 1976 Bncy Report
Or!lilt'i+:.; lii+ill+lgl' the l)rojects, working closely with the future tlSCi-ot the system. New R&I)
is ot1(!11 Iit'(csS+ily. T|ic ininicdiale problenl as well as the [ulure list.! of the tt'chnoh)g 5' is
woiki'd oul wiih die cooperating agency, and thereti)re the coniinitmttnl to Iransfer lhc
lt'chn<llogy developed is Stl+Ollg. Yhcre is also lhc nccessary Dei+sonnel inleraclion Io lnakt-
lhe lransl'er |:<lsl ai+ld eflt'clivc.
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[S] The ttnivcrsityapplications progranl is managed From NASA ]h'adqtuutens.
Universitiesidcnlif_,slaIcalld local problems |hal CallI)i.aided by the application of
renlotc sensing techniques. The Ir',msl_'rp oo:ss isdirectlyfrom NASA to tht'tmiversities
(not the uhimate users) and much of lilt" program involves the support of undcrgraduatc
and graduate co|lrscs ill remote sensing techniques. Thereti)re, this program is ainlcd at
cducating a potential user conlnnHlitv rather than directly transti:rring NASA technolog)'.
The regional .q)plications program, like tilt' tmiversity i)rogram, primm-ily involves Ihc
IISC Of I,andsal (tall. NASA persomlcl directly II/ill'k(.q tilt" data and lt'molc scnsing d;tla
processing techniques to tile vmious slalt's, I)lll il is tilt" user (stale) thai identities prob-
It, ms and I)roposcs lilt" coopcralivc prt_iccts. NASA directly trains lilt" tlstqs o1 the data, but
there is no new NASA R&D involved.
Beyond this, the ()|lice of Sl)aCc and Terrestrial Applications conducts an active and
aggressive tnogram tiw the i(Icntificalion of t)ronlising tt.chnologics i-estLlting tit:,m both
in-house and contracted work with a view to stixntll,lting thc application of those tcch-
noh)git's, where ap])ropriale, to ntm-space uses ill /\mt'ritm_ industry or the iml)lic sector.
This Technology L'tilizatitm ])rogranl utilizes a number of university-based mid olhc]- cen-
I('I'S itl'OUll(I [hc country as Ict]lnical data ('t'ntt'FS servicing indllslria] stll)_.;clibtqs illltl I)l|l-
t'rs inlcrcsled ill cxploring and possibly acqtfiring lilt' technoh)git's identified [br pt)lcnlial
1)OI I-S[):IC(' list'S.
Tilt" Technology Utilization 1)rogrmn also includes "al)plicalions teams" of experts
who condtlct new R&D tin pr<_jccls which have coInmcrcial potential. These projects arc
lllallagcd by NASA field centers and 1 Icadquarlcrs. They arc COOl)er',uivc prt!jccts, with
.ioinl funding with other Federal agencies whcrc appropriate. If a commcrcial vendor is
involved in the development <ff tile new lcctmolog_, there is joint participation with lilt"
vendor ill the devchgmwnt stage.
It.)| In a more general sense, lilt' ad'/t'nt of the Space 7)a.sportatio..S)'_tem has I)t'en shaped
by NASA st) as Io encourage the usc of humch services li)r public and private R&D, thus
stimulating tilt" development of new mchnologies b) users but not necessarily transfi'rring
actual technology (know-how) It) thCnl.
• International policies
NASA support for t)tller government agency progr;uns includes SUpllort tiw
[l)cl)m-tment oil Stale/All) IAgcncy li)r International l)evelopmcnl] objectives in
cxlcnding lhc 1)cnelhs of advanced technology It)the developing COllntrie,;. Thus, NASA
in cooperation with |tile Deparlmcnt of the] Interior makes l.andsat data available lo all
users and provides tcchnical gttidancc and training tin- the data processing and analysis
Icchniques required to makc use ot it. The same thing is done ill lilt' communications
licld whcrc, in addition, Ira|rich scrviccs arc provided to [)crnlil tm-cign acqltisilion of
th)HICSiit" (]()lllSitl SVSIt'IIlS.
( :[! RREN'I' NASA I'() 1J ( ;1ES/PIL&( :TI( ;ES
1J MITIN(; TE( :t IN( )1 .()( ;Y TIL,\N SFER
l.ilnilalions on NASA tcchnoh)gy Iransfkq apply to both in-housc and conlractor
devclol)cd technology and arc all csscntially predicated on t'onsidcrations of sccuritv tw
ti)rcign conlpclilion.
• In-house l'echnolog_'
In-house lechnology is rarely classified lint Ibis conlrol is available where (dctk-nse-
related) sccmily is apl)licable. _1_)control lilt' II'allst¢'F of unclassit]ed m-hoHsc tcchnolog,y,
lilt" agency may list) t)l)lilill ]);ill'lily; which comlfinc disclosltrt" wilh t't)ntFols ill lh(' |IS and
al)road. Patcqlt policy, th<)ttgh, has lilt' stated objcctivc o1 cncoltraging c(mlntcrcializ,tti(m
()[ ;In invcntion.
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[I0] A l)r(m(hw attempt t<) limit llt¢' wh_)h'sal(' disscminati(m <)f unclassilicd NASA telh-
n<)log_' was initiated ill 1!173 in tcsp<Jns+: to two stimuli: (1) the suggestion it+ soml + con-
gressiomll lilt-roll,+.; +hal NASA was a ms,jot conduit of technoloh, T Io competitors of the
United Stales, and (2) tlw possibility that the suplwcrilical wing, as a valuable+ US tech-
nologff+ +,may have been COml)rondscd hy ¢'ally Opel+ pul)lication.
The" FH)I) program was the resuh.-' It provides liir identil)+ing ct'rtain tl_chnolog+y as
having p(_ssihlc (,ally ;lll(l siF,niticant commercial potential, then tn;.+irkiitg ally documcn-
lalion <m lhal It'chnl)l()R T For Early l)omc'slic Disselninatiott. l+:tfiwls 1o 1)ent'tit US indus-
try attd deti.w general availahility t<) li)rt'ign industry then could he itnplenwnted liw tht'
tclhn<flo+g 9, so idl'nliti('d. Ttw l)l'lmrlments of Ststl(." +tnd (:(:,lltlnl'r(l" wtq(' consullt'd and
(,ndot+s('d lh(" ]:,rogianl _is a desirablt' experiment.
Similar c<)nlr(ll,_ ()it lilt" (:()SMI(: (:ontf)litt'r sotlwai-(" distrihulion ])rograttt wert" adopt-
('d it'(('iil]).' TileS(' I'l'gtll;tli()ils call t()l" lilt" identitlcalion of colnpitlt'r i)rogiaitts hv Iheir
pOll'+ilia] ('(Htiliil'lTi_il li_(,rilhl('s,_. Rl,,_triclioll_; oil di_+liii)ilti()li 1o I(ll('i_lt naliolta],_+ _ill"
l)la(t'd ()It Ill(" liil)_l crilical ,_c>liwai-t" pl+O_l+Tllns f<)r a dcsignat('d ]'J('i-iod (if yt'_ti',%, l,l'SS criti-
<.sin ])l-<)_l-Siltl++ lil;iy Ill, i,x(lt_lnged ()1- sold.
Tilt • lialt+ti,i + (if N,,\SA-tz('nt!isil/'d lt'l:]tllO]O_' i_ ['Ui+lltl:r colitroll('d in tilt" (()lil('×l lit
ililernaliOlla[ cool)('istli_,'l" si)Stlt! lJiogialli,_;. It is a _lml'r+t] ill+'(lind+lion ()t Siltit ])rogl+alns
It+sit lht' t<lt-('il4il ])ill'till'l" ]ISIVI' tilt' t'SSl'lllist] tt'clnlologica] Cal)alii[il:¢ it.quiit'd to (tiscltallZ, l'
tilt' r('sl)<insihi]ili('_ whi(]i ]i(' iiiidl'l+lakes in the (o+)rJ/-ialive a_rl't'iiit'nl. Thl>n, wilt'r('
alil)r()i)iilllt', it i_ Sl)_'(i17('(l ili_tl lit Ilie ('venl thai lhe l+<)rt'igi+ ])ai-ini'r dist<)vl'r,_ a need t()i-
i('(hni(a] st+si_iail(l', NASA lilaV it!l_+'r thai ll+¢'d 1o coniliit, rci;il _()lll+tc'N in lit(" I_],% (whi'rt'
it ill,+lit+it!+ sul!il'ci I<) (!×l)<)rl (Olill<)l,_;). NASA also i'(+_{!iv('P.; tht' right tit i-('qiiir(" Ilia+ siii+v
l('(']iliil'St] a+_+i_lail(C _ivcn ]w provided in "lllack ])ox" It>rill (as ++lid ])i+odti(l ralllei Iliali
II l i ll!t'illiol()k_:), hi <_(!nt'lSt]> ]i(Y, vt>ver, lhcrc art' rt!lalix't+ly ill'all ilil/_i't]ic'l+s in inll'rnli-
tiolial Sl)a((" l)r(!iecis ;tlil[ lilt' transfer of tl'clnlolot_ital kii(),.v-h<)w is 11ol invok,ed or
i(.(]ilir('d ])('l,.vi'i'll thl' (()o];llqathlg ageitcic,+;. Thi!ri, i+, ]lOWl,V(,l-, _;il])Malilial /(lltilit_'rtia]
iliv()iv(.in(!lil diixwtly whh tin _i(.r(i_l);tlt" (onlpstili('+ (+l!l_ _;t'tli<)li hid<+w).
it (('rlsiin itiil(ilitil (if (lit( it'li(ni is exercised +it both NASA l tt'sid(]il+li+l('i+_+ Siltd ti(qd t't'l+-
I('l+ with i-/,gsii+d I_) +lit" +ill}i('(l lii+illt_i ++lid trt'_ltilit+ltl (if i('t:ililit'a[ ])ai)t'rs Io Ill" t)i-t'+l*illt'd
1)'¢ N/\_,'\ [)(,lP4liltit(!l +tl)lO;id, lht'i-i*l)+v controlling ill so+lit' dl,gll't" li_tliP4lt'l ()1 know-how ])y
this ilil!_iIlS.
Also, NASA lx'quir/'s lit(' Ill'ill (:t!nlers It) report and (ileal htvitati(ins to |<)reign nalioll-
ais alll'ndittg syml)OSia. "rhi,_ rt,quirt-ntimi is informal and ]/rol)ahiy w_-lrr_lill+ fornializalion
and (eillializali(lii.
Thi'rt' ]lSi_ Ill!i'll _i chang(" in adt+linistratiori of tilt" NASA fori'igit i+l'Sident l('s+-'arc+h
+t_++()(i+tlt, l)iliglani+ Tli(_ policy ilOW in practice discoliragi'_ associal('+ in ti'clliiila] disri-
])]ille_ ill []txor ot lilt)s(' iii scieiitilic _il+C+l_,
l:ili<iilv, ill (_)iili<'(ii<)il wiill CXl)Ort (:oillrols dis('tls,_('d ht'low, NASA, alllioiigii Pl01 slii>-
,it.el to Ih(, J%,,lullili<lli+ (:(ntliols o1 lilt" Depai+tmel+ll (if _l_ill', liev(,rlh(!l('_;+ lstkt'+ sli'l),_ (tit
llio+(" r;ir(' <t((;t+ioil_,; wilt'It l('(]ill()l(:+_ry li_ii]+tT.,i- i,_ (:onll-nilil+iti'd, I() st_;+iiit' lllioti_]l ilil(ll-
nia[ ( o(lidiiiali<)ii wilh lit(! ()tfic¢_ of Milnili(:lil_ Coiltro] lliat _;ii(]t liall_l+eY would ]:it, con-
,_i+lCtlt wilh _<)v('rtlltlelil pla(:lice.
• ( :()Ill ISl(+l/'(I T('t:hilolok_'
l,illlilalions ()II lilt" i_x|)ol'l of C()lllractet+J+ technology' are t.sseillially outside NAS,,Vs
it'_])oilsihi]ili('s, sinct" I]il' ¢'x])<wi o[ s])a(e t(echllo]o_j_' hy _l priwlit_ (OnllsiClOl falls undt'l
lit(' l lilcrnaliona] Tra[t]( in Ainl_, Regtllaiions A(t adniinisiered ]/y lilt! ()t+[i(:t" (1t' Mlinilil)iis
2. N<\:g,\ NMI 221f).1 dalt,d l)(,{<,tilh(.i 13, 1{)7:+;,
3. NAN,\ N%II 22 IlL2 d;llt'd A])lil 7-]. 1(.)78.
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(2mtrol of the State Department. The same applies to aeronautical technohlg T of pri-
nmrily military character. Aeronautical technology, of dual use [ 121 (military and civilian),
plus a very extensive list of other lcchnologics covering sensors, data processing, c<mmu,-
nications cquipmcnt, etc., is covered by Department of Commerce export controls. NASA
provides technical advice It> both State and (:ommcrcc when rcqucsted and I)arti<ipatcs
in thc development of lists of controlled items, but the rcsponsibility lot granting or dcnv-
ing export licenses rests with those agencies.
If technical material is publishcd (nmdc generally available), it is considered to have
a general liccnsc for export and is not then conmlllcd. Thcletorc, NASA and its <ontrac-
t<>rs have some responsibility to c<msidcr whether the publication of partict,lar technical
data could compromisc the intcnt of State and (]ommcrcc control activities. In this con-
nection, both the NASA paten/progranl and dm FEDD program, described above, arc rcl-
CV_Illl ;tlld apply to contracted tcchnolog T as well as to in-housc tcchnolog T.
Since unilateral US export controls would obviously havc liulc effect if a forcig, n pur-
chaser could simply ttlrll It) other nations tot his necds, tilt:' Unitcd Slates has been aclivc
in organizing C()( ;()M, an cftorl of thc NATO nations and Japan to concert their export
controls on critical items vis-a-vis the (;¢mmmnist world. This system is in some sense ",m
intcrtmtional projection of the US Munitions (;onll+ol proccdmc, Ilul su|tkq+s [lOlll COll-
sidcral>lc diH'erenccs of view and competitive pressures am<rag the parlicipating nations.
Finally, of course, NASA-contractcd technology iIlay be' classilicd on dclcnsc g,oun<ls,
but this is relatively rare.
'1"o gcncrate advice lot Slate or (',ommcrce on spccilic export license rcqncsls, tilt"
central coordinating point in NASA is the International Aftairs Division. That Division
<h-aws on the technical cxpcrtisc of Ihc entire agcncy lot this propose. The final rccom-
mcndalion is treated according to general guidelines, contained in a policy paradigm
appr<_vcd by thc NASA Dcpttly Adlninistralor several years, ago. The gui<lclinc dislin-
guishcs technical know-how t]om cnd product. Kalow-how which is uniqucl} available
from the US would l)rcsuml)tivcly [13] bc dcnicd export. But il tilt. know-how is readily
available from o/her torcign somccs, the presumption wouht bc Ihal US industry should
bc alh_wcd to compctc. End products, who/her uniquely availat)lc ti-om the trS ,,," no,, arc
presumptively exportable unless unique know-how could hc extracted ti+om dicta. Of
course, there may bc over-riding considerations where, c.g., an end prodmt might bc crit-
ical to an obiectionablc cnd-usc, as in the cast' of missile components dcstincd tor a coun-
lry th<mght to bc developing ;t ntulcar weapons delivery systcm, or in thc case of a
compulcr whosc capacily could bc <livcrtc<l t<>wcapons system <lcsign. The policy para-
digm, which appca.rs on the Iollowing pagc, has bccn incorporated in a chtssiticd
[National Security Decision Mcmorandum] as an availablc guidclinc [or lhc govt.rlnnlcnl
as a wholc.
I)IS(;USSION
• [SSlleS
Thc pri,u'ipal questions which haw bccn raised with rcspc<t to NASA policy and prac-
tice in Icchnolo,.g_' lrans|k'r, whcthcr posilivc or rcstriclivc, appt'ar to I)cthese:
- Should NASA bc developing aeronautical [cchnoh>gT,, for <tct_.msc and tot private
in<hlstrv. > To what extent and according to whal criteria?
- What role should NASA play iu slimulaling tilt" industrial R&I) nccdcd to pro-
duct innovations consistent with uatiomd goals, and arc significant changes nccdcd in
('tll'l'('lll policies to maximize illdllSll'y+S ilIVUSIIIIUlll ill this R&I)?
- Similarly, in ticl<ls such as spacc con|nlunicatiolls mid rcnlt)tt" sensing, should
NASA bc developing and promoting an advancing technology' base lot other agencies and
to, +p,ivatc indttstrv and trader what critcria?
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[ 14] POIJCY PARAI)I(;M* FOR EXPORT AND MI.rNITI()NS C()NTROI,
I. hems unique to LF.S.
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'2. hems available clsmvhmc
KN( )W-I l( )W
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I'rcsunlptivcly,
n() iclcasc
2A (;onsi(ltq cx|)orl if
end-use conditions m('l
END PR()I)t!CT
IB (;onsi(li'r export if:
-- olld-IlSC conditions lncI
--Callll()t i)C iCVClSe-i:qlgillCCl%'d
If r('v('l_c4"n_inc('rillg t{'asiblc;
('vahlale risk and decide
a('c(ll-dillgly.
21 _, Exporl should lie apl)rov('d il
on(l-use conditions nl('i
'3. llcIllS inv(dvcd in U._.
coop. ])rl)7,i'illii_
3A (;_lnsi(l('r export (even 3B
it unique) in light of
rci('vanl pr(ivisi(ins ell
('(iol)(qativc aglCCillciiI,
quid/:ro quo, allft/or
i !.S. iiltci-est
Should I)t' al)l)rovt'd unless
crili('al cIl'nit'liis of it'chnoh)gy
illliqllC to L!,,_. dl'C stibject Ill
r(,vcrst,-_-ngiiit_t.rint4, in whirl!
(;is(" w(, COllSi(lcr ;as ill _l,'_i alld
il'SCl'Vt' righl It! (t('livl'r in
lila(:k box slIIIC.
* hlt('iidt'd Io SCl'VC _i_ tun(lanlenlal I_uidali( t' sillliecl l(i ('xleplilln in sp('<ial cases in Ihl' llati(lllal iill¢'lCSl.
[15] - Should NASA inainlain a lechnology utilizatioi! prograin (lire(led to non-space
ilS('s and illlder what criteria?
- T() what _'xlenl should NASA e()ntinue and develop the nnihil)li(iiy of public an(l
privall' sccl()r e×periinl,nl-and-deni(inslrali(lil projects iioW hegtln ill Sl)ecitic l('chnolo_:'
ai)pii(ali(iils? l lmv conir(llled or flexible should these aclivilies I)e? l,¥hal nle('hanisin
should coor(linale Iheln, if any?
- With respect 1o ov('rseas participation and benelil, as ill lhe l,,indsal pr(igraili,
wtlal policies sh(>uld he tollowe(l?
- Should N,Jt_m c(liliilliic 1o lry Io control unclassitied technical dala (as in the
FEI)I) and ( ](),SMI(] prograins) aiid how?
- Is NASA's t_)reign palenl filiilg progranl rost-etfective? Should it he C(llliinued?
- To what extent should NASA "market" its technology and in what style? _rhai role
should cost-beneth stn(lies have in fllis connection?
i (_l;)iions
The t_)regoing issties arc hriefly discussed in the paragraphs below:
- Aeronalili(a[ ie(hnolog 3' transfer. The Space Act obligates NASA to t_)sler I__S
I(.a(l('iship in aeronaulics, l,eadership in aeronautics equales with bload national securily
ol_iectives which cn(oiiipass bolh defense and COlllnlfrcia] interests. Since NASA's [lillda-
int'nlal mission is con(eived in R_I) terms, dearly it has n(i dloiee under currelil leg!sia-
l!on but I() develop lechllology li)r tim defense and eOlnlnereia] aspects of the aeronauti('s
ill(hislry. It li)llows that NASA Inilsl lind suitable mechanisms for transfirrring its tcchnol-
()gy ()till)ill Io industry so that it can best serve the spirit and the objeelives of the Acl.
,,*is lhe Bucy rel)orl makes quite clear, the most effective means of transter entail inte-
gral relalionships in the [ 16] various phases nf the R&D process. NASA certainly practices
IlI()Sl ()t lhe rliechanislllS !dent!lied lilt such transfer in the aeronautical field under a fair-
ly w(.ll-un{leist(_od set of criteria. These generally make the greatest government supl)orl
availahl(' lilt puhli(: interest purposes (environmental and safely oh, jeclives, e.g.) and
rcquii_' inore induslrial ((ir detT,'nse) support to thc degree lhal end produ(i (levelopnlenl
is api)r(lached. !¢Vher(" g(ivernlilelll Fegulation lit privale protii lilolivalion ('all ('licit
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tcclmical advances fi+om the industry, NASA should presumat)ly leave those dcvch>pmcnls
to lilt' industry. _vVherc national consi(lcrali<ms of sati'l+v, environment, _>v stvalcgic com-
petition in tilt" military or colnlncrcial liclds becomes critical, or whete tilt' cost, risk m_d
t_uilitics tbr technical advmtct' mt' I:,t,yond inthnslvy's capacity in a competitive system,
NASA its lilt" govcrltmcnt's agcnt must consider tilling the gall.
in sum, it is diHicuh lo conceive of a very tlilIcrcni role ti)r NASA than its traditional
one in thc dcvch)pmcnt of acr(matllical Icchno]ogy; however, its Iransti'r to industry mid
dcti'nsc nntsl be responsive to nilli<>nal necc|s and international prcssurcs (m US indtnstvv.
Fine tuning of lhc operaiing politics, of comse, is always appropvialc. MI!j<H-immv;tlions
may bc rcqtuircd ti)r <mc-ot:a-kind situati()ns.
- Space applicati(ms. Thc llrincil)al oplitlns are Io leave Ill(- dcvc[opm('nl ot sup-
porting and advancing technologies Io operational ilHt'rcsts o|ltc 1}1("(>l/crali_m,tl stage is
reached (>r, in the alternative, to>((mlintlc tcchnc>hlg_, tlcvel()pnlcnt in so!no degree. Whal
tcchnol<Ny should NASA gt'nt'li|tc tk)r transtin- to tilt" COllllncltial y,t'(tol? It _t('()llltllCl'(i+tl
industry exists, should wc c(>nsith'r any tin+th('r dcveh>pmcnt?
The comnmnications licit[ pr<)vides a uselill cxamplc, h is clc;tr that tilt" ()l)crali(>nal
intcccsls arc mdccd carrying ti>rwavd R&-D tbr much of their needs, thcrcl)y rcm_)',ingjtls-
ti|icalitm t()r government RScl) in those tlmiicttlar m-cas. But Iherc m-c imblic intcn<'sl
meas whcrt" the pt-ivatc sector lllil}' lillY(' no Irllotiv_tli(HI Io d() RScl). In ('()lllllllllli('itli()lIP';
these al'CitS int:hltlc technological dt+vch)llmt'nts li>r t'()llSt'l+Villg lilt' SIIC('II'tLIll axl(l ;tls() li)l'
conserving thc use <)I"the gc<)synchrottotts <>t|)il.
I171 It would thcrcli)vc sccm that NASA shouht consider tontilming its R&I) program
(including test and dc,nonsnation prt)iCClS ) in such arcas. These l)rogvmns in the com-
mtmicati<)ns arca should bc carcftfllv and n;trr<)wly dctincd. A posilivc answer sh<mld b('
contingent upon ihor<mgh advm_cc disctlssi<)n with those govt,rllmt,lll agcncics and
p<>tcntial ttscr commtmilics which may have real or l+mlcicd c<mtet-ns in ;it given area I<>
dcxclop tilt' nccessary dcgrcc of snpllort. (+ost-bcncfit considcrations shot,ld Ill, inchldcd
but (a) will often bc very diIficuh Io mcasurc li)r not-yct-cxisling applications, and
(b) should not ncccssarily I)c dctcrminalivc in pttblic interest areas in any casc, sin(c
itmmgilllc values ntav be of overfilling imp_)rtancc.
Whcvc NASA itself may 1)c given _)l)crati_mal responsibilities liar space ,tpplic,tlions. as
coltld <_ccut in the l,antlsai progn+;ml, NASA w<mld, <ffc<mrsc, dcicrminc the RS,cl) rcquire-
nlcnts to nlccl the nccds of thc user agencies, working in cot_jtmction with them.
- Tcchn<flog)' utilization, ASVF programs. The major options mc to run a push pv<_-
gram or a pull program. In cilltcr cast, NASA mttsl, undcr tilt" forms of tilt" Spacc AtI, l)e prc-
t)mc(t It) transtk,r lcchnologQ, it) F,tt[>lic and t)ri'+:itlc intcrcsis <)f this c<nmtvv in thc most
cf['cciivc and appropviatc way, who!hcf tin- space or non-spacc applicatitms. NASA's eXl)Cri-
('ncc t() cl,tle scems a|mntlantly <]car thal ItPt+hnt)log_ + ll;tns[_.+r is a s<Hn('IilIICS slow and
(littictfli-io-mcasurc process. F.ncrgctic t+tcasttrcs can 1)(" lakcll t() spccd-ul+ the l/VOccss I)v
idcntit!dng l)ossibilitics, bringing them It) thc allcntion of possible uscrs, organi/ing a b_>dx
of tl,lt,t, estatllishing a rctricv,tl sysl('ll| alld, ill many cases, It'sting and demonstrating the
applications. This is particularly truc ti>t tilt + public scctor (cities :rod stalcs, e.g., and other
g<>vcrnmcnl agcncics) whcrc non-spacc nccds may bc strongly tiqt Ira! tht' cxpct-tisc t+cquirc'd
tor atlaption !sitl, tCSl, dcmonstralion and iml)lcmcntation may I)c cniircly lacking.
At thc same time, expcricncc also suggcsls that thc dangers _l inlcrnal cnt]ntsiastns
for applications in fic](ts outside the agency's cxpcricncc and cxpt'vtisc tticta,c some inca-
Sill+(" !IS| of c<mscrvatism. ]i would sccm, theretorc, that thc agency shotuld (ontinuc st!b-
stantially along its present course but with greater visibility t+<wlllall:l_ClllCIII [t)r the tmmv
non-space applicalions cxph)rcd and tested.
This means lhai both hcadqttmlcrs and ccnlcrs sh_mld continue Ihcir initiitlivcs and
n'('sp<ms('s bttl lhat a svstcn+n should l)c cslablished to i)cvmil ]mrallcl aw:trcncss <>[ Sl)ccil]t
a(:liviliessoflw,¢',nay hi' iudeF,(mdcnl c(msid(.ralion of st.nsilivifies, inll)licalions and addi-
1[()t1:41 c()(]ld[ll;-t|i<HI I't'(]ll[l'(flll('ll|_ o[ _{ |)uh]i(', [lll('l'll;ll[()ll_tL _[)'¢('rIIIIIUIlIHI, ('Oll_-l'('ss[()n_t]
()r industry aflairs (ha]a(l(!r. The syst('m should not lie designed to delay or s('r('('n activi-
lit*s lint ralh('r t() [)(qmit "flagging" prohlcms on a timely hasis if dl('y should hc p('rc('iv('(l.
(:()sl-h('tl('lh mlalysis may he tlw ,ll)l)rOl)riat(' tool Ibr ('v;llu,lting S(),II(" al)l)li('ali(ms.
B('fi)l-(' r('sot,rces are (:<mlmiltt'd l() doing such Sllld[es, Ih(' (rii('ria noted under Ihc l)ara-
graph at)el(' <)n Spa('(" Al)l)licalions sh()ldd he consictev('d. Bu! th('l-C" is a c'onlinuing n('('d
fill _,11('|1 ('osl-h('l]('t]l stll(li('s lilY" Ilially ])otenlia] I)l'¢)jecls. '[raclifiovlally these slucli('s have
hi'i'll (hill(' hv Ill(" ,;ari()Hs [)Y()_vam ()ft](:('_. As tiler(" al'(" chine, [h(q't" is ,I ll('('(t fi)r mlil()vm
t(!('lllliqll('s t() h(! al)pli('(1 to ('()nt-h(!ii(!t]l analysis s() that Ill(' rt'sHhs (if Ill(! v_iri()ilS Sill(tit's.
can hi" conll)ait!(I. ]]l('s(" (lil('ri;I sll()ll]([ t)(' d('t('rniin('d hy a (('lllYal ()ft]((' alld tll('ll
apI)li('d wilh llw _isNi_t_|l}('lL' ()1' [hu V_lli()ll_ I)]'()_I'_|l]) (Ift]c(!_; or field ('cnl('rs.
-- llH('rliati<lll_ll. Tiw Spa(-(, Act ]|l_t.])(lales _}. pro_]al]l f)f illi('r]]_llil)l]al ('()op('ralif)ll,
._tll(I th(' ()m('r Spa((, Tr(_alv ca|is t()Y the sllaring of ill{' b,')_t_'fi/._ f)F Sl)a(t" _t(liVil'.,'. Thor(' is
ill) ]('(l[lil('lll('lil If) tl-_lll_,l(']-|(,(hllol()_n/_ ils(+]f ahroad.
'lh(" ()l)tif)l/S ar(' If) (()lldil(t '+_iv('-away" or slq)t)or! arid ai(i-ty])(" |)re,rams or t() s('('k
f()M-sh_llin_ ()r ()lh('r ('cf)llfmli( r('lllrT]. [;lltil {11(' l.atldsal prograll], th( " l)r('c¢'d(.nts ('_tal)-
iish('d I()l" ('()f)p(TaliVl' ill!)grains w(!r(! _(!l](_r()llS, hllt Ill)st f)t'l('l] "e¢('l'( • _;llt)i('('l('([ I<) I-('(][lir('-
lllf'lll_,; f)l scit'ntili(" _ali(lit', Hlld Illtltltiil interest.
1191 Thus, ill th(' firsl cxp('rim(mtation with commttni(ations sat('llil('s, fi)r¢'igii statt's wcr¢"
[)<'Hilitt('d Io particiF, alc in tilt' te+li.,_, phase (not the R&I)) fm tilt' ha.sis !hat they fund('d
tilt' ll('(:t'ssal'v <)'_('t+s('as ground stall<illS. NASA ther('|)y sav('(l Ih¢" t'xl)t'i/s(" of [iu](ling [itcil-
ili('s _ti hf)lh ('elds ()t +lh(' ('Xl)t'rim('tHs. Even in the weath('l salt+Hilt + ti(']{t, Ill(" |nil|a] ('<)f)p-
('l_lli()n ('ntail('([ (()lilp_tl-i_,()l] []ighls hv foreigl/aircra[! c()f)rdimtt('d 'whh NIkHC(_CI'_I[] t)_iss('s
and f)th('r af [ivili('_ (l('sigllf'd If) h('lp calihral(" and vali(1;tt(, Ill( + ill-St sait.]li!(, data _III;:t]%'N('_.
l,mi(lsal. Ill iht' [AIII(IN_Ii ('_IN(', it was Feh Ih_t! ;t [)('cltliaHy ('(fmf)nlic il[)l)li(aliotl _,vas
illvf)lv(.([ Hlld that (()si-sharillg Ior tlw Sl)a('(' seglll(qi! slu)uld I)(. (,stahlish(.(l ill l)rin(il)]( '.
(Th(' Ior('igll llS('l_, i)t ('Olll'S(', tinl(I all the|l" gl'Ollnd-h:tsl'd [iif'ilili('s ;all(l a('livilil.s.) B(.lbrt •
((isl-Nhalill_ was (W(!ll hr()a(]l('(I, h()w(.ver, NASA's a.gr('l'ln('lll I() [)l()gl_llil [ ,mi(lsals Io l-i'a(|
oul fi)r f()v('i_n slaliollS was f)l]g(:l hy several quid-pro-quos: lh(" ti)r(ggn slalions un(l('rl()ok
I<, SUl)l)ly (lala I'r('(' io I i)Hn(il)al inv(¢sligalol's] scl('cl('d hv NASA; lh('v w(q'(! ()l'digal('(l i()
prf)vi(l(. (lala ()f iill('r('sl 1() NASA on requesl; and they ieDr(_senled vahmhle insluml((' If)
NASA Ibr (l(,sir('d tiw('ign coverage when the sl)acecrafl lal)e r('(()r(lers should t_lil.
T(,('tmf)logy lransli't: in the sense of induslrial know-how, is no! inv()lved in the ah()v('
l_ml(Isa! lyl)(' fiwt'ign im'olv(qn(mi. Her(" we are speaking m()r(" ()t !h(' lranst_r ()[ !he b(,n-
('t]ls o[" a l('('ll_l()log_', hul some tlallSfelS of dala processing and analysis kn(iw-how ",it('
r('quir('(1 bv Iraining p¢'rsonnel. NASA does not ()])eral(! trainillg t)l'ogralns as such,
aliholigh limil('(l f)n-th,v:i()l) iraining opportunities are made available under c(.rlain ('fm-
dilif)ns, hl(luslrv and lille Ag(.llcy for International Dew'lopmenll, al(mg with olh('r sl)e-
cializ,.'(l g<lx('Nlm('m a_(ql(i(.s, ()fl('n provide training services.
FH)I). Th(' f)l)tiollS ;n(" wh(!lh('r to (:otHiml(_ lo try If) cf)nlrf)l tmclassil](,d I('(hlfi(al
{)lli])lliN hv NASA ilIl(l its ('Olltr;t('lol's or llOl, :and if so, wh('th('l- through the FEDI) pro-
_1_1111 i)l ;lllolh('l.
12!)1 lh(. ;llgmn('llls fi)r (fmlrf)l at(" !h(,se: NASA has been crili(iz('d fi)r its large ()Ull)U! ()f
l('(h]li(al itHi)rm;iti()n availahle 1o t_)reign competitoYs. The circumsralwes of rt'lease of
SUli('r(rhi(al Wiilg hlt()rlil_lli()ll ill ](%lsl Sil_eslc(I Ill;tit llla.jo] illll()V_tliOllS with signifl('alll
IlliliiHly alld/or (()nlllll'l(ial p()It'lilia] inighl lie (Olllpronlis('d and that l)i()[7.'ssi()il_ll Ill()li-
vali{)ll ',ili(l lradili()ll Illi-iy ()p('ratc to ohs(ur(" the national iilt('v('_l. The |a(l lh_il puhiic
ttill(l_, _ir(' iis('(I I() iiiid('rwril(' Sll(ii R&-[) w()uld, wiih ()lh('i t]t('l()i_, sl,(,lli Ii) r('(lilirl" _,oiii(,
l/'_;ii(l Ior Ih(' lialif)ilal ilil(,riP_l.
574 SI'ACE ,ks AN INVESTMENI' IN [_C()N()MI(_ (;R()'W111
The arguntents against FEDD are that it carries no sanctions, that it "tlags" tit(" most
important itetns st) t]tat tovcign interests can focus (>n obtaining then1, thai the "tro<)ps +.
at the centers ¢1o not like it, that it creates a useless work load, etc.
In a series of NASA Middle Management Seminars, FEDI) was discussed in depth. The
participants recognized that "sontething ought to I)e done" to assure preferential use 1)v
US interests of ttnclassitied technology which might have signiticant early commercial
potential. When asked if tht_y could think of somethitlg better than FEDI), the answers
were negative with a single exception, l,angley has felt, given Ihe inability to control FEDI)
ptfl)lications and the danger that the FEDD lal)e] might simply target them, that coll<_qui-
trots bringing together the illter_,_sted US firms are to l)e pret_'rretl. Signiticant it('nts,
should be discussed in depth anyhow. This approach appears to bc meritorious ;rod has
bccn cotntnended to the other field centers.
An important question raised by effi)t+ts to ilnplemettt the FEI)D program is this: Since
only a handtul of put)lications has been "FEDD'ed" by NASA, arc we doing tile job of review
and identiticatiotl very badly, is NASA admitting that only a minuscule percentage of its
tcchnical reports possess any significant early commerci;d potential or is the present pro-
gram simply ttnworkat)le? h would seem essential l]lal a thorough review of the FI']I)I) pro-
gram as it now stands in the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology I)c undt'rlaken,
along with a ¢Otnl)aris<+n and evahmlion <d any similar t)r_)grams [21 ] in other government
agencies. Suggestions Iov revising the program, coordinating it wilh <)they g<)velltlllt'lll
programs and policies, or al)olishing it could then be more rigorously evaluated.
Foreign l)atenl program. Since the current cost of the forcign patenl program greatly
exceeds the very small revezttles obtained, it mighl I)c argued Itl;tl lhe program should be
dropped. ()n the other hand, it would seem worthwhile to ewtluale experience wilh the
supevcrilical wing t);atents over the lleXl tt.'l.%rye_ll-s It) betterjttdge lll,._ f|lltlle ot this program.
- Marketing. As noted above, the dangers of internal elllhusiasnts lot al)plitali_ns
in ficl(ts beyond the agency's own experience and compctelwe dictate some measure ()1
conservatism in pushing such applications. Theret6re, "lll;trkels" nltlst t)e careftflly
explored in a(Ivancc with 1|1¢" IIcsl-intbrmed riser groups; c()sl-I)elle[][ c(_nsitlcralions
should I)c includc<l but are especially diffictflt and may often have limited validity in con-
ncction with innovations in lww fields or where public interests override.
It remains truc, nevertheless, thai NASA's stalttlory ol)ligalion to c()nlriJ)ule to le(h-
tlological advam'e will not implement itself. Therelbre, file agency must underuake well-
considered pr_grams to infi)rm possible users, 1() expcrinwnt wilh, lest, and on oc(asit_N,
detnonstrale space and noll-sl)a(e applications in lie national interesl.
Because of the implicalions tie tlne agell(y's image, its congressional and other gov-
ermnent agency relalionships, its in(lustry, interHalional and tLniversily relationships, it is
importanl that headquarters and center undertakings looking to new user groups and
markets t)e given timely visibilily tbr management. A "tlagging" system thal tlo(,s ilOl inhil)-
it activities or establish _lew clearance reqtfirentcnts is thereRwe important, to permit con-
trol t)y exception.
Document 111-32
Document title: "NASA Technology Transfer: Report of the Technology Transfer Team,"
December 21, 1992.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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NA._'A i_technoloL9' tran!fi, r prog'mm has bee,, lauded a.s one _t/ the more _ucee_[ul _t]._uch government
prog_am.s, and at the m_ametime it has been .severely criticized as not being very f//ective. Traditionally,
NASA ha_ /beused on technol%0 deveb_[nnent /br ,space and ha._ dmtmpht_'ed employee reward.s ]or the
tran_/er O/teehn°l°L_ out_ide NASA. This report, however; which was the result of an intensive in-
house review o/the pr%oam, _wommended im/.oving internal incenti_Je_ [or manageT:_ to stimulate
the tra n S[i'r _] lech noloAo.
[no imginati.n ]
NASA Technology Transfer
Report of the Technology Transfer Team
l)ecemlxw 21, 19!)2
BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS
I. NASA is accountable to transfer its special capabilities and technology. This is an
iml)Orta]H mission of tileagency.
2. Success in technology transfer requires deliberate dedicated effort. Thus NASA must
initiale technology transfer activities.
3. Technology transfer occurs mainly in the context of an appropriate person-to-person
relationship between the providers and recipients.
.1. Experience suggests that technology transfer is most successful when recipients want
technology for their needs. Effective, proactive outreach creates this desire. Thus a mar-
keting model for technology transfer has greater potential for success. A l>,tssive dit-
fusion model leaves much to (hancc.
5. Technology transfer is inseparable from the technology development process.
6. The influence of customer interests on NASA R&D goals is a vital indicator of poten-
tial success. This inlhtcnce shows early rccilfiCnt involw'ment, and shows thal a tech-
ll'[lI()gy tl+;tllP+lk'l"relatiot_shiP exists that is 11101"(!likely to succeed.
7. For technology transfer process management and improvement, effectiveness metrics
are better than activity metrics. Activity metrics having strong, causative influence on
effectiveness are useful.
_q. The technology transfer process should be conducted such that employees' interests
are benefited (ideally) and protected (at minimum).
l TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IS BEST ACHIEVED AS A MARKET-ORIENTED,TECHNICALLY CONDUCTED, LEGALLY SUPPORTED ACTMTY
IWhy What W<' F<)tmd Was There Io Be Found/What We Stngges! Doing About h ()rigi-
ll_lllyl_la('('d h('re]
RECOMMENDATIONS
All NASA element,', must in)plement and he cvahmled <)it their te(hn()h_' lrarLsi:('r pt<)-
gr_Hll
I. Each (t'tHtq lllilSl lll_]lll_Lg(' l() I|I(P lCC()inlllC+l(Icd m('Iri(s . . . ()r (lc[it)¢' and IlIitll-
age t<) m<)r(' (q+l_.'ctivc set
2. l l('acl(ltuarl('rs must itnl)It'met)t a urfili(+(l l)lan to sU[)l:,<wt tt'(+hu;<)l<)g_ ` l]atlsl:er
SlW< ifi('d r()l('n and missions <)f each ()lIicc
._7('_ Sl',\( J'i ,\S AN ] NVE%IMFINI IN E{ :( }N( Dd 1( ; ( _R( )WIII
Why Whal Wc Found W;ts
There To Bc Found
What Wc Sttggcst
Doing A1}oul It
N() (Icm NA,";,A poli(x I0, tot hnoh)_ r --.)+
tr_msl{'r /Too oitctl, ctlq)l<)y{.t.s, m,tn;ig(.q's,
{'()IllI'H('I(>I S. _tll{] tllliVUl'milit'S (lt)ll'l c()II_,idul"
lc_ llI1oh)g_, IImlsh'r I);HI i)l tht'ir.joh
No s'+stt'lll_tti(+ lll{'tl i( s,/st_tlisli(",,; used lhr
dccisi.us M
"I'cclm()h)gy tlitil++,f<.'l . i}itl{ t'_,st's i|lt' If(HI +
illlCgl-il+tt'd, llll(IOCtltllt'lll{'d, ;lllt| to() _;]<)W --
,'\pI)lic;ttion sltMics arc CXl}t'nsi'+'{'_'atls(,s __
g:_p I)ctwcctl id(+:l :tnd aplfli( _tti<)n
W{+ mc m)t h.ld:tmclllallv limited by
Ic_islatMu. wc ate limitcd h,, ot. wifl
( 2ha._c tht' cttltt, c
( R{'( otl.ticti(l;Hions 3-+"4)
Pl()lt+t I I+'III])]OX('('_ illlt'lC_;ls
(Rcct)mmcnd;'lii()ns 8-!I)
I)('l]ttc :i '+.vsl<.'lll:lti{ s{'l ()I lilt'it hn xxllh h
('llC()tlI ;l_U itlld (;|l)ltIl{' l('(]lll()h),_'+'
|lltIl+';[{'l" Slit'( t'_*S{% ' "
( Rt'('(illlillt'lld_lti()ll_ 1-_)
EIIIpI)W('I" pl()( {++¢+_V,ti()ll t('ittllS t()
llllpl (B'(' ]) I'< )('('F+:,,{'N
( R('('( )ii+ moil(fat i<)l) t))
F()st('r st'(()iid;liy ttti'_t'lt'd
I{'(' h il()]()t4y li ;lilSt{'i
( R('{ ( )llllll{'ll(I;lli( )lp+ (.)-ti)}
Provide hllr_tstitltttli¢ :t{tivitics SUl}li()rlilig all {{'iil('rs (SBIR, Tc(h Britq, (;(),%
MI{; .... )
hlslilult' _i t)roacliv(, ('l}{)il Io (li_tll_{" lilt' a//,{'il{)'+s l{'{tliiohi_y lialist0r ttilltii(' ;liid t'ilsiiil'
brt);i{h'i + ]}arti{ipati(}u liy ;ill {,]nl}h)yt,cs.
B. NASA shollhl Sl}ctil]tally IIl{'illiOll l('(hllol()g)' ll-;illSt2{,l ill V-_I-V sl;tl('lll{'lii . . .
4. AfhlihlistialOl siioilhl St'lid ;i dirt'l'liVl, Io IAssochllc AthliiliiSililltiisl :illd l(]('nlt'r
l)ircctolsi sl_tlili_ Ih_tt t{'thlio]o_) lr_iiis, h,i is _t iliiSs, i(}li of NASA alld spccit]cally
ttiat sCCOl/d;iiv l_tl_('l('d alid ilOii-t_u_t, lt,(l alC fillly wlhi{'d, inlporlant NASA iilis-
si(iilS whi{h sh(itll(l I){' illltll;t_-('(I a{tc)r(iingly . . .
3. A(llllilliSlI';ll()l S]l(>iihl {'()lllilltl{! Sll(}li<_ l{'{']lllO](}14]' tl';lllSl+,'l Stl]}])()l'l ;llld lll{';i_lll('
()vt'rall il_{'ll{')' p{'l't()l'lll_iil{'{' . . .
(i. l_2;t{'h {'{'nlt'r sholihl in(hi(h" tt'tlln<)h)_y tl;illSl+,'l ill their + lnissi()li si;itt'tiit'nt
7. 1"2i{'h {'t'llt{'l sliouhl l}r()vid{ • I{'chnoh)gy ll_tIIStCl" ll;lillit]_ t()1 ;ill ('llll)h)vt,{,s . . .
8. Assess, l}r()m{)i( `, ;tt_{l vt",vmd {'mph)yct's ;_{{<)vdiu_ t<) ili('lFhs/'{(}llti-il}tlti(}ns
{,}. P()rtn ail{I t'itip()w{'r ;it l(';isi th{' fi)lhB%ing pr()tt'ss <t(ti()n atl(t t}r()({.ss {h'v('h)pint,nl
l{'{tlllS: . . .
EXI'I +,{)RIN( ; II IE t !N KN( )V.,'N ._7'7
Tech l+,ticfs--inlbrmation acquishion to publication
Patenl applicalions and licensing
Solt'+vare disttibuti_m and t_-ansl_'r
(_ot+Jvmsi<m of non-la+t'brytt'd Io s¢'c<mdary tarRct,t'd
(_,{:,t+ivclsi,c:,n/int+p_ialion of l)lilnaFy tat,getcd to
s.+.'condar y lalr_,{'tcd
Excculi<m of '+ccondaly tat+g, ct,:d programs
l)elhtc tc]ation,d+i I) of ctmtm+ 1o [(:enters for the
(_ommctcial l)vvclolmlCnt <+I Spa(<: ]
F.mph_yc'c lll<)liv;+tli<+ll +lllfl illC,PllliVt' [])I" t,:chn<)logy Iv:+msfct" a<.livilit's
} Including use of
} iointlysl)onsorvd
} resear_h activities
}
10. Sc,r<mdauy tcchnol<>gO' transti'r activitivs should I)<.' pro;tclively s<mghl. Thc lmd-
R,pl ;tll<>calt'd t<) each c¢,t+lct + i_)r its use in se,_<mdaiy tatgclcd llat+sl_.'r pt<)gt+ams
should gros+v and bc lak,_'ll "off Ill.t' lop" as is SBIR.

ABiographical Appendix
William A. Ande_ ( 1933- ) ',,,as a c _utJt.i I '.S. An I:_n_c <dliccr, _tlthough 3 graduatc ot the ('.S. Naxal At adorn>.
(:h<_nctl xsith It.' third gro.p _+I astloua.ts iv+ 191i3, hc +sas the Ita(ku]) pilot tin (;emini I ] altd tilt + htllar moll-
.It pihH li>i Ap<,lh_ ,_. lit' i_'sig_it+(l horn NASA alld the ,,'kit F<_tct' (+wtixc <I.I_.) ill S;t'iHt'lllbet 191+9, '+vht+ll hi"
h('<;llli(' t'Xt'(lili;l' _,t'(It'IdlX t)l lilt' Nalil.lal ACl()llallti(s +tiltl ._I)H((' (_t)lltl(il..lOill('(l lilt' At()Itfil En)t'i,'4_,
(;<,;t..is.,i+,n i. I!17'.+ and l)c_ amc ch_fit ol thc Nil(+h':ir Rt'gulatoly < :<_n..isni,_n ill 1971. l lc was nanw<l t L.";
_llli_+)+t_,_+;it'|()I I,) NOl W;tV ill 197fi, I,;ilt'r, hi' '.+;<Jlk('d ;in _l vie(' l)rt'si_+h+ilt ol (+Clltq;d l'_]t'tlrit ;i+l(l tilt'It :Is +;(.lli<)t t'xt'l
t.i'_(, x i((* pv t'..id('ilt ()I ()+)i'l_Iti(>+l', fi,r +l'('xt]on, In(. Antlers rt.tivc<l as thitq t'x('ct+tiv( +()l(i(ct ,>I (;t'vt('r:d D'+waHtit.,
iN 19!+?_. hut lw ;t'tlmim'd _ hail ol lll_+ h<,_.tl. S,(.c "Alltlt.r:4, 'k%_.A+," l)it,gral)hi(al lilt', NAS';A I li'.t_>,i_ al Relt'rtql< t'
(:_dh', lib,n, NAS, A I li.,l<_i x ()lli_ _'. NASA ] h':t<Itli+_irlers. Washillqlo., D.( _.
Clinton P. Anderson ¢ IS!15-t975) (D-NM) x_;is t'h'ttt'd Io tilt' Ih,lt+.t ` _>l Rt.plcst.llt31i,,t's inl 1910 ;lll(l _,t'lxc<l
llll_Hlgh 1915. wl.'n hi' ;+as al,I),fil,tt'd s_'_ I¢'t_II} _)I aglicult.le, lit' ne.,ignt'tl h<,m their l>(_siti_+tl in 191M alid '+++is
ch'< t<'<l I<, l lw Si'.;.c, v. hcw lit' s<*_vcd until 1973. Sec Biog'rapbh'al lJit;,'rlm+: o] lhr l :ttil,,'d ,'+lab", (J.tL,+tr++. 1771 10S+)
(\%';_shillgton+, 1)(;: l'.+';. ('.()t.t'1111111+III lhil.i._ ()lfi(t +, I(.189).
Peter Badgley ( I!12.')- ) _el civt+d a Pit.It. h'<nn Princeton University iu 1951 and was a Sl)t'<ialist ill g<+_l<_h,-+'a..l
t_'_l_tli<+,.]I_+++.(+Ix<',+lh_I _ tivlw illthe' 19(db, +e,(hi('Iol th(' Earlh Rt'soIH( c +,Sur'.tT I'_g,+un within NL'k_;,Vs_iml_ '
+\pidi, ali_).sI'v+,gr;.n_()lli,_"a.d a +,(hici ,+_Iad'._m< cd vni+.+fi<)nsfor tht+ M_umcd Np+uc Nt i<'t.c lh_>K_atn withi,;
N,\_,,\'++( )IIi(<'<+I NI)++_<' M( i('t_((' ,twd Aill)li<;itions+_<+'('"l+adglcy+ Pt'teF+'+Iti<)gv_qdfi<;d I+h'. NASA IIb+l<.i(+II
Rt'h'l t't. t' ( :_,lh+( li,,_.
D+ James Baker (I!I+37 - ) h_l:+, "_t'l'+('(l ;is lilt + administnalor ol the National ()t t'anogHIdlit a.d Atm<,+.i)hc,it
:\<hili_linlt_tti<_ti ht tlw l)¢*l>antnlc_It ,+I (_lillll(+l(t + Silltt + ](.)(.I_. ,l_t'(+ lfl/h01'+ _'ho D+ ,+ill/r+t/r¢! 1G%16 (Xt'w l_lo'+idt']i(e,
NI: Mm<Itti+' Wh°+" Wh_+, l!l!i+h.
Malcolm Baldridge i 1!1_2-1987) st'_'+t'(I as ',t+(l('l+ll'V ot tOmltl('l+('( + hiHn 19SI .ntil his death. Scc W/I.'s llTu, i.
Dm+_+., tl/h rdil/t.i. I+)Y,¢, 19,_,'7 (\Vilwltqtt'. ll; Marq.is \VhWn Who, 19_q7).
James E. Beggs (1926-) scv,.t'd _ts NASA's +tdministraltw li'om .J.ly 10, I(.IMI, to l)eccmbcr 4, 1(.+85, '++¢hc]l tit"
tt_<_k ;ul indt'linilc h'ax(" ol +dlst'n(t' l)cnding disl)<+silion of an indit tnwnt h_,tn lht'Jllstit t' l)epav'tnwnl Ibr activ-
itie +, takitlg [)la( c pii<,i to his It'lltilt' lit NASA. This indit tmcnlt was lalt'i disvninst+tl, _tntl tilt +U.S. altlwvwy gt'tlt'l +-
al l_t,hlit I+ apoh+gizt'd Io l+,cgg_ Ib, _il+_r('tvd)_,rrasmmclil. llis resignati(m IIOltl N,.'k._A '++;itst'llk't ti'+c l)ll Fcbl'll+il'.v 25.
1986. Pti+,i t<_ NASA, I+.cggs had I)t'ell ('xt!('tltiv(' ViOl.' presidcnt and a dircctor t)f (;t+l_t't+ll Dyit_illlit S ill St. I.ouis.
l'tcvi_+.sly, hc hid scr+t'd with NASA in 1968-1969 as asmwiate adniinistrator flit + a(lvatict+d research and leth-
.<d<_gy_ Fn_+lli 196!1 I,_ 1977,, hc was undel setlet_ll+y Of transportali(>n, lie wellt I() _|llllllta Corpor_ition ivi l.t)s
Ailgeh.s as nlanagitig div c(tor <_I of>orations and joined (;cneral l)yimnlics in Jant,_u'y I(.)7+I. Belore joining NASA
tl. + It, sl time, I,<" lind bc<',, wilh Westinghouse Ele(t,it in Sharon, Pennsylvania, and Baltim¢+re, Maryland, fi,v
thin It'I'll VealS. :_. 1947 +2,radtlalt' I)t thc I. LS. Naval Academy, he scl+;cd with the N+iv:, iililil 195,I. In 1!t55, hc
t ('( civt'd a Inastt'i "+,<fogy t'c li ,+n_ the l I,ll '+*;il+l (_I adtlate _'hool of Business ..Mhninfistrali< m. St'c "Bcggs, ]_mws E.."
hiot.Ual)hi(al lih', NASA I listorical Rcfcrcnce C(>lh'ction.
Anatoli A. Blagonravov (1895-1975) '++;itshead ot'an engineering research institutc in tl.' S.<,virt t!ni<,nl...'ks So%*i(q
w.i)w.,.,t.lll;tliw' I<_ IIw (:witcd Nail<ms Ctnnntittcc _m the Peaceful Uses ol()utcr Spact' ((X)PtrOS) in the carh'
19641.., hc was also st'ni<_,r nt.,g<,ti_l<tt, with NASA's llugh I+. l)ryden, fiw t _,Ol)eralive Sl)aCt' projt+cts at thc height
(,I the (_ohl War ill thc early 1960s. lie workcd ,in+ dcveh_l)ing iull_tllt! y and arlillel y wealt<nts in W, wld Wal II and
()n nt+(krls altcrward. See "Blagonravov, A.A.," bi(tgraphical tile, NASA llist<)rical Referl'lwt' (:,)lh+t li.n.
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Ralph Braibanti ioillct[ I|lc l)c[)arllnt'n! (J| Start' ill 1972 and held a number o! _v_,.ignmcnts tclatt'd t. I+:ttin
Antt'tic;m and East Asian a|htivs bctbrc .it,thing Ihc Sl,_tlt' l')t+partnlt'nt's Buteat, eft ()ct'alls and ]lllclnali_)llal
E]ivilonmcnlal and Nciclltilic .,\+lairs i,l 1985. [ lc ctttlenlly scr',t's as divc(lor o[ thal but cau's sl)a(t+ altd atlvaH( cd
lct hn_flclg _, ,+tall- Scc hiogral)hical skct(h providcd hy R:dph Biailtanli, NASA llisl_)ri(al Roll+tenet • (]<>llc_li<m.
Zbigniew Brzezinski ( 1928- ++el vcd as, fllc |)rcsidcltl (_alICl'_ naliotml sct urity advisor from 1977 to 198l. Scc
V+'h0'_ Who u+ AmeT/+a 1996.
George E. Brown, Jr. (1920+-- (D-CA), sct'vctl ill lhe [louse ol Rcprcscmativcm h om+latnmvy ?_, 196_+,, t_> lmtuary
3, 1971, arid lht+n again |t-ore .lat+ittary ?_, 1973, to lilt + ltrCsent. Ill' chaircd the ][ousc C_mmfittt'c on ,"kicntc,
.+ql)at t ., :_,li(l Ttwhnohlgy l_tt a Httinbcr _I ),cars all(| currcl+tly is its ranking mill+Slit> Hwtnl)cr. St'< + l+',zogT,,++phital
l)ileclorv o]the Amt'r.'an C.ng_e++, 1774- / 996 (Alcxandvia, VA: (5(.2 Stall +l)ircctorics, hit., 1997).
Ronald Brown (It+41-19<.+6) sclvc<l a_, scctct_u v <>I totntncltc l+ll()]]l 19!+3 utttil his tlcath in +t ]tlallc IYash. S_'_'
W]./_ Vi'ho i_ America 19_)6.
David K. Bruce (1898-1977) ++a_, imc otlhc Int_st notable diplomats of the twentieth ,_,.'ntttr}. lit +sol vcd ill Wolld
VVar 1, altd ht +was admiltcd I_ the Mavyhmd ]:,al in 1921 |)tq_:)rt" Ittl ning hb, attcnlic+]l to t.uming in 1(++28. hi 1941.
hc htqi>cd organizc tilt" ()flit c of Slratcgic Scrvict.s and later hccamc thc director _)I thc ccon_)nlic t <_o|)t+ration
mis++i_m, t halgcd with the task i)I 1admilliSlcl'illg the Marshall Plan. lit + sclxcd ill scvcral t (_vclctl amltassadorial
posts, l/ll)SI n<_lal)lv Fr+ttltc (1%t8-19,+-_2L West (;Clln;tny (1957-19.59), (_lc_ll Britain (19(+1-191i9)+ and NAT()
(1974-1976). ]lc was also a icprc_,cntativc to the Vietnam Pcact + Conltqcutc ill Paris (197(+-1971) ;trill was liai-
s_)t] _flti(cr to (+otnmutfist (:hina tiom 197!'I to 1974. Scc +'Bruce, David K.," ill John ,";. l_,,+wman, cd.. Th,+
Camh_+dge l)icth_nary o/Ameri+n_ Biog+aphy (Cambridge, Eng.: The Camh_idgt. t;_li_crsily I'vcss, 19_.+5).
William Casey (1913-It+87) scivcd as chitq ol sc('rttt inlclligcnt c ill Em<Ipc li>r tilt + ()|li<c .I _,t_alcgi( ,"q,.'_xi(c_,
dtl_ mg Wo_ld War 11. AJ'tcl + tilt' war+ hc bct dlnc _t wt+althy bttsincssttmn. Fron+ 1++71 to 197+, hc st+_ v<+d sut ( cssixclv
:Is the _hait +<it lilt' St< ii1 it]+' +lll(l ]+_xt hall_,c (_ommi_+sion+ as tllldCF SCClCt_tl"s i)t statc lill c(xniomic aflitit s, ZtII(] an
ht'_llt ot tilt + Expovt-hnpt+rt B:mk. I h • also st'rvcd on the Forcign h]t_'lligc]lct' Advist_l v P,oavd unth'l I+'tt'sidcl,I
Ford. Ih _ was l:'rcsidcllt Reagan's lirst prcsidcntial c;int|);:ligl] Illall_tgcl and lilt'It SCl ,cc(l _ts Rcag_+tlit'r, divt't toy ot
ct'tltval inltqligclwc tmlil his death al tilt' ht'ight <ff the ha]l-Contra scandal. _'c "Czlscy, William," bi_,'4]aphital
tilt', NASA Ifisl_+rical RcR'rcllt c <+loller titan.
Emanuel Celler ( 188P_-1!1_ I) (D-NY) graduated h'om ( ;olumbia I.aw St h_)ol ill 1912 and immcdizltcl), hogan
practiciHg law in New Sbrk ( _it)'. l)urin,g Wt)vht War 1, hc scrvcd as an appeal agt'nt _tt Ihc dratt hoard. Following
tilt" wan hc Inadc a succcssi_d ,un l_)l- thc +louse ol+ Rt'prt+scntalivcs ill 1923 and ++crvcd :is a L)cm_t _ali< ttHtil
197.3, Ibr a lime as thair _>1 tilt' pow¢+rhd ludiciary C<imnfittcc. l;olh_wing his <Icl't+:tt i]_ 1973, lw.joincd a tom-
missiot+ to ucvisc tilt + li.'dcral altpcllatc t_>tll+t sySlCln and, in It175, rctln]t]cd t_ his law pHctkc. Scc "(;t'llcl,
l'_mattta'l," in Bowman, 7"lie (#+mbt+dEe ])ttl+oll+lt_+" OfA/P//'?it'(/_? I_lo_'+lph_.
Arthur C. Clarke ( 1917- ), IHIC (1| tilt' tnosl wcll-knowt_t scit+ttct + fiction attthors, ha+, also been an eh)qucnt writ-
t'r on bchalt of |he cxlth>rali_m <_f sl.m(t+. In 1945, Itct_trc thc invention ot the transistor, (]lavkt' wv_+lc all allit Ic
in LtTr+,l+'_ World dcs('rihing lht + I)ossibilily _! a gcosynchrotlous orbit and the dt+vt+h+l)mcnl <+l c_mmnmicati<ms
]cla}s bv satcllitc, lit' also wlotc scvclal lIIwcls, the m,+st kttown being 2UOI: ,4 3,_ba++'O+(+'ssO', bascd <_n +l s_ vct+n -
l>lav ,>I lht' salnc Itamt' thal hc it]Cltmcd fist dirc¢'tor SI_ItIIc_ Kublit k. Thc movie is slill <_nt' lJl thc most _calistit
dcpittions .t the vigl)vS _1 spatctlight cxc] tihncd. Scc "(]lalkc, A.(].," tti<lgvaphit;d lilt +, NASA tti,,torical
Rt+fi'lcn< c ( ;ollc('tiou.
EdgarM+Cot|rightIJ!)2:_- ) t';irtled il lniP, tt'l _| s{ Jl,llte degJl,e ill itt'rOl)_tlllJCit] i'n_JnceHn_ t;{ml l{c.nsstqael
l_cd'_tt't |nIl( ]nslitutc ill 1949. tilt' yt'ax ai]el hv Piut.d dw nlatt <_! l+t.wis l,allmatcn Y. I [(' (on(hI(led ut'st'ar(h at
I+ewin ml tl_t' acro<l}nami< s ot high+spt't'd air inductkm syslcms :rod jet exil nozzlcs. In ]9_'_bL he joined a sunall
task grotq) to hay tilt' limndatil)ul li_r a nati(inlal sit:lit' agen< }: When NASA tame i]lll) Irgng, hr' llecmnt' chit'l n|
adxmlt cd tt'chn<)h)_,ff, at NA.%_+ |It'adquartcrs, ditccting tilt' initial hHintdali<m ol lilt + :l_t'n_}'s tnt'l<'(_Hdogil al
satt'llitt' lJlOglalll, in(furling tilt' TIRO,"; and Nimbns p`+0jects. PJe('olnillg assistant dirt'| t_r |01 Innal alld |huge-
tat}' l)r ogt ant:,, in I !)60, ( it+f l| ighl directcd lht" plannittg itll<l itnpl<'menti+lb+m olsu< h pt 0it'< l_. :t,, _Ia+iltt't, Rang<'L
and S,m vcyol. I It' beta|He deputy dir¢'ctot +and then deputy associate adtmnistlaln] l]w spa(c st ien< t' and appli-
( athens in thc ncxt lew years and was depnt), associate adnfinistrat<)r fi+r nl;,|nllt.d spat t, llighl ill 1967. In 19(:,8, hc
)J+++a.l¢" tilt<+( tot ,ut lilt' l./+;tg)<'++' R¢-++;,++l,'t_")+<';<+tll('r. a fjouiticm he h,t+/<'l ¢.ttil I+PT++. i+hctl It<' ++'<'Ill I,u "+.+z.k t,++t p'ri-
x_m" inrhr.,l_ b bt'(<mling prc_,idt'nt _t th<' I.o_ kht.ed-(:+dilornia ill 1979. St't' "(tot night, t"d_at M,," Ili<_gHphi,t :d
tilt', NASA I listorical Rt'fi'rcnt <' (:cdh'(tion.
0
John M. Deutch [ 197,,_- ) sel',t'd a'+ dt'puty ,+ecrctary ot dctense from 19<.14to 1995 anti then a'+,<lhc( t_. _,t ten
tt;d inIHligen(e fi_>m 199.+_ Io 1997, lit' it'_ ei'_t+d a Ph+D+ li'om the Massacltu:.,t'tts hv, tilttlc ut Tvt hn<_h+g T and also
_,,tqvcd its thai '+,ch<_<d'+,dean <d scit.tl,, c and provo+,l. St't' "l)eiHch,.Ioh. M.," hi_)gtaphi_al tilt'. NASA I |istork al
R<'fi'r vtwc ( :+dlt*_ d,m.
Hugh L. Dryden (I 89X-1!11"C0 was a ( alt't't civil set t,*il`+`+liln(| |ill at'lotlHlanlit |st by dis( iplhH +who had als_> begun
tile a5 st.|itching +_f a +him lJt<_(lig;: I h' gradttatt'd at itg<' 14 from high scho<d arld +v<'nl <m t<, ear_l ;m A.P,. m
thlt.t + _,t'ars Iri>i_+ Jl,hlP, lh,l_kms (1916). Three years later (lglt.l), lie t'+`+rned his Ph.D. in phy:.ks antl matlle-
Ill;flit's |+<llll lilt' _,atllt' iliMittltil>ll, tWt'll though I`+e had |_.ill-time eniployment kll tilt" National Btllt'atl ol Ntandaltts
silt( (-./Itn< + 191N. t li'+ _ ;tl,_'(+r tilt+t,: +, ",+')licit |_+++:+<1ttl'`+ti| 19+ 7, P+'_; f|t't_R,:+d I¢1 slll+l++'itlg aPirtl+i+t, +llt'P_+ttl<'tlc<', ;It+<| p+itl.
tit ulall:, lilt' pHdllems ot the bmmda_y layer--lhe Ihin I_+,y,ercfl air t`++.'x! Io arl ahfifil Ihat (a`+`+sesdrag. In 1':)20,
he became _hiet ot th<' liner'ira's at'rl_dyltanfics sect|tin, tlis work in tlw 1920', on mt'asm ing t`+Hb`+lhmce in wind
huHtcls tiwilitatt'tl reseat( |1 ill Ihe Natitmal Advisory (:<lint|litter' fi,r At'r_mautks (NACA) that prodttccd Iht' lam-
inar Ilovv wings unt'd in tilt. P-51 Mustang and other W<+rld War 1[ ith'craft, Fr<m_ tilt' mid-192(),, to 19.17, his pub-
lit;ltiOns he( atne csst'nfial reading fi_r aer<_dynamicists ,around the worM. Dul-hlg W<_tld Wm 11, his ,,',**<llk on a
glhh' bomb named tilt" Bat won him a |'residt.mial (:ertilicate of _Ierit. | 1+.' ca|it'd his (at col at tht' Bu]elttl ill
Stml<la]ds b). I)t'('Olllillg i1"_ assistant dirt'ctor +tll,t'| theu associate dhe( tor dll1ing his final lx,,o years thclc. ] [e then
s<'_ vt't| its dht'ct<w ol tilt' NAt :,'\ f_cml 1947 to 195bI. after which he hecame deptH} adnmlistralm o| N ,m_`I_ t t I__It ' t
'E Kt'ilh (;Imlt;an arid laln¢'s E. '+_k'bll..gt't+ Ricl'_al+d K. Smith, 7/w//.gh L. lhyde. I'up+,P_. I,+9,%1q+55 (l+allinltwe,
MI): lh_'Jc_htv,+ tlopkins Imvt.rsity l.ibrary, 1974).
Dwight D. Eisenhower (18!)0-19|i9) was president of tile United Slall's lwlwccn 19.'+'>3 mid 1961+ Prcvi_mslv, he
had tlt'<'ll it (art't'r I'.._. Arltty tJH]<'<_:`+al`+d, during World War I1, was SUl)le`+`+`+eallied COltlltlilndt'l" ill ||lit'Opt', A.g
i_t.sith+nt, h<. was de<'ply imerested it'+ the use of space technolog?' fiw national security purposes and <lirected
th+ll ballisti( misnilcs and r<'<t)nnktissan(e salelliles he deveh)ped on a crash hasis. For more inlornlalion 1111
I;,i",<+nhc+wct ", spat t, t,t]mt,,, st.|' Rip Ihllkeh% The 5,_mt+*t,;h.,;Cl++is a.d Ea+l+, Uniled ,_;I.te+ .+_lut+eP+,fi++ (l++h+<mm`+gt_;,n,
IN: Indiana I !hi'tel +,Jr,, Ih-e+,.,, 1991 ); R. ('.ar_ill ttall, "The Eisenhower Adnfinismttinn and tht' C_ld War: Framing
A1m'_i(aI_ Astt<mat+ti(s to Stq'.'_' Nail<real Security," Pr+dol.,_+e: Quarler(', +J the Nati+mal ,tr+h/t,es 27 (:";filing 1995):
F+9-72; Rol)c_l A. l)i,.ine, 7he ._mtt+lk (: ,allen+fie: l:'i.senhtnue+ _ ICe+p+mse to the .S_n_i+'t,_ah'lhte (N_*w "_k, N'I_ ()xf()t(t
t ni,.c_sitv Ih_'ss, 1!19+._,).
John D. Erlichman was a senior assistanl to the president during the Nixon administ_ali<m..",;ce.l<dm Erlichman.
_Vilm_ss I+_t_+,we_: The Ntx,, Yemt (Ncw Yt_rk, NY: Simon aud Schnstet; 1982).
James Exon (1"5+21- ) servcd as the gov('1ntll" Oic Nebraska from 1.971 m 1979. Since 1979, lie has st'rved as a
I)<'m<w_tti( _t'Hal+)F IHm_ Nt'britski`+. Set' Who'_ Who in Ame+@a 19q_+
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PhilipJ. Farley ( 1916- ) ('_lt Hl>d a I'h.l). li{)m lilt' L+nixcP+ity lit (Ddit<llllia _ll l+.('tk(.h.x in ]!HI mid w_t', (m ihl+
liwullx, ;it (_(nl)ll_, (:hri'+ti ,Junior (:olh'gt' ti<}m IAHI Ii) ]':).l_ t)et_}rt, t+nl('nillg gl)'_'t'rlllIWnl ',++'(Ilk t_)l Iht' Ah)lnli(
F_nt'rk,',' (;()mmissi(m (Id:t47-1$1_,+1) _IN(I t_l lilt' St;lIt, l)<'ll:lrltm-m (195't-19(;9)+ Fr_)rH I':E)7 umil 191il, tit' ;+,as a
+.p('ci;ll _issiM_llll It> lhc _+t+trt.l;llY <)I +q_tlt' li)l lllS+tl'lll+llllelll ;lll{l +lll)nlit t'lirl_+', +tlld h()lll ]gli] It) l!lli2, his l(*_])(ill
sil)ililit's shilted to :lltlmi< t'nt'l _'_ ;rod (mlt'r spat( +. .,ax|lt.r s('v('ral vc:us ol ;Issigllmt'm ill th< + N<)ith Athmlit +Irt'atl'+
()rg_mi++'alli¢)n (NA'I'()). lit" itqllttlt'tl It) x,'Valshitlgli)ll :ind l)t'<mllc dCllmx+ s('<l(+t_ir'+ of slalt' l+)i p<diti(al milit+ux
_11+ilirs (I!)Ii7-191;!}). rl'ht.li lil)ll+ I<.}69 I. Iti7'._;, hc l)t+l_lll+t ` th+pHl_+ dh-t.tll+t (d tilt' t:._,.._itm, (;(mllol _md
l)iP.ilt lll_llil¢'lll Ag('ntx+, ,_lq' "F_IIIcx, l'J.." l>i+_gl;iphic;il lih+, NASA l list()ri¢_fl R('It'it'lll t. (',ollt't ti,)m
James Brov, tt Fisk (l!llO-lg,+";l) rt'tt+ixt'(l his PILl)+ ill l>hx+sit+d scitn(t, h()m tht + Malss;ithtlsl.lt+. hlslilutc <,I
rl'c(-hn< ,h+_', in 197,-) :rod st'rxr<'d m a x+a. it,lx .I t.dtl( ali(m_fl ali(l iH<Iusll S l),)Siti( )HS. I It' _+a', he:ix ik i_Ix,)l,,t'd ill l+(. k
at Bt'll I_.Icl>h_)m+ l.;ib<it_ll(itit.s, uhim:it(+Ix l)t'_()ntin_ it:., l)l('si(Iclit. St.c, "lg++k+ l+l+.." hi,,_;qdfilal l]h., NASA
I listoril al Rt'l_'rt'_ll t' ( ;()llcctil_n.
Peter M. Flani_ (192S- ) wan ;m +l.,sislat+t t<) tilt' l)it.silh.i+! ,)it lilt' Whirl + ]l<,tlst" Still! l1_m+ l!lli!_I<) 1971.
l'r<'xi,..sl), hr" had hct'll im(dv('d ill invt+Sllilt.lll l)mlkiliF, wilh l)ilh)tt, Rt'_id, ;m<l 1;<, lh. It'lllzllt+(l t() Imnillcs,.
wht'rl hi' l('|t _<ivt'l llln('lil St'l Vii(>. l Iis p,..itiull i._ thl' "Whir(' l lottst' hlx_dl('d him hl t'|l_)ttn It) _:lin _pl.<ixM t,,
httild lit++' Sllal'( ' Shutt]t' (lulhlg tilt' ]_llitl-l(lT_ ll(.ri(,d. _,t't' "Misct'llallt.ou,, ()thrl A_41.H_ i<.s " l>i<_t_l;illlficM fill+,
NA.";.:k l li+,t(.it al Rt'fi'rt'tlt c ( '._dlct ti()ll.
James c. Fletcher (1919-19':+I) tt'ct'ixt'd +IN Imlh'iF, l_tdtmlt, dt'glt'c ill ph','.il +, h()m (:<)Itmllli:l tmx+l.lsilx aml :l
do< l<n_ilt, in llhvsi;.+ h(.n th(+ ('+Mill. uia [ti.,titm,. + idT('< hn<dog_+. Ahl', h.l<li_g _l".l'+u (h +rod i_'al hiug p_J+.ili<mn
_it l larv;trd and l'rim t'l()H t tlli'¢(+l'nilil's, hi' j<fin('(l l lushes Aircr;l|l ill I!I.I_ _ttltl l_itl,i w(,_ kt'd :it the (;re(It'd Misnih.
l)ixisioN Ill the Ram¢)-W<.)hh idol. ( ;()i i)<,l_lli< m, hl 19F, S, Fh'tt ht'i l (Fh)ttntlrd thl' Slm( t+ l+:l(.ctl(mi¢ s ( ;Oll),+i +llil )II
ill (flc_i(l:fl(', (',;llih.ni_L whi(h _l|lt'l ;i lllt't_Ol" b<'( _Imt' the' Sp:.c (;t.llt.l+;tl (:i)l l)<)_+iti<.L lit' l_:ts Dltt'_ ll+llllt+ll ++'+S-
It'lll_, vi('t' llrC,+itl('llt ol tilt' A+Cltpjt't (;t'llt'l_ll (_l)l lJl_l+Iti(m ill _;lt r_lllll'llll). Ill Itl#+l, hc lit'( _tlnl' lll('+,i(h'llt <)! tht'
l rni"+'t't+,il_,'ol L'ulh. a l)i)siti(m hi' hchl imlil lit' '.+,:_isn;mll'd NAS,,\'s +I(llnhfisll;tl(+l iN l<J?l, lit" ..t't xt'(l tmlil I!)77.
lit' ;tls(i mt'Ivt'd :Is NASA _l(hilhlislr_th)l + +i st't(_lltl lhIw. |_I lit+ill Ix+ thl('c xcars folh,win_ lilt' It)s.. <Jl lht" Y,ll:l(t ,
Shulth' (,'D./h'.gl.l; l+lonl I!I_l; ilnlil 19Ntl. l)IHiil_ hi', litsl _tdmiIli'.Iratil)H ;It NAY,,\. l)L Fh't( ht'l wits _t,_,l,,m,,ildt.
I_il bt'_ilillillg tilt' Shtitll( + t'II_JFl. [)IHiII_ his St'limit tl'tttltt', hi> l)r('si(h.(l (,xl'i lhl' ell<ill It) lt'l<,xt'l l+i)lll lilt'
CD+lh>.AYP:llcidt+llt, St'(" Rt)gt'r D. I+;iulihls, ",\ \+_,'t+sh.l n _|lilllli)Ii ill _,VashiiIKt<,N, l).(: : la,u(.s (:, Fh'i( Ill'l. N.\_+\+
arid tilt + Filial Ft()nti('i," I'.+ifi, Ilist.H+(d I++'+,++++,6,1 (M;t_ 199F)): 21T-II.
Arnold W. Frutkin (191b;- ) '++,it+,ill'pill,+ (lilt'It<it <)I lh(, lL_,, N_ili(m_i) (]i_nnlniHtnt.t. h)l lht" lultt'rN+lli,,nlal
_[',c<,I)h'+'_h al _,_'ar in tht' N_lli.nM A(;.h.m+ <)! St it'ill t.s v,'h('n NAg,\ hilt'(l him it+ I!).'>_} _l., dill'( t<. +,l illtt'l ll_lli+)llill
llt_i_l:mln, :l lillt" llmt t li_lll_t'(l ill lgli]] t()_Insist+ml _ttlnmlinlt+tli)i |ill itltcr ti+llilm:tl _tli[lils. Ill l!17_ ,Ill' [)l.'l ;llllt i
_Inso(iatt' :i<Inlinislr:tl<+r f<ll ('Xtcl,ml rt'l+tli()iln. _l ]l()sl Ill' l_+lintluinhl+d i,+ 1_J7!I ;silt'It h<' If'till'if h()m It'dr'lid sr,-
xilt'+ [)lllill_ his (+llt+t+l. lit' had lit'i'll N,\_,\'_+ St'lli()l llt'_(lli;Itlll h)l alm,,st +Ill _)I thl' iml>.i l:lllt illlt'lil_lli<)ll+ll +.])_l( t'
;l_It't'llll'lll_,. Slq' "l:rtitkiIL At nt)hl," lli()Kz_iphi( _d lit('. NASA I Ib, lolit;ll RcI_'_t'n(t, < ;<dlt'l It(in.
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John II. Gibbons (19_!I- ) ht'+.It.<l lht" ()llill+ td rl't+l htl_)l()+.'3 ASS('SSmt'IIt It''dt't (;<i'+_ics+. liP' fOtlrt<'l>ll '+l'ars
I>cfin(, ht'tl)initlg I)rcsi(It,lll ('.liltt()ll's s('it'lltt' _l(Ix+is(_l ;uid ht';td _d" thr Whhc l l<)ust+ ()lti(t" i)l Nlit'lil<, tlll<l
'1+,'( hnld()_'+' I)<dit v in I!lt+ii/, Ih' l('ccixt,(I +l I)li,[). iii i)li_,.i( +, h(liii ])tlkl' I 'ilhci+,iix+ ill I{IF)-t+ _t't' +'(;il)l)_)ii,,. ]<)]ili,"
hi,)_i:ll)hit _ll tilt', NA.'-IA I li,,h)rit al Rt'ti'l('lil (' ( ',_dh'_ iioil.
T. Keith Glennan l lgOF,-Itl!F,) ++++is NA.%\'s lhnt a<hNinislrat_>l. IEt' +_i+, ('dm att'd ;it \'all" I'nixt'1+.it ', and x+o_ kt'd ill
th(" '.+()unt+l miiti(Jl+ l)it Itllt' h](Insll v '_+,,ith lilt' F.h.t tfit al R(+st';u.:h Pt(>(hH I,, (:()mlian'.. tlt' was ;tlm(+ slurl+() l]lill'i_igt'l
(_I l';<llani_+unt l+i(ttlt,-'n :In<l _q+iHiu('l (;.I(lw,.]1 .'Sl]tdi()n hl tht' l!J+10s. (;hqln:In johlt'iI (;.hlmhi;i 15ni+_.t'ish'+'s
[)i,,isi.n ,:.I x,'(+lJ Rt"+,<'an h hi 19 !+'-'. st'l '+'in_ llit,+u_h tht' w;m fi]st _]+ :+(hninislratt+r _nld then as dir<.'_ lq>r (_I the U.S.
N;ixv's | _n<l('l W+tl<'t SOtl+l(l l,;lhl)l;ll<)l it'.. 31t N('x+. ].on(hl]i, ( '+(+llllt+t lit Ill. It] I!)17 he he( auH' l)rt'side]ll i)I lht' (]:is("
[n'+,t+tut<' +>I It'( hl](>h>'.4+, m ( ih..,+t.l+u:d. DtHhi_ hi_, +t(llii+liiSll_llil>ll. (+_l+,t ' lOSt' lit]ill ;| |)linl+irik h+(al ii]++liltllil)l] I<>
l:mk with tht" top ('ll_+11('('l ill_ SH]<_,+I+ m tht" ll:tli<)ll. 14'I])111 ()t tlillt'l Ill3() to Nl)+..t'll)hUl Itl_'}_. (;It'ltt+_m st']st'd :Is
_I m_'mllt'I .I the At_mit l".nt']_,' ( _o]mni,,sion. I le :tl+o +.t'] v,_',irl a_+ adtniifislHlol _>I NASA ;,;hilt* tin It':]vt + Ir<_m ( last'.
l]t'twt't-n ,\li_Nst 7, l!Ir_bl ;u+d.l;mN+H V 211, 19lil. Alter le+tvmg NASA, hr. if'tin ilt'(l Ill tht' (;+it, e, '+_;ht'rt' he<' +,+.':is t'tin-
iillU('+l I++ +_t'i xt' _t_, I)_<'+,i<h'iil uilill l!l('_li, _,t+t' J,l). ]llllil('v. t'd,, "/Tit /J/P/h +_1+ ,\]IL_'A." 7"/#t' /J/aPt It/ 7] Kt'II]I (eli'#ill+Tit
(\\'_lnllhlt.+Tl<)l], I)( }: N,\_,,\ _1'-I lli_->, I{i93).
James {:. Ilagerty (I{11){) I%'tl ) li:l<l I)<'t'n lilt Ihl' sl;lt] ot the N+-I+, li+rk 77#_++'_ lit)lit I{I;/,t tt) 1912> Iht' t_tsl tilili '+(':11+_
;i,, I<'_i',l;lli',< + t iJll t',,I)iJllrll+lil ;ll lilt + ll_il)('i '_, <\tt)_lll)' I)ilre:ill. I It' ++t'rve<l _l'+ t'_;e( illiVe _i_,_,iJ++l_llil Ill _('_' _l_li t. ( '_()%i'lli(ll
Th+iinll., I)t'+_('_ Ill)ill 1!)13 t- I{l__') +ilitl lh('li i]_, l)('wt')">+ l/i("4_, "_t'( ICt_ii t, Jill Ih<' lit'xl I/+,,(_ )t>_il_ ht+l(ll< + h('( _lliiil]_
pit,,++, _,<><i(,i;ii t. till I+it,+,i<l(.nl l']i+><'ilh+_+_('i li+_lii ItlFf.I 1<_ I!ltil. _t't' "Mi_,t t'll+ilit'_)ti++ ()tht'l +\f{t'ii( it'<+>+` hio_i;ll)liit _ll
lilt +. N\_A I li_,i< _l itlll Rt't<+_ <'lit t' ( ;<+lh'(li.n.
Irwin P. ttalpern _¢'t xt'<l ;]+ Iht' dh t'_ ll)i <ll N..\%A'_ poli<y ;iil+ily++i_, +,t_il] ill thc mid-I!t(iO_, 1 It' l)it'vioti_t', +_(_ kt'd i_t
Ih<" (',¢,lill+il hit(.lli_t.n(t" ,\_<'li( '+ <ill _,<_i('1 _li](t ('+hint'++< ' l)_)lili(:tl-niilil_il'< ;llt]lh.+ _lii(l (h_tii hit'. Ih' lt.t¢'ixi'd _i
I'hA ). ill +,u+it,t hi.,t<+i x tit)ill (;(liiiil]l)i_i I'ni'+t'i'+ilx. _,t'(' "Mitt( t'lllint'<lu'+ N+\_,\," hi<_t4i:llllli< _ll tilt', NA_\ I Ii++l¢_ii(;ll
t_.t't(+l i'll< i" ( :ullt+< Ii()n.
Henry R. Hertzfeld ( Hilt:+, - ) is ;i S<'llilii i<'+.(';irth s(ienti_,t +it the (;('<_l_l' \'t'+i_,lliii_ll)n I 'ni',('rsii).'_, F,I]Cit t" t'.lit ;,
hl_liillh', l'it'_ i<_u.,I,,, h(' _+('i _,('(I +1++Iht' _.t'liilll t'( lllil)liii,4t _il NASA +]till lt'_ a I)_)lit ):llidl)+,l +tl lhi' N+tlillll;ll _ti<,ii( t"
I+<luntlltti<)ll. Ih' _<'<t'iv_+tl _l l'h.l), in t.t_>lil)llii(_, trl)ni +['enil)h' [!nivt'r_+il_, , +in+l ;i .1.1+. tlt'_it'e tio,u (;_.,,l_.t.
\+Ci_+hili!4t<>n I nixt.i_ii'+. _t't J ++$,li+,t i'll_uit'l)ti++ N L\_,,\ " lliot4r:il)lii< ;ll tilt', N,\_+,\ I [i_,lorit :il I_t+t('l('i]t <" (;llllt'tlion.
Walter J. Ilickel (1{+19- ) ;',;t'+ l.(o'+'('lliOi ot Al+iP+k+l lind Iht'n set-ret;trv <it tht' i]lteri_>l Ii(lili l!lt)!i I<) I{tT(). St.<"
Leonard Jaffe i(_iil(,<l th(" N_ililili:tl ._l[lvi.><)l "+ (:_)lnlnitli't' li)r At'ron;iutl( `+, in I!t,llt ;in(I w(_]kt'(l till it +iiid its, ++tit-
i<,,+++<li _li!4;iiii/;ili<ln. N+\_+,\. Illi thhl)-Ihit't' %t'_ll_, lit't(_ie liiO_+ill_ Ii) tilt" llii'i'all" _,t.ttl>l in l!t_l, let" liiilli:ilil'+
wl>i kt.+l hi Iht' ti_'l<l _1 ,>1>.. t" iil)lllil ,itil_il+,, _xt'i k('t'ill_ lii_iily (ll N+,\+A '_, e_il k t'ttili I_+ in l l.liilllt. ,,t.il+,il]_ +llill _,.llt'l-
lit] + (<)iiiiilillii( _ili<lii_. _t't' "latlt'. I +el)lilill'l,'" hil>14ralflli(:ll tih', NA+A 1 li_+lorita114{(.li.it.li((' (;olh't Iiun.
Karl G. Jansky f I!t(13-NI.'_!)) ++:l_, ;i i('++t':lr(ht'i li)l Bell [.iit)<li+ilillie_+ in Nt".4' Jt'r_,(') who, while P,lti(l','ilit_ itlt' ++t:ili<
lh_ll i>lit'ii (li.+i IIl)lt'd iadi+_ t lllliiiilini( _tii<lii'+, <1i+< <l'+('lell illlt'i_leil_ir nldi<_ 'e,'iix t.++. "I-Illi_+ lilt + Ih'hl _1 i_i<li+l ;l_,lll_ll_>-
im +,':in hot ii. St't' "K;u I (;..l;ulskv>" l:.iog]:tl;.hit al tilt', NASA I lisltiri<':i] Releleli( (" ('.<ilh't ti_ii.
David S. Johnson w;i +, Iht' I'_li'+ii<_nnl('ltt:ll .%lwllite (]('nter dii+e('t<lr lit tilt' l_]]lvh<lnln(+lil;l] _<it'litt + _el"+i(t'
,\diiihii+_il;lli_tl iii tlw ini<[-]!l(_li'_. _('t' "Mi_(t'll_tni+ou+ ()lhl'r A_el](),'* I)iIIt4r:illhit'al tilt', NA_.L\ ]li+,t_lit_ll
l'{l'lt'it'li( t J (;4_ih't tiOll.
John A. Johnson (Ittl]- ), ;iltt+i tolnlflt'lin': 4 law s(ll<lill +it thc Univer_+it'_ lit (;hi<al{ll in I!11(), i)r+li-Iit(.<l in
(;liit a_<l iiiilil I{)F./. '+_+'ht'li lit. t'lli('l('(I niilit+il)_,t'lVi(t" with ]he Na++_,'. _+'l<)nl HI,It!, I() 1!)+I1'4, tit' wa+ :ill _l+++i.,l_tili I(ll
illlt.ill+lliiililll +,('( ili il _, allilir,+ in Iht' l)et)+illlnel]l <it ,_lale. let' .ioined Ih(" otli('e 1)t th(' _t.lit'lal t()tiiiP+,t'l <)1 lhe
l)t'll+ii Init'nl ()t ]hi" \ii P_)I< t' ii] l!it!l :tilt[ P+t'l '+'ell linlil ()l;l()tit'i" 7, 1 !l-r)_ (tol lhe la_,t P+i× ),e:il TM _t_ Ihe _t'iit'r:il {olin-
nt'l), ;_,h('ti h<" ;it( t'l)led Ill(' _t'nt'l;ll (<llin_t'l I)<lniti(ll] :tl [_A_,,\. In I!)(_!+i, lu_ Icli thc Sl):tct' _t_t't+i< ") lit) l/<+.(<lllit' (lil('(
Ill] i:+1 ililt.iliiilil_lili) illlliil_('liielll'+ al It](" (]l)liinillllit_ili()ll_, _atl'llllt' (](lll)Oliili()li ((]()ili_,al}. [hi<" ilexl _+'l..itl, tit.
I)('< :lliit' _i %i( t' t)t t"+ilh'iii _1 (;i)lii+_ill _ii](I lh('ll, ill 1!17_+I, ++l,llilli _+i( (" l)i('++it|('nt _iii(] l;ill'l _ hi_-I (,xt,t utix(" <)tli< (.i; I It"
_('ti_<'d in I!l_(). _t't' 'i],>hl,_,,u,J A.," hi,>14]_]I_hi(al lilt +, NASA Ili_to_itl]l R(,It'ren(t' (:_lh,t litre.
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Lyndon B. Johnson (190;"+-1973) (I)-TX) was clot tt'd to Ihc [hmst' _[ RcpIcnentati,:t.'. in ]937 and '.,crxcd until
1949. Hc was at st'nalol froth 1949 to 1961, [.S,. vie+,' pv+,'sidcnt l+om 1960 to 19(53, and prcsi+,hcnt h<m_ l|wn until
l_.)(it.l. Bt's,t known ]or th+c social h,'gislalion h+c pa'_'+cd (hltitlg, his l)Vt+sMcn('y and lot ilis t+scalation _d tilt" Wal in
Vi+,'lnam, he was also highly, instrunlcntal in ++`wising an+,l passing th+,' hcgislaliml that ( r+,+at+,++,lNASA and in sup-
|)t)ltill_ lilt' [.,N. Sl)_l(t' llroglam as (hair o1111+," ( ',Olnlllittt't + Oll /_('l'()llilllli('il] and Spat+` + St+i+,qlt t-s, ;lll+,l <if lilt" ])it.-
l)alcdncss sttl)+,ontnliltcc of thc ,'_+,'n;lh- Arnl+,'(l ,%+,'lVi( t.s (:(>mmitt+,'+`'. I It" ]+th'r ill chaired lh+,' Nati.nal Act onanti( s
and Spat+`" (;olm('il wlll'n hi' was 'L,i('t' pr+,'sidcnt. On his ink' m :+,Uli[)orl i)J th+,' spate lilt)glare, st'<" R<dlt'it A.
l)ivinc, "l,vndtm B..lohnson and tilt" l+olili(s of %llatc," in R<dwrt A. l)ixinc, c<l., ?'he]ohn',.+,+ YeaP,,: Vietnam, the
I#tlvlrolllll._llt, alld Slit+U<+7' (I.awrl'o+,+,N K.%: Univcrsilv ot I_msas Press, 1_.t87), pp. 217-53; R<dlclt I)alhek, "i)ohnson.
Pr_pje('t Aptdht, and the Politics ()t St)act Ihogvam I+lant]ing, '' unpublishcd i)apcr dcli',clcd at a svmp<+xiunl c+]+
"lh+,+sith'ntiat l.ca+,h'rship. ('+(mgFCSS, and thc t +.S,. Spatc I't¢_g_a]n," sponsored by NASA and Am<+ri(an [ nix+,'rsitx.
_l_lll{ 1+ 25 ` It)':)3.
Nicholas L. Johnson is NASA's chicI scientist h+r orbital dcl)ris at tilt..l(dms.n Spalc (:t'ntt'r. lhcxiousl?,, hc
worked ill privat+, + industr',' ;llld w;l+4 +,onsid+,'l+,'d ;ill expert on the So,+i+,q s[la<'c I)l()_l-illll. ,_,t*t' "J()hllsOll, Nil, bolas
1.," bi,+g, ral>hital lit<', NASA Iiisl_nical Reh.rt.ncc (:olh'+,ti(m.
Roy W. Johnson (190(:,-19(;5) was named the lilst tlirectol of die D+,'1)artmt+nt .f l)cli.+ns+,+'s Advan(cd Research
Prqwcls Agt'nt)and scrvcd It+oft| ]9."+)I'_ll) 1959. As sit(h, hc was llead of I)t'lkqlse ])<+l)artmt, nt's initial spat+`.
efforts. Ptiou to joining the +_OVI'FIIlII+,'II[, 114.+ W<llked for (;t'tlt'lal El+,.+,+tlic an(l relircd +is an vxc( utixc xitc prcsi-
dt'nl. S+,+t+ "Johnson, Ro)W.+" biographit al tile, NASA l[ismrical RclcF+,'n+,'c Colh', lion.
Frederick R. Kappel wits lilt' chair ofthc l)oal+,l ()f dil ct tot s _11 tilt' Amt'l ilan Tt'lvph<mc and Tclcgt aph (:,)milan;+
in 1963. Set* "Mist ellancous Industr?,_ +. l)ioglaphical lilt', NASA llist,wi+,al R+,*l_'rt+n(< • Colhc(li<m.
Nicholas Katzenbach ( 1922- ) was twcnty_me whcn hi' was t+al)tlu +,.d hy th+,' (;crnmtl,, during Woll(i Wm II. and
hi+ was _++ill isont+r t)f war |k>r two yt'ars llntil the '.+,'ill +,'nd+,'<l. I[e rt'tllrnt+d to lilt' t;nm,d ,_,lah's _lll<| lll'canlc a
Rhodc.; St holar ill 1947. ",Vhcn h+,+ It'tllrnt+d h+otn I_hlgland ill 1950, hc +_as admiltcd Ic) lit(' Ncx+ lc,sc ?. llaL I h'
l)t'Calnt' a law pto|c'ssl)r at Yale Univt+rP+,ity ill 1952 and then at tilt' University <>l ('+16(ag_) l+.m 195G until 191_'k
lh' joined thcJustit c I)Cllattmcnt hl 191iI as assistant attorll+,'}' _+,'llt'lal+ atld ]11' +%r_lSIll omol+,'d Io dcpuly att<+l nex
g+,'twral ill 15)(+2. Ill' rcmaincd ill that position until lh+,' cnd o| 196,1 and was instvumc]ilal in thalting thc (_ixil
Righls .'x(t (d lhat S;llllt' t,t'+ll, lit + l)+,'t:.imc atl()l tit')'_('ll+"lEil iti 191"_i and tmd+,q ++t'(It't+ll _, (if MHIt+ ill lglh+. I It+ h+Ii
_o_,t'l lllll('lll _,t+lt,+t +,` tO "+':Ol'k l_>r IBM in 1969, wh+,-rc ht + sla?,cd tmlil 1981;. lb' i+,'tulnt.d t<_ l)liValt' ptattitc and
was nam+,'d chah-ol tilt' failing Bank (hct-lil atld (_olnlnct(t" Intt'rnalilmal hi 1991, Scc "Kat/cnba( h. Nit h,das (+h"
I>,+,+lh+vilh'), '' ill l+ox+inatl, The (;aml.'i+(_e lJittionary o/:lmePita. Bio:_raph_,.
Estes Kefauver (1903-1!_1i3'1 (I)-TN) sctvcd in tilt" thrust' t)f RclllCSCntalixes tmnl 1939 m I!t4!t and ill tit+,'
N+`'llilt+,' II'()]ll I':149 to 191i?,. the ran ilnstl,.Ccsshlllv as Adlai Stt',,Cll_;Otl's '..ic+,' plt'sidvnlial choi(c ill 1956. Y,<'C
Ili%,_aplmnl lJi_+'ctoI_'f o[ lhe I :llJl+,d 3;tales (),.[_,'t++% 1774 1(.'89.
John F. Kennedy (1916-1963) (I)-MAI was U.S. prcsidcnt ti.m 1961 It) 1963. A _,cmltoF ti<nn Massa_htts<'lt,,
b(+txvt'(ql I!15: +, alld 19(_,0, h+,' ';ucccssfi_llv ran li)_ llrl.sitlrt+t as tht' I)ctno(tali< can+,lidat+,', with part? whcclho_sc
I,vnthm l+,. Johnson :is his rmlning mat+`'. ['sing the sl<)gan "],('l's g+,'t this (()llllll'_+ IIIOVillg agaill,'" Kcntw<h
+,llargt'd th+,' Republican l+:is+,'nhowcr adnlinislr atil)n with +h)ing n,)lhing about th+,' in,,riad s()(ial. +,'t(lllOllli(. and
intcrnali_mal plobh'nls that f+`'st+`'vvd ill the 1950s. lh' was VSl)+,wiall ?, h;ivd on l+:ist.nh(r,,+:+,+t-'s rct ]:,i'll in il+tt']na-
tional _c]ations, taking a "'(ohl war]i_>v" positi(m <m a sU]ll>oscd "tni.;sih' gap" (whir h ttuncd out trot to llc thc
case) whcrcin the [rnitcd States laggcd f_u bchin+,l lh+,- S_:,*iet Union m intcr(ontincntal ballistic missih" Icth-
nology. ()n May 25. 1961, Prcsi+,henl Kcnncdv announ+,'+,'d to th+,' 11+iii()11 l)l(" g<)al <11 sending ;Ill Alllt'li( Jill Dr) tilt"
Moon lwli)vc lhe cnd o| thc dt+cadc. The httnlan s[:,a+,+,+Ilight impcrativc xxas a tlil-t'tl outgr<lwth _)I it; Pl_+i+,+('ts
M+,'Fcury (+it h,'ast in ill ]atl+,-l' slag]",,), (;<'mini, and +*\]7<)I](i w('rt' t'a(h dcsignt'd to +,'x+,'t utc it. ()ll lhis sul+jct t. scc
Waltcl A. M(l)ougall .... The Heave)t+ and the Ealth: A t'oliti+al /[i+tm+, o/ the .h_m+e AKr (New _)lk. N'_': I+_lSi( [_o<)ks.
19851;.Iohn M. [.ogschm. +lT+elh'ti_i,n to (.o to the Af0m+: 15o/ect Apollo a,d lhr National Inte,._t !(_aml_ridgt'. MA:
MIT Press. 1970).
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Robert S. Kerr (]I':;'16-]91_::;) (l)-()K) had I)('en g(wl'rnol of()klahonla h(ml It},t3 It) 1947 atld was i'h'ctcd It) the
Sl'llillt' Ihe t.lh)wing yea]. Ftoln 1961 until 1963, hr' i haired the A+_.ronauli(al and Sllal r Sl'it'lll't'S Comnlitt+:c.
Set" Anne I lodges Morgan, Rotmll ._. Kell: " 'tie .4enate D,ar_ (Nol In,IlL ()K: Uni',t'rsilv <,t ()klahonla Press, 1977).
Nikita S. Khrushchev ( 1_9 t-1971 ) wm_ prt+tni,rr <d+ lilt' Soviel [,]lliOll f]'(,In l<`),ri8 Ill 1961 and litst st!tret;lly lit the
(]ott]llllllliSt ])arty fionl 19,+'+_3to 196,i. lit' was rioted for an astonishin++4 silt'el h ill 197+6 dt+n<,uncing lit+." t rillll's
and lllundcrs _)I Josellh Sl;lliul atilt fill" gestures ill l't'(llllCiliation with lilt' 'vVt'st ill I':E19--I<`160, cnding with tile
breakdown Ill a Paris summit with l)residenl |Gisellllclwer altd lhe leaders of Ftatt(e and (;lt';tt l+,ritairt in the wake
<if Kilt usht ht.v's illlJl(ItlllCt'ltl('lll that till' Soxicts had shot down all Alllt'ril'a]l | I+2 rel+i_llnai_r+,_nll e ailcraft <)vet
lhr I Ifals <+ll May I, 19G0. Thcn in 191i2, Khrushl hey atlemptcd to plale Sovict ml'dilml-rangc inissih.s ill Cltba,
]his Icll to an intellse <risis ill (let.lit'r, lMl<,++ing whith KhIushchev a qreed to rt.nlow" lilt' missiles if till' lIllited
St;it<-s l>,O,llisl'd Io nlake no Ill(lit' att<'inpts to <,verthrow (hlba's (]onlnltwliSl _oxet llnlt'nl. Ahhtlugh he timid lie
<halming at times, Khrushchev was als. givett to blnster (extending even to sh<)c-l)<mnding at the United
N;iti<ms). I le was also +t tough neg<+tiatlw, alth<lugh he believed+ unlike his ]Iredl'('t+SSOl"L ill the possibility ol
(]<Jnlmutfi_,l ,,ilmly <r+:et till' V,,'csl witll.ut war. Fo_ htrther il+tlornlalion alloul hinl, st+(• his own Khru:,hthr+,
I{+,memh+'_s: "l'he l+asl 7_stam,'ld (l+,oston, MA: l.ittle, Brl,wn, 1974), as well as Edwa]d ('+raIlksha+_:, J_rhl'll+h+hgv: A
t+;alv,e7 (Nl'_ Y.Jk, NY: Viking, 19661: Mit hael R. Beschloss, Mayday:Eisellhmvel; Khtu_h(h,r, and The 1"-2At]air (New
_ilrk+ NY: ItaIpvr and R_)w, 1!1861; Robert A. Divine, Ei_enhower and the toM Wm (New M_rk. N'_2 ()xt0rd
t'ni,,t'rsitv l'ress, 19811+
Henry A. Kissinger ( 192% ) was assistant to the president tilt" national se('lllil_+* atlitirs holn 1969 to 11172:; and
s(+(lr{tl_tlv [11 state thelea|tl'r until 1977. In these l)<Isitiolls, lit" was eSllerially invi+Ivt'd m intt'rllalio]lal asllelts it|
spa< t'tlight, J)attit ulatl', lln'j.itll S<)xiet-Altlt'ri_ ;ul 1light, the Apolhi-So)u,' 'l't.sl Iht_jt'( l, in 1!177+. Scc "Kissingcr,
I lcm },'" biographical lilt', NASA l list<_rical Rch'rence (]<41el lion.
Christopber C. Kraft, Jr. ( 192+1- ), was ;l h)ng-slanditlg official with NASA lhtottght_ut the Apollo i)rograll+, l It'
tcceived ;i lmcheh>r <if st+il'tl(t" lh-gree ill aer<mautical engillet'ring fr<)nl Virginia lMl++tc(hlfil [!niversity in ITA44
and j<mled tilt + l,anglcy Aer<_nattti( al 141l)or+Itlff): ill the NA(2+_ tilt: next year. Ill 195._, still at l,angley, hc llt'(+anlt '
a Incntll<'l Ill thl" S[)al e Task (;r(+llp developing Project Mercury and int)ved wilh lilt' grout) t(+ ll<mst(m ill Iq62.
t h' was flight dit t.t tot hit all ot till' Metlul y and Ill;ill}: <flthe (;enlist tt]issions ;tlltl directed lilt" design tfl Missioll
(]<)rttlol +II till" M;tllllel[ Sllal l'l l;Iti ( ]l'ntl'l, which was letlallled lJle.]<lhnson Slmle (_ellll'l ill 1973. Ill+ Was n3wtt'd
tilt" M;tnttrd Sll;It t'l rall ( k'zlt<'r's deist? dill'ltor in 1970 attd its dil+c( t<ll tWO "+ears late_, a position he held troll]
his l(qilt'tlll'llt ill 1982. Sill(t' thl+tl, hi" h;Is tt'lll;lille(l active as _tll al'lOSlla('t' consuhant. See '+Kraft+ Christollhel
(;., Ji.," Ifiograllhi_ at tilt'. NASA t lisn)li_ al Rt'fiq cnl c (kflll'(li(nl.
L
William E. Lilly ( 1!12 I- ) entered Icderal ( iviliar_ servile ill 1950 as a blt<tget and proglaln arlalvsl with the Na',_, ,
( )]llnanle +l_.st Slatilln in (:alifilrnia and held a variety of positions with the Na'* T and the Bureau of Standards
tnltil 1960, whetl lle jllinl+d NASA as (|lit'f, lllans and analysis, lilr the Of]ice ol l.aunch Vehicles. lie st.rved NASA
lot t',+'l'nl+-<me years, Ill< tinting its I]rsl (onlptrnller--a position with ;tssot+i;tle administrat<ir status--in 197+{. He
lelired ill l<`l;":;l with thiltv-st'ven years Ill fk'deral servile, including service in the Na_, 7 t]-onl 1940 t<l 1946. See
"L+illy, W.E.," l'fiographi< al tile, NASA Ilistorical Refcrence ('ollection.
George M. Low (1<`12[_-1984), a ll;ative ot Vienna, Austria. came to the United States it_ 1940 artd ret ei'+*ed all
;tl'l()tl;lllli(;il +.'llgineerin_, degrt'l' ti'onl Rensselaer Plllytel+hni+ Institute ill 1<,148 illld d master ol st ien((" ill lht'
n;llllt" tield Ii<lm thai s_ll.,<,l i,I 1950. tic j(lincd the NACA in 1!149, and at I,ewis Flight Propulsion I+aborator',.
hc spt't iali]rd ill t+x1_l'rilnl'lll_tl ;lllll l}teoretil';tl rt'se;irl h itl several tie]ds. ] [e |)('(';Llne t hiefol nl;lllnt'd s11_itt'l]iglll
at NASA I Icadltttartcrs ill 1958. In I<,)1;0, l+<l+*, t haired a special c<mltnittee that t_)rn'lulaled thc _lriginal i)l;uls tor
lh(: Apollo hln;ir hlndings. In l<,)ti4, he l)('(illnl" deputy director ol the Mann,rd S|)a(e(Ta[t Cellter ill I|oUSt(W_.
thc 10rel unner l>[ th<'.ll,hnson Spa(-c Centcr. He became deputy adn'tirlistrator of NASA in 1969 and st'ivt'd as
;tiling a(hnitfistrat<ll Iroln 1970 Ill 1971. lle retired from NASA in 1976 to be(<nne |)rt-sident o| Rensselaer, a
positi.n Ill' slill hcld until his death. In 1<,190, NASA rctmmed its quality and ex(elh+nce award atilt hinl. See
"l..w. (;.M.," l)epttt_ Administrator tiles, NASA Historical Refi'rencc CllllectilltL
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MLeonard H. Marks wan {mc ot Ill{' In i._inutl <.:omnal hit {_rl}otal<}ts ;q}P_int<*d I}y Pr<'sid,.*zll Kenu]{'d'+. th" ursi_nt.d
lil_ull ( _()llln:lt'n t}c)_lull {)l {|il L'{ II)1% ill ]_il)_') II) b{'{ {)l{J{' di{('{'l{}l ot Ill(' ['.S. [llt(}l Inl_lli{)ll ,_{'ll{ _. S<*{" '**_|i_.t {'llall{'{}Hn
Industt y," bi*>graphMd tilt', NASA I lisloriral R{'ter','nce (',olh.'clioH.
Robert P. Mayo ( 1911_- I wan an {'{'ont}misl ;uld l'r('sidcIIt Ni×<m'++ lh"+,l dirt-{ I_}F ol the Bur,.'a{{ ol lilt" lhud;_('l.
(hLlul,, I. 11)70, wht'tl lht + Btu{'at{ {}I the Budgt't wa'++rcpla_cd wilh llw Of]ice ,>I Managt'm{'nt all{l Budget, Ma','o
wa,,; shilt{'d It;+ lilt' 'Whilt, lh_LJnt" an a l){('midt'lltial _l_,i_,tanl. Sholtly lh('leall{.r, h{' h'It Washillgl{.l I_} ;t_,,,{Imt" th('
pre.;i{h'tlcy ol th(" F{'<leJal P.{'St*lXt' Bank ol Chicat.c<}. St'(' "Ma,+<}. Rcd}erl l'{ottt'r), +' (,'llllPlll F+lll&P{flph_ ` 1{._'I},
i}11. _82-_4.
Richard C. McCurdy { I.q<lg- >, an rl]gim'¢_ specializing ill lr'tF{dcmn, was ass<n tall. ;{dmiuistlal_>r li+_ ,}lga+li-
zaliOll aml IllitlKlg{'lll{'lll ill NASA th'ildqHa{let'+, tio{l{ 1!}70 to ]97?, and ;{ (ollsll]l_{lll tl) tilt' a Lrt'{W_+ tr<}lll 1_}73
{mill ]98_2. St't' +N'h( '+urd,., R.( ',.," hi_+gH|lhi{ al lih', NASA 1lisl_)ri,_ al Reter{'nct" ( ;olh+{ Item.
Newton Minow (Itt_li-- ) was a laWVCF i_l {;hiram,} Ilefi}re Iwing at}poinlrd as (hair {}1 lh<* l:t'dt'_al
(]{mlln{ini{ ;(lit)tin {'.{>tmninsi{m Ii', lh t'.,ideHI l',&t.tlnt.dv. Ih' _,aint'{I a rt'l}lll;tlioll t)x alia{ ki]l_ tilt" {l{lalitx {}t I{'h'v]
si{m l}t<}_Hinnfit]g and lhI (';{t('llhl_, h, It'xokt' llr{m{h asI lit t'nst'++ l}as('d <ill I}_{}_ aHm_ill_. Ih" lrqlll l{t'd l<} his I;{'.+,
prattit {' t{dh)wi_l_ Kt'lmc{txr'++ asn;{ssilt;tli{}tl arid i,,mt'd lilt' IIuldil Br<}a(h a+qiu_, S+-.tt'm t}{}ald it+ I97B. I h" b<'{ am(,
( h;{il ot Ill;It oI_;ini/;{li{}ll ill 197M, ;lll{I lhell ht' l}e{';{{ll{, dil{'(t{}{ {}I lilt' Atln('lll){,l_, (]<}lnlltllllit;{li{}{l_+ l}l{_lalli
it_ \Vasl'thlgl{lH ill 19_'7. S('c "'Mill{_,,,., Ncwt{}ll (N{>Fmat]}," it_ Bowman. I'I: (,+'lllllDidr&rl" lJHll+Jlilll'_' O/ Allti'l_+flll
Big_,_ aph'_,,
George E. Muelh'r { I'018- } was NASA's asso{ iatt' a(lmi_fistlat.l t<}t HlallHt'd ',lla(ctlighl ti<m_ I!IG] +,I{_ 1!}{i9: a+,
suth, he rt'Sl}{}{Isibh + t_}_ t)xrrsceing Ih(' {{mll}h'ti{>n ot lht!je(I Ap{dh> and tr'_i{_ni_R tilt' {h'vt'h>lmWUt _>1 lilt'
S]);It t+ Sht{llh +. th" {l{C)xed Ill (;('llt'r;{I I}vnalnic'., ;is :+,{'{+h}r _,ilt+ i}lt*sid{.l{I ill It}lit+}. wh{'l{* h{ + It'nlaitlt'd I{{llil It.}71,
lit' Iht'n bt'(anl{. F,rt.si(h.Ht {}t the Svnlt.ms l}ev+..h}l}m{.ttl (]{)ll){>l-;lli{}ll ( 1_.l?l-I<..}81l} and Iht'tl iin {hair and {<}{-
I){}{atc {'xt'tuli.:c _flti{t'{ 1981-19<_2_}. St*t. "%hwllt'r, (;{.{_{. 1'2." biograllhicaI tih', NASA Ilist{}_ital Rch'l{q+tt'
{ ;olh'(tiol].
Karl Mundt (19{I0-+1t,}74) (R-SI)i st.l vt.d ill Ill{' I h}u:+,{' of Rt'l}l('sclllatixcs t+{}m lanualx !+, 197,9, mllil l)('{ {.{nber
:.l}, 1{.}48. I It' lht'n _t+r',cd a'_ a ,,eual<}_ h{ml l}cccmbt'r ?,l. 1t148, uHtil.Ja{luat) B, 1!lTB. S{'t' Bi..t.e+aphi+al l)iP+.+lm++
./ I/ : I '.it,,d ,'_/at+'+ C.ng}+.B. 177-t /996.
Homer E. Newell (1!}15-198P_) t'arm'd his Ph.l). in i{lalht'l{l+iti{,, lioln Iht" [rnivc_nit'+ {,I \Vi,,c_msi|l iu 1940 and
s{'tvcd as a tht'oreti{a] i)hvsil'ist and math('ntatician at the Naval R{',+t'a{( h I.al}i}ratol v Irom 1{.t44 ill 19B_. During
l};t{t t}t lh.41 ]}+.'I-ill(t. he ,was s{it'm {+ tlrl}_tam c{){)ldin;tl(ll t<}r I}l'(!}C{ 1 ++,';tll_ll;tld ;ttll(I _,+,a+, ;1<lill_ _,{ll}{+linlt+{Id{+lll {)t
Ill{' alm{}stlht.l(+ ;t_{I asu{}phy,dt',+ division. Ill 19:'-}8. hc transh+Fr('d t{i NASA It} as_,um{' r+.'sp{}nsibilit'+ t_. ]}l;{imin_
anti de'+t'h}t}ing Ih{' ucw ag('m'y'n stl;t{{+ s(it'm'e |}rogranL lie soon t}e(amt. (h.l>ul'+ di]{'{tor {}t ,+|}a{t'tlight tlr{_-
_{ams. Ill 19{H. hc I}<'(am{" (li_{'{ h}r {}1 lilt' {}tIi({' {:4 Spa('{- S(ien{ {-+, al+td in 191i3, hi' ht'(;um + asP,o( ial{" a<hoilm,+
ll;ll()l t<){- _+llacc ,,,{icu{'+.. ;tll{l al>l}lit ati_ms. {}X<'F Iht" <'(}{a".,{' (It his {';uce_; hc Ill'tam(' an iHtt'li_aliimallx ki_{);,+.n
;t{lth{}l-itv i]{ Ihc iiehl _}f atnlo,,i}h{*ric and spa{(' s(i{'ll(t's a_+',+++.'lla'; Ihe altlh_;+r <it U_ImC{{}tLS s{ i{'Htiti( arti{-h.++ and
,,c'.rn Ii{><}ks, in{htdhl_ I_)'.nd the AtmoV_herP: Ead_ }'eal_ .] Space ._{ience IWashin_llm, l}{ 2: NASA SI'-421 l. 1980}.
l [e retircd ii_ml NASA al th(' t'_ld {,t I tl7B. %ce +'Nc'.vell. thlmcr." tliograf}hi{+al tih*. NASA 1 listoFi(al Reit'r{'n{{"
(2ollectit}n.
Richard M. Nixon ( 19 I_1994) _r_s L [.S. t}] {'si{h'nl h{'twcrn Januat x lt}{i9 and Attgusl 1!_74. l+2_tl'l) r ill hi'+ pFt-Si-
d<'n¢),. Nixon alll}ointed a Space rl'ask (h(}u i} un{h'r the dire(ti{}n ol Vi{{" Pit's]dent Sl}iro T A_,new t{} a,.st'n.+ Iht +
lilt(t{(' ol spacellig, ht in the n;tlil)ll. Its It_l}_)rl rt'{ommclld{'d a vi_{}lou:., F.{}sl-A1}(dh} ('xph}ralion i}rogram {uhni-
ualiug ill a human {'xpcditi{}n t{} Mars. Nix_m did n<}l al}l}_{ive flits illan, b{{I ht' did d{'(i<h* i_ lay{}] ot t}tfil<ti{l:,.{
{m{' ch'n{('{ll (}1 it. Ih{" Spa{ {' ShtHlh', whi{h was al}pr{}vt.d ou ]aHtmry _3, 1972. St'{' R{}_<q l). l.aunius, +*NASA aim
Iht' I}<+{inio_ I{} Buihl tilt' .%l}:l(t ' Shtllth'. 19{:_}-7_," l/l_ tf_lorla_l 57 tAut{(trill 1{.}94 }: I 7-P;t.
.StYli
Herman Noordung (1k¢92-19_9) was a l)Seudon;in li)r 11cllnan I'_m-)< niL. Ih' was a rclativcl,, ot-,sctut' +_ltict'r in
Ill(" AIIStri_|l| _ll II1"_ _ll() Iw( Hnlt" _|11 t'll_hl('('l. El](olll_|_('d h_ I tt'lln:tnn ()bt.rlh, hi. _xlo[o _II ('_t1"1"¢ _Clllin_l] hl_)k
lill('d "lh.; I'.Jbl.,.m t!l ._/.,_'.e "1)._,.,'/: Th.; Itr.k..I Molto,; which mo'.,llv li)ctl'.,<.d (m lilt" t'ngill(+tqillg itsp('(-tn (:,[ '.|pat(" sla-
lions. _'c }l<'_tmmm Nt>+_lthmg, (.tlhed 1:,), Ein:.,t ,St_d)]ing,t*l m_.'l,].l). II_m]ey wilhJentlitet (;arland. "/he Pmtdmt_
.[ _,par; "l).v,4: 77w ltr.ket 3,1otr. (Wa'.hink_lon, I)( :: NANA SP-4026, I!I':151.
Robert G. Nunn, Jr. (1917-1!175), ,.':um'd a law dcg_<',." [tom Ihc t rni,,clsitv _1 (:hicag_ m It.l't2. Allt'l fimr ',,ears
ill lhl' Arln_ duling Wolld W;u II, Iht'n privat(' practic,." ot la,,+, t.l i.iKht ',c:us in Washingttm, D.(',., am+l ill his
h,_nlcll)v,'n ot 'li+lrt' I |;lilt(', h.liana, hc i.incd the office ol genclal i.unscl i_t the Air lgwce m 195t. lie t)cl ame
NA_,A'.. :tssislanl gcncl:fl (_lmn('l in No_.elnbcl 195_ and th('n spccial assist;mr to ['. Kcilh (',l('nnan in Scplcnflr._
19fi11. fh" helped dratl m;Ul,, h'gal and :_dnlinistrati".'c regulations ti_ NASA, and IIn'n hc ,.,_t'nl to work t_r tht'
\k'ashin_t<m law Ibm _,t .";hal p and l_,o_;m, l.,m'_, hc ti_rmcd the lirm _1 B;m.cll and Nunn, spe_ ializin_ in ener-
q', lckinlati_,n ;rod administ_nixc law..qcc "Nunn, R.(;.,.Ir.." tm)g_aphi_al fib', N.\Y;:\ llist_lic:d RcRqcnlc
John R. Pierce ( 19 I{)- is t _inln<ml,. l('l(q led to ;is lilt' invcntol _I tilt" i _>mnlnt+ic_ttions _411cllilc in 19_>I. ] It'
;,..in kcd I<,n lhitt,, lixc xc;ux _ls ;m t'll_illi't'r ill I+cll I+aboratorics and then w_)rkcd at the (::llili,_ hi;+ |l_Stilnlc ()I
h'l hm,l<,t_,, and its.lct l'i_qmlsi_m l,al)_)_a_.y Set" 'Ticrtt'..]. R.+" bi._ral>hiiM lilt +, N _'_+L_ llisltJl'il.ll Rt'It'rcnt c
(:_ ,]h'( li,+n.
Frank Pre_s (19_ t- ) sct',,cd as I'_c:+,idt'nt (_allt'r's s<'i('nc¢ adxiso_. ]:r_,m 19;'4,1 I_, 19_17,. hc scr,.cd as t)_t'nith'n!
_)I lilt" N:iti<mat .+'. ;_th'nl'+ <_I S_ icnlcs, lit' tct eixed a Ph.l). in g c_phssit s [l()in (:olulnlfia l nixc_xi!x in 1%19. St,<,
"lh c,,.., l't .ink." bi_)_ _q)hi_ al lih +, NA:++;A I lit, t<. i_ al Rt'h'l t.n(c ( _<dh+l li_m.
William Proxmire { 19IF+- ) (I)-WI) '.,c_ vt.d :is a senatt_r horn Augusl 2':L I!G7. _>.];ultt:u ', 3. 1{.+_9. lit' i hairetl
lilt" "_('n;llt" (il)llllnitlt't + {+11 B:ulkin_. th)using, ;m(I l.!rban Alt_til s fi_l s_+,,t'];tl nt'ssitms _)1 ('.lm_+t'ss. I It' v,':ls als. ;Ill
+,ulsp<&t+n _ tiff< .t V.aslt'tul _oXCllnu<'nt Sl>cntling, (fftt'_'l aW_nLdin_ hi'. intimt<_us +'( ,.hh'l_ Fh't'( c" ;tu+a]<l to those
pc_+ldc _t u oxt'_ nnlcHt .l_auiz_llitms hr. Ich waslc(l taxpayer nlollt"_. _t't' lli.k_mpl"ral lJh+'Hol)' ./ ¢h," Dm'rzra.
(+.+kin'++ 1771 l 9Uo: "l'i _xmi_c, William." l)i<_g_ al>hi(_d lilt', NASA I lis.. ic:il l_t'l('icln t' (',<dl('cti,+m.
Harold A. R,t+sen ( 192t_- t v, as _,_lt' ol Iht. kt"_ nck.ntisls at tht. I lughcs Ailt Hfl v,h_) dc'+chq)cd _xtw, m+. thc fir+;I
Rc(,s'_lll IIr(_ln)lis (<mlnnniit;iri(_ns s;ircltilc, t(u NASA. IIc _cccivcd !tw N;tli_ll,tl ,X.lcdM ot 'Ik*t hnolog_ ill HIS-).
"Rosen. Ihuold." Ifi_l_t:qd_ic:d fih', NASA tlisl._it al Rt.ft'ren<e Ct4h_t tion.
William C. Schneider j+4tt<'d NA."IA ill ,lul+c 1963 and ;+.'as tlw (;-<'mini missi,'m rli_<'< _<_.r t,'w ,;¢'t'<'n <+t lhc _t'++_
I] 1;ti i t i t J<t ( ;(.lllill i ini_,si_,ns, t:l+)lll 1967 I() 196ff. hi' +;.cl+v<.'(l its Ap.lh) inissi<m (tilctlot and the Apolh_ i)_o,,.+_am's
th.p_w,, tlil c_hw for ntis,.ious. I Ic lhcn s('rvcd html 19(:,.8 to 1974 as tlw Sk'.Aal) pr,,glam'_, tliwct(u'. After that, hc
'++.'l_l kt'd ;Is lilt' dcptU_ :lss.I iatt + _lthniniMl':tl(lF t(ll" space transt)ortati(m S)'+;It'IllS t(It ahnost Ibnr vr:tr+,. Frt+m 197N
In 19R0. hc ..el ',t'd ;is lilt' ;lsSllciat(' administral<>r t()r space tracking, and dala syst('lns, l It' reccivt'(I _ l+h.D, in ('n_i-
nt.c_mg fi_m; t':athldit t!ni,.ctsily. Nt,(. +'St h!+eidt'r. William C.," bit_gral>hilal fib', NASA |lisl<u+ical Rcfi'r,.'nlc
(:<,]h'_ _i<,n.
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Robert C. Seaman=s, Jr. (I!il8-), had bet'n mw_lved ial aerospacl' issm's since hc t_mpIt'tcd his So.l), ctt'grce
al Ih(' Massachllst'lls lllsiiluit' ellTot hn(do_,_, in 1951. He was tin the taculi) ai MIT's (l('l)artinctl[ M_lcltmautical
t'ngieleering ti'om 1949 (_ 195-h when he.it_iil('(t th(' Radio (;tlrl)t)i;llioll t)| Am(*iic;l (R(;A) as mallag(-v tit ih('
Airt)olnt' <+";.vslenls l.;ltlovalor}. In 195bI, lit' b('taIIl(" [tit' chi('| t'nginrt'i i)t the Missile EIt._ Int)]li(s and (;i)llliol
l)i_isitm al.I .j_itl_'tl NASA ill 196(I as assotiate a,rhninisllaloL hi [)t'ct'mtx'r 1tl65, hc b('(amc NASA's dt'put}
_lduniliinln;ll(m ][_' lt'|l N<\N.\ ill 19l_8. avid in 1969. lit. lit'tame st'tlvials ot lhc Ail lgJl(t', scl_iill4 ,nlil 1973.
,Nt'lillllttiS W+is t)tt'sidcilt ill the.' Natiotlal :\clidt+iil)tll l_:llgiiil't'rillg |ixlin M;t% 1977, Ill I)t*Cl'lnbcl 1{t7,t. l_hl-ll h( J
llCClilllt' lhl' tilSt adlllinislraltll + ill lhl' ll('W I_llt'lhr_ Rl'_,(*_ll't h ;llil'l l)t"¢('lot)ilit'lil Adoliliislrltlil)li. ] It + I'tlllllit'd I(I
MIT in 1977, bt'ttliiihit4 (tt'_lll _l[ ils St IItJol tit l"]iit_ilit't'lhlg ill 197_. In 191"11, lit" l_ii_ t'll'cl('d thail i_[ Iht' Ixl_tld <)t
lltl+lt'('_ ill Atql)_,ll_ttt, ( ]<)i i)l)l+llitlll. _t'c '+.l_t'+llll_lll_, rtllit'll ( :., I,:," llil)giai)llit +il lilt, NASA I lisloi ic'al R('li>l I'ilCt"
(]tdli'clitm: Ridr'll (;. SCalllalis, Ih. Ai.ti.Tat 7"t+_4et+: TDe <lul+>Di._aphy ,[/¢o/u'+l (,.._,e..m.+, # (14(;ishiill4tOil, l)(;;
N,,\SA SP-41II& 199(l).
Willis H. Shapley ( 1917- ), iht' st)it _lt litlii(_iis 11;u _;l_l asiwmmlwv tlallt,_ ShapIt'). t';u _wd a ha_ ht'hlr ofarls
ih't4Ict' tioni lli_' I'llht'i sit_. ol (;liit a_o hi l{t3bl. Fllllli ilia! ll(mii tilllil 1942, Ill' did _l;itlll;lll' _lll k alid iit'i t(ll illt'd
i t'_t'_lll Ii ili l)Mili(al s(i('il¢(, iilitl ll'l_llt.tl lit'Ills al ihc I.'ni_t'isii)(l! (;lli(a_o. llc joiiit'd Ih_' IIiilt'all ill lhc ]_.lidl_c'l
iii Itl47 aiid bl'laiilC _i llliil(il)ill t,xlliililit'l ill I!111"I. I;i_lill 195ii Io l':#iil. }it' /_ils as_islaill i liit'l l,\it Fell((,) ]11 itlt'
I)tilt';ili "_, Illiliilll v di_isiolh ll(.('illliin_ ])r_lgressivcly det)uly chit't tix ]li_lgl_llnlllilll4 (1961--191i:i) atilt d_'l)U_ ( hi_'t
(l_.ttl:'_) ill illal divisillli, lie als(i _;t'l_.('d i1'4 sil_'(i;ll a_,i_41_llll Ill Ilw dill'( llli [i_i _i);it t' lll_14111ill t ooldiliiili()lh [ll
]91i5, hc ilill'¢t'd Io [_?l<N_\ tik as_,(l(ialt' dt'lllil ) adllihii+qrallli, wilh his diiiit's iil(hidiil_ nilpCi _ishm M lhl" put)li(
at]ailS. (_)ilt.(It'ssillli;il :[tailn, l)t'liCll Iliit'ill tit ])t,lt'ilst' aild iilll'l al4cilc ) altiiils, aild illlcn ii;lii_>iial atliiil s (diit e_. t h*
i('liicd ill ]9771 hut _Cj_)iilt,d NASA ill 19_7 lo help il It't tl_/'l [i(Jlll ill( + ('ll./D'._'l dis_isi_'l, tic _,t'i \i'd il_ assol ialt'
th'l)lll ) lldillilliSliallll (lloli(_) ilniil I!i_, ,,vh,all lit' ;igaiil rl'iirl'd tliil (_lnlililit'd ll_ nt'l,,t, ;is ;i t _ll_,llllalll lf_ lilt'
adiiiinisllallli. ,_,<.'l'"_llald_' ), W.I I,," lliol4raphiral tilu, N'ASL\ ttisll)i i(al R¢l('rt'n((' (;Mh,t IMn.
George P. Shultz ( 1!19()- ) sl'; _t,d as diil'_ I_l ot the. ()flit t, td Manii!.{l'lill'lll ;tilt| llllllgl'l ;ltlc_ 197l), dill illt4 lht'
Nixoll ;l(tnliillMr_ilitili. [It'll>it' lhal Iillit'. lit" had lic('ll Xixoll's ,_,t it*l_ll",' (it lal)lli. ])lllilil 4 ihl" R('at4an adlliiliisli_l
li(in (19_1-11.t_9), _hllli/ nt'ivt'd _lS +_t'Clt'l_il"+ ot _l;ilt', _('_' "_hiili/, (i_'(ligl" l_., '" l':t_14 Cit_.'.l lli._t:lJh) }7,(zllut_Jk.
lip.._ 7.'5-!t0.
Eugene Skolnikoff st'r_i'd _,ll tilt" sial[ i J| ihl" \4'liilt, [t,)iist' soil,lie i" advisol tillln I!13_ I_, 19|i3. Alit'i i_ii d. lit" t_t'ill
1o ihl" Mas_;ithils_.'lls [nsliliilt + lit 'l_'( hii_lh>g,,, ':;ht'l(' tit' st'i"_'d _ls ;i tl_dilit ;il _t it,ill (' i)l_ltt,snlJi sill,( i;i]i/ili_ ill sli-
t'lltt', Ictilllt)l()g_, ;lllll Ii)ll'igil Ixdity issues, Svc '"4kMwik_ll] l']ll_t'llt'." t_i_gilililii_iil lib'. NASA t lisl_vi_al
rt'li'l t'lW(' (;oIIc( tMtl.
Jacob E. Smart i l)sc Ill Iht' i;illk (ll t_t*iit'l al ill lht' [ ,S, Arm), <_t'iVillf_ ilS tlt'lllil', t olIIlll;llldl'l _lt lh(' I ",_. |:.Ill(lilt'all
(]_liliill;[lld. 1 [(' i_ilit'tl N,\S.\ ill 191i6 as spt'< ial ilSni_,l;llll I_) lilt' ;idllliiii.,li'al_ll. Ill' lht'ii t)l'l allit' Ihc a( liii_ a_sis
liliil ;idliiiliiMiii[()l I_li ,idiliilii.+llillillli, Iht' _lS_,inl;llll a(tllliliiMllill_l |ill tJ_li(_ ;lll;ihsi.,, ;iil(I Ill(" ;i_,i_l_llil ;idlliiiii_-
ll;ll(ll Ii)1 Iht' |)t'});illliil'lll ¢1t [)t'tt*li_t' ;llld illll'lil_('llt)" ;iltiliiS. Ih' ,_ladii;ill'd filllli llll' t _._. '%lililal _ \l ;Idt'lll\ _il
Wc_l l>llilll ili 1931. 5;,t't' ",_lilal l. Ja( olx" lIMl_i at)hit al tih', g %_;,\ 1 [i_ll)i i(;il l_/'[('l('li( (' (:ollc_ Ii_lli.
C vru.,i R. Smilb (189_.1-19!1(i) wol kcd ill I)alikillt4 uinlil lit' I)l't tililt' ili;ilial4t'i _)1 'l't,xan Air I'lailsp_i h a sllllsidi_ll_
(ll Ill( > "I'_'xtls-l,_)ui_,i:.tl/a l>ll',_t'i ( ;¢)llltlillly. hi 193-I. Ihis t lllllll_lli ) l('_ll _;.llli.tt'(I. hl'(lllllill_ \lllt'l it _lll ,\iiliilt's. I 1'<"
was i hit't t*xt't lili%t" Iliilil lit' hl't illilt' _t>l It'lili _ i)l t <illlilit'lt I' ili 19t_. ii IJl_sili_lil lit' hl'ld lill (ill(' _(>_ll, I It' it'tilt'd
in 19(79. St't' "_lllilh. (].R. ((]\1 II_, R<_l_h'llh'" ill [IowIIlllll, 7"]_f" (.)tlRbg"tfl_'l l)i:li<m:._ ,/Am,,_7_.. Ifigq'mphy.
Robert A. Taft ( I_9-1953) (R-()11 ), lht' soll (,t I>l('qdcill \Villhuli Tati. _t'i _('(1 ;i_ a ,_l'ii;lilli |11)lll.lallllHl _ i_, 197,!t.
lililil Illl'_ _11, lgZf3 Nt't' lii.:_:t/JhT_.l l)n','_t_._ _J/I1: I'.itt.d %'l:ttes (,'o._#i'_. 1771-107(_.
5_48
Konstantin E. Tsiolkovskiy (I 8:'_7-19'3_) I)t'<antc enthralled with Ihv possil)ilitics tfl intcJl)l:metary travel a_ a I)ov
_tnd. _tl H_t' l()Ultt'('ll, started hlttel)entl<'nt sltzd t, tlShl_ I>(._ks h(ml his t_ltlwr's ]it)tar_ .n ll;|lllF_ll st i('llt(' _ll|d
lllAt]IClli;lli< S. lit" also th'vcl.pcd a passion li)t inventi(m, and llt' constructcd balh_on,;, pr<q)clh'd ('HI l'i_i_C_i, _lli(l
other in>di tllll(.lll_,. 1'1) IUI tht+r hi'. ctlli( +tlil)ll, hi'+ l)alcnt +, _,t'lll ltJllt tl+ Nil)s( 1)',¥ to pilVSiIc it+( hni( al studies, llt IX78,
]iv ])t.( anic _i Iv;t( h('i ()l tnath<'nl_Iti( s hi a n< h(,<.l n.tth _)I M<Jst ow. rl'niI)Ik(r+rskiy l]rsl :+,t;It+tt'tl ',_litin g ,m spate in
18<+)8, ,++.]Wlt llt' ,ittl)llliltt'd l<ir puhlit ati(m It) thc Russian journal, ,\:al.'Jl.r+e O/,.z_v_,in+e (,+',itienc(' RevJt"+:,,'), a 'e,'()l k
l>ast'(l _)i+ Veals <if (+tl(tilatJl)tts thal Lfitl olll lIKIItv Ill th(' l)rinciplcs ol nlc+dt'rn Sl>a(elli_ht. The ;irlith'.
''Ifltrt'sti}_+ilif+_, _i[);tt ( + 1:/it It R<+('_.<'I lit"+ J<('_,, '+ pr<'++<'nlt'd ,.'+'al ,, <J( al< .l;Iti<ms that/++kl (n+t m:_nv olthc l.+nciplcs ol
nlo(Icl n +,l>a(ctlight and opuncd thc do.i ttJ lutllrc writings on tht' sulpjt'ct. In it. Tsiolk<:+_,kiy dcsrril)cd in depth
tht" ust + <fl J(_( kcts lot l:itm< hing olhital Slmt cships. Thcrc lollowcd ;i s<'l it's ol htct c_isin_l'+ .;ophisli(atcd snttlics
oll th(. Ic(hnJt_tl ;l_ii)t't ts ol Sl)_ct'lli_hL llt th(" l(.12lls anti 19'.:it)s, llt. ]jlovt'd ('Sl)t'( tally plodttctivc, publishing tt'n
majol wol ks, t.lu( idating the n;itm t' +_l l)+>dics in orbit, tleveltqmlg scielltific l)rint iph's bchind rt'acti<m vchiclcs,
tlt'+;ignin_ orbital Sl);t< c slali_ms, and pt<mi_)tin'..r, intc'rplanclary travel. I le also furtht'rcd stu<lics +m re;m> pt in-
_Jl>h +,, ( onnnonh r used in t_,t kt'ts today: spt'tilit Jml)ulse to gauge t'n_JltC pt'i fl)l tnatwc. Intfltist;Igt" l)o()ster_;, lut'I
lllJXltll (+s st.h as liquitl hydrogen nn<l liqtlid ox'+:gt'n, tlt(" l)tohlenp+ itlltl l>.ssil>ilities hlht+tcnt ill nlitt <)_l_IX:ilx, lilt'
lJl<,mis< , .l solar l+OWcn m.l sl)at <*s.its l.++r t'xlrlt+r('l|J(+iiI)lr at ti_.'it). Signilic+Intl L llt' nt'x<'r It+ill the lcs<+ult ('s--nt+z
pcrhal>S thc int lin_tlJ(m--to cxi_.crimcltt with +<it kt'ts himscll. Aftcr tlt(" l+.<.Ishcvik _c,+.luti_.n _>I l_ll 7 :rod the t _c-
.titre <,i tln' S<),,it't ("hi.n, T+,i,,Iko',,+ki,, w;_++l<_t nl;ill): rcl'Oglli/t'tl It)l" hi_; lit COlnl)lislnncnts ill tht+ theory _il space-
flight. Among (flht'r h<)ll(ll s, ill I!121 hc t c(t'ivt'(l _I lil't'tJnic pension Irtmi th<' statc lh;it _dlowctl hint 1() rcthc it<m+
l(';it hitlg ;tl tht' a_e ol nixt) fl_ttt. Tht.lc;ilh't. hi' tlevolvd hill time I+) <Icxt'Ioping his Sl):. t'lli_ht thc.irivs sttillit+s.
Ili,. th_.mclical work gtt';lll)itflh]t'nccd latcr ii_t kt'tet'rs l)<_th in his tmtive I;itltl ;tntl lhr()tl+L_hotlt Eur.q)e. \Yhilc
h+'.:, wcll kn< :,++ndtnin_ his lilt'tim,:' in th(' [ +ttitt+d %t;tlt'_,, Tsi<flkovskiy',+ work cnjo,,etl I:.t.;td ,,tlld'+ ill Iht' t9.')1),. ;lltd
I_tt)O'.. X',h('ll Allit'l J( _tlth sl)ll_ht t<_ llll(l('t ".l;ilid how tht' S<_viel t !hi(hi h;Id _t( ( Omlili.;hcd ,,n(h ttncxl)cCh'd sl](+( t"+.',
it+ it'+ c+u h ',p:. (+IIiu hi ('ll+,t l',.._,<+<' "l.,i+,Ik+,x ,,kit. K.F.. .+ bi._+ aphi< ,I tik', NA++A l It.t<,+ i< :il R(.+<,I <.n( (+ + ;<+II<.t ti+,n
W
James E. Webb (190fi-19_17) ,:,;_+_N+\_,,,\+:.. a<hnini'+.tratot I)t'twvcn 19fi] and I_)t+_. I'_c',i.tt'+,h,. hv had I>ecn an aide
I<) a (<,n_(,s_,nnu+ in New l)(.al _Va+.hili_t<_ii+ an ;dtlt' to Washington htw_('t _.|;ix (), (_aldti(.t. Hltd ;i hlt_,hl(",+++ t'x('( -
tlth(' with lht. _l)t'rl)(',,._l),i_ati.n and tht + Kt'ir-M((;c<" Oil (:(imp;m>. llc h+id alto> bccn (lirc( l(>r <)l tht' l)_ult'att
,_I lhc l+,n(l_i't l)elwct+ii l!IIll ;mtl I!L+_(+):uld tni(h'r st'( zt'larv of _.tale i_()m I!)7){I to I!)_12. _,t't" IA:, ] It'nl ,. l+;tttlI)li_.ht,
]+_+Z+?7+++ j+/JI_]]/S+" ]+/+/++_+ ]_. ++#x/)]_ +J/ J_T, _.K + (l+,;Jthn,,;v, Ml):.J<lhns ll_)pkhp, t 'l)J,++')..Jl'. J';(',,..+ 19!I/++).
C_spar W. Wt.illber,_er ( I!)17 )+ l+.n_tilnc Rel)nhli_ ;m _()xt,rlllli('lll ()fit( ial, +_:;_',_ scni.._ lllt'lllht'l lit lhc Nixon,
l,'<_d, +_ti(l Rvn_m+ _ulnlini,.t_ati_)n',, lq)i Nixon _li(l F'<)r(t, hi' "+v+t_,dCl>i_ q. di_t'_ n+_ (i_7+I-I_7_i and tlhc_I.,_
+197_-I076) <_I thc ()l|kc ()I Man;+gt+mcnt _ind l))tld_t'l+ Ill this capa(ily, llt" had a Icatlin,_ it,h' in +,halmlg the
tti_v(th.n <il NA>.,LVs nt;!j_+_ clfln-t +fl thc 1970.+., lhc tlcxchqm_('nl .+I a r('tts_tbh' Np;i(c F.htttlh'. F'_>_ Rt'_+in. hc
+,(.t t.(.(l ;in St'( It'Lll ')(it +h'Icn,,c, in xxhJ( h hc (.xt+in._xv lhc use of the Slntltlc in lhc t'a]k IO_l)n Ior lht' laUl_chin_ _)I
chi..sil+t.tl l)el>n_Iint'nt .>I l)clcnsc l)a?.h)+i<b, it+t<) .]bit+ _t't' '+'W,.'Jltht'i_,el, (]aspar \V(ill:nd)," ('P(tt+'P+t IPi+:g,'+,+zt,l,'h+
1o7_, pl ). l_S-?,0.
Edward C. Welsh (1!1t)9-19_10) had a long t _tr('ct in 'ca_ ious priv;ttt' ;mtl pul)lit entt.tptist'-,, tic had ,,vt _cd as Ic_
islatixt' ;tssi_,t;illl It) l)t'lllo( lalil _ell;tlor S1tl;tll ,+++;?.min_ton t)(_r[i_"+tltll'i fi(lllt I_{ t() I++I;I, _md he ++a', the cxcctt-
fix(' +st'( It'Lll ) ol lht' Nali<)nal ,.\uw+tmuti( s and Space (_<luncil tlntmgh lht' 196<)s. St'(' "V','t'Ish. E.( '.,," hioKraphit al
fih', NASA l lisl_)ri(idRvlc_('nt (' (:<)llt'ttion,
llarry _¢_rexler + 1011 196_) "workt'd |()1 thc U._,. V+'t.;_thci t:_utt';itl t_<)ln IW31 until his (l<'alh. It<" x%r:_s__t+(' _)1 tlw
Jhsl +,(JI+DI]StS I'_ CII_,]Si(_II IlSill_ s;Hv]Jilvs f()! lll('tv(,<_to_i(;ll pnrp(_s<'s and was known ;_s th(" tillll('l (_1 lilt' ['IR()S
sat(+llilc, l;+t_tll I_17)r') t() 19F)_. llt' t%rk['_:ITS() lilt' (hiel stielllisl lor thc [[.S. cxpt.dilinn I(i ,\nl;ll(lJ(;i l<)t lilt'
Inlc_ niHi()nilll (;<',q)h',si( al _'_tr. In 1!161, llt' +',;is it h+ad neg()ti;ttor li)r the Utfited Slatcs it_ diatiin_ l)l:ms li+r i(fint
(+._.. S_):i('l ('nion tv,,t' ()t mt.t('(+rol<+_it al s;Ht'IIilcs. I/t' tel'el'tell ;t l'h.l), in meleololohr > It ovll lht' _,lllssi_clltv,,t'tls
lil'+liltllt' (it 'lcchn.h,14'+ in 1!):;19. S<.'t+ "'Wcxh.l. ILtii ,,," I)itlgraphic;il filc, NASA t ti++t()l il al Rt.tt'iCil((. (:(,llt'(tion,
F)8(.)
Kob_-rt M. white ( I{l_?,- ) s_'l v_'d :Is hu_td (>t the' | r.S. _,%'_';llh_*l IhN'_'_uu _lHd the ]+]nHHmnl_'llt;lt S< icllct' S_'I vi(cs
,\dtviiliistl;ttil_n ill lilt' I!)(+OS. _Is _tcllnitli+In_tll)l ol lilt' N+llioll+tl ()tt'+llli( +Itltl +\tlvlq>spht'ric +".<hllhli_,lu+IthIN ill Ill+ +
l(,lTOs, :ili(l _is h¢';id ol thu N_ililil+;ll ,"xt:t<It'vliT+ _il l+:l+gint'('ziN,_ in tilt' I_llt' l<+)NIb.. _t't' "+"+'x'hilt', Rid)+'It +",l.," l)i<>
gF+tl)hi('_d lilt'. NA,S.& l lislc)ri(':il Rt*ft'rt'nt+,, ' C<)llct li<)ll.
Clay I". +Whitehead w+is _i V+,thitt ' I loiLst+ st_ifl :tsnisl_tnit <llnt in_ lilt +NixtJll ,Itlll+ilIi'ttl_Iti'+_El i]I_lll ]_)(_{) to 1_;7_ _h,_ wits
}ll'+l'xri]'++itlvldxt'd ill ',ll_i'_'t' ll<dit ".' _ISSot Lltt'd with lilt +<Icci,,i_m t_l bllihl lht' _j)kitt' Shulth' +l.i<l li<+sl-,,\p, dh_ l>l+uHihl<_
Ji)l N,,\%++\..%t't' l+_tlil]ius, +'NASA +Inll lilt + l)('t iP+.+()III() l+,uil(l th{ + Sll+l_ <' Shlillh +. 1_#(i+;)-72>'; l+;itHliUS. "A %'_'('st(+lll
_()l Illl)ll ill 'vX+'_Inhhi_loll, 1).('++"
Donald D. Williams (ltl!'H-]!llil7) xv;l,, iH'+l_ umt'lli_ll in tilt' dt+xt'IOl)mt'llt (il thc l+:_lllx l_.ird ;,_<I S_'n<_lli t +)llllllll-
Hic:tti(m,. S+itt'llitt's. ] [C W_ISt'mplo,.t'd b) l lugllt+s ,'\it el:lit +lid "+,';+inll_illlt'{l till+' Ol ,\ll+t'li,:'_t'S lt'Zi l_l£tsl.llitlil1_ '_l_ilUl_
Int'll I+l I !)('_'++l)'+' tin' t LS. llmi,,l (:h;imbt't _+l ( :()llllllt'lt t'. ()l] l;t'l)xtUil,+ _I, l'!)l+(L WiIli_iHi,. (i_llllllitlt'd suit idc. St'_'
Y
John 'Yardley llt'_LH his (_ll('('l it+ ;tt'i<_Sll_i(t' ill l !l+lli, '.',:ht'll hi' jointed Mt l)ou+It+]l ,\irt l+tlt. V','hilt' v, ith lh;tt t IHll-
l)Jl1"., hi' HSStllllt'(l _l Itl_!ior loh. it) lilt + +%'lt'It'Ul 7/ :ilitl (;+'mill+ l)ll)_r;llllS. Ill I_)74. hr' (+lint' t() NASA _t+, lilt" ,tss()( i-
sllc +tirliliiliisll_It<it ` [()]ii+:Mnl('(i Sl}+It t'l+li_hl, l lis till(' lht'tl ('||3|ll_(+t} l(i +In_.()(i;ilt' :ll;|]il+rl+_+ll_it(_t I_++t'.,F._l( t'l]i:,r{ht, :llld
+tl I':i'T_, hr' l;.'*'t'+Imt' ;lmnot i_Itt* _Idmilli'.tl_Itot t_r sp_It t' lZ;tll_,l)I))'l+lli()ll S'++SIt+II]S. It| ]_)+I, ht + l<'llllllt'<l to tilt' plix+It<'
+t't it+it _tm pn('si(It'llt {ll tilt + Mcl)llllllcll-l)l_u_l_In A",ll(Hl+llllit + {1.()tlII);+l]). ,l_t't' 'g'_udlt+,., .l,iIm, +' l)+,,_,+iplu(+il lilt',
NAS..\ l list(_t i_;d lt'lt+It'l+( t ' { :olh'cth)ll.
John D. Yottng (lt,)l_+) - ) t':tnllcd :i n]_inlt't (i| s,_'+t*lll t' dt+_lt't ' lri>l+l Sxt+t( tlst' ill I!147, _IHd %('ixt'd _Is {III _d|+it.l ill
lilt' _,_;llillt' (',(It lJs h'l)lll I!).12 I() 1(,) I_-}. | It+ x_;_irkt.(l till x+ll it)if,, L_<)%(.Illlll(+)ll +l_+'n( it+'+ ill lilt' lll*Xt It',.+ "_(+Jl s _tlld lilt'l+
l',t't :till+' L+lllkltlkl_t+it;t'llt t t it'+Still+,+tit '+_,+,t|'+_,It KillS+'; _ (]_l, |it+It+ 1{)_+'] I_+ It+{:_|l. I It' m'l \Ud _tS N,\S;\',. dil t't It>l t+| ill_111-
_l_t'lllt'lll ;lll+tb. si"+ lr_)lll 1(,)(}11 Io I':)4+I +ll+_rl lhi'll lit'++till+', ",ll('(t'ss[%'t'l_+, {lt'llut}+ flilt'ilOl" 101 +t(llilillinll_lli+ll+ +I11{i
d('lllll,. ;isn(It'iillt' Jdinilli_,ll'iltOl" ;11 N+\_.'\ I I(';idguiirtt+rs. Ill' h'll Hi\N,% ill l_.)lii; li)l it S<'lil'_+ ()l lll+ltillb_.t'lll('lll ])l)si-
lions ill Iht+ l/lll't'llll tit tht' llii<tl4t'l _iil<l iht' I)t+l)_lrlllit'lil +ll th++illh, L_]dllC_lli<ln, _liid _,%'l'llilit'. Th_'it'_ltl+'i, lit +
t)t.i_lllit' _i I>i'_lti,'s_l ' <d ptil>lic Ill;lll_l_t')ilt'lil +ll +\lilt'lit'fill I'nixt'lsilv. _,t'l' '*Yllilil_, .I.11.$' Ili<_t41+illhit +ll Ilk N,\+,\
I I isi< _l it <ll I_t't/+l +'lit t ` ( ]l )llccii_ ill.
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I'oli( ,, ()n l,i(_*H_.iH_ ;rod ()l)(']alim_ (d I:'_ i'..'_.l_' R('lllm(" S('rming S_,rsI_'mS, " 3'79-_1
N_Hi(mal I>(1 t_; H_m( _' R(':i_';'-. (NI'I)-.). It;-t-li:i. _16,-_1
N_li(m_ll R_(li_) ( )l}srl'.al(_r,., ':'4.4_
N_li_>Hal R('s('a_(h (:(>_m( il. ;rod *'lg'd_-r_d R('s('a_(h and r)_w(.l(_pH_(.m t_ S_lcllil_' (:(_mmHni('_li_ms," 1:_."_,1]')
Nali,)Hal s_ i(',. (' F()lmd_don (NSF), 7, _41}. :_g_
N;llh)ll;li _,V('_IIII{'I .%('1','i((', I7_
X;n_d I_(',('a;( h [._d)(.at{.'_, 1_'7
X(.v,(.ll, I I..nwI E.. _1 I-1:'I; ;It_(I "l_:;lllil r(.NOlll,(./._ _lll"l/I,'y I)l'()_l';llll. " _'l_'_-_"10,_._'10-_'_._._:_-_(:_; _t11(I "]%1/.(.lin_ ill till'
1LN (;(.(d(_gi(al NH]",(W . . . R('_,a_{Ih_g R_L'nl_)t(" S('_Sing _m(I No_th Am('ri(a." _40_44: and "So_z_(' R('(('_ll
[II1('111;lli(lll;ll RI';II li()llS [() ER'I'_I ." _F)!)-6_
Nimb_., W_.dlh,.._ ,%_Hrllit_., IF_9-tiO, ItiFl
Nix.m. I)..i( ha_,'l M,, I ?;:_:'ff'_
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0( )'( :olm,_'ll, i;tmt's 1),, 914L%, 99-10,g
()rbilal Solar ()l)s_'r':al_ry (()N())-I, 1;'_?;
Ort)ital N,.:.;tt'ms ( :c)rl),, -l.tl_-.r_Ol
()rMn S;tl('liit,:' S:,,'sl_'m, 9; ;tnd "Whir(" I>;tF,ur _ln N_*;,,' hHt'rYulli<mal Nat('llit<." Syst+:ms+" 1.17-5:'I
P
P;tc'k_,r, lx'c_ .g., F_41_-'_3
l'_t tlA rtl:',;at. 10
l'as_tdt'tl_t, (L.\, _tl
]'t'nlln_rlvltlliil, ttlli',rCF_,il_, ()J\ :_
I'hars;dia, NY 2-)
l)it'rct',.[ohll R., _-3, 4_, !10: and "Exolit RadM Commtmi< ali(ms." _2-:+,1)
IMl(_t ifik, th'lman, 11
++lh('linfitlary l)('_ig]l ot a_ Expt'Hmt'ntal _,+,'c_Hd-( :ire litlg Ni)a_ _'sllip," 156, I_3
l)vl)xitfirt ", \Villi+ull. and "N.,\.NA Rt'p()ll [_|av ()vc]s|_l|c lhc ]4.({HiOlIHt |_'.'lIcl]ls i)l R+('s('_IIt h _lli(l l)('xt+hil)]i+t+nl
Nl)t+]i(|iit L_,'. -1?,1)4+2
FI
Radio (:orp_)latiotl ()I Am('i i(;i (I_CA). :_i, 5. ?; a]i(l :\( :IS, 14:-)-47; auil ",\(lmitHsllatixt' ati(i Rt'ff, lilatot ) l)rMdt.ms
Rt'latin+4 t(i tlw ,&tithori:.'atioit i>l C()in]llt'rti;tl]'+: ()lJ('r+tl;+lP Sl)att. (:()m]tluiHiali<_lls _l'_)rst('lilS, +' 61-lil; arid
E()SA]', 172; and '+l':st;tl)lish+t]tml _li l)_m+cstit Commlutit:;tti_itls-:+';;tt(.llit< , F+ttililit's l)x N_n+(;<)xt-trHiit.lil;tl
Entitit's," 120-?,2; atld I ]ugh('s '+( ',oinillcrl.i_t] S;ttcllitt. ( :(lilllntllli( ;flit,it Prt!jc(t," .'_l-?,:-); ;ill(| "l.+md l_t'lili)lt'-
N('ii:+in' 4 (:<)milH'rt'iali:ati(lll ,&(t o[ I<.i84, ', '.;12944: +tti(t ni,:It'+)r(il<)gi(al sNiff.lille.:.,, 1:-17; ;lil+l R<>s<'i+ '+, C..lml'lf#./
())mm.tl,tll++).s ,_:+IH/il+'. ?,.")-.*+9;;+.li(l "V++'hit(' l>al)¢i on Nt'w Int,_'itiati<)il;tl Nat(']lil+.' N}slt.ills," 117--):+i
RAND (:orl)., l:-_& I:-)7; all(| "lquth IHl<_i mati<)n fl(_m .Nl}a( t. I),.' Rt'ilitHt" _t'il,+iti_." _82J.J:';; ;ilid +']]itltiil '+ into tit,."
l"t'+tsihililx ()I \+rl+'_i|h('i Rt'(lillli_iiSn;iltt C from ;i .%;tlt'llil(' V('hi( It," I.PW, l_.r)-2()_
R,_'a_tn, Rt)tt_thl, ;utd ACTS. 14,_>-47; ;m(l "|+a_it A_l't't'iilt'llt ]].I'IXVt'I'II I+',_. [)t.lJaitln,..ll I c;+l (:()lnlilt'Itt' +itlli tit('
N+ttil)n+d .-\t'il)ll;ttl|it _+;lild SlJa(c :\dlllillislr;lliolt (:_Hi(ct nine, ()pt'tatiolt[d _It'It'i+ii)l<>gi(;il Naicllitt' N,,'slt.t]ls."
_()I_-I I; ;m(l "(:_)n,.t-Igt'n< (' ol [!.S.-Pol_tt-orbiliiiff, ()politic+hal ]']li%itl)lllllclll;ll Nalvllit<" .'_.,_;l(+lilP+,` 16:-i. 221-_:+,:
;lit(| "I.;tti(t Rt'n](_tt'+.N('nsitt,4 (:omnlt'rt +aliz;tti()it Act ()I 19R t,'" ?.29-4.1; ali(l '1.and Rt'lill)l+.' _mlsiI+g l>_dicx A<t <fl
lt.)':_, '' l 7:4-7F>, :'E>_-I;_; ;rod '"l'hv lh CSidCtlt'" Spat t" l>"Ik V and (:<)tnmvlt ial St)at t' ]tHli;ttixcn t,) l+t'14in the N('xi
(:ciltllt',," +|:->_')-()ll; arm "R¢'p_>rt <,I+ th<' (;OXClllni('lll T('(lmic;t] Rt',,ri,;.xs l'+m_'l or+ ht(Itlsti) R<..sp<it+nt.s <ill
(:_)n]mt't_i;lliz;ttioll ol th¢' Civil Rt'tti(_tc +cttsili_ S)stc'ms," :'i()ti-_l ; arid +'Rt's_d+Iti(m _+I ]sstit's Rt'l;itt'(l to lh ix;lit.
Nc(tor ']'rat+slt't ol(:ivil l.and ()bst+n,,ing Salt'lille' ,\t l i,,ilit'.,." 301_-0F_; _md ".,F,,tl (' t <)Hitlit'i(i;tli.'_tlil)N, 19_-:-)111.
:-_:+9-4 I; ;t]Id spa(t' cool]omits, :+;92-1()II; altd +'[ransi_.'i _)I (',ixil Mt'l_'_)Hih)_i( al N+lli']lilt'n." :+,21-29; +iNd "Vx'hilv
l+at:,('i t)n Nt'w hllctHalMllal _alcllil(' _):Nt¢'llt:_," ] t7-_'1:+
r+t.t.,,,..s, Rol),..tt (;.. :lHd "]Vh't'tinff at th,: U.N. (;¢+_dogit<tl Stl_x_'+ . . . R(.M;aldiHg Rt-m<_t+." S,:'lv.,illb_ ,tnd S<)ulh
+\llt¢lt ic;l. '' 2.j4_b.l l
Rt'i_ hdt'h'i I_'L F,W+. and "'NalioH;tl l'lall l_I ;i (',omnt_>n _.;nlt'tll ill M('tt'_rMogi( ;tl ()l)st't xatiHil S;it('Ilit(.n.'" 2lil-Oli
Rt'l;t,, l, '.+L'.+;:_
P.t'lll_llt' st'tlsitlg, 155-:+,g?,: and "l+,_tsi( A gl('t'ln(']ll l+,t'lxvl't'tl t'.S. [)t'p;tltliit'llt ot (:_ltlHIH'il (' ;l]l(l tht' N;lli_.+ll;tl
\,:+l<m:ttlti(s ;ut(| NF,a(¢' A(hniliisll;ttioll (:<_H_ ct Ifin_4 ( )pt'lati(mal M('lt'_ir<do_i(al Sat('llit<.' N)sl,t.nln," 201i-I I:
atl(I "( :i',il ()pt'ratitm;tl R('m_lv St,rising," 29 t-gF_: aim t ommt'; ci;lliz;iti,m ,)1, 17.'>-7(i: ;rod "( ;tmmit'i,: ial Np;tt,."
h;(histi; iH th(' ",_';it 2<)011," .173-,"+0; _u;d "ColY, t'r:_t'Htt, <_t t'.,N.-IMl;li-_>tl:,ifin_ ()pt'tali<mal l']n',il_mn],.']H;il
Salt'llilt. :++;)stt.ms." lli:'>, 22l-2:]; ;uHl "(:r_l]) Ig_]claslitlg l)s Nalt'llilt'.'" 272-75: ;u+d "(:ut]t'iH Nt;Itus ,,I N+\_,,\+s
Naltii;il I_csoui ( i's ])i,)_i;iili" (I(.i61;), 22t;-?,7: ail(l '+Eltt lh ]illOt In;flit)it |rtllli Np;t( <, b) t_t'iil_llt. _CliSilig." <J_qT-!t:+:
alid I':;illh Fi+_<liiilt, s_ttcllitcn. 1ti7-7li: ;illll "l+:ailh I_+c_,Hlil(l,_, ,'_ili_C_+ ])lil_ialiL '' <J.t_:lO+ 7:-I<,L:'_7, 7:'_it-:'lt_; till(I
"[{{ll'll'l'_, P_l.'_(Itll CI'*, tll I)l+" Nttl(li('(I li, IIII _]);ll I'." 7 I'I-Lltl: ;lit(I "1g II'l+'i_ll Ill di_X ]S:_llt'S rc_{tl dili_ E_u-tli I_(.,_l)llll (.
Nlli_l,)hll4 I)x .'_ait.11ill.," 762+(i9: iili(I +'hl(]tlir)hito lht' Fcasihililx (if \%'(';ilhci Rc(iHiiiLtisn;ilit (" til)iii ;i Nait'llii( '
\S,'hi/h,," IDT. 1_.r)-2117: ;lli([ "[,_ill(I Rt'ilil)lt" _;t'll_,iiil_ IMli_ Act ,>1 1997," 17: +,7:>, :+,:->2-ii_4: _iiid "l,and P.t'iiliHt.-
Nl'li++iti_ (;(liiinlt'i(i;tli/;llil)n ,:\tl tit 1{t14.t," ?,79 14; iilid |+;ill(l_,;ll, I:17,, ltiP4-7:l; _llill "|.;tii(|.,_il _t'iil()ll. _t'ii,,hi_
I%lk _," ?,-I:-_--t7; ali(t *'l._llilt_+al R('lnol(' _l'ii_ili_ _ll;llt'_)." ?,';7-7:+); _ill(I L;il_t' AIt';i (:l i> I) hl;t'iiloi x ExiJ('l iliiciil
ll_\(:IEl. 1";!): ,liid "M;ill_l_t.lllt.iil lllaii I_li Iht' l.;ili(kii I)l(l!4i;liii. '" :/.17+:52: _tlid liit'lt'lli_Jl(>_i(_il _alt'lliit's.
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IF_ti-li3; and "National Silaic Ihllic'," (199ti). ,Ili3-7<,1; and Niinl)u_ Weailici Salellilc, IF)9-110, ]til't; and
"()t)_l.l vint4 Ihl.' _l'l';illil.'l tioln a _;lll']tilf.' \i.hid_,," 177-83; and "lilanliilig 1711-;i (;kil I )tll'i'aliolial Lind Rcllilllc
_t.il_,ili_ Siliclliic _)Ml'lll," 7_.lli-!/lttl: alid POi_lr_lll)ililil_ ()lll.i_tlioila] l+]livironln¢'lll_l] _lll'llill>_ (P()l':_), 1ii3; aiid
"l_livlill ' _l'cior ()pel;ilion ot t.an([_ili <Slili'llilc_," 78l-N7; and "Ri-porl o|" Ihc (;o,,cinnienl 'l't'chnical P.(.vicw
Piiill'[ llii hilhl_llV Rl!_l)Oli_,t'_ llii (:(lllllil/>liialilalion of the Civil Rlqilol¢" _tL'li_,ill_ _%Ml'lli_." 309-71; and
"Rc_olulilm ot l_ilCS Rclalcd io Pi ivalc .Sl'c Ior "l'ranst{'r of (:ivil I_and ()bscrvint4 _alcllile A( Ib.:ilil's." 3II(_-IIN;
_llid Saicltiic POlil ]'()ll_l'l _.llli_>ii dc I;i Tci ll' (SPOT), 171, 17:4, 476; alid TIR()S, 157, 158, 161-62.2()34)1l; alid
"_Oilll' R('( t'iil ]llll'ill;ilil)ll;il Rl.;i(lillii_ Io I_R'I'S-I, "' 7.%94i7: alid "[7._. I>oli(_ ilii I.i_rn_ing _llld ()lwraihm lit
Ril hald_on, l_:lliol I.., I 1 I
Rolfllin_, Marlin I)., and "Mission ()lil'nlcd R_:I) and the Ad'¢anl'¢'nwiiI ot "l'el hnohlg_," ,I_/2-I."_
R,>lm.,_,', (:hm b,s l., 27F>-71;
R,>_ k_.ll Inlcilllitil>lill], lnl., 391: alld '"lhc ].:Clllionlil' hilt)_ill ot lh/" _l);il(" Prll_lalii." .1."_1-5-1; iilid "_ll;ill'
(:_>Ninlt'll iali/;tlion Mcclili_," I!IN JfiJl; and "Nl)a(e lndllslriali/alion Pina] R_.'])oll," 517-77
RIIM'II, Ilalold A.. _llid f:tJmlnr#lla[ (:fllltltlll#lJ((llToll_ 5;alellilr, 3Fi-39; allll |[li_hl'_ "'(:llliilllClCi_il Y,allqlilc
( ;iHliliiillii_ ;llioil I'l,>jc, i," 31 35
R_c, ( ;ill>oil ])., ,t9_-5111
0
_,alcllilc Ih>ui I'()bscl ration dc Ill h'llc (NP()[), 171, 173, ,17ti
_,alellilc Mililal _ I )llsci V;llillii _VMClii (_AM()_), I _i7
_iililtli I;illlil 1i _chh h', 37
Sa_,hill, loire (:., _277-_41
_l hlliOllkh'l..lal oil. <IO#4
S( hncidcl, V_'illianl, 1.17-:%3
_twn<t' AI)I)Iil alions, ]ill.. and '%t)ll( ¢' [ndiisll ialiTalion: An ()vl'r_:il'w, '' ,%'J7-33
,'_( :()RI_: (_;ig, llal (:l)lllllillni(;tliOll t)}( )li)ilil] R('I;I) l_:qiliplliCill), l>r(!ic('l. 7.89-90
S( oil, !¢(;iitt'i S,, 375-77
N_ oul l.;llinl h \i'lii_ Ic, 32, '.13. 2/5
_1,iiiii;111_,, RI >lwri ( :.,Ji., 737-.tO; and <'l-:arlh R_.,:_llllrl l's _llrv('y ]:'1o_1 ;llii." 7.1N-:'li), 7:fli-F>7,933-DIi; and "( )pclalillnal
Rcllilill,llil'lll_, IoI (;Iol)al Rl'SOtlll i' _111 _('%_ ]l_ Eariil-( )rhilal Saicllilcs," 7t6-18
,NhalflC ), Willis, 133, <J2)9-67, 789 ! t *Lt, ttl I-II9
N, Ili hi('i, Ri)l)cli ll.. <t2i777
_hlili/, (',c_)il4(" I',. 151 53, 277
Nh/ltll,> %,'%<;ij11'1 (:,, 7(i!171
%il4ti;l] (:<,1 pn, [ 'N., _J; allll I lliglll+_ "( :lllilllil'il iltl _,all'llilc (:l_ililniiniclilion I'l,?ic_ i," 3 I-2'>5
NillilX I:MIs, SI), 11i9. <s.%{t-li7
Skcllcll. A.M,, :21-75
Skolnikolt. l':llgi!ile B.. 7_47-93
Sktll I;i, ( ;i,i )1go, .|(iN-Fill I
,Nk_ lab, 134
_lllill I, ,lil_ _11 t(., 7.'111-:'_7
_,lliilh, ,\]llcil 1_:., <3_'I1 N3
_liiilh> lll(inih'), {)Ft-_,)(i
%milh, (;.R., 51 5(i, 59
Niniill I'icdl'lh k W., t9_ 501
N<lhr, v, R_d_l.i I, 3,'49
%lllllh'_vllllh (_.( ,, :2i
NIJ_U c c(+ln_,lni_ s. 38F1577, and "( '.lmilncrl ial Spa( c hidilsiry in ihe "l{'al 2OIIO," 173-<_11; ;ilid "( ',(ilnlnl'il ial l 's_.' ot
Nll;il _,," 7>13 II;: _lild "(:o_l-ttcnctil ,,\nal)'_is ot ,Nch,_ Icd "li'lhnolog) I. rlilizalion ()tlicc Prllgraili_>, '' FI:ID-_'IN; lili(I
"1he I'L_<_li_llii_ Eth'lls ot a Sl)al'l' _llilillli," 450-51; and "l'he I+:(OliOlilil |liil)acl ot NASA R_-I) Sl/endilig,"
,t14-2G; aiid '"1 Iw I+%cl>lil)llliC hiill:-IIl ol Ihe Slla('_<' Progranl," _t[ll-DJ%; and "E_.onoinil linllacl o| Slinlulalt'd
"li,_ hNological A(li_il,,," tfl_4-1 I; and "l@_>il_mii_ hnllaCl and Tl'chnohlgir:il Progress of N:\SA Rcscai<h and
I)cvchlilnlcnl l-_xl)cndiliiies," ,t77-30; alid "l+:h'clrollhorl'si_, ()pl'raliOll_, ill Sl);ICC." 5<1 I-,t3; alld "An I':xllhll alioli
ol llciictii_ hlllll IN.-\_A %lmlott,'" 559ii3; aild "Peasibilily Sllld}' ill (:Ollinil,l-(i;it _ll_llt' Manllt{illilrilig,"
Fll) l-I 7: iiild "l"casillilil,, ,Nlud _. ,.l[ (:_liniilCll ial _tlac'<' Manlll]lcluring: ]_roducliOll _lt l_halina(culi(a]_, '' _'t:14-'.41{1;
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and "l.(mg+Tern+ ])rospt+(Is fin l)<+'vt'h)lmlCnt'+ +n Sl)aCc," ,I_0-_: and mt'a++,mmg impa(l oL 3P+7-3(.12; and
*+Mission ()ri('ntvd R&I) and tiw Advari(emet+l it| Tvthn()h)gy," 432-4_+): and NA++';A activ+tiv,,, 3_6-_7: and
"NASA Rcpt)rt Ma,, ()_,crMat(' lilt' Ec<m(mlic B,+,'nefits ol Rest.at( h and Dt'v<'l<qmlcnt ."+pending," 1.'+)0-32: and
+'NASA Tech Br+t'f Pr<)glanl," 553-57): and +'NASA T('(hn(dogy ]_an',ler: Rt'pozt o! thv l_+( hn()i()_, rran,,h._
Tcam," 574-77: an(| national p<)licy. 3924)6: and "National Spa(< + l)olil v +"( 199(0, 46,_73; and "I hi' lqt'sidtml's
_,itat c Polity and (:onlnw](+ial +pact" Initiatives to flit+gill lilt' Nt'xl (:tqltllly," 4_')-1+O; and "(_uantHvinR thv
l+,('n(qits to lilt' Nalional E(onomx [ronl S<.*cl)ntl:u _ Apl+)licati<ms of NASA T<'clln()l()gw." 445-I(.): and "lh cq:,(_,,a]
tot Enhancing NASA I_..( Im(lh)_w Transfi't t<) (:ivil ,%:st<'ins," .":,.16-5:+):and "%onlt' M_+ic, r Inqtat ts .I tllv Nati(ma]
Spatt+ l)r()gram, `` 402-11)7: and '+N,l)at,.' [ndu:.,trializati()n: An ()xcr'+i<"tJ¢, '` 527-33; and "Slta(t' ]ndttslriali+,'aliOll
Final Rt'l:,Ort, +' ,'%1T-2)7: and slimulati<m ()I tcthn()]og', ttansl('r, 391':-1I)1): and "]v(lulol+)R_ "rrarlslel Whir("
l)alU'r. '" 563-74; and "U.S. (;Olnlner<'ial SlmC-t' I'.licv (;ui<h,lm(.,+," .:l(;O+h3
,%pacc [+]c¢Ir<mics ( '.m i.'+,, and | [ugh(", "+(_ounncr( +al Satcllh<. ( +otnttnm+l ali<m Pt+!jt'( I+'" ?,]-3_)
Nlta('t' hlduslrit's, Int.. 4(.)8-51)l
,_,Imce/li_,&t, II; and "Th(' .%l)a('( ' Slatilm," l l-l')
"Spact' Nlali()ll, l'h('," II-I [)
Spat|' S('rvi(t's. hi(., I(.)N-_)OI
Spate Y,vstcnls,'l,otal, 7
Sputnik 1, 2, _li
,%tanli)rll R(_'st'alt h lnslillttC, _,_9
Statv, Dt.l)altnwnl ()I, _)-,"+{); and "( :ivil ()pt'lali()llal Rt'lll()lt' ,%<'llSill_.'" 2!)4-(17): and +'( :,)mc_4(.]i_ _. (_I l.'.N. I'()la_-
()t Itilh) R ()pt'lati()nal Em, it()nrut,ntal Satcllitt' Nvstt'nls," I(+).%,221-23: and "Eal lh Rt,s()m( (.s Slu v(,,, l)t<)gtam, ''
2 IN-50, 2511-_)2, 27)3-_)(+; and "Fort,ign l)+)li( +, Issut's R<'galding Ea+th R('s()ur(<" Nut xt._+in R l)x Salt,Ill|l,, +' 2(;2-1;':I;
and "A (;h)bal N','+lt'zll ()I Satcltitc (:()inmlmi(ati()ns, '+ (.)%1()8: alld "Nali()nal Sl)aCC Pl)lic'," (I!)(,)6), 4(')'3-7:;;: and
"PlanninR fit) a (:ixi] ()pt'rationa] |+lind R('nl()It, N(+llshl_ Nalt'l]ih' N',Mt'ln." 291_,-:+)06: and "I)<)li(x (',()n(('t llitlg
[.S..\ssi,+tanl t' ill tilt' Dt',,t'lopnlt'nt ol l,otciRn (:()re)nut6( atiotr,, F;at('llilt' (:al)allilitics," l (l'_.
.)I . .). at+d "R(+I)()) I ()l
tht + Unitvd Ntatcs l)('Ic_ation . .. l)n l)('linlilixc AlnauiRctncnts Ion till' lntt+inatiumd l't'h'(_)mnlnlnitati()n,,
Sat('llitt' (_Oll,,,<))tiuln," 10_,-20; and "Rcs(:+luli()n ()I Is,,u('++ R('latt+d It) l)liXal( ` S('lh)r I ran'+h') o| (;i,.il I.a)id
()h'+,<'t ,,ili_ Nalcllil(" ]\( tivilivs," ?,0()-?)(hN: and "Trau,+It') ()It '.S. (_()innnuli( ali()ns %atclIitt' Tt'( Im()h)u,',," !)6-!)9:
and "[[.,";, ,\s,,istanl<, iu thc Earh l(stahli,,hmcHl (,! (_i)lllllitlllitillil)ll+_ Nat('llitc F;('tXitC," 9_')(.)1;: and "Whir("
l)aF,+.'r ())l Ncv, In|el mttilmal galt'llitt. SVSl+,'nls," I 17-7)3
Stmling, VA, 24
NItq,+,iHI, hxin, 85
Y)ugat (;r()',(', \VV,-15
S_u(oln I..l, ?), :+7)
N_n(t)m 2, t., 3
S_nt<)m 3, I, :-)
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